Shariah is coming! Shariah is coming!

[Rex Brynen]

From the Centre for Security Policy, Shariah: The Threat to America (An Exercise in Competitive Analysis—Report of Team ‘B’ II) (http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p18523.xml):


Today, the United States faces what is, if anything, an even more insidious ideological threat: the totalitarian socio-political doctrine that Islam calls shariah. Translated as “the path,” shariah is a comprehensive legal and political framework. Though it certainly has spiritual elements, it would be a mistake to think of shariah as a “religious” code in the Western sense because it seeks to regulate all manner of behavior in the secular sphere – economic, social, military, legal and political....

...as this report documents powerfully, our leaders have failed to perceive – let alone respond effectively to – the real progress being made by the Muslim Brotherhood in insinuating shariah into the very heartland of America through stealthy means. Team B II believes that the defeat of the enemy’s stealth jihad requires that the American people and their leaders be aroused to the high stakes in this war, as well as to the very real possibility that we could lose, absent a determined and vigorous program to keep America shariah-free. To that end, Team B II sets forth in plain language who this enemy is, what the ideology is that motivates and justifies his war against us, the various forms of warfare the enemy employs to achieve his ends, the United States’ vulnerability to them, and what we must do to emerge victorious.

The team was lead by retired Lieutenant General William G. "My God is bigger than yours" Boykin (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3199212.stm). As far as I can see, it contains no actual experts on Islam or Islamic law. That may explain the factual inaccuracies and rather hysterical, paranoid tone.:wry:

[Tom Odom]

Is Allen Arkin gonna play the Imam? :wry:

I mean really, "concerned with the preeminent totalitarian threat of our time: the legal-political-military doctrine known within Islam as "shariah," is more than a little hysterical. :eek:

[SteveMetz]

When questioned as to why there were no actual Muslims on the group or consulted for the report, Patrick Poole used archetypical talk radio logic (http://bigpeace.com/pspoole/2010/09/21/thinkprogress-org-strikes-out-on-team-b-ii-report-part-1/): 1) call the questioner a liberal; 2) create a nonsensical straw man and demolish it.

[Tom Odom]

When questioned as to why there were no actual Muslims on the group or consulted for the report, Patrick Poole used archetypical talk radio logic (http://bigpeace.com/pspoole/2010/09/21/thinkprogress-org-strikes-out-on-team-b-ii-report-part-1/): 1) call the questioner a liberal; 2) create a nonsensical straw man and demolish it.



Eureka! Shariah is really a liberal plot for a totalitarian regime! Brilliant!

Can a I have Guiness, please?

I mean if that's still allowed before Shariah takes over...

[omarali50]

Interesting discussion on:

http://scienceblogs.com/dispatches/2010/09/the_irony_of_the_anti-sharia_m.php

[SteveMetz]

It's very sad that Boykin and Soyster were part of this. Some people are just hard wired for fear and hate. They've been lost without a mission since the demise of the Soviet Union. In the absence of a real demon, they concoct one out of whatever raw material is available.

[Bob's World]

The basis of U.S. Grand Strategy since at least 1945 has been rooted in the defeat, denial or containment of some threat. Without a threat to fill the role of opponent, U.S. Grand Strategy falls apart.

We have been struggling since the collapse of the Soviets to find some bogeyman who is ready, willing and able to fill this role. We've interviewed and tried several reluctant candidates, but none really work the way the Soviets did. Oh for the good old days...

At a conference at Duke last year on Grand Strategy I enjoyed hearing the thoughts of some of our brightest minds on this topic. Finally I asked Dr. Gaddis of Yale, "Does a Grand Strategy requires some threat to counter, or can it be cast in positive terms to promote something instead"? I could hear the wheels turning all around this room full of PhDs; but no one really had an answer. It was almost like no one had ever considered the possibility of such a thing.

Of late we have been attempting to shoehorn "Islam" in various ways into this role of opponent. Personally, I think it is time to decide what it is we are for, and promote that. This is more likely to build us the alliances we need to counter real threats once they emerge. Emerge they will, but our current approach is not the best way to prepare for them.

[SteveMetz]

The danger is that whacko stuff like this report numbs our ability to identify real and serious threats from extremism and hence makes us less safe.

[Fuchs]

At a conference at Duke last year on Grand Strategy I enjoyed hearing the thoughts of some of our brightest minds on this topic. Finally I asked Dr. Gaddis of Yale, "Does a Grand Strategy requires some threat to counter, or can it be cast in positive terms to promote something instead"? I could hear the wheels turning all around this room full of PhDs; but no one really had an answer. It was almost like no one had ever considered the possibility of such a thing.

There are actually several countries with such grand strategies. Their grand strategies are consistent and robust, but not extremely obvious because some of their choices appear to be passive.

I think France's grand strategy needs no bogeyman (although they are occasionally in violent conflict with some smallish powers).
Germany's (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/09/grand-strategy-of-germany-frg.html) and Japan's grand strategies need no bogeyman either.
Saudi Arabia, UAE and Turkey: same.

Pakistan, USA, North Korea, Syria and Iran depend heavily on their ability to point at an external threat (for domestic stability and in the case of the USA also for maintaining their international networks).

[Bob's World]

What is "Extremism" though? If denied legal venues to address legitimate grievances, then one is forced to take "extreme" measures to create change. Certainly when populaces are held in conditions of poor governance there will be many with less than noble goals who step forward to exploit such situations for their own ends; but they are more "opportunists" than "extremists."

Governments create these conditions, not those who emerge to exploit them. When we promote and protect those same governments, we redirect focus at ourselves. I suspect most populaces would prefer employing effective legal means of promoting change, but such means are pretty scarce in the countries where so many of these "extremists" come from. Simple Cause and Effect, and until we stop labeling the effect (extremism) as the cause (governance), we will continue to be one significant step behind on this one.

The extremism that concerns me is the version that sits in power over much of the Middle East. We know its wrong to promote governments so contrary to our national principles and ethos, yet we also know we cannot simply walk away from relationships that help secure critical LOCs and resources. We need to find a new balance point. First step is to identify the extremists we need to focus the most on; and those are primarily the current governments of that region. I think we can out compete AQ as the champion of the oppressed, that we have more to offer through enabling legal and peaceful evolution of governance than he does through violent revolution of governance.

We'll see. Current focus appears to be to reinforce the status quo, and build their military capacity to more effectively suppress their populaces. Then conduct "nation building" to presumably buy off these same populace so that they will stop complaining and lending their support to these extremists organizations. "Denial" is not just the name of the river running through the heart of much of this...

[Tom Odom]

The danger is that whacko stuff like this report numbs our ability to identify real and serious threats from extremism and hence makes us less safe.

Steve

Great to see you posting! Agree on the impacts of agenda driven thinks tanks; maybe I will someday get a chance to sit down with you and relate the series of visitors through MND-B in 2009, all of whom came with a solution looking for supporting "facts".

Bob,

Playing the role of Mr. Obvious, I would add that the void you remark on is exacerbated by the 4 to 8 year cycle of electoral posturing with regards to foreign policy. In the interest of fairness, one can make the case that our own makes us lack of clarity makes us damn near impossible to fully understand. Whether that is a good thing is of course equally debatable.

Best
Tom

[flagg]

The basis of U.S. Grand Strategy since at least 1945 has been rooted in the defeat, denial or containment of some threat. Without a threat to fill the role of opponent, U.S. Grand Strategy falls apart.

We have been struggling since the collapse of the Soviets to find some bogeyman who is ready, willing and able to fill this role. We've interviewed and tried several reluctant candidates, but none really work the way the Soviets did. Oh for the good old days...

At a conference at Duke last year on Grand Strategy I enjoyed hearing the thoughts of some of our brightest minds on this topic. Finally I asked Dr. Gaddis of Yale, "Does a Grand Strategy requires some threat to counter, or can it be cast in positive terms to promote something instead"? I could hear the wheels turning all around this room full of PhDs; but no one really had an answer. It was almost like no one had ever considered the possibility of such a thing.

Of late we have been attempting to shoehorn "Islam" in various ways into this role of opponent. Personally, I think it is time to decide what it is we are for, and promote that. This is more likely to build us the alliances we need to counter real threats once they emerge. Emerge they will, but our current approach is not the best way to prepare for them.

As posted in another thread.....would a Pakistan/India(and possibly China) Conflict offer both a threat that must be contained from spreading(outside of just maximizing the political/economic/military attrition of combatants) as well as the opportunity to promote(and dictate) the global recovery?

Is their an excessive focus on Islam and Iran as a threat...when it could quite possibly come(and rather quickly) from a less expected direction?

[SteveMetz]

Since it seems appropriate to this discussion, below is a draft of an essay that will appear in the next JFQ. Since this is just a draft, don't quote it. This is actually a very toned down version. The original took direct aim at those exploiting public hostility toward Islam, including political leaders like Palin and Gingrich, and the Islamophobia industry represented by people like Pamela Geller, Patrick Poole, and Daniel Pipes.


Islam, Domestic Politics, and the Crumbling of American Strategy

In the early years of the Cold War, Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the powerful chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, urged that politics stop "at the water's edge." When facing a major threat--as the United States was at the time--Americans should set aside partisanship, at least in foreign policy and national security strategy. This was sage advice but seldom heeded. The norm was for foreign policy and national security strategy to be used as partisan ammunition, particularly against whoever happened to be president and, by association, other members of the president's party. The reasons for this lie deep within the American strategic culture and political system. As a general rule, Americans are not deferential to public policy experts. The public believes that it should play an important role in formulating policy even on issues where it is not particularly well informed. Expertise is deprecated with the assumption that common sense can substitute. Simplicity is lionized and complexity disdained. Clearly the populist instinct runs deep in American political culture, its ideas advanced by the media in their never-ending quest for a larger audience and politicians in pursuit of votes.

This is good to a degree--it is part of what makes the United States and Americans special. But the intersection of public opinion, domestic politics, foreign policy, and national security strategy is treacherous. Since most Americans have little knowledge of, interest in, or understanding of world affairs, they are vulnerable to exploitation by pundits and politicians looking for a cudgel to use against a sitting administration. To resonate with a mass audience, issues are simplified to the point of caricature. This not only hinders serious policy discussions, but also confuses and antagonizes foreigners, whether allies or enemies (or those trying to decide whether to be allies or enemies). Any domestic consensus which does emerge from this tumult is fleeting and fragile. It may form during a major conflict or crisis, but quickly crumbles as the perception of danger declines. One has only to look at the precipitous decline in the approval rating of George H.W. Bush soon after the 1991 war with Iraq. America loved him but only briefly. Historically, rip-roaring partisanship rather than consensus is the American norm. And today, the United States is once again in a crescendo of this phenomenon. This has a very dark side: growing domestic hostility toward Islam is undercutting the foundation of America's global strategy.

(continued)

[SteveMetz]

The Forward and Indirect Strategy

For a while after September 11, American politics did stop at the water's edge; public anger and fear dampened partisanship. But it did not last long. As Iraq slipped into protracted and bloody counterinsurgency President Bush's opponents understood that the conflict there was his greatest political vulnerability. They had no qualms about using it against him despite the effect that their criticism had in Iraq or elsewhere in the Muslim world. Ironically, though, even while attacks on the Bush handling of Iraq intensified, there was consensus on his broader strategy for dealing with al Qaeda and Islamic extremism. Partisan disagreement focused on the the execution of the strategy rather than its foundation and assumptions. Both Democrats and Republicans agreed that the conflict with Islamic extremists would be won or lost in the psychological realm--in the complex, shadowy world of attitudes and perceptions. Both agreed that a forward defense was best--that extremism should be stifled at its source. And both agreed that the best way to do this was by mobilizing support and strengthening partners in the Islamic world. Direct American action, including the use of military force, was sometimes necessary but ultimately victory would come when partner states were stable, prosperous, and capable and thus could control extremism on their own. Hence the strategy was both forward and indirect.
"Success," as the Bush counterterrorism strategy stated, "will not come by always acting alone, but through a powerful coalition of nations maintaining a strong, united international front against terrorism." In addition to building partner law enforcement, intelligence, and military capacity, this included altering "the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit." The essence remained psychological. "In the long run," the Bush strategy added, "winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas. Ideas can transform the embittered and disillusioned either into murderers willing to kill innocents, or into free peoples living harmoniously in a diverse society." President Obama, while committed to changing some of Bush's methods, largely adopted this strategy. The 2010 National Security Strategy stated:



Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American people. To advance our common security, we must address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within their borders and to be our partners in addressing common challenges.

But this was a peculiar consensus. Even though the basic contours of the strategy against terrorism and extremism were accepted by both a Republican and Democratic administration and had wide support from Congress and the American public, it was precarious largely because it was constructed on questionable assumptions formed in the traumatic months after September 11 and never seriously analyzed. For instance, the strategy assumed that most governments and publics in the Islamic world shared the American threat perception, believing that extremism was inextricably related to terrorism and hence illegitimate. The strategy assumed that Islamic governments and publics saw the American role much as Americans themselves did. The United States, Americans believed, wanted only to see extremism controlled and terrorism extinguished. Certainly, they thought, Muslims must understand this. And, perhaps most importantly, the strategy assumed that what Americans consider misperceptions common in the Islamic world--that the United States primarily sought to exploit the Islamic world's resources, to impose its values, or to promote Israel's security--could be changed by "strategic communications" and assistance. Differences were simply misunderstanding. Americans, in other words, saw their power as benign and their motives as pure, and believed others did as well.

These assumptions, having been formed in haste during a time of deep national trauma, were deeply flawed. Partners in the Islamic world have steadfastly demonstrated different priorities than the United States, often tolerating extremism that only threatened America (or Israel, Europe, Australia, Russia, or India) rather than themselves. Witness Pakistan's tolerance of the Taliban and al Qaeda, and Saudi Arabia's acceptance of extremists, at least until they threatened the regimes in Islamabad and Riyadh. Much of the Islamic world rejected terrorism which targeted other Muslims, but did not automatically associate what Americans consider extremism with terrorism. Many Muslims distinguished legitimate extremism, even extremist movements which used violence, and illegitimate extremism. American strategy did not. The assumption that anti-Americanism could be fixed by strategic communication and assistance has not proven true. It resists strategic communications and foreign assistance. While the Obama administration has been able to moderate some of this, it remains a powerful force, particularly in Pakistan, the most important Islamic nation in the struggle with violent extremism and a major recipient of U.S. assistance. And counter to American assumptions that closed political systems spawn anti-Americanism, the more democratic a government in the Islamic world, the more it reflects and responds to the deeply anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments of its public and the less likely it is to attack extremism directed only against outsiders. A closed political system like those in Egypt or Saudi Arabia can, to an extent, ignore public opinion. They normally exercise control over their military and intelligence services. More democratic states like Pakistan cannot, thus making them vulnerable to the whims of public opinion and willing to overlook any relationship that their militaries and intelligence services has with extremists.

The notion that public diplomacy and strategic communication would address these problems also proved false. Ultimately it does not matter whether the perceptions of the United States which are common in the Islamic world--that Washington is in the thrall of Israel, deliberately seeks to keep Islamic nations weak by any means available, and wants to politically dominate the Islamic world so as to exploit its resources--are accurate. The naive American trust in the power of objective truth does not work in a deadly struggle with extremism. Beliefs matter more than reality. Hostility, anti-Americanism, and misperception are simply parts of the strategic terrain, as immutable as mountains or swamps. Changing deep set perceptions and attitudes is like changing physical terrain: it may be possible over an extended period of time and at great cost and effort, but is normally not the wisest course of action. Yet the United States continued to rumble along with a strategy based on wishful thinking rather than cold reality.

(continued)

[SteveMetz]

Undercutting the Strategy

For a few years after September 11, the fissures and faulty assumptions in America's global strategy were papered over and held in check. Islamic partners were willing to cooperate to a point given the benefits involved. This gave Americans the impression of progress. But cooperation was fragile and thin, based more on an expectation of material gain than shared priorities and perspectives. And the United States was able to teeter along with a flawed strategy because because opposition from the element of the American public most likely to oppose the partnerships in the Islamic world--the political right--was held in check by Republican control of the White House. As long as it was George W. Bush and his administration arguing that extremists were not representative of Islam--something that President Bush stated often--the right muted its anger and hostility. Criticism would only strengthen Bush's critics. But with a Democratic president, the gloves came off. Politicians and pundits on the right found that public anger and hostility toward Islam was a useful tool to mobilize their constituency and attack a president whom a significant portion of Americans believed to be a secret Muslim. Just as Iraq was President Bush's vulnerability, Islam is President Obama's.

Before the 1970s, the vast majority of Americans thought or knew little about Islam. Most probably did not have an opinion one way or the other. But two things changed that. One was the Iranian revolution and its vociferous hatred of the United States. Seeing Iranian clerics hissing that the United States was "the Great Satan" while hypnotized crowds screamed in assent was an eye opener for Americans. Second was the adoption of terrorism by the Palestinian movement and Hezbollah. For many Americans, including a number of fundamentalist Christians, opposition to Islam because a component of the support for Israel which, they believed, the Bible required.

These things sparked a distrust, apprehension, and outright fear of Islam which, of course, grew immensely after September 11. In the anger of that time, hostility began to move from the political fringe toward the mainstream, and to grow in power. In recent years this has taken a number of forms. One end of the spectrum is inhabited primarily by people driven by the psychological need to hate something, whether propagandistic bloggers, talk radio hosts who stoke fear and anger to boost ratings and income, or small-time fundamentalist ministers who believe they are implementing divine writ. These people are simply hard-wired to hate. With the demise of the Soviet Union, they had no bete noire until what they saw as dangerous and aggressive Islam emerged to replace godless communism.

The other end of the spectrum was at least more sophisticated in its thinking. Probably the best known example was the "clash of civilizations" argument of the imminent Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington. Huntington contended that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global security system would be dominated by conflict between Islam and the Christian West rather than between competing ideologies both originating within the West (communism versus democratic capitalism). Huntington argued that the conflict between Islam and the Christian West was not a transitory phenomenon or the result of a fixable misunderstanding, but flowed "from the nature of the two religions and the civilizations based on them." With the end of the Cold War and, importantly, the resurgence of Islam, it developed into an "intercivilizational quasi war." America leaders, Huntington wrote, "allege that the Muslims involved in the quasi war are a small minority whose use of violence is rejected by the great majority of moderate Muslims. This may be true, but evidence to support it is lacking." His own position was clear: "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power." While Huntington's position was attacked virulently within academia, it demonstrated that hostility toward Islam was not limited to America's political fringe. Just as anti-communism had its hate-fueled John Birch wing and its intellectual advocates from Paul Nitze to Ronald Reagan and William Buckley, hostility toward Islam has a populist component and an intellectual one.

Admittedly, Americans remain divided on their attitude toward Islam. Polling data shows that 49% of Americans now have a negative view of Islam--the highest number on record. Of course, Americans themselves would say that means that a majority does not. But ultimately what matters for the U.S. global strategy is whether the publics and elites in Islamic countries believe that Americans are hostile toward Islam, not polling percentages. Given the psychological dynamics of the situation, all it takes is periodic outbursts of anti-Islamic sentiment, particularly those with support from American elite figures, to sustain the impression of hostility by Muslims abroad. Call it the Abu Gharib syndrome--one negative event can counteract dozens of positive ones or majority support. This is unfortunate, but it is the reality of cross-cultural communication.

But despite the perception of growing American hostility toward Islam, U.S. strategy persists in assuming that there is no basic incompatibility between Islam and Western civilization, only misunderstanding. Policymakers have not come to grips with the dissonance between domestic hostility toward Islam (whether real or perceived) and a global strategy based on winning support and building partnerships in the Islamic world. Now with extensive and opposition to the planned Cordoba House Islamic center in New York City, demonstrations against mosques across the country, and Koran burning ceremonies by fundamentalist ministers, passions are boiling. Muslims abroad are well aware of this. In September 2010, for instance, Afghans demonstrated to protest the highly publicized planned burning of Korans by the Gainesville, Florida-based Dove World Outreach Center. Even General David Petraeus, commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, warned that this threatened American service members. It all undercuts the idea that America's war is only with terrorists and not all Muslims. They feed the narrative of al Qaeda and its sympathizers that America and the West are at war with Islam itself. Condemnation of the Cordoba House by well known figures, including a number of prominent political leaders with electoral ambitions, mosque attacks, and Koran burning make a major contribution to the strategic communication of al Qaeda and other extremists.


 

(continued)

[SteveMetz]

Options

Today American strategy has hit the wall, crumbling in the face of growing public hostility toward Islam. There are only two solutions. One would be to try and re-cage the tiger by constraining domestic mistrust and hostility toward Islam at least enough to sustain the global strategy. This would require Republican leaders in particular to return to the messages of the Bush administration--that extremism does not represent or reflect Islam in general, and that despite recurrent anti-Americanism, U.S. partnerships in the Islamic world are making progress and can be sustained. Republican leaders, in other words, would have to abandon a theme which energizes and excites their political base, and give up on the notion of reviving the emotions of September 11 as elections approach. This is unlikely. Equally importantly, leaders and publics in the Islamic world would have to control anti-Americanism. Countries like Pakistan would have to recognize that they cannot be shrilly anti-American while expecting massive U.S. assistance. Again, this is unlikely since anti-Americanism in Pakistan and across the Islamic world has become legitimate and institutionalized. It sells papers and attracts viewers for the media. It makes politicians popular. Ironically for Americans, the growth of a free press and the process of democratization in the Islamic world has fueled and will continue to fuel anti-Americanism.

The alternative is to accept the notion that irresolvable differences exist between the United States and the Islamic world and that the clash of civilizations is a reality. Americans could stop ignoring blatant hypocrisy such as criticism of opposition to the Cordoba House at the same time that Islamic nations prevent the building of Christian churches, or vehement anti-Americanism combined with a demand for more American assistance. Americans could stop ignoring the misinformation which abounds in the Islamic world where any conspiracy theory about the perfidy of the United States, no matter how bizarre, finds a ready audience, even among the educated.

If this happens, the United States would be forced to craft a new global strategy based on at least a major if not a total disengagement from the Islamic world, shifting to a close rather than forward defense against terrorism. In the rubric of the Cold War, the United States would substitute roll back with containment, mirroring decisions made in the 1950s when the infeasibility of roll back became clear. While a solid argument can be made for this, it is important to think it through. It would, for instance, require disengagement from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan and Iraq might remain democracies, but would certainly become intensely anti-American, their leaders recognizing that public support is more important to the retention of political power than U.S. assistance. Iran--as the modern founding father of anti-Americanism--would certainly become more influential (although not hegemonic, given the Sunni-Shiite and Persian-Arab divisions).

Most nations in the Islamic world would be officially anti-American. A few, particularly those facing a major threat to the regime and able to disregard public opinion (i.e. closed political systems) might sustain some type of cooperation with the United States, but it would be tenuous. Even this would undercut the basis of American strategy since even though al Qaeda needs some sort of sanctuary or base, it does not need any particular sanctuary or base. It could simply move to nations which heed the demands of their publics to end cooperation with the United States. Some of these would allow an al Qaeda presence, whether openly or clandestinely. Across the Islamic world, Al Qaeda would grow in prestige and popularity claiming, whether rightly or wrongly, that it drove the United States out of the Islamic world. Much of the public there would believe it. Al Qaeda would welcome many new recruits eager to be part of the perceived victory. In such a strategy, the United States would "fight them here" because it could not "fight them there."

Ultimately this might prove better than the current American strategy. The consideration which long inspired American involvement in Southwest Asia--concern for access to oil--now seems obsolete. Oil will be available at market prices no matter how anti-American the governments in producer nations. Disengagement from the Islamic world would allow the United States to make major cuts in the size of the military and the defense budget, thereby providing an opportunity to lower taxes, pay down the national debt, or invest in infrastructure and education. The United States could fend off even a strengthened al Qaeda. After all, America's vigilance and defenses are far superior to what they were in September 2001. Every indication is that these things rather than involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan are what has prevented another terrorist attack in the United States. The United States could launch long range spoiling attacks against known al Qaeda bases or sanctuaries. While these might not be as effective as having allied governments controlling extremists for the United States, they might suffice. And, if the close defense was effective, it would not matter whether anti-Americanism reached new peaks in the Islamic world. Disengagement would be a risky strategy but, potentially, one with significant payoffs.

This is, however, speculative. Still, a few things are clear. American domestic hostility toward Islam will grow, particularly in the electioneering leading up to 2012. Hostility toward Islam has fused with political opposition to President Obama. (Hostility toward Islam is highest among Americans who oppose Obama.) Hostility toward Islam has become an integral part of the political battle between the left and right. But it is also clear that the American public cannot be anti-Islamic and expect Islamic nations to serve allies in the fight against extremism. This dissonance cannot be ignored or wished away. It cannot be papered over it with a bit more foreign assistance and more adept strategic communications. This is akin to painting a rusting hulk.

Albert Einstein once said that insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result. Whatever the context of his statement, he might well have been commenting on current U.S. strategy. Reality now calls. If a clash with Islam is inevitable, then current U.S. strategy is paralyzingly flawed. A new strategy must reflect the inherent antagonism. This would represent the greatest shift in American strategy since the emergence of the Cold War. Unfortunately, neither of the feasible strategic options--continuing on with a deeply flawed strategy or totally abandoning it--is appealing. Both abound with risk. But the rising tide of domestic hostility toward Islam will soon force the United States to choose. Americans have ignored the fissures and dissonance in their global strategy for nearly a decade now. Now that time has passed. Dangerous times lie ahead.

[Bob's World]

So much of the current American angst with Islam is rooted in Cold War strategies as implemented in those Islamic states seen as critical hedges against Soviet expansion due to their location; those seen as critical suppliers of oil; and those seen as occupying key terrain along critical LOCs. The wild card in this mix was/is our commitment to sustaining Israel as a nation. It has created a witches brew.

We now find ourselves in bed with some of the shadiest dictators and monarchs on the planet; who have come to act with ever increasing impunity under the umbrella of U.S. protection and enriched with foreign aid or petro dollars. At the same time we find ourselves at odds with those Islamic states that have had the fortitude to either resist or throw off our influence. Countries like Iran or Libya. Added on to all of this is this growing trend of individuals and organizations rising from Muslim populaces to challenge poor governance at home and also to attack those who work to keep such poor governance in place.

If our populace mis-understands the problem it is because our leaders do as well, and this is equally true on both sides of the aisle.

Al Qaeda is a symptom, an organization for their times. They are political opportunists with an agenda to advance and a willingness to employ any degree of illegal violence necessary to achieve it. They also are empowered by the tools of globalization to enable a networked approach to global unconventional warfare and sustained by a rich base of poorly governed populaces. These populaces do not have to stretch their imagination too far to buy into the linkages of Western manipulation and influence to their current challenges of poor governance at home.

For the US., playing the political blame game won't help; and neither will aggressively attacking the symptoms of the problem with a mix of counterterrorism and nation building tactics.

The U.S. must restate the problem. The U.S. must take responsibility for the effects of its role in the Middle East over the past 60+ years. Once we have that cathartic moment, not unlike step one in 12-step program, we can begin to get better.

We can employ our influence to encourage meaningful evolution of government where such is required (on local terms, not ours)

We can become the champion of the oppressed people of these regions, standing on the principles contained within our Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights rather than more recent corruptions of that founding Ethos to justify our behavior. We can implement a form of "soft-UW" that encourages very effective non-violent approaches; over the violence offered by AQ. By out-competing AQ we render them moot. By attacking them we validate and strengthen them at the same time. (Like cutting up starfish and throwing them back in the ocean...it makes sense, but the actual effects are the opposite of those intended)

Or, placed in the terminology of my community: We must put the Liber back in De Oppresso Liber.

[J Wolfsberger]

...

Al Qaeda is a symptom, an organization for their times. They are political opportunists with an agenda to advance and a willingness to employ any degree of illegal violence necessary to achieve it. ...

Which agenda, to bring this back to the original post, is their own, radical version of Sharia.

There have been a lot of good points raised on this thread, but one that should be added is that Nations (in the capital letter sense) have interests. They also have culturally determined morals and ethics to govern how those interests are pursued. For all the talk of "international community," there is absolutely no consensus on what those morals and ethics should be. (which is why I've always thought talk of "international community" a useless form of intellectual [self satisfaction].)

Whether we like it, or want to acknowledge it, or not, there are:

a. Groups of radical, violent ideologues who draw inspiration, or at least political cover, from a specific religion they have be interpreted as requiring intrusion into all aspects of life. (Not my interpretation, it's theirs.) These groups completely and absolutely reject any notion of internationally accepted morals and ethics in any dimension of human experience.

b. A significant number of people have adopted this radical interpretation as a way of explaining their circumstances in life, whether that be the unpopular American teenager or the impoverished and brutalized Yemeni peasant.

c. There are Nation states that find it in their interest to promote and even encourage these groups as a tool in advancing what they have determined to be their national interest. That interest may be establishing a regional hegemony (Iran) or a tool for redirecting domestic frustrations (Saudi Arabia).

I agree, it's not time to push any panic button over some grand international conspiracy to impose Sharia on the world. But I think it might be short sighted not to recognize that that is a major motivator to many of the people drawn to the violent movements.

[tequila]

Disengagement would be a risky strategy but, potentially, one with significant payoffs.

Steve, a nice article but with two significant caveats.

1) I don't think you've established that Islamophobic sentiments have become dominant within the American political establishment. It might have found a receptive audience in large segments of the American population, but that's a far cry from actually becoming influential over either the policy community or the political community as a whole. Americans generally don't vote on foreign policy, and while there is a lot of free-floating hostility out there that can coalesce around cultural markers, that's not the same as formulating a new foreign policy direction. American alliances with Muslim countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia are deeply embedded. Anti-Americanism in both places has run far higher in the past than Islamophobia has in the U.S., but that has not prevented Turkish or Saudi elites from deepening the alliance further for much the same reason --- domestic constituencies often have greater priorities than the relationship with the U.S.

2) Even assuming your point about anti-Muslim feelings becoming a driving force in American foreign policy, I cannot see how this leads to inevitably to disengagement/containment or smaller defense budgets. There are enormous domestic political constituencies invested in larger defense budgets. A forward-leaning Islamophobic American foreign policy is also possible, based on aggressive military action against supposed threats (which would now extend to a far greater spectrum of Muslim 'enemies') and a greater tolerance for civilian casualties.

[SteveMetz]

Steve, a nice article but with two significant caveats.

1) I don't think you've established that Islamophobic sentiments have become dominant within the American political establishment. It might have found a receptive audience in large segments of the American population, but that's a far cry from actually becoming influential over either the policy community or the political community as a whole. Americans generally don't vote on foreign policy, and while there is a lot of free-floating hostility out there that can coalesce around cultural markers, that's not the same as formulating a new foreign policy direction. American alliances with Muslim countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia are deeply embedded. Anti-Americanism in both places has run far higher in the past than Islamophobia has in the U.S., but that has not prevented Turkish or Saudi elites from deepening the alliance further for much the same reason --- domestic constituencies often have greater priorities than the relationship with the U.S.

2) Even assuming your point about anti-Muslim feelings becoming a driving force in American foreign policy, I cannot see how this leads to inevitably to disengagement/containment or smaller defense budgets. There are enormous domestic political constituencies invested in larger defense budgets. A forward-leaning Islamophobic American foreign policy is also possible, based on aggressive military action against supposed threats (which would now extend to a far greater spectrum of Muslim 'enemies') and a greater tolerance for civilian casualties.


In this quintessentially pyschological conflict, I don't think it matters whether America actually IS Islamophobic. What matters is whether a large segment of the population in the Islamic world believes it. And since the publics there are already prone to believe that, all it takes is the occasional Koran burning or mosque protest to sustain the perception. People in the Islamic have difficulty believing that Gingrich, Palin, Boykin, Gaffney and Fox News don't reflect the dominant position within the American public and elite. Remember that a hefty portion of the public in the Islamic world already believes that Israel and American Jews control public opinion. Again, the reality (or unreality) of this matters less than the perception.

Being Americans, though, we think like Americans. We believe that if we can show polls to people in the Islamic world demonstrating that 51% of Americans don't have negative attitudes toward Islam, that will suffice. I don't think it will.

And my point was that the more democratic governments in the Islamic world become, the more anti-Americanism will influence their policies. Just compare Turkey's relationship to the U.S. today to its relationship under the military junta. Same with Pakistan.

I believe that means that our best partners are going to be despots like Mubarak and the house of Saud. The more democracy grows, the less receptiveness to us.

Is that a basis for a global strategy?

On defense budgets, I agree with you. I simply suggested that shifting from the forward strategy in the Islamic world would give us the opportunity to shrink it. We may eschew that opportunity and simply find some new mission or threat to focus on. Maybe the Navy and Air Force will win out and China will become our focus threat.

[Bob's World]

Which agenda, to bring this back to the original post, is their own, radical version of Sharia.

There have been a lot of good points raised on this thread, but one that should be added is that Nations (in the capital letter sense) have interests. They also have culturally determined morals and ethics to govern how those interests are pursued. For all the talk of "international community," there is absolutely no consensus on what those morals and ethics should be. (which is why I've always thought talk of "international community" a useless form of intellectual [self satisfaction].)

Whether we like it, or want to acknowledge it, or not, there are:

a. Groups of radical, violent ideologues who draw inspiration, or at least political cover, from a specific religion they have be interpreted as requiring intrusion into all aspects of life. (Not my interpretation, it's theirs.) These groups completely and absolutely reject any notion of internationally accepted morals and ethics in any dimension of human experience.

b. A significant number of people have adopted this radical interpretation as a way of explaining their circumstances in life, whether that be the unpopular American teenager or the impoverished and brutalized Yemeni peasant.

c. There are Nation states that find it in their interest to promote and even encourage these groups as a tool in advancing what they have determined to be their national interest. That interest may be establishing a regional hegemony (Iran) or a tool for redirecting domestic frustrations (Saudi Arabia).

I agree, it's not time to push any panic button over some grand international conspiracy to impose Sharia on the world. But I think it might be short sighted not to recognize that that is a major motivator to many of the people drawn to the violent movements.

The Pied Piper is a fairy tale. Bin Laden is not leading the children of Islam to their doom with some magic flute of ideology. He is waging UW and his purposes, while twisted, are political. If the Muslim populaces of the Middle East in large, and Muslim populaces of the West in part, did not reasonably perceive that they were held in conditions of poor governance by the West, their would be little support to AQ.

It is easier to blame Islam and label it as evil than to take hard looks at our own approaches to foreign policy in the Middle East. I get it. That doesn't mean I condone it, and I certainly won't just push of responsibility for my own actions onto some convenient foil.

Radical Islam is no more and no less the problem for western governments today than Radical Christianity was 500 years ago. Sometimes governments bring these problems on themselves through their actions. It isn't about religion, it is about politics.

[SteveMetz]

I agree, it's not time to push any panic button over some grand international conspiracy to impose Sharia on the world. But I think it might be short sighted not to recognize that that is a major motivator to many of the people drawn to the violent movements.

No doubt but my point was that hysterical and nonsensical stuff like the Boykin/Soyster report detracts from our ability to recognize its real role. It's "crying wolf." People stop listening after a while and hence won't hear if there is a real wolf.

[tequila]

And my point was that the more democratic governments in the Islamic world become, the more anti-Americanism will influence their policies. Just compare Turkey's relationship to the U.S. today to its relationship under the military junta. Same with Pakistan.

I believe that means that our best partners are going to be despots like Mubarak and the house of Saud. The more democracy grows, the less receptiveness to us.

Is that a basis for a global strategy?

*snark* It has been for decades, hasn't it? *snark*

Perhaps I'm not understanding the thrust of your article. Is it that Islamophobia in the West is the issue, or that anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is the issue?

If it's anti-Americanism, I would argue that the problem is quite manageable.

Political majorities in Muslim countries are little different than in America in that they are primarily focused on domestic politics. You will get a lot of people willing to say they don't like America or American foreign policy, but very few people willing to actually vote or demonstrate or apply genuine political pressure based on anti-Americanism. This might shift based on a major media incident or if the U.S. becomes involved in a domestic issue (i.e. American bases or military presence, or U.S. involvement in elections, or U.S. invasion of a neighbor), but most people just don't pay that much attention to foreign issues, and rarely on a sustained basis.

As Ken reminds us, anti-Americanism is quite strong as a cultural undercurrent in many countries, including many that are U.S. allies. This includes South Korea, large swathes of South and Central America, France, Mexico, Germany, etc. I would chalk up places like Indonesia, Malaysia, and India as other countries whose governments often find common ground with the U.S. despite cultural anti-Americanism in many parts of society.

Culture matters to a degree, but in foreign affairs interests matter more, especially in the day to day.

[SteveMetz]

*snark* It has been for decades, hasn't it? *snark*

Perhaps I'm not understanding the thrust of your article. Is it that Islamophobia in the West is the issue, or that anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is the issue?

If it's anti-Americanism, I would argue that the problem is quite manageable.

Political majorities in Muslim countries are little different than in America in that they are primarily focused on domestic politics. You will get a lot of people willing to say they don't like America or American foreign policy, but very few people willing to actually vote or demonstrate or apply genuine political pressure based on anti-Americanism. This might shift based on a major media incident or if the U.S. becomes involved in a domestic issue (i.e. American bases or military presence, or U.S. involvement in elections, or U.S. invasion of a neighbor), but most people just don't pay that much attention to foreign issues, and rarely on a sustained basis.

As Ken reminds us, anti-Americanism is quite strong as a cultural undercurrent in many countries, including many that are U.S. allies. This includes South Korea, large swathes of South and Central America, France, Mexico, Germany, etc. I would chalk up places like Indonesia, Malaysia, and India as other countries whose governments often find common ground with the U.S. despite cultural anti-Americanism in many parts of society.

Culture matters to a degree, but in foreign affairs interests matter more, especially in the day to day.

I'm not trying to assign blame. My point was simply that it makes no sense to pretend we can execute a strategy based on partnership when both sides are increasingly hostile to the other. We've deluded ourselves into believing this is all a misunderstanding, and we can fix it if we just get our STRATCOMMs better organized.

And, personally, I think the anti-Americanism is Pakistan is quite a bit different than that in Germany or South Korea.

And here's today's Exhibit #1 (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/23/freedom-versus-shariah/) to show how outright ignorance and/or deliberate propaganda about Islam is becoming mainstreamed in the U.S. The op-ed begins with a demonstrably false assertion and then builds on it. But looking at all the whoopin' support in the commentary section.

[tequila]

And, personally, I think the anti-Americanism is Pakistan is quite a bit different than that in Germany or South Korea.


Yes, it's much more intense - probably more intense than anywhere else in the world. However, I'd argue it will be much less so when the drone campaign eventually comes to an end and the American withdrawal from Afghanistan occurs - that is, once American policy stops impinging in the domestic Pakistani political sphere.

Actions matter. Pakistani anti-Americanism was less intense prior to 2001. Indonesian anti-Americanism, OTOH, was arguably much higher. These things can be managed, just as we've been managing them since 1945. The 'clash of civilizations' is a silly construct. Cultures differ, but they aren't going to inevitably clash.

[SteveMetz]

Cultures differ, but they aren't going to inevitably clash.
Huntington's argument is not that cultures inevitably clash because they are different. I'm re-reading the book now.

[Ken White]

...We've deluded ourselves into believing this is all a misunderstanding, and we can fix it if we just get our STRATCOMMs better organized.I'm unsure who "we" are but personally, I don't think most Americans subscribe to that. If you meant the Washington power structure; those are people who prove on an hourly basis that they are out of touch with virtually everyone except themselves. That means they are dangerously deluded -- but then, we knew that... :rolleyes:
And, personally, I think the anti-Americanism is Pakistan is quite a bit different than that in Germany or South Korea.Totally true but all three pose their own sets of problems due to their latent anti-Americanism and of the three, which could be potentially the more dangerous...

Not to mention that the difference in functional dislikes is in part driven by those nation's own culture, in part by previous US actions and will possibly affect our future in quite different ways. The various dislikes will manifest themselves in both overt and less obvious ways -- as has already occurred in the latter two Nations you mention.
...The op-ed begins with a demonstrably false assertion and then builds on it. But looking at all the whoopin' support in the commentary section.Look also at the location of the Op-Ed and said comments. Just as the Center for Security Policy is a fringe element, so is that paper and so is the author of the Op-Ed. I think it was Entropy who wisely said "Never read the comment sections in Newspapers..."

As you say, the fact that most Americans will virtually ignore all three is eclipsed by the fact that it plays into the arms of those anti-US types -- worldwide, to include here in this nation, and of all stripes -- yet, on balance, I agree with Tequila. Actually, I agree with him on both points and I agree with you; I suspect the actualities are somewhere in between, muddled, as is the American way. :wry:

That's not okay in many aspects -- but I doubt much can be done about it.:(

As Tequila said: "The 'clash of civilizations' is a silly construct. Cultures differ, but they aren't going to inevitably clash." Even though there are fringe elements on both sides of any potential conflict who actively want that clash, most people are really pretty pragmatic and do not...

All that said, I agree with your premise on several counts:
"Albert Einstein once said that insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result. Whatever the context of his statement, he might well have been commenting on current U.S. strategy..."Too true...
Reality now calls. If a clash with Islam is inevitable, then current U.S. strategy is paralyzingly flawed. A new strategy must reflect the inherent antagonism.While I doubt that such a clash is inevitable, I do think our current policies -- they are not a strategy -- are not helpful and that they could bring about the very clash that we should wish to avoid.
This would represent the greatest shift in American strategy since the emergence of the Cold War... Americans have ignored the fissures and dissonance in their global strategy for nearly a decade now. Now that time has passed. Dangerous times lie ahead.True on the first bit, though I'd say it's in excess of two decades...

I strongly agree the time has past. We have literally frittered away 20 years and the fault -- it is emphatically a fault -- can be attributed to four successive US Administrations and to four SecDefs from Cheney forward (I give Rumsfeld a minor break because he got stuck in a war he did not want and Gates is not yet gone). Congress is equally responsible. As I said up top about the DC crowd; "That means they are dangerously deluded -- but then, we knew that..." :mad:

[SteveMetz]

I'm unsure who "we" are but personally, I don't think most Americans subscribe to that. If you meant the Washington power structure; those are people who prove on an hourly basis that they are out of touch with virtually everyone except themselves. That means they are dangerously deluded -- but then, we knew that... :rolleyes:



Personally I don't know too many Americans, whether "the Washington power structure" or the Sarah Palin crowd, who accept the idea that people in the Islamic world understand us pretty well, but just don't like us and what we stand for. There are dozens and dozens of official statements from both the Bush and Obama administration contending that "public diplomacy" will make for better understanding and less hostility. After nine years in which this hasn't happened, we cling to it.


Just as the Center for Security Policy is a fringe element, so is that paper and so is the author of the Op-Ed. I think it was Entropy who wisely said "Never read the comment sections in Newspapers..."

First of all, I don't think that's true. I'm a South Carolinian and I can tell you that Nugent's essay very much represents the majority perspective in much of "red" America. But in any case, when people in Pakistan read that essay, do you think they'll say, "Oh that's just a fringe publication, so we should disregard it"?


As Tequila said: "The 'clash of civilizations' is a silly construct. Cultures differ, but they aren't going to inevitably clash." Even though there are fringe elements on both sides of any potential conflict who actively want that clash, most people are really pretty pragmatic and do not...

I'd be happy to discuss the merits and shortcomings of Huntington's "clash of civilizations" theory but don't see much value in debating a caricature version of it.

[Ken White]

Personally I don't know too many Americans, whether "the Washington power structure" or the Sarah Palin crowd, who accept the idea that people in the Islamic world understand us pretty well, but just don't like us and what we stand for.I guess it's all in who you meet and where. I don't know too many Americans who do not realize that most natives of other Nations do not understand us at all well -- and that includes their intelligentsia -- and that many in those nations do not like us for various reasons, valid and not. Nor do I meet, talk with or know many who do not accept that we are not well liked -- or who fret much about that fact.

Most of them, unwashed though they be, seem to grasp that the 'Islamic' problem with us revolves around several factors, that we are at fault in some ways and agree that the cultural disconnects are pervasive and difficult to reconcile. However, they really aren't interested in us changing -- and they can do math...:cool:

That means they wish there was no disconnect but aren't inclined to try to change the attitudes of others. That latter sort of effort seems to be a Beltway habitue shtick.
There are dozens and dozens of official statements from both the Bush and Obama administration contending that "public diplomacy" will make for better understanding and less hostility. After nine years in which this hasn't happened, we cling to it.Apparently you missed the bit where I said I agreed with you -- and faulted several other Administrations...
First of all, I don't think that's true. I'm a South Carolinian and I can tell you that Nugent's essay very much represents the majority perspective in much of "red" America.We can disagree on that, the definition of "much," I mean. I'm a Kentuckian, have lived all over the South, to include two years in Charleston and fishing in Lake Moultrie. I now live on the Redneck Riviera, just got back from a trip to Jawja. I know and talk to many people (including relatives all over the South *) who would certainly agree with the Nugent perspective. I know a good many more who would not (Including more of the above *). Also know a bunch who would and do withhold judgment due to inadequate information (including most of the above *). That's three thirds, two of 'em likely do not agree with or support the Gaffney / Nugent view. :wry:

No way to tell, really, we're both stating our perceptions or opinions and should be able to do so without being disagreeable.
But in any case, when people in Pakistan read that essay, do you think they'll say, "Oh that's just a fringe publication, so we should disregard it"?Uh, no -- that's why I said above:

"As you say, the fact that most Americans will virtually ignore all three is eclipsed by the fact that it plays into the arms of those anti-US types -- worldwide, to include here in this nation, and of all stripes..."

You seem to have missed the fact that I agree with you.:confused:
I'd be happy to discuss the merits and shortcomings of Huntington's "clash of civilizations" theory but don't see much value in debating a caricature version of it.Huntington's Clash is IMO a caricature in itself. People are more complex than that and times change. I did not attack that book or idea on its or their merits, what I did say was: "While I doubt that such a clash is inevitable, I do think our current policies -- they are not a strategy -- are not helpful and that they could bring about the very clash that we should wish to avoid."

I'd say have a nice day but you seem to have made other plans...;)

[Global Scout]

And my point was that the more democratic governments in the Islamic world become, the more anti-Americanism will influence their policies. Just compare Turkey's relationship to the U.S. today to its relationship under the military junta. Same with Pakistan.

I believe that means that our best partners are going to be despots like Mubarak and the house of Saud. The more democracy grows, the less receptiveness to us.

Is that a basis for a global strategy?

Interesting observation, and while it probably shouldn't drive our strategy it should cool our jets on our effort to "push" democracy around the world.

[Cliff]

The U.S. must restate the problem. The U.S. must take responsibility for the effects of its role in the Middle East over the past 60+ years. Once we have that cathartic moment, not unlike step one in 12-step program, we can begin to get better.

Do you see this admission as being more for our own sake, or for the benefit of the people in the Middle East? If it is for us, then it makes sense... if it is for the folks in the Middle East, then I am not sure if it would be effective.

I do agree that we should confess our sins as it were...



We can employ our influence to encourage meaningful evolution of government where such is required (on local terms, not ours)

We can become the champion of the oppressed people of these regions, standing on the principles contained within our Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights rather than more recent corruptions of that founding Ethos to justify our behavior. We can implement a form of "soft-UW" that encourages very effective non-violent approaches; over the violence offered by AQ. By out-competing AQ we render them moot. By attacking them we validate and strengthen them at the same time. (Like cutting up starfish and throwing them back in the ocean...it makes sense, but the actual effects are the opposite of those intended)

Or, placed in the terminology of my community: We must put the Liber back in De Oppresso Liber.

I agree on the non-violence. If you look at our own civil rights movement, you see many elements of a (mainly) non-violent insurgency that was relatively effective...

Why have the Palestinians, Kashmiris, or others in the Middle East not attempted to use non-violent protests and methods?

It looked to me like the Kashmiris were going in this direction a little while back... but the emphasis on throwing stones is closer to the intifada than to MLK or Gandhi.

These techniques could rally world opinion to their causes... It seems like the Gaza relief flotilla folks definitely benefited from this sort of push.

Do you think that these methods could be effective if used en masse? Certainly us training/encouraging such efforts would hopefully help... but would long-term benefits occur? Or will the people just vote to institute sharia once they have the power?

It seems like we gave the Mujahideen a lot of help, and not all of ended up liking us afterwards...

I'd be curious to here folks opinions on the viability of non-violent resistance in the Middle East.

V/R,

Cliff

[Bob's World]

Interesting observation, and while it probably shouldn't drive our strategy it should cool our jets on our effort to "push" democracy around the world.

Its great when its voluntary, but it's rape when one party forces it on another "for their own good" or otherwise.

I remain a big proponent for self-determination. Besides, I have a theory that we really got away from promoting self-determination in the Cold War when so many populaces were self-determining that communism was the best way to throw off the heavy yoke of western colonialism. Our national ethos got in the way of our mission to contain the Soviets, so we compromised a little and changed our product to "democracy."

Personally I think we should go back. You may not like what you get with self-determination, but at least it's never rape...

[Bob's World]

Cliff,

If we encourage governments to dialog with their populace and be open to reasonable evolution with one hand, and encourage non-violent challenges of poor governance by oppressed populaces with the other, we can realign ourselves with our national ethos. Not the neutrality of a fan sitting in the bleachers watching, but rather the neutrality of an umpire on the field keeping things from getting out of hand as the competition plays out.

To proclaim that U.S. interests and US values are "universal" as we do in our National Security Strategy though,blows me away. The hubris is off the chart, or maybe it's just ignorance, I don't know which. Glenn Beck has been ranting about how we are out to form a world government; I guess if you think everyone shares your interests and values, why not? Worrisome stuff, that. People need to chart their own path; extremes of behavior don't fare well in the light of day, and there are fewer and fewer dark corners in the globe every day.

Our current doctrine for COIN presumes keeping the current government in power. I am no fan of regime change, but I think we approach the troubled states where AQ has so much sway more effectively when we do not just grant the government a guarantee that we will help them maintain the status quo. We become more effective when we don't take sides and don't project our interests and values onto others. To wage this kind of diplomacy is nothing that our "state" department is trained, organized or inclined to do. We need to tune our own government and policies up to be more effective in the emerging world, and then go out to engage it.

Who knows, our greatest allies 20 years from now may well be states that have not yet formed, or governments that do not currently exist. They might not even be states at all. Now is not the time to attempt to rigidly enforce the past, but rather to develop a greater flexibility for embracing the future as it emerges around us.

[tequila]

But in any case, when people in Pakistan read that essay, do you think they'll say, "Oh that's just a fringe publication, so we should disregard it"?


But Steve, why does it matter so much whether or not the general cultural mood in Pakistan is anti-American? Surely we should take steps to reduce it if possible, but do general public perceptions really matter so much when it comes to foreign policy?

[Cliff]

To proclaim that U.S. interests and US values are "universal" as we do in our National Security Strategy though,blows me away. The hubris is off the chart, or maybe it's just ignorance, I don't know which. Glenn Beck has been ranting about how we are out to form a world government; I guess if you think everyone shares your interests and values, why not? Worrisome stuff, that. People need to chart their own path; extremes of behavior don't fare well in the light of day, and there are fewer and fewer dark corners in the globe every day.

I agree with this. One thing that has been interesting for me to see in CGSC is the degree to which we mirror image... even folks who have just come from working wonders COIN-wise in foreign cultures still have a hard time seeing things outside the "American" perspective- especially strategically.


Our current doctrine for COIN presumes keeping the current government in power. I am no fan of regime change, but I think we approach the troubled states where AQ has so much sway more effectively when we do not just grant the government a guarantee that we will help them maintain the status quo. We become more effective when we don't take sides and don't project our interests and values onto others. To wage this kind of diplomacy is nothing that our "state" department is trained, organized or inclined to do. We need to tune our own government and policies up to be more effective in the emerging world, and then go out to engage it.

Definitely agree with this... Karzai being one good example, the current Iraqi political structure being another, and Pakistan being a potential third.

The problem is, how do you prevent the replacement from being worse than the status quo?

If you look at the trajectory of democratization and economic progress, the folks who developed economically first and politically second did better than those who tried the other route. South Korea is a great example of this... I think the economic part is probably the most important piece- you gain so much traction if people's lives are better.

Is there a middle ground, where you can encourage change but not chaos? Seems like a tough balance. I think our current policies may be too hypocritical to work - it's great to be for liberty but that kind of seems false when you support dictatorships.

I guess the other question is will anti-Americanism fade if people's economic and political conditions improve?

V/R,

Cliff

[Cliff]

This (http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/09/24/texas-board-ed-considering-resolution-calling-publishers-limit-islam-textbooks/?test=latestnews?test=latestnews) will help our stratcomms for sure.

The Texas Board of Education has passed a resolution to limit references to Islam in textbooks.

V/R,

Cliff

[SteveMetz]

A correction of a post I made earlier in this thread: JFQ retracted its acceptance of the essay I pasted in here so I don't know where, if anywhere, it will be published.

[Dayuhan]

Coming? It's already there...

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101007/ap_on_el_se/us_nevada_senate_angle

LAS VEGAS – U.S. Senate candidate Sharron Angle told a crowd of supporters that the country needs to address a "militant terrorist situation" that has allowed Islamic religious law to take hold in some American cities....

[SteveMetz]

In an era of whacked political candidates, Sharon Angle is the Empress of Whackiness. I believe the Nevada Senate race may offer the worst choices in the history of American politics.

But, seriously, what is troubling is that there are enfranchised Americans who believe nonsense like that Angle spouts.

[Hacksaw]

Steve...
Just an observation...
You seem more disillusioned than usual of late...
A less than spectacular fall season?
Or are you a closet 49er fan?:D

[Pol-Mil FSO]

I sometimes worry that we have reached the point where a politician who came out and said the biggest threat to U.S. National Security is posed by "Mexican Muslims who want to use anchor babies to impose Sharia law" could gain significant support, at least in a Republican primary, or in an election here in Arizona.

[120mm]

This (http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/09/24/texas-board-ed-considering-resolution-calling-publishers-limit-islam-textbooks/?test=latestnews?test=latestnews) will help our stratcomms for sure.

The Texas Board of Education has passed a resolution to limit references to Islam in textbooks.

V/R,

Cliff

Well THIS is a valid response to a genuine concern. A normally Muslim-friendly (non-religious) friend of mine is doing a research project and has privately shared findings with me that pretty much show that textbook companies are trending toward PROMOTING Islam.

At issue is that any factual representation of Islam as a religion is subject to unending lawsuit peril from Radical Muslims living in the US, so the textbook manufacturers have defaulted to basically including a highly complimentary "See how Islam is superior to all the other world religions" theme.

The problem as I see it, is that Americans come in two flavors, vis-a-vis Islam. They are either xenophobic 'Murrican anti-Arab/furriner/Muslim, or they are spineless, brainless, gobs-o-goo "Religion of Peace" apologists. There is very little actual middle ground or understanding of how Islam works or what it stands for, at least among mainstream Muslims.

[Tom Odom]

And here I was worried the family farm might be at risk...


Group Launches Media Blitz in Oklahoma for Anti-Shariah Ballot Initiative (http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/10/20/anti-islamic-group-launches-media-blitz-oklahoma-anti-shariah-ballot-initiative/)
A group vowing to fight "Islamofascism" has launched a media blitz in Oklahoma supporting a state constitutional amendment that would prohibit the courts from considering Islamic or other international law when ruling on cases in Sooner State courtrooms....

...The group says the constitutional amendment will prevent the takeover of Oklahoma by Islamic extremists who want to undo America from the inside out.

[SteveMetz]

If that passes it will be proof positive that Oklahoma is not yet ready for democracy. And those buffoons probably don't know that the U.S. Constitution makes international law part of U.S. law. I assume they simply aren't sharp enough to understand the distinction between international law and foreign law. Nor are they bright enough to understand that in Western countries where sharia courts exist, like the UK, they are informal bodies which do not supersede British law.

It is pretty sad, though, that Woolsey has sailed boldly off the edge of reality.

[82redleg]

If that passes it will be proof positive that Oklahoma is not yet ready for democracy. And those buffoons probably don't know that the U.S. Constitution makes international law part of U.S. law. I assume they simply aren't sharp enough to understand the distinction between international law and foreign law. Nor are they bright enough to understand that in Western countries where sharia courts exist, like the UK, they are informal bodies which do not supersede British law.

It is pretty sad, though, that Woolsey has sailed boldly off the edge of reality.

The Constitution does? Please reference.

I'm sure some progressive judicial ruling does, but that doesn't keep it being as wrong as I don't know what.

And the sharia courts (as they exist in the UK and other places) are just a step. If you don't fear a religion that doesn't accept the separation of church and state, and demands that its followers use force to convert or make subservient non-believers, you are blind to the realities of Islam.

[SteveMetz]

The Constitution does? Please reference.

I'm sure some progressive judicial ruling does, but that doesn't keep it being as wrong as I don't know what.

And the sharia courts (as they exist in the UK and other places) are just a step. If you don't fear a religion that doesn't accept the separation of church and state, and demands that its followers use force to convert or make subservient non-believers, you are blind to the realities of Islam.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Treaties are the primary source of international law. The other important source is custom, but most of customary law that matters has been ingrained in treaties.

I don't know a nice way to put this, but the notion of a sharia threat is absolute nonsense.

It's like this. The word "law" has multiple meanings. It's used to refer to guidelines which members of some organization agree to be bound by. There is a Boy Scout Law and the Mormon Church has a Law of Chastity. Adherence is voluntary by members of those organizations. It is NOT law in the sense of mandatory law passed by a legislature. It does NOT supersede local, state or Federal law.

That is what some Muslim communities in Western nations have elected to do. Sharia rulings do not replace or supersede British law or American law any more than the Boy Scout Law or the Mormon Law of Chastity do.

Things like this Oklahoma movement make Americans look like fools who don't understand the concept of law.

And the notion that Islam "demands that its followers use force to convert" is simply--and I'm looking for the nicest word I can find--wrong. But that is irrelevant to the topic under discussion.

[jmm99]

from Steve Metz
Treaties are the primary source of international law. The other important source is custom, but most of customary law that matters has been ingrained in treaties.

is definitely not accepted:

(1) internationally by such as the ICRC (e.g., its massive publications on Treaties and customary international humanitarian law (http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_treaties_and_customary_law?OpenDocumen t) and Customary international humanitarian law (http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/section_ihl_customary_humanitarian_law)). The ICRC considers the rules in the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II (not ratified or acceded by the US; but accepted by many allies) to be customary IHL. That is just one example where "most of customary law that matters" has NOT been "ingrained" via treaties ratified or acceded by the US.

(2) domestically by such as the Lexington Principles Project (http://law.wlu.edu/lexingtonprinciples/) at Washington and Lee University, which (pdf (http://law.wlu.edu/lexingtonprinciples/)) sets out 45 principles of customary international human rights law that it seeks to incorporate into US law via judicial decision (p.23 pdf):


2. Introducing the Transnational Incorporation Doctrine

The Transnational Incorporation Doctrine, first developed for the Lexington Principles, asserts that there are some rights under international human rights law that are so fundamental that they should be included in our understanding of the right to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Because international human rights are universal, this new interpretation would result in universal application of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause with respect to incorporated rights. Nationality and territoriality would play no role in determining their applicability. Rights incorporated through this mechanism would be universally applied to all human beings, and these protections would have a domestic legal status equivalent to all other due process rights. The Ninth Amendment seems to indicate that the Framers of the Constitution intended to allow for this possibility.

The effect of adopting the 45 Lexington Principles via the 5th Amendment Due Process Clause would be to write those principles into the Bill of Rights, totally bypassing the constitutional amendment process. It would indeed give new meaning to the overused term "judicial legislation".

That project is not some fringe nutcase group, but includes in members and on its advisory group (pp. 6-7; all three below are well-known in the LOAC field):


Geoffrey S. Corn
Associate Professor of Law
South Texas College of Law

Jack Goldsmith
Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law
Harvard Law School

Lt. Col. Gary D. Solis, USMC (Ret.)
Adjunct Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center
Professor of Law (Ret.), U.S. Military Academy

Now, I don't favor this backdoor method of amending the Constitution; but one cannot question that these Transnationalists have told us exactly what they want to do. And that is to incorporate a great deal of "customary" I Law by a process outside the treaty process.

As to Oklahoma or any other state limiting its state judges' choice of law in state cases, it has a perfectly good constitutional right to do that, so long as it violates neither the Supremacy Clause nor the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Neither of those provisions requires application of Shariah (as a true legal sysytem - which it is; comparing it to "Boy Scout Law" is frankly insulting to centuries of very explicit Islamic jurisprudence).

To the extent that Muslims elect to use shariah rules as their own internal "canon law" within their mosques, that is another issue - a freedom of religion issue.

Personally, I think the whole "Shariah Thing" (yeh, Spencer and Geller et al; and their just as rabid opponents) is overblown. Where my line is crossed is where any religion's canon law is adopted either via legislation or judicial decision as a special rule of decision. That would violate the Establishment of Religion Clause.

The entire "discussion" re: Islam and Shariah brings out the worst of our present Era of Absolutism.

Regards

Mike

[SteveMetz]

OK, fine. My point was that either the sponsors of the action in Oklahoma or the author of the Fox story don't understand the difference between international law and foreign law.

[J Wolfsberger]

And the notion that Islam "demands that its followers use force to convert" is simply--and I'm looking for the nicest word I can find--wrong. But that is irrelevant to the topic under discussion.

Steve, if you mean many Moslems do not believe that, I'll agree. However, there are still a large number of Moslems, to include all radical Moslems, who believe precisely that, based on a strict reading/interpretation of the Koran and Hadith.

[SteveMetz]

Of course. The vast, vast majority of Muslims and Islamic clerics dispute that the religion implores all Muslims to covert by force. Yet American Islamophobes, most with a knowledge of Islam a few verses picked up on the Internet deep, claim that they know better.

As I've said often, I believe that delusion and hysteria about Islam hinders our ability to come up with an effective assessment of it.

[Tom Odom]

Of course. The vast, vast majority of Muslims and Islamic clerics dispute that the religion implores all Muslims to covert by force. Yet American Islamophobes, most with a knowledge of Islam a few verses picked up on the Internet deep, claim that they know better.

As I've said often, I believe that delusion and hysteria about Islam hinders our ability to come up with an effective assessment of it.

Agreed.

[J Wolfsberger]

Of course. The vast, vast majority of Muslims and Islamic clerics dispute that the religion implores all Muslims to covert by force. Yet American Islamophobes, most with a knowledge of Islam a few verses picked up on the Internet deep, claim that they know better.

As I've said often, I believe that delusion and hysteria about Islam hinders our ability to come up with an effective assessment of it.

I generally agree, but not with the part about delusion and hysteria. I think the failure in effective assessment has three components:


Hard radical Moslem behavior makes headlines - because if it bleeds it leads. Every time a nut case, who happens to be Moslem, attacks his daughters in the name of "honor," it will make national news. That leaves an impression that all have this attitude (which is, to the best of my knowledge, tribal custom having nothing to do with Islam).

Soft radical Moslem spokesmen, usually self designated and further promoted by PC groups, who speak of Moslem grievances against Western Civilization. (At one point, they were explaining that Moslem's were still angered by the Crusades.) Most people hear these grievances/explanations and (correctly) conclude that if they really believe this, they aren't very rational.

A PC crowd pushing special accommodation, status, protection, etc. for Moslem's and Islam. (For reasons I will not go into on this board.) It hasn't gone as far in the U.S. as it has in Canada or Europe, but it is still there. That will inevitably alienate people who will ask why Christian prayer in school violates the legal principle of Separation of Church and State, but building a Moslem prayer room in the schools doesn't.


I think that for most people, not just in the U.S. but also, increasingly, in Europe, Canada, Australia, etc., these add up to concerns that are both rational and mistaken, but not delusional or hysterical. Obtaining a more accurate evaluation will require recognizing that the concerns are legitimately held, then working to demonstrate that they aren't correct. Which is why I would like to see the responsible Imams and other spokespeople given more prominence in the national discussion on the issue.

[tequila]

Which is why I would like to see the responsible Imams and other spokespeople given more prominence in the national discussion on the issue.

Impossible to do when professional Islamophobes, who are given a megaphone by a partisan media, feel no shame in slandering any Muslim leader or spokesperson as a terrorist sympathizer. Seriously, if Feisal Abdul Rauf can be portrayed as a radical, any Muslim can be.

[SteveMetz]

A PC crowd pushing special accommodation, status, protection, etc. for Moslem's and Islam. (For reasons I will not go into on this board.) It hasn't gone as far in the U.S. as it has in Canada or Europe, but it is still there. That will inevitably alienate people who will ask why Christian prayer in school violates the legal principle of Separation of Church and State, but building a Moslem prayer room in the schools doesn't.
[/LIST]

I think that for most people, not just in the U.S. but also, increasingly, in Europe, Canada, Australia, etc., these add up to concerns that are both rational and mistaken, but not delusional or hysterical. Obtaining a more accurate evaluation will require recognizing that the concerns are legitimately held, then working to demonstrate that they aren't correct. Which is why I would like to see the responsible Imams and other spokespeople given more prominence in the national discussion on the issue.

We'll agree to disagree. When an organization screaming about the Islamic take over of Oklahoma is endorsed by a former CIA director, we're well beyond "rational and mistaken." We are, in my opinion, at the point of delusion and hysteria. (Unless there is an AQ document I've missed where OBL listed his priorities as liberating Mecca, then Jerusalem, then Tulsa.)

And your statement about "why Christian prayer in school violates the legal principle of Separation of Church and State, but building a Moslem prayer room in the schools doesn't" is, at best, a red herring. No one prohibits Christian students from praying; law prohibits school officials from sanctioning prayer or making in mandatory. If schools were forcing non-Muslim students to use the prayer room, then the comparison would be valid. As it is, public schools can and do provide a space for Christian prayer groups to meet outside of class time.

And the comment "I would like to see the responsible Imams and other spokespeople given more prominence in the national discussion on the issue" overlooks the fact that it happens on a regular basis. Yet we see purportedly responsible media like the Washington Times printing op-eds by people like Ted Nugent which assert that no Muslim clerics condemn terrorism or extremism. That is a demonstrably false statement.

What concerns me is that delusion, hysteria and falsehood about Islam has moved from the lunatic fringe like Pamela Gellar and Robert Spencer to the mainstream like the Washington Times and Fox News, stoked by people like Boykin, Woolsey and some other major political figures.

My major concern, as expressed in my essay that I can't find a venue for, is that it is ridiculous to assume that this will have no effect on our strategy of building partnerships in the Islamic world. One of the most important points made in the 1980s by Jeanne Kirkpatrick and institutionalized in the Reagan strategy was that other nations couldn't spew virulently anti-American rhetoric and expect to be our partners and recipients of aid. That made perfect sense. But it cuts both ways. If Americans see Islam as a religion as a threat rather than simply Muslim extremists, then we cannot rationally expect to implement a strategy based on partnership with Islamic nations.

[Tukhachevskii]

If Americans see Islam as a religion as a threat rather than simply Muslim extremists, then we cannot rationally expect to implement a strategy based on partnership with Islamic nations.

I dare you to find a better example of both logical inconsistency and irony.:D



Instead of posting a fuller response to the comments above I hope to incorporate them, with the permission of the posters, into an article I have been in the process of writing for a long time now. I simply can't respond in the depth and detail I'd like to in this space/medium without my reply looking like an article (so why not write it as such anyway). However, I nwould like to know from Steve Metz what the specific delusions abour islam he is refering to....


What concerns me is that delusion, hysteria and falsehood about Islam

...I might then be able to make some informed posts in response.

[SteveMetz]

I dare you to find a better example of both logical inconsistency and irony.:D



Instead of posting a fuller response to the comments above I hope to incorporate them, with the permission of the posters, into an article I have been in the process of writing for a long time now. I simply can't respond in the depth and detail I'd like to in this space/medium without my reply looking like an article (so why not write it as such anyway). However, I nwould like to know from Steve Metz what the specific delusions abour islam he is refering to....



...I might then be able to make some informed posts in response.

Things mentioned in this thread alone: that Islam demands that Muslims convert non-Muslims by force, that Muslims want to impose sharia on Oklahoma, that no Muslims or no Muslim clerics condemn terrorism or extremism.

[tequila]

One of the most important points made in the 1980s by Jeanne Kirkpatrick and institutionalized in the Reagan strategy was that other nations couldn't spew virulently anti-American rhetoric and expect to be our partners and recipients of aid. That made perfect sense.

Was this an actual Reagan Administration policy? What accounts for our long and fruitful partnership with the Saudis and the Pakistanis at that time, then? Or indeed with recipients of American largesse like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani?

[SteveMetz]

I don't remember the Saudis and Pakistanis being virulently anti-American at the time. But, of course, exceptions are always made for "strategically significant" partners.

[tequila]

I don't remember the Saudis and Pakistanis being virulently anti-American at the time.

Well, it's not like political Islamism in the 1990s came out of nowhere. The Saudis were exporting Wahhabism everywhere in the 1980s and Zia ul-Haq was forcing political Islamism of the Jamiat-e-Islami type on Pakistan while at the same time taking our money to kill Russians. And yes, both strains were very anti-American and anti-Western.


But, of course, exceptions are always made for "strategically significant" partners.

Isn't that kind of always the problem? It's not as if SA or Pakistan are less vital now - quite the opposite.

[SteveMetz]

I don't think that's really the same thing. But my point was that I think it's correct to use a nation's attitude toward us as one determinant of the type of relationship we have with it. I just don't think we can have it both ways--using a nation's attitude toward us as a determinant of the nature of our partnership, but thinking that the attitudes of the American public toward the potential partner do not matter.

Do note that I have not taken a position on the inherent nature of Islam, or on the long-term compatability of Islamic culture and the West. I've only made two points: 1) if we don't ratchet down the domestic hostilty toward Islam, we're going to have to radically revamp our global strategy; and, 2) we should take a deep breath and work with a realistic perception of Islam, both globally and domestically, rather than an hysterical notion based on ignorance, and on assuming that the most hostile and violent members of that culture characterize the whole culture.

[120mm]

I don't think that's really the same thing. But my point was that I think it's correct to use a nation's attitude toward us as one determinant of the type of relationship we have with it. I just don't think we can have it both ways--using a nation's attitude toward us as a determinant of the nature of our partnership, but thinking that the attitudes of the American public toward the potential partner do not matter.

Do note that I have not taken a position on the inherent nature of Islam, or on the long-term compatability of Islamic culture and the West. I've only made two points: 1) if we don't ratchet down the domestic hostilty toward Islam, we're going to have to radically revamp our global strategy; and, 2) we should take a deep breath and work with a realistic perception of Islam, both globally and domestically, rather than an hysterical notion based on ignorance, and on assuming that the most hostile and violent members of that culture characterize the whole culture.

So, what would you like to try first? Re-education camps? Trials and imprisonment of those who are hostile toward Islam? Maybe we could just fast forward to mass executions of those who hold politically undesirable viewpoints?

Steve, welcome to America. Glad you could join us. In case you haven't noticed, popular opinion is fickle and there is a strong tendency to run toward isolationism and populism, often unfounded by fact.

I'll be busy cleaning up the remainders of manifest destiny and the whole sinking of the USS Maine thing while you mull that over....;):D

[SteveMetz]

Our system works best when responsible leaders temper uninformed mass misperceptions and prejudices. At times, unfortunately, we lapse into periods when purportedly responsible leaders elect to exploit it rather than temper it.

[Tukhachevskii]

Things mentioned in this thread alone:
(1)that Islam demands that Muslims convert non-Muslims by force,
(2) that Muslims want to impose sharia on Oklahoma,
(3)that no Muslims or no Muslim clerics condemn terrorism or extremism.

Ok thanks for the calrification (p.s, because of the nature of the medium my responses may seem more "strident" than they are intended, if we were face to face I am sure you'd find me more collegial/jovial in a debate). Let's use Ends, Means, Ways as a heuristic device for the discussion. Apologies in advance for the typing errors, I have yet to fix my keyboard 9I suppose I should stop eating soya nuts at the desk!).

1. Ends.Islam and conversion. Islam (by which I mean the core historical a priori/generative grammar centred on the Prophet, the hadeeth and sharia and the Quran) deman that the call (da'wa) to Islam be made universally. Jihad is the military manifestation (ways) of that goal. According to the Shaira (supported by hadeeth that are sahih (and that's an important issue) it is incumbent upon the Muslim polity to call (da'wa) non-Muslims to Islam...if they refuse then they must be conquered and brought under the system of Islamic governance as either Dhimmi (protected persons-"People of the Book" loosely defined or killed. That's the law. Whether we like it or not and whetehr our "moderate" muslim friends admit as much is irrelevant. When a "peaceful" Ahmaddiya or Sufi is confronted with the overwhelming evidecne of his duty to wage Jihad (under an appropriate authority, more on that later) what exactly is his reponse...either to fiollow the law or renounce his/her faith (under Islam any Muslim that fails in their duties toward Islam or the law is an apostate and thus must be...killed). Jihad, let us not forget, is a universal obligation upon Muslims/ The fact that many don't is a matter of a sliding scale of adherance. The more pious the Muslim, the closer he/she follows the dictates of Islam, the more inclined (obligated) they will feel towards Jihad. Rememebr, like the US constitution, Islams generative grammar exerts a tremendous ammount of centripetal/normative presuure upon Muslims. The laws stating that Islam does not belive in conversion by force (the Meccan verses) were abrogated (every Muslim knows this or if they don't they can find out from their Imam). They are relevant only to the uninformed. Islam does not advocate conversion by force (torture) but only by ultimatum. Their reasoning is that anyone who hears the call would in their right mind convert; if not then they must be possessed by Shaitan and thus destroyed (an analogy can be found in the Communist theory of war as being inevitable).

2. Muslims wish to impose/introduce Sahir'a to the whole world. Theuir religion dmenads that. Islam and Muslims have bnot fulfilled the Prophets mission until the entire world is Islamic (not necessarily Muslim). What people tend to forget is that according to Islamic law (but, curiously Shia versions differ because of their emphasis on the Hidden Imam) wherever Sharia law operates can be ipso facto declared Islamic territory and we all know the consequences of that. The Prophet stated that if a Muslim lives in a land without sharia then he should either conquer it (bring Sharia to it, sort of like American's bringing freedom and democracy) or they should elave for somewhere where Sharia is operative. The great number of Muslim fence-sitters ("moderates" to you) merely sit between their "foundationalist" co-religionists and their host societies and reap the rewards from both.

3. There are a great many Muslim clerics who denounce terrorism against women and children and suicide. They do not denounce Jihad (ways) or the goal (ends) of sumbission of all to Islam. Islam forbids the murder of non-combatants (civilians) only if they are not aiding and abetting the enemy (Us) but aiding and abetting can run the whole gamut to providing sanctuary to food (talk about a moveable feast). What clerics differ over is who constitues an appropriate polictal authority endowed with the wherewithall to declare jihad. The Shia resolve this with the Hidden Imam, hence they view their Jihad as purely defensive. But don't let that fool you. According to Islam Jihad is defensive because any non-Muslim entity that exists is a threat to the mission, veracity and truth of Islam (analogous to Nazism's view of the jews, hence Hitler could get away with stating that his war against the USSR was defensive because the Jews were a biological threat, Communism was a Jewsih plot and the Commisars were all Jews, even though his victims would have seen it differently).

Our problem is that we refuse to listen or examine Islam on its own terms (according to its own "rules of formation"/"generative grammar") and instead analyse it in accordance with what we think it should be. Robert Spencer's analysis of Islam is bang on the money but his subsequent programmatic goals (as a pro-Christian revivalist) is not. Indeed, if you compare his jingoistic Islam for dummies book with the more nuanced, reasoned and schollarly work of Bonner's Jihad in Islamic History you will fidn their conclusions are identical. I don't like Spencer or his approach either but that shouldn't detract from the essential soundess of his argument. Besides, like Bonner above, their are several score authories on Islam would state exactly the same (Espositio is not one of them).

[SteveMetz]

Sorry, but I stopped reading when I hit the sentence, "Jihad is the military manifestation (way) of that goal." I'm certainly no expert on Islam but even I know that's not correct.

Ironically, when asked about Old Testament passages advocating things like genocide, Christians usually contend that they have to be understood in historical context. But then some of the same will cherry pick a verse out of the Koran and assign a meaning to it which most Muslims disagree with.

[Tukhachevskii]

Do note that I have not taken a position on the inherent nature of Islam, or on the long-term compatability of Islamic culture and the West.

If that's the case then I respectfully sumbit that the follwing statement's don't make sense...


1) if we don't ratchet down the domestic hostilty toward Islam, we're going to have to radically revamp our global strategy; and,

2) we should take a deep breath and work with a realistic perception of Islam, both globally and domestically, rather than an hysterical notion based on ignorance, and on assuming that the most hostile and violent members of that culture characterize the whole culture.

Only when you analyse Islam fully (don't foregt how much time and effort was spent examining Communist doctrine) can you decide whether what is currently being raised (let's leave the identity of those involved out of it for the moment) is hostile or accurate. By that measure Communism was a benign doctirne (in terms of philosophy and theory nothing Marx said advocated violence as suh, that was a development largely due to Engels and even more so Plekhanov and Lenin).

To work with a realistic, rather than fanstaical/fictional, perspective of Islam one must be ready to accept the unsavoury aspects of it (which is a large part of the problem). The problem is that as soon as this is raised people slam the messenger as a fascist/nazi/racist/bigot/(&tc.). Our own perceptions of the criteria for the validity of truth claims clouds the fact that our opponents don't give a damn. Read anythign written by the actualised Jihadis (as opposed to those who have yet to fullfil their obligation) and what do you see? You see them quoting the central doctrinal texts (if you will) of Islam. There was a rideculous scene in NCIS-Los Angeles where a character confronts a Muslim terrorist and utters the imortal lines uttered by all delusional types (he did so in Arabic)"There is not compulsion in Reliogion" What does the suicide bomber do? He smiles and explodes the bomb because he, and to the programme writers credit, knew that that verse is irrelevant/abbrogated. The call to jihad is a universal obligation. We need to ask ourselves why more haven't answered the call not why so few have (got nothing to do with poverty either).Anyone who hears that and regards him/herself a Muslim CANNOT ignore the call to Jihad or risk falling into Shirk or being labbeled a Rafida. If you are not willing to hear the truth- in fact what counts as the truth is as much in dispute- and would rather take what our opponents and their supporters line/speil as truth then I don't see how we can ever come to a consensus regarding the threat (which we consequently downplay/ "misunderestimate":rolleyes:).

[Tukhachevskii]

Sorry, but I stopped reading when I hit the sentence, "Jihad is the military manifestation (way) of that goal." I'm certainly no expert on Islam but even I know that's not correct.

What? Are you serious. Sir I absolutely cannot belive that you would say that in all seriousness. I don't have references to hand (who would have thought I needed them, given that I am merely stating both the consensus of Islamic scholars and Islamic texts themselves) but I will endevour to find them...I really think you need to start aqcuianting yourself with that material. I am truely shocked.

For a start this (http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8280.html) is as good a place as any.

[SteveMetz]

Without boring deeper into the question of whether Islam really is as insidiously aggressive as you suggest (and I clearly believe that you ascribe the beliefs of the most extreme Muslims to the religion as a whole), let me pose a question: If there is an irreconcilable "clash of civilizations" underway, what is the appropriate strategy for the West? I haven't seen any of the Islamophobic community, from the Spencer and Gellar to Woolsey and Gingrich, spell that out.

On an historic note, what eventually led to success in the Cold War was that rational, cold headed people like Kennan and Nitze, who understood communism as it was, were able to trump the hysterical anti-communism of the mass public.

[SteveMetz]

What? Are you serious. Sir I absolutely cannot belive that you would say that in all seriousness. I don't have references to hand (who would have thought I needed them, given that I am merely stating both the consensus of Islamic scholars and Islamic texts themselves) but I will endevour to find them...I really think you need to start aqcuianting yourself with that material. I am truely shocked.

For a start this (http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8280.html) is as good a place as any.


The statement that you are "merely stating both the consensus of Islamic scholars and Islamic texts themselves" is simply false. Jihad is a complex notion. Any Islamic cleric will tell you that military conquest is by far the least important idea. In fact, most will argue that it is not part of jihad at all--that the AQ portrayal of it, which you seem to accept, is wrong.

By the way, here's the introduction of the book you linked (http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Qxq7eykoJgoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR15&dq=Michael+Bonner+jihad&ots=BYUBL4nC0J&sig=dkRmSgyhQozaMBjybc_Np2gVIS8#v=onepage&q&f=false). You tell me if the author says that jihad=coversion by military action.

[tequila]

I just think it is odd that Tukhachevskii appears to believe that both himself and Osama bin Laden have hit upon the genuine meaning of Islam, while billions of Muslims have lost the plot.


Read anythign written by the actualised Jihadis (as opposed to those who have yet to fullfil their obligation) and what do you see?

I like that - any non-jihadi Muslim is just a jihadi who hasn't fulfilled his obligation. I suppose that would include guys like my platoon sergeant in Iraq who did three combat tours and put more bullets in "actualised jihadis" than anyone else I've ever met. But I suppose he isn't a real Muslim, because he doesn't agree with your definition of Islam? Because he's unaware that all the verses in the Quran that argue for moderation have been abrogated in "real" Islam? Hmmm ...

[Steve Blair]

Gents,

Let's all work to keep the discussion civil, shall we? Personal attacks won't work the issue to any sort of reasonable conclusion (even if it's to agree to disagree).

[Tukhachevskii]

The statement that you are "merely stating both the consensus of Islamic scholars and Islamic texts themselves" is simply false. Jihad is a complex notion. Any Islamic cleric will tell you that military conquest is by far the least important idea. In fact, most will argue that it is not part of jihad at all--that the AQ portrayal of it, which you seem to accept, is wrong.

By the way, here's the introduction of the book you linked (http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Qxq7eykoJgoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR15&dq=Michael+Bonner+jihad&ots=BYUBL4nC0J&sig=dkRmSgyhQozaMBjybc_Np2gVIS8#v=onepage&q&f=false). You tell me if the author says that jihad=coversion by military action.

Er, I don't recall making the bove assertion. Perhaps if you had read the entire post instead of stoping where you heard something you didn't like then we could talk. However, I'm taking the advice of another poster and keeoing shtum about all things Islam. I hope you're all right in the long term. I sincerely do.

[Tukhachevskii]

I just think it is odd that Tukhachevskii appears to believe that both himself and Osama bin Laden have hit upon the genuine meaning of Islam, while billions of Muslims have lost the plot.



I like that - any non-jihadi Muslim is just a jihadi who hasn't fulfilled his obligation. I suppose that would include guys like my platoon sergeant in Iraq who did three combat tours and put more bullets in "actualised jihadis" than anyone else I've ever met. But I suppose he isn't a real Muslim, because he doesn't agree with your definition of Islam? Because he's unaware that all the verses in the Quran that argue for moderation have been abrogated in "real" Islam? Hmmm ...

I seem to recall tussling with you before, I hink bodegas were mentioned at some point, seems you like to attack rather than discuss, nye problema. It's not MY definition of Islam. Its a reading of Islam based upon how the central tenets demand to be read, i.e., accoding to the rules by which they were themselves adumbrated. One of the key drivers of conflict in Indonesia, for instance, is that between Ahmaddiyya adherents and adherents of (any) one of the Sunni branches. Their argument, and they're not arguing about Jihad but rather other peripheral issues but the implications are the same, is that the Ahmaddiya have innovated (tantamount to bid'a) by ignroing how the Quran and the sharia in particular are meant to be implemented. The Ahmaddiya are some of the foremost adherents of the meccan verses (those that have been abrogated) and one of the fears they have is that their youth (again talking about Indonesia in partilucar but the import is universal) have been "weened" away from them by persuasive arguments based wholly upon Islamic methodologies. As I said in my original post its not about how many Islams there are out there but rather how many variations/deviations on the theme and how the whole discursive field has a strong system steering/maintenance capability (i.e., the rules which it itself lays down about how to interpret/implement it). Listen, agree with me or don't, I really don't care but provide me with evidence to the contrary and maybe we can talk.

T, over and out

[jmm99]

seriously Shariah (and I mean civilized discourse that would "hold up in a court of law"), let's rejuvinate this thread, Mullah Omar: Taliban Rules and Regulations; and discuss what aspects of Shariah are and are not applicable to the so-called "GWOT".

BTW, Shariah is not a monolith as this map shows:

1294

Anyone who wants to join in discourse in the Mullah Omar thread, is welcome; but don't poison the well.

Regards

Mike

[Entropy]

One of the "features" of Islam is the lack of any formal hierarchy to enforce compliance with religious interpretation. This raises a fundamental question: Who defines Islam? Is it what a majority of Muslims believe? Is it a "strict constructionist" view of the Koran? Is it cherry-picking certain tenets of Islamic thought?

The answer is yes to all of those and more. So, who can say what is a legitimate interpretation and what isn't? That's up to individual Muslims and the best thing we can do as non-Muslims is to stay out of interpretive disputes.

[tequila]

It's not MY definition of Islam. Its a reading of Islam based upon how the central tenets demand to be read, i.e., accoding to the rules by which they were themselves adumbrated.

Sorry, it is your definition. If it wasn't, then I would expect that many Islamic authorities would be arguing that it is incumbent upon every Muslim to make war on every non-Muslim until the entire world has been converted to Islam, turned into a dhimmi, or killed. This is your interpretation, correct or no?


As I said in my original post its not about how many Islams there are out there but rather how many variations/deviations on the theme and how the whole discursive field has a strong system steering/maintenance capability (i.e., the rules which it itself lays down about how to interpret/implement it). Listen, agree with me or don't, I really don't care but provide me with evidence to the contrary and maybe we can talk.


What exactly are you saying here? That the Quran and the hadith can really only be interpreted one way? What exactly is the "steering/maintenance capability" you are talking about?

[Ethereal]

So, what would you like to try first? Re-education camps? Trials and imprisonment of those who are hostile toward Islam? Maybe we could just fast forward to mass executions of those who hold politically undesirable viewpoints?

Steve, welcome to America. Glad you could join us. In case you haven't noticed, popular opinion is fickle and there is a strong tendency to run toward isolationism and populism, often unfounded by fact.

I'll be busy cleaning up the remainders of manifest destiny and the whole sinking of the USS Maine thing while you mull that over....;):D

Perhaps if we "hug them" they'll go away, since facing them is clearly out of the question....... sheesh. America is doomed.

"E"

[120mm]

Perhaps if we "hug them" they'll go away, since facing them is clearly out of the question....... sheesh. America is doomed.

"E"

You obviously do not understand the power of sarcasm. I was merely poking fun at Dr. Metz's frustration with the American electorate. And his frustration that they would actually be what they are.

[jmm99]

So, we shortly should see a lawsuit challenging the ballot proposiition.

From NewsOK (http://newsok.com/oklahoma-muslims-to-challenge-ballot-measure/article/3511163):


Oklahoma Muslims to challenge ballot measure

An Oklahoma Islamic group says a legal challenge is planned against a ballot measure prohibiting state courts from considering international law or Islamic law when deciding cases.

Published: November 4, 2010

OKLAHOMA CITY (AP) — An Oklahoma Islamic group says a legal challenge is planned against a ballot measure prohibiting state courts from considering international law or Islamic law when deciding cases.

The ballot measure, State Question 755, was approved with 70 percent of the vote in Tuesday's general election. But Muneer Awad, executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations in Oklahoma, says Oklahoma Muslims believe it's unconstitutional.
.....
Awad says a lawsuit against the measure will be filed in federal court by a member of the state's Islamic community as early as Thursday.

The ballot proposition, Oklahoma "Sharia Law Amendment", State Question 755 (2010) (http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Oklahoma_%22Sharia_Law_Amendment%22,_State_Questio n_755_%282010%29#Text_of_measure), read as follows:


This measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a section that deals with the courts of this state. It would amend Article 7, Section 1. It makes courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases. It forbids courts from considering or using international law. It forbids courts from considering or using Sharia Law.

International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals with the conduct of international organizations and independent nations, such as countries, states and tribes. It deals with their relationship with each other. It also deals with some of their relationships with persons.

The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations. Sources of international law also include international agreements, as well as treaties.

Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.

Shall the proposal be approved?

For the proposal

Yes: __________

Against the proposal

No: __________

Passage of the measure (70% apporoval) changed the Oklahoma State Constitution (http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Oklahoma_International_Law_Amendment_(2010),_Const itutional_changes) from this:


The judicial power of this State shall be vested in Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, a Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court on the Judiciary, the State Industrial Court, the Court of Bank Review, the Court of Tax Review, and such intermediate appellate courts as may be provided by statute, District Courts, and such Boards, Agencies and Commissions created by the Constitution or established by statute as exercise adjudicative authority or render decisions in individual proceedings. Provided that the Court of Criminal Appeals, the State Industrial Court, the Court of Bank Review and the Court of Tax Review and such Boards, Agencies and Commissions as have been established by statute shall continue in effect, subject to the power of the Legislature to change or abolish said Courts, Boards, Agencies, or Commissions. Municipal Courts in cities or incorporated towns shall continue in effect and shall be subject to creation, abolition or alteration by the Legislature by general laws, but shall be limited in jurisdiction to criminal and traffic proceedings arising out of infractions of the provisions of ordinances of cities and towns or of duly adopted regulations authorized by such ordinances.

to this (key part bolded):


A. The judicial power of this State shall be vested in the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, a Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court on the Judiciary, the Workers’ Compensation Court, the Court of Bank Review, the Court of Tax Review, and such intermediate appellate courts as may be provided by statute, District Courts, and such Boards, Agencies and Commissions created by the Constitution or established by statute as exercise adjudicative authority or render decisions in individual proceedings.

Provided that the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Workers’ Compensation Court, the Court of Bank Review and the Court of Tax Review and such Boards, Agencies and Commissions as have been established by statute shall continue in effect, subject to the power of the Legislature to change or abolish said Courts, Boards, Agencies, or Commissions. Municipal Courts in cities or incorporated towns shall continue in effect and shall be subject to creation, abolition or alteration by the Legislature by general laws, but shall be limited in jurisdiction to criminal and traffic proceedings arising out of infractions of the provisions of ordinances of cities and towns or of duly adopted regulations authorized by such ordinances.

B. Subsection C of this section shall be known as the “Save Our State Amendment”.

C. The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international or Sharia Law. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.

Let the games begin.

[slapout9]

Let the games begin.


I posted this on another thread but it may have some bearing here. It is called 3 things you didn't know about Islam.


http://www.youtube.com/user/HISTROIKA

[motorfirebox]

I seem to recall tussling with you before, I hink bodegas were mentioned at some point, seems you like to attack rather than discuss, nye problema. It's not MY definition of Islam. Its a reading of Islam based upon how the central tenets demand to be read, i.e., accoding to the rules by which they were themselves adumbrated. One of the key drivers of conflict in Indonesia, for instance, is that between Ahmaddiyya adherents and adherents of (any) one of the Sunni branches. Their argument, and they're not arguing about Jihad but rather other peripheral issues but the implications are the same, is that the Ahmaddiya have innovated (tantamount to bid'a) by ignroing how the Quran and the sharia in particular are meant to be implemented. The Ahmaddiya are some of the foremost adherents of the meccan verses (those that have been abrogated) and one of the fears they have is that their youth (again talking about Indonesia in partilucar but the import is universal) have been "weened" away from them by persuasive arguments based wholly upon Islamic methodologies. As I said in my original post its not about how many Islams there are out there but rather how many variations/deviations on the theme and how the whole discursive field has a strong system steering/maintenance capability (i.e., the rules which it itself lays down about how to interpret/implement it). Listen, agree with me or don't, I really don't care but provide me with evidence to the contrary and maybe we can talk.

T, over and out
This is simply not a reasonable argument. Islam is a religion, and people are prone to interpret religious texts however they damn well please. The struggle between the western and "Muslim" worlds is not about religion, it's about economics. Religion at best shapes the threat--it doesn't create it.

[jmm99]

the bolded part of this:


from motorfirebox
Islam is a religion, and people are prone to interpret religious texts however they damn well please. The struggle between the western and "Muslim" worlds is not about religion, it's about economics. Religion at best shapes the threat--it doesn't create it.

regardless of what is is about, and as a starting point, whom do you include in the western world and whom do you include in the Muslim world. In short, define and ID the opposing sides.

That having been done, please go back to your substantive points and draw me a word picture of what that struggle looks like.

Regards

Mike

[motorfirebox]

Clearly defining what the sides are, in terms larger than specific campaigns, is a tall order (hell, even in the specific context of, say, Iraq or Afghanistan, it's not always easy). I'm not actually sure that such a thing is possible. But it is possible--and important--to clarify who the enemy isn't. Defining the other side of this conflict as Islam is a bad mistake that I wish were less prevalent.

[jmm99]

simply on grounds of logic, that if you cannot define who is the enemy, you cannot define who is not the enemy.

Not that defining membership in violent non-state actors is easy. I stick with the 2001 AUMF and follow the DC Circuit decisions. The result is that I see a armed conflict between the US and AQ (together with its associated groups). In terms of the type of conflict, AQ is waging unconventional warfare against the US - often via local insurgencies it supports in the hope we will get sucked in.

Most of our coalition partners do not see it that way, but regard AQ as a criminal group to be handled pursuant to civilian criminal law. E.g., no drone strikes and direct actions permitted.

I don't see a present, generalized struggle (in the sense of a jihad) between the western world (basically the EU, prob. Russia, the Anzacs and the Americas) and the Muslim world (shown on the map I posted).

Iran also wages unconventional warfare via proxies (not so much directly vs the US to date, but vs Israel and less directly vs Saudi Arabia).

Europe may have issues with specific Muslim population groups. I can't pontificate on that. So far, we (US) have not had problems with our Muslim population generally - as opposed to problems with individuals or small groups linked to AQ ideologically.

Regards

Mike

[motorfirebox]

Of course you can define who the enemy isn't. We're pretty sure the enemy isn't moon men from Venus, after all. It's certainly within the capability of logic to rule things out.

I think I may have been unclear. When I said the west was engaged in a struggle with the "Muslim" world, I put the quotes in because I was being facetious. I don't think defining the conflict was west vs Islam (or, god forbid, Christian vs Islam) is accurate or helpful, which is why I was arguing against the concept Tukhachevskii put forward--he stated that Islam is inherently a religion which conflicts with western interest, and I disagreed. To the extent that it's anti-western, so is Christianity and almost any other religion you could name.

Given that many of those we are incontrovertibly in conflict with--as evidenced by the fact that they're shooting at us and trying to blow us up--are Muslim, though, it's useful to clarify that the conflict doesn't (despite their claims, as well as the claims of certain western blowhards) spring from the fact that they're Muslim and we're not. If we don't make that division clear, we'll end up fighting half the planet. And quite possibly losing.

What we're in conflict with is a socioeconomic class. They're poor enough to be angry, but close enough to our fantastic wealth to be able to use certain features of it--our communication and transportation networks--against us to great effect. People don't like to think of themselves as jealous or greedy, so yeah, they wrap their conflict in their religion to make their anger more palatable to themselves (just as many in the west choose to view the conflict in terms of ideology in order to escape having to acknowledge the role their own wealth plays). But it's about haves and have-nots doing their usual dance.

[jmm99]

especially your last paragraph:


from motorfirebox
What we're in conflict with is a socioeconomic class. They're poor enough to be angry, but close enough to our fantastic wealth to be able to use certain features of it--our communication and transportation networks--against us to great effect. People don't like to think of themselves as jealous or greedy, so yeah, they wrap their conflict in their religion to make their anger more palatable to themselves (just as many in the west choose to view the conflict in terms of ideology in order to escape having to acknowledge the role their own wealth plays). But it's about haves and have-nots doing their usual dance.

If this be true (relative "have nots" vice the US "haves"), we would still be dealing with a very large percentage of the World's population. I don't see where this concept is any more helpful (to even generate a definition of the problem) than the concept of throwing all Muslims into the same basket.

Regards

Mike

[motorfirebox]

Fair point. My own bias is showing; I tend to view almost everything through the filter of wealth and wealth gaps, these days. Regardless, my main purpose in posting was to kick the legs out from under the idea that a religious text is the first, inevitable, and continuing cause for conflict.

[jmm99]

we have to look at all relevant and material factors - or we end up fighting a "war" which we perceive as something that it is not.

Cheers

Mike

[Tukhachevskii]

Sorry, but I stopped reading when I hit the sentence, "Jihad is the military manifestation (way) of that goal." I'm certainly no expert on Islam but even I know that's not correct.


The statement that you are "merely stating both the consensus of Islamic scholars and Islamic texts themselves" is simply false. Jihad is a complex notion. Any Islamic cleric will tell you that military conquest is by far the least important idea. In fact, most will argue that it is not part of jihad at all--that the AQ portrayal of it, which you seem to accept, is wrong.

By the way, here's the introduction of the book you linked (http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Qxq7eykoJgoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR15&dq=Michael+Bonner+jihad&ots=BYUBL4nC0J&sig=dkRmSgyhQozaMBjybc_Np2gVIS8#v=onepage&q&f=false). You tell me if the author says that jihad=coversion by military action.

I (would) like to think that the older I get the thicker my skin has become and I’ve got more of a handle on my temper. But try as I might, even though I tried counted beyond ten, I just couldn’t let these comments pass coming as they do from someone ordinarily described as an academic (which was always a dirty word where I was taught...by scholars); especially from someone who sought to put me in my place by quoting the sales blurb rather than actually reading the book I suggested he consult (academics!). Those quoted below (of which there were many more but I didn’t want to bore you), apart from Akbar (who is a journalist, I think) and Nafzinger (a military historian usually of the Napoleonic era), are reputable SME’s...I don’t acquire knowledge from twats like Robert Spencer (in case you were wondering).



DJIHAD etymologically signifies an effort directed towards a determined objective. (Cf. idjtihdd: the work of the scholar-jurists in seeking the solution of legal problems; mudjdhada or, again, djihdd: an effort directed upon oneself for the attainment of moral and religious perfection. Certain writers, particularly among those of ####e persuasion, qualify this djihdd as "spiritual djihdd" and as "the greater djihdd", in opposition to the djihdd which is our present concern and which is called "physical djihdd" or "the lesser djihdd". It is, however, very much more usual for the term djihdd to denote this latter form of "effort"). In law, according to general doctrine and in historical tradition, the djihdd consists of military action with the object of the expansion of Islam and, if need be, of its defence. The notion stems from the fundamental principle of the universality of Islam: this religion, along with the temporal power which it implies, ought to embrace to whole universe, if necessary by force. The principle, however, must be partially combined with another which tolerates the existence, within the Islamic community itself, of the adherents of "the religions with holy books", i.e., Christians, Jews and Madjus [q.v.]. As far as these latter are concerned the djihdd ceases as soon as they agree to submit to the political authority of Islam and to pay the poll tax (djizya [q.v.]) and the land tax (kharddi [q.v.]). As long as the question could still, in fact, be posed, a controversy existed—generally resolved by a negative answer—on the question as to whether the Christians and Jews of the Arabian peninsula were entitled to such treatment as of right. To the nonscriptuaries, in particular the idolaters, this half measure has no application according to the opinion of the majority: their conversion to Islam is obligatory under pain of being put to death or reduced into slavery. In principle, the djihdd is the one form of war which is permissible in Islam, for, in theory, Islam must constitute a single community organized under a single authority and any armed conflict between Muslims is prohibited. Following, however, the disintegration of Muslim unity and the appearance, beginning in the middle of the 2nd/8th century, of an ever increasing number of independent States, the question arose as to how the wars which sprang up between them were to be classified. They were never included within the strict notion of djihdd—even in the case of wars between states of different religious persuasion—at least according to the general Sunni doctrine; and it is only by an abuse of language that this term is sometimes applied to them, while those authors who seek for a precise terminology label them only as kitdl or mukdtala (conflict, war). There is even hesitation in referring to the struggle against the renegade groups in Islam as djihdd. The viewpoint of ####e doctrine is not the same, for, according to the ####e, a refusal to subscribe to their teaching is equivalent to unbelief (kufr). The same holds good, a fortiori, for the Kharidiite doctrine [see further TAKFIR]. The djihdd is a duty. This precept is laid down in all the sources. It is true that there are to be found in the Kurgan divergent, and even contradictory, texts. These are classified by the doctrine, apart from certain variations of detail, into four successive categories: those which enjoin pardon for offences and encourage the invitation to Islam by peaceful persuasion; those which enjoin fighting to ward off aggression; those which enjoin the initiative in attack, provided it is not within the four sacred months; and those which enjoin the initiative in attack absolutely, at all times and in all places. In sum, these differences correspond to the stages in the development of Muhammad's thought and to the modifications of policy resulting from particular circumstances; the Meccan period during which Muhammad, in general, confines himself to moral and religious teaching, and the Medina period when, having become the leader of a politico-religious community, he is able to undertake, spontaneously, the struggle against those who do not wish to join this community or submit to his authority. The doctrine holds that the later texts abrogate the former contradictory texts (the theory of naskh [q.v.]), to such effect that only those of the last category remain indubitably valid; and, accordingly, the rule on the subject may be formulated in these absolute terms: "the fight (djihdd) is obligatory even when they (the unbelievers) have not themselves started it". In two isolated opinions, however, attempts were made to temper the rule in same respects. According to one of these views, attributed to ‘Ata (d. ii4/732-3), the ancient prohibition against fighting during the sacred months remains valid; while according to the other, attributed to Sufyan al- Thawrl (born 97/715), the djihdd is obligatory only in defence; it is simply recommended (li 'l-nad-b) in attack. According to a view held by modern orientalist scholarship, Muhammad's conception of the djihdd as attack applied only in relation to the peoples of Arabia; its general application was the result of the idimd (general consensus of opinion) of the immediately succeeding generations. At root, of course, this involves the problem as to whether Muhammad had conceived of Islam as universal or not. The opinion of al-Thawrl appears to have been adopted by al-Djahiz. The heterodox movement of the Ahmadiyya [q.v.], beginning towards the end of the 19th century, would go further than al-Thawri inasmuch as it refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the djihdd even as a recommended activity. Cf., in the same sense, the doctrine of Babism (see BAB).

According to the general doctrine of the Shi’a. due account taken of their dogma concerning "the absence of the Imam", who alone has the necessary competence to order war, the practice of the djihdd is necessarily suspended until the re-appearance of the Imam or the ad hoc appointment of a vicar designated by him for this task. The Zaydi sect, however, which does not recognize this dogma, follows the same teaching as that of the SunnI doctrine. Characteristics of the duty of djihdd. The djihdd is not an end in itself but a means which, in itself, is an evil (fasdd), but which becomes legitimate and necessary by reason of the objective towards which it is directed: to rid the world of a greater evil; it is "good" from the fact that its purpose is "good" (hasan li-husn ghayrih).

[Tukhachevskii]

A religious duty. The djihdd has the effect of extending the sway of the faith; it is prescribed by God and his Prophet; the Muslim dedicates himself to the djihdd in- the same way that, in Christianity, the monk dedicates himself to the service of God; in the same vein it is said in different hadiths that "the djihdd is the monasticism of Islam"; the djihdd is "an act of pure devotion"; it is "one of the gates to Paradise"; rich heavenly rewards are guaranteed for those who devote themselves to it; those who fall in the djihdd are the martyrs of the faith, etc. A substantial part of the doctrine reckons the djihdd among the very "pillars" (arkan) of the religion, along with prayer and fasting etc. It is a duty which falls upon every Muslim who is male, free and able bodied. It is generally considered that non-Muslims may be called upon to assist the Muslims in the djihdd. A "collective" obligation (fard kifdya) in contrast to fard ‘ayn. The fard kifdya is that duty which is imposed upon the community considered as a whole and which only becomes obligatory for each individual in particular to the extent that his intervention is necessary for the realization of the purpose envisaged by the law. Thus, as soon as there exists a group of Muslims whose number is sufficient to fulfil the needs of a particular conflict, the obligation of the djihdd no longer rests on the others. The general teaching is that the duty of djihdd falls, in the first place, individually as a fard 'ayn, upon those who live in the territory nearest to the enemy, and that the same holds good in the case of the inhabitants of a town which is besieged. In the organized State, however, the appreciation of the precise moment at which the djihdd is transformed into an 'ayn obligation is a matter for the discretion of the sovereign; so that, in the case of general mobilization, the djihdd loses, for all the members of the community, its character of fard kifaya, and becomes, instead, fard cayn. All this implies, however, that for those who hold the reins of authority and, in particular, the sovereign, the djihdd is always an individual duty, since their own personal action is necessary in every case. Where there are several independent Muslim states, the duty will fall upon the ruler of the state which is nearest to the enemy. Further, the duty of the djihdd is relative and contingent in this dual sense that, on the one hand, it only comes into being when the circumstances are favourable and of such a nature as to offer some hope of a victorious outcome, and, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the duty may be renounced in consideration of the payment by the enemy of goods reaching a certain value, if such policy appears to be in conformity with the interests of the moment.

Its subsidiary character. Since the djihdd is nothing more than a means to effect conversion to Islam or submission to its authority, there is only occasion to undertake it in circumstances where the people against whom it is directed have first been invited to join Islam. Discussion turned on the question as to whether it was necessary, on this ground, to address a formal invitation to the enemy. The general doctrine holds that since Islam is sufficiently widespread in the world, all peoples are presumed to know that they have been invited to join it. It is observed, however, that it would be desirable to repeat the invitation, except in cases where there is ground for apprehension that the enemy, thus forewarned, would profit from such a delay by better organizing his defences and, in this way, compromising the successful outcome of the djihdd. Its perpetual character. The duty of the djihdd exists as long as the universal domination of Islam has not been attained. "Until the day of the resurrection", and "until the end of the world" say the maxims. Peace with non-Muslim nations is, therefore, a provisional state of affairs only; the chance of circumstances alone can justify it temporarily. Furthermore there can be no question of genuine peace treaties with these nations; only truces, whose duration ought not, in principle, to exceed ten years, are authorized. But even such truces are precarious, inasmuch as they can, before they expire, be repudiated unilaterally should it appear more profitable for Islam to resume the conflict. It is, however, recognized that such repudiation should be brought to the notice of the infidel party, and that he should be afforded sufficient opportunity to be able to disseminate the news of it throughout the whole of his territory [see SULH].

Its defensive as well as offensive character. The djihdd has principally an offensive character; but it is equally a djihdd when it is a case of defending Islam against aggression. This indeed, is the essential purpose of the ribdt [q.v.] undertaken by isolated groups or individuals settled on the frontiers of Islam. The ribdt is a particularly meritorious act. Finally, there is at the present time a thesis, of a wholly apologetic character, according to which Islam relies for its expansion exclusively upon persuasion and other peaceful means, and the djihdd is only authorized in cases of "self defence" and of "support owed to a defenceless ally or brother". Disregarding entirely the previous doctrine and historical tradition, as well as the texts of the Kur'an and the sunna on the basis of which it was formulated, but claiming, even so, to remain within the bounds of strict orthodoxy, this thesis takes into account only those early texts which state the contrary (v. supra).

The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. 2 (C-G) (http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=7560), pp. 538-540

[Tukhachevskii]

The rationale for Islamic thinking about war has its basis in the fundamental categorical structure of Islam itself. Because the world is divided between submission to God’s will and rebellion against God’s will, the fact of conflict is inevitable. (Note that I do not say between believers and unbelievers – that would be too Christian a categorization, and it would obscure the way that this conflict occurs even in the heart of the ordinary Muslim, as she or he struggles to be properly and fully submissive to God.) In this way, the fundamental logic of war is couched in theological terms of obedience to God. p.195

Those who still submit to God’s will must be prepared to fight to defend God ’ s order, and – when the requisite authorities deem it proper – to fight to expand the dominion of God across the whole globe. The ultimate aim and expectation is universal conquest; as one of the most historically significant verses in the Quran suggests, Muslims are enjoined to “ fight [the unbelievers] until there is no more persecution [or seduction] and worship [ din ] is devoted to God ” (Q. 2:193). p.195

War – literally, qital , or “ fighting ” – is simply the last step in the “ ladder of escalation ” in the effort to conduct jihad in the dar - al - harb ; it was the way in which Islam would be brought to non - Muslim lands, if those lands would not allow more peaceful means of bringing Islam. Jihad is in a way simply the reality of the tension and irresolvable conflict at the border separating the dar - al - Islam and the dar - al - Harb . p.196

Because the sword verses were revealed in Medina and later than the peace verses, which were revealed in Mecca, the sword verses are often taken to be normative, or even to have “abrogated ” (revoked) the peace verses. What is interesting, though, is how even in its more militaristic forms of the sword verses, the Islamic doctrine of jihad does not seem to have committed its faithful warriors to engage in wars of mass conversion. Historically, Islamic armies sought conquest but not conversion; in the early centuries especially, conversion seems to have been discouraged. Particularly with the other “ Peoples of the Book ” – that is, Jews and Christians – the economic benefits of taxing non - Muslims (the jizyah , tax on non - Muslims) meant that the early Islamic Caliphate stood to lose valuable streams of funding were too many of their subjects to convert to the religion of the Prophet. p.197,


C. Mathewes, Understanding Religious Ethics (http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=EyCsZE_iHp4C&printsec=frontcover&dq=understanding+religious+ethics+mathewes&source=bl&ots=xiuTWhGZ8A&sig=54x2pdOv_GlUY925LyPlBtm0bcA&hl=en&ei=D-RTTaCbAoexhQeenZnjCA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false) (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010)

[Tukhachevskii]

One of the goals of jihad was to conquer and dominate non-Muslims. [...] In summarizing the teachings of the Quran with regard to the subject of jihad, it is important to emphasize that we have a very martial and well-developed teaching here. Although it is not an exhaustive treatment of jihad—many of the hadith and subsequent jurisprudence are devoted to annotating topics only adumbrated in the suras—the Quran nonetheless presents a well-developed religious justification for waging war against Islam’s enemies. p.10-11,

There is a redemptive aspect to jihad that is crucial to understanding its development. We have already noted Quran 9:111, where this salvific contract is spelled out. In ‘Abdallah b. al-Mubarak’s Kitab al-jihad we see similar attitudes. In the above hadith, “the sword wipes away sins” in a manner similar to the Christian tradition, which places redemption in the Cross: “Being killed in the path of Allah washes away impurity; killing is two things: atonement and rank [in heaven].” Fighters were encouraged to wear white so that the blood of their sacrifice would be apparent. p.15

Incitement and psychological fear are both important components of jihad, as is recognized in the Quran 3:151: “We will cast terror into the hearts of the unbelievers on account of their associating with Allah that for which He sent down no authority.” The Prophet Muhammad further amplified this idea by noting that God had helped him with a fear (ru‘b or mahaba) that He had sent before the Muslim armies to a distance of a month’s journey. According to this idea, all who lived at this distance from the Muslims would feel this fear and be defeated by it even before meeting the Muslims in battle. The psychological preparation for victory or defeat is also a theme of the hadith literature, in which we find a great many references to poetry, flags, and slogans intended to aid the fighters. Probably the most popular slogan— Allahu akbar! (God is greater!)—is usually said to precede Muslim advance into battle. p.17-18

One of the bases for this type of regulation was defining the manner in which war should be declared and what its limits were. The Messenger of Allah, when he would send a commander with a raid or an army would enjoin upon him the fear of Allah, especially with regard to himself, but also with regard to the Muslims, and say: When you meet your polytheist enemy, call to him [to choose] between three possibilities—accept whichever one they accept, and desist from them:

1. Call them to Islam; if they accept, then accept it from them and desist from them. Then [if they accept Islam] call them to move from their homes to the home of the muhajirun [immigrants]; if they do this, then they will have the rights and the responsibilities of the muhajirun. Ifthey refuse, then designate their home, and inform them that they will be like the Muslim Bedouin—Allah’s law, which is incumbent upon the believers, will be incumbent upon them, but they will not have any right to the movable or nonmovable spoils, except when they fight at the side of the Muslims.

2. If they refuse, then call them to pay the jizya [poll tax]. If they accept, then accept it from them and desist from them.

3. If they refuse, then ask Allah for aid against them, and fight them. If you besiege the people of a fortress, and they desire to surrender unconditionally (‘ala hukm Allah), do not accept this from them, but let them surrender according to your judgment, and do with them what you wish afterwards. p. 19-20

The Prophet Muhammad is portrayed, as Patricia Crone has stated, as a doomsday prophet, sent just before the end of the world to warn those who would heed a warning and to punish those who would not. Here, the process of jihad, as in the traditions cited above, is one in which the hold of worldly things over the believer is diluted. Because of the impermanence of the soldier’s life, and the difficulties of establishing a stable family or gathering substantial possessions, many of the ties that bind people to this world are weakened or even dissolved entirely. When this is taken into consideration, the spiritual significance of jihad becomes even more pronounced. It is clear why the connection with the end of the world had to be maintained in the jihad literature. Without this final date in mind, it would have been difficult for Muslim fighters to summon up the necessary energy to achieve the conquests. p.23

Martyrdom in Islam has a much more active sense: the prospective martyr is called to seek out situations in which martyrdom might be achieved. p.26

For the true beginnings of the “greater jihad” we must go to the great theologian and Sufi al-Ghazali (d. 1111). It is to his formulations that we owe the success of this doctrine. In his great work Ihya _ulum al-din (Revival of the Religious Sciences), al-Ghazali presents the lusts and passions of the soul as an invading army trying to conquer the body and to keep it from following the path of mysticism. In an interesting reinterpretation, he strips a passage from Quran 4:95 from its context (indicated in bracketed text) to argue that Muslims must fight not by means of their possessions and “persons” (the word being the plural of nafs, soul), but against their possessions and their souls: [Those of the believers who stay at home while suffering from no injury are not equal to] those who fight in the cause of Allah with their possessions and persons. Allah has raised those who fight with their possessions and persons one degree (over those who stay at home; and to each Allah has promised the fairest good. Yet Allah has granted a great reward to those who fight and not to those who stay behind). This creative reinterpretation of the Qur‘anic verse turns the focus radically away from the original intent to concentrate on the battle against one’s lower passions, especially the soul. Al-Ghazali takes this argument further when he deals with the subject of exercising the soul. Throughout the Ihya, he uses military, and especially jihad, imagery to describe this battle. However, al-Ghazali nowhere indicates that he sees the jihad against the soul as a substitute for militant jihad (he in fact rarely deals with militant jihad in the Ihya). But in the section on enjoining the good and forbidding the evil (al-amr bi-lma _ruf wa-l-nahi _an al-munkar, one of the most fundamental principles of Islamic social law), al-Ghazali adduces the example of the jihad fighter who sacrifices himself for the greater good and leads a charge against a large number of the enemy in an attempt to cause them distress (this would later become the legal basis for the suicide attack or martyrdom operation of contemporary times). p.37

Others have fallen into this error as well [of assuming the division between greater and lesser Jihad is legal or actual- T]. They comprise two basic groups: Western scholars who want to present Islam in the most innocuous terms possible, and Muslim apologists, who rediscovered the internal jihad in the nineteenth century and have been emphasizing it ever since that time as the normative expression of jihad—in defiance of all the religious and historical evidence to the contrary. The motives of the first group are well intentioned, probably undertaken with the goal of furthering interreligious dialogue and skirting an issue that has long been used by polemicists as a vehicle for attacking Islam. p.40

In his more recent Unholy War, while discussing the many meanings of jihad, Esposito continues to avoid all historical context for his discussion and simply repeats what contemporary Muslim apologists say about this doctrine. Since he has already decided that radical Muslims are terrorists, Esposito is able to avoid dealing with the fact that they have extensive support in the central texts and doctrines of Islam. p. 42

From an outsider’s point of view, after surveying the evidence from classical until contemporary times, one
must conclude that today’s jihad movements are as legitimate as any that have ever existed in classical
Islam, with the exception of the fact that they disregard the necessity of established authority—that a legitimate authority such as a caliph or an imam could declare jihad. Other than this one major difference, contemporary jihad groups fall within the confines of classical definitions of jihad. That this is true can be seen by their careful regard for classical and contemporary law, their heavy emphasis on the spiritual rewards of jihad, and their frequently voiced claim to be fighting for the sake of Islam. p.164

D. Cook, Understanding Jihad (http://www.amazon.com/Understanding-Jihad-David-Cook/dp/0520244486) (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2005)

[Tukhachevskii]

Efforts have been made in some circles in modern days to explain away all the Prophet's warlike expeditions as defensive wars or to interpret the doctrine of Jihad as merely a bloodless striving in missionary zeal for the spread of Islam. Much of this special pleading is the sheerest sophistry. The early Arabic sources quite plainly and frankly describe the expeditions as military expeditions, and it would never have occurred to anyone at that day to interpret them as anything else [.]

Arthur Jeffery, The Political Importance of Islam (http://www.jstor.org/pss/542473), p. 386. All the more prescient for having been written in 1942.





The necessity of the armed struggle against the unbelievers was clearly indicated in the Qurån, as in Qurån 22/39: “Permission is given to those [believers] who are fighting [the disbelievers] because they have been wronged. Surely God is able to give them victory!” Whether this was a defensive or offensive struggle mattered little because the resistance of people to Islam was often taken to be equivalent to an attack on Islam [it still is- T]. The final goal of jihåd must then be a world which has been brought under the control of Islam and is, by definition, peaceful.


Underlying the idea of jihåd is a unified Muslim community, the umma, which has the collective duty to expand Islam; this was to be done under the leadership or commission of the caliph. Expansionist wars were the responsibility of those who were charged with the task or those who chose to do so as a group; defending Islam, however, was a duty which fell on everyone who was capable. An expansionist war could not be undertaken without first issuing a call for the unbelievers to join Islam; should there be resistance to that call, then the war was justified. This notion of a unified community underlying the idea of jihåd is crucial because it emphasizes the political (as opposed to religious) significance of the doctrine, certainly as it evolved. A caliph who issued a call for jihåd was also asserting legitimacy in his position as caliph. (As we will see in medieval and modern times, in the absence of the caliph, the call for jihåd acts as an assertion of authentic Muslim identity.) pp.65-66


Underlying this presentation [the apologist’s case for jihad] is the common modernist approach to the issue of jihåd, here presented as only defensive and hedged by rules compatible with contemporary moral standards, in themselves superior to the practice (rather than the theory) of other modern nations. The centuries of Muslim discussion regarding jihåd and its obligations and flexible application are discarded and replaced by an invocation of modern liberal standards. p. 209


Andrew Rippin, Muslims: their religious beliefs and practices (http://mirror.lib.unair.ac.id/bahan/EFOLDER/Mu5lims.pdf).

[Tukhachevskii]

[On Jihad as a form of “good work” or divine charity undertaken in return for the blessings and favour of God- T]The deal between God and those who fight in his path is portrayed as a commercial transaction, either as a loan with interest (“Who is there who will make a fine loan to God, which God will then multiply many times over?”), or else as a profitable sale of the life of this world in return for the life of the next. How much one gains depends on what happens during the transaction: one obtains Paradise if slain in battle, or victory if one survives, either way a grand reward (ajran "aziman) and one of the two finest things (ihda al-husnayayni). Modern treatments of this commercial vocabulary in the Quran have commented, sometimes with an apologetic or patronizing tone, that Muhammad was, after all, a merchant and that commerce was second nature to the Meccans. What we stress here is that Quranic discourse includes, on the one hand, reciprocity and generosity, creating ever more solidarity among the community of believers in all their activities (in both war and peace), and on the other hand, an emphasis on reward and striving, giving the believers, as individuals, an unparalleled sense of confidence and entitlement. p.32


What emerges, from this and many other places in the hadith, is a central theme of the jihad, namely the propagation of the Faith through combat. Islam must be brought to the entire world, as when the Prophet says: “I have been sent to the human race in its entirety,” and “I have been commanded to fight the people (the unbelievers) until they testify: ‘There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God.’ ” This fighting and spreading of the faith will continue until the end of the world as we know it now. p.49

The Islamic Tradition, specifically the hadith, makes this connection and spells out the doctrine with abundant detail. Here, as in the Christian doctrine of the martyr, shahid signifies a person who, through suffering and death, has achieved high reward in the hereafter. Descriptions of the martyrs in the Tradition include their ability to intercede for the faithful on the Day of Resurrection, otherwise a prerogative reserved for the Prophet Muhammad himself. Their souls have the shape of white birds, feeding on the fruits of Paradise; or alternatively, they are held in the craws of green birds that feed in Paradise and drink from its rivers. These birds also nestle in golden lamps suspended underneath the divine throne. These traits, setting the martyrs apart from the rank and of the blessed, also occur in early Christian descriptions of the martyrs, and again point to a close connection between the two traditions. Indeed, the Arabic word shahid may plausibly be thought to derive from the Christian Syriac for “witness” and “martyr,” sa¯hda¯. Nonetheless, the underlying idea is different. No longer do we have the Christian insistence on passivity and nonviolence. Instead of metaphorical soldiers of God, we have fighters who literally take up arms and use them. The Muslim texts of Tradition and Law repeatedly affirm that the martyrs (shuhada') are those who die while fighting for the faith. Their sins are forgiven, though not their debts. They go immediately to Paradise, skipping the long wait for Resurrection and the “tortures of the grave” that others must undergo. p.75


Throughout this time and afterward, the jihad remained closely connected to that part of the original Islamic message that we usually, and somewhat misleadingly, refer to as “charity.” In the Quran, and also in the early narrative texts of sira and maghazi, fighting in the wars is a matter of identity and belonging. It is not something for which one receives payment (here, as in pre-Islamic Arabia, the notions of payment for service and wage often cannot be distinguished from the notions of corruption and bribe.) Meanwhile, however, soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the victorious early Islamic state suddenly found itself inundated with all sorts of wealth. At the same time, it had to confront the large-scale problems that confront all great empires, including the recruiting, paying, and supplying of its armies. As the Umayyad and then the "Abbasid caliphal regimes tried various solutions to their fiscal and military problems, the juridical and theological doctrines of nascent Islam slowly emerged. The “school” (or perhaps merely the local trend) of Medina, in its relative isolation, continued, somewhat longer than the others, to construct solutions to these problems in more Quranic terms, that is to say, by thinking in terms of gifts to fighters rather than payments to soldiers. Elsewhere, however, other scholars began to think differently. Is military service a religious obligation incumbent on each individual? How can the central authority (in the jurists’ terms, the imam and his representatives) recruit large numbers of fighters and keep them supplied and equipped? [i.e., the success of jihad created problems that led to a need to temper its effects and appeal- T] p.168-9

M. Bonner, Jihad in Islam History: Doctrines and Practice (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Jihad-Islamic-History-Doctrines-Practice/dp/0691125740). An excellent examination that refers to French scholarship unavailable in English.

[Tukhachevskii]

I just think it is odd that Tukhachevskii appears to believe that both himself and Osama bin Laden have hit upon the genuine meaning of Islam, while billions of Muslims have lost the plot.
Lewis said it best....


The coincidence of views between Islamologists and Islamic “fundamentalists” is apparent, not real, and the reformers’ accusations of complicity in reaction arise from a failure to distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive statements. The scholarly student of slam – especially if he is not Muslim – studies Islam as a historical phenomenon, as a civilisation with a long and distinguished record of achievement. The evidence he uses is that provided by Muslims – what they have said, written and done in the course of centuries. That is, he is concerned with the past and with the ways it can be used to understand the present. It is not his task or his right to change the present or to try and shape the future. This task is for the Muslim – his right, his duty, his exclusive privilege.

Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (http://www.amazon.com/Islam-West-Bernard-Lewis/dp/0195090616), p. 195 n1 to Chapter 8