Suppressive Fire

[Pete]

Last calling station, say again last transmission, you're coming in broken with cognitive dissonance... Authenticate X-ray Bravo ... screw it, negative contact, out.

[Ted Rush]

One good marksman who fires only once or twice a day but consistently gets hits will be more suppressive than an entire Company firing full automatic with few or no hits.
^^^ This


People around you becoming casualties is suppression -- everything else is just clutter.
^^^^and this

At the heart of it you have to consider your enemy and what will affect him. If a 4-man team of snipers are dropping your friends left and right you're going to be "suppressed" and wishing you were back home with mommy. If an enemy is just randomly throwing tons of inaccurate ordnance your way (assuming you're trained), it won't have much effect.

Suppression is simply making the other guy not want to execute his plan, or prevent him from interfering with your plan, because he would be dead if he tried.

[Pete]

That's the theory, at least, but after a minute or so of rock and roll it ought to be replaced by something more thought-out and accurate.

[Nick]

As a Marine Machine Gunner MOS 0331 you are trained from day one in SOI School of Infantry that when you recieve contact you immediatly lay down that supression. (obviously in the direction of the enemy) Now accuracy is most defanitly wanted but the main goal is to keep the enemys heads pinned down. This is in the current war atleast. That is just for machine gunnery, any other MOS such as Rifleman 0311 will take the accurate shots and maneuver towards the enemy.

[Leopard 2A4]

Hello at all...

Let me tell you about my experiences I had to make as a german soldier in AFG.
When I started my duty in the german army 1999, we were trained for defending our country against large armys. The doctrine was the same like in the cold war. A temleader had to lead every single riffleman. Fire was controlled by the leader. Surpressing fire we user for movement Rio. But we trained for fights when the enemy advances from one direction When you can see him comming miles away.
Then we were sent to AFG, where everything changed. Enemy comes from multiple directions and when you recognize it, he is too close to coordinate fire by one man. We germans where shocked the first times we got troops in contact. No one had real fighting experience in his life, even the commanding officers did not. So we just defend our asses by trying to get away.
But by the time we got this experience and we started to engage an defeat the INS who attack us. And I can tell you, we do our job now. And I am proud.
In my last tour, late 2010, I had to learn that the most INS does not give #### of surpressing fire. They don't keep thier heads down. They just go on doing thier business. They don't care about dying, they are full of drugs. You just can stop them with accurate fire. Body-Body-Head...

Hope you won't be angry for my english!

[JMA]

Hello at all...

Let me tell you about my experiences I had to make as a german soldier in AFG.
When I started my duty in the german army 1999, we were trained for defending our country against large armys. The doctrine was the same like in the cold war. A temleader had to lead every single riffleman. Fire was controlled by the leader. Surpressing fire we user for movement Rio. But we trained for fights when the enemy advances from one direction When you can see him comming miles away.
Then we were sent to AFG, where everything changed. Enemy comes from multiple directions and when you recognize it, he is too close to coordinate fire by one man. We germans where shocked the first times we got troops in contact. No one had real fighting experience in his life, even the commanding officers did not. So we just defend our asses by trying to get away.
But by the time we got this experience and we started to engage an defeat the INS who attack us. And I can tell you, we do our job now. And I am proud.
In my last tour, late 2010, I had to learn that the most INS does not give #### of surpressing fire. They don't keep thier heads down. They just go on doing thier business. They don't care about dying, they are full of drugs. You just can stop them with accurate fire. Body-Body-Head...

Hope you won't be angry for my english!

Thank you for posting that.

I would be interested to hear more about how the German troops in Afghanistan adjusted to the type of warfare and to combat itself.

I presume that there is no formal counter insurgency training as part of the basic and normal training of German soldiers? If there is now was it written based of Afghanistan or where did you draw the doctrine and tactics from?

[Fuchs]

The best public article on it is probably this recent one:
http://www.strategie-technik.de/04_11/Fue.pdf
(in German, of course)

A frequent remark of German soldiers from AFG is that only explosive warheads (40 mm) seem to have a psychological impact on the enemy.

Then again, this kind of firefights is not necessarily representative for other conflicts, nor is the skill applied necessarily matching historical heights.

-------

I have no good relations with any AFG vet, thus I've got no good source.
I am nevertheless a bit puzzled by those reports. They seem to be illogical or be based on some basic misunderstanding.

An enemy who doesn't get suppressed / impressed by small arms fire would expose himself so much that firefights would be over after mere seconds. That's apparently not the case.

A possible explanation could be that people have an exaggerated idea of what suppressing fires are. The seem to believe it's a near-permanent 100% silencing of the enemy (or causing his flight) when it's merely meant to be a very temporary interruption of his aimed fire capability.

I advise therefore caution about veteran reports about supposed failures to suppress the enemy. There may be a problem of inaccurate language.

[JMA]

As a Marine Machine Gunner MOS 0331 you are trained from day one in SOI School of Infantry that when you recieve contact you immediatly lay down that supression. (obviously in the direction of the enemy) Now accuracy is most defanitly wanted but the main goal is to keep the enemys heads pinned down. This is in the current war atleast. That is just for machine gunnery, any other MOS such as Rifleman 0311 will take the accurate shots and maneuver towards the enemy.

It is the general comment from those with experience that the drill where you immediatly lay down suppressive fire in the general direction of the enemy does more for your morale than it suppresses the enemy fire. Bursts of machine fire in the general direction of the enemy does not achieve much at the ranges contacts reportedly take place in Afghanistan. The use of alternate fire positions by the Taliban and the restricted movement potential of ISAF forces due to the IED threat and individual weight loads make most of these contacts reportedly inconclusive.

Given the number of contacts infantry patrols have experienced there should have been a tactical evolution by now.

[JMA]

I advise therefore caution about veteran reports about supposed failures to suppress the enemy. There may be a problem of inaccurate language.[/I]

My experience thought me to exercise caution when debriefing or hearing reports from soldiers with limited combat experience. Most often they read the situation wrong and/or draw the wrong conclusions from their experiences. No soldier wants to accept that his squad/section fired off 1,000 rounds of ammo to no effect. These same soldiers - often half way to becoming 6 month wonders - are often asked and offer an estimate of how many of the enemy they killed. Kind of like if 1,000 rounds were fired then they must have at least got ten... surely, yes? The debriefing officer writes it down muttering "yes, that sounds reasonable".

[Fuchs]

Given the number of contacts infantry patrols have experienced there should have been a tactical evolution by now.


I think there is; the same as with fighter aircraft with the introduction of radios by the late 30's. More loose patrols with lots of spacing between elements allows much of the blue force to remain effective even if one or two elements are in trouble. It's much better to fan out like this than to patrol in a large, cohesive group.
The terrain and mission don't allow for consistent use of such spacings and the elusive enemy has the initiative, can engage whenever the Westerner's are not in a favourable position...

[Infanteer]

A frequent remark of German soldiers from AFG is that only explosive warheads (40 mm) seem to have a psychological impact on the enemy.

That was our general observation as well. Lots of 40mm grenades and M-72s.

[JMA]

A frequent remark of German soldiers from AFG is that only explosive warheads (40 mm) seem to have a psychological impact on the enemy.

Sometimes the soldiers get these things wrong and it becomes a thing of myth. One would need to have this confirmed through "debriefs" held with captured/surrendered Taliban to be absolutely sure what the dynamics are. These "debriefs" would be the best source of which buttons to push with the Taliban so as to achieve the best psychological result. Got to take the guesswork out the understanding of the enemy.

[Leopard 2A4]

@ JMA
We have a counterINS Training in Germany. But I think it is not that effective than the training in the US or the UK. When you come to the German Army, you have 3 months of Basic Training. In my time you only got trained for conventional warfare. Today the newbies have two weeks of CI-Training. But its not very effective. When you got an employment in AFG, bosnia or what ever, you have to do several training modoules before you go there. The germans also participate from the experiences of other nations and try to push this into the trainings. But I think the trainings could prepare you for real combat action in AFG. But by the time, enough advisors will have made their own combat experiences...
And we alltough get better... Learning by doing!!!

[Fuchs]

The need for special Counterinsurgent combat training such as convoy protection training does little else but exposing that the conventional warfare training is horribly incomplete.
Insurgents are comparable to lightly armed stragglers of destroyed enemy armoured brigades; that's supposed to be the least trouble in a conventional war.

[tequila]

The need for special Counterinsurgent combat training such as convoy protection training does little else but exposing that the conventional warfare training is horribly incomplete.
Insurgents are comparable to lightly armed stragglers of destroyed enemy armoured brigades; that's supposed to be the least trouble in a conventional war.

Let's not get too crazy about this now. Convoy protection is trained so much because it's one of the few combat scenarios that most non-infantry troops will encounter, not because we're somehow overwhelmingly incompetent about it. It's not as if the Taliban is overrunning NATO convoys or even seriously inhibiting us.

[JMA]

@ JMA
We have a counterINS Training in Germany. But I think it is not that effective than the training in the US or the UK. When you come to the German Army, you have 3 months of Basic Training. In my time you only got trained for conventional warfare. Today the newbies have two weeks of CI-Training. But its not very effective. When you got an employment in AFG, bosnia or what ever, you have to do several training modoules before you go there. The germans also participate from the experiences of other nations and try to push this into the trainings. But I think the trainings could prepare you for real combat action in AFG. But by the time, enough advisors will have made their own combat experiences...
And we alltough get better... Learning by doing!!!

Well you have (generally) a peace time army with (at one point) little real expectation of becoming involved in a counter insurgency operation - like in Afghanistan. So perhaps on that basis the short basic training is acceptable - with the emphasis on the "basic". The additional training would presumably take place to fill the time hanging-around in peacetime waiting for the next war to break out.

Under that scenario it would be understandable to conduct counter insurgency training prior to deployment. I would like to believe that the German military has seized the opportunity to urgently and aggressively use the opportunity to develop and exercise a COIN doctrine while deployed in Afghanistan.

I wonder if the same problem exists with the German military as with the Brit and US deployments where due to the rapid rotation a lot of troops learn a little and no one learns enough? For German soldiers Afghanistan may well be a once in a career opportunity to see some action. What rotation system do you work on there?

[JMA]

The need for special Counterinsurgent combat training such as convoy protection training does little else but exposing that the conventional warfare training is horribly incomplete.
Insurgents are comparable to lightly armed stragglers of destroyed enemy armoured brigades; that's supposed to be the least trouble in a conventional war.

You are correct that if the conventional warfare training is complete - meaning that it is covered and well exercised in all its aspects - adapting to COIN operations would be/should be a relatively simple process.

But if the insurgents come out of the population itself and with the support of the population itself (as the Germans found in Russia 1941-5) it will be a different story.

[jcustis]

This snippet from a recent Marine Corps Gazette article, by a pretty talented 1stLt Franco, provides one of the best descriptions of enemy fire I have seen in a while. He wrote it in the context of reporting to higher headquarters in the Afghan environment, but I think it serves as an interesting reminder that sometimes, fire sent towards the enemy and (returned in your direction) can be a lot of noise and nothing more.


> Sporadic ineffective fire...the enemy is engaging the unit every few minutes with a few bursts or single shots. The effects of the fire are not deterring the unit from maneuvering or returning fire. The fact that it is ineffective can help determine whether the enemy is trying to bait the ground force into an ambush; wants to see their tactics, techniques, and procedures; or is just harassing the unit. The ineffective fire also shows the level of marksmanship of the enemy and may help determine their range.

> Sporadic effective fire...the enemy is engaging with a purpose, from closer range, or is a skilled marksman. On numerous occasions in Marjah, the enemy would engage an element in a compound every few minutes with a single accurate shot or burst. Effective fire means it is affecting the element’s ability to maneuver or return fire.

> Sustained ineffective fire. This type of fire will mostly come from inexperienced fighters who are not aiming but rather making noise with their weapons. The sustained rate of ineffective fire shows the enemy element’s lack of fire discipline, ineffective range at which they are trying to engage a unit, or lack of training.

> Sustained effective fire. Effective fire of any kind halts a unit’s ability to maneuver and return fire freely. When that fire is sustained, the ground commander and COC need to begin to utilize supporting arms internally to the ground element or externally utilizing 81mm mortars, close air support, or artillery. As Marines we can never become fixed by the enemy and allow them the ability to maneuver on us and control the pace of the firefight...an element taking sustained effective fire should initiate some type of support.

[JMA]

This snippet from a recent Marine Corps Gazette article, by a pretty talented 1stLt Franco, provides one of the best descriptions of enemy fire I have seen in a while. He wrote it in the context of reporting to higher headquarters in the Afghan environment, but I think it serves as an interesting reminder that sometimes, fire sent towards the enemy and (returned in your direction) can be a lot of noise and nothing more.

OK, so now we know the problem, now what is the solution?

If these circumstances were to be termed type A, B, C, D contacts with the enemy what would be the most appropriate tactical response to each? (Given that this will differ between mounted and dismounted infantry.)

I am still hoping that the role of the infantry remains to close with and kill the enemy.

More recent amended Brit infantry role "The mission of the infantry is to defeat the enemy through close combat."

[jcustis]

There has never been any difference in the ends, when it comes to the means of mounted or dismounted infantry.

The answer is, and will always be, to fix and maneuver.

[JMA]

There has never been any difference in the ends, when it comes to the means of mounted or dismounted infantry.

The answer is, and will always be, to fix and maneuver.

Did I say any different?

You get the benefit of the doubt on your interpretation so I accept the need to clarify what I said.

The initial tactical response at the time of making contact will differ if infantry are mounted or dismounted.

I hope this removes the confusion.

[jcustis]

The initial tactical response at the time of making contact will differ if infantry are mounted or dismounted.

Again, regardless of the condition - mounted or dismounted - the battle drill is the same:

-Seek cover
-Return fire
-Assess the situation and develop a course of action
-Recommend the course of action
-Execute the course of action

That course of action had better follow the principle of fix and maneuver or the unit isn't going to achieve the desired end.

[Fuchs]

Actually, some responses include simply keep driving to leave the kill zone asap.

It depends.

[jcustis]

True, but chalk that up to seeking cover, so it is still point #1 really.

Nobody should be taking free shots at infantry. Support units might allow the enemy to take a swipe, but that is not the COA infantry should be employing by default.

[Fuchs]

The difference is greater. There are counter-ambush tactics whose inventors did not trust the ability of leaders to survive the ambush, understand the situation behind cover, communicate, have control over their men and do something smart in such a situation.

That's why some approaches simply advise to an automated response (and some of them avoid getting pinned).

[JMA]

Actually, some responses include simply keep driving to leave the kill zone asap.

It depends.

Depends on what?

From the Rhodesian manual (http://selousscouts.tripod.com/movement_security.htm):


Immediate Action Techniques

3. The killing ground. This is the area in which effective terrorist fire can be brought to bear. In order that the terrorists may not have the advantage of opening fire on ground of their own choosing, every effort must be made to get vehicles clear of the killing ground. Thus when vehicles are fired upon:

a. Drivers are not to stop, but are to attempt to drive on out of the killing ground.

b. Sentries are to fire immediately to keep the terrorists down.

c. When vehicles are clear of the killing ground, they are to be stopped to allow their occupants to debus and carry out offensive action.

d. Following vehicles approaching the killing ground are not to attempt to run the gauntlet of the ambush, but are to halt clear of the area to allow their occupants to take offensive action.

4. Where vehicles have not been able to drive clear of the area under fire, troops are to debus under the covering fire of the lookout men, which should include smoke if possible, and are to make for cover on the side of the road. The actual bailing out drill is dealt with in greater detail later in this section.

[Fuchs]

It depends on much.

A vehicle convoy must not be pinned because it's got little combat power but much speed in the killing zone. Its threatened vehicles need to speed out of the killing zone.

An Infantry squad on the other hand has relatively much firepower, but little speed. It needs to dive first, then react to the situation.


There's also the decisionmaking and communication thing and the human factor.
You can expect a driver to drive on when under fire (even though with much increased risk of a crash) while almost every infantry squad has at least one soldier who's sure to take a dive into cover, no matter what's the orders.


Speed is relative, of course. Movement speed, ability to accelerate further, distance to end of killing zone, lethality of ambush fire / time ... this can be calculated by OR, but usually the troops in the conflict learn when to run and when to duck by trial & error.


Finally there's a big problem; how do you react differently to an RPG strike and a AT mine strike? The RPG requires a speedy reaction, while the same could just drive the blue force into many more AT mines...

I attempted to find something simple that allows for a good reaction almost every time even with human factors in play, but I didn't find any back in '03 or '04 when I was looking at ambush problems.
An unpredictable opfor that varies its tactics or even combines them is a helluva lot more difficult and dangerous than the remote controlled HE mine tactics that dominated in the last decade.

The proper response to the aforementioned dilemma is probably to be so overwhelmingly dangerous to direct fire opfor that they restrict themselves in their tactics down to a point where we are not in such serious dilemmas any more; that's pretty much what was done.

[JMA]

Again, regardless of the condition - mounted or dismounted - the battle drill is the same:

-Seek cover
-Return fire
-Assess the situation and develop a course of action
-Recommend the course of action
-Execute the course of action

That course of action had better follow the principle of fix and maneuver or the unit isn't going to achieve the desired end.

Fuchs has touched on it in that if in a vehicle and in the killing zone the drill is/should be to drive through and out and then to stop. If the killing ground is ahead then stop before entering and deploy - taking care not to fire on your own forces who where ahead of you.

Foot patrols had a response in Reaction to Effective Enemy Fire summarised as - dash, down, crawl, observe, sights, fire on receiving the command to "take cover".

There are some changes coming in the Brit minor tactical doctrine where it will go something like this:


The reaction to effective enemy fire must be for the whole section to remove itself from the killing area immediately. ...

The initial drill, therefore, is: Return fire – take cover – return appropriate fire. It is recognised that the initial return of fire will be largely inaccurate, however, it assists with locating the enemy and will disrupt enemy fire. Even after this individual drill has been completed it may be necessary for the section commander to organise further extraction of his section from the killing area under the cover of smoke and F&M (fire and movement), especially if casualties have been taken.

This change seems to be coming as a result of an acceptance (through Afghanistan experience one supposes) that whole sections may be caught out in the open when the enemy initiate contact and then have to implement one of a number break contact drills to get out of trouble. Hitherto these break contact drills were the preserve of special forces or recce patrols where they were either badly outnumbered or fighting was not their mission.

So this is the kind of change/innovation I was inquiring after.

[JMA]

It depends on much.

A vehicle convoy must not be pinned because it's got little combat power but much speed in the killing zone. Its threatened vehicles need to speed out of the killing zone.

An Infantry squad on the other hand has relatively much firepower, but little speed. It needs to dive first, then react to the situation.

There's also the decisionmaking and communication thing and the human factor.

You can expect a driver to drive on when under fire (even though with much increased risk of a crash) while almost every infantry squad has at least one soldier who's sure to take a dive into cover, no matter what's the orders.

Speed is relative, of course. Movement speed, ability to accelerate further, distance to end of killing zone, lethality of ambush fire / time ... this can be calculated by OR, but usually the troops in the conflict learn when to run and when to duck by trial & error.

Finally there's a big problem; how do you react differently to an RPG strike and a AT mine strike? The RPG requires a speedy reaction, while the same could just drive the blue force into many more AT mines...

I attempted to find something simple that allows for a good reaction almost every time even with human factors in play, but I didn't find any back in '03 or '04 when I was looking at ambush problems.
An unpredictable opfor that varies its tactics or even combines them is a helluva lot more difficult and dangerous than the remote controlled HE mine tactics that dominated in the last decade.

The proper response to the aforementioned dilemma is probably to be so overwhelmingly dangerous to direct fire opfor that they restrict themselves in their tactics down to a point where we are not in such serious dilemmas any more; that's pretty much what was done.

I think that piece on Movement Securit (http://selousscouts.tripod.com/movement_security.htm)y mentioned earlier has much value even though it is circa 1970s.

While it is necessary to have the doctrine it is TTPs which need to be locally adapted to enemy and terrain in the ever changing operational environment. You are correct that one needs to avoid settling into a predictable routine.

As far as the killing zone is concerned it rather depends how long it is and due to spacing how many vehicles are caught therein. Obviously those vehicles caught in the killing zone must attempt to drive out and those not yet in should avoid entering it. The enemy would presumably want to force the vehicle of their choice to stop in the killing ground and prevent following vehicles from being able to pass by to get out. Good selection of the position of the ambush is also important with steep inclines and narrow bridges being of the best.

Anti-tank mines one would assume would be command detonated otherwise there would be just too much guesswork about how and when the ambush would be initiated. But then maybe the enemy think differently (or don't think). For slow moving vehicles an RPG into the radiator will most often stop such a vehicle or cause it to loose control and crash... but then generally it must be the first vehicle which may have some frontal protection.

The rule applies that the vehicle(s) caught in the killing ground must attempt to drive out and allow the troops to debus and form up. Those who have not yet entered the killing should stop and carry out the drill to secure the vehicles and the prepare to clear the ambush party. The command and control is another issue which should be rehearsed.

The kind of reaction required will be determined by the quality of the enemy you face.

It seems that the logistic convoys out of Pakistan are well secured as they only (from what I hear) have problems in Pakistan and few if any on the Afghanistan leg of the route.

[Markus]

As a Reconnaissance Platoon Sergeant in 1966, I enforced a firm no automatic fire rule for that reason. No problems once I bounced a Steel Helmet off one guys back in a firefight because he violated the rule...

What do you think about the idea of issuing semi-only rifles to the troops, or to the new troops? Would you support it?

[Ken White]

What do you think about the idea of issuing semi-only rifles to the troops, or to the new troops? Would you support it?One could go semi-auto only without too great a penalty but there is a need for very, very rare full auto fire. Some ambush situations, breaking contact, CQB in buildings and the like. Not always in those examples but sometimes...

For combat, better to have a capability that one may use rarely than to not have it when one might need it. In this case, given little additional complexity, small to no weight increase (other than ammo usage...) ease of manufacture and such, there is no significant burden attached to the weapon. The training requirement is increased but only slightly.

Using semi-auto only weapons is essentially a technological cover for inadequate training. The full-auto problems of lack of accuracy and excessive ammo expenditure are obviated by better training. Thus the weapon should not be the issue, training should be. All things considered, best to keep the capability and train better.

[JMA]

One could go semi-auto only without too great a penalty but there is a need for very, very rare full auto fire. Some ambush situations, breaking contact, CQB in buildings and the like. Not always in those examples but sometimes...

For combat, better to have a capability that one may use rarely than to not have it when one might need it. In this case, given little additional complexity, small to no weight increase (other than ammo usage...) ease of manufacture and such, there is no significant burden attached to the weapon. The training requirement is increased but only slightly.

Using semi-auto only weapons is essentially a technological cover for inadequate training. The full-auto problems of lack of accuracy and excessive ammo expenditure are obviated by better training. Thus the weapon should not be the issue, training should be. All things considered, best to keep the capability and train better.

The one issue that relates to the weapon and its design is the sequence of the change lever switching. For example the AK goes Safe-Auto-Single, while the FAL FN goes Safe-Single-Auto. This has an impact with (as you say) undertrained troops.

[Ken White]

The USSR undertrained and knew it so they compensated by emphasizing the use of full auto and requiring a conscious decision to go to semi-auto. Tactically and training-wise, the AK was a direct descendant of the PpSh series...

The west with the FAL and the M-16 reversed that requiring extra effort to get to full auto. The M14 and some nation's FALs were issued as semi-auto only and required armorer modificiation to employ the full auto capability. In the US Army, that worked but again it was just a mechanical substitute to compensate for mediocre training. The M16 with all weapons full auto capable had no problems in good units, bad units allowed misuse. The US Army's foolish and flawed attempt to improve full-auto accuracy with a burst limiter only encouraged poor habits without improving accuracy. It is a good example of providing a capability for one thing that gets used for others. Some believed the 3-round burst was to save ammo and thus encouraged its use(:eek: ???:rolleyes:). Fortunately, that aberration of a mechanical substitute is on the way out.

Give the troops the capability they need and train them to use it properly. Really easier and cheaper than complicating the logistic system for no good reason...

[JMA]

Give the troops the capability they need and train them to use it properly. Really easier and cheaper than complicating the logistic system for no good reason...

You sure about that?

It seems to me that the current reality is that its easier to complicate the logistic system than to provide army wide high quality training even if that were cheaper and a dedicated and professional corps of instructors existed.

[Ken White]

You sure about that?As positive as one can be about anything based on reasonably comprehensive but not full knowledge.
It seems to me that the current reality is that its easier to complicate the logistic system than to provide army wide high quality training even if that were cheaper and a dedicated and professional corps of instructors existed.It is easier because but only because it is the route that was chosen during WW II and that became thoroughly embedded in the psyche of the organism that is the US defense establishment. That route was logical and advisable at the time due to the fact that personnel, mobilization and training systems adopted for WW I were themselves already firmly embedded and thus it made sense to do it that way at the time.

Achieving change in a massive bureaucracy is never easy. Remaining wedded to systems that originated almost 100 years ago to cope with the mobilization of a large conscripted force is thus understandable -- but that doesn't mean it's right...

Aside from wasting many personnel capabilities and not using others to the fullest, it is extremely expensive -- I believe unsustainably so given future costs of materiel, transport and such -- and provides only marginal effectiveness. IOW, it is true today because it's a habit and we can afford it. I do not believe the former is an adequate justification or that the latter will remain true. That dedicated corps of professionally competent instructors does indeed not exist today. It did but it was allowed -- forced -- to wither in the name of 'personnel management' and 'career progression.' It can be reconstituted. The talent is available in large quantities; it just isn't being used.

[JMA]

As positive as one can be about anything based on reasonably comprehensive but not full knowledge.It is easier because but only because it is the route that was chosen during WW II and that became thoroughly embedded in the psyche of the organism that is the US defense establishment. That route was logical and advisable at the time due to the fact that personnel, mobilization and training systems adopted for WW I were themselves already firmly embedded and thus it made sense to do it that way at the time.

Achieving change in a massive bureaucracy is never easy. Remaining wedded to systems that originated almost 100 years ago to cope with the mobilization of a large conscripted force is thus understandable -- but that doesn't mean it's right...

Aside from wasting many personnel capabilities and not using others to the fullest, it is extremely expensive -- I believe unsustainably so given future costs of materiel, transport and such -- and provides only marginal effectiveness. IOW, it is true today because it's a habit and we can afford it. I do not believe the former is an adequate justification or that the latter will remain true. That dedicated corps of professionally competent instructors does indeed not exist today. It did but it was allowed -- forced -- to wither in the name of 'personnel management' and 'career progression.' It can be reconstituted. The talent is available in large quantities; it just isn't being used.

OK, so training is the problem.

Now what will it take for the military to address this problem?

Just a question... what % of currently serving senior NCOs and field rank and above officers would be willing to agree that training quality is the problem?

[82redleg]

OK, so training is the problem.

Now what will it take for the military to address this problem?

Just a question... what % of currently serving senior NCOs and field rank and above officers would be willing to agree that training quality is the problem?

Sample of one.

Training is the primary problem (well, that or leadership). Would be glad to help fix it, but its going to take more than one MAJ (or all the MAJs, or even all the FGs) to fix. Until the GOs are convinced enough to change the system (granted, we can help with this convincing), training effectiveness will only be possible in small units for short periods of time (I think these two attributes, size of unit and length of time have inverse proportions, so a small unit can achieve effectiveness of training for longer- see 75th RGR RGT or a larger unit can achieve effectiveness of training for shorter). Notice I said effectiveness of training, not efficiency. Effective is good, efficient is good enough, which is what we have now.

[JMA]

Notice I said effectiveness of training, not efficiency. Effective is good, efficient is good enough, which is what we have now.

I would be happy if you would clarify that differentiation.

[Ken White]

I agree with 82 Redleg -- only things I'd add are that, to paraphrase Bertrand Russell, 80% of the work is done by 20% of the people -- thus I suspect about 20% would agree with the Redleg and I... :wry:

Add the fact that leadership is influenced significantly by training; i.e. people tend to do what their training suggested they should do. The personnel system is not supporting the Army as it should and that also needs to be fixed but a good leader would do that. There are equipment issues but they are a result of inadequately trained persons buying less than necessary or effective gear.

In the end analysis, mediocre training simply produces mediocre results across the board.

[82redleg]

I would be happy if you would clarify that differentiation.

Effective training is good training, "producing the intended or expected result"

Efficient training is good enough training "productive of desired effects; productive without waste"

In a mass mobilization situation, for the US in WW1, WW2 or what we expected during the Cold War, you settle for efficient training- good enough to get Soldiers into the fight. Sure its not perfect, or even close, but allows you to field the force you need to win the war.

Its exactly the model that we built to win WW2, and have sustained since then. Unfortunately, it is not optimized for implementation in a long service, professional force, such as the US is using to fight the current conflicts.

What we are doing is train Soldiers well enough with minimal resources (especially the resource of time, although there are others). What we should be doing is providing the best training possible for the limited number of professional Soldiers we have. In return we should treat these professionals as professionals. We don't pay master plumbers or master carpenters union wages to rake leaves, cut grass, or do janitorial work. So why do we let professional Soldiers deal with the same distractions from their trade of managing violence. The Ranger Regiment model is, from my limited interaction with it, about right. We should expect (and provide the resources) for our Soldiers, especially our combat arms Soldiers, to train to the level of professional athletes and master their weapons and combat skills. They should work on that at least 40 hrs per week. Instead, they are treated as a replaceable cog in the machine.

[JMA]

Effective training is good training, "producing the intended or expected result"

Efficient training is good enough training "productive of desired effects; productive without waste"

In a mass mobilization situation, for the US in WW1, WW2 or what we expected during the Cold War, you settle for efficient training- good enough to get Soldiers into the fight. Sure its not perfect, or even close, but allows you to field the force you need to win the war.

Its exactly the model that we built to win WW2, and have sustained since then. Unfortunately, it is not optimized for implementation in a long service, professional force, such as the US is using to fight the current conflicts.

What we are doing is train Soldiers well enough with minimal resources (especially the resource of time, although there are others). What we should be doing is providing the best training possible for the limited number of professional Soldiers we have. In return we should treat these professionals as professionals. We don't pay master plumbers or master carpenters union wages to rake leaves, cut grass, or do janitorial work. So why do we let professional Soldiers deal with the same distractions from their trade of managing violence. The Ranger Regiment model is, from my limited interaction with it, about right. We should expect (and provide the resources) for our Soldiers, especially our combat arms Soldiers, to train to the level of professional athletes and master their weapons and combat skills. They should work on that at least 40 hrs per week. Instead, they are treated as a replaceable cog in the machine.

Thanks for the response.

Never served in a peace-time environment so seldom had to find something to keep the troopies busy (... the sergeant major took care of that anyway ;) ). But I can understand the problem.

I suggest the problem at company level is the number of qualified instructors among the NCOs. In any event there are not enough NCOs on most establishments to maintain a training tempo of 40 hours a week of effective and worthwhile training. I would be interested in how you would see this being achieved whilst achieving maximum activity at the same time?

[Markus]

I am certainly a SAW sceptic. I did some interviews of Afghan veterans last month and the UK's L110 LMG is called "the noise maker." Given the choice the boys want to carry the GPMG. The problem seems to be the 10-inch barrel.

Now I've played on the range with IDF's Negev, and it's a very impressive weapon, at least in its most recent iteration. Good as it is, I'm not sure I want to have the weight and trouble of 2 x belt fed weapons types in a platoon.

The weight carried in TI-sights and NV would seem a better choice.

This might be a good point for me to display my ignorance.

The L110 LMG (called the FN Minimi in Australia, if I am not mistaken), is called "the noisemaker" and the GPMG (which in this case probably means FN MAG) is preferred, but this is solely based on its calibre, right? They wouldn't scoff at the Minimi 7.62 variant?

Also, I still don't get it: I understand that there have been complaints about lighter rounds not putting down drug-crazed religious fundamentalists, but I don't think I'd like to be hit by a .22 round let alone a .223 or .308. Is it solely range that is the issue (I read somewhere, perhaps here, that firefights are happening at greater distances than the 300m that came out of all those old studies)? Or could it be mere bravado that people scoff at the 5.56?

Finally, what does everyone think about an intermediate round - something like 6.5 or 6.8? My theory is that the 7.62 may simply be bigger than necessary - that the proponents of 5.56 were right but they went overboard. What is needed is the minimum mass necessary to knock down a peaking dervish at 500m, wouldn't you say? Shouldn't we be going for the lightest round that will do this? And might that round be smaller than 7.62?

[jcustis]

I'll borrow from the recently deceased Stephen A. Camp and say that placement is stopping power, and I think the advantages of the newer rounds are not exceptional right now. From another forum I frequent (and from a ballistics expert):


The 6.8 mm design does not offer "ideal" terminal performance, as it is a compromise that was constrained by the requirement that it had to function in the 5.56 mm M4/M16 envelope; however, given those platform design requirements, 6.8 mm works VERY well for combat, as it offers better terminal performance than ALL 5.56 mm loads, as well as 7.62x39 mm loads.

The designers of the 6.8 mm SPC simultaneously developed an "ideal" assault rifle cartridge, with NO platform imposed design limitations. This "idealized" assault rifle cartridge, the 7x46 mm, offers better range and terminal performance than 6.5 mm Grendel, 6.8 mm SPC, or any other common assault rifle cartridges, including 5.45x39mm, 5.56x45mm and 7.62x39mm. Felt recoil appears manageable and weapons remain controllable in FA fire. The 7x46 mm cartridge OAL is a bit too long to fit into the M4/M16 or other 5.56 mm size weapons/magazines, yet it does not need a receiver/magazine as large as those used by 7.62x51mm/.308 platforms. As a result, the 7x46mm requires new weapons

[Markus]

...has it ingrained in his head to "seek cover and return fire". ... Where those texts fail is in not describing it as "aimed fire."

There is a lot of full-auto fire going on, and it looks as though they really had not idea where to send it, as evident in the POV guy's lack of any commands or orientation until more rounds crack overhead and he finally calls out a direction. it's pretty clear that he isn't even achieving the stock weld necessary He alsi starts out firing at the hillside that looks to be close to 500m so that appears to be an attempt to satisfy some notion that getting rounds out - any rounds - is better that waiting to ID the threat target. That's an example of our training problem.

One thing that I often wonder about but have just managed to articulate is pressure to return fire, especially social pressure. It seems to me that often one would have no idea, or only a vague idea, where fire came from. I can imagine feeling totally confused yet also feel like a bit of a goose sitting there doing nothing and wondering what's going on - like at school. I can also imagine a sergeant yelling at me to start firing, everyone else is firing, so I just do what everyone else is doing. Don't want to be accused of cowardice or something later...

Now I think about it, I wonder how much of that is going on on the other side as well. How much of the 'Taliban' fire is bravado, a feeling of 'I've got to be seen to be doing something', or just some larrikins messing with the soldiers' heads to get a rise?

[jcustis]

Besides a few initial bursts, I'd probably say 75% of their fire is just as errant and misplaced. That's part of the reason why they'll go to the effort they do to emplace IEDs.

[Markus]

Thanks Ken White and JMA.

So, ideally, give them full-auto and train them properly. If - and only if - proper training is unavailable, giving them semi-auto only is then a strategy available to compensate for this.

PS: It is conventional wisdom in Australia (from the little I've heard) that the reason the SLRs had their auto capability disabled was because they tended to jam on full auto, not because training was inadequate. Of course, it's perfectly possible that that was just an excuse - the powers that be would prefer not to admit that training was inadequate or that they didn't trust their troops.

[Markus]

Has anyone here experienced incoming suppressive fire? Did it work?

[Markus]

Would tracer have a suppressive psychological effect? Or would it merely serve to highlight how poorly aimed and useless and laughable one's fire is?

[Fuchs]

The SLR was from the beginning a semi-auto version of the FAL (which was known in Germany as G1 iirc). It has to be seen in context of the Sterling submachinegun which was in parallel service with the infantry and provided the full auto fire at short range that the SLR lacked.

It's possible to train very quick semi-auto 7.62NATO fire (with rifles such as SLR and G3) in order to emulate the short-range firepower of the full auto setting. It only takes a quick index finger with 'quick fire muscle memory' for this.


I remember to have been quite effective at about 30 m range with G3 full auto (multiple hits on 'kneeling soldier' target with one burst), but it's generally unlikely that you'll hit something with a 7.62NATO rifle burst that you wouldn't have hit with single fire as well. In fact, aiming low left for the burst felt like more of an effort than to simply aim at centre with the V-sight.

The real full auto advantage only comes into play when you're in an indoor firefight at distances where a compact submachinegun would have been first choice. The SLR has an excessive length for indoor use and has the Sterling as partner, thus the Commonwealth armies didn't lose much by ditching the full auto option.


Would tracer have a suppressive psychological effect? Or would it merely serve to highlight how poorly aimed and useless and laughable one's fire is?

Special forward-visible tracers were developed for .50" machine guns in World War 2 for bomber defences. The point of the concept was exactly their unnerving effect on fighter pilots.

[Markus]

I would be interested to hear more about how the German troops in Afghanistan adjusted to the type of warfare and to combat itself.

I second that.

[Ken White]

Has anyone here experienced incoming suppressive fire? Did it work?Yes to the first question, depends to the second...

After a fair amount of exposure in differing terrain, climates and with different opponents -- as well as with US and other units of varying quality and experience and with varied weapon mixes -- the quick answer is yes but usually only briefly.

Once the initial shock passes most units so engaged will work their way out of it one way or another. Generally, a small volume of accurate fire suppresses (I prefer 'deters' because it really doesn't suppress or stop for much time...) while a large volume of inaccurate fire will not. Any volume and accuracy level works against poorly trained or inexperienced troops; as they become better trained or more experienced, any volume and accuracy will often barely cause them to break stride. :cool:

Terrain, vegetation, urbanization also have an impact. A well trained unit dispersed to 100m intervals in the desert isn't much of a target and will react rapidly to fire; a poorly trained element, bunched up a few paces apart OTOH will likely take some casualties and thus be deterred. Yet that same crew in an urban area with lots of cover may do much better. In jungle or heavily wooded areas training becomes quite important due to lack of visibility and thus control is very difficult -- people have to know what to do and others must rely on one to do the right thing at the right time.

METT-TC and training, yet again... ;)

[Markus]

After a fair amount of exposure in differing terrain, climates and with different opponents -- as well as with US and other units of varying quality and experience and with varied weapon mixes -- the quick answer is yes but usually only briefly.

Once the initial shock passes most units so engaged will work their way out of it one way or another. Generally, a small volume of accurate fire suppresses (I prefer 'deters' because it really doesn't suppress or stop for much time...) while a large volume of inaccurate fire will not. Any volume and accuracy level works against poorly trained or inexperienced troops; as they become better trained or more experienced, any volume and accuracy will often barely cause them to break stride.

Thanks Ken. This is interesting because the general sense I get from this thread in its entirety is that suppressive fire should be used only as a very brief initial response, to be replaced quickly by aimed fire.

Like a Mad Minute - nobody here seemed to use that term - at first contact, lay down suppressive fire, which is necessarily fire that is relatively unaimed (you might not know exactly where the fire came from - which seems likely to me), perhaps firing bursts into likely spots according to the Mad Minute idea, then switch to aimed fire, which might mean not firing at all for a very long time if you can't see anything, but probably means manoeuvring (which I define as "sneaking up in an organised way to where you think you'll have a good position from which to deal with the enemy").

Rather than "Suppressive fire - doesn't", as the saying does, it is more accurate to say that suppressive fire does but only temporarily.

The advantages of this is that an initial burst of suppressive fire:


puts the enemy at a temporary psychological disadvantage
gives you a psychological boost (which may not be necessary for veterans but they're not the category I'm worried about)


Switching to aimed fire:


reduces the danger to civilians
permits better manoeuvring(?)
commands the respect of the enemy
actually suppresses better than suppressive fire (as someone here pointed out - I think it was in About Face or Steel My Soldiers' Hearts that I read how a single sniper tied down a whole battalion for hours)
is more likely to hit the enemy
conserves ammunition


So the answer is not an either/or but rather the judicious blending of the two.

Any criticisms?

[Markus]

It's possible to train very quick semi-auto 7.62NATO fire (with rifles such as SLR and G3) in order to emulate the short-range firepower of the full auto setting. It only takes a quick index finger with 'quick fire muscle memory' for this.

I've seen this with a .22 semi-automatic (the only semi-autos available to civilians in Australia). It was impressive - the volume was impressive, we didn't consider accuracy. Now you mention it, it was so fast it makes me query the necessity of full-auto (although I do take Ken's point that soldiers should have the option for those rare situations where auto is desirable).


The real full auto advantage only comes into play when you're in an indoor firefight at distances where a compact submachinegun would have been first choice. The SLR has an excessive length for indoor use and has the Sterling as partner, thus the Commonwealth armies didn't lose much by ditching the full auto option.

And, since carrying both a rifle and a submachinegun is a pain, why not combine them into an M4 or Steyr AUG?

Speaking of which, I have discovered that:


The [Steyr AUG] features an Spz-kr type two-stage trigger (pulling the trigger halfway produces semi-automatic fire, pulling the trigger all the way to the rear produces fully automatic fire) and a safety mechanism (cross-bolt, button type), located immediately above the hand grip.

And, while we're on the topic:


Some versions have an ALO or "automatic lockout", a small projection at the base of the trigger. This was first included on the Irish Defence Forces variant of the rifle, and soon after, the Australian Defence Forces variant. In the exposed position the ALO stops the trigger being squeezed past the semi-automatic position. If needed, the ALO can be pushed up to permit automatic fire.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steyr_AUG

Presumably this does give soldiers the option then of auto fire, but stops panicking newbies from unintentionally firing on full auto.


Special forward-visible tracers were developed for .50" machine guns in World War 2 for bomber defences. The point of the concept was exactly their unnerving effect on fighter pilots.

I wonder if the pilots actually found it unnerving. Presumably they did, since it seems likely to me they couldn't otherwise know they were being shot at. On the ground though it might just tell the Taliban where you're shooting from.

[JMA]

Has anyone here experienced incoming suppressive fire? Did it work?

Yes and yes... but only for as long as the initial tempo of fire is maintained.

Meaning that what suppresses is a high volume of accurate fire that forces those on the receiving end to get their heads down. Such an initial high volume of suppressive fire is seldom maintained and it petters out into what is called a "lull in the battle". This lull will come for sure and when it does the commander must have a plan to maneuver his men out of their current position (in anticipation that the enemy will shortly attempt to close with and kill you) and into a new position of improved tactical advantage. If you fire back you will just get more of the same.

We have discussed it somewhere here before and that is what is effective suppressive fire. For unblooded troops what they consider as effective fire in their (collective) first contact most likely won't be considered as such after some combat experience. It takes a little while for troops to become more discriminating about the quality of incoming fire. This problem is insurmountable under general mobilization conditions and there are many records from various wars where "raw" newly deployed units were specifically targeted as they are considered soft targets. Effective and realistic "battle inoculation" training (that which the health & safety nazis won't let you conduct) is what is required to prepare soldiers for battle and improve their ability to accurately read and interpret battle conditions from the get go.