The UK in Afghanistan

[davidbfpo]

A curious title IMHO from a UK think tank RUSI:

British operations in Helmand Province are showing signs of significant progress, thanks partly to the success of the counter insurgency strategy and the leadership of General Stanley McChrystal

Link: http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N4C223C1F023C7/and fuller report is on a linked PDF.

I just admire this passage, before reading the fourteen page report:

Although recent US media reports have noted the slow advancement of the US-led operation in Marjah, they have failed to recognise the 'encouraging progress' in Nad-e-Ali... Professor Farrell (Kings War Studies) identifies that insurgents have been pushed to the outskirts of the district; that freedom of movement for civilians and security forces has been 'dramatically improved'; public services and the police are getting better and there is even an effective governor and representative community council in place.

This study combines analysis of documents, interviews, and observation in the field.

Farrell attributes the British success in Nad-e-Ali to 'strategic patience': British military and civilian advisors have been working hard for the last 18 months to develop local governance and push the Taliban out of the district. Farrell also highlights the importance of 'the McChrystal effect' in reinvigorating the campaign under 'clear strategic direction'

More from my armchair after reading the full report.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Infanteer

I'd try, but the static is drowning things out....

No need to chirp.

Two sides of this debate and that is the value or otherwise of the basics as taught to recruits and built upon by trained soldiers in operational settings such as for example dash-down-observe-sights-fire.

William is entitled to his opinion and perhaps has experiences to support his position. I support the DS version he does not. It is up to him to provide the alternative, yes?

You have a position on this?

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by JMA

William is entitled to his opinion and perhaps has experiences to support his position. I support the DS version he does not. It is up to him to provide the alternative, yes?

...and I do - constantly. What do you want to know?
- and which DS solution, from whose army and from what date?
The whole reason I got involved in studying "Minor tactics" was because I was so disgusted with the DS solutions.

[davidbfpo]

Well now the Prime Minister has said it:

Prime Minister David Cameron has said he wants UK troops out of Afghanistan within five years.

Asked if he wanted the troops home by the next general election, due in 2015, Mr Cameron said: "I want that to happen, make no mistake about it.

BBC report:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/politics/10420911.stm

Maybe not the right place, but the former Labour Foreign Minister and contender for Labour Party leader, David Miliband, has written an open letter to General Petraeus: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html

Finally this report (Post No.521) is worth reading, especially for the parts and footnotes on the ANA, ANP and integration with ISAF: via http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N4C223C1F023C7/

[Fuchs]

"ds"?

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

"ds"?

Directing Staff - Instructors.

[davidbfpo]

Not unexpectedly General Sir David Richards has been interviewed after the removal of General McChrystal. He made some interesting comments, stressing at one point his views were private!

If you look at any counter-insurgency campaign throughout history there's always a point at which you start to negotiate with each other, probably through proxies in the first instance, and I don't know when that will happen. From my own, and this is a purely private view, I think there's no reason why we shouldn't be looking at that sort of thing pretty soon. But at the same time you've got to continue the work we're doing on the military, governance and development perspectives to make sure they don't think we're giving up. It's a concurrent process and they're both equally important.

He can be listened to on 'The World This Weekend', alas the half hour programme does not show when he is interviewed:http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006qnz4 I assume it works beyond the UK.

The BBC News report: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10427983.stm

The General is preceded by a short interview with a Lt.Col. Richard Williams, an ex-SAS commander in Iraq, who comments on General McCrystal's strategy and IMHO is rather direct - alas not given more coverage. I recommend you listen (in the next seven days).

[davidbfpo]

An optimistic report on Sangin, where IIRC the largest number of UK casualties are caused

Sangin is important. Not only is it totemic to the Taliban, it is central to the significant but ever-dwindling illegal narcotics trade and is a key economic and transport hub. You cannot begin to hold northern Helmand without first having Sangin.

I find this

ever-dwindling illegal narcotics trade

odd, but he is on the ground.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ves-us-on.html

[davidbfpo]

Adam Holloway, a Conservative MP and ex-UK Army officer, took part in a short radio discussion today on Afghanistan; he has been an advocate of an accommodation with the insurgents since 2008.

Link: http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/console/b00sw3sc (available for a week).

He made two particular comments:

The insurgents are hundreds of local groups united by a hatred of foreign troops and an unwanted corrupt central government....In Helmand 80% of bodies we recover after an engagement have died within twenty miles of where they live. That should tell you who we are really fighting here.

The second belongs better on 'The UK in Afghanistan' thread and will be posted there too:

The big threat (to the UK) is the video pictures on the websites of the global Jihad. Afghanistan is a massive driver of radicalisation across the region and in our northern mill towns.

I asked the head of the Afghan secret service a while back how many hard core AQ operatives were in Afghanistan, he said he didn't know it was less than the number of British citizens of Pakistani origin who were working with the Taliban...

(Commenting himself ) AQ are long gone from Afghanistan...

The extent of UK citizens being involved in fighting in Afghanistan is an issue that gets rare attention, lurid headlines sometimes and so his comments are welcome. IIRC an ISAF spokesman, maybe General McChrystal, commented a few months ago that less than 80-100 AQ were active in Afghanistan.

In a slightly different format this post appears on the 'COIN and Reconciliation' thread.

[davidbfpo]

A slightly adapted headline after this:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-10-years.html

A few details I'd not seen before and clearly the locals in Sangin are far from supportive of the UK's attempt to help (being polite).

The ten year quote is in a shorter article:

We are here to create time and space for governance to take hold," said Lt Col James. "That's much more decisive than fighting Taliban. It just takes hellishly long unless you have the right force density - that's my concern, that we might be here 10 years rather than five years. But we need to see this through.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-10-years.html

What makes anyone think the Afghans will change, to accept governance too?

Nearly a third of UK deaths have been in Sangin, since 2006. I despair.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

A slightly adapted headline after this:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-10-years.html

A few details I'd not seen before and clearly the locals in Sangin are far from supportive of the UK's attempt to help (being polite).

There are some quotes from the first article which IMO are important and support what I have been saying for ever so long now:

The troops feel that too many Taliban are getting away with attacking Nato troops "while we have one hand tied behind our backs.

It is clear that even the children are helping the Taliban. The more that they appear the more likely it is that a British patrol is being "dicked" (observed) and information is being passed back up the Taliban chain.

Children are also being used increasingly often to plant the IED explosive devices that cause so many Nato casualties.

The Taliban's marksmanship is improving, too –enough so that, after one burst of Taliban fire, the scramble out of a ditch and across 20 yards of open ground was a moment of concentrated fear.

[Ken White]

"The troops feel that too many Taliban are getting away with attacking Nato troops "while we have one hand tied behind our backs.

It is clear that even the children are helping the Taliban. The more that they appear the more likely it is that a British patrol is being "dicked" (observed) and information is being passed back up the Taliban chain.

Children are also being used increasingly often to plant the IED explosive devices that cause so many Nato casualties.

The Taliban's marksmanship is improving, too –enough so that, after one burst of Taliban fire, the scramble out of a ditch and across 20 yards of open ground was a moment of concentrated fear.

Remove the identifying nationality and affiliation and you can apply it all to practically any such war where so-called COIN principles are employed. Kids around the world are always up for some excitement and kids are all tribal in the broad sense of the word. Scrambling across 20 m of open ground is ALWAYS to be avoided even against terrible shooters with air rifles -- but all shooters get better with practice.

Nothing new in any of that. Nothing new in the stupid ego trip that says "This time it'll be different because 'we' are doing it..."

It never is.

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

Something about your last comment, and its context, that reminded me that the only reason Chuck Norris does not send you Xmas cards is because he is safer if you don't remember that he exists.

Very well said.

Steve

[Ken White]

Chuck who?

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Ken White

Remove the identifying nationality and affiliation and you can apply it all to practically any such war where so-called COIN principles are employed. Kids around the world are always up for some excitement and kids are all tribal in the broad sense of the word. Scrambling across 20 m of open ground is ALWAYS to be avoided even against terrible shooters with air rifles -- but all shooters get better with practice.

I concur.
You cannot get away from open ground, unless you have prescriptive approach to tactics, which leads to you being fixed. Operations have to account for tactics, terrain, threat/policy.
Everyone in the British Army is briefed on the "Child threat" and has been for 70 years.
Almost NOTHING seen in A'Stan or Helmand is new or unknowable, but the press coverage and most open sources commentary on this aspect of operations is woeful.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I concur.
You cannot get away from open ground, unless you have prescriptive approach to tactics, which leads to you being fixed. Operations have to account for tactics, terrain, threat/policy.

One point that seems to be missed and that is you can dominate ground through observation and fire. You don't need to walk it to dominate it... and remember you can never own it.

Everyone in the British Army is briefed on the "Child threat" and has been for 70 years.

In Rhodesia they used to send kids out (mujibas) to try to find signs of a security force presence in an area. If found they had a various signals (shouting, whistling etc) to pass on the message.

The issue is not that it happens but how you deal with it.

Almost NOTHING seen in A'Stan or Helmand is new or unknowable, but the press coverage and most open sources commentary on this aspect of operations is woeful.

Yes its the same old stuff... the military never seems to learn.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by JMA

One point that seems to be missed and that is you can dominate ground through observation and fire. You don't need to walk it to dominate it... and remember you can never own it.

I concur, but to move around, to manoeuvre, you are sometimes forced to cross open ground, the same way you have to transition choke points, and probable killing grounds.

The issue is not that it happens but how you deal with it.

Again, concur, but having "figured the maybes" goes a very long way.

Yes its the same old stuff... the military never seems to learn.

...and who is THE military?
Very few armies retain corporate knowledge - or even actually study warfare for that matter.
What everyone gets confused about is looking at Armies who have gained and successfully applied operational experience, and then assume that this will carry over to another army or even another theatre. It almost never does! - and for pretty well understood reasons. IMO, the primary one is a failure of professional study.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I concur, but to move around, to manoeuvre, you are sometimes forced to cross open ground, the same way you have to transition choke points, and probable killing grounds.

Being forced to cross open ground and to habitually walk on it are two different things.

Again, concur, but having "figured the maybes" goes a very long way.

They like drug dealers will continue to effectively use children until such time as effective counter measures are found. Knowing about it and thought about it are not enough.

...and who is THE military?
Very few armies retain corporate knowledge - or even actually study warfare for that matter.
What everyone gets confused about is looking at Armies who have gained and successfully applied operational experience, and then assume that this will carry over to another army or even another theatre. It almost never does! - and for pretty well understood reasons. IMO, the primary one is a failure of professional study.

Yes I agree but would add to that the arrogance factor of the non general staff officers coming through who are always questioning what the "old f*rts" know anyway. It seems from Afghanistan that the Brits split comes at Lt Col level where as they (and the more junior officers) are on the ground know it all and all those above are merely relics of past wars and campaigns and are hopelessly out of touch.

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I concur.
Almost NOTHING seen in A'Stan or Helmand is new or unknowable, but the press coverage and most open sources commentary on this aspect of operations is woeful.

I thought about press coverage, public/published opinion and such things for a while and the competence gap is really a problem because much can be misinterpreted (especially with pessimism).

On the other hand, dedicated reporters who know the military well or were officers once are simply not credible enough for much of the audience. That kind of experts tends to be too pro-war, not critical enough and too concerned about their access / embedding advantages.


We would need maybe a dozen journalists in a larger country who are both critical and knowledgeable and wouldn't misunderstand a tactical withdrawal for a strategic disaster or a skirmish for a disastrous battle. They should neither be hawks nor pacifists or something like anti-*insert weapon or ammunition type here* activists.
They should be ready and willing to engage reporters who reported nonsense on the military with a battle of words.


If only the military could nourish such a competent core group of journalists without corrupting them into propaganda multipliers...

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

We would need maybe a dozen journalists in a larger country who are both critical and knowledgeable and wouldn't misunderstand a tactical withdrawal for a strategic disaster or a skirmish for a disastrous battle. They should neither be hawks nor pacifists or something like anti-*insert weapon or ammunition type here* activists.
They should be ready and willing to engage reporters who reported nonsense on the military with a battle of words.

My experience, that is Journalists are generally not good at assessing information, in a military or operational context. They have a need to write stories, and report "facts"- and they never have any responsibilty for what they report, so mistakes are normally cost free. That generally disqualifies them from the necessary rigour and objectivity of an analyst or a commander.
Having said that, a lot of commanders and analysts lack objectivity and rigour as well!