View Full Version : New Rules for New Enemies
SWJED
10-25-2006, 02:17 PM
October Armed Forces Journal - New Rules for New Enemies (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2088425) by LTC John Nagl and LTC Paul Yingling.
... Insurgent tactics are appealing to both nonstate actors and to states wishing to harm the U.S. Nonstate actors and weak states wishing to harm our country have little choice but to adopt insurgent tactics. These groups lack the means to generate conventional combat power. However, even states with the resources to generate conventional combat power find insurgent tactics effective. Great-power wars are costly, risky and are prone to escalation. When one or more of the great powers possesses nuclear weapons, the dangers of direct conventional combat are potentially catastrophic. To avoid the stalemate created by nuclear deterrence, great powers turn to proxies employing insurgent tactics. For those wishing to harm America, insurgent tactics are far safer and more effective than facing us in conventional combat. During the latter stages of the Cold War, the Soviet Union avoided direct military confrontation with the U.S., preferring instead to sponsor anti-American insurgencies in Vietnam, Nicaragua and El Salvador. The U.S. later employed similar tactics, supporting insurgencies against Soviet clients in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua and elsewhere. Today, there is growing evidence that Iran is supporting anti-American elements in Iraq.
Although insurgents and terrorists operate in small cells, they are capable of inflicting great harm. The greatest national security threat facing the U.S. is not a conventional attack by a foreign military power, but rather a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction. On Sept. 11, 2001, al-Qaida murdered nearly 3,000 Americans by turning civilian airliners into weapons. Had these terrorists procured weapons of mass destruction, the death toll would have been greater. Moreover, there is a clear link between insurgency abroad and terrorism on American soil. Terrorist groups such as al-Qaida seek to create rogue regimes such as the Taliban in Afghanistan or failed states such as Somalia and Iraq. In these ungoverned spaces around the globe, terrorists generate combat power for use against the U.S. and other free societies. Because free societies rely on the relatively free movement of people and goods across and within national boundaries, it is cost prohibitive to defend every vulnerable point. The best way to prevent terrorism at home is to deny terrorists the sanctuary they seek in rogue and failed states around the globe...
To win the Long War, the Army must change its culture to one that demands and rewards adaptation. This cultural change will serve as the catalyst for a comprehensive redesign of doctrine, organizations, training, leader education, material development and soldier recruitment.
To win the Long War, the Army must develop a more adaptive organizational culture. To create such a culture, the Army must change its focus from a centralized, specialized focus on major conventional wars to a more decentralized and less specialized focus on full-spectrum operations. This shift in organizational culture cannot occur within existing organizations — indeed these organizations can be an impediment to change. The best way to change the organizational culture of the Army is to change the pathways for professional advancement within the officer corps. The Army will become more adaptive only when being adaptive offers the surest path to promotion.
To create a culture of innovation within the Army, we must develop a new pathway to success that is not beholden to any branch. The old bromide is true — give a man a hammer and he sees every problem as a nail. Human beings understand problems in the context of the tools available to solve them. A culture that fosters innovation is one that develops leaders who are equally comfortable applying the elements of combat power and the specialized capabilities of the various branches. Furthermore, the development of this generalized expertise must be rewarded through promotion and command selection — the surest means the Army has to communicate which skills, knowledge and abilities it prizes most highly.
Toward that end, the Army should consider abolishing branch distinctions among field-grade officers for most within the operational career field. Under the current model, an officer remains in his basic branch until he retires or is promoted to the rank of general officer. This lifelong branch affiliation narrows an officer's perspective and limits his familiarity with capabilities outside his branch. The new model for career advancement should terminate branch affiliation for most officers in the operational career field at the rank of captain. A captain who commands with distinction within his basic branch should have the opportunity to command again in another branch. Officers who command successfully in two organizations from two different branches — maneuver and logistics, fires and intelligence, etc. — are those most suited to command battalions and brigades. The pathway to high command should be reserved for officers who demonstrate a facility with a variety of tools, both lethal and nonlethal. While there would still be a significant need for specialized officers, the surest pathway to high command ought to lie open to the adaptive generalist over the narrow specialist.
To win the Long War, the Army must embrace the combined-arms battalion (CAB) as the basic building block for tactical operations and develop a flatter organizational structure. The development of modular brigade combat teams is a step in the right direction but does not go far enough. The current organization is too hierarchical and too specialized to operate most effectively in the Long War...
To win the Long War, the Army must educate leaders to think critically and comprehensively regarding the application of all elements of national power. Destroying our enemies' capacity for organized resistance is necessary but not sufficient to deny terrorists and insurgents the permissive conditions they require to sow instability. To eliminate or prevent the emergence of terrorist sanctuaries, Army leaders must possess the intellectual tools necessary to foster host-nation political and economic development. The development of capable and credible political and economic institutions denies terrorists the ungoverned spaces they need to thrive. Such development can be fostered only by highly educated leaders. Some look elsewhere in the Executive Branch for this expertise, and there are efforts underway to improve both capacity and capability for stabilization and reconstruction tasks in the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development; however, it is our soldiers who will pay the price if we count on others to perform these essential tasks that only the Army has the resources to implement.
COIN is graduate-level warfare practiced at the lowest echelons of command. Small units are often responsible for fostering political development and economic reconstruction within their areas of operation. These tasks are essential for effective counterinsurgency. Building effective political and economic institutions denies insurgents support from the population, making them easy prey for security forces. However, the typical company commander has neither the professional education nor the language skills necessary to accomplish these tasks. While there are many gifted amateurs in our formations performing heroically, the Army cannot rely on improvisation for mission-essential tasks. Company-level commanders ought to have undergraduate-level education in economics and politics and language training prior to commanding in a COIN environment. Field-grade officers require more advanced training in these disciplines and skills, as their challenges in COIN are correspondingly more difficult. The education of noncommissioned officers must change as well. NCOs must receive language training comparable to that of officers, as our sergeants are most often those in direct contact with civilian populations and host-nation security forces. NCOs ought to have at least some undergraduate-level education in relevant disciplines to complement and keep pace with the efforts of their officers...
To win the Long War, soldiers must treat non-combatants with respect while at the same time act aggressively and independently to defeat our enemies. Balancing aggressiveness and restraint is certainly stressful and difficult, but it is not impossible for intelligent and disciplined soldiers. Effective counterinsurgency requires security forces to isolate insurgents from the population. To cut off insurgents from the physical and psychological support provided by civilian populations, security forces must earn the respect and trust of the host-nation population. Security forces earn trust and respect when they treat non-combatants with dignity and in accordance with host-nation laws and internationally accepted norms. Such behavior is not only a moral imperative but also an operational necessity. Treating non-combatants with respect increases access to human intelligence, fosters participation in political processes and ethnic/sectarian reconciliation and encourages risk-taking and investment necessary for economic reconstruction...
Much more at the link...
Steve Blair
10-25-2006, 02:57 PM
Very interesting article, although I feel I must (in relation to this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1346) comment on one of the authors' statements.
When they say
During the Plains Indian Wars, many of the tribes opposing America's westward expansion adopted decentralized hit-and-run tactics to terrorize settlers. In response to these threats, the U.S. Cavalry abandoned the large-scale tactics of the Civil War in favor of small-unit operations. Cavalry troops and squadrons conducted area security operations to protect settlers dispersed over wide areas of the frontier. Cavalry squadrons were combined-arms formations that contained intelligence collectors and cultural advisers (then called scouts) as well as maneuver forces and an organic indirect fires capability. This decentralized approach was necessary to ensure that these organizations possessed the tools they needed to bring security to the frontier. this is only partly true. Of all the frontier army commanders, only Nelson Miles regularly took artillery with him, and he was an infantry officer by trade (colonel of the 5th Infantry) and not a cavalryman. In truth, the cavalry commanders tended to dislike taking artillery (combined arms) as they felt it slowed them down. Units also tended to operate in an "either/or" configuration: using either infantry or cavalry as the main striking arms. When infantry accompanied a cavalry column they were usually used to provide security for the supply trains and not as a main striking force. Scouts played a role, but it was most prominent with George Crook and less so with other commanders (one being Ranald Mackenzie, arguably the most successful of the frontier army officers). The strategy of force dispersal was also forced on the army by events (a very small base force and a large number of garrisons required for what were often political reasons - much like today...;) ). It was not so much a conscious choice as something that was required by events.
This "historical correction" aside, I am glad to see some officers finally looking to the frontier army for some historical context and examples. I've been working on an article about army operations in Arizona between 1860 and 1870 that ties in with some of this, and have also done something in the past regarding the operations tempo of a frontier army regiment. A very interesting field once you get past the Custer fans and foes....:)
Tom Odom
10-25-2006, 03:41 PM
Among my pet rocks, the one most fondled is the issue of transformation and small units. I wrote a piece for Mil Review a couple of years ago; to get it published I had to sell it to the Mil Review editors as something truly related to transformation and therefore worthy.
Nagl and company address this issue and that is a good thing. Altjough I agree with Steve on the US Frontier Wars analogy; Nagl is an Armor officer so he would think Cavalry, not necessarily a bad thing. I still like the flexibilty and combat power we built into the ACRs.
But getting back to the issue of small units, the real issue is not simply numbers. It is experience. We have long equated small unit leadership with junior leadership, even as we add ever increasing loads on those same small units and their same junior leaders.
We have wasted the rank of Major for years and we need to change. Majors should command--at the company level.
For more see: Transformation: Victory Rests With Small Units (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/MayJun05/odom.pdf)
Best
tom
marct
10-25-2006, 04:01 PM
Tom and Steve,
I have a little bell going off in the back of my mind. Back in the Seven-Years war, if I remember correctly, weren't the American colonial units "combined arms"? Also, was the pre-Jefferson army based on a combined arms/legion model?
Marc
Steve Blair
10-25-2006, 04:13 PM
Yes, Marc. In the early days of the American Army it was organized as combined arms legions. This didn't last more than a few years before it was replaced. During the Seven-Years period there were some units that were sort of combined arms, but it was more typical to see them style themselves that way but in practice be light infantry.
And Tom, I tend to feel that the ACR in either its more current or (preferably) its Vietnam TOE would be outstanding for this type of warfare.
marct
10-25-2006, 04:35 PM
Yes, Marc. In the early days of the American Army it was organized as combined arms legions. This didn't last more than a few years before it was replaced. During the Seven-Years period there were some units that were sort of combined arms, but it was more typical to see them style themselves that way but in practice be light infantry.
Thanks, Steve. I sort of remembered that from reading one of my ancestors journals. Okay, that gives a career re-organization an historical basis that can be sold as a "return to traditional values".
To win the Long War, the Army must change its culture to one that demands and rewards adaptation. This cultural change will serve as the catalyst for a comprehensive redesign of doctrine, organizations, training, leader education, material development and soldier recruitment.
To win the Long War, the Army must develop a more adaptive organizational culture. To create such a culture, the Army must change its focus from a centralized, specialized focus on major conventional wars to a more decentralized and less specialized focus on full-spectrum operations. This shift in organizational culture cannot occur within existing organizations — indeed these organizations can be an impediment to change. The best way to change the organizational culture of the Army is to change the pathways for professional advancement within the officer corps. The Army will become more adaptive only when being adaptive offers the surest path to promotion.
The problem with this recomendation is how to actually get it implemented politically. A "return to traditional value" argument is one way to do that.
The proposal to abolish branch affiliations after the rank of Captain seems interesting, but I would have to question whether or not that would work without fairly extensive retraining. Also, I expect that there is no way it could be implemented without grandfathering everyone who holds higher rank so that they don't have to meet the new requirements <wry grin>.
In some ways, the proposal reminds me of Heinlein's organization of the Mobile Infantry in Starship Troopers. I wonder if that is where they got the idea from?
Marc
zenpundit
10-25-2006, 04:37 PM
I believe the Civil War saw a revival of "combined arms" units among the volunteers of certain northern States, early in the war.
Steve Blair
10-25-2006, 04:40 PM
I believe the Civil War saw a revival of "combined arms" units among the volunteers of certain northern States, early in the war.
It was also very popular in the South. Wade Hampton's Legion springs first to mind, but there were other examples as well. These efforts tended to die out within the first year of the conflict, as the issues of equipment and replacements came to dominate matters.
SWJED
10-25-2006, 05:01 PM
We have wasted the rank of Major for years and we need to change. Majors should command--at the company level.
I attended a 4GW PME at JFCOM on Monday - TX Hammes hit on this point several times during the panel discussions.
As has been pounded home many times on the SWC - experience combined with training and education is the key to success. When we throw in strategic compression and expect wonders from the strategic corporal (and all small unit leaders) we have to start looking at aging the force. TX talked about majors as company commanders and staff sergeants as squad leaders as a start. Of course simply aging the force is not the silver bullet - proper training, education and experience must go hand-in-hand.
Steve Blair
10-25-2006, 05:21 PM
Again, from the frontier army example, one way to age the force may be to allow people to remain in certain ranks/grades longer than we have previously. This has been touched on by some of the military personnel system reformers, and I really feel it deserves a second (and third) look. Shoving majors down to company command level creates expensive companies, but allowing a captain to remain at that rank and lead his company effectively for a few more years gives us the baseline experience without clogging the ranks with more "leaders." Again, to draw from the frontier army level, majors were often used as either fort commanders or as squadron/battalion commanders (at this time in our organizational history the squadron/battalion was an ad hoc unit containing from two to four companies depending on tactical need). They served a purpose, but didn't clog the smaller units.
Tom Odom
10-25-2006, 05:56 PM
Steve,
The issue with Majors goes beyond adding experience to companies. It also targets adding experience to the force. At present a junior captain who successfully commands a company say at the 5 year mark willl not command again if he does everything correct until another 10-13 years. That gap in troop leading for maneuver officers especially is critical for them, for the army as a whole, and for the companies who would have benefited. Expensive? Perhaps but the infantry has already become a most precious asset, one spread way too thin. And the model I look at puts captains at platoons and lieutenants at sections. In any case, in wars costing billions of dollars every month to sustain, wars being fought, won, or lost by small units, does it not make sense to strengthen those units?
best
Tom
Steve Blair
10-25-2006, 06:06 PM
Tom,
I think that we do need to strengthen our small units, but it also has the very strong potential to undermine the learning ability and authority of the NCOs in those units. Increasing the officer to NCO ratio just rings lots of bells with me, but that may be because I've been around the Air Force too long. What I see there, with heavy officer supervision, is a whole set of NCOs that may be good technicians, but have little in the way of leadership skill (on the average). Then when they hit E-7 or so they're expected to have leadership skills. I know I've mentioned this before on another thread, but I do worry about the effect shoving officers further down in the chain will have on our enlisted force.
marct
10-25-2006, 06:11 PM
Steve,
From what I understand, the air force is an anomaly as far as the officer - NCO relationship is concerned, at least that's what my brother in law says (22 years USAF, E8, ret'd). I doubt that, if you compared actual tasks, you would find that much similarity, and task definitions are the basis of career tracks.
Marc
Steve Blair
10-25-2006, 06:21 PM
Marc,
Yeah, I know the Air Force is something of an anomaly in this regard. But you do run into something of an organizational issue when you start over-supervising folks and then expect them to show leadership and initiative. To an extent I'm playing devil's advocate here, but I do view it as a real concern. I agree that we do under-use the rank of major now, but even after reading Tom's article I'm not totally convinced that shoving them down a command level is a complete answer to the problem.
I'm not knocking your ideas in the least, Tom, just raising a concern I have about the process and how it may impact other areas and levels of command.
marct
10-25-2006, 06:30 PM
Hi Steve,
Yeah, I know the Air Force is something of an anomaly in this regard. But you do run into something of an organizational issue when you start over-supervising folks and then expect them to show leadership and initiative.
Well, I can't disagree with the concern :). I think you can certainly mitigate some of the organizational problems with training and being very, very, clear on both leadership expectations from both officers and NCOs and on how people can gain those attitudes / skills. While micro-managers, like death and taxes, are always with us, it is certainly possible to structurally mitigate against them and, in this case, shift the individuals out of areas where they can do damage and into areas where their propensities will be useful.
To an extent I'm playing devil's advocate here, but I do view it as a real concern. I agree that we do under-use the rank of major now, but even after reading Tom's article I'm not totally convinced that shoving them down a command level is a complete answer to the problem.
I'm not knocking your ideas in the least, Tom, just raising a concern I have about the process and how it may impact other areas and levels of command.
I'm still trying to print it off but, on the whole, I think I like the idea IFF majors are also required to have a fair amount of cross-training. That's going back to the Nagl and Yingling article.
Marc
Tom Odom
10-25-2006, 07:05 PM
Steve,
The dynamic I advocate is parallel structural improvements in NCO ranks. It is not a question of over supervision. It is a question of experienced leadership that adds to the unit's collective experience. We suffer from a leader development model that keys on the individual; in consequence we develp very experienced leaders--who never (almost anyway) do the same job again. In contrast our units continually go through a cycle that brings in new leaders (officer and NCO). The unit learns and improves overtime and peaks at a certain stage--usually about the time the leadership starts preparing to move on. The cycle starts again. Unit stability efforts have helped somewhat but the cycle is still there.
We have compounded this cycle because we have altered the career paths of NCOs to where (unfortunately in my mind) the days of the platoon daddy with several years in that role is no more; they get 18 months or so and that's it. When you throw into that issue, the problems of NCO shortages--using fresh out of advanced training specialists as team leaders and even squad leaders we are back to the era of breaking the NCO corps.
But getting back to Nagl and ideas of adaptive leadership, the key to adaptive leadership is experience. You cannot train experience; you can train from experience. Adaptive leadership for inexperienced soldiers is a certain part smarts and a large part guessing. Adaptive leadership based on experience is infinitely preferable and certainly more survivable.
Much of our modeling of unit leadership requirements is industrial age thinking in that we structured our forces on a draftee military (or a huge influx of volunteers) and we expected largely to gain our experience the hard way by taking casualties. With certain exceptions (the airborne for one) infantry soldiers came from the pool of those without key skills.
We don't do that anymore; the very reason for the creation of the combat training center program was to gain our combat experience in training. It works but it still suffers from keeping the same model of leadership requirements that we had under the industrial age parameters.
We have to get past that---and current operations are driving us that way. There are limits to what you can train into a young soldier and expect him to retain. We hear the calls for language skills, cultural awareness, etc. None of those obviate the needs of tactical reality--like understanding how to best use an machine gun or operate an ever growing assortment of communications hardware and software.
Infantry soldiers are no longer "those not selected for something else." They and the other combat arms soldiers are the reason the Army and the Marines exist. if we are to truly achieve the concept of the "strategic corporal," we have to start reinforcing small unit leadership with greater experience levels.
Now I am gonna give my pet rock a rest
best
Tom
zenpundit
10-26-2006, 03:41 AM
SWJED wrote
"As has been pounded home many times on the SWC - experience combined with training and education is the key to success. When we throw in strategic compression and expect wonders from the strategic corporal (and all small unit leaders) we have to start looking at aging the force. TX talked about majors as company commanders and staff sergeants as squad leaders as a start. Of course simply aging the force is not the silver bullet - proper training, education and experience must go hand-in-hand."
Tom wote:
"But getting back to Nagl and ideas of adaptive leadership, the key to adaptive leadership is experience. You cannot train experience; you can train from experience. Adaptive leadership for inexperienced soldiers is a certain part smarts and a large part guessing. Adaptive leadership based on experience is infinitely preferable and certainly more survivable."
Well said. Now check this out:
From H-Diplo Listserv (http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0610&week=c&msg=D/ge25WUT7DaGQoJwKjgPg&user=&pw=)
"Forwarded From: "Herrera, Ricardo A Dr CSI"
<Ricardo.A.Herrera@us.army.mil>
CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT
Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors:
Implications for the U.S. Army
11-13 September, 2007
Fort Leavenworth Frontier Conference Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Organizers: The United States Army Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Combat Studies Institute will host
a symposium entitled "Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors:
Implications for the U.S. Army." The symposium will include
a mixture of guest speakers, panel sessions, and general
discussions.
This conference will explore the impact of conflict between
nations and non-state combatants within a historical context.
The conference will examine current issues, dilemmas, problems,
trends, and practices associated with conflict between
constituted nations and trans-national, religious, ethnic or
criminal groups.
Proposed Program: CSI will issue a Call for Papers in October
2006. While the symposium program is tentative and flexible,
CSI expects it to include the following panels and topics:
- Non-State Actors and their impact on strategic communications
and Information Operations.
- Law of War and Military Doctrine dealing with Non-State Actors.
- The military's role in conflict termination and securing the
political end state especially if one or more combatants is a
Non-State Actor (e.g. Hezbollah, IRA, FARC, FMLN, al Qaeda).
- The armed forces as part of the interagency process.
- Military operations with International Government Organizations
and Non-Governmental Organizations.
- Tactics of militaries and rogue organizations or Non-State
Actors on the battlefield.
- The military and cultural awareness.
- The role of technology in empowering and combating Non-State
Actors.
- Impact of Non-State Actors on Global economics and Non-State
Actors' financing.
For more information on the symposium, please contact CSI at
913-684-2139 or email: CSIconference07@leavenworth.army.mil
<mailto:CSIconference07@leavenworth.army.mil> .
Ricardo A. Herrera, Ph.D.
U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute
201 Sedgwick Ave
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027
O: (913) 684-2126
F: (913) 684-4861
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/INDEX.asp
<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/INDEX.asp>"
That might be a good place for SWC regulars to make their points.
marct
10-26-2006, 04:13 AM
That might be a good place for SWC regulars to make their points.
Is someone thinking of putting a panel together? If so, I would be interested in putting a paper together - maybe on "symbolic warfare".
Marc
selil
10-26-2006, 05:06 AM
- The role of technology in empowering and combating Non-State
Actors.
Would that be a place to publish a paper on high speed acquisition of data from items like cell phones, PDA’s, and computers in the field for intelligence analysis or to far out for the audience?
Rob Thornton
10-26-2006, 11:14 AM
I think one of the first things that would have to be addressed is the issue of resourcing. You either pay for the type of people you want up front (incentives or appeal), or you develop them (time, money, investment). To paraphrase a recent article by retired General Scales – this is a people business, and without good people you will not have a good military. This resourcing issue is exacerbated by competing requirements – we have both a mass based set of requirements in the Army, as well as an increasingly technical set of requirements (the range of attributes covers all of the leadership traits).
We are competing for the same types of leaders (in terms of realized or unrealized potential) as the profit based organizations which can afford to offer these people what they desire within the context of an 18-25 year old’s sense of what is important. Certainly we have an appeal, but when you add up incentives, which option do we think comes out ahead? Further, we often cannot afford, or choose not to afford providing the incentives at critical points in these leader’s lives where they make choices about staying or leaving (could be a branch, a service, an organization or the military). We all know Business covets the military leadership experience brings to the table, just look at the ranks of the contractors right now in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. We need to consider what made the difference in that Soldier/Airman/Marine’s decision to go, or stay; then we need to adjust to compensate.
If you look at the erosion of benefits that active duty service offers, it most often targets people. Consider who and when the erosion of benefits like family medical and dental care, DODs schools, Housing, and social services targets. It impacts the family of a soldier at a time when his loyalties are divided between taking care of his family (this is of course compounded when deployed) and serving his country. The family weight in his decision making process should not be under valued. Consider the skill set this man or woman has in the context of COIN – he is by virtue of having a family, somewhat more emotionally stable – he is probably slightly older and his cumulative experience is worthy. He is a combat multiplier in his unit by his ability to provide calm and wisdom – having a family builds patience and exposes you to problem sets outside the normal military experience, and by such infect/influence many others with the same qualities. Consider the value of this man or woman when considering the use of lethal force. This is just one example of how we either undervalue people skills in favor of hardware.
Resourcing the types of educational investment to build the leaders we want is critical to realizing the goal. While Knowledge Networks, Communities of Practice, and Distance Learning offer opportunities in experience transferal and education on the cheap, the context upon which they draw is limited to the personal ability to internalize it an apply it, therefore it should not be a substitute for small group instruction, but a supplement. So how do we resource pulling out leaders at all level and giving them the right tools to succeed? Granted a bigger pool to rotate is attractive and provides more flexibility, but it also means more resources required for education, recruiting, and retention. Given the people we want often have families that must be entered into the equation; this has a large price tag.
I realize that culturally we are much more comfortable with a MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) equation vs. the subjective human one, but if we do not resource the kind of people we know we need we will have to lower our expectations in reference to our capabilities. We have to balance our appetite for hardware with requirements for quality people we can recruit, train and retain. I’ve been on the Army’s cutting edge for technology for about 6 years (Stryker, FCS) and for the last 8 months I’ve been doing the advisory job here in Iraq. I can tell you, sophisticated equipment only bears good results when there are good people using it. Do we need to modernize, yes; but do we need everything on the buffet table right now? I see some great vehicles here in Mosul that would be perfect for COIN, it’d be great to replace every 1114/1116/LVL II 998 with the RGR Engineer vehicle. COTs is not necessarily a bad thing and relooking our hardware acquisition strategy to match our personnel one may not be a bad idea. Reevaluation of our genesis for hardware in the context of new alternatives and requirements for the 5-25 year mark seems militarily prudent in light of the strategic, operational and tactical consequences of not doing so.
Our strategy needs to be people centric with the goal to equip them with the best technology that meets their needs. Conversely, if we show a long term trend of taking care of people at the DOD level ( I mention it because I’m not sure it happens for most above the BN & BDE levels), then our reputation for doing so will spread. People want to belong to good organizations that they can both believe in and which believe in them. One of the things you learn early on is that it is not so much what you are doing that makes you happy, it’s the climate of the organization, and purpose or esprit de corps which accompanies it.
marct
10-26-2006, 12:43 PM
Would that be a place to publish a paper on high speed acquisition of data from items like cell phones, PDA’s, and computers in the field for intelligence analysis or to far out for the audience?
I don't know - it might be. There's also a stream on "Non State Actors and their impact on Strategic communications and Information Operations." and another on "The role of technology in empowering and combating Non-State Actors". Maybe one on integrating high speed data acquisition into combat units?
Marc
marct
10-26-2006, 01:23 PM
Hi Rob,
You've raised some very good issues that apply across a number of militaries.
I think one of the first things that would have to be addressed is the issue of resourcing. You either pay for the type of people you want up front (incentives or appeal), or you develop them (time, money, investment).
Paying up front does not, necessarily, have to be incentives based - at least in the sense of hiring bonuses, etc. ROTC programs are an example of an up front incentive which is universally available. The problem with many of the other types of up front incentives is a complex mixture of loyalty by those hired and resentment from those who didn't get them; at least that is the experience of most of the high tech industry. While internal development takes longer and, on paper, costs more, in the long run it is probably a much better solution.
We are competing for the same types of leaders (in terms of realized or unrealized potential) as the profit based organizations which can afford to offer these people what they desire within the context of an 18-25 year old’s sense of what is important.
TRue. I know of at least one person who graduated with a BA and, within 3 years, was making 3.1 million. But "important" is a very slippery term. In my experience teaching a lot of people in this age range, admittedly Canadians not Americans, many of them are searching for "meaning" and something they can commit to. This need for meaning isn't being met in the current Canadian university environment by the older systems which, in many cases, are getting viewed as increasingly irrelevant. That's probably why the Canadian Forces started their new recruitment campaign (http://www.forces.ca/v3/engraph/home/home.aspx?bhcp=1) (warning, it loads slowly).
....We need to consider what made the difference in that Soldier/Airman/Marine’s decision to go, or stay; then we need to adjust to compensate.
Very true. Surely there have been internal HR exit studies done, haven't there?
If you look at the erosion of benefits that active duty service offers, it most often targets people.... This is just one example of how we either undervalue people skills in favor of hardware.
I think that there are several issues running around here. Some have to do with forced promotions, i.e. an institutionalized Peter Principle. For example, my brother-in-law was given the choice of being promoted out of an area he loved working in and was really good at or leaving. He left. Others are directly related to benefits for family, while others may be more personal.
Resourcing the types of educational investment to build the leaders we want is critical to realizing the goal. While Knowledge Networks, Communities of Practice, and Distance Learning offer opportunities in experience transferal and education on the cheap, the context upon which they draw is limited to the personal ability to internalize it an apply it, therefore it should not be a substitute for small group instruction, but a supplement. So how do we resource pulling out leaders at all level and giving them the right tools to succeed? Granted a bigger pool to rotate is attractive and provides more flexibility, but it also means more resources required for education, recruiting, and retention. Given the people we want often have families that must be entered into the equation; this has a large price tag.
It's tricky, and its not a new problem by any means. Off the top of my head, I can't think of anything that would work immediately. I know that the Canadian Forces shifted part of their general social role towards disaster relief and SAR operations, and that is now part of the social expectation of the CF. I don't think that solution would be immediately possible for the US forces, even though the expertise is there as is the history.
The reason I'm bringing this up is that one good retention motivator is the feeling that "I am making a real difference". It's a very strong motivator for a lot of people. And as an added bonus once there is general social acceptance, the feeling is reinforced by having your own citizen thanks you for doing it while, at the same time, getting good organizational PR.
I realize that culturally we are much more comfortable with a MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) equation vs. the subjective human one, but if we do not resource the kind of people we know we need we will have to lower our expectations in reference to our capabilities.
I suspect that part of the problem is that the expectations are set by politicians, many of whom have never served in the forces and, as a result, have a totally skewed set of expectations. That is certainly the case in Canada.
Our strategy needs to be people centric with the goal to equip them with the best technology that meets their needs. Conversely, if we show a long term trend of taking care of people at the DOD level ( I mention it because I’m not sure it happens for most above the BN & BDE levels), then our reputation for doing so will spread. People want to belong to good organizations that they can both believe in and which believe in them. One of the things you learn early on is that it is not so much what you are doing that makes you happy, it’s the climate of the organization, and purpose or esprit de corps which accompanies it.
I totally agree with your overall strategy and with your comments on organizational support.
Marc
Steve Blair
10-26-2006, 01:42 PM
TRue. I know of at least one person who graduated with a BA and, within 3 years, was making 3.1 million. But "important" is a very slippery term. In my experience teaching a lot of people in this age range, admittedly Canadians not Americans, many of them are searching for "meaning" and something they can commit to. This need for meaning isn't being met in the current Canadian university environment by the older systems which, in many cases, are getting viewed as increasingly irrelevant. That's probably why the Canadian Forces started their new recruitment campaign (warning, it loads slowly).
I've seen studies, and my own experiences with our AFROTC cadets confirm this, that many American students in this age group are also searching for that elusive "meaning."
And as for private sector vs. military job comparisons, I think that people in the military lose sight of their benefits when compared to the "average" private sector worker at the same level. The NCOs in my area complain about their pay and benefits all the time, forgetting that they get a housing allowance (which private sector employers do not provide), bonus pay based on a number of factors, free household goods transportation and moving allowances (again, dream on about this in the average private sector job), decent guaranteed pay raises (which often do not happen in the private sector), and so on. They stopped complaining around me when I showed them that after a few years in the university system, at a fairly high grade, an E-4 who has just been promoted makes more than I do.
The other thing to consider is that most studies of Generation Y (or Millennials or whatever you want to call them) seem to indicate that they have no problem with changing jobs if they feel they've been slighted or disrespected in any way. But, oddly enough, they tend to rise and perform when challenged to do better than they have before. Retooling to match them could prove a very expensive and difficult undertaking.
Tom Odom
10-26-2006, 01:44 PM
I am already writing my proposal--started 2 days ago
best
Tom
SWJED wrote
Tom wote:
Well said. Now check this out:
From H-Diplo Listserv (http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0610&week=c&msg=D/ge25WUT7DaGQoJwKjgPg&user=&pw=)
That might be a good place for SWC regulars to make their points.
marct
10-26-2006, 02:05 PM
And as for private sector vs. military job comparisons, I think that people in the military lose sight of their benefits when compared to the "average" private sector worker at the same level.
That's a good point, and something that does need to be brought home. One of the things I have urged some of my clients to do is to consider putting in a person-centric HR "accounting" system which gives employees an idea of the "value added" they already have got and will get from their continued employment in the organization - compared with national level data. In the private sector, at least in Canada, an average hiring costs about $25k, so the cost savings can be quite significant.
The other thing to consider is that most studies of Generation Y (or Millennials or whatever you want to call them) seem to indicate that they have no problem with changing jobs if they feel they've been slighted or disrespected in any way. But, oddly enough, they tend to rise and perform when challenged to do better than they have before. Retooling to match them could prove a very expensive and difficult undertaking.
Honestly, I don't find the job shifting reaction surprising in any way. Then again, I've been studying it for a long time, and I lecture on it :). The "challenge" reaction is also not surprising to me - it actually goes together with the job shifting and the lack of any loyalty to organizations. I could, and have :), gone on for hours on this shift.
Would it be expensive to retool for this? Probably less expensive than you would think, at least in terms of cost. The biggest cost would be political changes.
Marc
marct
10-26-2006, 02:06 PM
I am already writing my proposal--started 2 days ago
best
Tom
Okay, so what's the topic and is it for a paper or a panel?
Marc
Tom Odom
10-26-2006, 02:29 PM
Paper will be on Rwanda/DR Congo and non-state actors.
No panel as yet; we could put a proposal on the table as the SWJ. I know the guys who are organizing this thing. One is actually doing a project on the DR Congo since 96 and yours truly will probably be a critical source.
Any thoughts from the "board"?
Tom
selil
10-26-2006, 02:30 PM
Resourcing the types of educational investment to build the leaders we want is critical to realizing the goal. While Knowledge Networks, Communities of Practice, and Distance Learning offer opportunities in experience transferal and education on the cheap, the context upon which they draw is limited to the personal ability to internalize it an apply it, therefore it should not be a substitute for small group instruction, but a supplement.
The structure of highly effective educational environments and creating effective learning environments has been solved. The very topics of study in effectively creating the transfer of expertise between individuals and through an organization was originally studying military strategy. Would the grand chess player make a good general? Were the techniques of one type of strategy able to be transferred as expertise to another strategy? Unfortunately the answer has always been maybe.
The keys of knowledge skills and abilities as educational objectives hinge on the key process of context. Context is built through learning objects that the student or learner can internalize and then recall in environments where appropriate. A computer text session can provide some of that context through the stories and sharing between entities in an organization, but often the deeper sense of presence is lacking and context is diluted by the non-transactional or asynchronous communications model.
For rapid transfer of context nothing can beat the smoking room. A bottle of whiskey, a thick cigar, and a few hours for old war horses to reminisce can provide context to a junior (learner) that is missing from most programmed instruction. The key is not necessarily mentorship, but the transfer of expertise in context. The lions of academia in the faculty break room accomplished this task, the aging law officers shared their experiences in the shift room, the O-club served the military in this way.
Unfortunately formalizing concepts like this will rarely succeed. As social constructs organization seem to fall into the trap of creating “executive suites”, “senior officer dining halls”, and the informal transfer (the one most likely to succeed) fail. Similarly providing formal mentorship programs are highly dependent on the specific individuals and organizational context can be lost.
selil
10-26-2006, 02:40 PM
The other thing to consider is that most studies of Generation Y (or Millennials or whatever you want to call them) seem to indicate that they have no problem with changing jobs if they feel they've been slighted or disrespected in any way. But, oddly enough, they tend to rise and perform when challenged to do better than they have before. Retooling to match them could prove a very expensive and difficult undertaking.
I was told that my students were arrogant, ignorant, hopeless, deadbeats.
So, I raised the bar. They complained mightily. Attendance got better.
So, I raised the bar again. They complained mightily. Attendance got near perfect.
The problem wasn't the students it was the inflexibility of the instructional methods being foisted on them.
I made the projects real. I integrated actual scientific/technology research into the curriculum. The students stepped up to the challenge.
The Generation that gave us the summer of love, Disco and Cocaine, a war on drugs and the decade of greed (80's), radical religious right bounded by polarized political process (90's), and denigrates the "Y us" generation as being lazy fools has engaged in simple ageism. The 20 year olds of today are the smartest, calmest, tolerant, media savvy generation ever.
marct
10-26-2006, 02:55 PM
Hi Selil,
On most of what you said, I agree. I will, however, beg to differ with you on your final point.
For rapid transfer of context nothing can beat the smoking room. A bottle of whiskey, a thick cigar, and a few hours for old war horses to reminisce can provide context to a junior (learner) that is missing from most programmed instruction....
Unfortunately formalizing concepts like this will rarely succeed. As social constructs organization seem to fall into the trap of creating “executive suites”, “senior officer dining halls”, and the informal transfer (the one most likely to succeed) fail. Similarly providing formal mentorship programs are highly dependent on the specific individuals and organizational context can be lost.
I certainly agree that this is the most effective way of transfering contextual knowledge. Where I would disagree with you is when you say "formalizing concepts like this will rarely succeed".
A highly formalized model of how to organize this type of knowledge transfer exists and has for quite a while. The problem with knowledge of the model is that it comes out of a rather obscure part of Anthropology and the core theoretical texts are written in a manner that would make any manager throw up her hands in disgust.
If you're interested, the model is the classic "Rites of Passage" model produced original by Van Gennep and modified by Victor Turner, Edward Bruner, Charlie Laughlin and some others. Operationally, the model tends to be poorly understood and misapplied outside of Symbolic Anthropology and, to a lessor extent, Performance Anthropology. The reason I disagree with you is that the model was built based on observations in the field of how many cultures actually formalized this type of knowledge transfer.
There are, however, several rather serious operational problem with the model - at least in terms of applying it in large organizations. First, the model relies quite heavily on the use of certain types of ritual structures that have been banned by law in most jurisdictions (it's not drugs, it's a form of psychological manipulation). Second, in order to do it properly, it is both time and person intensive.
Marc
zenpundit
10-26-2006, 03:01 PM
"The keys of knowledge skills and abilities as educational objectives hinge on the key process of context. Context is built through learning objects that the student or learner can internalize and then recall in environments where appropriate. A computer text session can provide some of that context through the stories and sharing between entities in an organization, but often the deeper sense of presence is lacking and context is diluted by the non-transactional or asynchronous communications model"
The perfect should not be the enemy of the good.
IT-based CoP's are a good sight better than not sharing knowledge except through direct instruction in a classroom or autonomous self-study.
selil
10-26-2006, 03:20 PM
If you're interested, the model is the classic "Rites of Passage" model produced original by Van Gennep and modified by Victor Turner, Edward Bruner, Charlie Laughlin and some others. Operationally, the model tends to be poorly understood and misapplied outside of Symbolic Anthropology and, to a lessor extent, Performance Anthropology. The reason I disagree with you is that the model was built based on observations in the field of how many cultures actually formalized this type of knowledge transfer.
You learn something new every day. :D
Thank you for adding to my reading list.
marct
10-26-2006, 03:51 PM
You learn something new every day. :D
Thank you for adding to my reading list.
No probs :).
Try The Ritual Process and The Forest of Symbols by Turner, Turner and Bruner's The Anthropology of Experience. For Charlie's work, check out http://www.biogeneticstructuralism.com/
Marc
marct
10-26-2006, 08:28 PM
Paper will be on Rwanda/DR Congo and non-state actors.
No panel as yet; we could put a proposal on the table as the SWJ. I know the guys who are organizing this thing. One is actually doing a project on the DR Congo since 96 and yours truly will probably be a critical source.
Any thoughts from the "board"?
Tom
How about
Cultural conflict in asymetric "battlefields"
Abstract: This panel offers a series of papers dealing with conflict between a variety of state and non-state actors in a plethora of differing "battlefields". While the specifics of each paper deal with a particular instance, Rwanda, the DR Congo, ____, the papers are unified with a concern for examining the new strategies and tactics of the Information Age.
Okay, pretty schtick, but it does cover a fair amount of the things we have been dealing with in various threads.
Marc
selil
10-27-2006, 02:34 AM
.....with a concern for examining the new strategies and tactics of the Information Age.
"information age", or "hyper-media age"....
ubiquity often seems to be the issue rather than information
marct
10-27-2006, 05:05 AM
"information age", or "hyper-media age"....
ubiquity often seems to be the issue rather than information
I could go with either one, although I have a partiality for "information age" - it is just so illiterative vs. the industrial age :).
In a lot of ways, I have adopted the Canadian Communications Theory tradition (Innis, Grant, McLuhan, etc.) way of analyzing material: oral cultures, written cultures and chip cultures. I find it to be a useful heristic, albeit somewhat limited,
One of the characteristics of the "information age" is super-saturation of information - to the point where information no longer informs the individual. This certainly seems appropriate when we consider current events...
Marc
Rob Thornton
10-27-2006, 06:06 AM
I guess overall what I'm concerned with is that the list of skill sets needed by almost every level of leader/soldier to face new enemies on new battlefields points to a significant increase education to help them become the experts we need them to be. These will compete with the many other things we need them to do which cover the gamut of individual, leader and collective tasks. However, the quality of recruit (officer or enlisted) is roughly the same as 6 years ago, he is drawn from basically the same segment of society for whatever reasons he traditionally has been. While POIs/Curricula have been changed to account for changes in the operating environment, and while threats have been prioritized at different levels – from training for a deployment 1 year out to the likelihood of threats outlined in the US National Security Strategy – there is still the issue of time to train/time to prepare in an OPTEMPO that creates rigorous demands on Force Providers.
Much has been said and written about the attributes we need in this era of enemies who seem to come and go as they please in alien cultures, hostile populations who have agendas and desires we can often not comprehend, and operating in environments where subtle hints can save your life and the lives of your men (or women). These skills are not cheap. You either pay to develop them during the deployment, you develop them beforehand, or better yet you have a culture where these skills are inculcated from inception and grown throughout. Somewhere in there you have to apply resources. It is easier if you start with the best talent. It is also easier if you have talent spread throughout the organization allowing for a kind of osmosis effect. Barring that, you have to dedicate the resources to build your own. The buzz phrase is “everyone a Pentathlete”. How many pentathletes do most of us know or have even met? I have personally known some guys that awed me in almost every regard that could either be classified pentathlete, or mutant. I can count them on two hands – they were all either senior E-8s (one was a fantastic E-7) on the enlisted side, or remarkable O5s and above on the officer side. Why is that? What does it take to build an Army of pentathletes? Figure out first what it takes to build one.
I want us to succeed in efforts to realize our vision of the type of leaders & soldiers we need, but I believe the expectations do not match the resources being applied to get us there. My own experience with education is that it does not really become tacit knowledge until I can apply it to future challenges and until I’ve had a chance to pullback and review it while not engaged in some other absorbing tasks with the added responsibilities brought on by leadership. That may be just me, but I think that the reason we’ve had such success with the military’s OES and NCOES is that at different times officers and NCOs would attend their schools, be with peers where they could share experiences that helped them negotiate a POI that prepared them for the next set of responsibilities they would take on with higher rank. Since we are general purpose force that covers the possibilities of HIC to COIN to disaster relief, the POI itself is diffused by virtue of the self imposed requirements to expose leaders to the challenges they will face. Yes we concentrate on providing the context which focuses on building leadership, but you can’t part completely with the specific technical requirements either – how long does it take to learn a language, gain an understanding of local economics, an understanding of agriculture, of local government, of the equipping and training of a foreign security force which mirrors their specific enemy, of dealing with inter-agency types that may not share your goals or drive to name a few? Pentahlete may be an inadequate descritpion.
Tom Odom
10-27-2006, 01:20 PM
Rob,
First of all it is great to see you posting, keep it up.
Second I agree with your thoughts and it is very much a reality: resources must match demands or the demands will not be fulfilled.
At the risk of being shot or branded a heretic, I believe that we have to make a fundamental shift in our approach to manning and training and that shift is not one that the military can do within itself.
It's called a draft. If we are fighting new enemies and we need a new approach, we must approach it in a long war model. We are not dong that. We are approaching it in a constant crisis management model; we hire contractors to provide inherently needed services in any war. We are cycling units faster than we can reset those units. And we are doing this in an atmosphere of magnetic ribbon patriotism that portrays trips to the mall as fighting terrorism.
We need a national service draft that does not necessarily draw forces strictly for military use. We need border security. We need our own reconstruction services for disasters. We need a system to draw young people into a sense of middle ground that leaves them with a viewpoint that goes beyond their own needs (seen now as rights versus right to pursue those needs).
For the military we need Soldiers that we can train, equip, and field without constraint for 2 years, meaning the draft needs to be for 3 years. It must be a draft that does not offer deferment or escape to those who qualify physically and mentally. I also believe that we should restructure officer accession so that all officers--whether ROTC, Academy, or OCS--should have that 3 years as an initial qualification, whether by draft or by volunteering.
The resources you cite should come from shifting from the model of drawing recruits through benefits to training and sustaining the NCO corps and the Officer corps under the philosophy of you retain Leaders through recognition, benefits, and opportunities to serve.
And even as I bother sayong all of this, I go back to my original point: this is not a shift the military can make on its own.
Best
Tom
Steve Blair
10-27-2006, 01:33 PM
When dealing with officer accessions, I also think some attention needs to be paid to how ROTC targets its people. Dealing with a student environment, and given some of the very diverse students (including MANY non-traditional students who bring valuable experience to the force), ROTC has the chance to get at a target audience other avenues may miss. But they hurt themselves by remaining heavily focused on engineers and technical majors to the exclusion of much else. It may also help the services to loosen up some of the programs that allow promising enlisted personnel to get out and go through ROTC with a wider variety of academic majors (currently ALL of our prior enlisted types at my detachment are engineering majors).
I tend to side with the views expressed by Douglas MacGregor regarding force structure and Donald Vandergriff about the personnel system and structure within the forces. A draft of the sort Tom mentions can help, but there must also be some fundamental changes in the way the military deals with the careers of its people. Up or out is a failure, and has been for years. The same goes for many of the individual replacement systems that have been tried. It's been my feeling for some time that we need to make changes at this most basic level before we should start spending tons of time and money on the tech stuff that tends to grab headlines and look good at trade shows.
slapout9
10-27-2006, 01:52 PM
Tom Odom, you response about a national service draft is an excellent idea, for the reasons mentioned that the US needs all types of skills for the War Without End. Not just military. I was getting worried about you for awhile, you go off and shoot at Bambi with a bow and arrow, then you have dreams about chatty Kathy dolls and then you found your pet rock???? Remember 3.2 beer machines they had in the barracks for awhile.
Tom Odom
10-27-2006, 02:46 PM
I was getting worried about you for awhile, you go off and shoot at Bambi with a bow and arrow, then you have dreams about chatty Kathy dolls and then you found your pet rock???? Remember 3.2 beer machines they had in the barracks for awhile.
You made me laugh with that one. Although I gave up the beer years ago, it may be the long term effects of mefloquine taken in Africa well beyond the 90-day recommendation. We use to call the day once a week we took our mefloquine, "dream days." We learned to consume those pills on a staggered schedule, let we all be flying through the night. Cerebral malaria was the very real alternative so I took my pills.
Actually I am a long term Hienlein fan since I read "Starship Troopers" as kid during the Vietnam War and the raging debates over service, draft, and war. I was sorely disappointed by the movie. Many consider him a neanderthal but he was on to something.
Best
Tom
PS Bambi survived but I am going again next week
marct
10-27-2006, 02:46 PM
Rob,
First of all it is great to see you posting, keep it up.
Let me definately second that sentiment :).
Second, I agree with your thoughts and it is very much a reality: resources must match demands or the demands will not be fulfilled.
At the risk of being shot or branded a heretic, I believe that we have to make a fundamental shift in our approach to manning and training and that shift is not one that the military can do within itself.
It's called a draft. If we are fighting new enemies and we need a new approach, we must approach it in a long war model. We are not dong that. We are approaching it in a constant crisis management model; we hire contractors to provide inherently needed services in any war. We are cycling units faster than we can reset those units. And we are doing this in an atmosphere of magnetic ribbon patriotism that portrays trips to the mall as fighting terrorism.
Tom, while I agree with your reasoning in laying out the needs, I really do have to disagree with you about the proposed "solution". Let me lay out some of the reasoning behind my disagreement.
The "draft" is politically divisive. When the rumours of President Bush thinking about a draft started circulating a while back, there was a lot of political fighting going on in reaction to them. Drafts are seen, quite rightly in my view, as forced labour. Historicallly, and by that I mean let's go back to the 1960's, the draft was full of holes - deferments, escape over the border to Canada (and why do WE have to deal with YOUR social reactionaries? :)), etc. Even if the legislation was enacted with no deferments, you would still have a leaking sieve over your northern border, and the people flowing over it would be the people who could afford to come and resettle. That will, IMHO, inevitably lead to increasing racial and ethnic tensions which, in turn, just makes the general US society more vulnerable and more cut off from your allies who either don't have a draft (e.g. Canada) or who have a long history of "national service" and view the US as acting out of desperation (i.e. most of the EU).
The draft will increase internal social conflict. Regardless of any legislation, the racial and ethnic tensions are already fairly high in the US over both the GWOT and the issue of "illegal aliens" (Damn those pesky Martians anyway, comin' here and stealing our jobs!).
The draft is insecure. Okay, supose you do get the legislation through. What is the psycho-social profile of most of the al-Qaida cell members? First or 2nd generation immigrants rediscovering their Islamic identities and living in Western countries. Great! So we now have a situation with heightened tensions and forced labour of young muslims in the US. Tell me you don't think that al-Qaida will see this as a fantastic opportunity to infiltrate! I know that if I was a planner on their side, it is one of the first things I would look at doing.
There is a final point I want to make about this that doesn't go well in a list (or PowerPoint <wry grin>).
Given the symbolic meaning of "The Draft" in the US, the current political concerns about the relationship between the various branches of government, and persistant whisperings about a re-establishment of an "Imperial Presidency", I suspect that the basic nature of US society would shift towards that of a "total society". The US doesn't really have that model as something that is defined as "Good", unlike Britain, Canada and most of Europe. It is, in fact, totally opposed to the spirit the led to the original rebellion of the 13 colonies. It is also the core area of conflict that led to your own civil war (the rights of the individual states vs. the rights of the central government) and has led to the creation of many of the militias today.
Most importantly, I think this would lead inevitably to questioning "why" people are fighting with most of the drafted troops coming to the conclusion that they are doing it because the have to or their own government will hunt them down. Didn't we see enough of that in Vietnam?
Now, I may be being unduly pessimistic about these projections, but I don't think so.
We need a national service draft that does not necessarily draw forces strictly for military use. We need border security. We need our own reconstruction services for disasters. We need a system to draw young people into a sense of middle ground that leaves them with a viewpoint that goes beyond their own needs (seen now as rights versus right to pursue those needs).
Again, I really don't disagree with your needs assessment, just your proposal to re-implement the draft. Let me toss out an alternative solution.
First of all, the military has traditionally been a way for kids to get out of poor backgrounds, get some education, learn some discipline and get some bucks together. Service with the Forces has a great number of "pull factors". What if, in place of a draft, you extend these pull factors? What if you were to create a program called "National Service" or some such, that encompassed all of the areas you are talking about in different streams? And, most importantly, where any service with combat forces may happen this is purely voluntary. Structure it so that there is a "basic training" which concentrates on physical fitness, basic educational skills (including history, Steve!) and basic teamwork followed by stream centered "basics".
Now, free education and experience can certainly help people get a job and will also make it more likely for employers to hire them, so that is one pull factor. Let's add in another one - "money". We have already heard a fair bit about school vouchers in the secondary school system, what if that was expanded into the post-secondary system using the same model as WWII? For each year of "national service" up to, say, a maximimum of four years, give the partcipants a voucher for one year of tuition and then require that that voucher be accepted. The universities would scream, but let them - they can still cherry pick based on SATs and other forms of entrance exams. Expand on this idea somewhat and modify it so that someone who doesn't want to go to university would get a government guarenteed loan to start up a small business, maybe at 10k/year, along with a program to help them start it up.
I suspect that some type of a program based on pull factors like this would be much more successful than the draft. It would also go a long way towards re-inforceing certain core values of American culture, as opposed to re-inforceing ones that are against American culture (e.g. hyper-centralization).
One final point and I'll leave it along. "Conscientious objectors" won't have a leg to stand on and a pull program will do a lot to make national service popular in the long run once people start graduating out of it, going to universities and running their own businesses. And besides that, it would mean that we in Canada don't have to deal with all those pesky American draft dodgers stealing our jobs <grin>.
Marc
marct
10-27-2006, 02:51 PM
Actually I am a long term Hienlein fan since I read "Starship Troopers" as kid during the Vietnam War and the raging debates over service, draft, and war. I was sorely disappointed by the movie. Many consider him a neanderthal but he was on to something.
Definately! Personally, if I ever teach a course in ethics, I am making Startship Troopers, the book not that abortion of a movie, required reading. As a side note, I always loved H&MP and I base some of my courses on it.
PS Bambi survived but I am going again next week
Good! There are too many of those pesky critters running around eating gardens and causing car accidents:).
Marc
marct
10-27-2006, 03:06 PM
BTW, the issue of the US dumping their "undesireables" in Canada is rather a hot button one right now for us.
Exiled U.S. sex offender arrested at border
Last Updated: Thursday, October 26, 2006 | 9:59 PM ET
CBC News
An American teacher exiled to Canada after he was convicted of sexually assaulting a student was arrested by Canadian border guards on Thursday.
More... (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/toronto/story/2006/10/26/sex-offender.html)
Marc
Rob Thornton
10-27-2006, 03:23 PM
Tom,
Here is one my boss and I were bantering back and forth. Is the concept of "Inter-Agency" cooperation soley a military buy in, or does it go both ways? He sent me an article out of the Foreign Affairs Journal that caused me to look hard at this question. In that "90 & 180 day objectives" document I sent you I brought up that regardless of how good ISF gets, without some reconstruction funds to get projects going, the Iraqi public will not establish faith in local government; no faith in local government = en environment in which insurgents can support.
We've heard about the PRTs (Proincial Reconstruction Teams), what we need are CRTs (City Reconstruction teams). Teams that like you had mentioned could be drawn from American Society to function within the role of their acknowledged profession. Doctors, lawyers, Small Buisness gurus, telecommunications specialists, power plant engineers, agricultural engineers, city planners, family planners, firemen, hazordous waste guys,etc. - all the skills that cities have come to rely on to keep a city functioning. Everybody has heard about the National Guard guys who are often more valuable fulfilling their civilian role here then their MOS (they do a good job at both), so why have we not asked the question why?
We need practical experience in these roles, not just well educated OGA (Other Govt. Agency) types. Their would have to be unity of command, and with that would come the provision of personal security. But lets say that at a certain watermark in the transition of security, host nation security forces took up the role securing their AOR (which of course is the plan), and the auxillary role CF (Coalition Forces) took on was the facillitation of reconstruction?
I'll stay away from formng a concrete oppinion about a military draft question because I don't have a resonable comparrison (my PEBD was 85), but I do recall the horror stories of armed FODs going into the barracks, but that may have been more the result of a social/cultural problem associated with the times. However an offer to forego paying back massive student loans and some incentives along the lines of a GI Bill, or other like ideas might get us the kind of professionals we would need for Reconstruction Teams - maybe even offer their kids a free state school 4 year scholarship and offer them & their families Active duty Healthcare benefits, PX, Commissary priviliedges while serving - oh and pay them at the same professional rate you'd pay military doctors, lawyers, etc.
In staying with the theme of the thread, its a new era in warfare with new enemies, and we need to adapt faster then the enemy
Best Regards, Rob
slapout9
10-27-2006, 03:24 PM
Tom, I read Starship troopers to. It is a great book. I agree forget the movie, but the uniforms were pretty neat. Citizenship should be earned not just granted based upon some accident of biology and geography. As for Bambi maybe take a rifle just in case??
Marc, I didn't know sex offenders were considered criminals in Canada.(bad joke)
marct
10-27-2006, 03:37 PM
Marc, I didn't know sex offenders were considered criminals in Canada.(bad joke)
Only when they come from the US :D Actually, his case is a rather anomolous one under Canadian law. Technically, our age of consent is 14 unless their is a relationship of institutional power (e.g. teacher-student) in which case it's 18. From my understanding, the girl was 15, but he was also her teacher.
Actually, what most of us are really getting peeved about is having Canada viewed as a dumping ground <wry grin>. Hey, we're only now getting rid of te last crop of Marxist profs you guys sent us during the Vietnam War :eek:
Marc
Rob Thornton
10-27-2006, 03:46 PM
Marc, I posted my reply to Tom without reading yours - but the lesson of the contractors is clear where there is some type of worthwhile incentive, people will sign up. Debt reduction in the "now", or long term (I have 4 kids) would be a powerful tool in getting me to volunteer a year of my time - particularly if in that year my hardship was the equivalent to a bad vacation, and one in which I felt I had contributed to something other then my self.
For some humor on a serious subject - We need a name for this service corps of debter/do gooders, any suggestions? "Corps of Engineers" is taken, "America Corps" was already proposed and sounds imperial, the "Selfless Service" is too altruistic, and "Team America" is copyrighted.
How about (seriously) the "Global Service Corps", sponsored by the US, open to CF partners (could offer oppotunities for citizenship - if you are willing to serve then in my book you stand to make a good American (or Canadian)). It does not sound completely unilateral, but we need to consider keeping it out of the UN resource arena - it may commit us to use of force where we prefer not to.
Regards, Rob
selil
10-27-2006, 03:55 PM
How many who aren't serving in the military would return willingly if recalled?
I have an interesting family history along my dads line. My grandfather fought in the Spanish American War and World War 1. One of my Uncles was I believe was drafted and served in Korea and later in Vietnam, and my father (born when my grand dad was 62!) was drafted early (1961-62) into Vietnam.
My uncle was a conscientious objector and did three tours (two in Korea and one I think in Vietnam) as a medic. My uncle describes those years as the most rewarding of his life. My father was an “advisor” training people in the mountains how to generate electricity. When they get together they rarely talk about serving, but when they do they refer to their time in the “peace corps”.
Military service was imposed on them as a duty to be accomplished at peril of their lives and liberty. The rewards in their service so closely related yet so substantially different did not drive a rejection of the political process, but rewarded them with a deep and substantial sense of patriotism.
The fear and loathing of a draft may be an expression of the loathing an entire generation of baby-boomers expresses as contempt for the bounty they’ve received. In that shadow of a morally depleted generation are gen-x, and gen-y who have already expressed a willingness to solve problems versus create new ones. Gen-x and gen-y denigrated and attacked as worthless slackers have to be problem solvers as they’ve been the bed rock holding up the baby boomers for years. If the solution to the problems of global terrorism threats requires a draft then express the solution with proof of the problem.
I asked who would serve given the chance. The fact is that I think most with prior service would willingly jump into the breach and the reticence in servitude is not with those who have served (us?), or those who would serve (gen-x, gen-y), but likely in the realm of those who attempt to lead. Where is the quote of the American general who said “We are at war, and America is at the Mall”. The culture of fear imbibed and pandered by civilian leadership is without sustenance and soon becomes stale. There is an entire generation who is the most educated fearsomely independent and collectively generous group in history. They are all entering or in their 20’s.
It seems that making a case for war in secret hearings holding that case to be a state secret and then expecting a democracy to step into line with whole hearted support would be a major error in strategy. Reasoned discourse while educating the public on the course of war has to become a priority engendering realistic expectations rather than a fearful boogeyman. The answer to the General is everybody went to the mall because the President told us to.
Gen-x and gen-y would tell you “Mall? Try Amazon or E-Bay”. Who’s truly out of touch with beating heart of society?
marct
10-27-2006, 04:00 PM
Hi Rob,
Marc, I posted my reply to Tom without reading yours - but the lesson of the contractors is clear where there is some type of worthwhile incentive, people will sign up. Debt reduction in the "now", or long term (I have 4 kids) would be a powerful tool in getting me to volunteer a year of my time - particularly if in that year my hardship was the equivalent to a bad vacation, and one in which I felt I had contributed to something other then my self.
I really think that pull factors work better, and debt reduction, now or in the future, would be a good one, especially for civilians. That post I made was really aimed at explaining why I thought a draft would be a very bad idea and I wasn't thinking about immediate needs per se. Hmmm, maybe tied in with the idea of a sabbatical from a business where the business gets to double write off the salary?
For some humor on a serious subject - We need a name for this service corps of debter/do gooders, any suggestions? "Corps of Engineers" is taken, "America Corps" was already proposed and sounds imperial, the "Selfless Service" is too altruistic, and "Team America" is copyrighted.
LOLOL. How about "The Peace Through Superior Firepower Corps" ;)
How about (seriously) the "Global Service Corps", sponsored by the US, open to CF partners (could offer oppotunities for citizenship - if you are willing to serve then in my book you stand to make a good American (or Canadian)). It does not sound completely unilateral, but we need to consider keeping it out of the UN resource arena - it may commit us to use of force where we prefer not to.
Regards, Rob
I certainly agree with keeping any of the operations out of the hands of the UN - their record is not very encouraging <wry grin>.
How about basing a general/international level organziation out of NATO / SEATO with individual ones from every member if they choose to do so? If it was kept fairly lean at the international level and emphasized individual national buy-in to specific projects as well as the ability of individuals to buy into a project not supported by their national government, this would probably work.
Marc
marct
10-27-2006, 04:30 PM
I asked who would serve given the chance. The fact is that I think most with prior service would willingly jump into the breach and the reticence in servitude is not with those who have served (us?), or those who would serve (gen-x, gen-y), but likely in the realm of those who attempt to lead. Where is the quote of the American general who said “We are at war, and America is at the Mall”. The culture of fear imbibed and pandered by civilian leadership is without sustenance and soon becomes stale. There is an entire generation who is the most educated fearsomely independent and collectively generous group in history. They are all entering or in their 20’s.
I really think this is a key point and it mirrors some of the discussions I have been having with my wife - a self-styled "Northern Yankee Democrat" from Princeton. In a lot of ways, it comes down to a question of "why are we fighting", and your comment about "those who attempt to lead" is telling. Much as I dislike referencing him, I think that Jurgen Habermas' idea of a "legitimation crisis" is really playing out now in the US over leadership issues and the "moral stature" of those who govern. I know that this is also happening in Canada, but the politics are sufficiently different that it doesn't have the same impact of moral bankrupcy.
I want to comment on your "culture of fear" remark, because I think it is another crucial point you raise. You are absolutely right about it "becoming stale". At the risk of sounding very weird, I would argue that such a form of cultural manipulation on the part of self serving politicians (and academics <sigh>), is a spiritual abyss that destroys the soul of individuals by teaching them to hate both the "Other" and themselves.
It seems that making a case for war in secret hearings holding that case to be a state secret and then expecting a democracy to step into line with whole hearted support would be a major error in strategy.
Oh the sarcasm! The dry wit! I love it!!!!! :D
On a (slightly) more serous note, when does the Whte House get renamed as The Court of Saint James?
On a (definately) more serious note, democracies, regardless of their form, rely on the consent and support of the governed in a trust relationship and, when that trust relationship is breached, the entire basis of social legitimacy disappears. If you detect a slight Burkian strand of thought in my comments, I'm not surprised :).
Reasoned discourse while educating the public on the course of war has to become a priority engendering realistic expectations rather than a fearful boogeyman. The answer to the General is everybody went to the mall because the President told us to.
I am reminded of a quote, can't remember where I heard it, about a Russian taxi driver in Moscow saying "Democracy is wonderful! As soon as we get a President to tell us what to do, we will have it down pat" (or something like that). Selil, I think you are right in your answer to the General, but what does that say about the role of the President and the responsabilities of individual citizens?
Gen-x and gen-y would tell you “Mall? Try Amazon or E-Bay”. Who’s truly out of touch with beating heart of society?
LOLOL. And the small wars village commons is here.... :).
Honestly, no democracy can survive, except as a shell, without its citizens having to bear the responsabilities of being citizens as well as enjoying the rights of being citizens.
Marc
James Greer
10-27-2006, 06:16 PM
The other reason for extending time in grade/service is to provide time for the additional education and developmental experiences required by 21st Century complex warfare. If we want our military to have experience with other USG Agencies or Alliances to experience the rest of the DIME or if we want strong, resident masters Degrees in International Relations, Economics, Social Sciences that takes a couple of extra years not currently provided for in a career with many tactical, military gates.
Tom Odom
10-27-2006, 07:00 PM
Tom,
Here is one my boss and I were bantering back and forth. Is the concept of "Inter-Agency" cooperation soley a military buy in, or does it go both ways? He sent me an article out of the Foreign Affairs Journal that caused me to look hard at this question. In that "90 & 180 day objectives" document I sent you I brought up that regardless of how good ISF gets, without some reconstruction funds to get projects going, the Iraqi public will not establish faith in local government; no faith in local government = en environment in which insurgents can support.
We've heard about the PRTs (Proincial Reconstruction Teams), what we need are CRTs (City Reconstruction teams). Teams that like you had mentioned could be drawn from American Society to function within the role of their acknowledged profession. Doctors, lawyers, Small Buisness gurus, telecommunications specialists, power plant engineers, agricultural engineers, city planners, family planners, firemen, hazordous waste guys,etc. - all the skills that cities have come to rely on to keep a city functioning. Everybody has heard about the National Guard guys who are often more valuable fulfilling their civilian role here then their MOS (they do a good job at both), so why have we not asked the question why?
We need practical experience in these roles, not just well educated OGA (Other Govt. Agency) types. Their would have to be unity of command, and with that would come the provision of personal security. But lets say that at a certain watermark in the transition of security, host nation security forces took up the role securing their AOR (which of course is the plan), and the auxillary role CF (Coalition Forces) took on was the facillitation of reconstruction?
I'll stay away from formng a concrete oppinion about a military draft question because I don't have a resonable comparrison (my PEBD was 85), but I do recall the horror stories of armed FODs going into the barracks, but that may have been more the result of a social/cultural problem associated with the times. However an offer to forego paying back massive student loans and some incentives along the lines of a GI Bill, or other like ideas might get us the kind of professionals we would need for Reconstruction Teams - maybe even offer their kids a free state school 4 year scholarship and offer them & their families Active duty Healthcare benefits, PX, Commissary priviliedges while serving - oh and pay them at the same professional rate you'd pay military doctors, lawyers, etc.
In staying with the theme of the thread, its a new era in warfare with new enemies, and we need to adapt faster then the enemy
Best Regards, Rob
Rob,
Critical issue one addressed in an opinion piece somewhat disguised as a news report by Austin Bay, a retired colonel, recounting lunch with the SecDef, on the need to realign the Nat Sec Structure to achieve "Unified Action, " yesterday on the Early Bird under the title "...With Forecasts" in the Wash Times.
I saw what I would call somewhat "Unified Action" in the USG reaction to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The senior leaders "played well" together and the agencies fell in behind them. On the intel side, we had some knife fights but by and large it was a semi-unified effort.
At the pointy end of things in 2 very different embassies, I saw one case of complete and utter chaos and one of true unified action through a country team that worked very well together--so much so that we were altering viewpoints and affecting decisions in Washington. The first was in Zaire and it was a charlie foxtrot which began when the Charge (since we had no ambassador) announced he thought the refugee crisis in July 94 would be over in a couple of weeks. He refused to go to Goma until State ordered him to when the USAID Administrator announced he was coming out. When airlift started to flow, the same guy wanted a by name list of everyone coming so he could decide who would get country clearances; I had to threaten to call the Joint Staff and relay his demand before he backed off. He never got any better and OGA (aside from AID) didn't either.
In contrast, Kigali worked well. DoD mobilized. The NSC mobilized. State mobilized. AID was superb; we had the AID chief of staff with us for months at a time. The effort was truly extraordinary: Rwanda and the Balkans were the 2 standing items of interest in the NSC and the White House--driven of course by a need to recoup much face lost in the USG's stance during the genocide.
The other reason for extending time in grade/service is to provide time for the additional education and developmental experiences required by 21st Century complex warfare. If we want our military to have experience with other USG Agencies or Alliances to experience the rest of the DIME or if we want strong, resident masters Degrees in International Relations, Economics, Social Sciences that takes a couple of extra years not currently provided for in a career with many tactical, military gates
As Jim Greer states above looking at US military culture we have to train ourselves in working across agency boundaries; we have to do the same thing on the State, AID, and other agency basis. The challenge we have is overcoming the cultures inside those agencies--as does the culture inside the military--must be changed. AID actually has the least distance to travel in making such changes. The get it done make it happen culture inside the military exists in AID. Getting such cultures to mesh in PRTs is made more difficult when they form on the fly. OFDA and its Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) are semi-permament teams that form according to need like we form JTFs. I believe we need standing JTFs or at least ready JTFs that form, execrise, and stand down all the while remaining on call. I believe also that we need to increase the JIIM aspects of such JTFs and start forcing other agencies to play with us.
Best
Tom
Rob Thornton
10-27-2006, 07:47 PM
Tom,
I had a buddy that did an internship with FedEx, do we do that with OGAs? Could we get them to do it with us? Could logisitican do a year with USAID, or an IO guy with USIS? How about and Infantryman with FBI? Lets say a CPT gets himself BQ'd then instead of going to a CTC - he goes to do a 6 month course for the OGA, then a 2 1/2 year tour with the OGA? Now lets turn the tables and bring the other guy in to our midsts. Would an FBI guy be useful in COIN - you betcha (We've had to create our own wire diagrams on AIF from scratch - what I would not give to have such a resource on the team. Could a USAID guy work at a CTC, deploy on a MEU, work with a transport wing? DOD was pushing hard to break down the barriers and turn us purple - I think we are making significant progress in those areas, but that was brought about in the light of pre-9/11 requirements. Its still valid and still a need, but post 9/11 has brought the same need with OGAs/DoD.
While I'm aware that OGA types sometimes attend the War College, I don't know if they attend something like ILE (maybe I'll find out in Sept 07), and I know they don't attend the CPT's Career Courses. In fact I could not tell you what their professional education system looks like outside of attending a university. What if instead of sending a guy to a CPTs career course or ILE, he went to Georgetown? The reason I bring it up is because its a reource thing - there is only so much time, and while time off for advance degrees is great, there simply is no way everyone can get there given OPTEMPO early enough in their career where it changes their cultural bias (I think its very subtle sometimes, but a natural inclination).
So I guess there are at least two ways to get new DNA into the genetic pool - add to it, or trade it out. Maybe the right answer is a combination of both, mutts are generally more healthy anyway.
Rob Thornton
10-28-2006, 07:58 AM
Tom,
I had a buddy that did an internship with FedEx, do we do that with OGAs? Could we get them to do it with us? Could logisitican do a year with USAID, or an IO guy with USIS? How about and Infantryman with FBI? Lets say a CPT gets himself BQ'd then instead of going to a CTC - he goes to do a 6 month course for the OGA, then a 2 1/2 year tour with the OGA? Now lets turn the tables and bring the other guy in to our midsts. Would an FBI guy be useful in COIN - you betcha (We've had to create our own wire diagrams on AIF from scratch - what I would not give to have such a resource on the team. Could a USAID guy work at a CTC, deploy on a MEU, work with a transport wing? DOD was pushing hard to break down the barriers and turn us purple - I think we are making significant progress in those areas, but that was brought about in the light of pre-9/11 requirements. Its still valid and still a need, but post 9/11 has brought the same need with OGAs/DoD.
While I'm aware that OGA types sometimes attend the War College, I don't know if they attend something like ILE (maybe I'll find out in Sept 07), and I know they don't attend the CPT's Career Courses. In fact I could not tell you what their professional education system looks like outside of attending a university. What if instead of sending a guy to a CPTs career course or ILE, he went to Georgetown? The reason I bring it up is because its a reource thing - there is only so much time, and while time off for advance degrees is great, there simply is no way everyone can get there given OPTEMPO early enough in their career where it changes their cultural bias (I think its very subtle sometimes, but a natural inclination).
So I guess there are at least two ways to get new DNA into the genetic pool - add to it, or trade it out. Maybe the right answer is a combination of both, mutts are generally more healthy anyway.
Tom, I found that article on the Earlybird. Bay makes a srong point, which leads me to ponder, if we are aware of, what can/will be done? Below is an excerpt form the article which originally appeared in the OCT 27 Edition of the Washington Times, pg 17 by Austin Bay entitled "With Forecasts"
"I know, that's quite a claim, which is why I need to translate the military-speak: Unified Action means coordinating and synchronizing every "tool of power" America has to achieve a political end -- like winning a global war for national survival against terrorists who hijack economically and politically fragile nations and provinces.
People understand the role of soldiers and cops in a war, but in 21st century wars where economic and political development are determinative, an Agriculture Department arborist and a Commerce Department trade consultant can be a powerful contributors to "Unified Action."
Restoring Iraqi agriculture provides an example. Saddam Hussein's economic and political policies damaged agriculture in the land that eight millennia ago spawned the Agricultural Revolution. (Heck of an achievement, huh?) Agriculture, Commerce and several NGOs have expertise and programs that help revive Iraqi farms. Still, problems occur when trying to tailor programs to meet specific local needs -- like, who pays for the program and is ultimately in charge of oversight and coordination.
While serving in Iraq in 2004, I met a young U.S. Army captain who was running a successful small-scale date palm restoration project. What we really need are joint development and security teams, where agricultural and economic specialists work with that captain "in the field" on a sustained, day-to-day basis. We need to decide who is in charge of that team (the captain or the arborist?) and how we fund it.
Our system for "Unified Action" is still largely a Cold War, 20th-century relic designed to prop up governments (so often corrupt and ill-led), instead of helping individuals and neighborhoods become economically self-sustaining and self-securing. Winning war in the Age of the Internet means improving neighborhoods and individual lives. The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner and micro-finance whiz Muhammad Yunus understands this.
We are in a long, global war, where economic and political development programs must reinforce security and intelligence operations -- and vice versa.
We've been improvising "joint development and security operations," and we've learned from our improvisation (Mr. Rumsfeld's "we're better than we were").
But it's time to quit improvising. Effective "Unified Action" requires re-engineering 20th-century Beltway bureaucracies -- which means thoughtful, sophisticated cooperation between the executive branch and Congress.
That means getting past the sensational gossip and confronting an essential issue.
Austin Bay is a nationally syndicated columnist."
Rob Thornton
10-29-2006, 04:53 PM
Just a follow up, but what about an Officer Training Program aimed at producing foreign service types? They go to a Basic Camp, and an Advance Camp, get a huge scholarship, and pay it back by doing 4 years Active and 4 years IRR in the Foreign Service?
marct
10-29-2006, 04:56 PM
Just a follow up, but what about an Officer Training Program aimed at producing foreign service types? They go to a Basic Camp, and an Advance Camp, get a huge scholarship, and pay it back by doing 4 years Active and 4 years IRR in the Foreign Service?
That would certainly make sense - it could also be adapted to almost any skill set and aimed at any organization.
Marc
Steve Blair
10-30-2006, 02:46 PM
Just a follow up, but what about an Officer Training Program aimed at producing foreign service types? They go to a Basic Camp, and an Advance Camp, get a huge scholarship, and pay it back by doing 4 years Active and 4 years IRR in the Foreign Service?
You could easily tool ROTC this way, since there are already ways it interfaces with what are considered the more professional degrees (legal and medical).
Tom Odom
10-31-2006, 02:02 PM
Although I agree that a ROTC approach to the Foreign Service would have benefits, I will say that barring a fundamental shift (akin to California opening new waterfront properties adjacent to Ft Irwin after the rest falls into the sea) in the way the Foreign Service approaches life. It remains in its heart an organization founded on Ivy league elitism and it maintains a caste system that would make sense in old school S Africa or India.
Sec State Rice and the former Sec State GEN Powell have attempted to change this; that the Embassy in Baghdad is a rotating door for short termers tells me they have not succeeded.
We are going through the transformation of Civil Service. A larger goal and one easier to manage due to its lesser size should have been creating a National Security Corps that draws all foreign relations oriented organizations into a central being, like we were supposed to have done with Homeland Security.
best
Tom
Steve Blair
10-31-2006, 02:15 PM
What I would like to see ROTC do is shift away from its heavy emphasis on technical majors and move more into a dynamic form of officer entry.
Currently there are SOME language-type programs available for our cadets, either in the form of advanced language training or cultural immersion (basically a semester or two spent overseas). However, there is no direct link between this system and the university's relations with overseas universities (the school I work for has exchange programs with universities in a number of places, including Egypt and Morocco;) ). What ROTC COULD be used for is to draw in more people with a liberal arts background (anthro and history, to name two examples) and then allow them (in fact encourage them) to take a semester or two overseas (through the university's exchange program). This would give them a leg up in terms of real skills and cultural exposure when they go on active duty. Currently ROTC does not really tolerate time "away from the unit," which prevents us from making the best use of our students and the programs that are available for them.
Models for this do exist to a degree. The Navy, for example, spends a great deal more time and money on their ROTC cadets than the Air Force or the Army. Almost every summer they are in the program, Navy cadets are taking part in some sort of cruise or duty exposure, some of which does take them overseas.
ROTC also has the advantage of being able to bring in students who are older than those allowed into the academies. We really should look at this program as a way to bring more mature, balanced officers into the service and to take full advantage of the study programs offered by the various universities.
marct
10-31-2006, 02:22 PM
Hi Tom,
Although I agree that a ROTC approach to the Foreign Service would have benefits, I will say that barring a fundamental shift (akin to California opening new waterfront properties adjacent to Ft Irwin after the rest falls into the sea) in the way the Foreign Service approaches life. It remains in its heart an organization founded on Ivy league elitism and it maintains a caste system that would make sense in old school S Africa or India.
I have a suspicion that the closest paralel for the current US Foreign Service lies in the Byzantine Empire of the 11th century. The same is probably true of the Canadian civil service as well. Hmmm, maybe that's why Byzantine history isn't really taught in North America... :rolleyes:
We are going through the transformation of Civil Service. A larger goal and one easier to manage due to its lesser size should have been creating a National Security Corps that draws all foreign relations oriented organizations into a central being, like we were supposed to have done with Homeland Security.
Maybe I'm being cynical, Tom, but from what I have seen, creating "super-bureaucracies" merely expands bureaucratic empires while reducing the efficiency of individual units operating within them and making them less accountable to the supposed "rulers" of their society (doesn't seem to matter if they are "the People" or an absolute monarch). Consider, by way of an historical example, the ratio of Colonial Office bureacrats in the UK to the population they supposedly "govern" and look at how it has changed since 1850.
I have often thought that it would be a great idea to adapt Roman engineering quality control traditions to bureacratic initiatives...:cool:
Marc
marct
10-31-2006, 02:37 PM
What I would like to see ROTC do is shift away from its heavy emphasis on technical majors and move more into a dynamic form of officer entry.
....What ROTC COULD be used for is to draw in more people with a liberal arts background (anthro and history, to name two examples) and then allow them (in fact encourage them) to take a semester or two overseas (through the university's exchange program). This would give them a leg up in terms of real skills and cultural exposure when they go on active duty.
That would certainly be a help, Steve. A lot of this goes back to career path rewards, so it would also be useful to consider cross-departmental placements as well. For example, someone who is on an MP/CID career path could be cross-placed into the FBI for a year, or someone who would be commanding a foreign deployable company could be sent to work for State for a year.
Even if it wasn't done after graduation, having a summer internship placing a cadet with different groups could be useful.
ROTC also has the advantage of being able to bring in students who are older than those allowed into the academies. We really should look at this program as a way to bring more mature, balanced officers into the service and to take full advantage of the study programs offered by the various universities.
Sometime in the late '80 or early '90's, McMaster University in Hamilton Ontario totally changed their entrance requirements to their medical school. They were less concerned with "traditional" academic markers and more with individuals perceptions and life experience. They revamped their entire medical program and their application process and ended up with a lot of "intentional healers" - people who really wanted to be doctors and had the ability but, for one reason or another, never made it through the "traditional" selection methods (usually funding). Think of it as an intensive OCS for civilian mustangs (if that isn't a contradiction in terms). The McMaster model may well be worth looking at.
Marc
Rob Thornton
10-31-2006, 03:18 PM
Our problem is not limited to questions of potential resources, but extends to the inability to identify requirements for a mission set, and in the greater sense requirements for a long term strategy. In this thread we have identified the critical need for FS types who can partner with the military in the exectuion of a strategy designed to meet the emerging (and recently identified) needs of GWOT. We recognized in the last QDR that this slice of the pie was the most likely, and that it will be with us for the long term.
Resourcing:
We have Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines leaving Active duty for various reasons. The Navy and Air Force have recently partnered with the Army for the Blue to Green program which offers military members a chance to latterally X-fer vs. total seperation (many will seperate howver). We have 20 year mark members retiring for various reasons. We have members who just decided to leave after their inital obligation is expired. These people are potential resources, that could help increase the numbers of FS types.
However, it goes back to incentives (such as waiving some requirements in lieu of other qualities, entry level positions, opportunities unavailable in their military job, etc.), and it requires a plan to market, identify, recruit and train those who would transition. Having spent a few years working in embassies as a Marine prior to going to college and becoming a Soldier, I can identify with what Tom said, however, I have also known some real team players in the FS who really impressed me (so much that I almost went FS as a career). Active recruiting of prior military service members to the FS would equip it with people who had a much more acute perspective about how big policy actions shake out on the ground. It would strengthen their gene pool, and assist with inter-agency cooperation.
Recognition:
However, it still goes back to recognition of the need, and a desire to meet that need in a timely manner. In keeping with the theme of the thread, these new challenges call for us to either innovate within our resources, or adapt existing resources. I hope we (the big we at the "all the institutions of the United States" level are not so rigid that we will try to make the problem fit our desired solutions in order to preserve the status quo vs. doing good problem/mission analysis and making the needed changes to be successful.
Tom Odom
10-31-2006, 05:19 PM
Maybe I'm being cynical, Tom, but from what I have seen, creating "super-bureaucracies" merely expands bureaucratic empires while reducing the efficiency of individual units operating within them and making them less accountable to the supposed "rulers" of their society (doesn't seem to matter if they are "the People" or an absolute monarch). Consider, by way of an historical example, the ratio of Colonial Office bureacrats in the UK to the population they supposedly "govern" and look at how it has changed since 1850.
If the model is Homeland Security as it stands, I agree. I would advocate however a blend of the Roman with the modern. Consolidation should not add layers; it should blend and streamline along functional lines. DHS did not do that; it merely added levels of C3 to an already confused system.
The need for transformation has in my mind been largely misdirected; it targeted the force, not the bureacracy that wields it and that is where transformation is needed.
We need another Key West and a simultaneous transformation decisionmaking and policy apparatus. Getting beyond PPT bullet or bumper sticker thinking however seems unlikely.
Best
tom
marct
10-31-2006, 05:24 PM
If the model is Homeland Security as it stands, I agree. I would advocate however a blend of the Roman with the modern. Consolidation should not add layers; it should blend and streamline along functional lines. DHS did not do that; it merely added levels of C3 to an already confused system.
What, restore the Office of Barbarians :D ?????
Actually, I agree that a restructuring should streamline rather than expand. Maybe the civil service should look ar bringing in some people from the private sector (not Enron!).
Marc
selil
10-31-2006, 09:36 PM
ROTC also has the advantage of being able to bring in students who are older than those allowed into the academies. We really should look at this program as a way to bring more mature, balanced officers into the service and to take full advantage of the study programs offered by the various universities.
Look at myself as an example. I'm a single enlistment former Marine. I've worked at Cheyenne, Space Command, law enforcement and a variety of other places. I would consider taking a reserve commission if for no other reason than the retirement benefits. As an academic I could use service of that type within my discipline and serve the military in a variety of ways. Further I spend three months each summer sunning myself on a high mountain lake so I'm available a quarter of the year guaranteed.
But, I'm not going to enter the service as an 0-1 lieuey, and I'm never going to command troops (nor should I). Now I teach members of the military and ROTC. There is no mechanism for me to get involved nor would most military branches take a 40+ academic even if I could pass a PFT. So, a background in information assurance, crypto, and analysis will be used 9 months out of the year. But, I get to do a lot of fishing.
cmetcalf82
10-31-2006, 11:42 PM
What I would like to see ROTC do is shift away from its heavy emphasis on technical majors and move more into a dynamic form of officer entry.
Currently there are SOME language-type programs available for our cadets, either in the form of advanced language training or cultural immersion (basically a semester or two spent overseas). However, there is no direct link between this system and the university's relations with overseas universities (the school I work for has exchange programs with universities in a number of places, including Egypt and Morocco;) ). What ROTC COULD be used for is to draw in more people with a liberal arts background (anthro and history, to name two examples) and then allow them (in fact encourage them) to take a semester or two overseas (through the university's exchange program). This would give them a leg up in terms of real skills and cultural exposure when they go on active duty. Currently ROTC does not really tolerate time "away from the unit," which prevents us from making the best use of our students and the programs that are available for them.
Mr. Blair,
I agree that we could utilize ROTC to better prepare future officers. As a product of ROTC I agree that it currently fails to reward future officers who wish to do a year abroad or other forms of immersion study. Without any consideration for cost a way to generate better more rounded officers would be to extend the top 10-20% of ROTC cadets and give them the opportunity for a fifth year of education in return for a longer commitment. They could utilize this fifth year to begin graduate work or allow them to spend a year abroad in some sort of immersion study program. This would expose them to a wider range of experiences and help them better understand the cultural nuisances of living and communicating with other peoples.
Rob Thornton
11-01-2006, 06:30 AM
Originally posted by Tom Odom , The need for transformation has in my mind been largely misdirected; it targeted the force, not the bureacracy that wields it and that is where transformation is needed.
Tom, Did you mean in the context of HQs such as JFTs, or Unified Commands, or higher? Is it a matter of the execution of good policy, or is it a lack of defined strategy that makes for an inadequate policy? Is it a failure to understand the need for the required command relationships and structures which would reduce friction?
Rob
Steve Blair
11-01-2006, 02:42 PM
Mr. Blair,
I agree that we could utilize ROTC to better prepare future officers. As a product of ROTC I agree that it currently fails to reward future officers who wish to do a year abroad or other forms of immersion study. Without any consideration for cost a way to generate better more rounded officers would be to extend the top 10-20% of ROTC cadets and give them the opportunity for a fifth year of education in return for a longer commitment. They could utilize this fifth year to begin graduate work or allow them to spend a year abroad in some sort of immersion study program. This would expose them to a wider range of experiences and help them better understand the cultural nuisances of living and communicating with other peoples.
Within AFROTC there are five-year majors, although those are currently restricted to technical fields. Their commitment isn't any longer than people in four year programs. Grades do not matter in this case, only the major selected by the cadet. It wouldn't be at all difficult to expand this program, and it doesn't really entail much in the way of additional expense.
Another good way to improve the quality of ROTC would be to increase the number of scholarships available to students who are already in college. AFROTC currently targets high school seniors for the majority of its scholarships, and as a result tends to draw in people who may be more interested in the money than serving. Granted this is anecdotal based on what I've seen at my detachment, but kids coming out of high school often don't really know what they want to major in, and the scholarship program makes them declare a major right out of the gate.
There are already a fair number of rewards (outside scholarships and so on) for the top 10%-20% of cadets. Being able to target majors other than tech for extended ROTC time might be a better way to increase the quality and depth of our ROTC-produced officer corps.
Rob Thornton
11-01-2006, 03:40 PM
On another thread on SWJ entitled "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" there is a link to a good down and dirty on the PRTs. Here is the link to the report (http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/06-034.pdf)
They have some of the same problems other types of Transition teams do, but as mentioned in the report they should be given credit for getting themselves up and running in the midst of ownership/responsibility issues (which are probabloy getting worked through). The intent is that the PRTs will continue until the criteria is met for a transition to a US AID program
Several themes in the report stuck out:
- A lack of non-military personnel to fill out slots designated for civilians due to some physical risk concerns, or availabilty (rolled up into human resources) - this one ties back into the need for either a larger pool of resources, or cross training military personnel to fill the billets. The report mentions DoD filling the CA slots, but in the future if PRTs (or something of like composition) become a part of a preventive strategy "such as using them in the Horn of Africa", then other slots will have to be filled as well. A friend of mine just returning from R&R says the PRTs are advertising in the El Paso Job Fair (starting at 125K) for certain skill sets. I think this emphasizes that in unstable, immature security environments, either the military is going to have to accept the burden, or the FS is going to have adapt.
-Another issue highlighted Unity of Command. On pg. 14 of the report's main body, it recommended that the PRTs be the agent for the management, auditing, and coordination of all US Govt. reconstruction funds available in the region (this includes CERP and other military funds) under the guidance of the chief of mission. While I can see the need for clarity, and the desire to mass effects, and prevent duplication of effort, I have a problem with that. It seems to uncouple security from stability. I think another alternative would be to subordinate the PRT to the military (no higher then the DIV level, no lower then the BCT) in order to get the unity of command and maintain the simbiotic relationship between security and stability, you get unity of command, and you have the feed back mecahanisms (the patrols and HUMINT collectors) to gauge the effect of the projects, and you have the agility to redirect based on what is having the most effect.
The report is an easy read, and sheds some light on the PRTs activities and issues. It also gives a good look into future problems where military and OGAs and maybe NGAs will interact. We could be talking about disaster relief, Homeland Security, or early civil/military intervention where a combination of TTs under a JTF HQs were deployed to prevent a more serious problem
Tom Odom
11-01-2006, 03:48 PM
Tom, Did you mean in the context of HQs such as JFTs, or Unified Commands, or higher? Is it a matter of the execution of good policy, or is it a lack of defined strategy that makes for an inadequate policy? Is it a failure to understand the need for the required command relationships and structures which would reduce friction?
Rob
Rob,
I mean all of the above. The Unified Command Plan, the Dept of State Embassy and Bureau system, the divisions between State, DoD, CIA, AID, FBI etc etc etc are all based on 19th century information flow and management processes. Our decision-making process is like a mental version of trial by combat; the "pure" is proven virtuous by winning.
The Unified Command Plan and the Embassy system are built on the assumption that instantaneous communications do not exist. So we need distant embassies and commands to make decisions--that they no longer make because those instantaneous communications do exist.
I fully realize that these comments are akin to telling a drowning man he needs to learn to swim. I don't have a hip pocket plan to fix this; I do believe we will not go forward unless we begin to talk about it in a meaningful way.
best
tom
marct
11-01-2006, 04:03 PM
Hi Rob,
Just a couple of comments on the points you raised.
- A lack of non-military personnel to fill out slots designated for civilians due to some physical risk concerns, or availabilty (rolled up into human resources)
- this one ties back into the need for either a larger pool of resources, or cross training military personnel to fill the billets. The report mentions DoD filling the CA slots, but in the future if PRTs (or something of like composition) become a part of a preventive strategy "such as using them in the Horn of Africa", then other slots will have to be filled as well. A friend of mine just returning from R&R says the PRTs are advertising in the El Paso Job Fair (starting at 125K) for certain skill sets. I think this emphasizes that in unstable, immature security environments, either the military is going to have to accept the burden, or the FS is going to have adapt.
One other option available would be rasing dedicated PRT units either via a National Guard model or internally. One of the things that bothers me is that there is going to be some serious culture conflict internally if, for no other reason, than the salaries.
-Another issue highlighted Unity of Command. On pg. 14 of the report's main body, it recommended that the PRTs be the agent for the management, auditing, and coordination of all US Govt. reconstruction funds available in the region (this includes CERP and other military funds) under the guidance of the chief of mission. While I can see the need for clarity, and the desire to mass effects, and prevent duplication of effort, I have a problem with that. It seems to uncouple security from stability. I think another alternative would be to subordinate the PRT to the military (no higher then the DIV level, no lower then the BCT) in order to get the unity of command and maintain the simbiotic relationship between security and stability, you get unity of command, and you have the feed back mecahanisms (the patrols and HUMINT collectors) to gauge the effect of the projects, and you have the agility to redirect based on what is having the most effect.
Some type of matrix leadership would have to be worked out with very clear guidelines. I can certainly see why you would argue for a sub-ordination of the PRTs and, in some ways, I agree with you. I think, however, that there would be significant problems with a straight subordinant position.
The report is an easy read, and sheds some light on the PRTs activities and issues. It also gives a good look into future problems where military and OGAs and maybe NGAs will interact. We could be talking about disaster relief, Homeland Security, or early civil/military intervention where a combination of TTs under a JTF HQs were deployed to prevent a more serious problem
One of the reasons why I am suggesting a matrix leadership has to do with the international scope of many of the future operations. I think it makes more sense to set up a process that is organizationally flexible so that we don't have to recreate the wheel in the future.
Let me give you one example where this might come into play. Currently, German troops in Afghanistan are restricted in their operations to the equivalent of PRTs. This was a political decision on the part of the German government. This allows me to envision a scenario where you might have an American Battalion with an "embedded" German company that has different rules of engagement. This type of scenario highlights an increased flexibility vs. the current deployment options.
Marc
Rob Thornton
11-02-2006, 06:36 AM
Marc,
I'd like to explore the concept of this type of coalition partnership:
Originally posted by Marc - Let me give you one example where this might come into play. Currently, German troops in Afghanistan are restricted in their operations to the equivalent of PRTs. This was a political decision on the part of the German government. This allows me to envision a scenario where you might have an American Battalion with an "embedded" German company that has different rules of engagement. This type of scenario highlights an increased flexibility vs. the current deployment options.
I think that the idea of plugging in CF partners in roles that fit with their capabilities, constraints, etc. is a great idea. I think to have the analysis done up front and the composition of those elements with the decision points as to when they are activated is key. However, it could make for some muddy command relationships along the way as issues such as funding and support are hashed out.
We'd looked at a planning model that used a reverse order sequence (PH IV S&RO, PH III MCO, PH II Condition Setting/Staging & Reception, PH I Deployment) to identify desired end states and work backwards. This led to a better understanding of where decision points could become unhinged by examination of more then just military actions.
While we've done well at adapting to working through an extended PH IV, I think it worthwhile to consider that a political decision point which injected a PH IV Stability & Reconstruction into a failing state right from the start might omit the need for a PH III MCO and be far more cost effective (resources, unneeded deaths and suffering, etc) then waiting until the state fails.
We have full time partnerships such as NATO, but are we really talking about (Tom I think had mentioned way back in the thread) a standing or rotational Combined Multinational JTF? If so, we (the US) and other like minded states would need to synchronize and codify a few things. Truly there are transcendent threats that would seem to only get more dangerous in the future. Tom had mentioned a Key West, maybe we also need a Malta?
Regards, Rob
marct
11-02-2006, 11:33 AM
Hi Rob,
I think that the idea of plugging in CF partners in roles that fit with their capabilities, constraints, etc. is a great idea. I think to have the analysis done up front and the composition of those elements with the decision points as to when they are activated is key. However, it could make for some muddy command relationships along the way as issues such as funding and support are hashed out.
I agree. I think this is one of the key problems with any type of alliance structure but, politically, we are in a situation where we have to have them. I do agree with you about the pitential for confusion in command relatioships but, in all honesty, I think that every nation involved in one of these coalition forces should already be thinking in terms of ways to get around the organizational problems.
BTW, in addition to the potential command, funding and support problems, I would also add in a serious media component. If we assume that the majority of conflicts for the next 10-15 years are going to be of a state (or co-alition) vs. non-state form, then the primary battlefield will be in various mediaspaces - at least in terms of achieving ultimate political goals.
We also need to consider developing a serious coalition legal structure, along with a coalition level LE system. One of the key mediaspace issues that has led to a degradation of support for both Afghanistan and Iraq has been questions about the legality of detentions and interrogations, and there should be ways to avoid this. Probably the best way to do so, would be to have a multi-national LE system.
We'd looked at a planning model that used a reverse order sequence (PH IV S&RO, PH III MCO, PH II Condition Setting/Staging & Reception, PH I Deployment) to identify desired end states and work backwards. This led to a better understanding of where decision points could become unhinged by examination of more then just military actions.
Rob, on the whole I think that is probably a good system. It might be even better if it was extended into a Phase V: Successful state reconstruction. As I envision this phase, it would be primarily political, at least in the sense of laying out a general blueprint for a variety of final forms. I do realize that this certainly extends the planning process :).
Let me give you one example. In Afghanistan, before the 2003 Loya Jirga, there was a strong move to restore the monarchy. When the Loya Jirga met, however, there was a fairly common perception that even the idea of the monarchy was anathema to the US and that Karzai had enough backing from outside Afghanistan that he could twist the monarch to support him. I remember in the weeks leading up to the Loya Jirga and during it, hearing rumours from a friend (who had a number of family members as delegates). She would complain about outside interference and, after a while, I started to hear about how some of the Pashtun elders were getting very ansy about the process. I have a suspicion that those rumours, whether true or not, account for some of the Taliban support in Waziristan.
The point was that there was an appearance that the final form of the new state was already decided externally rather than internally. This perception, in turn, created a reduced legitimacy for the new government. If there had been a clear statement at the outset that the specific form of the new government was irrellevant, but still accepted certain basic principles, I suspect that the operations would have gone a lot better.
While we've done well at adapting to working through an extended PH IV, I think it worthwhile to consider that a political decision point which injected a PH IV Stability & Reconstruction into a failing state right from the start might omit the need for a PH III MCO and be far more cost effective (resources, unneeded deaths and suffering, etc) then waiting until the state fails.
I agree totally. This is, however, an exceedingly tricky situation under international law and, also, from a PR angle. Even in the current situation in and around Darfur, we can see problems with the concept - i.e. who is going to be willing to admit that their sovereignty is less than total?
We have full time partnerships such as NATO, but are we really talking about (Tom I think had mentioned way back in the thread) a standing or rotational Combined Multinational JTF? If so, we (the US) and other like minded states would need to synchronize and codify a few things. Truly there are transcendent threats that would seem to only get more dangerous in the future. Tom had mentioned a Key West, maybe we also need a Malta?
I think we do need a combined multinational JTF, and NATO may be the organizational framework to try it out in, although there would have to be provisions made for non-NATO members to be part of any specific operation. Certainly the UN has been less than useful or successfull in such endevours :cool: .
While I can see any number of short, medium and long term problems with such a combined JTF, I think that most of them could be overcome with sufficient advanced planning.
Marc
Rob Thornton
11-02-2006, 03:49 PM
You know, the U.S. could also wind up being the supporting effort / PRT provider for a ally led military effort. We need to consider that we may not be asked to provide what we are comfortable providing because of local /regional / inter-national perceptions.
This would make a great excercise concept for flushing out the linkages.
marct
11-02-2006, 05:27 PM
You know, the U.S. could also wind up being the supporting effort / PRT provider for a ally led military effort. We need to consider that we may not be asked to provide what we are comfortable providing because of local /regional / inter-national perceptions.
This would make a great excercise concept for flushing out the linkages.
That's a really good point, Rob. I think something like this would have worked well in Kosovo, and may work well if we ever get more troops in Darfur. It would certainly have the advantage of not requiring a major combat troop commitment while, at the same time, possibly go a fair ways to imporving the US' image worldwide.
Marc
Rob Thornton
11-05-2006, 06:46 AM
Strategically what are our imperatives in this face of New Rules and New Enemies?
What are the instruments of policy outside of the application of force that we can use to mitigate our reliance on it? We've talked allot about Inter-Agency, FS, OGAs, Revamping our OES and NCOES, restructuring our organizational and bureaucratic structures, but what about the ideas that would change the causes and supporting causes (real or perceived) about how choose to involve ourselves abroad?
Awhile back there was an article in either Parameters or JFQ (sorry I cannot recall which) that called for a Manhattan Project for alternative energy. In my mind this type of thinking challenges our strategic thinking and provides options to policy.
I also recall reading an article that discussed how many states have skipped a generation of technology (such as going straight to a wireless communications infrastructure), or how some states such as India have based large portions of their economy on IT service communities.
These are just examples, but I think if we do not look forward and examine the impact of supporting causes for intervention (could be commitment of military forces, could be a trade agreement), we will find ourselves potentially committing the inappropriate resources to a problem or problem set. Politically this can be difficult because their is often an expiration date associated with a decision due to elections ( I think this has been a fact of life since the first polis), but it is one that craft a long term sustainable strategy that allows for a state to wisely apply its valued resources, preserve and improve itself, and gain the long term strength of the moral position.
History and examination of how others wield their influence can provide some valuable insights.
marct
11-05-2006, 05:48 PM
Hi Rob,
Strategically what are our imperatives in this face of New Rules and New Enemies?
This is, of course, the $64,000 question.
One of the things I find both intensely interesting and, at the same time, intensely frustrating, is how the very debate is constructed. Specifically, the debate appears to take, as an axiomatic assumption, the idea that the only reorganization that matters is within the US.
Now I may be biased, being a Canadian nationalist, but it does strike me that we are not dealing with a situation of present and future conflicts on a State vs. State model. Occasionally, it is a State vs. non-State (e.g. Israel vs. Hezbollah) but, most of the time, it is an alliance of States vs. an alliance of one or more States and non-State actors (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq). I stress the alliance aspect because I believe that it is one of the two centers of gravity used to defeat US / Coalition forces: the first is to break allies away from the US and the second is to increase popular US dissent against US political and military operations.
What are the instruments of policy outside of the application of force that we can use to mitigate our reliance on it? We've talked allot about Inter-Agency, FS, OGAs, Revamping our OES and NCOES, restructuring our organizational and bureaucratic structures, but what about the ideas that would change the causes and supporting causes (real or perceived) about how choose to involve ourselves abroad?
Absolutely crucial. Okay, I am probably going to get dumped on by a lot of people, but I feel I really need to say this. Right now, many people outside the US (including a large number of Canadians and Europeans) view the US as a rather uncivilized and sometimes obnoxious teenager playing on the international stage. While this was something of a problem during the Cold War, it could be tolerated and accepted. With the rise of the EU and China, and the US left as the only "superpower" (hmmpf, it isn't, but that is another rant), anti-American attitudes are "hardening" amongst many current and former allies.
I think the first President Bush understood this, but I don't think the second does and I will point to his unilateral by-passing of the UN debates to get a clear mandate for the invasion of Iraq as a good example of that. BTW, for those of you who don't know this, many Canadians felt insulted by his unilateral rejection of our UN motion in support of a coalition attack on Iraq - that is the political reason why Canada doesn't have troops in Iraq. The entire handling of the UN debate just reinforced the image that the US would do whatever it felt like doing with very little regard for any other nation.
I apologize if I have infuriated anyone by what I have just said but, as someone who is outside the US, I think it needed to be said for one simple reason: one of the keys to defeating any US led coalition is to break away US allies. More importantly, in the case of OIF and the current war in Iraq, I believe that this type of unilateral action gave fuel to local US anti-war protests by concentrating way too much of the debate on whether or not the war was justified as opposed to a debate on how to win it.
Rob, you asked what I consider to be an absolutely crucial question - "What are the instruments of policy outside of the application of force that we can use to mitigate our reliance on it?" I would have to say that one of the policy instruments must be a reliance on the establishment of international support and by-in, and a key component of this must be a respect for other nations and a willingness to moderate positions based on what other nations say. On the bright side, I would have to say that the current Presidents' reliance upon China in the ongoing North Korean situation is, to my mind, a very possitive sign.
End of rant....
Awhile back there was an article in either Parameters or JFQ (sorry I cannot recall which) that called for a Manhattan Project for alternative energy. In my mind this type of thinking challenges our strategic thinking and provides options to policy.
How about an SWJ seminar? I'd be happy to come down and make unpopular comments <wry grin>.
I also recall reading an article that discussed how many states have skipped a generation of technology (such as going straight to a wireless communications infrastructure), or how some states such as India have based large portions of their economy on IT service communities.
Yeah, it's a fairly well known phenomenon in development work. Possibly the best example is the communications development in the Sultinate of Brunei where you actually had neo-lithic villages in the jungle with radio phones. Afghanistan is another example on the communications end. I have a whole bunch of lectures on how societies / cultures adopt and adapt differing technologies and how that plays back into modifying their actions and, eventually, their structures.
These are just examples, but I think if we do not look forward and examine the impact of supporting causes for intervention (could be commitment of military forces, could be a trade agreement), we will find ourselves potentially committing the inappropriate resources to a problem or problem set. Politically this can be difficult because their is often an expiration date associated with a decision due to elections ( I think this has been a fact of life since the first polis), but it is one that craft a long term sustainable strategy that allows for a state to wisely apply its valued resources, preserve and improve itself, and gain the long term strength of the moral position.
I totally agree. I think it is also important to note that nation states themselves are changing. "Sovereignty", for the individual nation state, has been progressively eroding for the past 100 years or so as a result of inter-state agreements (e.g. WTO, GATT, etc.), economic globalization and the rise of regional inter-state "polities" (e.g. the EU, ASEAN, etc.). In effect, individual states actually have less control over their resources due to large numbers of "binding" inter-state commitments.
At the same time, for the past 150 or so years, we have seen an increasing rise in global, non-state actors whether they are multinational corporations, supra-governmental bodies (e.g. the WTO or World Bank), or terrorist groups. This type of shift was quite predictable; for example, George Grant talked about it in Technology and Empire in the 1950's, and most of this trend can be directly corrrelated with increased communicative bandwidth and the development of rapid transportation technologies (if anyone wants the references, I'll be glad to post them).
So we are living in "interesting times". On the one hand, nations states have been systematically eroding their sovereignty through inter-state agreements while, on the other hand non-state actors of all sorts have been coming into existence obtaining some components of sovereignty. On the third hand, individuals are forming their own multi-national "communities" that transcend national boundaries and some of these communities are operating politically and militarily.
History and examination of how others wield their influence can provide some valuable insights.
Too true! Then again, I think we have another thread (or two) that have noted this :)
Marc
slapout9
11-05-2006, 07:36 PM
Rob, I think this is the paper your are talking about. Very good idea. The link is posted below.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1339.pdf
Rob Thornton
11-06-2006, 12:16 PM
Marc - still thinking about your reply
Slapout - Rgr - thanks - right article - I had lost it back when my laptop crashed
I wanted to post something we had touched on earlier in the thread (I have some time on my hands as its a quiet day here - curfew because of the verdict)
I had written a post on the Advisor's Log I keep on CC.mil for folks coming out on this duty about discussing morals and ethics with their counterparts. A friend of mine who has done some great work on the ethics and morality of killing followed up on it, and I wrote back. The letter is from an email where we are discussing leader development. Any strategy will only take you as far as those who are responsible for executing are prepared to do so. I'll post the letter first then the piece of discussing morals and ethics below that.
From the email
"Pete,
Please feel free to use whatever you think will help develop the evolving skill sets and personality traits we require in our leaders. I've had some interesting thoughts lately about what challenges and demands await the next generation of leaders. I believe it goes far beyond what can be encapsulated on an OER duty and description block. I used to watch with amazement the episodes of the recent Star Trek series where these multi-faceted leaders dealt simultaneously with both their command and responsibilities, and with the problems of being expeditionary (to boldly go....). I did some digging about America's past (an easy read it Max Boot's Savage Wars of Peace, but there are allot of others which are good also) and found that Naval Captains have always had to play part military leader, part ambassador because they were often isolated and with very slow communications back to the US to ask for guidance. I think British Colonial forces may have been required to operate with similar autonomy as well - however their policy goals would have reflect colonial ambitions. To some degree you might also look to frontier America.
So I'm intrigued by what the nature of our strategy for next 20 years (as considered in light of today's expectations) means in terms of requirements for leader development. With the exception of the example of the "Naval Ambassador", the other examples are still somewhat narrow in scope - nobody was really worried about offending Indigenous American Indian tribes unless it meant sacrificing local tactical advantages. When you consider the nature of actions today which make for a kind of interwoven local, regional, domestic and global tapestry of primary, secondary and tertiary effects you wonder if you can afford not having the leaders who are well developed (maybe better developed?) in their emotional and intellectual characteristics.
When you look back at men like Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Lewis and Clarke, and even many of the Civil War officers, you see men who were well versed in many areas from Shakespeare to Smith to Thucydides to Copernicus. They were trained in Engineering, well versed in Humanities, and aware of a wide range of political thought. Their own works bear this out, and cause me to wonder if they were the exception to the exception, or have we become culturally so focused that we have surrendered diversity in favor of narrow development?
Consider our own OES and where the emphasis is given the limited amount of time and the avalanche of requirements (both identified and desired). Since once in the pipe officers are going to be limited to available time, mentor development (still somewhat arbitrary and inconsistent) and self development (desirable but not mandatory), the only place where the exposure to ideas not directly related to military science is during the cadet phase. I am unfamiliar with the requirements at USMA, but I can tell you at ROTC if a cadet wished to pursue a strictly technical degree such as business, or sports medicine or the like, there was no requirement other then the basic core level courses (1000 level) in terms of diversity. While the content of those classes is often solid, the context is mainly subject to students taking a class because it’s a requirement and the discussion of ideas is unfortunately shelved.
Maybe what we could introduce are classes inside the ROTC curricula where these complex ideas as contemplated by great minds are discussed in the context of the challenges these leaders will face abroad. I’m not talking about vignettes for 350-1 requirements, but the discussion of the nature of those ideas and where/why they originated. Its important because many places our officers will go have either never been exposed to those ideas, or culturally see them very different (for example Iraq has suffered under a brutal dictator for a couple of generations – they have adapted their perspective as a result and it will take more then a few years to develop a new perspective). Other then changing the public educations system to acknowledge that there are more life skills needed then just hard math and science, the injection of these ideas into a cadet pedagogy is the only place I see available. I have been far enough removed from ROTC that I no longer am sure what they are teaching.
I’ve recently been in contact with a former squad leader who has finished his 4 year degree and now is seeking a commission in the Army. He was asking for advice on commissioning sources. I explained to him that in my mind the best thing he could do was to spend and additional two years working on his masters’ and attend the 2 years of ROTC. He was not exactly keen on the masters’ part (he’d just been saturated by school). I explained to him the relevance on today and tomorrow’s mission. I told him about the things that I was doing in my current job and what I expected for tomorrow’s leaders.
We are in a time in our military history where we have an opportunity to identify early how to improve our most important resource –people. We need to devote just as much time to investing in them the skills and traits they will need as providing them with the proper hardware. While machines and technology are seldom as good for other tasks as the one they were primarily designed for, people are the most adaptable, agile, tool we have. Machines are not innovative, people are. The leader must be jut as capable of negotiating Human Terrain as physical terrain." - end of email - the Discussion post will follow
?
Rob Thornton
11-06-2006, 12:16 PM
From the Discussion Post on Morals and Ethics
"You will find that many opportunities will arise for you to discuss ethics and morals with your Iraqi counterparts. These will be among some of the most challenging and rewarding conversations you will have. These conversations will require you to examine your own beliefs in the context of how and why Iraqis see the world differently. You will need to consider why they see the world the way they do (such as understanding the long term effects of having brutal, totalitarian dictator for a leadership model has on the cultural and national psyche). You will need to frame your (our) ethical and moral beliefs in a manner that resonates with them. Here are some vignette topics you can use to discuss morals and ethics with your counter parts:
Corruption – pick one from the recent news (its all over both the Iraqi news and our own since the media is pretty much universal in their coverage). Shape it into a vignette that has a personal impact so it becomes more relevant. Discuss at length its consequences at every level so they understand the harm it does. Do not expect to come to a real concurrence on beliefs with the first conversation, instead focus on planting the seed. You have also established your views on the subject, empathized with them by trying to understand the environment in which their views have grown, and you have set the stage for future discussions.
The Army as a guarantor of human rights – this is a delicate subject, but one you will need to discuss and understand. Remember you are not advising the US Army (or for that matter any western army). These men will be fighting this insurgency and potentially others within their own country day on end, for an indeterminate period. They may be targets of revenge for their actions even after the insurgency is over. They have seen neighbors, friends, family and innocent women and children killed for no other reason then because someone in their family served. When they see a terrorist, they realize that the next time they see this man it may be in an ambush, or fleeing from a crime where one of their family was murdered. For many their frame of reference of a time when security was guaranteed was when Sadam held absolute power (they tend to gloss over some of the more thorny details). They are disheartened by the seemingly (perspective is 9/10’s of reality here) apathetic criminal justice system which seems to value the rights of the criminal above those of society or the safety of society’s defenders and their families. They understand their average insurgent better then we do. They know his background and what he has endured before he ever gets to them. They know that the insurgent is a hard man who will use every advantage such as claiming to only target Americans, to claiming abuse, to using connections to regain his freedom so he can conduct his terrorist activities again.
Within the context of the above you are going to have to make a case for the problems with a rigid, cookie cutter Iraqi ROE. I’ve heard Iraqis become so frustrated with the system that they proclaim the next time they will not risk capturing the terrorist, but instead will kill them. I’ve heard them discuss the need for stronger techniques during the questioning of detainees. You have to argue for the problems with such a cookie cutter, rigid application of force. You have to point out the short and long term problems with such solutions. Explain the consequences of a climate where everyone (or at least every soldier) is free to use violence because it is the most expedient and most convenient. Point out that while Sadam’s regime may have preserved order, the price paid was heavy, and that many innocent people died as a result. Point out that the what they are fighting for is not to set the conditions for another Sadam to come to power. Point out that such conditions allow for abuse of power under the guise of public good. Again, you are going to have to frame your arguments within the context of the environment you are in. You are not trying to castrate them, ultimately (and I mean down the road when the MiTT training wheels come off and we are no longer embedded) their solution may be something we would have trouble accepting in our society. Consider the diplomat’s son in the 1990s who received a “cane” whipping from Singapore authorities for vandalism (I think he had spray painted a car), we considered it barbaric given the type of crime, the age of the boy, that he was an American, and that it was a beating. However, it was not our rules. We often have debates in our own societies about capital punishment, prisoner rights, etc. Be careful about viewing a foreign state’s practices (particularly on where we are trying to develop to be able to stand on its own two feet and make decisions concerning its own interests) through a US centric lens, you may find yourself defending your own point of view and being labeled a hypocrite.
My point in this thread is that no one told me I’d be mentoring on ethics. The “advisory pitch” made things seem much cleaner, discuss a little MDMP, work some effects, and conduct a few AARs. This is not a CTC, and you are not an OC. Advisory work is more like developing a team from the inside out then the outside in. I’d recommend you familiarize yourself with a few other texts besides FMs. You might bring along a little Jonathan Hume, some Plato, some Shakespeare, and the Federalist Papers for a start (actually the list could be very broad, and there are lots of places to ref. good discussions on morals and ethics). You are more then just a military advisor, you are something of a mentor too. Your day to day interactions and conversations over the year your are an advisor will do more to develop and influence your counterparts then any class or block of instruction you give. The former is a cumulative picture about who you are, and what a US Soldier believes in, the latter is a stand alone class that is delivered and received as such." - end of thread post
So what are the thoughts about emotional and character development as a requirment to implementing a strategy for New Enemie and New Rules
Steve Blair
11-06-2006, 03:07 PM
I think we need to be very careful about how much ethics mentoring we do when we go into advisory efforts. The ethics sources you mention are Western in origin, and may have little or no bearing on the environment an advisor finds himself working in. It gets very difficult when dealing with things like this, and there's always the major concern of not wanting to look like we're imposing our belief systems on another culture (which typically opens us up to attacks from just about everyone in the IO arena).
Good points, though. This is a very convoluted area.
Rob Thornton
11-06-2006, 06:31 PM
Steve,
You're right, but "thorny" may be a word to be used in conjunction with convoluted. In truth I have been hip deep in all kinds of issues out of necessity. Since we are balancing our goals with their goals, its bound to happen.
You are right, all of the sources I mentioned are western, but you have to start somewhere. I think it may be beneficial to understand yourself and the foundations of your beliefs, before trying to understand the beliefs of others.
So far I'd have to say I've benefited as much from their perspective as I have from mine. My counterparts have been as eager to understand me as much as I am to understand them. We've created an atmosphere where open dialogue is encouraged, and it has really paid off. We've had some very frank discussions on topics that I thought were once taboo. We have had disagreements that became animated, and did not end with either side conceding their position, but ones that did enhance respect for on another. We've also had disagreements that did end with both of us seeing the problem from another perspective and modifying our views some.
This has been one of the most challenging and rewarding assignments I have ever had. However, I know other teams and advisors who are having a range of difficulties adapting to their role as an advisor (not that I hadn't had my share of problems). I think it has something to do with applying too much of the things that make us successful in traditional operational roles. We breed A type personalities that desire to be in leadership positions, and we are very good at it. Some of the jobs the military is and will be doing will require not only that skill set, but others as well, and the ability to transition quickly.
To be honest, I'm still learning every day.
Regards, Rob
Steve Blair
11-06-2006, 06:55 PM
Glad to hear it's working out for you, Rob! It sounds like you've hit a good balance, which sadly doesn't always happen with assignments like this.
One reason I pointed out the thorniness of the ethics question is that we will have some advisors who don't have the maturity or personality to deal with the more complex areas and simply try to put their view forward as the correct one.
Jimbo
11-07-2006, 05:48 AM
When we were advising the Iarqis' early on you don't get wrapped up in ethics. You focus on military professionalism in the sense of servic eto country and not arbitrarily killing people. corruption, you have to accept that their is a 10 to 15 percent cost of doing business in that region. It has been that way longer than we have been a country. We don't have the time or resources to fix that. We focused on the responsibility of rank. the Iraqis had respect down, we had to gte them to undertsnad how to care for soldiers. Literacy was another problem we had as well. The key thing was teach them Infantry tactics and get them success on the ground. AAR it, and build from there.
Rob Thornton
11-07-2006, 03:17 PM
Jimbo,
The IA have progressed quite a bit (it may be different down South) up here. We still have CF platoons conducting the occasional combined patrol, but tactically the IA here are capable of conducting independent ops (and they do a pretty good job of it). Yes literacy amongst the Jundi is still a problem, but getting better. Tribal segregation is still a problem, but shows signs of getting better as competence is starting to be regarded as desirable over who lives in what town. While CF units run basic soldier and leader skills training programs, and units such as the scouts work with CF scouts on things like CTR and sniper skills, the MiTTs these days focus on developing the staff and the BN CDR. That is just our charter, and its also what we are resourced to do. Your talking about BN TTs where out of the 11 guys 4 are majors one is a CPT, and the rest are SNCOs. It is not about MDMP though. It is about helping them build solutions to their problems that are executable and sustainable by them - read Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems.
Yes there is a certain amount of corruption. We joke and say its part of the culture - we'll call it cultural economics with a subset of local best business practices :D . However when your soldiers are quitting because out of the $13 a day for life support you only see a fraction, then you have to explain how it jeopardizes the mission - i.e. poor food in quantity and quality, poor living conditions, etc = attrition of your best soldiers who will find other opportunities. That's an example, but the point is that a lack of ethics in morals in some areas puts the mission at risk. They will have to find a balance. But if they abandon all morals and ethics then they cease to be soldiers and the mission fails. Its important they understand that leadership means accepting and fulfilling your responsibility, and that while you need to be able to execute your combat tasks, these guys are going to have to sustain this army they have built at the current OPTEMPO for some time to come.
They are making progress. Our BN has come a long way in the last 8 months. We go out on the Operations and walk with them. They are working well by themselves, with CF partners and with the IP. I have seen officers here that would do well in any army. In many ways they have advantages that they are using in COIN that we do not possess. They are even adapting the conventional force structure we initially stood up for them to mirror the enemy (one of the biggest things I think an Army can do is recognize its shortfalls and adjust their resources to compensate in order to build the organizational structure they need to be successful.) he TTs are finally getting the resources to do more. It is the main effort (at least where we are at) because we have transitioned to a point here where the ISF have equity (if not the majority) of the fight. We live with these guys - we are own their schedule - eat with them, etc. I'd guess within the next year within this Division, they will be good enough at the BN level that they will not need a TT with them, and efforts will focus at the BDE and DIV levels.
Regards, Rob
Rob Thornton
12-12-2006, 03:01 PM
I thought Recommendation #2 fit pretty well in this thread, but as stated it ain't cheap!
Second, we must develop a new class of statesmen, civilian and military, to be holistic thinkers, capable of managing the integration of the many implements in the toolbox of American power - diplomacy, economics, law-enforcement, intelligence, information, as well as the military. They should have a deep understanding of modern conflict in all its manifestations, from narcotics and international crime, to terrorism, insurgency, ethnic and civil wars, conventional war, as well as the ecological basis of national security
Any body hear the relevant joke about the Lexus? Woman goes into a Lexus dealership and peaks into the cabin of a top end model, as she does so she experiences a minor case of gas. Embarrased, she looks around to see if anybody heard her. Sure enough the floor sales man is standing behind her. To recover she asks, "How much for this one?". The salesman replies, " I don't know, if you farted just touching it, you'll #### when you hear the price!"
Full context below. regards, Rob
Philadelphia Inquirer
December 12, 2006
Winning Battles, Losing Wars
Once again, the United States has failed to grasp that war is more than just weapons.
By Gabriel Marcella and Fred Woerner
On April 25, 1975, U.S. Army Col. Harry Summers, author of On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, said to a North Vietnamese colonel in Hanoi: "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield." To which the North Vietnamese replied: "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."
Both men were right. In Vietnam, the United States scored all kinds of tactical victories but lost the war. Today there is no military peer that can compete with the global reach, speed, precision, and lethality of our armed forces. And few nations can be as proud of their soldiers and officers; they represent the finest values of American democracy.
Yet Iraq demonstrates that, despite all the power, resources and technology, we are strategically impaired. We continue to win most of the battles, but not the wars.
War is a transformative political process intended to lead to a better peace, not a mere sequence of battles. In Iraq, our soldiers fight splendidly, performing Herculean feats to make the investment in blood, treasure, and honor work. But strategic success, a better peace than what preceded, may be beyond their grasp because of flaws in strategic design made by superiors.
Why are we strategically impaired? Rather than seeing continuity, Americans tend to separate peace from the aberration called war, whereas the opponents we face do the opposite. Our strategic planning tends to reflect that bifurcation and causes untold distempers and recriminations among civilians and military in government.
In foreign affairs, we rely too much on military might, allowing the velvet glove of diplomacy and information to wither in comparison, thereby weakening the world's understanding of what we stand for, and breeding misperceptions that lead to hostility.
We have unbounded confidence in technology to solve the complex social, economic, and political problems of millennial civilizations.
We go to war without mobilizing the support of the American people, knowing full well their impatience for quick results and intolerance for ambiguity. We have a quasimissionary zeal to "democratize" societies that we barely understand, and we fathom the intellectual requirements for such ambitious tasks even less.
Moreover, we give the military missions that are best performed by civilian agencies like the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and then we don't empower the military.
Finally, going it alone internationally loses friends who want to help and burns bridges that must be rebuilt.
What can be done? First, our political leaders must respect the complexities, limits, paradoxes, and unintended consequences of war. They must understand the utility of the military, neither expecting it to perform the impossible nor underestimating its enormous capabilities for doing good.
Second, we must develop a new class of statesmen, civilian and military, to be holistic thinkers, capable of managing the integration of the many implements in the toolbox of American power - diplomacy, economics, law-enforcement, intelligence, information, as well as the military. They should have a deep understanding of modern conflict in all its manifestations, from narcotics and international crime, to terrorism, insurgency, ethnic and civil wars, conventional war, as well as the ecological basis of national security.
Third, they should be thoroughly schooled in the language, culture, history, economics, and politics of foreign cultures.
Fourth, we should strengthen our diplomatic and informational capabilities. The United States is likely to need these tools for a long time in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, where we have deployed power since America inherited global responsibilities in 1945, but still the areas we understand the least.
Democracy is a process of mutual learning. Our founding fathers understood this and the seriousness of war very well. Thus they wrote into the Constitution that the responsibility for taking the nation's armed forces to war be shared by the people and the government. If we are wise, we will learn from the Iraq experience, make corrections, and approach future war better prepared to build the better peace.
Gabriel Marcella teaches strategy at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. Fred Woerner is a retired general and professor emeritus of international relations at Boston University.
Tom Odom
12-12-2006, 04:40 PM
And that is why unless things have changed dramatically (and I do not believe they have) Foreign Area Officer attendance (as a FAO not as a secondary FAO) at the War College is non-existent.
At best we can hope to make the correspondence course list as I did where our real world experiences have no effect on our fellow students.
Right
Tom
I thought Recommendation #2 fit pretty well in this thread, but as stated it ain't cheap!
Rob,
It may look expensive, but all that money we saved in the 90s by not actively pursuing #2 has cost us in Iraq. The money spent sending Petraues, Chiarelli, and McMaster to grad school was an investment well worth it.
Just think how many more Mattis' are out there wanting to self-educate themselves by reading voraciously, but we don't have a program to provide books from professional reading lists for free, and so they don't have the institutional push to make them take the plunge. Heck, I'm sure that we spend more money funding knife purchases through the supply system for soldiers in Iraq that could easily be better spent on stocking several thousands libraries with Galula, Nagl, Horne, Krepinevich, Linn, etc.
Rob Thornton
12-13-2006, 05:55 AM
Shek,
You are spot on. I've always thought the problem was convincing the hands that control the wallet that investing in people is just as important in investing in hardware. So its not a question of "means" but of "will". Retired General Scales has written allot on it as well. Somewhere along the line we developed a cultural aversion to developing intellect as a priority. We talk a good game, put out some good periodicals and pubs, but we don't like to resource the types of programs that allow for building intellectual width (scale that exposes many), and depth (makes them in to "Olympic Class Pentahletes able to handle the diverse challenges of the COE/FOE). When we do, culturally we subconciously tell others the path to higher command is to push for certain jobs that keep you in the operations jet stream (ex. I heard once from an 06 in my SR counseling, "Don't spend time doing SAMS, that requires a commitment that puts you behind the competition! Go for the "king Maker" job - the BDE 3!"). This leaves those who really value knowledge, and that want command to self-educate (a bonus for the military which now gets a few smart guys on the cheap), or willing to let the chips fall where they may.
When I made the decison to leave Operations for the 59 field (a very tough decision on my part), I had plenty of reasons - family, age, desire for something different, etc. I also knew that IN Branch would not say, "Hey wait a second?" - because I was swimming out of the jet stream; so by Darwinian standards there must be a reason :D .
So while it would be an easy thing to fund in someways, we'd have to place cultural emphasis on it for it to be more then an anomaly. What a paradox in that we often know what is most healthy for us, but choose not to do so, even when we have most of the resources available.
By the way, I got your nephew's letter. I mean to write them back and thank them soon. It really brightened my day.
Best regards, Rob
marct
12-13-2006, 01:36 PM
Hi Rob,
I've always thought the problem was convincing the hands that control the wallet that investing in people is just as important in investing in hardware. So its not a question of "means" but of "will". Retired General Scales has written allot on it as well. Somewhere along the line we developed a cultural aversion to developing intellect as a priority. We talk a good game, put out some good periodicals and pubs, but we don't like to resource the types of programs that allow for building intellectual width (scale that exposes many), and depth (makes them in to "Olympic Class Pentahletes able to handle the diverse challenges of the COE/FOE). When we do, culturally we subconciously tell others the path to higher command is to push for certain jobs that keep you in the operations jet stream... This leaves those who really value knowledge, and that want command to self-educate (a bonus for the military which now gets a few smart guys on the cheap), or willing to let the chips fall where they may.
I hate to say it, but there is a reason for that <wry grin>. It's actually a process you see in most organizations based on an Authority Ranking system (ref to Alan Fiske's Relational Models (http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/fiske/relmodov.htm)). Basically, operations inside such an organization require the assumption of greater knowledge the higher up the chain of command you go - the knowledge is the ideological basis (not symbolic) of authority that serves as one justification for invocing that relational model.
The ideological model is supported and mediated by a symbolic system that reinforces it at an emotional level. Most modern, bureaucratic organizations use "knowledge" as the basis of the ideological claim but others have been used: blood lines (aristocracy, tribal lineage), rhetorical skills (politics in a democracy), closeness to "God" (the Cathars, al-Queda), etc.
The internal selection method may be Darwinian (straight selection pressures with no teleological value), but it is justified using a Spencerian "survival of the fittest" model with a specific teleology. Organizations also "protect" their teleological vectors and resist changes to them in the long run, even though there may be short run changes (this is a principle called "organizational hysteresis"). If you want to change the valuation of knowledge inside the military, then you have to think like an organizational genetic engineer ;) .
I don't know the cultures well enough to offer specific suggestions on doing this type of organizational genetic engineering but one observation that may help is that every successfull organizational re-engineering has several characteristics:
an executive level "champion";
constant communications to all levels of the organization;
a clear statement of vision, values and ethics;
a well laid out system of rewards and punishments to reinforce those values;
a group with power whose sole responsability is to enforce that code; and
an agreement that the core power brokers in the organization don't have to meet the most onerous requirements that they impose on the rest of the organization.:rolleyes:
So while it would be an easy thing to fund in someways, we'd have to place cultural emphasis on it for it to be more then an anomaly. What a paradox in that we often know what is most healthy for us, but choose not to do so, even when we have most of the resources available.
Personally, I always thought that the paradox went deeper than that, for the military at least. For me, it centers on the concept of "civilian control" and how that is interpreted. Basically, the paradox I see is the question of "who has the right to establish and change the social focus of the military?" As long as the ultimate power is vested in an abstract symbol, the Crown, the Constitution, etc., then there is a "touchstone" for all orders and cultural changes. If this power is, however, invested in individual people, however, then that person becomes the touchstone - a dangerous situation when combined with a polarized democratic process.
Marc
Rob Thornton
12-13-2006, 03:04 PM
Marc, killer reply & a great read on organizational theory.
Organizations also "protect" their teleological vectors and resist changes to them in the long run, even though there may be short run changes (this is a principle called "organizational hysteresis"). If you want to change the valuation of knowledge inside the military, then you have to think like an organizational genetic engineer .
I don't know the cultures well enough to offer specific suggestions on doing this type of organizational genetic engineering but one observation that may help is that every successful organizational re-engineering has several characteristics:
1. an executive level "champion";
2. constant communications to all levels of the organization;
3. a clear statement of vision, values and ethics;
4. a well laid out system of rewards and punishments to reinforce those values;
5. a group with power whose sole responsibility is to enforce that code; and
6. an agreement that the core power brokers in the organization don't have to meet the most onerous requirements that they impose on the rest of the organization.
Can you subconsciously be bound to "organizational hysteresis", or is it more of a matter of being ignorant of the organizational inertia which inhibits change? To me, the first in my mind implies a fear of change; the latter more of an inability to consider problems which require change?
• an executive level "champion"; - A CSA with a SecDef mandate?
• constant communications to all levels of the organization;- we are getting better about this through Communities of practice, Blogs, circulation of emails and ideas
• a clear statement of vision, values and ethics; - we kind of have that with the OERs where we lay out attributes, values, ethics, but I don’t think we’ve done a good job emphasizing where those come into play. Many company grade officers & arguably junior field grades don’t think understand the organizational and individual values of “emotional strength, conceptual, and the ilk” . We beat a pretty good drum though on “adaptive, innovative and agile”
• a well laid out system of rewards and punishments to reinforce those values; - Hmmmm???
• a group with power whose sole responsibility is to enforce that code; - For the military I’d prefer that it be more of a shared group responsibility
• an agreement that the core power brokers in the organization don't have to meet the most onerous requirements that they impose on the rest of the organization. – I don’t understand. If the core power brokers don’t share it, then they don’t understand it, and we’re back to square pegs in round holes.
As for me, I'm waiting for the Matrix theory - where I get a USB port behind my ear:D
Thanks, Rob
marct
12-13-2006, 04:01 PM
Hi Rob,
Marc, killer reply & a great read on organizational theory.
Thanks :).
Can you subconsciously be bound to "organizational hysteresis", or is it more of a matter of being ignorant of the organizational inertia which inhibits change? To me, the first in my mind implies a fear of change; the latter more of an inability to consider problems which require change?
Get to the heart of things why don't you?
That's a really tricky question and to do justice to it, I'm going to have to give you a rather long and complex answer. The (very) short answer is "both".
Let me start by saying that institutions and organizaions do not "exist" in any absolute sense of the word - they are "illusions" held in the minds of individuals. These "illusions" are reified (turned into objective things by cultural convention) and, as a result, take on the attributes of things that exist. It is "easier" (actually, it's part of our evolutionary heritage) for us to ascribe characteristics to a shared illusion than it is to deal with its reality.
Having said that, "organizational hysteresis" really refers to what might be called a "self-protection mechanism" in the brain that allows individuals to operate within an organizational environment. All organizations have both ideological (rational, communicated reasons) and symbolic (significatory and emotional) systems. Organizational hysteresis operates using the symbolic system and is usually expressed via the ideological system.
"fear of change"? Sure, that's some of it, although fear, at an unconscious level, of "meaninglessness" would probably be a better description. I usually use Yates' Second Coming as a way of communicating what I mean by this:
TURNING and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
"Organizational inertia"? Sure, there's some of that too. One of the key problems for any organization is to figure out at any given time what its rate of adaptation needs to be. If you look at private industry, for example, the past 40 years has seen a massive shift in the rate of change in employment practices, technology adaptation, etc.
I'm pretty certain that most people in any organization have a fairly good idea of the inertia of that organization <wry grin>. The question is how this is handled in the ideological and symbolic systems of the organization. Organizations based on Authority Ranking systems have a tendency to disapprove of change both ideologically and symbolically, so if you really want to overcome organizational inertia, you need a strong, institutionalized component of the organization whose job it is to push for situational change.
BTW, this doesn't actually have to be a person it can be a process. Let me give you an example: Take the "lessons learned" documents coming out of Iraq. If the process required policy revisions based on these documents with a regular review for compliance every, say, 6 months, then you would actually have a form of adaptability that takes advantage of organizational inertia.
• an executive level "champion"; - A CSA with a SecDef mandate?
Possibly, although it could be an outsider who is brought in at the JC level.
• constant communications to all levels of the organization;- we are getting better about this through Communities of practice, Blogs, circulation of emails and ideas
I agree on that :). In many ways, the communications structures that have worked in private industry tend to be a combination of "official" and unofficial. Think of it as an "organizational lessons learned" campaign <evil grin>. BTW, it is also crucial that negative lessons learned are included with no backlash IFF their was no fault.
• a clear statement of vision, values and ethics; - we kind of have that with the OERs where we lay out attributes, values, ethics, but I don’t think we’ve done a good job emphasizing where those come into play. Many company grade officers & arguably junior field grades don’t think understand the organizational and individual values of “emotional strength, conceptual, and the ilk” . We beat a pretty good drum though on “adaptive, innovative and agile”
I suspect that that is a reaction to the current operational environment - "adaptive, innovative and agile" are much more usefil in the field. The actual "vision statement" has to be an offical construct, while the applications of an ethics code need to be continually debated. Proctor and Gamble is a good example of what I am thinking of now. On the training side, Heinlein's idea of a class in History and Moral Philosophy is a good example (Book not movie!).
• a well laid out system of rewards and punishments to reinforce those values; - Hmmmm???
Pretty simple, really. You already have the Joint Code of Military Justice for most operations. In the case of implementing changes, you need to tweak the current system such that each desireable value is reinforced, while non-desired values are punished. For example, let's supppose that a company commander drags his heels on implementing a particular initiative. This is pretty much already covered under the JCMJ and it's just a matter of applying it.
• a group with power whose sole responsibility is to enforce that code; - For the military I’d prefer that it be more of a shared group responsibility
I can understand that, but there is always the problem of an old boys network disrupting the change process. Think of what I am proposing as a combination of an Inspector General and an Auditor General. I'm not sure about the US, but in Canada, the Auditor General has the right to examine any government organization and the legal responsibility to point out its flaws. As an anti-old boys network component, the Auditor General is appointed for a specific time period and given a golden parachute. They are never expected to work for the government again.
• an agreement that the core power brokers in the organization don't have to meet the most onerous requirements that they impose on the rest of the organization. – I don’t understand. If the core power brokers don’t share it, then they don’t understand it, and we’re back to square pegs in round holes.
Not quite - this is more of a "reality of situations" than an ideal. The core power brokers are required to appear to support it, but are not required to meet all of the "new" requirements. For example, let's suppose that one "requirement" was for a mandatory sabbatical after 10 years of service. The main power brokers are likely to be older and closer to retirement, so they could be exempted from this requirement on the understanding that they would retire within 10 years. Or how about mandatory psychological testing every six months for all active duty personelle?
Basically, it is a way of sugar coating something that they can't stomach.
As for me, I'm waiting for the Matrix theory - where I get a USB port behind my ear:D
:D It's coming!!!!!
Marc
Rob,
I'm sure that you've already read this op-ed piece from Parameters, but if not, it gets very much at the heart of our conversation:
"Fashion Tips for Field Grades"
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB731.pdf
What a great metaphor, and all too sad.
120mm
12-14-2006, 09:34 AM
On superiors exempting themselves from onerous requirements:
As a Reservist, I have time and time again been forced to attend mandatory training designed to "accept change", yet I have never seen a person in actual authority attend. The result? The organization in question doesn't actually change, as the important people didn't have to attend the class, or buy into change, at all.
On a contrarian note: I had the honor of speaking at last year's Combat Studies Institute Symposium. LTG Petraeus was the keynote speaker on the first day. He got up, said his spiel, and then, shockingly to me, sat back down in the first row. And attended all three days of the conference.
I have never, ever seen such behavior in a senior officer. It was the first time, in over 24 years of service, that I saw a senior officer actually attend something. LTG Petraeus not only attended, but he took notes, and asked a question or two of every single presenter.
I always just assumed that once you hit O-6, that you became a "Spot-Check Charlie" who had to be acquainted with your organizations through briefing slides. The 5 GOs that I've worked directly for, wouldn't have recognized their respective units without a 2 hour PowerPoint briefing.
I've been both a unit commander and an SGS. I am not overwhelmed with our current crop of O-6s and above. And the Field Grades I work with every day appear to be largely anti-intellectual, as well.
Tom Odom
12-14-2006, 01:40 PM
True enough...but
The really good officers AND NCOS read. The steadty stream of visitors through my office dirung rotations or LTP classes indicates the appetite is there if we cook the meal.
The most sought after item aside from Lessons Learned materials? The military history DVD I assembled with 3 CDRom equivalents of military history from CSI, CMH, and MHI.
I have hopes for a new rennaissance in the Army as we had in the early 80s.
I have nothing but respect for David Kilcullen the Aussie who is the latest fad in COIN theory. The Army had Kilcullens before 9-11 as did the Marine Corps as did State, CIA, and AID. But as indicated in the fashion piece from SSI above, we were not fashionable.
Even Colin Powell in his "rules" offers a distinct anti-intellectual bent:
1. It ain't as bad as you think. It will look better in the morning.
2. Get mad, then get over it.
3. Avoid having your ego so close to your position that when your position falls, your ego goes with it.
4. It can be done!
5. Be careful what you choose. You may get it.
6. Don't let adverse facts stand in the way of a good decision.
7. You can't make someone else's choices. You shouldn't let someone else make yours.
8. Check small things.
9. Share credit.
10. Remain calm. Be kind.
11. Have a vision. Be demanding.
12. Don't take counsel of your fears or naysayers.
13. Perpetual optimism is a force multiplier.
Meanwhile the challenge to all of us on here is to:
1. Keep reading and learning
2. Keep encouraging others to do the same
3. Reward those who do, if only with simple praise
4. Maintain the intellectual integrity and bravery to challenge ignorance
5. And remember that stupidity cannot be fixed with knowledge: to reverse Forrest Gump's Mama: "Stupid does because Stupid is."
Best
Tom
marct
12-14-2006, 01:53 PM
Hi 120mm,
As a Reservist, I have time and time again been forced to attend mandatory training designed to "accept change", yet I have never seen a person in actual authority attend. The result? The organization in question doesn't actually change, as the important people didn't have to attend the class, or buy into change, at all.
You know, I hesitated before listing that particular point <wry grin>. Historically, it has tended to be the result of backroom political deals inside organizations with divided power structures. It is a face saving option that allows the cynics who run many organizations to appear to support a position, but then not actually do anything other than make their underlings do the work <sigh>.
On the effects of it, you are quite right. It doesn't necessarily stop change, but it does inevitably slow it down.
On a contrarian note: I had the honor of speaking at last year's Combat Studies Institute Symposium. LTG Petraeus was the keynote speaker on the first day. He got up, said his spiel, and then, shockingly to me, sat back down in the first row. And attended all three days of the conference.
I have never, ever seen such behavior in a senior officer. It was the first time, in over 24 years of service, that I saw a senior officer actually attend something. LTG Petraeus not only attended, but he took notes, and asked a question or two of every single presenter.
Remember that point I made about establishing a "Champion"? That is exactly what he was acting as. If his actions shocked you, how do you think that they have affected your long-term view of what a senior officer should do? My gut guess is that you, and a bunch of other people attending, started to rethink your views. His actions of attending, paying attention, asking questions, etc. has, probably, shifted your emotional responses to the symbol of a "good senior officer".
This is culture change in action. Now, to back it up and reinforce it, the trick will be to start getting more and more senior officers to attend this type of event, making it a "tradition" for fast-track promotions. If that happens, then the inverse will happen as well - "Jim, oh, he said he can't be bothered with coming. Yeah, I guess he will get that posting to the Dew line. See you there...". It's a silly script, but it is also the basis of what cultural change / engineering in organizations is all about - redefining the emotional valuation of symbols (including events).
I always just assumed that once you hit O-6, that you became a "Spot-Check Charlie" who had to be acquainted with your organizations through briefing slides. The 5 GOs that I've worked directly for, wouldn't have recognized their respective units without a 2 hour PowerPoint briefing.
<wry grin>You know, somehow that doesn't make me feel very sanguine. I hope that they didn't need a 20 slide PowerPoint presentation to show them how to get under cover? Hmmm, maybe I should rethink that - there is something to be said for Darwinian selection ;) .
On a more serious note, this is a classic problem that has developed time and time again in many organizations between those who "do" and those who "support the doing" - think of it as the difference between warriors or soldiers and bureaucrats. Inevitably, when the "doers" are not needed for the survival of the society, the bureaucrats take over the institutions. The Byzantine Empire in the 11th century provides one of the most horrific examples of this in terms of the military, but their are other good examples as well - the Roman Catholic Church in the 14th century and the British Colonial Office in the 20th century come to mind.
I've been both a unit commander and an SGS. I am not overwhelmed with our current crop of O-6s and above. And the Field Grades I work with every day appear to be largely anti-intellectual, as well.
So are many of the academics I've come in contact with :D . I think it's important to point out that being overly intellectual is equally dangerous. To my (biased) opinion, the best situation is someone who can combine expertise in the immediate "now" when neccessary and, at the same time, has the ability (and knowledge) to sit back and think when time is available.
Intellectualizing, over-thinking as it were, is actually something that has been bred out of our species for most of our history, and for good reason. When I talk about this in my Intro to Anthropology classes, I use the example of Australopithicenes after they developed Oldowan tool technology. Picture this scene:
(Setting - the savanah grasslands in Africa. A small troop of 3 foot tall Australopithecines gather around to hear their troop leader talk)
Leader: Alright, listen up! This is it! This is what we have been waiting for! WE've got the tools! We've got the technology! Let's conquer the world! (sound of raucus cheering)
(pan shot showing the troop moving out into the tall grass. Sequence of shots showing time movement of several hours, ending with the troop in a skirmish line moving towards a watering hole)
Lucy: Um, guys, do you see that patch of grass up ahead? The one that's moving against the wind?
Everyone: Yeah Sure Got it, etc.
Lucy: Do you see that tuft of grass that looks a bit burnt at the end?
Everyone: Yeah Sure Got it, etc.
Lucy: Well, I don't know about you guys, but I'm getting out of here!
Leader: What!?! Deserting your post? Get back here and use logic, damnit!
(shot of Lucy running of into a stand of trees 200 meteers away)
Leader: Damn coward! Okay, boys, let's look at this logically. A tuft of grass going against the wind. Hmm. it's tawny, and now, hey, that's odd - it seems to be moving towards us.
(shot of other members of the troopp running for the trees)
Leader: Hey, wait a minute! Don't forget, we've got the technology here - we can take on anything! Now, hey, it's getting closer isn't it? Wow, only about 15 feet away and...
CRUNCH as a lion jumps on the leader and proceeds to have lunch while thinking that his current meal tastes a bit "airy".
I'd hate to think what would have happened if Australopithecines had had PowerPoint presentations :eek:
Marc
Steve Blair
12-14-2006, 01:56 PM
I've seen the same interest from some of our AFROTC cadets, Tom. I'm something of the office history specialist, and many of them drop by with questions or just to talk and get book recommendations. But they get little encouragement aside from these talks. Our course materials are geared toward turning out little Curtis LeMays who can spout AF "core values" until the cows come home but have no real grasp of reality outside the little blue ball. And it's a shame.
Rob Thornton
12-15-2006, 05:00 AM
I read recently where the 3 GOs in the running to take over from GEN Casey are: LTG Petraeus, LTG Dempsey and LTG Chirelli. One of them will implement (and are probably influencing its design) whatever new strategy comes out with the New Year. Their policies and execution of the strategy will influence every officer here in some fashion who will take back with them what they have learned to the various school houses, follow on assignments, etc.
I was talking with our team 1SG last night about if we thought the American public had the stomach for a "generational war"? What I mean for example, if say in 2008 -2010, we transitioned from a major investment in Iraq to say a major investment in the Horn of Africa, would the public have the stomach for it? Even though the public suffers very little - not many serve, the % of the GDP spent on Military Spending is actually very low (almost commensurate with the % who serve) - would we have the politcal will for it? Are we willing to allocate the resources for it?
There was an article which quoted an AF strategist the other day that said (I paraphrase), "Radical Islam is willing to fight for 50 -100 years to establish an Islamic State" and that this was somewhat akin to the "Cold War" in terms of it being an ideological struggle on a global scale.
Now maybe through limited, "early intervention", etc. the world can help to deny the conditions in failing states from being ripe for picking by radical Islamic opportunists. However, its going to take leaders with vision on how not only to employ all the instruments available to them, but the leadership skills to build teams of diverse groups (Combined, Inter-Agency, Joint) with mixed chains of command together to achieve a purpose.
Maybe, these early intervention efforts can go under the public radar enough not to drag in the media'a propensity to spin it; maybe it won't spook the politicians, or be used by the other party as a "catalyst" for change, maybe...., but even relatively small deployments (in comparrison to OIF & OEF) can go supernova quickly.
Keeping the "Long War" acceptable to a public majority who does not seem interested in sacrifice in almost any sense of the word will be difficult. Our national short term memory and attention span may create something more along the lines of a "knee jerk", reactionary strategy that allows only for intervention after the conditions are such that the contest is already decided, but still demand action because now a political response to media spun public outcries require it. However, failure will now be the fault of .....
I know its dark and pessimistic, and hopefully its not so bad as all that. My point is to discuss some of the conditions that leaders will have to operate in. Which brings me back to Marc's Executive champion & the other motivators for genetic re-engineering. One of the challenges is going to be engineering the all volunteer military for another long struggle - our metaphor of the background of Marathon in which the pentathletes compete.
120mm
12-15-2006, 10:01 AM
Marc, you got my sarcastic point about Petraeus, entirely. What also interests me about the guy, is that we had a couple of discussions during the conference and he seemed genuine and smart.
My point about anti-intellectuals, is that they tend to have good coping skills for one set of familiar situations. Unfortunately, they lack the imagination and desire to prepare themselves for a different set of unfamiliar situations.
In other words, being anti-intellectual discards the baby with the bath-water. While one can be overly-intellectual, and embrace new things without healthy skepticism like your Australopithecenes, most people I label as "anti-intellectual" were saying things like "They're just truck drivers, they'll never have to use their rifles" in early 2003 in Kuwait.
It is not easy to be well-read in the military, and it is not easy to have worked with your hands in academia, from what I've seen and experienced.
Steve Blair
12-15-2006, 02:24 PM
Marc, you got my sarcastic point about Petraeus, entirely. What also interests me about the guy, is that we had a couple of discussions during the conference and he seemed genuine and smart.
My point about anti-intellectuals, is that they tend to have good coping skills for one set of familiar situations. Unfortunately, they lack the imagination and desire to prepare themselves for a different set of unfamiliar situations.
In other words, being anti-intellectual discards the baby with the bath-water. While one can be overly-intellectual, and embrace new things without healthy skepticism like your Australopithecenes, most people I label as "anti-intellectual" were saying things like "They're just truck drivers, they'll never have to use their rifles" in early 2003 in Kuwait.
It is not easy to be well-read in the military, and it is not easy to have worked with your hands in academia, from what I've seen and experienced.
You may have the misfortune to discover (if you haven't already) that there are many in the academic world that also do not have the imagination to prepare themselves for new or different situations. I've encountered many academics over the years who refuse to believe that military personnel are capable of critical or rational thinking. There are also a fair number out there who feel that studying military history somehow makes you a militarist or Nazi and that it should be carved away from the mainstream of historical study (while, of course, keeping their pet niche of environmental history or some mutant version of gender studies). Anti-intellectualism in the sense you use the term is sadly very alive and well within academia.
marct
12-15-2006, 03:18 PM
You may have the misfortune to discover (if you haven't already) that there are many in the academic world that also do not have the imagination to prepare themselves for new or different situations. I've encountered many academics over the years who refuse to believe that military personnel are capable of critical or rational thinking. There are also a fair number out there who feel that studying military history somehow makes you a militarist or Nazi and that it should be carved away from the mainstream of historical study (while, of course, keeping their pet niche of environmental history or some mutant version of gender studies). Anti-intellectualism in the sense you use the term is sadly very alive and well within academia.
Isn't that about the only environment where it could survive? A hot house? <wry grin>.
Honestly, I swear that the process of getting your Ph.D. is designed to stamp out any type of imagination or original thought. As a case in point, one friend of mine (not on my committee, but a very well respected academic) told me to forget about trying to come up with anything new - just find a respected theory and apply it then publish like crazy. BTW, he has been using the same data set for 14 years and publishing basically the same material for the same time.
Imagination is not prized in many departments. In some, and I'm lucky enough to be teaching in one of them, it is both prized and matched by what I call a "civilized mode of discourse". BTW, a loose translation would be "I think that's nuts, but keep talking - I'm sure that we can both learn something". As I said, a nice department but, unfortunately, rare.
Marc
Tom Odom
12-15-2006, 04:13 PM
Imagination is not prized in many departments. In some, and I'm lucky enough to be teaching in one of them, it is both prized and matched by what I call a "civilized mode of discourse". BTW, a loose translation would be "I think that's nuts, but keep talking - I'm sure that we can both learn something". As I said, a nice department but, unfortunately, rare.
Is that like having "a peculiar world view you make no attempt to hide or overcome" Marc? (quoting that review I sent you a short time back) :D
Tom
marct
12-15-2006, 04:43 PM
Is that like having "a peculiar world view you make no attempt to hide or overcome" Marc? (quoting that review I sent you a short time back) :D
Tom
You got it, Tom :D
Amongst other things, I call myself a "pre-modernist", a monarchist, and a solid believer in the ideals of the British Empire that never was, all of which really un-nerve a lot of my academic colleagues <evil grin>. All in all, I just view myself as being solidly in keeping with my family's tradition of ecentricity - something I get from both sides of it :D .
Marc
selil
12-15-2006, 05:51 PM
Where is the Renaisance man? The stove pipes of science are filled with the burned embers and sludge created by the fleeting careers of men who showed imagination and leadership. As the cogs of science turning and churning adapt the grist in the gears are those who think differently. The machinery of science and academia are melted together leaving those who would think differently outside the tower. So it was with Bill Gates, Bill Joy, and many others who adapted technology.
When was the last revolutionary change in science and arts? When was the last unexpected turn of consequence not piled on the bones of anitiquated thought?
Rob Thornton
12-15-2006, 06:01 PM
I remember seeing a sign in the Franklin Street Pub in Clarksville, TN that read, "The wheel is a fine invention, but does not go nearly so well with pizza as beer!":rolleyes:
marct
12-15-2006, 06:04 PM
Where is the Renaisance man? The stove pipes of science are filled with the burned embers and sludge created by the fleeting careers of men who showed imagination and leadership. As the cogs of science turning and churning adapt the grist in the gears are those who think differently. The machinery of science and academia are melted together leaving those who would think differently outside the tower. So it was with Bill Gates, Bill Joy, and many others who adapted technology.
What poetry! The Renaisance man has been killed by the machinery of a science that makes us all into its own image. Then again, there are some ghosts in the machine :D
When was the last revolutionary change in science and arts? When was the last unexpected turn of consequence not piled on the bones of anitiquated thought?
Shouldn't we add in philophy to the list <wry grin>? I must say that my insipration has frequently come from the wrolds of Gregory Bateson; especially his last couple of books.
Marc
Tom Odom
12-15-2006, 06:47 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by selil
Where is the Renaisance man? The stove pipes of science are filled with the burned embers and sludge created by the fleeting careers of men who showed imagination and leadership. As the cogs of science turning and churning adapt the grist in the gears are those who think differently. The machinery of science and academia are melted together leaving those who would think differently outside the tower. So it was with Bill Gates, Bill Joy, and many others who adapted technology.
What poetry! The Renaisance man has been killed by the machinery of a science that makes us all into its own image. Then again, there are some ghosts in the machine
I think I will go watch the Terminator series non-stop
Then I'll be back :eek:
Tom
PS Marc
I maintain Forrest Gump is the greatest philosphical expression of the 20th Century. Gary Senise as "Lt. Dan" signed my copy of the Wit and Wisdom of Forrest Gump. I mean who can compete with "Some people, like me, are born idiots, but many more become stupider as they go along,"?
marct
12-15-2006, 06:57 PM
I think I will go watch the Terminator series non-stop
Then I'll be back :eek:
But in what form:D
PS Marc
I maintain Forrest Gump is the greatest philosphical expression of the 20th Century. Gary Senise as "Lt. Dan" signed my copy of the Wit and Wisdom of Forrest Gump. I mean who can compete with "Some people, like me, are born idiots, but many more become stupider as they go along,"?
True, true. Maybe we should start assigning it.... Naw, it is too accurate <wry grin>. After all, we aren't allowed to talk about reality, only "Truth":rolleyes: . Of course, I could assign Tom Lehrer - always one of my favorite philosophetrs of the 20th century:cool:
Marc
Steve Blair
12-15-2006, 07:11 PM
Never start assigning things. That just gives "academics" more chances to ruin any learning possibilities that might exist within the material...:eek:
marct
12-15-2006, 07:17 PM
Never start assigning things. That just gives "academics" more chances to ruin any learning possibilities that might exist within the material...:eek:
Darn! Good point... Mayeb soemthing along the lines of "Whatever you do, Don't listen to Tom Lehrer!"? Nah, half of them would take me seriously <wry grin>.
Marc
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