Afghanistan and U.S. Interests: Kotkin vs Nagl

[Bob's World]

The first question one must always ask is "What are our National Interests?"

The Washington Post ran this quote from John Nagle on 31 August:

JOHN NAGL

President of the Center for a New American Security

America has vital national security interests in Afghanistan that make fighting there necessary. The key objectives of the campaign are preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach and ensuring that it does not become the catalyst for a broader regional security meltdown. Afghanistan also serves as a base from which the United States attacks al-Qaeda forces inside Pakistan and thus assists in the broader campaign against that terrorist organization -- one that we clearly must win.

U.S. policymakers must, of course, weigh all actions against America's global interests and the possible opportunity costs. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, low-cost strategies do not have an encouraging record of success. U.S. efforts to secure Afghanistan on the cheap after 2001 led it to support local strongmen whose actions alienated the population and thereby enabled the Taliban to reestablish itself as an insurgent force. Drone attacks, although efficient eliminators of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders, have not prevented extremist forces from spreading and threatening to undermine both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The so-called "light footprint" option has failed to secure U.S. objectives; as the Obama administration and the U.S. military leadership have recognized, it is well past time for a more comprehensive approach.

In a well-stated countering perspective, Major Jeremy Kotkin published the following piece here in the SWJ that argues in fact that we have no such National Interests at stake. Though Jeremy is a bit of a protégé' of mine, and a co-worker here in the Strategy Division at USSOCOM, these thoughts are his own. Jeremy makes a good case, and it is one grounded in sound history as well as the principles of Strategy and Insurgency. Frankly, Dr. Nagl's argument has no such foundation to rest upon.

For your consideration: U.S. National Interests and Afghanistan; and the young, untested Major Kotkin vs. the CNAS machine and Dr. Nagl


http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...hanistan-in-t/

[omarali50]

with apologies for rampant cross-posting:
I am going to stick my neck out and make some predictions (as an amateur with nothing to lose):
1. Af-pak is a cash cow for the Pak army, the insurgents, the afghan govt and assorted warlords. They have been in this trade so long, they are really really good at it. They will keep the temperature warm enough to keep things flowing, but not hot enough to scald. There is also a lot of US prestige and credibility at stake (such things do exist). Then there is the bureaucratic inertia of the US establishment. Maybe we should factor in some actual corruption (in the sense of US officers whose direct financial interests are tied with this policy). Finally, India and China and Russia and Iran do NOT want a jihadi takeover of Afghanistan, but are OK with seeing the US bleed a little in the process (well, maybe not India, not the bleeding part; they are probably the closest thing to a genuine ally in this endeavor, but they are also the most rickety state on that list, so they count for less). SO, the prediction is that all these forces will conspire (sometimes literally, mostly indirectly) to keep the US in Afghanistan doing recognizably similar things to what it is doing right now, for at least 2 more years.
2. The really mad cow jihadis are enough of a headache for pakistan that they will need to be fought. The army will try to convince some to go to Kashmir and others to join the "good taliban" (aka Haqqani network??) but there are true believers in that party and they are the wild card. They can upset the best laid plans of mice and men. 0ne really big attack in India or the US and all bets are off. No prediction.
3. I think the US is not impossibly far from a workable afghan govt but if the current Karzai setup is the best they can do, then it doesnt look like it will work. On the other hand, maybe the embassy is not clueless and they have a cunning plan. Prediction: I am unable to decide so I tossed a coin (literally) and came up with this: Miracle Max will deliver. The US will stabilize a near-workable Afghan govt enough to make a legitimate drawdown in 5 years (not a Saigon embassy helicopter scene). A jihadist insurgency will continue, just as it does in Iraq, and in time India and china and Pakistan and iran will have more to do with it than the US does, but it wont be a defeat. It will cost a hell of a lot of money and will finance many mansions in Pakistan, Afghanistan, England, and back in the US itself, where blackwater investors will be joined by discerning warlords and Pak army generals (who will buy ranches to escape the disorder back home).
Wishful thinking?
Comments?

[Ken White]

Quoth Nagl:

...The key objectives of the campaign are preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach and ensuring that it does not become the catalyst for a broader regional security meltdown. *

I wish he had expanded that and told the world how, without a multi-decade presence in Afghanistan, he proposes we might accomplish that...

...al-Qaeda forces inside Pakistan and thus assists in the broader campaign against that terrorist organization -- one that we clearly must win.

Clearly? I think not. If it were clear, then even I would see the logic and rationale. I do not. Some said we clearly had to win the 'Cold War.' I didn't see the logic there either -- and regardless of those who say we 'won' it, I suggest that the erstwhile opponent is still around and still causing minor problems. That's the key point -- minor. That, I suspect is the best we can hope for with Al Qaeda and it's clones, derivatives and Allies. We are not going to eliminate terrorism or Islamist fundamentalism. We can through many avenues reduce the problems they bring to an acceptably low level -- major military force is not one of those avenues at this point; it is, in fact, pretty close to counter productive.

As Major Kotkin says, Hezbollah is far more dangerous than is A.Q. and neither poses an existential threat. Both and their allies require a comprehensive diplomatic and low key SFA approach with enhanced strategic entry capabilities predicated on the probable force structure size limitations faced by the US. Executing a series 'COIN campaigns' is not only not the best answer, it is a quite poor answer that will almost certainly fail.

The so-called "light footprint" option has failed to secure U.S. objectives; as the Obama administration and the U.S. military leadership have recognized, it is well past time for a more comprehensive approach.

Obviously, Doctor Nagl's math and mine differ.

The US and NATO plus any nascent Afghan forces do not and will not have the manpower to provide anything other than a light footprint. The objectives -- if they are cited above (*) -- are not attainable at an affordable cost and they need a more comprehensive re-look.

I do agree with him that a more comprehensive approach is needed -- simply comprehending that COIN efforts as a large force intervenor do not work would be a good start.

[Surferbeetle]

Omarali50,

Interesting posts as always.

Speaking of cross posting, while trying to gain a sense of things in Afghanistan a couple of economic questions have popped up and I would be interested in your take on things.

My understanding is that estimates as to the annual per capita GDP range from less than $365 (less than the 'magic' $1/day mark, my source is a 2004 World Bank Hydraulics & Hydrology Study of Afghanistan, Working Paper # 36, Water resource development in Northern Afganistan and its implications for the Amu Darya Basin) to $800 and that some of the small time poppy farmers are in the $6,000 range (WSJ article). Would you agree?

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by omarali50

...I am going to stick my neck out and make some predictions (as an amateur with nothing to lose):

1. Af-pak is a cash cow...There is also a lot of US prestige and credibility at stake (such things do exist). Then there is the bureaucratic inertia of the US establishment... keep the US in Afghanistan doing recognizably similar things to what it is doing right now, for at least 2 more years.

Probably correct. I think you have the timing about right as well -- I'd note that US domestic politics also intrude on the timing...

2. ... 0ne really big attack in India or the US and all bets are off. No prediction.

I'd add Europe as well.

3. ... The US will stabilize a near-workable Afghan govt enough to make a legitimate drawdown in 5 years (not a Saigon embassy helicopter scene)...Wishful thinking?

Probably not. Pretty close to right, I'd say, though I might go with "...five years -- or less."

[omarali50]

I deliberately left Europe out of the picture. Lets say there is a big attack on London: my guess is the majority of the British people (and CERTAINLY a majority of the British press) will blame the British presence in Afghanistan and suggest a pullout. Same for most other NATO countries. Subsequently, there may well be a rise in nativist/fascist nonsense and life will become harder for the various islamists who still get welfare payments (their number is probably decreasing anyway) but it wont lead to a re-invigorated mission in Afghanistan. Or am I completely off?
One can also imagine an attack in China: That would lead to a large number of detained Uighurs suddenly dying in a tragically failed jailbreak, followed by a meeting with the Pakistani ambassador and then the Pakistani airforce will go out and bomb 10 or 15 villages and compounds in Waziristan and desperately look around for some Uighurs they can round up and put on a plane to Urumqi. And more Chinese special forces will enroll in that pushto and dari training school in inner Mongolia or whatever (I hear the Chinese are great at thinking ahead). Still, no immediate change in Afghanistan.

[omarali50]

Originally Posted by Surferbeetle

Omarali50,

Interesting posts as always.

Speaking of cross posting, while trying to gain a sense of things in Afghanistan a couple of economic questions have popped up and I would be interested in your take on things.

My understanding is that estimates as to the annual per capita GDP range from less than $365 ...l"]$800[/URL] and that some of the small time poppy farmers are in the $6,000 range (WSJ article). Would you agree?

I dont know any official figures, but have a couple of anecdotes:
The average Afghan is dirt poor. Our family used to send something like 30 dollars a month to a family in the khyber agency and they were eternally grateful. They are also verry very hardworking and reasonably honest as long as they regard you as part of the community. Their first instinct is NOT to be a freeloader. Pathan taxi drivers in the Gulf states run their own informal insurance scheme and its much much better than any "regular" insurance company. The average pathan is not a blood thirsty killer, he is a very hardworking protocapitalist good citizen but lacks a functioning state...where they find a functioning state, they are better workers than the Chinese and almost as good in business.
2. The average drug dealer or smuggler is so rich its unbelievable. But I have no idea what an average poppy farmer makes.

[Ken White]

I think it would depend on the scale and location of the attack. Multiple attacks would have interesting effect on the European body politic...

I should have clarified that I was thinking long term and not Afghanistan specific.

Originally Posted by omarali50

...Subsequently, there may well be a rise in nativist/fascist nonsense and life will become harder for the various islamists who still get welfare payments (their number is probably decreasing anyway) but it wont lead to a re-invigorated mission in Afghanistan. Or am I completely off?

Not off IMO. I'm not thinking Afghanistan so much as the overall and long term effect. My "Uh-oh" scenario involves stupid attacks irritating Europe to the extent that they shake off the 'no more war' dream and get annoyed enough to respond. Forcefully.

One can also imagine an attack in China: Still, no immediate change in Afghanistan.

True. Plus as you say, China thinks ahead and has no qualms with using force internally.

[William F. Owen]

As Ken says, maybe the CNAS guys have lost the bubble.

I think it's worth noting that the CNAS guys don't come on SWJ, anymore. Maybe rigour isn't welcome. Be nice to be proved wrong - for real.

[slapout9]

Remember what I said the side with the most PH'D's will lose

[jmm99]

tell your sidekick MAJ Kotkin that I like his article, particularly his distinction between national interests and vital national interests:

from article, p.2
To be clear, a vital national interest is that which is directly tied to our national peace and security. If these interests are threatened the nation itself is at existential risk.

Somewhat similar thinking is found in Kilcullen's Chap 5 (of TAG) - turning the elephant back into the mouse.

And, there is no doubt that ...

...these thoughts are his own.

He did not use the phrase "good governance" once.

[Bob's World]

Originally Posted by jmm99

tell your sidekick MAJ Kotkin that I like his article, particularly his distinction between national interests and vital national interests:



Somewhat similar thinking is found in Kilcullen's Chap 5 (of TAG) - turning the elephant back into the mouse.

And, there is no doubt that ...



He did not use the phrase "good governance" once.

Jeremy came back from his War College training all "regimented" so to speak, and I've been working hard to corrupt him, but he holds his ground and thinks well for himself.

Of course, to be fair, the article is about US National interests, and not the nature of insurgency, so he did well not to just sprinkle around buzz phrases that are totally irrelevant simply to impress his boss!

[Bob's World]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

As Ken says, maybe the CNAS guys have lost the bubble.

I think it's worth noting that the CNAS guys don't come on SWJ, anymore. Maybe rigour isn't welcome. Be nice to be proved wrong - for real.

CNAS has been very successful, puts out some good thoughts, and has tremendous influence currently.

They also are getting into a sticky area of conflicting interests. I suspect Ms Flournoy would like to compete for the SecDef job, and by all accounts she is qualified. John may have an eye on Mr. Vickers office as well....who knows. Like I said, success no matter how well earned creates conflcts of interest that can shape the positions one takes.

I suspect the President may well feel compelled to take a hard stance on Afghanistan for fear that he will be called out as totally soft on terrorism. These guys have to make hard choices, and there is no right answer. I wish the boss was getting better advice though. We don't need to get harder on terrorism, we need to get smarter, and that doesn't necessarily mean we have to become decisively engaged in a course of action in Afghanistan that may well fail the Suitable, Acceptable, Feasible test.

He needs someone to explain the concept of "Good Governance" vs. "Effective Governance" perhaps...

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by Bob's World

Jeremy came back from his War College training all "regimented" so to speak, and I've been working hard to corrupt him, but he holds his ground and thinks well for himself.

Of course, to be fair, the article is about US National interests, and not the nature of insurgency, so he did well not to just sprinkle around buzz phrases that are totally irrelevant simply to impress his boss!

He will do just fine.....as it appears he is a Wardenfile of the highest order

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by slapout9

Remember what I said the side with the most PH'D's will lose

Dave,loose is southern spellin

[jmm99]

insertion of and infiltration by the BW team into our little nation is definitely in progress - G-d help us !

In any event, Kotkin, welcome to the boondocks - have fun.

Cheers

Mike

-----------------------
PS: To which "failure of the CJCS during Viet Nam" do you refer in your post linked above ?

The 1954 "failure" stating in effect that Indochina was not a vital national interest for the US; the 1961-1962 "failure" in pointing out the force requirements and risks to hold the T-bone of Laos; or the later capitulation to "limited war" and "counterinsurgency" (on the cheap) after the Kennedy administration dumped Decker and others ?

[Entropy]

MAJ Kotkin's critique is, in my judgment, very good - one of the best I've read, in fact. Well done sir.

[kotkinjs1]

First, thanks to all who took the time to read my initial essay. However, what's becoming apparent by some of the responses is that its being translated to mean that I'm calling for a 'full and immediate departure' of Afghanistan - basically a cut and run. They, rightfully so, point to the damage that would have to our credibility across the globe because, right or wrong, we said that since we broke it, we'll fix it.

That's not what I'm proposing though. Just because a situation doesn't threaten our 'vital' national interests doesn't mean we should ignore it; just the opposite. National interests are still critical to promote (and that's they key word....versus 'enforce' or 'coerce by force') and there are instruments of national power and (thanks to 'Bob's World' for explaining this theory to me) concepts of full-spectrum deterrence to achieve them. Not only invasion, occupation, and nation-building through military intervention.

My last comment over at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...-in-t/#c004155 explains what I'm trying to say better.

And thanks again for all the constructive ideas. They are appreciated.

[omarali50]

cross posting again:
I think discussing the war as if its all about afghanistan (or afghanistan and pakistan) is also misleading. What IS the purpose of going to war after 9-11? Obviously the final purpose is not some kind of police mission to arrest a particular perp. IF that is the purpose, then this trillion dollar war is the most ridiculous possible way of going about it. You could have paid Musharraf 100 billion and had everyone in Alqaeda in Guantanamo in one month. The fact is, that is NOT the overall purpose. Let us define the overall purpose, then the purpose of each subsidiary operation can be debated…..
My contention is that the reasons include some combination of deterring future attacks like 9-11 (or worse) “by any means necessary”, making sure that no organized modern state in the Muslim world actively supports or even passively tolerates such terrorists, and perhaps, getting some other geopolitical benefits in the process. Is that a fair assessment?

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by omarali50

My contention is that the reasons include some combination of deterring future attacks like 9-11 (or worse) “by any means necessary”, making sure that no organized modern state in the Muslim world actively supports or even passively tolerates such terrorists, and perhaps, getting some other geopolitical benefits in the process. Is that a fair assessment?

My take has always been that the synergy of a number of things led to both attacks, that Afghanistan was a quid pro quo for allowing the paymaster who supported the 2001 attacks to live an operate there and the attack as mounted was pure serendipity in that what was available worked.

Attacking Iraq OTOH was a quid pro quo for 22 years of attacks emanating from the ME and was directed to Iraq because Saddam was a pariah and Iraq was geographically central to the ME. In the event, it did not work as well because what was available didn't know how to do what was asked of it -- which muted the intended effect but it has worked out fairly well so far which will not do as much good as had it gone well but is better then a total failure would have been. In the long term the view will be that the US wanted to get rid of Saddam and did that and that when the Iraqis asked them to leave, they did so.

Afghnistan is a work in progress. For both, the final results will not be truly known for some years. For both the lesson is the tool that is available gets used -- whether it's a good idea or not. The solution to that is to add to the tool box. Power saws are great but sometimes you need a Scalpel...