QDR and Strategy Changes

[Cliff]

Howdy-

Much balyhoo has been made in recent days about the upcoming QDR and the change in strategy to drop 2 Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) sized force and instead go to hybrid war.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/wo...html?ref=world

While not explicitly stated as a 1 MRC force size, the new strategy has been used in recent debate as justification for buying less F-22s, recently by the USAF Chief of Staff in a speech at Elmendorf AFB:

http://www.elmendorf.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123157910

The question then becomes how we fulfill our commitments to allies in multiple theaters with a 1 MRC force?

In other words, will our allies (and our enemies) still see our promises as being credible if our forces can be tied up by just one conflict?

We have treaties with the NATO countries, Japan, South Korea, ANZUS... and commitments in the Persian Gulf as well as in Afghanistan. While clearly our nuclear capability is one of the most important parts of these promises, are they alone enough to make our commitments credible?

It seems that we need to have the capability to have a credible conventional deterrent in multiple theaters, otherwise we end up potentially constraining ourselves as we did in the late '50s when there weren't many options between small interventions and massive nuclear attacks...

While small wars and interventions need to be a part of our strategy, how they fit in with the other end of the spectrum seems to be the challenge to me. I'm curious to hear your opinions on the strategy change...

[Ken White]

I see no real change. Post 1992, the force for one real war, much less two was not resourced.

The Two MRC label, just as the "We'll move ten Divisions to Europe in ten days" during the Cold War was pure myth. This when we only had ten active Divs and we knew that calling up the ArNG Divs, filling them and training them up for combat would take two to three months.

The CSAF comment was only boilerplate -- He, you or I cannot state that any specific number is 'adequate' to fight a war the dimensions of which are unknown. If you define 'war' down as 'contingency,' what does that mean? If Afghanistan and Iraq are 'contingencies, ' they've pretty well kept a lot of the total force / all services moderately occupied. Any further effort in the ME would've maxed out a lot of things -- and the Far East would've had to wait...

Someone in DC just decided to get real. No big thing.

[Bob's World]

To designate how many of what type of conflict one is willing to resource to is NOT STRATEGY. More policy based on what we are willing to spend; vice strategy to do what we need to do

But then QDR has little to do with strategy and far more to do with buying stuff also.

Sad, on both counts.

[Entropy]

I think Ken and Bob have it about right. I increasingly wonder why we bother with QDR's in the first place since they haven't really had much impact since they were instituted.

[John T. Fishel]

a strategy in itself but it is a strategy document. The US military strategy is the National Military Strategy (unclas) plus the Joint Planning Document (JPD - all the classified annexes) All of this is part of the Joint Strategic Planning System and the other strategic planning systems. We used to teach this stuff in C 500 at Army CGSC.

Cliff, as far as USAF fighter systems are concerned, in the last 30+ years the only single purpose fighter aircraft that we have fielded that have not been adapted to a multiporpose role are the F 22, the A 10 and the F 14. The latter has gone out of the Navy inventory and the F/A 18 has been adapted to carry out air superiority missions. Even the Harrier was adapted by the Brits for an air superiority role in the Falklands which it did well enough. The Air Force never liked the A10 and was trying to retire it before DS/DS but its mission is CAS and CAS alone. The F 22 has never been used for any purpose and is not particularly likely to be used. Both the F 15 and F 16 have been used for air superiority, air interdiction, and CAS. The Joint Strikefighter (F 35?) is supposed to be a multirole aircraft that will replace all of the above, as i understand it. In a relatively austere time, doesn't it make more sense to close down the F 22 line and start up the Joint Strikefighter line bringing a new and "better" multirole aircraft online to replace the aging fleet of F 15s, 16s, 18s? Seems to me, this makes more economic and strategic sense. Of course, it might just be a bust - or not as good as advertised like McNamara's TFX.

Cheers

JohnT

[Bob's World]

QDR is important, but one really needs to understand that it has a high Flash to Bang ratio. It is the vehicle that allows the new class of policy types to roll out their policies and get to meet the Service equity guarders.

It also is the field of battle that the services trot out their various schemes for maintaining what they think is important from their own perspectives while attempting to camouflage it as the latest flavor of policy.

There may not be much accomplished, but there is much to be learned; that is there is for one who understands this is far more a grand game of "Show and tell" mixed with the classic shell game; and not a venue to actually craft new strategy and tailor a force to execute it.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Bob's World

QDR is important, but one really needs to understand that it has a high Flash to Bang ratio...this is far more a grand game of "Show and tell" mixed with the classic shell game; and not a venue to actually craft new strategy and tailor a force to execute it.

It's also a function where squeaking wheels get oiled...

Never mind something else may need more oil.

[Cliff]

Nevertheless, it does act as an effective constraint on the resources that will be available to the military to execute the strategy. In theory it should be the basis of the National Military Strategy... pragmatically (and as discussed recently in the Strategic Compression section by Rob Thorton and others) the means available can (whether you think they should or not) constrain the strategies available to us. Ergo, the QDR matters to strategy. I think that, in reality, it will mainly be used as a means to justify whatever direction folks want to take, not as a means of assessing the overall defense strategy/programs of record.

I understand the CSAF comment is boilerplate, and that we haven't resourced to 2 MRCs in a long time.... which leads to my next question - is explicitly stating our limitations better than keeping a certain level of strategic ambiguity?

[Cliff]

Originally Posted by John T. Fishel

Cliff, as far as USAF fighter systems are concerned, in the last 30+ years the only single purpose fighter aircraft that we have fielded that have not been adapted to a multiporpose role are the F 22, the A 10 and the F 14. The latter has gone out of the Navy inventory and the F/A 18 has been adapted to carry out air superiority missions. Even the Harrier was adapted by the Brits for an air superiority role in the Falklands which it did well enough. The Air Force never liked the A10 and was trying to retire it before DS/DS but its mission is CAS and CAS alone. The F 22 has never been used for any purpose and is not particularly likely to be used. Both the F 15 and F 16 have been used for air superiority, air interdiction, and CAS. The Joint Strikefighter (F 35?) is supposed to be a multirole aircraft that will replace all of the above, as i understand it. In a relatively austere time, doesn't it make more sense to close down the F 22 line and start up the Joint Strikefighter line bringing a new and "better" multirole aircraft online to replace the aging fleet of F 15s, 16s, 18s? Seems to me, this makes more economic and strategic sense. Of course, it might just be a bust - or not as good as advertised like McNamara's TFX.

Cheers

JohnT

JohnT-

I have to disagree on the F-22, sir. It is certainly not a single-role aircraft... it is capable of performing ISR, DEAD, and Strategic Attack. The Raptor actually practices doing TST and CAS as well... although not optomized for either, all it is really lacking is a targetting pod... which could be added fairly easily. Just as the Eagle spawned the Strike Eagle, so will the Air-to-Ground capes of the Raptor build as it matures. If we had a few more Raptors, we would have enough to cover our other commitments and deploy some for OIF/OEF support, and I think you would see them actually being used.

The F-15C always has been and remains a single-mission fighter - Air to Air being the only role.

I laugh when folks claim that the F-22 doesn't represent a joint capability (it is a single service solution) and therefore we should move on to F-35. The Navy, Marines, and most of the USAF are out of the Air Supremacy business- as you mention, the Navy quit back when it turned the Tomcat into the Bombcat around 1993 or so. The entire US military depends on the F-15C and F-22 for Air Superiority. If you look at the results of any big exercise (Red Flag, Northern Edge, etc) on the 1-2 goes per exercise that the other fighters take the air to air hammer, you'll see that you can get the job done but it's going to cost you about like 66-68 in Vietnam did in terms of exchange ratios (2-1 or 1-1, at times worse...). Aegis and Patriot are at best local solutions, which can keep your FOB or CVBG from being attacked, but can't protect a theater.

I'm not saying the Navy or Marines or anyone else can't do it... I'm saying no one practices it because they are focusing on the current fights in OIF/OEF. They can do this and not have excessive risk because someone is practicing it. The F-15C and F-22 allow them to do this. Cut them, and either you accept losing a lot of folks or you make all the air to ground folks practice air to air enough to be viable... which means they will suck at supporting the folks on the ground. So really the F-22 is huge for supporting the trooops.

The risk of losing air superiority isn't great right now... but it's a lot higher than folks think. 187 F-22s isn't a viable community... oh by the way, when you deploy your Raptors (you'd have to send almost all of them, expecially since DOD is cutting most of the F-15Cs) who is left at home to train, or do Homeland Defense? Once you get there, all your adversary needs is 60-100 flankers and some double digit SAMs, and presto, no ISR, no airlift, no CAS... The F-22 exists to enable the rest of the military to do its job and not have to worry about getting bombed. Folks don't realize how good they have it... What happens when your drones get shot down, and you have no air support, oh yeah, and you can't get medevaced or re-supplied by air because the airlifters and helos got themselves shot down?

The F-35 doesn't have the same ordnance or capabilities in the air to air arena the F-22 has. It is stealthy, but it is speed limited... which means it is more vulnerable, especially to SAMs. The F-15C/F-16 hi-lo split worked well... and that seems like what the F-22/F-35 should be... unfortunately you need a minimum number of F-22s to make the force viable, otherwise you have too few to even do one war.

I don't think asking for 2-3 more years of F-22s (60 ish more) to bridge the gap between now and the F-35 reaching full rate production is asking for the moon. The military requirement for the F-22 is 384.... 240 is the moderate risk force.

I guess what I am saying is I think the country can afford to hedge its bets and at least make sure the F-35 works before we bet our airpower overmatch on it. I know this isn't a popular opinion, but I just don't want to see us end up like we did at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, where we lost air superiority quickly and had to fight to get it back- I don't think we have the resources to take the losses that would entail anymore.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Cliff

Nevertheless, it does act as an effective constraint on the resources that will be available to the military to execute the strategy...In theory it should be the basis of the National Military Strategy...I think that, in reality, it will mainly be used as a means to justify whatever direction folks want to take, not as a means of assessing the overall defense strategy/programs of record.

That's what's always been true about it -- it is the exercise to divide the pot and strategy has little or nothing to do with it. Actually, the Strategy should drive the QDR to produce an unconstrained requirement sheet and then Congress should make the hard calls on what gets funded. Since Congress really does that but does not want to be seen doing so in case there's a screwup, they fob it off to DoD by statutorily requiring both a National Military Strategy and a QDR. Lights and mirrors, little more.

I understand the CSAF comment is boilerplate, and that we haven't resourced to 2 MRCs in a long time.... which leads to my next question - is explicitly stating our limitations better than keeping a certain level of strategic ambiguity?

Makes no difference in my view. I'm pretty sure I'm not the only guy in the world that can count. That is, most potential opponents have a reasonably good idea of what we can practically do and pay little attention to the rhetoric and news releases which are virtually meaningless.

So really the F-22 is huge for supporting the trooops.

Provided there are opponents for them to be huge with. Who do you see that as being in it's design lifetime; with what and in what quantities? Second question; maintenance costs, OR rate?

I just don't want to see us end up like we did at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, where we lost air superiority quickly and had to fight to get it back- I don't think we have the resources to take the losses that would entail anymore.

Missed WW II, did make the other two and in the early days of both -- there was no loss of Aerial Superiority in either though in both there were lapses caused by training deficiencies and logistic issues, not by the aircraft involved. There were, however, inadequate for task aircraft in both wars as aircraft designed for specific missions had to be used for other missions.

One could extract from that the quality of training is a more important discriminator than the quality of aircraft AND that using single role, sole purpose aircraft is not the best solution. That might particularly apply in a time of constrained budgets which are certainly going to be here very quickly. That last is almost certainly driving the F22 decision.

[Bob's World]

There's nothing about the F-22 that makes me laugh. This is one deadly serious piece of air to air kit.

It also represents:
- a techonology we should probably develop and not buy, wait for the next generation. No need for the Aircraft now, and the next gen will be even better.

-a major distraction for the airforce; helping them keep their eyes off the ball we really need them to hit now and for the foreseeable future.

- an expense we can't afford.

- a Moby Dick of an objective for an Ahab--like AF senior leadership. Mortgaging the entire service on the gamble that what they want is more important that what the nation needs. They may be right, but I have my doubts.

A Sergeant Major and good friend got a tour of a hanger of F-22's by the NCO responsible for maintaining them. I won't elaborate, but if half of what that seriously concerned NCO shared with another is true, showing him phyisical examples of each concern he raised, people should be brought up on charges.

[Cliff]

Originally Posted by Ken White

That's what's always been true about it -- it is the exercise to divide the pot and strategy has little or nothing to do with it. Actually, the Strategy should drive the QDR to produce an unconstrained requirement sheet and then Congress should make the hard calls on what gets funded. Since Congress really does that but does not want to be seen doing so in case there's a screwup, they fob it off to DoD by statutorily requiring both a National Military Strategy and a QDR. Lights and mirrors, little more. Makes no difference in my view. I'm pretty sure I'm not the only guy in the world that can count. That is, most potential opponents have a reasonably good idea of what we can practically do and pay little attention to the rhetoric and news releases which are virtually meaningless.

Valid points sir. My point on the ambiguity was more aimed at allies or potential allies than enemies - will our allies believe our promises.

Originally Posted by Ken White

Provided there are opponents for them to be huge with. Who do you see that as being in it's design lifetime; with what and in what quantities? Second question; maintenance costs, OR rate? Missed WW II, did make the other two and in the early days of both -- there was no loss of Aerial Superiority in either though in both there were lapses caused by training deficiencies and logistic issues, not by the aircraft involved. There were, however, inadequate for task aircraft in both wars as aircraft designed for specific missions had to be used for other missions.

Unfortunately this thread has veered off onto the Raptor, which is a valid example of how our ways-ends-means discussion is a little off track at times it seems, but wasn't my objective in starting this thread.

I think the opponents potentially include Iran, North Korea (though this is more doable for the aircraft we have), some part of China, Venezuala, or any number of wildcards. Not to mention that the design life doesn't really mean much - the F-15Cs were supposed to be gone 10 years ago originally, they'll be flying (and falling apart) for at least 15-20 more years. We have been historically horrible at predicting the next war - hence the F-22 as a hedge.

MX costs and FMC (OR) rates for the F-22 are about where they should be for a fighter of its age. If you think it's bad now, wait till F-35... especially the V/STOL version. The WaPost article and some of the stuff put out by Sen McCain and Levin on the F-22 is false - they cherry picked data from 2-3 years ago, and spun it as facts. Senator Chambliss asked the AF to look at the claims made (purportedly based on AF data), they are refuted here.

Even Obama's pet AF 4-Star, Merrill McPeak, has said it is "real mistake". Article here.

FYI While I don't fly Raptors, I have flown with it a lot, and while it has had issues in the past, it is getting the job done now. Most recently, the PACAF IG gave Elmendorf AFB an ORI (full war dress rehersal) during which the F-22 did very well in all respects - resulting in an "outstanding" grade. Results talked about here. Oh by the way, the legacy aircraft aren't doing much better because they are simply wearing out - the cost of maintaining them is steadily increasing and their FMC (OR) rates are falling.

Originally Posted by Ken White

One could extract from that the quality of training is a more important discriminator than the quality of aircraft AND that using single role, sole purpose aircraft is not the best solution. That might particularly apply in a time of constrained budgets which are certainly going to be here very quickly. That last is almost certainly driving the F22 decision.

I agree training is most important, and if I have to choose I'll choose adequate flying hours over buying a new plane. I don't think we should have to choose- OBTW all the training in the world doesn't change physics- if they have SAMs and AAMs that can shoot me at/outside of the ranges I can employ at, all the training in the world won't help. We need new jets, period.

Again, the Raptor is not single mission. It already has air to ground capability and these capes are increasing, not being minimized.

I think some of the folks on Hawaii, Midway, Wake and the Philippines would disagree with the loss of air superiority. Much of our problem in both theaters was logistical, but it also stemmed from the fact that our frontline fighters (P-40, P-39 for the Air Corps, F4F for the Navy) were outclassed by their opponents. We eventually got there, but only later in the war. Our enemies now are at parity or better... and the last quick-acquisition fighter we made was the F-117 in 1982- that still took 5 years to field 59 of them....

Back to what I wanted to talk about on this thread, though, I think our ways/ends/means are out of whack with each other. If we want to truly fulfill our NMS, we need to buy the resources to make that happen, or change the strategy.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ron Humphrey]

Waaaay down there somewhere beneath the totem pole, but

Even accepting that the SecDef has some major political impetus placed upon them in reference to what the administration would want, I find it very hard to imagine or accept that this particular one would not have tried to keep the line at least open "if" he felt that it was necessary for our security.

If one where to accept that premise then for me the larger question is why others who absolutely do not know or see everything he does wouldn't feel compelled to share their concerns with him and then move on to work with their partner forces to ensure that areas they feel will be a risk are addressed through "other means" (NOTE) This is said as in a choice that they make not something that should have to be thrust upon them from above

Am I mistaken in my perception that our current SecDef has been more than open to constructive feedback from all quarters?

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Cliff

Valid points sir. My point on the ambiguity was more aimed at allies or potential allies than enemies - will our allies believe our promises.

But I'm unsure what promises you mean? NATO and other treaties; yes, I think so.

I think the opponents potentially include Iran, North Korea (though this is more doable for the aircraft we have), some part of China, Venezuala, or any number of wildcards. Not to mention that the design life doesn't really mean much - the F-15Cs were supposed to be gone 10 years ago originally, they'll be flying (and falling apart) for at least 15-20 more years. We have been historically horrible at predicting the next war - hence the F-22 as a hedge.

For the next 20 years or so, none of those can outmatch the number Block 50-52 F16s much less the 100 or so F22 and anything else that can be fielded. Which is obviously why I asked.

MX costs and FMC (OR) rates for the F-22 are about where they should be for a fighter of its age. If you think it's bad now, wait till F-35

I don't think it's bad but people i talk to in the AF do.

Senator Chambliss asked the AF to look at the claims made (purportedly based on AF data), they are refuted here

That would be Senator Chambliss from Georgia? Ah, yes.

Even Obama's pet AF 4-Star, Merrill McPeak, has said it is "real mistake".

Had his 37th TFS flying CAS back in the day. That a retired USAF Fighter Pilot supports buying more fighters is not a surprise.

I agree training is most important, and if I have to choose I'll choose adequate flying hours over buying a new plane. I don't think we should have to choose

I suspect you'll not only not get more of your new birds, you'll also get fewer flying hours. Apparently many involved in this have not lived through major financial downturns and their knock on effect on the DoD budget. Trust me, having lived through several, it hurts in many ways. it's going to get worse before it gets better.

all the training in the world doesn't change physics- if they have SAMs and AAMs that can shoot me at/outside of the ranges I can employ at, all the training in the world won't help. We need new jets, period.

Oh? Based on what I just quoted from you and me being a dumb grunt, I'd say you need new Radar and missiles for your older jets...

I think some of the folks on Hawaii, Midway, Wake and the Philippines would disagree with the loss of air superiority...also stemmed from the fact that our frontline fighters...We eventually got there, but only later in the war.

Which is probably why I specifically exempted WW II and addressed only Korea and Viet Nam.

Our enemies now are at parity or better...

I keep reading that but but as I mentioned, I can count and I have some vague idea of reliability factors, particularly engines, fuel factors and OR rates plus training levels so I'm apparently less concerned about that than some.

Back to what I wanted to talk about on this thread, though, I think our ways/ends/means are out of whack with each other. If we want to truly fulfill our NMS, we need to buy the resources to make that happen, or change the strategy.

Good plan on getting back on thread since I suspect most non-AF persons aren't going to agree on the need for more F-22s -- and what we say here will have no affect on the buy in any event.

Are you talking about the unclassified NMS or the classified version? Either way, good luck with that. I spent 45 years in DoD, military and civilian and I've been watching them closely for an additional 15 and the Department has been over funded more years than not. Good years or bad, the problem is not that DoD is under resourced; the problem is that Congress dictates the spending to a too finite degree AND that DoD misallocates money badly. That is a function of our governmental system and is unlikely to change. the good news is that adequate money trickles down; we get to buy more really good stuff than most anyone else and we have good people using it so it all generally turns out fairly well.

I've lived and worked under several 'strategies.' None of them were ever fully resourced. Not one. It'll work out.

Perils of living in a democracy that is uncomfortable with things militaire. Pain in the tail often but all things considered, I wouldn't change it...

[Surferbeetle]

Originally Posted by Cliff

My point on the ambiguity was more aimed at allies or potential allies than enemies - will our allies believe our promises.

Originally Posted by Cliff

Back to what I wanted to talk about on this thread, though, I think our ways/ends/means are out of whack with each other. If we want to truly fulfill our NMS, we need to buy the resources to make that happen, or change the strategy.

Having spent some time wandering around the globe it’s my opinion that most folks in other countries have a pretty good understanding of who our allies are and what we can bring to the fight. Being an AF brat sensitized me to the importance and associated costs of the strategic mission the USAF covers down on. Having done the unthinkable and joined the Army I have been sensitized to what it takes to gain and hold ground. I have spent a few years working for the Navy as well and have an appreciation for their contributions to the strategic and sea-lanes fight. Not to leave anyone out, I have enjoyed all of my time spent working with Marines. My take away from these experiences is that DOD is a huge organization, with substantial redundancies in its various abilities to wage war. The safety factors built into our organization truly impress this engineer, just as they do our allies and opponents.

The system is indeed in need of re-balancing. If we can accept that people are more important than hardware, if we can acknowledge that we have substantial redundancies built into both the workforce and the equipment of the whole of DOD, and if we understand that most forecasts predict ongoing and substantial changes to our financial system then perhaps Mr. Gate’s recommendations can be seen as being not just reasonable and prudent but also as a shrewd way forward which will help to ensure that our enemies and allies alike continue to believe our promises.

[Cliff]

Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey

Waaaay down there somewhere beneath the totem pole, but

Even accepting that the SecDef has some major political impetus placed upon them in reference to what the administration would want, I find it very hard to imagine or accept that this particular one would not have tried to keep the line at least open "if" he felt that it was necessary for our security.

Am I mistaken in my perception that our current SecDef has been more than open to constructive feedback from all quarters?

Sir-

I'm also low on the totem pole, so I don't know either. I do know that the commander of Air Combat Command thinks that 187 F-22s isn't enough to meet the national military strategy - see article here.

According to testimony by Sen Orrin Hatch, the "study" that Sec Gates used to justify cutting the F-22 don't exist. Testimony is here.

As I understand, congress is a little miffed as they don't think the language passed in 2007 requiring a comprehensive TACAIR study be accomplished was complied with.

V/R,

Cliff

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Cliff

FYI While I don't fly Raptors, I have flown with it a lot, and while it has had issues in the past, it is getting the job done now. Most recently, the PACAF IG gave Elmendorf AFB an ORI (full war dress rehersal) during which the F-22 did very well in all respects - resulting in an "outstanding" grade. Results talked about here. Oh by the way, the legacy aircraft aren't doing much better because they are simply wearing out - the cost of maintaining them is steadily increasing and their FMC (OR) rates are falling.

I have to say, I see the F-22 as an article of faith for the USAF. "Good Fighter = must be good."

I am fascinated by air power theory, but the lack of any real theory kinda prevents me taking it seriously. F-22 is a very good example.

• Stealth Aircraft, with a radar!!! yeah. I know you can turn it off and be "networked," -see next point
• Currently available networked electro-optic air defence and passive radar, may make "stealth" greatly less effective.
• Very manoeuvrable, but cannot out manoeuvre many in service missiles, without injuring the pilot.
• 80% of the cost only got a 20% improvement. There is no evidence that it justifies it's return on investment.
• It also rests on the case that air power capability is absolutely related to aircraft performance, - which history shows not to be true.

Now, if someone tells me that there are sound political and industrial arguments for building F-22, then OK, but the operational arguments are pretty weak. Historically, the majority of the evidence shows that Pilots and Air Forces are the least qualified to choose their aircraft. Everyone wants a Ferrari, when what is needed is a pick-up or a Volvo Estate.

[Cliff]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I have to say, I see the F-22 as an article of faith for the USAF. "Good Fighter = must be good."

I am fascinated by air power theory, but the lack of any real theory kinda prevents me taking it seriously. F-22 is a very good example.

• Stealth Aircraft, with a radar!!! yeah. I know you can turn it off and be "networked," -see next point
• Currently available networked electro-optic air defence and passive radar, may make "stealth" greatly less effective.
• Very manoeuvrable, but cannot out manoeuvre many in service missiles, without injuring the pilot.
• 80% of the cost only got a 20% improvement. There is no evidence that it justifies it's return on investment.
• It also rests on the case that air power capability is absolutely related to aircraft performance, - which history shows not to be true.

Now, if someone tells me that there are sound political and industrial arguments for building F-22, then OK, but the operational arguments are pretty weak. Historically, the majority of the evidence shows that Pilots and Air Forces are the least qualified to choose their aircraft. Everyone wants a Ferrari, when what is needed is a pick-up or a Volvo Estate.

Sir-

Anytime I post here about the F-22 I know what is going to happen, and probably I am not convincing anyone.

Have to respectfully disagree, though - since the facts on the F-22 have been muddled lately due to a lot of yellow journalism.

Why do you say there is "a lack of any real theory" - what do you mean by that?

While I can't go into specifics, your first 3 points on F-22 performance do not reflect the actual capabilities. One of the big arguements for the F-22 over the F-35 is it actual can defeat most enemy missiles due to being faster.

What is your justification for 80% and 20%? A brand new F-15C (IE buying a new airframe with the same avionics) would cost $90-100 million.... (singapore payed $1B for 12 F-15SG) an F-22 costs about $140 million... about 40% more, not 80%. Generally the F-22 can handle about 2x as many adversaries as an F-15C... 100% improvement. Pretty good investment if you ask me. OBTW we cannot continue to upgrade F-15Cs and F-16s... the airframes are literally falling apart- and not just the Eagle that broke in half.

Finally, on your last point, why does the F-22 case rest on this? The case for the F-22 is one of A. Economics- see my point above and B. capabilities, which is what you are arguing.

I would say that Desert Storm and OAF pretty convincingly argue that superior aircraft make a difference. While training is important, like I said before no amount of training can overcome physics. And no amount of training can overcome your airplane falling apart.

Is anyone asking the Army to go up outnumbered against T-90s in rusted out M-60A3s? Because that is what you are proposing...

V/R,

Cliff

[Steve Blair]

Originally Posted by Cliff

I guess what I am saying is I think the country can afford to hedge its bets and at least make sure the F-35 works before we bet our airpower overmatch on it. I know this isn't a popular opinion, but I just don't want to see us end up like we did at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, where we lost air superiority quickly and had to fight to get it back- I don't think we have the resources to take the losses that would entail anymore.

V/R,

Cliff

I wasn't aware that we ever LOST air superiority over Vietnam. When exactly did this happen?

That said, I don't have a beef with the F-22 as a tech test bed, but I have yet to be convinced that anyone is going to send it into a SEAD environment where it might get shot down (and I mean a real war environment, not an exercise). Remember the fuss when one F-117 got knocked down? A-10s can manage to a great degree because they can take lots of physical damage. Stealth aircraft simply cannot. And as so much of procurement is political, that explains much of the white noise that emanates from congressional hearings. Congress has always liked airpower because it's sexy and (more to the point) because its most strident advocates always promise that it brings war on the cheap.

I don't think anyone's proposing the M-60A3 analogy, but I do think there is a growing sense that the F-22 might be a "bridge" aircraft between the F-15 and the F-35.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Cliff

I would say that Desert Storm and OAF pretty convincingly argue that superior aircraft make a difference.

The Buff and the Bone did good work.

Is anyone asking the Army to go up outnumbered against T-90s in rusted out M-60A3s?

No. Though they did ask the Army for many years to go up against hordes of T-72s with a few old M-60s and M-48s. Bad allegory, I think. Regardless is anyone asking the USAF to go up against anyone with anything? Only the Indians have enough new aircraft on order to be remotely problematic. The Chinese are getting there but they have other problems. I doubt either of them will appear as an adversary in the near future, they have other things to do. The only serious challenger could be the EU and that is not terribly likely at this time.

Back to the farce of the QDR and NMS; This was your question:

While small wars and interventions need to be a part of our strategy, how they fit in with the other end of the spectrum seems to be the challenge to me. I'm curious to hear your opinions on the strategy change...

I initially responded with "I see no real change. Post 1992, the force for one real war, much less two was not resourced." I used the post '92 period to resonate with the current era but FWIW, we have never since 1944 (or other than during WW II, before, for that matter) resourced our nominal strategy of the time. There is nothing new except that the unclassified variant will be modified to reflect reality to an extent. Welcome to life in an essentially un-militaristic democracy. Note that our nominal allies all have the same problem except most of them have it far worse than us.

Not only the current QDR but the F-22 topic (as well as FCS, the Zumwalt class and other things) also are indicative of a shift from a realistically unsupportable strategy of buying not Silver but Platinum Bullets and having a quasi-conscription based large armed force in being to a more realistic smaller and hopefully far more professional force that has limitations, recognizes them and does not gloss over them by promising more than it can deliver. I anticipate significant pressure to avoid Platinum Bullet purchases, downgrading to mere Silver, in the near future (see the F-35). Be happy it will not go back to the 1950s with Lead Bullets in inadequate quantities.

The combat experienced force of the next few years will still be capable of doing things no one else on the globe can do or will be able to do for certainly the next 10 to 15 and probably the next 20 to 30 years. Thus, worry about hardware for the period 15-20 years out is IMO appropriate; for today, it's not an issue...

Thus I'm not sure there is a problem. If there is, I'm having difficulty seeing it.