Let's talk about "design", and the death of the MDMP

[jenniferro10]

Could the Military Decisionmaking Process be dead? They seem to think so over in the Danger Room:

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009...ybrid-threats/

Who are these "little known" theorists advancing the "design" method of operations planning? We could probably debate the legitimacy of design for a while, but what I want to know is who can throw in some of the actual facts about the real changes we can see in the future. How will this affect the fact that culture is finally getting its due as a distinct and significant element in planning? Anyone?

[Bob's World]

Anyone pimping "design" who does not understand how it is an enhancement of MDMP, not a replacement to it, simply does not understand the essence of design.

Both are good tools, both can be abused, neither stands alone; and both can be "over-doctrinized."

[IntelTrooper]

From what I'm reading on current ops and strategy in Afghanistan, the net effect of the addition of the "design" phase is negligible. Either people do not understand it or it is being used at the wrong echelons.

[Ken White]

It will simplify some things and complicate others. As Bob said, both are good, complement each other and both -- or either -- is not a panacea. They're simply tools.

Among other things, adopting Design is an admission that the Army's training system doesn't work as well as anyone would like and that trying to break things down to the lowest common denominator is not a good plan for either understanding combat skills or teaching how to think versus what to think.

So the good news is that we're exploring design; the bad news is that the Army is still determined to put square pegs in round holes by trying to produce processes that can be learned to produce effective commanders and staffs.

Won't work; some can, some can't. All talents are not equal. A solution to do the best we can with what's available for a mobilizing large, draftee Army is a good and necessary thing -- but put it on the shelf until it's required and until then treat the smaller professional Army as what it is -- a small professional Army. Place the gifted and intuitive in command, there must be a way to convince Congress that's important, more important than trying to equalize outcomes...

[Rob Thornton]

Bob's World said:

Both are good tools, both can be abused, neither stands alone; and both can be "over-doctrinized."

Design helps you get the problem (more) right by supporting the establishment of a hypothesis (X is the problem) and from which a theory (e.g. if I take the following actions (Y) they will/may result in a range of possible outcomes (Z,Z1, and/or Z2, etc.). You can then explore that range of possible outcomes to develop an operational approach.

The goal is to figure out which conditions associated with the problem must change in order to bring about a desired or tolerable outcome (possibly for more participants than just your team), then figure out the actions or tasks which will bring about those conditions.

During the actual execution design is handy to look at how things are progressing, and/or how the introduction of new factors affect the desired outcome. This may cause you to "reframe" your problem.

It may be useful here to have a way to measure those changes in conditions to which you have designated tasks to see if you are doing the right things, and to measure the performance of those tasks to see if you are doing the right things well. This however is not part of design as I understand it, but is still prudent and useful as there are a number of things that may be changing or resisting changes.


Enter MDMP -

Sooner or later once a decision has been made to do something, physics become an issue. Analytic processes such as MDMP get to the nuts and bolts (details) of moving stuff around, synchronizing time tables, etc. MDMP is therefore a useful tool to get after the details and the mechanics - there is not much theory here, but there is allot of action

As Ken points out -

trying to break things down to the lowest common denominator is not a good plan for either understanding combat skills or teaching how to think versus what to think.

which I think leads to COL Jone's point about part of what leads to "over-doses of doctrine".

Both processes should remain descriptive as much as possible to allow for flexibility in execution. To chew on something till its bland enough for everyone may lead to something less than useful.

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

Rob, over at the COIN website we had a short discussion about design and I mentioned a guy.... he was a retired Col. I think Papa something??? he was doing some research and discovered that the US was the product of Operational Design....which is absolutley true, it is designed to work a specifc way and we violate that at our own peril!!! It seperates problem solving from solution planning (MDMP) two very distinct functions but they both go togather. To me it is EBO with a good dose of Army practicality thrown in,otherwise known as systems developement/thinking.

[Rob Thornton]

Slap,

Well and concisely said:

It separates problem solving from solution planning (MDMP) two very distinct functions but they both go together.

I'd probably just add in "problem identification" in front of "problem solving".

To me it is EBO with a good dose of Army practicality thrown in,otherwise known as systems development/thinking

I think General Mattis made a good point, at least that is how I read it - that an "effect" is simply a change in a "condition", which if if correctly identified is the "purpose" of the actions you take. The important thing here is understanding the purpose to which you are applying effort before deciding on the task. Most folks think in "task/purpose", this helps you think in "purpose/task". That makes it allot simpler for me.

Best, Rob

[Hacksaw]

Design is a poorly understood process because few people really agree as to what design is... much less how one goes about doing it...

I've had opportunity to discuss design with those who are knee deep in trying to describe the process for doctrinal purposes... I'm still not convinced that it really falls outside of mission analysis (a real mission analysis as opposed to a rushed assembly of running estimates - which at times is appropriate and necessary, but is not mission analysis - more like mission bisection)...

I'm all for those at strategic and operational level thinking through a situation before telling the boots on the ground how to suck the egg... I also think its great if they just maybe talk to those same "doers" before putting options in front of a 4-star that fail to pass the FAS test... If Design in some ways does this or better encourages this... I can live with that... But its ironic...

SAMS is the mother, or at least the champion, of Design...

SAMS is also the mother, or at least the flame keepers, of Army Planners/Planning...

A supposed (and in my experience - real) value of SAMS was the relationships and ability to leverage those to cut across organizations and talk truth to each other...

Not casting stones, but has this diminished???

I suppose the need for design may be a function of senior leader proclivities... I've worked for senior leaders who's expectation was a "design" level of mission analysis... I've worked for others who complained that those type of details made their heads hurt...

Perhaps the adoption of something called "Design" will provide the junior leaders/planners who work under "MG Headache" a leverage point when the boss wants to wave off everything that doesn't fit into his preconceived notion of the world...

Either way... Design in no way replaces MDMP for all the reasons above... at some point Newtonian physics have to be considered... A BCT still requires x amount of gas, y time to pass when on an MSR, and needs z number of bullets, etc etc etc... and Design in no way addresses those issues...

Lastly, the idea that this is a useful tool at the tactical level in time constrained environments is laughable - unfortunately its also a matter of discussion... ugh

[Menning]

For anyone who hasn't seen it, you can download a copy of Design: Tools of the Trade here.

[Steve Blair]

..........(ten characters)

[jenniferro10]

Originally Posted by Bob's World

Anyone pimping "design" who does not understand how it is an enhancement of MDMP, not a replacement to it, simply does not understand the essence of design.

Both are good tools, both can be abused, neither stands alone; and both can be "over-doctrinized."

I, too, was wondering why Danger Room seemed to think the two were mutually exclusive.

[Ken White]

overly enamored of using acronyms they didn't comprehend to show they were connected and on the inside -- even though they may be the former to a slight extent, they never are the latter to any extent (with rare exceptions) -- and were quick to applaud anything 'new' as a change from the old way of doing business -- even if, as is generally true, it is just a new name for old tricks. Unfortunately, it's a rare journalist today who really understands what he or she is writing or saying.

[jenniferro10]

Under the title "Design is..."
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/B...design-is.aspx

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by jenniferro10

Under the title "Design is..."
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/B...design-is.aspx

The problem here is one man. Shimon Naveh, a former IDF officer. He came up with SOD. By all accounts, the SOD he talked about with the US Army, is not the SOD he talked about with the IDF. Why is not entirely clear, but I've been looking into SOD for about 2 years now, and I see nothing of use to it. What is more, the IDF ditched SOD, for basically the same reason.

From talking to the few who actually study this area, it seems if you understand the campaign planning processes which were around in European Army's between about 1870 and 1929, there'll be little anyone else can teach you.

[Spud]

Originally Posted by Menning

For anyone who hasn't seen it, you can download a copy of Design: Tools of the Trade here.

My apologies for dragging up a somewhat dated thread but I'm head down preparing a position paper on the applicability of design for us as part of my staff college work.

Been reading far too much on operational art and operational design over the past few weeks and finally stumbled on this document by Dr Jack (thanks Menning)

After reading it (which is thankfully a very easy read after some of the papers I've struggled through recently) I remain concerned with a couple of things. Forgive me if there are some cultural misunderstandings that lead to my concerns ... we are only separated by the same language after all

Firstly I get the feeling (like that articulated by Hacksaw) that this new focus on Design is actually in response to some commanders getting it and others not (particularly after watching HBO's Gen Kill over the past few nights). From my reading so far it seems to provide new words for what I would have considered common-sense in command and leadership. Perhaps I'm looking at this wrong but reading it all I'm becoming increasingly concerned with professional military competence if we have to spell out in such detail that #### happens in war and that you need to be flexible and adaptive to maximise opportunities for success. Chapter 8 in this paper (Ridgeway in Korea) does not highlight the value of design to me at all ... it highlights the value of competent command and leadership. Frankly if we're not doing the things that General Ridgeway saw as essential on taking command there is a far greater issue at stake here and that goes to the very core of PME.

Secondly (and perhaps my greatest issue) is that Design seems to be offered as the panacea for the constraints imposed on modern combat operations through its ability to ensure we are solving the right problem. This is great if we are divorced from policy but we're not. The planners back in 02/03 identified the post conflict problem and attempted to ensure it was addressed (or that at least forces were there to adapt to the problem if it did ensue) yet the constraints placed on them led them to refocus their efforts. Identifying the problem is all well and good but the nub of it is the ability to do anything about it. In our case it is the constraints imposed on our level and type of commitment that define the problem that we can solve not the problem that needs solving. It leads to the "niche capability" and "punching above our weight" tripe that we offer as an excuse for limited action while still being a great Coalition partner.

My head hurts even more now.