MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[SdunnyW506]

Has anyone taken a look at the paper "Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer" by MAJ Thomas P. Ehrhart? From what I have heard it has caused something of a stir within the US Army. The debate over replacing US infantry weapons and marksmanship training has gone on for a little, but here someone has finally put it into a serious thesis.

If anyone has taken a serious look at it, what are opinions?

Here's the pdf link.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

Also, here is an abstract of his paper. Sums up the intent pretty well.

Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy at ranges beyond 300 meters. While the infantryman is ideally suited for combat in Afghanistan, his current weapons, doctrine, and marksmanship training do not provide a precise, lethal fire capability to 500 meters and are therefore inappropriate. Comments from returning soldiers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain. This monograph reviews the small arms capability of the infantry squad from World War I to present. It then discusses current shortfalls with cartridge lethality, weapons and optics configurations, the squad designated marksman concept and finally the rifle qualification course. Potential solutions in each of these areas are discussed.

Once again, any thoughts?

[Ken White]

the good Major's conclusions mirror almost exactly what the report of that test -- which recommended retaining the M-14 for worldwide service while developing a better automatic rifle version and a shortened version for airborne use and buying a few AR-15s for special purpose units -- recommended to DA. I have it on good authority that that report was forward to DoD with a recommendation for approval.

In the event DoD -- Secretary McNamara (assisted by Curtis LeMay, whose troops needed no more capable weapon) -- decided to buy the M-16 and cancel the contract with TRW for the M-14. I'm sure that the fact TRW had contributed to Nixon's campaign while Colt had contributed to Kennedy's had no bearing on that decision. It is noteworthy that the Marines objected and the Army was, as usual, acquiescent...

MAJ Ehrhart's recommendations also track with a number of studies in the 1970-2000 period that found the same problems.

In short, he's right.

[Fuchs]

I saw test results of a German small arms test in 1991 very recently (not for the first time).
It compared G3 (~M14) and AK-74. The latter (high quality Eastern German licensed copies that were later sold to Turkey) proved to be superior up to 200m, with G3 having advantages beyond that distance in great part thanks to its longer sight line (now irrelevant with standard optics).

The M14 was most likely never even close to an optimum compromise. The magazine capacity is low, recoil is strong, it's heavy, long and the cartridges are heavy & bulky as well.

Almost a hundred years of optimum cartridge finding projects have almost always yielded an optimum cartridge of 6-7 mm calibre for an (assault) rifle, with few exceptions during the 30's and 40's when assault rifle(-like) designs were seen as relatives of submachine guns and rifle-like range not required. Those optimum compromises looked similar to 7.62mmx39.

We would discuss the disadvantages of the M14 and the screwed up 7.62x51 nonsense that was a poor cartridge from the start if there had not been the AR-15 and 5.56mmx45.


Let's get over the loss of M14 and G3 and accept that the next step should be an intermediate bullet (with whatever cartridge design - there's still the telescoped stuff around, after all).

By the way, PEO soldier has launched a new carbine competition without requiring a specific calibre.

[William F. Owen]

Read the report. It's not a document I would cite of feel comfortable doing so.

See my response to this very debate here, in article I was asked to right for RUSI

Having now talked to lot of UK guys back from A'stan, I have to say I am very un-surprised at what they actually say, which is that personal weapons are really just for self defence and under 200m and what does the killing is platoon weapons/section weapons, like GPMG, LRR and Projected HE. In other words all the lessons from the past 60 years hold true.

[Bob's World]

In recent engagements the TB have a very high ratio of PKMs and RPGs to the size of force encountered. Meanwhile our guys are working through tighter and tighter restrictions on the use of heavy firepower, restrictions that are frankly necessary to implement the CG's guidance and change the tenor or the coalition approch in deed as well as word. I agree with what the commander is doing, but it is indeed forcing changes of the dynamics on the battlefield as well.

At this point it is new TTPs more than new rifles that our soldiers need, and as usual they must be developed in-stride. There may be more value in discussing the mix of weapons at the squad level rather than the caliber. (Though I know my uncles who carried M-1 Garrands as infantrymen in the very close fighting of the South Pacific loved the punch that a 30-06 provided...).

[Firn]

Originally Posted by Bob's World

In recent engagements the TB have a very high ratio of PKMs and RPGs to the size of force encountered. Meanwhile our guys are working through tighter and tighter restrictions on the use of heavy firepower, restrictions that are frankly necessary to implement the CG's guidance and change the tenor or the coalition approch in deed as well as word. I agree with what the commander is doing, but it is indeed forcing changes of the dynamics on the battlefield as well.

The article by Major Ehrhardt raises very similar points:

Operations in Afghanistan have exposed weaknesses in our small arms capability, marksmanship training, and doctrine. After-action reviews and comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage U.S forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6,000 feet.59 Current equipment, training and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain.

....

The modern infantryman is burdened with excessive weight in the form of protective gear, communications equipment and weapons systems. He is fighting an enemy conditioned to the elevation and terrain. The enemy travels light and employs supporting weapons from standoff, to include mortars and medium machineguns. Faced with these conditions, the modern infantry attempts to fix the enemy with direct fire and use supporting assets to kill the enemy. Supporting assets, such as close combat attack, close air support or indirect fire, are not always available. Further, their application is often restricted when collateral damage is possible, due to the enemy’s information operations and worldwide media access.

It seems to me that the TB try mostly rather hard to reduce the risks incurring when engaging coalition troops. They can usually initiate the contact on their terms, using terrain, ROE and distance to their advantage and seem to increasingly tailor their forces, as Bob said, to suit this conditions. All those factors buffer them against a "decisive" tactical defeat. This low-risk tactics seem to work well as part of their overall strategy, as it allows them to preserve their fighting forces and still greatly impact the ability of the coalition to fulfill their missions.

A very high ratio of crew-served weapons like GPMG, mortars and RPG could allow them to get a lot more out of their limited pool of better trained men while employing the rest more effectively in their support.


Firn

[Infanteer]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Read the report. It's not a document I would cite of feel comfortable doing so.

See my response to this very debate here, in article I was asked to right for RUSI

Having now talked to lot of UK guys back from A'stan, I have to say I am very un-surprised at what they actually say, which is that personal weapons are really just for self defence and under 200m and what does the killing is platoon weapons/section weapons, like GPMG, LRR and Projected HE. In other words all the lessons from the past 60 years hold true.

Je suis d'accord.

Rifles just protect the guy carrying and extra belt for the GPMG or a mortar bomb. Infact I prefer the 5.56 as it is half the weight of the larger rounds and means soldiers are lighter and:

1. Soldiers are able to carry some (more) support weapon ammo; and
2. Soldiers have more mobility, making it easier to close with the enemy and force him to either stand and die or move into a beaten zone.

[Fuchs]

Me thinks you assume too much infantry combat in open terrain, in tank or mountainous terrain.

Combat in settlements or forests leads to completely different conclusions - and these are two of the three terrain types that infantry is really needed for (urban / forest / mountain).

This expeditionary nonsense of fighting against poorly trained, equipped, supplied and supported paramilitary forces at the end of the world leads to completely wrong conclusions.

It's like the "The Boers shot at us at 800 m and did hit us (rarely)!" outcry of the early 1900's that was extremely misleading in regard to the REALLY important warfare that took place during 1912-1921 in Europe.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Me thinks you assume too much infantry combat in open terrain, in tank or mountainous terrain.

If you mean me, you are right. I am assuming that the infantry do not choose when and where they fight - but have to be able to do it.

Combat in settlements or forests leads to completely different conclusions - and these are two of the three terrain types that infantry is really needed for (urban / forest / mountain).

That assumes terrain types are homogeneous. They're not. I live in a Middle-eastern town and I can see terrain well over 600-1000m, in every direction.

This expeditionary nonsense of fighting against poorly trained, equipped, supplied and supported paramilitary forces at the end of the world leads to completely wrong conclusions.

What kills and suppresses the Taliban in 2010 did the same to anyone and everyone in 1944.

It's like the "The Boers shot at us at 800 m and did hit us (rarely)!" outcry of the early 1900's that was extremely misleading in regard to the REALLY important warfare that took place during 1912-1921 in Europe.

Sure. Terrain, threat, tactics, and policy.

[kaur]

In the beginning Norwegians had in Afganistan G3 rifles, then they got HK416, but they didn't get rid of G3's. Why? Maybe this is best mix for them, just like US got M14 from warehouses to add long range fire to M4-equipped soldiers.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by kaur

So many things odd and wrong with that picture, I just do no know where to begin!
The world gets stranger and stranger!

[kaur]

PS Wilf, I was reading your RUSI article and was hoping that you say something about HK MP7. I'm little bit disappointed

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by kaur

PS Wilf, I was reading your RUSI article and was hoping that you say something about HK MP7. I'm little bit disappointed

I think I said it all before.

[kaur]

Wilf, do you dare to suggest this to troops in Afganistan?

The new section could be still be eight
men, all equipped with an MP7 or P-90,
but one man also carrying an MGL, and
another a GPMG or LMG (L7 or L110).

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

If you mean me, you are right. I am assuming that the infantry do not choose when and where they fight - but have to be able to do it.

We don't have enough of em to waste em in wrong tactical employments once we get into a great war.

That assumes terrain types are homogeneous. They're not. I live in a Middle-eastern town and I can see terrain well over 600-1000m, in every direction.

This is entirely irrelevant, and you should be aware of it. It's not relevant how far you can see, but how well the terrain can be used for cover & concealment. I can see down the road for hundreds of metres, yet someone could easily sneak up to me into hand grenade range without giving me a chance to see (much less identify) him.

What kills and suppresses the Taliban in 2010 did the same to anyone and everyone in 1944.

Except that most of it wouldn't work against a high end opponent, of course. OEF-A and ISAF forces would be slaughtered mercilessly if they used their tactics against the Russians, Chinese or any other halfway effective infantry force.
The behaviour observed in AFG is outright suicidal in modern army-on-army warfare.
The ratio of CAS to ground forces (platoons being able to call in CAS!) is the exception of the rule, as is the 99.9% lack of fire support on the red team.
A few bullet near misses may suppress a real soldier as well as a Taliban - but the chance to score these near misses drops considerably if you face real soldiers because they would kill your battalion in a day at a rate that the whole TB doesn't match in a year, much less with small arms and grenades.

A tripod machine gun team on open terrain would be killed ASAP with mortars and alternatively by a sniper in a European-style war. Alternating concealed and if possible flanking MMG positions are practical, MMG employment as done in AFG is rather not ... against a competent opponent.

Let's face it; the conditions are so extremely different and the competency and capability of the TB is so marginal that almost nothing from AFG will serve us in the next great war. Much will hurt us, though.

About your example "1944"; even 1944 Finns or Germans would easily multiply the losses of ISAF and OEF-A if they replaced TB 1:1. A finnish sniper killed more Russians during the winter '39/'40 than the TB kill Western+Pakistani soldiers in a whole year. The TB are ridiculously harmless and incompetent. German bus drivers are a greater threat.

.

[Infanteer]

Good to know I'm a suicidal incompetent....

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Me thinks you assume too much infantry combat in open terrain, in tank or mountainous terrain.

Combat in settlements or forests leads to completely different conclusions - and these are two of the three terrain types that infantry is really needed for (urban / forest / mountain).

This expeditionary nonsense of fighting against poorly trained, equipped, supplied and supported paramilitary forces at the end of the world leads to completely wrong conclusions.

Well, I've been roaming around grapefields, wadis and villages for the last 5 months, and I think your assessment is wrong. Just because Kandahar is "desert" on the map doesn't mean that the terrain isn't varied.

An insurgent bullet will kill just as good as some Russian conscript's. Although I don't give the insurgents here credit for much, they do know how to use complex terrain (their home turf) to their advantage and understand kill zones.

Please enlighten me on our poor behaviours here - I employ techniques that would work equally well against Russian conscripts and insurgents; they're nothing more than the basics and we use them because they reduce our vulnerability and allow us to bring the right weapons to bear.

[Fuchs]

Give an example and I'll tell you what could have gone wrong if you had faced a powerful opponent.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by kaur

Wilf, do you dare to suggest this to troops in Afganistan?

I would dare, SUGGEST and without blinking. - Suggest means go work it out, do the trials and do the training. IF it does not work well, DO NOT DO IT!

None of the articles you see written by me (or even Jim Storr) should be taken a doctrine. A lot of the time they seek to be provocative, to get the debate going - because most of the time their simply is no discussion and no debate.

[William F. Owen]

FUCHS

a. It does matter how far you can see, because you may well be seeing people who are shooting at other people who are closer to them. - or trying to stop them moving around and across terrain you cannot secure, except by fire.

b. Combat has to be accepted as and when it occurs. Terrain is not homogeneous. Even in Jungles you may be engaged by a 14.5 AAMG a 1000m across the other side of the valley - as happened to a friend of mine in Laos.

c. I agree that the Taliban are not a well trained opponent, but you do not have to be that good to be that lethal so that it counts. Combat is not defined by absolutes. It's very context specific and all very relative. Good enough merely has to be "better than."

What is more, NO good Army will take the tactical conduct of operations in A'Stan as being illustrative of anything other than irregular warfare against a 2nd rate opponent.

[Infanteer]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Give an example and I'll tell you what could have gone wrong if you had faced a powerful opponent.

Since you're making the assertion that we are tactically inept, and I am out here daily generally seeing the opposite, I think the onus is on you to prove it.

Define "a powerful opponent" - enfilading fire from a PKM kills, regardless of what the guy firing it is wearing.