Eaton fires broadside at Cheney

[Old Eagle]

Doch. Wirtschaftswissenschaft -- Grundkurs/Einfuehrung usw, usf.

[John T. Fishel]

learn to speak about what you know and ask about what you don't know. The Americans here all understand what is meant by the shorthand term, Econ 101 (although the course I took was labelled Econ 1). I suspect the Canadians here would know the meaning of the shorthand as well. Others have explained the term to you so I don't have to.

Tequila, troops - that is trained troops - ARE a scarce resource. We simply don't have enough in theater to do what GEN McChrystal wants to do. In his analysis, he needs more of that scarce resource. From what I have read, we can come up with about 40k in relatively short order and still have troops available for other contingencies. But this number will stress the regenerative capacity of the Army and Marines. If we need more for this or some other contingency, where do we get them and what risk do we assume if we don't? The economists call this an analysis of "opportunity costs." BTW, although I usually make fun of economists for assuming away all the really important variables, in this case they really do make a contribution to our understanding of both the immediate problem and a useful link to the political cultural problem that we call (shorthand again) being casualty averse.

Cheers

JohnT

[Greyhawk]

...that troops were still at Keating (and other remote locales) because a final decision on strategy/resources had not yet been made. The plan to depart those locations goes back a ways (iirc one year, at least), but the final "do it" button was never pushed. The reason for that has never been clearly stated, though a post-battle WaPo account says it was due to everything but indecisiveness.

KABUL, Oct. 4 -- U.S. commanders had been planning since late last year to abandon the small combat outpost in mountainous eastern Afghanistan where eight U.S. soldiers died Saturday in a fierce insurgent assault.

The pullout, part of a strategy of withdrawing from sparsely populated areas where the United States lacks the troops to expel Taliban forces and to support the local Afghan government, has been repeatedly delayed by a shortage of cargo helicopters, Afghan politics and military bureaucracy, U.S. military officials said.

[Greyhawk]

Eaton on Iraq, to the the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, September 2006: "We are, conservatively, 60,000 soldiers short".

Eaton on Iraq, May 2007: "Now our military is overcommitted, and America is less secure. Mr. President, you're being told we need serious diplomacy, not escalation, and you're still not listening."

[Abu Suleyman]

Originally Posted by tequila

Except Abu Suleyman's argument doesn't seem predicated on resource constraint. We're not going to run out of soldiers or Marines anytime soon.

There are plenty of things that we are not going to run out of, perhaps ever in meaningful terms, but which still fall within the constraints of scarcity. Scarcity does not necessarily mean impending exhaustion of supply, but the presence of a limit, however large or small, and the value that we place on things because of said limit. In the case of lives, their innate value, which I initially feared was I had portrayed too lightly, is at least one of the major reasons we should spend our blood wisely.

Nonetheless, all military excursions are ones where we exchange blood and treasure for ... something. If we already know that we are not going to get what we want with the current strategy, we should immediately change direction. While we may not be able to get to the correct strategy directly, we should at least be exchanging our blood and treasure for the information of what might work eventually.

Think of the patrol that walks into an ambush. They know that they cannot stay where they are at, nor can they keep doing what they are doing. some of them will probably be killed no matter what they do, they will certainly be destroyed if they continue on their current course. While flanking left may not be the correct solution to resolve the problem, it will 1) buy them (a little) time and 2) give them information about how to resolve the problem ("oh, good their line end here" or "Nope, looks like they are on the right side" etc.). God help the patrol who in a similar situation the leader says "Let us take a moment to consider our direction carefully before we act," because many of them will soon meet him.

[Schmedlap]

Eaton had a crap reputation even prior to 9/11. He was one of the few senior officers outside of my chain of command whom I had actually heard of when I was a 2LT in 2000.

[Fuchs]

I encountered "Econ101" many times and it never made sense. I don't recall it ever being used in my presence for a basics course in economics . The others always used it to assert that their economic favourite idea was undisputable and correct.

Stuff like
"stimulus packages are always a good thing, that's Econ101", for example.

So blame me for misunderstanding the term if you want, but I blame those who distorted its meaning instead.

Originally Posted by Old Eagle

Doch. Wirtschaftswissenschaft -- Grundkurs/Einfuehrung usw, usf.

It's usually divided into BWL/VWL or Mikroökonomie/Makroökonomie. Wirtschaftswissenschaft is a degree programme, not a course afaik.

Intro courses are of marginal value in a discussion*. Intro course content is especially not basic truth, but instead it's a fundament (often used to teach method, not so much content) and the end product usually looks very different than the fundament suggested.

*: The Solow model (~Makroökonomie II) is one of the few really useful contents from early economic studies, as it helps to quickly explain (superficially) the quick post-WW2 recovery in former Axis countries.

[Tom Odom]

I encountered "Econ101" many times and it never made sense. I don't recall it ever being used in my presence for a basics course in economics . The others always used it to assert that their economic favourite idea was undisputable and correct.

Stuff like
"stimulus packages are always a good thing, that's Econ101", for example.

"stimulus packages are always a good thing, that's basic economics", for example.

So blame me for misunderstanding the term if you want, but I blame those who distorted its meaning instead.

No one blamed you for misunderstanding the term; I called you on your manners in presenting the issue--as did John T.

Tom

[jkm_101_fso]

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

Eaton had a crap reputation even prior to 9/11. He was one of the few senior officers outside of my chain of command whom I had actually heard of when I was a 2LT in 2000.

My old roomate at Campbell told me that Eaton "ruined Ranger school" and was a "sworn enemy" of the RTB.

[tequila]

Think of the patrol that walks into an ambush. They know that they cannot stay where they are at, nor can they keep doing what they are doing. some of them will probably be killed no matter what they do, they will certainly be destroyed if they continue on their current course. While flanking left may not be the correct solution to resolve the problem, it will 1) buy them (a little) time and 2) give them information about how to resolve the problem ("oh, good their line end here" or "Nope, looks like they are on the right side" etc.). God help the patrol who in a similar situation the leader says "Let us take a moment to consider our direction carefully before we act," because many of them will soon meet him.

Except it's a very, very far stretch to compare a tactical situation to a decision about strategy.

Again, please tell me how many troops are going to die because the President is taking a few weeks to actually analyze and decide what the proper course ahead should be, as opposed to deciding according to when you think he should?

[Entropy]

I think, for this war, the many months its taking to develop a strategy is not as bad as it could be. I don't think, for example, that political leaders could take that amount of time in a conflict like WWII. We can, in this conflict, more easily maintain the status quo while our leadership works through the strategy problem.

Still, in general, the sooner a strategy is formulated the better, because it's not as if the enemy is sitting still waiting for us.

[Schmedlap]

Originally Posted by jkm_101_fso

My old roomate at Campbell told me that Eaton "ruined Ranger school" and was a "sworn enemy" of the RTB.

That was part of it.

[Bill Moore]

I think, for this war, the many months its taking to develop a strategy is not as bad as it could be. I don't think, for example, that political leaders could take that amount of time in a conflict like WWII.

During WWII it was a hard fight to develop any consensus on our strategy in Europe, where we should open the first front, should we next go to Italy or the heartland, how do we divide the goodies between the allies, etc. In the Pacific Theater there was also considerable debate between Army and Navy approaches. In the Korean conflict there was considerable debate as in Vietnam, so what exactly is different?

The answer is 24/7 news, blogs, twitter, etc. that have to push hype to stay in business. Look beyond the hype and consider that strategic decisions are obviously of strategic importance and will impact our nation in a variety of ways (security, economically, etc.), so I think we can wait a few more days/weeks to get the best answer rather than rushing to support or deny GEN McCrystal's proposed strategy. We have national interests outside of Afghanistan also, so those who actually see and understand the bigger picture have to weigh the risk of surging in Afghan to those interests. I think we need to give it a break. War is hell, war is complex, and it has always been that way, and the nations (and world's) best minds should debate the issue fully. A tactical commander must make tactical decisions quickly, but strategic leaders generally do not, and they definitely don't for an insurgency in Afghanistan.

[John T. Fishel]

if it takes longer to decide on strategy but rather what the risks are to achieving our objectives. We know - as much as can be known - what it takes to defeat an insurgency. We have solid quantitiative and qualitative evidence. We know, for a fact, that a strategy built around a purely (or mainly) enemy centric approach will fail in Afghanistan on numerous counts. We can predict, with reasonable accuracy, what will happen if troop strength is not increased and we rely more and more on targeted drone strikes - and it is not a positive outcome. With a little less assurance, we can predict a negative outcome if additional troops are fed in too small increments over too long a time - we fail. So, the presidential decision is really whether the strategy GEN McChrystal has proposed meets the Acceptability component of the FAS test. Essentially, if it does not - if President Obama chooses not to resource it properly - then we must choose not merely a different strategy but a totally different objective and build a strategy to achieve it. I, for one, am not sure that any other objective is acceptable, nor am I sure it would be feasible. In the end, if we want to achievethe objective stated by President Obama, we really need to give GEN McChrystal the resources he says he needs. So, this debate over resouces is the wrong debate. The debate needs to be over ends/objectives. IMO changing the objective means accepting defeat.

On that cheery note...

JohnT

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by tequila

Except it's a very, very far stretch to compare a tactical situation to a decision about strategy.

Principles are principles and time is time. The parameters are different but the compressed time tactically is simple relaxed or more time strategically

Again, please tell me how many troops are going to die because the President is taking a few weeks to actually analyze and decide what the proper course ahead should be, as opposed to deciding according to when you think he should?

Hobson's choice? Unanswerable question as you know.

Moot point in any event. The Prez will take his time and make a decision -- it is highly unlikely to change much on the ground no matter what that decision is. It is an almost certain fact that if we remain in Afghanistan, there will be more casualties. The prime determinant of the number of those will most likely be time followed by enemy activity and own actions as contributors. The enemy activity cannot be predicted with any reliability and it is, regrettably, probably going to drive the latter consideration. Bill Moore said it well:

"I think we need to give it a break. War is hell, war is complex, and it has always been that way, and the nations (and world's) best minds should debate the issue fully. A tactical commander must make tactical decisions quickly, but strategic leaders generally do not, and they definitely don't for an insurgency in Afghanistan."

This discussion of time / strategy is more politically than operationally pertinent.

ADDED: That statement by me in on way contravenes that just above by John T. Fishel. We're both correct as a change in strategy will be a political decision.

[slapout9]

I think Economics 101 is a very good analogy as it relates to the Means portion of the Strategy equation. In Econ 101 you learn about Supply and Demand, if your Strategy requires a certain demand for People,Guns and Money and you don't establish a reliable Supply Mechanism to maintain the appropriate level. Then you just guaranteed the outcome......which is one you want like

[Shek]

Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

Finally, while I am not defending Dick Cheney at all, my main take away from his speech was that the president should stop pondering his navel and do something. For all the Bush administrations many flaws, it was decisive. I was always taught, and continue to believe, that in war the best thing you can do is the right thing. Then next best thing you can do is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing. Put another way, it is hard to correct your course, if you aren’t moving at all.

In other words, get the lead out and make a decision, before someone else makes it for you. Indeed no decision is a decision all to itself. I don’t think that this is an unrealistic request since this is the president who was supposed to have superior judgement, be ready day one, will listen to his generals, and already issued the Afghanistan plan. I don’t buy the ‘we need more time’ thing. If time were such an issue, then perhaps we could put Health Care, Global Warming, The Olympics, Harvard Professors et al. on the back burner for a couple of weeks, and sort this out. After all, soldiers are dying now, and Commander in Chief is actually a Constitutional responsibility of the President.

Abu S,

A few points/questions:

1. If the President made a decision two weeks ago to adopt a troop increase, when would the first brigade be available to deploy? Would it be time now? Would it be the brigade that just got pulled off the hook for Iraq? Would it be a different brigade based on matching task org with the required mission in Afghanistan? I'm not looking at a specific answer as we'd then be traveling down the OPSEC path, but it's quite possible that waiting for several weeks/months doesn't change anything at all.

2. If the assessment determines that the current strategy is the way forward based on the value of the object in view, the means required to work towards the object, and the risk that the strategy takes on, then how does the timing change anything?

3. Here's a potential scenario: The administration has already made their decision, but is delaying a pro-forma decision and is instead continuing to "deliberate" so that it builds political support for the decision. Doing this ensures that GEN McChrystal will be able to prosecute the strategy without major domestical political hindrance unless the 2010 elections create a mandate for "change." Not doing so means that the heat of the 2010 elections only gives GEN McChrystal six months to demonstrate success or else we abandon a superior strategy.

All of the above scenarios lead to the conclusion that an immediately executed decision may not change anything and in fact, may even cost more lives. What we are forgetting here is that strategy is not made and executed in a vacuum, but that domestic politics plays a role (and it should, after all, war is about pursuing policy/political objectives) both in shaping the strategy and assessing the strategy.

In fact, I'd offer that calls to make an immediate decision may actually harm the process. Right or wrong, the reality is that a quick decision could appear to be the result of the administration kowtowing to the military and the GOP, which only stands to discredit Obama amongst the base and make it less likely for a strategy to have staying power as it is executed.

[Ken White]

Wisdom from the Hudson. Amazing...

[Shek]

Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

Nonetheless, all military excursions are ones where we exchange blood and treasure for ... something. If we already know that we are not going to get what we want with the current strategy, we should immediately change direction. While we may not be able to get to the correct strategy directly, we should at least be exchanging our blood and treasure for the information of what might work eventually.

A few more comments

1. "Immediately" in the context of national decisions takes a long time. It's like trying to turn a zodiac (tactical) vs. a supertanker (strategy). Furthermore, to be logical, you should change direction based on comparing the new vs. the old, not simply drawing up a new and then go charging after it. I don't know exactly how long GEN McChrystal had to draw up his assessment, but given that it was a few months, how long is sufficient for the NSC to digest it?

2. We have an assessment from an operational commander. Resourcing him means that those resources aren't available to other operational/theater commanders. What are the unintended consequences? North Korean adventurism? Chinese adventurism? Shia or Sunni adventurism in Iraq? It's simply not a matter of just rubberstamping GEN McChrystal's report, but looking at the second and third order effects.

3. Strategy isn't a binary approach - either you can achieve your OBJs or not. Instead, it's along a probabilistic continuum and the question is do we accept the risk. So it's not a question as you state that "we are not going to get what we want," but rather, what is the risk that "we are not going to get what we want" and is that acceptable or not based on the means spent. We should be careful in making absolute statements when assessing strategy.

[Shek]

Originally Posted by Ken White

Wisdom from the Hudson. Amazing...

Oops, need to change the location. Gravitation pull has pulled me closer to the Beltway