Warrior Ethos

[Schmedlap]

Originally Posted by Brandon Friedman

When we were dealing with this in Iraq, it wasn't that CA couldn't do it or that we couldn't handle CMO ourselves, but, like you said, there just weren't enough of them (or us).

Agree. I was just pointing out that what we were attempting to do was not, by definition, CA or CMO. It was something else that we're searching for a description for: armed social work, armed community organizing, applying band-aids to amputations, something else...

Originally Posted by Brandon Friedman

However, I understand that now most combat arms Army officers being involuntarily mobilized out of the IRR are being re-classed as CA officers.

Yikes. I'm afraid to ask how that's working out.

Originally Posted by Brandon Friedman

I don't know how they're being utilized down range, but it would seem to me that we should be embedding CA teams at the company level (if not lower). Anyone know if we're doing that now? When I was deployed, we had something like a four-man CA team attached to the battalion. Sometimes.

In OIF I, we had a CA team at Bn level. My last deployment with a CF unit ended in Jan 06. We had one CA team for the BDE. It worked about as well as you would expect.

[Surferbeetle]

Schmedlap,

Great questions, glad to see that you are back. I will break up a few of your points and address them individually. Lets see if we can better describe the Civil Affairs elephant.

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

To be fair, those definitions don't seem to match what our forces are called on to do. Our forces needed to organize some kind of civil order or governance (preferably the latter), not just cooperation between locals and the US military. CA and CMO seem to be geared towards synchronizing existing civil governance with the military, rather than creating or organizing civil institutions in the first place. It seems to assume that some kind of governing framework is already in place and can be leveraged. Well, what if there isn't?

Let’s split hairs concerning your assumption that a governing framework does not exist (and as I recall you spent time in Iraq so I will use Iraq as a staring point). Nature abhors a vacuum, and in Iraq my assessment (and apparently yours as well when you describe gangs and militias) was that many different governing frameworks existed even though the GoI framework ranged from weak to non-existent depending upon time and place. None-the-less, a review of US history reveals that we have imposed military governments upon countries whose governments we deemed to have failed. The examples include Mexico, The Confederacy, the Philippines, Germany (WWI and WWII), and Japan. The question of who was legally in charge of Iraq during March 2003 until today, is beyond my technical expertise. Wikipedia, however provides a legal background/timeline on the occupation of Iraq and the status of forces agreement and perhaps you or JMM can shed some additional light as to its adequacy and applicability to this question.

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

The definitions from the links that you provided above (with my commentary in brackets)...

Civil Affairs - Civil Affairs units help military commanders by working with civil authorities and civilian populations in the commander’s area of operations to lessen the impact of military operations on them during peace, contingency operations and declared war. [Lessen the impact? That is not what has been needed, lately. What has been needed is the creation/organization of some kind of governance so as to prevent a situation from arising in which lots of people organize themselves into gangs, militias, and kill one another due to fear and competition for resources and power. That is not lessening an impact. That is preventing a new threat from emerging out of a vacuum.]

[Again, this does not meet the need that we have had lately. What was needed was to stand up some kind of indigenous civilian authority to mediate disputes and prevent the society from devolving into Hobbes' "state of nature"]

[Nice things to have, but you need some kind of governance. Otherwise, these projects do not have the intended effects. Does CA establish governance?]

[situational awareness and intelligence collection - but nothing about organizing the people into some means of governance]

] "The part is in bold could be a solution in Iraq or Afghanistan, if there are enough troops to do it. But there are not and were not. So those troops, instead, need to organize the locals to do it themselves. But that is not what the definition is describing.

Security and Stability are inseparable, as we both know from Iraq. From a purely military standpoint as a CA-Bubba I can’t work with the locals to bring the local Water Treatment Plant back on line (LOO-Restore Basic Services) or assist with elections (LOO-Conduct Free Election) or work with the local police forces to bring them back on line (LOO-Restore Security) without Infantry-Bubbas doing snap-TCP’s, cordon & knock ops, raids, etc. etc. Simultaneously we need SF-Bubbas training local military forces and Active, Guard, Reserve and CA-Bubbas with professional civilian skills (practiced every day) working with the locals on this problem. This is the essence of Civil Military Operations…CA planners (limited resource) helping GPF forces (larger resource) to work with the local population (largest resource) to stabilize the AO.

As you know well, it’s a tough nut/moving target and this is reflected in the progression of US Doctrine for these situations: Small Wars, Low Intensity Conflict, Operations Other Than War, Military Operations Other Than War, Stability and Support Operations, Security Force Assistance, etc., etc.

For your Saturday night reading pleasure GTA 41-01-001 is one of our easily accessible guides to Civil Affairs which is “Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.” and provides more insight into how our small Civil Affairs forces work the worldwide battlefield.

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

What was needed, so far as I can tell, is not defined in some existing term, so armed social work enters the vocabulary. It sounds, to me, like armed community organizing. Perhaps that is not the best term, either. Maybe armed social work is better. Maybe both are wrong. Fine. But it's beyond the scope of CA or CMO, imo.

IMHO Germany and Japan are examples of adequately resourced CA/CMO operations and Iraq and Afghanistan are poster children for what happens when we don’t adequately resource CA/CMO operations. Who is the Four Star General Lucian Clay of Afghanistan or Iraq?

Again IMHO we should consider adequately resourcing Civil Affairs Forces across all of the services with respect to people, language training, cultural training, industry training, and technical & advanced degrees (your link to the WSJ article on Korean enlistment rates with respect to highly educated professionals could be a part of the solution). This would be with the understanding that the nation that we are assisting will provide the bulk of the needed human capital to accomplish the mission....which of course will drive how we approach the problem set.

Lastly we need to incorporate CMO training from AIT and BOLC forward.

Ken, however brings out some pithy points that need to be reflected upon as well. If I may paraphrase: Since capabilities/tools are often used in emergencies without respect to long term impacts is this capability something that we as a nation want to invest in?

Steve

[Ken White]

when it first came out, CPT Foley. Ipicked up an early copy at the SWC Bookstore on Smoke Bomb Hill in '64. First Edition. Read it a couple of more times later. Gave it to my son; he can use it, I'm long retired.

I had before and after the book the opportunity to try his techniques and / or see them attempted. He doesn't have any more answers than anyone else does. All wars are different and if you get wedded to a technique or series of them, you will fail. People, culture, terrain -- all those things differ.

The problem with Galula and all the COIN experts is one of resources. There is no question that what they want to do works, I totally agree with the philosophies of FID and COIN.

The issue is that to do what's prescribed is simply unaffordable.

You will never get enough trained soldiers, not SF, with language and cultural skills to do what Galula and the others recommend. That's reality. The French could not do it in Viet Nam or Algeria and later in Viet Nam, with over 1.5M Allied troops in a nation with half the population of Iraq in one-fourth the area, we could not do that -- and good techniques were tried early on (too few people) and later (too few trained and competent people). Afghanistan is larger, has more people and far more difficult terrain. You cannot use good COIN practices without enough people with the skills to do the job required and you will not ever have enough adequately skilled. To do so would require significant devotion of a great many national assets to one small nation and a cessatio0n of short tours; stay until the job's finished. The cost benefit ratio will never support such an effort. Nor should it.

Plus you have to cope with the one third rule and the two year rule and you can finesse those just so long...

If State and SF don't stop potential FID efforts before they build, you're going to have to call in the grundy old Big Army and unless it's an Andorra sized nation, there won't be enough folks and they are unlikely to do it right -- it is not their job, not really. They'll give it their best shot but it's unlikely to ever be more than barely adequate. That, too is reality.

Said Boot:"I know its off topic, but you reminded me of something I had forgotten about until I read you post." So too did you too. Had to hitch a ride on a C-130 once upon a time; Crew Chief or Loadmaster said "you can't get on this plane with those Hand Grenades." So without a word, I pulled them off my harness and tossed 'em to him. The AF has no sense of humor...

Brandon

"The bottom line is that if you really want to affect policy change, you have to work to get your own people elected to office--and that means people with military experience."

I think you'll find that's a decidedly mixed bag; we've had a large former military / veteran presence in Congress, the WH and throughout Government before. Politics corrupts. They didn't do much better than the non-veterans have done. In fact, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations did a really poor job on most things and they were loaded with WW II veterans. Johnson was far and away the worst President I've seen (even if he did give me a cigarette lighter).

Schmedlap has it right. Ethical and reasonably honest. Good luck with that indeed...

[Ken White]

However, ever now and then I do think I need to throw a cautionary wet blanket (with sand) on the beach party...

Originally Posted by Surferbeetle

...As you know well, it’s a tough nut/moving target and this is reflected in the progression of US Doctrine for these situations: Small Wars, Low Intensity Conflict, Operations Other Than War, Military Operations Other Than War, Stability and Support Operations, Security Force Assistance, etc., etc.

I suggest there is not so much a progression of doctrine as a plethora of names which have by themselves fragmented effort to an extent by precluding a consistent doctrine. Everyone wants to make big tracks when they're on watch...

IMHO Germany and Japan are examples of adequately resourced CA/CMO operations and Iraq and Afghanistan are poster children for what happens when we don’t adequately resource CA/CMO operations. Who is the Four Star General Lucian Clay of Afghanistan or Iraq?

You keep using these and I keep pointing out that the circumstances and the people were and are totally different -- that's a bad comparison, the politics of the day, the economics, the troop strength and several other factors make those literally dangerous and misleading comparisons. Such an effort is not going to be made today. Not even close.

Ken, however brings out some pithy points that need to be reflected upon as well. If I may paraphrase: Since capabilities/tools are often used in emergencies without respect to long term impacts is this capability something that we as a nation want to invest in?

We need to invest in it and will -- the real question is to what extent and for what use...

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

The term "armed social work" is in danger of becoming the next "hearts and minds." By that, I mean that people will assume the common usage of the words and draw meaning of the term from there. What do we mean by "armed social work"?

Thank you! Hearts and minds was a silly think to say and Templer came to regret saying it. "Armed Social Work" is equally silly.

COIN is a form of warfare. It differs from other forms only in ways and means.
Based on his writing Moa-Tse-Tung read far more Clausewtiz than he did Sun-Tzu!

a.) Some in the US look at Iraq after an invasion and says "ahh... COIN," and confuses the acts associated with getting a society functioning, post war, with those acts exemplified by COIN best practice.

b.) What you see in "New COIN" is the US applying Iraq to COIN thinking and not COIN thinking applied to Iraq. - which is why A'Stan is far from over, and still may slip away.

c.) Securing the population, and addressing their physical needs - NOT SOCIAL - like, security, fuel, food, electricity etc, should only be done where the populations support/well being, bears on the political and military outcome, in that they support you, not the insurgent. Getting them to support you, to the extent that they provide you with intelligence, and deny the insurgents any support - so essentially give you target data, and deny the bad guys logistics - is aimed at doing the insurgents harm. Harm as in killing and capturing. This generally applies to all forms of warfare! - which is why the Nazis ended up with 100,000 strong "partisan" groups behind their lines in Russia.

To characterise the above as "armed social work" or "gaining the human terrain," is dumbing down solid, well understood and enduring military best practice.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Ken White

There's also the fact that Wilf comes from the British tradition where the civilian side of the FID effort used to be very much in charge and that system worked well for them.

Correct. - not surprisingly! The British "tradition" to countering an insurgency is based on being the existing government or having the explicit support of an existing government - which has the appropriate structures in place or having the resources and support to create them. - again, Sierra Leone is an excellent example.

I think current British practice shows they've lost their civilian edge to an extent -- and that our history shows that our system is not particularly effective -- or desirable. My solution to that problem is develop the civilian structure and get the military out of the lead for such efforts

I think the Basra fiasco was purely down to a lack of resources and political will - and the bad guys knew it. If operational success had been absolutely essential to UK foreign policy, the UK conduct of Iraq would have been very different. You can see the same issues in A'Stan.

[Surferbeetle]

Originally Posted by Ken White

However, ever now and then I do think I need to throw a cautionary wet blanket (with sand) on the beach party...I suggest there is not so much a progression of doctrine as a plethora of names which have by themselves fragmented effort to an extent by precluding a consistent doctrine. Everyone wants to make big tracks when they're on watch...You keep using these and I keep pointing out that the circumstances and the people were and are totally different -- that's a bad comparison, the politics of the day, the economics, the troop strength and several other factors make those literally dangerous and misleading comparisons. Such an effort is not going to be made today. Not even close.We need to invest in it and will -- the real question is to what extent and for what use...

...and so it's worth the wet blanket (even with the sand).

Ken,

We are in agreement that getting the analysis wrong can have dangerous consequences and that Germany & Japan are not the best fit models for Iraq & Afghanistan for the reasons that you mention...however I am open to suggestions as I dig around and try and find/understand more appropriate models

We certainly have other fish to fry when it comes to dedicating a four-star to head up CA/CMO operations for these two conflicts, but having been spoiled by having worked for some good GO's...

Steve

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Brandon Friedman

—in which COIN techniques must be utilized—and there’s the preventive COIN environment, in which you spend the bulk of your time trying to keep the locals happy and safe—where it is “armed social work” and where you do “need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win," despite what Mr. Owen argues.

Sorry, but this strike to the heart of the issue. There is no such thing as "COIN techniques" - 99% of actions performed in COIN are applicable in other forms of warfare. What you are talking about is not something exclusive to something called COIN. It is a means to end, to applied as and when necessary, and within a political context.

Talking about "armed social work," and "respect for culture" utterly misses the point, of
a.) Don't let civilians, who are under your protection, come to needless harm, either by your action or ... worse.. inaction, because it will/may negatively impact your military operations.
b.) Do not do those things that will needlessly create offence, because it will/may negatively impact your military operations.

Now is statement A or B incorrect?
Are they actually different from saying "social work" and "respect for culture". I submit that A is not Social work, and B is good behaviour, not respect.
You are going to have to do things that are not synonymous with "respecting their culture" - killing, searches, etc, so why back yourself into that corner with sloppy semantics?

[Brandon Friedman]

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

I agree with the frustration, with one caveat. I don't think most are loyal to their constituents. They are loyal to whatever will induce their constituents to vote for them. That can be something diametrically opposed to the welfare of their constituents.

Absolutely. That’s what I meant when I said it. Should've been clearer.

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

Disagree with the solution. An ethical individual will do the right thing, whether that person has military experience or not. We don't need to elect people with military experience (though that's not a problem if they have it). We need to elect people who are ethical. Good luck with that.

It’s not just about ethics. It’s about ethics and expertise when you’re trying to decide whether or not to go to war. I’ve met ethical politicians who simply don’t have the requisite experience or information to even know who to listen to. And with competing lobbying organizations, think tanks, and other political pressures, it becomes a problem. Both the House and Senate are filled with committee members whose only qualifications are that their district or state elected them to office. Others have a very narrow breadth of professional expertise. It’s not unusual to find one’s self horrified at the lack of knowledge and awareness on the part of some members of the House and Senate Armed Services and Veterans Affairs Committees (like when you have to explain to a sitting member of Congress what “dwell time” is and why it’s important in terms of effectively managing a long war).

And when you’re fighting in two or more conflicts at the same time, this type of knowledge becomes important. So it helps when members have military experience. However, if you’re willing to forgo that by not competing for representation, then the SEIU, the Club for Growth, George Soros, and Rush Limbaugh—people whose first, second, and third priority is not defense policy--will be more than happy to assist other candidates in taking your potential candidate’s place.

And when you allow that to happen, you get a Congress that gets jerked around by guys like Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney. (Apologies if anyone here is a big fan of those two.)

You might say it’s not important to have people with military experience in office, but I will argue that it’s absolutely crucial that members of one co-equal branch of government be able to go head-to-head with a member from the other branch. Take Rumsfeld and Cheney for instance. Those guys, whether you support them or not, pushed Congress around in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion. They said that not only is invading Iraq an awesome idea, but we can do it with like 90,000 troops. And it’ll be easy.

And there was no one in Congress with enough of a following or enough political capital (like, say, a Jim Webb) to stand up and say, no, actually, that’s a really bad idea the way you’re presenting it. That's why it's important. I'm sure there were plenty of ethical politicians in 2003 who believed Wolfowitz over Shinseki.

(I should also add, I'm not suggesting that prior military experience makes a politician ethical. I could probably name half a dozen unethical, former military members of Congress off the top of my head.)

[Brandon Friedman]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Sorry, but this strike to the heart of the issue. There is no such thing as "COIN techniques" - 99% of actions performed in COIN are applicable in other forms of warfare. What you are talking about is not something exclusive to something called COIN. It is a means to end, to applied as and when necessary, and within a political context.

Call it whatever you like.

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

You are going to have to do things that are not synonymous with "respecting their culture" - killing, searches, etc, so why back yourself into that corner with sloppy semantics?

If you're not willing to empathize with the population--to try and put yourself in their shoes--and to show respect for their culture and history, then you'll never know your enemy.

And what do killing and searches have to do with not respecting their culture? Nobody said when you search a house you have to completely toss it. And you can be shooting at a guy and still respect his culture. You just don't have to respect the fact that he's trying to kill you. It's not personal. And if you've laid a solid foundation of mutual respect with the locals prior to that, then they tend to understand.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Brandon Friedman

Call it whatever you like.

Thanks, but I am not doing this to be a semantic pr*k. There is a real danger now that some, maybe a lot, think there is something called COIN and something call "War fighting" so the all the diverse reasons and conducts of warfare, are now in two boxes. When you they find another conflict that doesn't fit, they'll invent another box. In fact if you look at "Hybrid" and the Lebanon, they did.
Words matter, and so does the meaning. If it doesn't you can't have doctrine, because you cannot teach it.

If you're not willing to empathize with the population--to try and put yourself in their shoes--and to show respect for their culture and history, then you'll never know your enemy.

I can empathise with them on a very basic human level. That's entirely normal, and you don't need to be taught to do it.
You can't tell soldiers to respect a culture that holds values they don't understand and are in some cases abhorrent to them.
Do you think it's okay to deny women's right? Allow male domestic violence? Arrange marriages? Honour killings? Consider some races sub-human?
These are unacceptable, and you should not respect cultures, or those elements of culture that advocated such things.

Culture is a highly complex area with many different forms of expression, and vastly variable, so the blanket guidance "respect culture," is so simplistic as to cease to be useful.

Let me give you a specific example. If you went to search a house and woman told you from behind a close door, "my husband is not home, go away!" would you? Respecting her culture means you go away. Understanding her culture, means going and getting two woman from another house, who can protect "her honour" and tell her husband, while you search her home.

World of difference. - and at some point, all the allowances and negotiations run out. If you can't find other women, you are going in anyway, and in some cases, that could get that woman beaten or even killed, by the husband, and there is nothing you can do about it. - then turn around to the platoon and tell them this is a culture they need to respect.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

"sloppy semantics" going on here (love that term wilf).

The term “respect” is a bit subject to interpretation since it can mean "to hold in esteem or honor" as well as “to show regard or consideration for.”

I for one do not respect the Arab / Muslim culture since it is decidedly misogynist and in many ways sadistic, ignoring basic human rights, particularly with regards to women.

However, when dealing with Arabs / Muslims I show respect for aspects of their cultural norms in not handing them items with my left hand, not exposing the soles of my feet, not touching the top of heads, and especially being mindful of women's precarious position in regards to contact with non-family member males since it could be very detrimental to their personal health and well being.

I think some folks are using the term in the latter sense vice the former; where as wilf is solidly using it in the former. But that's just me.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Umar Al-Mokhtār

I for one do not respect the Arab / Muslim culture since it is decidedly misogynist and in many ways sadistic, ignoring basic human rights, particularly with regards to women.

... I'm your brother on that one.

However, when dealing with Arabs / Muslims I show respect for aspects of their cultural norms in not handing them items with my left hand, not exposing the soles of my feet, not touching the top of heads, and especially being mindful of women's precarious position in regards to contact with non-family member males since it could be very detrimental to their personal health and well being.

... and someone taught you good behaviour and toleration.

I'm told the best Schwarma is in Haifa! Get your ass over here!

[CPT Foley]

Originally Posted by Umar Al-Mokhtār

"sloppy semantics" going on here (love that term wilf).

The term “respect” is a bit subject to interpretation since it can mean "to hold in esteem or honor" as well as “to show regard or consideration for.”

I for one do not respect the Arab / Muslim culture since it is decidedly misogynist and in many ways sadistic, ignoring basic human rights, particularly with regards to women.

However, when dealing with Arabs / Muslims I show respect for aspects of their cultural norms in not handing them items with my left hand, not exposing the soles of my feet, not touching the top of heads, and especially being mindful of women's precarious position in regards to contact with non-family member males since it could be very detrimental to their personal health and well being.

I think some folks are using the term in the latter sense vice the former; where as wilf is solidly using it in the former. But that's just me.

When I advocate respecting other cultures I'm not suggesting Soldiers embrace them, like them, or in any way adopt a relativistic approach toward culture. You can find aspects of a culture abhorrent and still treat members of the culture with respect. It makes me want to smash furniture when I hear Officers & NCOs refer to Haji this & that. Most of them know on an intellectual level that it's probably a bad idea to make light of one of the pillars of Islam. I suspect they succumb to it because the terminology is so widespread. We are that tone deaf as a force. I want to be clear, my issue is not based on fairness or sensitivity or ethics. It is purely base on pragmatism. We will have greater success garnering support in the AO, region, worldwide when our forces operate with the same meticulous care that we have for our arms and equipment toward cultural considerations. It's not a sensitivity issue, it's a success issue.

[Ken White]

with Wilf and Umar Al-Mokhtār. I can know and militarily adapt to an alien culture and accord the populace respect and some cultural awareness but there are and have to be limits or I am not doing my job and am taking the easy way out. I can make people working for me behave responsibly and I should do so -- but I'm not in a position to make them accept a culture that is alien to them.

I can know my enemy -- though in the situation we're talking here, the population should not be my enemy -- and I can respect him for his capabilities but that doesn't mean that I or any soldier has to accept any tenets of that culture.

I also suggest that in every foreign nation in which I've served, no matter how nice and respectful I or the Troops were, the locals did not want to understand us with only rare individual exceptions -- most of 'em were quite polite (most peoples are far more polite than Americans) and / or respectful or fearful as the situation seemed to dictate -- but they really just wanted us gone, out of their sight and out of their country as quickly as possible. A soldier in a foreign land had better never lose sight of that fact of life.

On a believe it or not allied note, Brandon, you mention that the Administration pushed Congress around in the lead up to invading Iraq. Possibly true and of note is the fact that the pushers you cite were former Congroids. Does this mean they 'knew their enemy?' Or could it simply mean that Congress' lack of gumption and concern for their own reelection has more to do with their rollover than did any lack of 'expertise?'

As I pointed out, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations were quite poor strategically and they were loaded with veterans as were the Congresses of the time. I'm not at all sure your desire for more veterans in Congress will do what you appear to think it will do. The historical evidence over the last 200 years and particularly recently is not favorable. I think every Mother's advice "Be careful what you wish for, you may get it..." is probably appropriate.

[Brandon Friedman]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Thanks, but I am not doing this to be a semantic pr*k. There is a real danger now that some, maybe a lot, think there is something called COIN and something call "War fighting" so the all the diverse reasons and conducts of warfare, are now in two boxes. When you they find another conflict that doesn't fit, they'll invent another box. In fact if you look at "Hybrid" and the Lebanon, they did.
Words matter, and so does the meaning. If it doesn't you can't have doctrine, because you cannot teach it.

While there might be some people who want to put "COIN" and "war fighting" in two different boxes, I'm not one of them, and I never suggested that. But you're absolutely right that words do matter.

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I can empathise with them on a very basic human level. That's entirely normal, and you don't need to be taught to do it.
You can't tell soldiers to respect a culture that holds values they don't understand and are in some cases abhorrent to them.
Do you think it's okay to deny women's right? Allow male domestic violence? Arrange marriages? Honour killings? Consider some races sub-human?
These are unacceptable, and you should not respect cultures, or those elements of culture that advocated such things.

I'm not going to get sucked into broad-brushing a billion Muslims here. That's absurd. Of course we don't respect men who abuse women or who practice honor killings. But when you walk into a city like, say, Baghdad with the mentality and preconception that the inhabitants are a bunch of wife-beating, 11th century savages, then you're setting yourself up for failure. When you enter a situation like that, you have to give people the benefit of the doubt--regardless of what you think you know about them. And if they disappoint you (or try to kill you), then you can make the adjustment. But when you allow an air of "their-culture-is-abhorrent"/"hajji-this-hajji-that" to permeate your unit in advance of any interaction, I'm telling you, it's going to cause problems for everyone.

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Culture is a highly complex area with many different forms of expression, and vastly variable, so the blanket guidance "respect culture," is so simplistic as to cease to be useful.

Fair enough.

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Let me give you a specific example. If you went to search a house and woman told you from behind a close door, "my husband is not home, go away!" would you? Respecting her culture means you go away. Understanding her culture, means going and getting two woman from another house, who can protect "her honour" and tell her husband, while you search her home.

World of difference. - and at some point, all the allowances and negotiations run out. If you can't find other women, you are going in anyway, and in some cases, that could get that woman beaten or even killed, by the husband, and there is nothing you can do about it. - then turn around to the platoon and tell them this is a culture they need to respect.

The ideal answer here is neither. In ultra-conservative areas like eastern Afghanistan, the answer is to bring along both Western female troops and plenty of Afghan troops. If that's not possible, then, like you say, in most--but not all--cases you have to go in anyway. If it's viewed in the community as a lack of respect, then it's something you'll have to take up with the village elders. But if you've shown respect in the past and you have good working relationships in the area, then it should work. On the other hand, if they're all Taliban, then you can, you know, make the adjustment.

[Brandon Friedman]

Originally Posted by CPT Foley

When I advocate respecting other cultures I'm not suggesting Soldiers embrace them, like them, or in any way adopt a relativistic approach toward culture. You can find aspects of a culture abhorrent and still treat members of the culture with respect. It makes me want to smash furniture when I hear Officers & NCOs refer to Haji this & that. Most of them know on an intellectual level that it's probably a bad idea to make light of one of the pillars of Islam. I suspect they succumb to it because the terminology is so widespread. We are that tone deaf as a force. I want to be clear, my issue is not based on fairness or sensitivity or ethics. It is purely base on pragmatism. We will have greater success garnering support in the AO, region, worldwide when our forces operate with the same meticulous care that we have for our arms and equipment toward cultural considerations. It's not a sensitivity issue, it's a success issue.

I agree with this.

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Thanks, but I am not doing this to be a semantic pr*k. There is a real danger now that some, maybe a lot, think there is something called COIN and something call "War fighting" so the all the diverse reasons and conducts of warfare, are now in two boxes. When you they find another conflict that doesn't fit, they'll invent another box. In fact if you look at "Hybrid" and the Lebanon, they did.

Totally agree! (Of course, I expand the singular box a little further than you do). Let's add another part of the danger of constantly expanding taxonomies: for every "new" taxon, you need new "experts". Of course, that means that you have to hire new consultants, pay for new research (and translators), and set up new organizational units. Now, I would never say that that was a bureaucrats dream, but...

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Words matter, and so does the meaning. If it doesn't you can't have doctrine, because you cannot teach it.

I think Lewis Carroll captured this nicely...

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I can empathise with them on a very basic human level. That's entirely normal, and you don't need to be taught to do it.
You can't tell soldiers to respect a culture that holds values they don't understand and are in some cases abhorrent to them.

Hmm, I'm not sure about the first - 'tis a little too optimistic for me.

On the second point, of course you can tell soldiers to respect a culture that they find abhorrent! Of course, telling them to respect it is one thing, getting them to respect it is another. And, if they totally do "respect" it (in the cultural relativity suffering from PMS [Post-Modernist Syndrome ] sense), then you have probably just helped your enemy.

Somewhat less on the tongue-in-cheek level, this is a problem Anthropologists have been dealing with for a century or so, and the British military has been dealing with for longer. "Respect" should, IMO, always be interpreted in two different, and distinct, ways: a) for the commonality between two people (whatever that may be - it varies), and b) for utilitarian purposes of completing the "mission", whether that be countering an insurgency or getting an ethnography published.

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Do you think it's okay to deny women's right? Allow male domestic violence? Arrange marriages? Honour killings? Consider some races sub-human? These are unacceptable, and you should not respect cultures, or those elements of culture that advocated such things.

Wilf, I had no idea that you hated 19th century British culture so much !

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Culture is a highly complex area with many different forms of expression, and vastly variable, so the blanket guidance "respect culture," is so simplistic as to cease to be useful.

Actually, I would go further - it is outright dangerous simply because it is so semantically loose. One of the worst things I ever saw as a graduate student was another grad student so traumatized by being told she had to "respect" the people she was studying that she ended up having a nervous breakdown. BTW, her fieldwork was with a group that is considered to be "nice" by most people.

Cheers,

Marc

[Brandon Friedman]

Originally Posted by Ken White

On a believe it or not allied note, Brandon, you mention that the Administration pushed Congress around in the lead up to invading Iraq. Possibly true and of note is the fact that the pushers you cite were former Congroids. Does this mean they 'knew their enemy?' Or could it simply mean that Congress' lack of gumption and concern for their own reelection has more to do with their rollover than did any lack of 'expertise?'

Ken,

Concern for a politician's re-election is always paramount. In this case it means they didn't have the popular support or political capital to oppose in any coherent fashion. But when a politician has relevant personal experience, that brings with it a wealth of political capital. By that, I mean it's much easier--with voters back home--for a senator who's a doctor to feasibly oppose a popular health care proposal. Or for a Congressman who served as a maneuver commander to oppose a widely accepted defense policy.

[Ken White]

unfortunately, mine is historically and actualities of a long life based and thus is far less benign.