What would you change about current ops in Iraq?

[SSG Rock]

I'd like to take a moment to pick some brilliant minds here gentlemen if I may. If you had the authority to change anything we are doing in Iraq, what changes would you implement regarding military tactics, troop levels, equipment? The table is wide open, all the way to the nuclear option. Or, would you change anything at all?

[jcustis]

-Put more LAR on the ground. This would mean cutting the Okinawa rotation and mobilizing Reserve companies again. This is near and dear to me, and since this is my post, I get to make the recommendation

-Make advisor tours 14 months, and institute a volunteer/screening process. If a guy wants to go and is screened as an appropriate candidate, he goes. I'd rather see a unit give up it's best and brighest because the guy went willingly, as opposed to being a mandatory fill. 21-day train up, 30-day RIP, 10 months walking the beat with IA partners, 30 days RIP, and 30 days at FMTU.

-Get the Corps' FMTU in psynch (e.g. school seats, MTTs, exchange officers) with the JFK Special Warfare School, if it isn't happening already.

-Get around the B.S. of 1 or 2-man pre-deployment site surveys. Every company commander should have the opportunity to go and walk the ground.

-Charter and establish a COIN center of excellence in CONUS, now, or expand the scope/charter of the JFKSWS. It should be an Army and Marine affair to start. School seats should be purple, but I think we only need two branches of instructors for the time being.

-Start compiling AARs of advisor team actions, from the advised force (and not the HHQ talking heads in Baghdad) perspective. Despite all their idiosynchrasies, the Iraqis and Afghans aren't stupid. We can't afford to be narcissistic in this endeavour, and need a report card from all sides. Will it be realistic and devoid of flowery or hollow praise? Maybe not at first, but has it been tried?

-If the Army can publish On Point, I see no reason why the Corps cannot commission a compilation of journals from three IA advisors; One very successful, one who had a few issues, and the third being an advisor who had to fight hard to make everything happen. It doesn't even matter if it is ghost-written, as long as the salient points are published and reinforced.

Hope this develops discussion, though I am far from a brilliant mind.

[Jones_RE]

Establish joint US/Iraqi police forces. The Americans involved would not be soldiers - rather they would possess police powers chartered by the local government. The point is to allow members of the force to play a more inherently political role - which US military officers are subscribed from doing by their traditions. Stringent training requirements and a strict code of ethics would be indoctrinated in all officers - along with a period of training in US cities with large Arab populations or high crime rates.

Institute a program based on Combined Action Platoons to provide personal security to Iraqi communities.

Immediately assess, on a grid type basis, those areas of Iraq that are under the sway of insurgents, relatively peaceful or in between. Continuously update this assessment, based on voluntary cooperation with government forces, tax revenues collected, number and violence of attacks, etc.

Reorient the entire counterinsurgency effort to focus on consolidating our gains in one or two small safe areas (via CAP and joint policing) rather than a "fire brigade" approach of rushing reinforcements to the latest hotspot. I cannot stress enough the importance of small scale, successful operations to our overall efforts. It doesn't matter if it's some dusty little village no one has ever heard of - if it's possible to secure the thing and "innoculate" it against further insurgency then it's a victory. Frankly, right now we need victory. Once we've learned how to achieve a single victory, we can duplicate that success in other areas. It also builds credibility in a way no photo op or leaflet campaign ever will.

A complete reversal in prisoner/detainee treatment. All individuals under coalition custody should receive the very best treatment to include: the opportunity to write letters to family members (which may be read and/or censored as needed), clean and air conditioned living quarters, regular meals of the highest practical quality (which should be better than our troops eat), clean civilian clothes, access to religious counseling (even if only through a US military chaplain) and polite, respectful treatment at all times. An insurgent should feel like the guest of honor. I don't feel this level of treatment would be necessary in all situations, but it's important to make a clear change from past practices and abuses. There are countless examples of this kind of thing working for our enemies and treating prisoners well is the one thing totally under our control that would separate us from the insurgents in the minds of the locals (who should be thinking: the Americans will feed, shelter and respect me even if I'm not allowed to leave, the insurgents will torture me and then behead me. I'm for the Americans!).

Recruit from among captured insurgents for agents who will switch to our side. They are the single most effective weapon in guerilla warfare. Improvements in prisoner treatment will help a lot.

Change search procedures. Homes should be searched in groups - as many as possible at a time. However, the searchers must be accompanied by Iraqis of stature who will sign statements that property was not taken and female quarters were entered only by female personnel. Mosque searches must also be videotaped and the tapes/CDs distributed to locals after the fact.

When detaining an individual for interrogation or interviewing locals, many locals should be questioned so that the insurgents will not know who gave them up. Anonymity is the only security we can offer informants at this time.

Despite the above, soldiers are not to debate searches, interviews or arrests. Nor should they be deterred by local resistance - although firing on an unarmed mob isn't much of an option. That means training in riot control techniques and issuance of adequate less than lethal weapons, plus appropriate ROE.

Strongly consider relocating the seat of government to a safer area.

[carl]

Regarding Jones RE point 8, about taking steps to preserve the anonymity of informants.

Bing West mentioned just such steps being taken in Vietnam in his book "The Village". Hundreds of people at a time would be detained or questioned in order to conceal the identity of one or two.

[SSG Rock]

Although they have begun doing this on a smale scale, I believe in the strategy of breaking up the super base and moving our troops into towns to live among the people, I think that this is a demonstration of faith and good will and we will enjoy all kinds of benefits from it both tangeble and intangeble, afterall, this is about winning over the people more than defeating the insurgents. I have read articles that seem to indicate the Marines have been doing this but the Army isn't, I'm confused as to what the facts are. Of course we should leave some superbases in tact, and occupied for contingency purposes, and I'd leave the log and aviation units away from built up areas as well.

To me, this is all about denying the enemy freedom of movement and to do that we need to be where they want to be. Maybe establishing partnerships with IA would help in that regard. Even to the point that they co-locate on our bases to live, train and work with us, I'm not sure about this but maybe its something to kick around. I think the more exposure that IA has to our units the more they will learn even through observing from a distance.

I like the idea of turning detainees to our side. If you pay them enough, they'll do it.

I also think that the IP should be trained by police and other law enforcement entitites. The IP need to learn how to think like the insurgents, they need to learn how to fight just like they do. I also think that the leadership of the IP should recieve some training outside the country.

[Strickland]

Originally Posted by SSG Rock

I'd like to take a moment to pick some brilliant minds here gentlemen if I may. If you had the authority to change anything we are doing in Iraq, what changes would you implement regarding military tactics, troop levels, equipment? The table is wide open, all the way to the nuclear option. Or, would you change anything at all?

Speaking as a citizen, and not as a Marine, I would begin the process of leaving.

[jcustis]

To me, this is all about denying the enemy freedom of movement and to do that we need to be where they want to be. Maybe establishing partnerships with IA would help in that regard. Even to the point that they co-locate on our bases to live, train and work with us, I'm not sure about this but maybe its something to kick around. I think the more exposure that IA has to our units the more they will learn even through observing from a distance.

This is already the case for the most part. Having the ING remain in place (alone) at their old HQs/camps was one of the major headaches. Once there, they would often simply not leave to do anything.

Same thing with the IP training. There's a lot of civ-pol training going on by contractors aboard larger bases, but I fault it with not embedding these trainers with the graduates, to see whether what they teach is really what the IP needs to 1)do his job, 2) adhere to the constitional precepts of the govt, 3) overcome the reality that graft will likely never leave the culture.

I'm all over the out-of-Iraq training piece, especially for their senior leadership, but more along the lines of them giving us training in the realities they face, and how military/police life used to be. The downside is that the family effect plays havoc with any initiatives that may take the bread winner out of the country for any serious length of time.

[Strickland]

Can anyone name a successful example, whereby an outside power defeated and then eradicated all vestiges of the government, military, and internal security apparratus of the host country, and then remade them all in the face of a continued insurgency? The Soviet experience in Eastern Europe or Central Asia after 1922 and post-1945 comes to mind, but neither turned out real well in the end.

I have read the suggestions listed above, and they all appear to be well-thought out; however, I am unclear if they assist in achieving the overall campaign objectives. How do these enable those points articulated by the President in his Victory in Iraq Strategy document?

Per the President -

Victory in Iraq is Defined in Stages
• Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones,
building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.
• Medium term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully
constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential.
• Longer term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international
community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.

So, as far as the suggestions listed above, how do they help us in the big picture? The items or tactics suggested appear to be geared toward short term solutions per the President's guidance. So, where are we in the big picture, short, medium, or long term, using the president's definitions?

[979797]

The best suggestion is that of something similar to combined action platoons. We need to take companies, assign them a neighborhood (for large urban areas) or a village, and then send them there to live with the people. Then, the Army needs to give that captain the power to make the difference. The battalion commander's main function would be to make sure his companies are receiving the supply and support they need to succeed. It would suck for the troops, but they could rotate to a "superbase" every one to two weeks for a day to eat hot chow, get a shower, and visit the PX.

The problem with force protection (from the Army's perspective... I don't know how the Marines do it) is that we insulate ourselves from the people. As a PSYOP guy, I have to build relationships. I have a difficult task made MORE difficult when I approach people dressed like a stormtrooper, wrapped head-to-toe in Kevlar (they have us wearing these kevlar shoulder pads now... it's crazy). Patrols roll around in steel HMMWVs and Bradleys. Very little long-distance dismount patrols in which foot soldiers directly interact with people.

The concept of the "superbase" (with power, water, and PX) is very bad for our efforts. We allow locals to work and sell wares on the base, so they see us living in luxury and then have to return home at night to their homes with no running water, maybe a few hours of power a day, etc. What type of perception is this? Think about the statement it makes among the people.

I sit in the BUB and listen to staff officers talk about searches of weapons caches, an occasional insurgent killed, or a school built. We're missing the entire point. It's about the people, stupid. And the force structure we have in place, with our superbases and force protection rules, are simply a barrier between us and the people.

You don't build relationships based on a few hours spent weekly in one of many towns in a battalion AO. You have to live among the people, suffering their hardships, and showing them you GENUINELY give a #### about them.

I think, at this point unfortunately, we're beyond the point of being able to fix things and make it nice. Too much water under the bridge and all that. But, I hope we LEARN from this war so we won't make the same mistakes next time.

[nichols]

Originally Posted by 979797

You don't build relationships based on a few hours spent weekly in one of many towns in a battalion AO. You have to live among the people, suffering their hardships, and showing them you GENUINELY give a #### about them.

This is the key to success. It doesn't matter where you are or how fluent you are in a language. When the local people see this grass roots level activities, they respond accordingly.

The kick in the teeth is that we have been talking about the Strategic Corporal for some time, Distributed Operations for about two years now but we as a military are still attached to the base/PX/shower embellical cord mentality of WW II.

My first change would be to eliminate all types of troop formations and close order drill. These have the effect of cognitively teaching the troops the herd mentality.

[Steve Blair]

I would say again that the firebase syndrome came directly from Vietnam and the perceived need to keep a draftee army "fat and happy" in the basecamps when not out slogging through the bush. Not only is it damaging to building relationships with the local populace, it raises the cost of any involvement dramatically. Base camps don't just spring out of thin air. They take money to build and troops to man and guard. Drawing from the historical examples, a four company battalion in Vietnam had to leave at least one company on "palace guard" at any given time. One quarter of the combat strength was unavailable for operations, or things like CAP and RD.

There is an enduring myth that American troops cannot live in the field without their running water, Internet cafes, and ice cream. Though it's been proven time and again that they can live in the field, and often do so very effectively, the base camp has been very hard to get away from.

[Merv Benson]

Steve,

My recollection of firebases in Vietnam is of isolated hill tops with a few 105's and sandbagged bunkers. Troops were dependent on choppers bringing in supplies including water. It was definitely nothing like the forward operating bases in Iraq. It was really a way to control space with a minimal amount of force. My company cleared the way for the installation of one of the first on Dong Ha Mountain where we also found the 75 mm pack howitzer that was used to harass Camp Carrol. I think that pack howitzer is in a Marine museum now.

[slapout9]

Good observation merv. They were called firebases for a reason. Also I never saw a General Officer wear a Miami Vice shoulder holster like some of them do now. The nickname for this holster by Police officers was a "Jackass Rig." Wonder if this why we are loosing??

[Steve Blair]

Originally Posted by Merv Benson

Steve,

My recollection of firebases in Vietnam is of isolated hill tops with a few 105's and sandbagged bunkers. Troops were dependent on choppers bringing in supplies including water. It was definitely nothing like the forward operating bases in Iraq. It was really a way to control space with a minimal amount of force. My company cleared the way for the installation of one of the first on Dong Ha Mountain where we also found the 75 mm pack howitzer that was used to harass Camp Carrol. I think that pack howitzer is in a Marine museum now.

This certainly happened with the Marine Corps and some units of the 101st that operated in I Corps, but if you get down to some of the Army organizations in III Corps there was a different mentality. Perhaps I should have used the term base areas or something similar as opposed to the combat fire base, which was often a rather sparse operation (especially in the period after 1968 when the First Cavalry Division began using battalion-sized camps that were only opened for a few days and then closed out). However, the same could not be said of the more developed complexes around Saigon. I think what we may be seeing now is that same mindset, but they happen to be using more "combative" names.

[979797]

Troop formations and close-order drill are a good thing for transitioning civilians into soldiers. You gotta have it for your conventional combat units.

What you need for counterinsurgency though are units that can act independently and with initiative. A captain (or even staff NCO) who is presented with a crisis of perhaps strategic proportions and is given the ability to resolve it without having to "call the six". From an Army perspective, Special Forces has this capability (although I've heard some friends there lamenting how "big Army" is slowly sinking its claws into the organization).

The only way to graduate soldiers to the level I'm talking about are to train 'em hard as recruits first. I feel that the current Army basic training regimen and syllabus is woefully lacking in this regard. The Marines still kick our ass in this category. Once seasoned with a few hard years in a line unit, they can be ready to move into special units that are given latitude in operational planning and decision-making and are free from micro-management.

I also think soldiers serving here (at least the squad-level leadership and up) need REAL cultural training. I'm not talking about the silly "Arabs consider the left hand dirty" type kindergarten ####. I mean the real, in-depth "how does an Arab think and feel" GRADUATE-LEVEL type knowlege. Why do our leaders still make decisions and assesments based on western education and values? For all you "Boydists" out there, you cannot get inside the enemy's OODA loop thinking like a westerner. You get inside it and think LIKE AN ARAB THINKS!!

There is a lieutenant in my supported unit who is a company XO. He was amazed at the books in my PSYOP team's collection and he wanted to read them. #### that I thought was basic-level stuff that my team and I had read or at least looked at and discussed. I have the advantage of a team member who serves on a congressional staff as a middle-eastern specialist, but still... what sort of prep work had this LT been doing apart from an NTC rotation and checking off the blocks on a CTT worksheet?

On the bright side though, in the same company, is a staff sergeant who trades books with me all the time. So, there is always hope...

I perused the board in which everyone here introduces themselves and was disappointed to see so few who wrote "I'm an active-duty Army infantry (or armor, or FA, or whatever) officer/NCO in Iraq thirsty for knowlege and looking to truly win the counterinsurgency fight here." There are so many who are "former" or "retired" and this is well and good. Especially for the guys who served in 'Nam. There are many lessons to be drawn from that conflict and can be applied here (as well as many that can't). But this board should be overwhelmed with current leaders who are looking for more answers and bouncing ideas off eachother. God knows we have enough access to the Internet.

Anyway, I'll step off my soapbox (or, rather shut off my loudspeaker).

[SWJED]

I also think soldiers serving here (at least the squad-level leadership and up) need REAL cultural training. I'm not talking about the silly "Arabs consider the left hand dirty" type kindergarten ####. I mean the real, in-depth "how does an Arab think and feel" GRADUATE-LEVEL type knowlege.

Well said...

[CPT Holzbach]

There is a lieutenant in my supported unit who is a company XO. He was amazed at the books in my PSYOP team's collection and he wanted to read them. #### that I thought was basic-level stuff that my team and I had read or at least looked at and discussed. I have the advantage of a team member who serves on a congressional staff as a middle-eastern specialist, but still... what sort of prep work had this LT been doing apart from an NTC rotation and checking off the blocks on a CTT worksheet?

On the bright side though, in the same company, is a staff sergeant who trades books with me all the time. So, there is always hope...

Hey 979797, would you be able to list some of those books here? I'd love to hear what you consider must-reads. And on a side note, your location says "Rustamiyah". Does that mean FOB Rustamiyah, Baghdad? If so, how are things going there? I was stationed there with 3ID through 2005. Lemme know how stuff is going there.

[jcustis]

979797,

I've read both of your posts and think they are spot on!!! Welcome to the forum...

[marct]

Originally Posted by 979797

I also think soldiers serving here (at least the squad-level leadership and up) need REAL cultural training. I'm not talking about the silly "Arabs consider the left hand dirty" type kindergarten ####. I mean the real, in-depth "how does an Arab think and feel" GRADUATE-LEVEL type knowlege. .... For all you "Boydists" out there, you cannot get inside the enemy's OODA loop thinking like a westerner. You get inside it and think LIKE AN ARAB THINKS!!

There is a lieutenant in my supported unit who is a company XO. He was amazed at the books in my PSYOP team's collection and he wanted to read them. #### that I thought was basic-level stuff that my team and I had read or at least looked at and discussed. I have the advantage of a team member who serves on a congressional staff as a middle-eastern specialist, but still... what sort of prep work had this LT been doing apart from an NTC rotation and checking off the blocks on a CTT worksheet?

979797, you've got some really good points here. I guess that my main questions would be a) how do you go about doing it and b) how do you sell it institutionally?

Back in WWII, there was a concerted effort to get inside the heads of the Japanese. Given that the traditional methods of doing ethnographies couldn't be used, Ruth Benedict pioneered a new method - "culture at a distance" (see The Chrysanthemum and The Sword). This method allowed her to get a gut-level (i.e. internal, "intuitive") understanding of Japanese culture that was worth a lot more than a Western, intellectual knowledge based understanding (i.e. typical graduate level stuff, at least in Canada).

The start of this methodology, however, was with reading the "basic level stuff", followed by a sensory immersion into everything she could find (language, film, food, clothing, etc.). From what I have seen, which I will admit is woefully inadequate , I get the feeling that, barring Maj. Gen Mattis' 2003 work towards this, there seems to be very little work on institutionally supporting this type of training for troops going on regular deployments. Is it possible that the LT you mentioned is from a unit where the emphasis is on "real military training, not that fuzzy ####"?

Another question, again coming from my ignorance, is given that you have such a great library and obvious expertise in the area, are you tasked with any in-field training? I'm asking, because one of the roles that Anthropologists traditionally played when working with non-Anthropologists was as in-field trainers in both the local culture and, perhaps more importantly, in the attitudes and perceptions of how to analyze and get to know a local culture.

Marc

[Tom Odom]

Marc,

Much of what is bandied about currently on cultural sensitivity is often easy to say and impossible to do. We cannot make cultural experts of every soldier; we have enough challenges making sure that our soldiers are trained and proficient in their specific and general skill sets.

979797 as a PSYOP guy is in the business of anticipatory analysis of the enemy. My business as a foreign area officer was heavily oriented in that regard per your discussion of immersion training. see http://www.tamu.edu/upress/BOOKS/2005/odom.htm for my experiences in that regard.

still 979797 is absolutely correct: we do need to prepare our soldiers to think and open their minds when they deal with foreign cultures. for that matter, we need to prepare some senior leaders as well (I was reading Tom Ricks' Fiasco last night).

I start with 2 basic rules:

They (fill in the culture) don't think like you do

They (fill in the culture) have an agenda in everything they do with you

If I can get those basics across, then the listener can began on the right track rather than mirroring.

It also cuts back on assuming everyone loves or hates us. Ricks book has a fantastic discussion of walking with a patrol as its members tell him how much the Iraqis love Americans. He parallels it with insights gained from the locals via interpreters (I assume) that say exactly the opposite.

Hopefully as a soldier develops he will continue to develop and broaden his analytical framework so that he truly starts to think like his enemy (or ally). The same applies in strategic and tactical intelligence analysis. getting inside a guy's head starts with understanding his mental framework is different. it is remarkable to me the number of analysts who balk at looking at motivations and intentions. they dismiss it as voodoo analysis, preferring discussions of recorded actions and speeches. My response is that it is voodoo. It is the voodoo that I do if I wish to anticipate what my opponent is likely to do. Merely digesting actions and spoken communications is history.

Best
Tom