Wargaming

[John]

I am currently in CGSC and a SAMS selectee. Deployment experience and now the word of academics has led me to believe the Army no longer has a viable model for wargaming for stabilization / counter-insurgent operations. The linear process is no longer feasible given the number of variables, threats, competitors, etc. (i.e. action, reaction, counteraction is a thing of the past).

I am beginning my thesis research in this area of wargaming. Specifically looking at a model that provides an idea of what questions should be looked at. Honestly, I am not convinced that wargaming is feasible given the complexity of influences along a given LOE.

Thoughts and perspective would be appreciated.

Cheers
John

[jcustis]

You've probably already seen his posts if you conducted any degree of forum searches, but I recommend that you might want to talk with member Nichols first and foremost.

[Rex Brynen]

Originally Posted by John

I am beginning my thesis research in this area of wargaming. Specifically looking at a model that provides an idea of what questions should be looked at. Honestly, I am not convinced that wargaming is feasible given the complexity of influences along a given LOE.

Thoughts and perspective would be appreciated.

I think, as a first step, one needs to think about what one is wargaming, and why.

Is it for purposes of training? In that case, a well designed wargame can highlight operational complexities, and identify the sorts of questions, issues, and challenges that COIN and stability operations present. (On the other hand, if it implies to much clarity about this, I think it sends all the wrong signals.)

Is it for the purpose of operations planning? Here I'm much more dubious, although one can imagine wargame designs that help to identify possible responses by insurgents and others.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by John

I am currently in CGSC and a SAMS selectee. Deployment experience and now the word of academics has led me to believe the Army no longer has a viable model for wargaming for stabilization / counter-insurgent operations. The linear process is no longer feasible given the number of variables, threats, competitors, etc. (i.e. action, reaction, counteraction is a thing of the past).

Warfare has never been linear, and the number of variable is quantifiable. This is just irregular warfare as opposed to regular warfare. You merely have to replicate the Ends, Ways and Means in a form that delivers the product you want. FIGHTING Irregulars is not very different from Fighting Regulars. War gaming really only works at the tactical level, so I suggest that is the limit of your enquiry.

I am beginning my thesis research in this area of wargaming. Specifically looking at a model that provides an idea of what questions should be looked at. Honestly, I am not convinced that wargaming is feasible given the complexity of influences along a given LOE.

Do you mean "gaming" or simulation? What is the exam question? ( see REX ) Warfare today is no more complex than it was 3,000 years ago. If you assume it is, you've just backed yourself into a corner.
Killing bad folks = gets points. Killing civilians = loosing points.
Irregular warfare generally requires greater discrimination in order to support the Policy = do not kill civilians.

Actually there are at least two PC based simulations that already account for this, - and do it pretty well.

[Bill Moore]

John,

Sounds like an interesting project, but perhaps being too long in the tooth I remain a skeptic of any attempt to seriously replicate a stability operation. However, I still think a game could be useful in introducing multiple variables that a commander/leader will have to consider ranging from security to economic development to developing peace arrangements between different warring factions.

Ideally any game developed would allow the integration of key players from the interagency, NGOs, PVOs, multi-national partners; and portray a complicated/complex environment such as Bosnia, Somalia, etc. At the same time following Wilf's focus at the tactical level, we should be able to scale it down to the tactical level by focusing on particular military missions such a security operations, providing humanitarian assistance, etc. I don't think the tactical piece of the game is that hard. We actually played games like this during the 90's focused on Peace Operations that are a form of Stability Operation, so you don't have to reinvent the wheel.

I agree with Wilf that war isn't more complicated now than it was in WWI or during the Vietnam conflict, but simply that the environmental variables have changed. We're not worried so much about conducting operations that may cross the red line anymore resulting in superpowers slinging nukes at one another. Now we're more concerned about misstepping, thus allowing or causing pockets of instability to expand and destabilize entire regions. This is a strategic level consideration that will define your limitations at the tactical level. For the gamers at the tactical level you're given a mission, your limitations, an environment, and then you play the game and see what ideas it generates.

[BayonetBrant]

First things first, go find Dr James Sterrett on the sims team down in the basement of the L&C bldg, and have a long conversation with him. He's the wargaming guru down there, and has a great wealth of experience that can (at least) help point you toward some great resources. While you're there, ask him what the difference is between a "game" and a "sim" and see how long it takes him to ask "did Brant put you up to this?"

Second, and more to you direct area of interest - you need to ask what the point of the wargame is within the context you're observing. Part of what comes out of the MDMP wargame is the identification of key decision points, and the CCIRs that drive those DPs. Regardless of "linear" or not, that output is still relevant, significant, and useful.

MDMP wargaming for COIN is still branches, sequels, and FRAGOs, just much more divergent than before, and may require more nebulous descriptors than we've had in the past - especially at higher echelons where you increase the involvement of participants not under military control (DoS, USAID, etc). You're branches and sequels are no longer "what if they attack the flank" but now "what if they start bombing day-care centers".


However, let me also say that you can NOT throw out the 'conventional' type of MCMP wargaming any more than you can throw out the 'conventional' maneuver plan or 'conventional' combat doctrine of the US military. No other gov't agency in the US 'owns' warfare the way DoD does. Lots of people have a stake in COIN/nation-building, like DoS, DoJ, USDA, CIA, USAID, etc. Only one owns conventional warfighting, and if we don't do it, there's no backup plan.

[Surferbeetle]

Originally Posted by John

I am currently in CGSC and a SAMS selectee. Deployment experience and now the word of academics has led me to believe the Army no longer has a viable model for wargaming for stabilization / counter-insurgent operations. The linear process is no longer feasible given the number of variables, threats, competitors, etc. (i.e. action, reaction, counteraction is a thing of the past).

I am beginning my thesis research in this area of wargaming. Specifically looking at a model that provides an idea of what questions should be looked at. Honestly, I am not convinced that wargaming is feasible given the complexity of influences along a given LOE.

Thoughts and perspective would be appreciated.

Hi John,

Simulations and models are pretty powerful tools as long as we keep in mind that they are simplifying and incomplete representations of reality (perhaps comparable to Bertrand Russell's table).

SWC threads How to Win and Mathematics of War have some interesting points on the why's and how's of simulations. These post's (here and here) on concepts examined by others have sparked some thoughts.

I enjoy making simple models in excel (on occasion I also use mathcad & mathematica but it's rare) for engineering work and financial modeling. I enjoyed using the commercial simulations offered to us in mba school, and sometimes work with HEC-RAS while dabbling with HEC-HMS, Arcview and AutoCAD Civil 3D.

This is a thesis that I am exploring here at SWC. (Since that post I am presently defining War as being composed of various TTP, or warfare types, i.e. Conventional warfare, COIN warfare, etc. and have not changed my views that the nature of war is constant throughout these TTP).

The Jan/Feb 2010 edition of the Atlantic discusses military simulations in the article SimCity Baghdad by Brian Mockenhaupt.

Lieutenant Colonels Matthew Moore and Kevin Mindak repaired the airport, the bus terminal, and the water-treatment plant. They silenced three insurgent groups and won the support of many in Al-Hamra’. But the mayor, Anwar Sadiq, still spoke out against the U.S. Army battalion stationed in his town.

Steve

[Wargames Mark]

These might be of interest:

UrbanSim

Deep Green

I have been thinking about doing something very similar to the UrbanSim concept, but as a commercial product, and reflecting my own particular view of network defeat.

With regard to the Deep Green concept, anyone interested in it might also be interested in the subject of genetic algorithms (also, see the Robby the Robot examples on the net, such as this one. Read about GAs recently in Complexity: A Guided Tour).

[Rex Brynen]

Originally Posted by Wargames Mark

These might be of interest:

UrbanSim

You'll also find some discussion of UrbanSim, as well as links to some additional material on it, here.

[Wargames Mark]

Originally Posted by Rex Brynen

You'll also find some discussion of UrbanSim, as well as links to some additional material on it, here.

Good site you have!

[John]

All -

Thank you for the comments thus far. I am looking at the tactical level wargame, not unlike the MDMP that we currently use. My questioning is not based on a "game" or "sim", but the thought process required to understand competitors, tribes, etc. Further, I am not convinced, based on personal experience, that one can completely understand every effect on the battlefield. Nor am I attempting to develop a product to predict the future. However, I do propose that TTPs, good practices, in conjunction with current business models can provide an estimate of actions, reactions and counteractions.

I envision input from HTTs, PRTs, and others that provide insight and perspective to a unit's battlespace.

I understand John Nagle's comments that humans are involved and we cannot completely predict their actions. I concur, but submit we can do a better job of understanding trends, causes, and effects.

Regards

John

[Stan]

Originally Posted by John

My questioning is not based on a "game" or "sim", but the thought process required to understand competitors, tribes, etc. Further, I am not convinced, based on personal experience, that one can completely understand every effect on the battlefield.

I envision input from HTTs, PRTs, and others that provide insight and perspective to a unit's battlespace.

Regards

John

John,
Just my blind 2 cents, but a simulator or game cannot replicate the thought process of life on the ground. Only experience will provide the upper hand and even that's not a guarantee I'm willing to bet on.

You're on the right track in my opinion - There are many other players out there that we tend to ignore when it comes to fully understanding the playing field. I learned more from a bunch of mixed up expats in the bush than any other pre-deployment training program.

Regards, Stan

[Rex Brynen]

Originally Posted by John

My questioning is not based on a "game" or "sim", but the thought process required to understand competitors, tribes, etc. Further, I am not convinced, based on personal experience, that one can completely understand every effect on the battlefield. Nor am I attempting to develop a product to predict the future. However, I do propose that TTPs, good practices, in conjunction with current business models can provide an estimate of actions, reactions and counteractions.

I think this is the right approach to take. I would, however, be wary of excessively privileging the notion of "best practices" (which may be highly contextually dependent)--indeed, this is one of my concerns about UrbanSim, in that it potentially generalizes from one set of COIN experiences that may not travel well to other environments. (Then again, I haven't seen the actual simulator, only read the literature on it.)

Key, I think, is encouraging people to think about what questions they need to ask, what kind of dynamics they need to be alert for, and what kind of operational/economic/political/normative trade-offs they are likely to face.

Finally, we need to prewarn people in a sophisticated way about "worst practices"--that is, situations where well-intentioned actors make mistakes due to organizational pathologies, cultural baggage, inappropriate or unresponsive SOPs, etc. I've often found that my own students end up repeating many of the mistakes they've already read about--which provides a valuable opportunity to discuss how and why they did so.

[Eden]

Originally Posted by John

All -

Thank you for the comments thus far. I am looking at the tactical level wargame, not unlike the MDMP that we currently use. My questioning is not based on a "game" or "sim", but the thought process required to understand competitors, tribes, etc. Further, I am not convinced, based on personal experience, that one can completely understand every effect on the battlefield. Nor am I attempting to develop a product to predict the future. However, I do propose that TTPs, good practices, in conjunction with current business models can provide an estimate of actions, reactions and counteractions.

As someone who went through this process as a planner bound for Afghanistan in 2006, I can give you some insights - mostly negative 'cause I screwed up, but leavened a little in hindsight. I understand you are talking wargame not in the sense most of the posters in this thread have taken it, but in the Army planning sense of marathon sessions with some poor unfortunate posted at a matrix chart to fill out tiny boxes. The only good thing about them is that they were too boring for the generals to attend, so actual work does get done.

First, you can't expect the same level of fidelity you learn to strive for when planning a river crossing on the north German plains - you won't come away with "TF 1-23 LD 210330 at PP 1 & 2" or "Activate Branch Plan B if 3rd TA retains 75% of combat power". Second, it is much easier to talk yourself into things when wargaming counterinsurgency or nation-building, either out of ignorance or wishful thinking - or most likely both. "Yeah, if we kill or capture Mullah Omar the local elders will agree to promote recruitment for the ANSF" may sound reasonable, but it reflects an inappropriately linear faith in cause-and-effect that just doesn't hold when dealing with human hearts in a hideously complex operating environment.

You can't really wargame operations because in this environment they are spread out over months, not days, and because they are subject to incredible ethical, social, political, economic, and, yes, military stresses. They can also be radically affected by things that would normally be insignificant in a conventional setting: the death of a particular individual, the crash of a helicopter, an enterprising reporter, a phone call from a politician (or his brother-in-law), a case of collateral damage or fratricide.

You can and should wargame concepts of operations. Say you want to stop infiltration over the international border. You can wargame the concept fairly easily, along with the bad guys' likely reaction, possible counter-reactions, counter-counter-reactions, etc. You won't come away with details that will help in the day-to-day grind, but you can emerge with the following:

A rough idea of the problems that will crop up
A vague notion of the resources required for various levels of success
A primitive understanding of the political, social, and economic influences at work
A draft list of possible indicators and barely adequate measures of effectiveness/progress
A lot of blank spaces in your understanding and situational awareness that various staff weenies can go away to try to fill in

In other words, it is a brainstorming session with a modicum of discipline applied through adherence to normal wargaming procedures. Helpful, but not a silver bullet. It is really easy to allow it to focus directly on staff processes; try to avoid that as it will give the illusion of solutions without preparing you to face the messy realities on the ground.

One last word - get some real experts to role play during the wargame. Best solution would be to get guys currently on the ground, but that won't happen. Indigenous personnel, guys with past experience, academics, State guys, NGO reps, smart-ass captains who think they are smarter than every field-grade they ever met - these are the guys you want in the room, particularly on the 'red' team.

[marct]

All really excellent points, Eden. I'd like to elaborate on your last one:

Originally Posted by Eden

One last word - get some real experts to role play during the wargame. Best solution would be to get guys currently on the ground, but that won't happen. Indigenous personnel, guys with past experience, academics, State guys, NGO reps, smart-ass captains who think they are smarter than every field-grade they ever met - these are the guys you want in the room, particularly on the 'red' team.

There's two extrapolations that should be made here. First off, don't stick with Red and Blue teams; add in multiple additional teams, at a minimum add in one "team" for each lineage operating in the area, one for NGO's in the area, and one for the "press". On this "press" point, set up your game rules such that the press team gets points for "sensational" stories that make the administration and/or the military look "bad". That's not always the case by any means, but it's a factor to consider.

Second point, in addition to the types of people Eden suggested, get some precocious 12 year olds (a younger, more smart ass version of the CPTs Eden suggested), plus some old style, RPG gamers (preferably old DMs of the frakin' sneaky variety) who know a bit about current operations.

One final point, make sure that you have an umpire / ref who is not military. This is, actually, crucial - you want someone who can think totally outside of the doctrinal box. Personally, I'd suggest Rex !

[Ken White]

Also add a couple of sharp SFC/MSG types to your Red Team -- go for SFCs at a minimum because most have no problem speaking truth to power. Stop at MSG because they have not yet learned to make all their answers politically palatable. The NCOs will play dirty, even most CPTs will not.

[Steve Blair]

And be sure to get outsiders to play press and local interest groups. They're going to give you the most innovative and/or irritating performances, which is just what you need in that role. They'll be best able to shake up your regular participants and give them situations that won't be "in the book." Marc's comments are especially valid here.

[Hacksaw]

Thanks for writing what I was supposing I was going to have to (until of course I read your post)...

Rule one of MDMP: Understand the problem, if you don't, don't worry you will continue to return to Mission Analysis until you do...

Rule two of MDMP: If you come away with a shared understanding of the problem, the process largely served its purpose... because you can then develop...

(head node to Eden)

A rough idea of the problems that will crop up
A vague notion of the resources required for various levels of success
A primitive understanding of the political, social, and economic influences at work
A draft list of possible indicators and barely adequate measures of effectiveness/progress
A lot of blank spaces in your understanding and situational awareness that various staff weenies can go away to try to fill in

I think the intellectual discord John senses is that we have plenty of senior officers who just want a series of decision points and 3 x 5 cards handed to them at the end of the process as opposed to being an active participant at specific points in the process...

Live well and row

[Duckhunter]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Warfare has never been linear, and the number of variable is quantifiable. This is just irregular warfare as opposed to regular warfare. You merely have to replicate the Ends, Ways and Means in a form that delivers the product you want. FIGHTING Irregulars is not very different from Fighting Regulars. War gaming really only works at the tactical level, so I suggest that is the limit of your enquiry.

Do you mean "gaming" or simulation? What is the exam question? ( see REX ) Warfare today is no more complex than it was 3,000 years ago. If you assume it is, you've just backed yourself into a corner. Killing bad folks = gets points. Killing civilians = loosing points.
Irregular warfare generally requires greater discrimination in order to support the Policy = do not kill civilians.

I admit that I am new to this blog; however, I would like to respectfully disagree with Mr. Owen. I will start by saying that I am a current Army field-grade officer and CGSC student. Also, I have read many posts by Mr. Owen, and I find his comments to be largely lucid, intelligent, and well-said. Nonetheless, I feel obligated to disagree on many points in his post.

At first glance, there is nothing shocking (or shockingly wrong) with Mr. Owen's comments. However, as I read them more deeply, I think those comments are made without an appreciation for the complexity of a counter-insurgency.

First of all, he contends that

Warfare has never been linear.

Many historians argue that linear warfare was the norm until 1939, when the German blitzkrieg defeated Poland and essentially altered the nature of combat. This strategy (coined "third generation warfare" by the United States in 1989) focused on maneuver, speed, surprise, and synchronization to overwhelm the enemy. So, historically speaking, warfare was ENTIRELY linear before 1939.

When Mr. Owen states that

"Killing bad folks = gets points. Killing civilians = lossing [sic] points

I can't help but cringe a little. Clearly, killing civilians on a regular basis is not going to win any friends among the local population. However, "killing bad folks" is an oversimplification that borders on intellectual arrogance. First of all, how does one define "bad?" While this seems like an absurd question, there are countless levels of "bad," and not all of them should be solved with lethal fire. In many cases, it is actually preferrable to leverage lower-level criminals, insurgents, etc., as a way to glean more information about the higher-tier individuals. This is a fairly common practice in poorly-acted crime shows, but the fact is that it works on the ground in places like Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. So, no..."killing bad folks" does not necessarily get points. In some cases, the losses grotesquely outweigh the gains.

Finally, I take issue with the claim that

Warfare today is no more complex than it was 3,000 years ago. If you assume it is, you've just backed yourself into a corner.

I'm certain that every generation of veterans believe -and justifiably so, in my opinion- that they are fighting a different kind of war. But at no other time in history have the lines between tactical, operational, and strategic warfare been so blurred. The actions of a few Soldiers on the ground can produce second and third-order effects that immediately impact upon national strategy. A good, albeit overused example, is the Abu Graib scandal. The level of complexity that young men and women deal with while deployed is significant, as are the repurcussions of their actions. The slightest mistake is leveraged in the information age by insugents looking to capitalize from the fog of war. As the first conflict since the explosion of the Internet, the War on Terror makes headlines, across the globe, within minutes. That burden is heaped on the shoulders of young officers, NCOs, and enlisted personel. I think, in response to Mr. Owen's claims, that if you assume warfare today is the same as it was for the Doughboys of WWI, then you have, in fact, backed yourself into a corner.

I apologize for rambling. Again, I respect 99% of what Mr. Owen says. However, I did feel the need to voice a different opinion on this one post. Thank you for listening.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Duckhunter

Nonetheless, I feel obligated to disagree on many points in his post.

...and you are obligated. T'is why you are here!

First of all, he contends that Many historians argue that linear warfare was the norm until 1939, when the German blitzkrieg defeated Poland and essentially altered the nature of combat. This strategy (coined "third generation warfare" by the United States in 1989) focused on maneuver, speed, surprise, and synchronization to overwhelm the enemy. So, historically speaking, warfare was ENTIRELY linear before 1939.

Which historians? So the Greek Persian Wars were linear? Hannibal's campaign against Rome was linear? Wellington's campaign in Spain? The Spanish conquest of South America? The English Civil War? The US Civil War? ...and what does "linear" mean anyway? The first common and enduring use of the phrase "Front lines" - in Theatre terms - appears in WW1. It was never used in the same context before that.
There never was anything called "Blitzkrieg". It's baby talk, and the Germans never used the word. German operations in 1939 were based on tactical doctrine written in 1922/3 and that in turn developed from the Artillery Tactics of WW1 - often wrongly coined "Stormtrooper."

However, "killing bad folks" is an oversimplification that borders on intellectual arrogance. First of all, how does one define "bad?" While this seems like an absurd question, there are countless levels of "bad," and not all of them should be solved with lethal fire.

Killing the folks who oppose your policy is why you fight. "Bad" means exactly that. Warfare is about the breaking of will, via violence. All else is diplomacy.
Warfare requires killing. Killing is instrumental, so must be applied against the right people for the right reasons. Who you need to kill is why you have intelligence. FIND, FIX, STRIKE, and EXPLOIT works in all warfare, regardless of the enemy or the policy - and even Galula could not avoid that fact - he just couldn't admit it!

But at no other time in history have the lines between tactical, operational, and strategic warfare been so blurred.

Why are they blurred? What do you not understand?
a.) There is not an "operational level of war." There is tactics and strategy.
b.) Operations are those things an army does to ensure tactical action occurs in the time and place best suited to the political aims required.

The actions of a few Soldiers on the ground can produce second and third-order effects that immediately impact upon national strategy.

I submit winning the Battle of Waterloo (tactical action of a "few soldiers") had strategic effect!
300 Spartans did the same (in myth anyway).
5-10 Bombs dropped by 5-10 men, won the Battle of Midway.
One U-boat captain sinking the Lusitania provided the US with a pretext for War.

A good, albeit overused example, is the Abu Graib scandal.

Explain the actual strategic out come of Abu Graib? Give me facts. What did it actually change?

The level of complexity that young men and women deal with while deployed is significant, as are the repurcussions of their actions. The slightest mistake is leveraged in the information age by insugents looking to capitalize from the fog of war.

How is this new? WW1 was started by one assassination. What about a mistake by Nuke Boat driver in the Cold War?

As the first conflict since the explosion of the Internet, the War on Terror makes headlines, across the globe, within minutes. That burden is heaped on the shoulders of young officers, NCOs, and enlisted personel.

No it isn't. This is a myth. - and the internet and conflict existed well before 2001! War on terror? War on an abstract noun? It may be more complicated because Presidents do no understand the instrumental nature of strategy.

I apologize for rambling. Again, I respect 99% of what Mr. Owen says. However, I did feel the need to voice a different opinion on this one post. Thank you for listening.

No apology required. First call me Wilf and second, voice away.
-Point is, you seem to have brought into all the comforting myths of modern warfare that forgives folks not studying military history both in breadth and in depth. It is incredibly arrogant of the modern generation to assume they have it tougher or more complex.
It is simply without evidence. Confusion born of ignorance (no offence intended) does not mean "complex." Warfare has always been about the most complex human affair on the planet.
Loosing on Iwo Jima or Okinawa would almost certainly have had far greater strategic consequences than defeat/withdrawal in both Iraq or Afghanistan.
Washington loosing his entire Army in one administrative river crossing at Trenton would have had similar effect.