Quick question about parapets

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

It would take thorough deliberation to draw a mroe stupid picture than this one:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...3/IMG00077.GIF
Almost everything is wrong in it.

That's what happens when you hire civilian educators to develop training and doctrine materials...

[Fuchs]

It reminds me a lot of ~1900 exercise field fortifications. It's just a bit too empty for a 1900 illustration, of course.

The rest of the manual has many very elaborate buildings (supposed to be field fortifications) that would be inadequate for peacekeeper outposts, too easily hit in static warfare and too elaborate for mobile warfare.

Field fortifications and field manuals seems to be a NATO-wide if not world-wide problem. The state of the art seems to lag behind technology by decades, and many field manuals lag behind the state of the art by even more decades.

Germans and Austrians rarely create grenade sumps, for example.
The Bundeswehr did (and I think it still does) prefer field of fire absolutely over protection - as if it was still in the "our MG42 provides 80% of the squad's firepower and the squad only has one, therefore it needs maximum field of fire!" mode despite the introduction of automatic rifles and two MG4 into the squad.

And then there's the generally stupid idea of trenches in open terrain. That's easy to illustrate - and idiotic.


Field fortifications is one of the topics that promise a rude awakening in the next great war. The peacekeeping and small war above-ground fortifications surely did much harm to the idea of field fortifications.

[Firn]

A blast from the past. It might be a partly biased work, but it doesn't seem to me that this bias extens into core of the subject. The threat of enemy fire was certainly a bit larger back in those days.

Firn

[Cole]

Fuchs, believe many OPs/COPs/FOBs effectively protect Soldiers and would protect ANA after we leave. Others, not so much. Consider the following:

1) Insurgents use massed RPG fire in Afghanistan as surrogate artillery
2) Currently inaccurate harassing mortar/rocket fires may not always be as inept...plus GPS mortars and smaller rockets will come sooner than we think
3) Population-centric COIN requires closer COP proximity to villages which increases risk of attack and provides cover for attackers
4) Current HESCO bastion provides potential for rapdily created above ground "trenches" and even "walls" for rooms

My personal belief is that COPs in particular should have smaller interiors to reduce probability of interior impact by RPGs or mortar/rocket fire. The tendency to have lots of wooden buildings and flammable roofs that can burn ala COP Keating is another weakness. A reporter or Soldier had made a YouTube video of COP Keating which showed its weaknesses because it was built in an earlier time when the threats were not as great. It not only was below nearby steep mountains, but did not appear to have many towers or defensive positions. Another YouTube seemed to confirm the lack of defenses as a UH-60 took off and someone filmed the entire COP.

In contrast, I've seen promotional material for HESCO showing a PLS-like flatrack holding a container with HESCO deploying hundreds of feet in a matter of seconds, ready to be filled with dirt/rocks. The container itself can also be used as a room in between the HESCO. Place those seven foot tall, 100 foot long barriers about 9' apart from each other in parallel and it creates rows of trench-like rooms that just require mortar-resistant overhead cover. Use bunkbeds as coal mine-like bracing material.

The final component is vehicle fighting-positions within the COP to exploit M-ATV crew-served weapons capabilities when not patrolling. Create a one-way, one lane road within the HESCO perimeter walls (with rows of HESCO forming the rooms in the center) with firing positions at each corner to reduce opportunities for the enemy to hit the M-ATV with massed RPG fire as the enemy did at Wanat where the TOW vehicle and mortar HESCO position were in the open and targeted immediately.

There is a lack of concrete plants and it is difficult/expensive to get HESCO into Afghanistan and filled by engineers in a timely manner for newly arriving forces in new COPs. Given the same amount of HESCO, I contend you can either create:

1) Smaller HESCO perimeter COPs/OPs with interior trench-like HESCO rooms
or
2) Far larger HESCO perimeter COPs/OPs with exposed interior wooden buildings that still must be built and are a fire hazard with little overhead protection

As always, just my opinion with no commercial interests in HESCO.

[Ken White]

Almost no one has those today...

Hesco Barriers® are like MRAPs -- they have their uses AND misuses, advantages and disadvantages. The major disadvantage is that they provide a cocoon that most (not all) troops (and their leaders...) are reluctant to leave and thus discourage aggressive action and provide a generally false sense of security. That doesn't even address the concurrent lack of mobility and thus flexibility...

The cost of mass Armies is becoming increasingly unaffordable, the nation(s) that break(s) the small but very high quality plus the intelligence / flexibility / speed barriers is/are the one(s) that will win most fights.

So called COIN operations using mass armies have never worked unless a degree of (today) unacceptable harshness was used. Those days are gone and have been since 1945. We need to back off this fetish with 'fixing broken nations. Abysmal stupidity!

[Pete]

Fuchs, the link below to the Charles B. MacDonald book The Siegfried Line Campaign, U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1963, probably won't tell you anything that you don't already know, but the photographs and architectural drawings are interesting. The author received his introduction to combat as an infantry company commander during operations in 1944 against these defenses.


http://www.history.army.mil/books/ww...-ch02.htm#p33b

[Fuchs]

"Defensive operations are a product of mass armies.
Almost no one has those today..."

Field fortifications are about protection, not about defensive operations.

You should dig in while resting, while waiting (marshalling areas are shell magnets!) and you may dig in to prepare for an ambush.

The perception that "dug in = static defensive" is widespread and wrong.
This mistake is probably part of the problem with modern field fortifications (the lack of experience after WW2 being the greater one).


It's too enticing, so I'll drop a few more lines:

The exploitation of the superior strength of tactical defensive is a smart move (and often done) on the offensive.
A classic example is the use of ambushes after overtaking a withdrawing enemy during a pursuit. Rommel's book provided a stunning anecdote that nicely illustrates the point (how he supposedly eradicated a regimental-sized marching column by taking its soldiers captive one vehicle at a time behind a turn of a road ... after infiltrating with units relatively deep into opfor country).
One of the most successful German tank commanders of WW2 (great Colonel, poor General) was also extremely successful by infiltration+ambush.
A recent Israeli urban combat tactic is apparently all about setting up ambushes indoors while advancing (that takes time, of course).


In short: Stuff associated with defence can also belong into the advisable repertoire of offence.

[Ken White]

I didn't.

Neither a Hesco Barrier® nor an MRAP have much to do with field fortifications.

Which has little bearing on the fact that I do not agree with the excessive digging many advocate. There is a time and place and I've dug a hole or two in as hard a soil as anyone but excessive use is just like those Hescos and MRAPs -- it breeds an 'I'm safe here' mentality and a reluctance to move. In any serious war, one either moves or one dies.

That simple. This is true:

This mistake is probably part of the problem with modern field fortifications (the lack of experience after WW2 being the greater one).

You're also 100% correct on the marshaling areas. Which is one reason their use should be avoided where possible; they're necessary for marginally trained troops -- that mass Army thing again -- but not necessary for well trained units.

[davidbfpo]

I have followed this thread and note the art of fortification does make rare appearances, oddly always around Hesco barriers and introduction over those interested in such matters may find this website useful:http://www.fsgfort.com/. It belongs to the Fortress Study Group, which I am member of and historical field fortifications do appear.