Afghan Exit:why, how and more in country and beyond

[Bob's World]

Moderator's Note

There are now over three hundred threads in this forum and time for a new one to cover what may happen, is planned to happen and not only the impact within Afghanistan, but at home too. Home of course being wider than just the USA, the ISAF coalition and those nations who have participated in Afghanistan.

The catalyst for this thread came from a number of posts on the 'The Best Trained, Most Professional Military...Just Lost Two Wars? ' thread which IMHO contribute to that subject and are more pertinent here.

Secondly after a review there are a number of threads that cover aspects of an exit, most of them from a historical angle; back to three years ago only.

Fuller explanation and links etc are on Post 16.

This thread was not started by Bob's World, rather I used it as the starting point.(Ends)




OK, so what should the individual consequences be?

Thereafter what and how long would it take to replace with those who built it with those without guilt or blood on their hands?

I don't think we need to go on a witch hunt to see who to punish.

It's just time to recognize that we don't need to control, directly or indirectly through the Northern Alliance, Afghanistan to prevent it from being an AQ sanctuary. To recognize that the Northern Alliance has absolutely no interest or desire to be the government we want them to be. To recognize that we are better off simply packing up and going home than we are executing any kind of phased out exit plan.

[carl]

To recognize that we are better off simply packing up and going home than we are executing any kind of phased out exit plan.

Should we continue to pay for the fuel and ammunition for the ANSF after we leave? And should we make special provisions to take along the many thousands who have worked for and with us, and their families, when we go?

[Bob's World]

Carl,

We were manipulated (willingly) by the Northern Alliance. We did not trick them into supporting us, rather it was quite the opposite. Most are now mulit-millionaires and already have their exit strategies well funded and well planned out. I shed no tears for them.

Those in the villages, those who embraced the Villlage Stability program, for example, that is another matter. There will be no offers of sanctuary for these people I am sure, and they have no millions to show for their buying into what we were selling. These are the ones who are most vulnerable to what will happen as the US and GIRoA both light out for other places.

As we prioritize our loyalties, I think we might want to think about our own troops, their families, and the people of the US. I think this has gone on long enough.

[carl]

Bob:

Those who aren't rich will look at us and say "You promised." If we don't at least try to make some extraordinary provisions for them that makes us a pretty shameful lot. Those who aren't rich to whom we made promises will probably not look kindly upon us if we were to bug out precipitously leaving them. We might have to steal out like thieves in the night.

Do you think we should continue to supplies fuel and bullets once we leave? The Soviets did that at least until their system collapsed.

[JMA]

Bob:

Those who aren't rich will look at us and say "You promised." If we don't at least try to make some extraordinary provisions for them that makes us a pretty shameful lot. Those who aren't rich to whom we made promises will probably not look kindly upon us if we were to bug out precipitously leaving them. We might have to steal out like thieves in the night.

Do you think we should continue to supplies fuel and bullets once we leave? The Soviets did that at least until their system collapsed.

Carl, the problem stems from the concept of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend". You can of course exploit this situation without throwing billions at these temporary 'fair weather' allies but that is not the way the US works.

The US politicians - remember Nixon with his "Peace with Honor" BS - seem to be able to sell anything to the voters but after the US troops are safely back at home and the country concerned drops off the radar thats when the real problems begin. More were killed after the war in Vietnam. What are the stats from Iraq using "Mission Accomplished" as the end of the war (they thought).

What will happen in Afghanistan is anyones guess but what is for certain is that the leaders of the current regime are well set up with US money to move at short notice while for the villages the cycle of violence will continue.

[Bob's World]

Bob:

Those who aren't rich will look at us and say "You promised." If we don't at least try to make some extraordinary provisions for them that makes us a pretty shameful lot. Those who aren't rich to whom we made promises will probably not look kindly upon us if we were to bug out precipitously leaving them. We might have to steal out like thieves in the night.

Do you think we should continue to supplies fuel and bullets once we leave? The Soviets did that at least until their system collapsed.

Carl, you act like we somehow lured the Northern Alliance into doing something they were not already completely dedicated toward the accomplishment of. Or, as if the Afghan populace somehow has any more say now in who rules them than they did before. This is still a land where the only sure vote is cast in 7.62mm lead.

Think about it, if the election process was truly fair and functional, the Taliban government in exile would have simply rallied a "get out the vote" campaign rather than a long, bloody insurgency.

Government to government relations are contracts, not blood oaths. You worry about what happens if the US "abandons" GIRoA; but answer this, how long ago do you think that Northern Alliance-based government abandoned us?? 5 years ago? 10 years ago? Never really caring about what we wanted from the first place? We were "abandoned" long ago, but were too self-absorbed to notice or even much care.

Again, they abandoned us long ago, and have been manipulating us to protect and fund one of the most self-serving governments on the planet. Will many good Afghan people suffer when we leave? Yes. But many good Afghan people suffer because we stay as well.

Time to stop make arguments based on false logic and poor facts. It is only just in the past few months that our senior leaders in Afghanistan are waking up to the fact that the interests and efforts promoted so heavily by ISAF are not anything that GIRoA is interested in at all. If we would have truly honored Afghan sovereignty from the start we would have realized this long ago. Allowing our General's opinions to trump the host nation's President is a bad policy that leads inevitably to places like the one we are in now.

As soon as we stop driving the train as to what "must" be done, there will be a HUGE compression and reduction of security effort by GIRoA. As soon as we stop funding development and security forces there will be an immediate halt to 90% of that as well. We have been self-serving in our approaches just as much as GIRoA has. Time to let this situation find a more natural balance. That is a balance that may well end up with significant Taliban influence over it. We need to prepare for that reality and be willing to swallow our pride and reach out to embrace it.

The only way our true enemies gain undue influence or sanctuary in Afghanistan is if we once again turn our backs on the place or are too proud to reach out to the new management that is sure to rise. Judging by our spiteful positions on Cuba, Vietnam and Iran, however, I am not optimistic that we will this time decide to be the bigger man and extend our hand first. Most likely we will allow ourselves to be manipulated by a vocal diaspora that has fled in our wake to enjoy their il-gotten gains in the safety of our borders

[carl]

David:

Your judgment in these matters is good. You decide.

But let us amend the original question the C's asked. We'll go from 'How come such a great military just lost two wars?' to 'How come this country of ours that professes to be a cut above, the city on the hill, is probably going to abandon millions of people to lethal killers again?' Just like we did before.

I remember the aftermath of our abandoning South Vietnam. I hoped we would never do it again though I knew in my heart that we probably would. That won't make it any less sad and shameful though.

[jmm99]

with the OP's question:


from Carl
How come this country of ours that professes to be a cut above, the city on the hill, is probably going to abandon millions of people to lethal killers again?

In answer, it will continue to do so until (1) it ceases to preach that it is "the city on the hill"; and (2) it ceases to preach that it will safeguard "millions of people" from "lethal killers".

It will continue to do so so long as its strategy continues to be based on what was so clearly stated to be US strategy in Afghanistan from the gitgo:


Future of Afghanistan (http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/6757.htm)
Richard N. Haass (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_N._Haass), Director, Office of the Policy Planning Staff, and U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan,
Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC
December 6, 2001

Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before the Committee on Foreign Relations in my capacity as U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan.

Our aims in Afghanistan are well known to the American people and this Committee. We seek to bring about an Afghanistan that is free of terrorists, that no longer is a source of poppy, and that allows its citizens -- including an estimated five million refugees and an unknown number of internally displaced persons -- to return to their homes and live normal lives in which opportunity comes to replace misery. ... (JMM: much more of the same in the rest of the statement).

Not to blame Mr Haass too much, who was simply following in the footsteps of a flock of US Presidents (from Wilson to GWB, at the time) and stating what his boss Colin Powell wanted stated.

If one believes that the US is "the city on the hill" and has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers", then one is obliged, I suppose, to preach what Mr Haass said. The problem is that, if in the course of these neo-colonial wars, one must pull the plug, charges of hypocrisy are well founded indeed.

I do not believe that the US is "the city on the hill"; or that it has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers" - other than its own citizens. I am therefore a "bad, evil person".

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

But let us amend the original question the C's asked. We'll go from 'How come such a great military just lost two wars?' to 'How come this country of ours that professes to be a cut above, the city on the hill, is probably going to abandon millions of people to lethal killers again?' Just like we did before.

I remember the aftermath of our abandoning South Vietnam. I hoped we would never do it again though I knew in my heart that we probably would. That won't make it any less sad and shameful though.

The word "abandon" is emotionally loaded and I don't see any place for it in a discussion like this. Do you suggest that protecting the populace of the world is an American responsibility? Or that once the US associates with a dysfunctional government they are then committed to defend the governed populace forever?

If Afghans want to keep the Taliban out, they can do that. They sent the Russians back to Russia, they're sending the Americans back to America, they can send the Taliban back to Pakistan... if they want to. If they don't want to, that's ultimately up to them. I don't see how protecting Afghans from themselves, or from each other, is an American responsibility.

[jcustis]

The word "abandon" is emotionally loaded and I don't see any place for it in a discussion like this. Do you suggest that protecting the populace of the world is an American responsibility? Or that once the US associates with a dysfunctional government they are then committed to defend the governed populace forever?

If Afghans want to keep the Taliban out, they can do that. They sent the Russians back to Russia, they're sending the Americans back to America, they can send the Taliban back to Pakistan... if they want to. If they don't want to, that's ultimately up to them. I don't see how protecting Afghans from themselves, or from each other, is an American responsibility.

Quoted for truth, as they say. Absolute truth.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by JM999


If one believes that the US is "the city on the hill" and has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers", then one is obliged, I suppose, to preach what Mr Haass said. The problem is that, if in the course of these neo-colonial wars, one must pull the plug, charges of hypocrisy are well founded indeed.

I do not believe that the US is "the city on the hill"; or that it has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers" - other than its own citizens. I am therefore a "bad, evil person".

Posted by Dayuhan


The word "abandon" is emotionally loaded and I don't see any place for it in a discussion like this. Do you suggest that protecting the populace of the world is an American responsibility? Or that once the US associates with a dysfunctional government they are then committed to defend the governed populace forever?

Lot's of wisdom in the above quotes, and while I emphasize with Carl's lamenting, I have come to a place where I believe the American people have a strong sense of right and wrong, which is a large part of what makes me proud to be an American. The downside to this (and I have definitely been guilty of this) is they feel compelled to act when they see an injustice in the world, but they have no idea where that act will take them or the millions of people impacted by it. We collectively have naive beliefs about how the world works, and then when we find out that can't save all the children or send all the girls to school despite our best efforts, and we get tired of our people coming home in coffins or terribly maimed with no end in sight we abandon altrustic goals for more reasonable ones. The question we need to ask in the beginning before we commit is will we ultimately do more good, or create a worse situation like we did in Iraq where more people died after Saddam was soundly defeated?

A case in point that is not Afghanistan centric. We generally find it apalling that kids would work in a so-called sweat shop for 10-12 hours a day in a developing nation, although kids did it in the US during the industrial revolution. We find it more disgusting if they're working in a company making goods for a US Company. We're so disgusted that we jump on our white horse and ride to the rescue. In this case Senator Harkin in 1993 proposed legislation banning imports from countries that hire underage workers. Bangladesh saw the writing on the wall, and directed its factories quit hiring children. Bravo! America came to the rescue, we can all sleep better.

The rest of the story is those kids didn't go to school or stay home and watch Sesame Street, in many cases they ended up in worse jobs, living on the street, and in many cases they ended up as child prostitutes. They worked in those sweat shops because they were the best available alternative and we took that away from them with the best of intentions, because we used mirror imaging, and assuming if the kids weren't in sweat shops they would be going to school.

We're naive as a people because most of our people view the world through 30 second sound bytes and make a judgment on whether something is good or bad, and may even push to have the government deploy the military to "fix" the problem. The military isn't broke because it can't fix these problems, but our national level decision making process is.

[carl]

Carl, you act like we somehow lured the Northern Alliance into doing something they were not already completely dedicated toward the accomplishment of. Or, as if the Afghan populace somehow has any more say now in who rules them than they did before. This is still a land where the only sure vote is cast in 7.62mm lead.

I don't give a darn about the warlords. I give a darn about all the people we made promises to and who will be subject to that 7.62 mm vote when we bug out, cut off the money and don't bother to try and make extraordinary efforts to take people who trusted us with us.


Think about it, if the election process was truly fair and functional, the Taliban government in exile would have simply rallied a "get out the vote" campaign rather than a long, bloody insurgency.

I have thought about it. I thought to myself that Taliban & Co have never much cared for elections. The results are too unpredictable for them. MO wrapped himself in the cloak of the Prophet, he doesn't do elections.


Government to government relations are contracts, not blood oaths. You worry about what happens if the US "abandons" GIRoA; but answer this, how long ago do you think that Northern Alliance-based government abandoned us?? 5 years ago? 10 years ago? Never really caring about what we wanted from the first place? We were "abandoned" long ago, but were too self-absorbed to notice or even much care.

Tell me, are there gradations in how seriously we should view promises? Does a promise or a commitment leave more wiggle room than a blood oath?

That is a nice bit of sophistry, us being abandoned. It cleverly shifts the blame. "Your honor I woulda kept the deal but they broke it first." And you always use "Northern Alliance" so we don't have to think about the little people we are going to bug out on. "Northern Alliance" sort of blocks them from view.


Will many good Afghan people suffer when we leave? Yes. But many good Afghan people suffer because we stay as well.

So one equals the other then? No I think not. That knife is sharp and it will cut deep when we bug out. We can lessen the pain for some if we try to take a bunch of them out with us when we go, or arrange for them to come later if things fall apart. I think we should do that. Do you think we should do that?


Time to stop make arguments based on false logic and poor facts. It is only just in the past few months that our senior leaders in Afghanistan are waking up to the fact that the interests and efforts promoted so heavily by ISAF are not anything that GIRoA is interested in at all. If we would have truly honored Afghan sovereignty from the start we would have realized this long ago. Allowing our General's opinions to trump the host nation's President is a bad policy that leads inevitably to places like the one we are in now.

I agree wholeheartedly with you last sentence. That speaks directly to the point the C's were making in their original post. As you said previously, our generals allowed scores to trump wisdom. That is poor soldiering. Of course since they have made it into the multi-star club, they will benefit now and forever from the impunity that comes from being in the club.

I agree with you first sentence also, though probably in a different way. I would apply it to our relations with our enemy, the Pak Army/ISI. But it is probably too late now.


As soon as we stop driving the train as to what "must" be done, there will be a HUGE compression and reduction of security effort by GIRoA. As soon as we stop funding development and security forces there will be an immediate halt to 90% of that as well. We have been self-serving in our approaches just as much as GIRoA has. Time to let this situation find a more natural balance. That is a balance that may well end up with significant Taliban influence over it. We need to prepare for that reality and be willing to swallow our pride and reach out to embrace it.

I think India, Iran, the Stans, Russia and Turkey are all going to have something to say about that. As for us, if we are going to bug out, which it seems we are fated to do, why on earth would we entreat with Taliban & Co? All those countries know a lot more about it and are a lot closer. After bugging out we wouldn't have any pull with anybody anyway.

I asked way above if you thought we should stop funding the ANSF after we bug out. I take it that you think we should. We didn't take a blood oath so that is OK I guess.


The only way our true enemies gain undue influence or sanctuary in Afghanistan is if we once again turn our backs on the place or are too proud to reach out to the new management that is sure to rise. Judging by our spiteful positions on Cuba, Vietnam and Iran, however, I am not optimistic that we will this time decide to be the bigger man and extend our hand first. Most likely we will allow ourselves to be manipulated by a vocal diaspora that has fled in our wake to enjoy their il-gotten gains in the safety of our borders

Yeah, that diaspora will have a voice. Their throats won't be sliced. The ones we made promises too whom we won't take with us, they won't be heard, for they will be dead.

A lot of your arguments, they abandoned us, things will reach their natural level when we leave, the enemy isn't really that bad (Mullah Omar, the getter outer of the vote) remind me of the things that were said from 1973-1975. It was all said then too so our self esteem wouldn't be lessened when we pulled the plug.

[carl]

The word "abandon" is emotionally loaded and I don't see any place for it in a discussion like this. Do you suggest that protecting the populace of the world is an American responsibility? Or that once the US associates with a dysfunctional government they are then committed to defend the governed populace forever?

If Afghans want to keep the Taliban out, they can do that. They sent the Russians back to Russia, they're sending the Americans back to America, they can send the Taliban back to Pakistan... if they want to. If they don't want to, that's ultimately up to them. I don't see how protecting Afghans from themselves, or from each other, is an American responsibility.

The word abandon is a simple description of an act. You promise to stand by something and you don't, you have abandoned it. If that is emotionally loaded that is a measure of the 'don't you dare hurt my feelings' culture we live in now, a culture that in my view blinds us to consequences of our actions.

Your first question is a simple device to distract. We'll move on.

When we say we are going to stick with somebody we should, at least to the point where we make a good faith effort to try. We never did because we never recognized and dealt with realistically the Pak Army/ISI. So now we are going to bug out. Since that is a done deal seemingly we should keep the money going to the ANSF and we should make arrangements to take those who worked with us, with us, when and if they need to go. We won't of course. To damn difficult to assimilate people like that (the word that is to be uttered disdainfully with slightly curled lips). We have incurred, I think, certain moral obligations. (I know what's coming so please don't present me with the argument that nations only have interests, not moral obligations. I don't agree.)

Your last paragraph I heard before, almost 40 years ago. Only then instead of Afghans, it was South Vietnamese. The argument facilely ignored outside actors then, just as it does now.

[jcustis]

I don't give a darn about the warlords. I give a darn about all the people we made promises to and who will be subject to that 7.62 mm vote when we bug out, cut off the money and don't bother to try and make extraordinary efforts to take people who trusted us with us.

Carl, who are you referring to when you say we made promises to people?

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan
The word "abandon" is emotionally loaded and I don't see any place for it in a discussion like this.


The word abandon is a simple description of an act. You promise to stand by something and you don't, you have abandoned it. If that is emotionally loaded that is a measure of the 'don't you dare hurt my feelings' culture we live in now, a culture that in my view blinds us to consequences of our actions.

Your first question is a simple device to distract. We'll move on.

Agree. Glad to see someone else has picked up on that.

You are correct. We have now entered the era of the 'spin'.

Surely there is some smart young guy with time on his hands who can plot the path of spin from the beginning when the intervention was being justified up to now when the spin is being applied to justify cutting and running.

I am constantly amazed how some people (many around here) just jump onto and defend to the death the current spin band wagon being applied by the current Administration. Worthy of study.

[davidbfpo]

There are now over three hundred threads in this forum and time for a new one to cover what may happen, is planned to happen and not only the impact within Afghanistan, but at home too. Home of course being wider than just the USA, the ISAF coalition and those nations who have participated in Afghanistan.

The catalyst for this thread came from a number of posts on the 'The Best Trained, Most Professional Military...Just Lost Two Wars? ' thread which IMHO contribute to that subject and are more pertinent here.

Secondly after a review there are a number of threads that cover aspects of an exit, most of them from a historical angle; back to three years ago only:

a) Leaving Afghanistan: is the USA following the USSR strategy? http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16855

b) The best thing we can do is leave: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16590

c) Leave or Stay: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=14354

d) Withdrawal deadlines discussion: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10789

e) What If We Fail in Afghanistan?: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8990

Political statements abound on a change of roles, notably the end of a direct combat role for ISAF by 2014 and on the exit of contributors beforehand, such as France. Strategic value and partnership are mentioned, although the exact form is very dependent on the Afghan national government's stance.

What does an exit mean for the Afghan people, recent posts have asked what does it mean to those who have fought with us, been interpreters and the like?

[Dayuhan]

The word abandon is a simple description of an act. You promise to stand by something and you don't, you have abandoned it.

I don't buy it. A simple description of an act would be "a withdrawal of troops and other resources", or some such thing. "Abandon" assumes an absolute, eternal, and irrevocable commitment, and no such promise was ever or could ever be made. Of course any commitment made has to depend on corresponding effort from the Afghan side. No government on the planet can be expected to fling money eternally at people who seem mostly interested in stealing it, or to provide eternal support for a government that shows few signs of interest in standing on its own. All commitments are limited, just as all resources are limited.


When we say we are going to stick with somebody we should, at least to the point where we make a good faith effort to try. We never did because we never recognized and dealt with realistically the Pak Army/ISI.

I don't buy it. How many lives, how many years, how many hundreds of billions of dollars - much of it stolen by the people we're allegedly abandoning - are needed to constitute a "good faith effort to try"?

There's no way the US can deal realistically with the Pak Army/ISI until we withdraw from Afghanistan: the need to supply forces through Pakistani territory is the single biggest constraint of the revision of that relationship. Absurd to say we shouldn't leave until we deal with Pakistan when we can't do anything about Pakistan until we leave.

Even after leaving, of course, all the US can do is stop giving money and threaten various actions if they do things we don't like. Whether or not that will change their policies is debatable: they are not a vassal state and they are not required to bow to our will.


So now we are going to bug out.

And why should we not? It's pretty clear that the Afghan Government is not going to put any effort into defending or sustaining itself while the Americans are there to do it for them.


Since that is a done deal seemingly we should keep the money going to the ANSF and we should make arrangements to take those who worked with us, with us, when and if they need to go. We won't of course. To damn difficult to assimilate people like that (the word that is to be uttered disdainfully with slightly curled lips).

I would personally have no objection to providing continuing military and civilian assistance, with some provisions. It should be clear that the assistance will be gradually phased out. It should be clear that any organization that doesn't make very visible progress on controlling corruption, meaning specific individual consequences, gets nothing. It should be made clear that if the people training the military get shot, military assistance will stop. I have no personal objection to taking in people who worked with us if they lose - which doesn't have to be a foregone conclusion - with the provision that anyone with a record of stealing public money, dealing drugs, etc is not going to be included.


We have incurred, I think, certain moral obligations. (I know what's coming so please don't present me with the argument that nations only have interests, not moral obligations. I don't agree.)

And the government on the receiving end has no moral obligation to make a visible effort to step up and carry their share? How long do you throw money and lives down a black hole?


Your last paragraph I heard before, almost 40 years ago. Only then instead of Afghans, it was South Vietnamese. The argument facilely ignored outside actors then, just as it does now.

I don't buy it. The Taliban aren't the NVA, not by a long shot. If Afghans want our help in suppressing them, they need to show that they have the will - they've been given the means - to step up and make real substantive effort to carry the fight themselves. We all they know how. If that will is shown, they deserve support. If not, they don't.

There are no blank checks or open-ended commitments in international affairs. None. Never have been, never will be.

[davidbfpo]

Professor Richard Caplan of Oxford University has a edited volume 'Exit Strategies and State Building' and a relevant short article in Survival, June-July 2012 issue. Link to the book:http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/news/new-book-by-professor-richard-caplan.html

To Amazon, no reviews yet:http://www.amazon.com/Strategies-State-Building-Richard-Caplan/dp/0199760128

From his university bio:
Richard Caplan is Professor of International Relations and Official Fellow of Linacre College. His principal research interests are concerned with international organisations and conflict management. His current research is focused on post-conflict state-building. He is directing a research project on 'Exit Strategies and Peace Consolidation' that is examining the empirical experiences of, and scholarly and policy questions associated with, exit in relation to four types of international operations where state-building has been a major objective: colonial administrations, peacekeeping operations, military occupations and international administrations.

I enjoyed reading the article, especially the point that:
...benchmarks need to be concrete and measurable, using meaningful indicators....

Then I read the SWJ article on the Soviet exit, which quite clearly had 'benchmarks' in place.

[carl]

Carl, who are you referring to when you say we made promises to people?

Us, the Americans, the Americans as viewed by the Afghans there and by the rest of the world. When we are judged by those people, they won't use the actual verbiage contained in speeches and policy statements. They will judge us as a group using the totality of the circumstances covering back to 2001. When views like that, we made promises. Again using the totality of circumstance, we made those promises to the Afghans. That is how I figure others judge it, and that is how I judge it.

[carl]

I don't buy it. A simple description of an act would be "a withdrawal of troops and other resources", or some such thing.

You parse the word as you like. I see abandon and I figure the rest of the world is most likely to see like that too.


There's no way the US can deal realistically with the Pak Army/ISI until we withdraw from Afghanistan: the need to supply forces through Pakistani territory is the single biggest constraint of the revision of that relationship. Absurd to say we shouldn't leave until we deal with Pakistan when we can't do anything about Pakistan until we leave.

We supplied the big force we have there now via routes other than Pakistan for months. If we reduce the force to the point where it can be supplied by air and the north route, we can sustain it indefinitely without Pakistan. We have never really tried. That bespeaks laziness, lack of imagination and being the mark for the sahibs in Pindi. The Afghans see that as does the world.


Even after leaving, of course, all the US can do is stop giving money and threaten various actions if they do things we don't like. Whether or not that will change their policies is debatable: they are not a vassal state and they are not required to bow to our will.

Did you ever see the movie The Servant with Dirk Bogarde? It is a dark and twisted tale about how man servent takes over the household through malevolent force of character that subtly overwhelmed the employer. The employer could have stopped things and ruled the roost at any time but he never even tried. Weak character you see. We're the employer.


And why should we not? It's pretty clear that the Afghan Government is not going to put any effort into defending or sustaining itself while the Americans are there to do it for them.

Yep, heard that exact same argument in 1973-1975.


I would personally have no objection to providing continuing military and civilian assistance, with some provisions. It should be clear that the assistance will be gradually phased out. It should be clear that any organization that doesn't make very visible progress on controlling corruption, meaning specific individual consequences, gets nothing. It should be made clear that if the people training the military get shot, military assistance will stop. I have no personal objection to taking in people who worked with us if they lose - which doesn't have to be a foregone conclusion - with the provision that anyone with a record of stealing public money, dealing drugs, etc is not going to be included.

Well that is a start. Good for you. But I note that you incorporate so many provisos that you would be able to leave any time you felt like it and could easily avoid taking those people with us by saying we haven't been able to fully investigate. IIRC, we did the same thing when we wouldn't take in all the European Jews that there were visa for before WWII because the powers that be said they couldn't be sure they weren't Nazi agents. (I recall reading that in FDR at War but I don't have the book here and I may be wrong.)


And the government on the receiving end has no moral obligation to make a visible effort to step up and carry their share? How long do you throw money and lives down a black hole?

Don't conflate the gov with individuals. In order to save those individuals, millions of them perhaps, we might have to put up with a bad gov. It wouldn't be the first time. If you insist on putting behavior of the gov foremost, that is presenting an excuse to bug out on the individuals.


I don't buy it. The Taliban aren't the NVA, not by a long shot. If Afghans want our help in suppressing them, they need to show that they have the will - they've been given the means - to step up and make real substantive effort to carry the fight themselves. We all they know how. If that will is shown, they deserve support. If not, they don't.

You ignore the outside influences in both cases again, the Soviet Union and Red China in the one case, and the Pak Army/ISI in the other.


There are no blank checks or open-ended commitments in international affairs. None. Never have been, never will be.

Maybe not, but if you make a promise, you should keep it.

[Dayuhan]

You parse the word as you like. I see abandon and I figure the rest of the world is most likely to see like that too.

What's the basis for this assumption about what the rest of the world will think? As far as I can tell from published commentary around the world, the prevailing opinion seems to be that we were bloody barmy to get bogged down in Afghanistan in the first place and that the sooner we're out the better. The idea of US intervention and armed nation building has not exactly been received with open arms around the world, in case you haven't noticed.

I have no problem at all with the world knowing that the patience of the US taxpayer is not unlimited. I have no problem at all with the world knowing that that the US will not provide unlimited to governments who steal from us or populaces who sit idly by and let their government steal from us without a visible murmur of dissent. I have no problem at all with the world knowing that we'll support those who work with us to the best of their abilities, but that our support is conditional. I have no problem at all with the world knowing that we are not a bunch of bloody idiots who will throw money and lives down a black hole for all eternity without revising a plan that is clearly not working. I have no problem at all with the world knowing that we are capable of recognizing and changing a dysfunctional policy, however belatedly.


We supplied the big force we have there now via routes other than Pakistan for months. If we reduce the force to the point where it can be supplied by air and the north route, we can sustain it indefinitely without Pakistan. We have never really tried. That bespeaks laziness, lack of imagination and being the mark for the sahibs in Pindi. The Afghans see that as does the world.

It all seems terribly easy to fix for people writing on the Internet, doesn't it? Any brilliant ideas floating around on how exactly to do this? You recognize, I assume, that the other routes we depend on are in the hands of governments and individuals who are every bit as capricious as the Pakistanis?


Did you ever see the movie The Servant with Dirk Bogarde? It is a dark and twisted tale about how man servent takes over the household through malevolent force of character that subtly overwhelmed the employer. The employer could have stopped things and ruled the roost at any time but he never even tried. Weak character you see. We're the employer.

We are not in a position to fire the Pakistanis. They are there. They will act in their perceived interest no matter what we do or say. The decision to try to build a nation of our liking in Afghanistan is what's responsible for this situation, not the Pakistanis.

The single worst decision we could make at this point would be to conclude that since we must fix Afghanistan and we can't fix Afghanistan without fixing Pakistan, we therefore have to fix Pakistan too. Follies of that magnitude are what bring great powers down.



Yep, heard that exact same argument in 1973-1975.

Yes, it was true then as well.


Well that is a start. Good for you. But I note that you incorporate so many provisos that you would be able to leave any time you felt like it and could easily avoid taking those people with us by saying we haven't been able to fully investigate.

Why should we take anyone with us when we leave? We're leaving them with a country, a government, and an army... not perfect ones, but it's not our job to make them work, it's theirs. If they give a rat's ass about their country, why would they want to come with us, instead of staying and fighting for their country? At what point would you expect them to take it over themselves? No nation anywhere was ever built or secured by any means other than the blood and sweat of its own citizens.


Don't conflate the gov with individuals. In order to save those individuals, millions of them perhaps, we might have to put up with a bad gov. It wouldn't be the first time. If you insist on putting behavior of the gov foremost, that is presenting an excuse to bug out on the individuals.

So you propose to save the people from their own government? How do you propose to do that? Take that government away and install a new one (worked ever so well in Vietnam)? We are a nation. We have a government. That government deals with other governments. Relations between the Afghan government and people are something Afghans need to work out.

I don't see these supposed millions out in the streets protesting corruption or begging the US to stay.


You ignore the outside influences in both cases again, the Soviet Union and Red China in the one case, and the Pak Army/ISI in the other.

You ignore the blue whale in the outside influence drawing room: us. The support we gave South Vietnam was orders of magnitude beyond what the North received from anyone. The support we've given the Afghan Government is orders of magnitude beyond anything the Taliban has received from Pakistan. If winning or losing was a function of outside influence, Duong Van Minh would have been strolling down a boulevard in Hanoi and the Taliban would have been exterminated years ago. Outside influence or support means squat if the people on the receiving end haven't the will to fight or are too busy stealing the money to bother fighting.


Maybe not, but if you make a promise, you should keep it.

What exactly was promised... to whom, by whom, and when?

[jmm99]

Not a difficult question to answer (originally asked by Jon Custis, I believe) - for which, there are three key documents:

2001 Future of Afghanistan Statement (http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/6757.htm)


Richard N. Haass, Director, Office of the Policy Planning Staff, and U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, December 6, 2001.

Technically, this was not a binding international agreement; but it does represent the US position in 2001-2005. It looks to three areas of strategic partnership: The Political/Diplomatic Front; Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction; and The Military and Security Front.

2005 Strategic Partnership Agreement - Bush & Karzai (pdf file attached).

Again, this presents the same three areas of strategic partnership (in slightly different words): Democracy and governance; Prosperity; and Security.

2012 Strategic Partnership Agreement - Obama & Karzai (http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf) (full text). The WH fact sheet (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/fact-sheet-us-afghanistan-strategic-partnership-agreement) notes the five areas covered: Protecting and Promoting Shared Democratic Values; Advancing Long-Term Security; Reinforcing Regional Security and Cooperation; Social and Economic Development; Strengthening Afghan Institutions and Governance; and further that:


The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) is a legally binding executive agreement, undertaken between two sovereign nations. The President’s goal in negotiating such an agreement has been to define with the Afghan Government what's on the other side of Transition and the completed drawdown of U.S. forces. The agreement the President signed today will detail how the partnership between the United States and Afghanistan will be normalized as we look beyond a responsible end to the war. Through this Agreement, we seek to cement an enduring partnership with Afghanistan that strengthens Afghan sovereignty, stability and prosperity, and that contributes to our shared goal of defeating Al Qaeda and its extremist affiliates.

but that:


When it comes to an enduring U.S. presence, President Obama has been clear: we do not seek permanent military bases in Afghanistan. Instead, the Strategic Partnership Agreement commits Afghanistan to provide U.S. personnel access to and use of Afghan facilities through 2014 and beyond. The Agreement provides for the possibility of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014, for the purposes of training Afghan Forces and targeting the remnants of al-Qaeda, and commits the United States and Afghanistan to initiate negotiations on a Bilateral Security Agreement to supersede our current Status of Forces Agreement. The United States will also designate Afghanistan a “Major Non-NATO Ally” to provide a long-term framework for security and defense cooperation.

To be clear, the Strategic Partnership Agreement itself does not commit the United States to any specific troop levels or levels of funding in the future, as those are decisions will be made in consultation with the U.S. Congress. It does, however, commit the United States to seek funding from Congress on an annual basis to support the training, equipping, advising and sustaining of Afghan National Security Forces, as well as for social and economic assistance.

In connection with timeframe and termination, the 2012 SPA is very specific:

1643

Both parties have agreed that either party may terminate on 1 year's notice.

In this context, assertions flaunting the terms "abandon" and "cut and run" are a bit irritating and obnoxious - a mature flaming assertion would not be averse to such couplets as "coward, cowardice" and "traitor, treason".

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Not a difficult question to answer (originally asked by Jon Custis, I believe) - for which, there are three key documents:

2001 Future of Afghanistan Statement (http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/6757.htm)



Technically, this was not a binding international agreement; but it does represent the US position in 2001-2005. It looks to three areas of strategic partnership: The Political/Diplomatic Front; Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction; and The Military and Security Front.

2005 Strategic Partnership Agreement - Bush & Karzai (pdf file attached).

Again, this presents the same three areas of strategic partnership (in slightly different words): Democracy and governance; Prosperity; and Security.

2012 Strategic Partnership Agreement - Obama & Karzai (http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf) (full text). The WH fact sheet (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/fact-sheet-us-afghanistan-strategic-partnership-agreement) notes the five areas covered: Protecting and Promoting Shared Democratic Values; Advancing Long-Term Security; Reinforcing Regional Security and Cooperation; Social and Economic Development; Strengthening Afghan Institutions and Governance; and further that:



but that:



In connection with timeframe and termination, the 2012 SPA is very specific:

1643

Both parties have agreed that either party may terminate on 1 year's notice.

In this context, assertions flaunting the terms "abandon" and "cut and run" are a bit irritating and obnoxious - a mature flaming assertion would not be averse to such couplets as "coward, cowardice" and "traitor, treason".

Regards

Mike

Mike,

Politicians in general are the scum of the earth.

I would suggest that one does not go out on a limb and get all defensive about the actions of people you can trust about as much as you can a crack whore.

Read Perfidious Albion (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfidious_Albion). The shoe fits the US (as well as most other countries).

Shrug your shoulders and live with it by all means (because its not going to change) but for heavens sake do not pretend it is not happening.

The US is going to dump its one time allies in Afghanistan and leave them to the wolves. Whether they do so in a hurry or with one years notice makes no difference... and the spin-doctors will come up with a justification.

[jmm99]

Mark:

You have posted five sentences of smoke - none of which address the simple question of "What Was Promised?".

Whatever you want to call them - "scum crack whores" in your terms - they got together this year and definitively agreed to the US withdrawal. Ain't no dumping when both parties agree to the terms.

I'll skip delving into Perfidious Albion. Not knocking your choice of reading materials; but I'm now into the BEF of WWI and especially the memoirs of the soldiers who fought in that war. As I've said elsewhere, I will be doing not much posting and much more reading.

Even your book, if my pre-publication order ever ships.

Astan's a done deal. Live with it.

Regards

Mike

[jcustis]

Us, the Americans, the Americans as viewed by the Afghans there and by the rest of the world. When we are judged by those people, they won't use the actual verbiage contained in speeches and policy statements. They will judge us as a group using the totality of the circumstances covering back to 2001. When views like that, we made promises. Again using the totality of circumstance, we made those promises to the Afghans. That is how I figure others judge it, and that is how I judge it.

I'm sorry, looks like I wasn't clear. I got it you were referring to the US, but do you mean the "people" to be Afghans in general? There is a huge gulf between the Kabul elite and the South Helmand farmer, who isn't holding "us" to any credibility standard in the first place.

[jcustis]

You have posted five sentences of smoke - none of which address the simple question of "What Was Promised?".

He also ignores some pretty clear evidence you provided in the pursuit of continued howling over a policy decision he doesn't like. It's peculiar, ignoring terms like "Major Non-NATO ally", unless it was noted and deliberately ignored because it eminated from the White House and not the Pentagon.:rolleyes:

[carl]

Not a difficult question to answer (originally asked by Jon Custis, I believe) - for which, there are three key documents:

Well there it is, the piece of paper that we can wave at the ghosts when they come calling; saying "You promised." We can show it to them and say "Show me where?" They will stand silent but that look won't leave their faces as they fade away. We will go on and be a lesser people but we won't know it. We have that piece of paper you see.


In this context, assertions flaunting the terms "abandon" and "cut and run" are a bit irritating and obnoxious - a mature flaming assertion would not be averse to such couplets as "coward, cowardice" and "traitor, treason".

Regards

Mike

You know I tried to figure out how "mature flaming assertion" actually fit into that sentence. I had to think on it for a whole day before I could say "Oh I get it now."

[carl]

I'm sorry, looks like I wasn't clear. I got it you were referring to the US, but do you mean the "people" to be Afghans in general? There is a huge gulf between the Kabul elite and the South Helmand farmer, who isn't holding "us" to any credibility standard in the first place.

Yes I was referring to the Afghans in general. I know there is a huge gulf between the Kabul elite and the South Helmand farmer. I don't care about the Kabul elite. They will escape. I do care about the millions of others who were foolish enough to put their trust in us. They weren't as wise as the South Helmand farmer.

[carl]

Dayuhan:

When we cut off the money to Afghanistan sometime after 2014 and we don't make provisions for those who trusted us and worked with us to get out, you tell yourself whatever you need to so even the tiniest thought of our country shaming itself doesn't cross your mind. The arguments you have presented here should work very well.



It all seems terribly easy to fix for people writing on the Internet, doesn't it? Any brilliant ideas floating around on how exactly to do this? You recognize, I assume, that the other routes we depend on are in the hands of governments and individuals who are every bit as capricious as the Pakistanis?

You made the point that there was no way around dealing with the Pak Army/ISI because of supply considerations. I responded that there was and said how it could be done and has been done. Then I get the catcall above. How do you deal with a catcall? I don't rightly know.

I would note that none of those capricious governments are sponsors and supporters of Taliban & Co. as is the Pak Army/ISI.

[Ken White]

However, with respect to Viet Nam and a few other places, we did indeed leave a few, relatively speaking, people in bad straits. Certainly not millions by any stretch. For some the error was their own and for some the fault was ours. That or the actually rather small numbers don'tt excuse those that we left that we should not have but the entire issue should be viewed in context and perspective. The vast majority of residents in Viet Nam and elsewhere were just thankful that we were gone and accepted the cost of those 'left behind.'

I suspect the same attitude prevails in Afghanistan. To cite promises presumed is irrelevant to all but those who wish for whatever reason to make an issue of them. Some here or there may feel "lesser." That as they say, is their problem. For the US, 'lesser' is a fact of life and has been for over a hundred years. TR started us on the downhill slope and W. Wilson accelerated the decline -- been going on ever since; generally at the hands of those in positions of power who were concerned with 'doing good.' That includes G. W. Bush who kept us in Afghanistan and Iraq, both places where we had no real business to cause us to stay because he -- not the Nation -- had an attack of sadly misplaced moral rectitude. IMO, he failed in his responsibility in his elected position because he put personal feelings before the good of the nation that he was nominally responsible for 'leading' (as if anyone could 'lead' the US... :rolleyes:).

As for perfidy, that's a feature of nations (plural as JMA noted), not a bug. Not going away, either. "Live with it..." Indeed. :wry:

[carl]

However, with respect to Viet Nam and a few other places, we did indeed leave a few, relatively speaking, people in bad straits. Certainly not millions by any stretch. For some the error was their own and for some the fault was ours. That or the actually rather small numbers don'tt excuse those that we left that we should not have but the entire issue should be viewed in context and perspective. The vast majority of residents in Viet Nam and elsewhere were just thankful that we were gone and accepted the cost of those 'left behind.'

A few? Actually rather small numbers? The vast majority thankful that we were gone? Perhaps. No way to really argue that. I remember though the boat people most of whom I think died at sea. The million dead Cambodians. The Hmong who were hunted down and the ARVN collapsing with no fuel nor ammunition. That is part of the context too.

[Ken White]

A few? Actually rather small numbers? The vast majority thankful that we were gone? Perhaps. No way to really argue that. I remember though the boat people most of whom I think died at sea. The million dead Cambodians. The Hmong who were hunted down and the ARVN collapsing with no fuel nor ammunition. That is part of the context too.Then you remember that some Boat People had US ties but the majority by far were South (and former North...) Viet Namese Catholics who decided they'd rather not live under the rule of Hanoi -- who BTW later penalized a lot of people who had no US ties or debts owed. You can add the Cambodes to your total but we promised them nothing and in fact did very little there -- we didn't abandon them so I'm unsure why one would add them into the tally of folks we've abandoned...

I went to Laos in 1961. The Hmong were being hunted down and killed before we got there, nothing changed except we added some Americans to the KIA column and the Hmong flocked to help us -- and themselves -- in yet another effort that was doomed to fail before it began -- and a lot of Hmong and other hill tribes as well as Americans knew that very early on.

On the ARVN collapsing with no fuel or ammunition, you're absolutely correct and the US' 93d and 94th Congresses have much to answer for in that defeat. So does Nixon and the failed 'Vietnamization' effort. As do Johnson possibly the worst US President ever and Kennedy who was a good talker...

It was always doomed to fail, so was the entire intervention. We promised something we couldn't deliver -- just as occurred in Afghanistan and in Iraq and has in other places.

You're again focusing on the symptoms. Of course we're leaving people in the lurch. We have -- and had -- little choice but to do so. That's the penalty of sticking ones nose in places it doesn't belong -- and why all those people are just happy to see us leave.

They really wish we hadn't come in the first place.

The quick smack at that point is that regardless, we went, therefor we acquired a debt of honor and whether we should have done so or not is immaterial. That's a quick rebuttal -- and it's wildly fallacious. The reality is that anyone who promises something they cannot provide is far more morally guilty than one who foolishly tries to something they patently cannot do, finally realizes their error and has little choice but to withdraw under pressure.

In quick turnover, quarterly bottom line and sound bite prone America, those who initially committed are never the ones that have to clean up the mess as best they can. You're fond of history and often cite successes of others and even ours from past centuries. For those other and those other times, there was a degree of continuity; people were more careful about what they promised or did because there would likely be consequences. We have devolved the system, destroyed any semblance of continuity and now let faceless people or even, Gods help us, Committees who will move before any consequences might occur...

Focus your anger on those corrupt and righteous souls who wrongly send us to these destined to fail efforts, not those who have to try to pick up the pieces and do the best they can with a terrible hand.

As long as you and others focus on the wrong end; the 'departure' as opposed to the problem site, the beginning, it will not change. We will continue to meddle and fail and abandon some people that we should not.

[carl]

Ken:

That was a very thoughtful comment. Many of the points I disagree with but you've outlined your position well.

I know we have gotten ourselves in a corner because we refuse to see the reality of the situation, though we would probably disagree what that reality was. I full well blame those elites who don't see. But I also see that many of the same names that refused to see are still blindly leading. Or rather the system that refused to see is exactly as it was. And I fear that that same system will turn our backs on those we owe again.

I think, just me, that regardless of how you go about making the promise, you incur the same moral culpability if you don't fulfill it. And in these particular circumstances, that moral culpability means that when we leave, we must, must, try hard to take those we can with us if things fall apart. And we must keep the money going. It still sickens me to remember all those smug demands to 'end the war' by cutting off South Vietnam. We still have a chance to do the right thing by the Afghans. We haven't sent them fully down the road we sent South Vietnam down yet. I hope to God we don't and I think it important to remind people what we did those many years ago on the tiny chance we'll do right this time.

We'll have to leave the actual numbers that we left to die rest. I think it more than very small numbers but it may not be useful to debate that. I included Cambodia because it was part of a unified conflict whole. If South Vietnam had held, I believe Cambodia would have held and that million would still be alive.

My main point here is that we haven't gone fully down that road in Afghanistan yet. We don't have to. I hope we don't though I bet we will.

[jcustis]

Yes I was referring to the Afghans in general. I know there is a huge gulf between the Kabul elite and the South Helmand farmer. I don't care about the Kabul elite. They will escape. I do care about the millions of others who were foolish enough to put their trust in us. They weren't as wise as the South Helmand farmer.

I think that is where your perception is at odds with reality Carl.

The Afghans didn't put their trust in us as much as they simply rode the fence, used our do-good attitude and largess to their benefit, and got the handouts we gave.

Where there were not enough handouts, they were more than happy to point out where the boogeyman was, to make sure we understood the degree of instability in their neighborhoods, whether it be Kabul or the Korengal, imagined or real. Our COIN principles ensured we did something about resolving the "instability" as quickly as we could muster the manpower and the money. Successive unit rotations didn't move the chains as much as they simply held on to a 9-5 semblance of security until the sun went down.

There is a reason why Mullah Omar came to power, and that will be part of the Taliban's (or similar incarnation) resurgence when we leave.

[carl]

JCustis:

My perception at odds with reality? You won't be the first who has thought so. But in my world (the sky is blue in my world so at least one thing matches up) I've read that a lot of Afghans have done things that they wouldn't have done if they thought (and I'll admit it was foolish of them to think we wouldn't) we were ultimately going to leave them in the lurch.

[wm]

I do care about the millions of others who were foolish enough to put their trust in us. They weren't as wise as the South Helmand farmer.

I wonder whether millions of Afghanis have placed their trust in the US. Were that to be the case, I am inclined to believe that much less anti-Coaltion violence would be happening in the country. To say, correctly, that the rank and file Afghanis had placed their trust in the Coalition in general, or the US in particular, would be tantamount to saying that the the guys wearing the white hats (us) had "won their hearts and minds." And, had we won their "hearts and minds," then we could say we had won the population-centric COIN campaign. However, given that the opposition forces are still able to "move through the people as a fish swims in the sea." to quote Mao, I doubt that "millions" of Afghanis have much trust in the protection that the Coalition forces are supposedly providing to them.

In other words, the lack of progress in stemming the violence in Afghanistan seems to demonstrate that the Coalition has not established a believable claim to be the legitimate protectors of those Afghan people who Carl asserts will be sold out by US forces' departure. Without that legitimacy, I aver that neither the Afghanis nor anyone else in the world will view the Coalition's departure as a sell out. Anti-American/anti-Western voices may very well bruit the "sellout/abandonment" claim as part of their standard anti-American propaganda rhetoric/rant, but merely saying something does not make it true.

Afghan feelings about the US presence in Afghanistan seem much more like those of the citizens of Rock Ridge the day that Sheriff Bart arrived in town. (Blazing Saddles (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=upvZdVK913I))

[davidbfpo]

Many years ago I read Frank Snepp's 'Decent Interval' on the end of South Vietnam, it made quite an impression on me, although not immediately found on my bookshelves today:eek:

Americans no doubt have some, strong memories.

Snepp referred IIRC to lists of priority individuals and families who had worked for the USA and only some escaped at the time of the fall of South Vietnam.

I do wonder whether similar lists already exist in Afghanistan and whether anyone has asked or thought hard if those at risk want to leave. How many interpreters for example left with the Western forces upon withdrawal? Somehow I doubt that the British public would accept a responsibility to accept more than a few hundred Afghans.

Incidentally a few years ago I met an Afghan refugee in the UK, he'd had been a Kabul cadre, trained in the USSR and was in Bulgaria at the end. He had never returned home and his parents were known to be dead. We already know that Afghans trained overseas have a habit of going AWOL.

[Dayuhan]

When we cut off the money to Afghanistan sometime after 2014 and we don't make provisions for those who trusted us and worked with us to get out, you tell yourself whatever you need to so even the tiniest thought of our country shaming itself doesn't cross your mind. The arguments you have presented here should work very well.

What would you have us do, annex Afghanistan as the 51st state and govern the place ourselves? Sooner or later they have to stand on their own, at which point it ceases to be our responsibility and becomes theirs. If we wait for them to be fully ready that will never happen, because as long as we're their they have no incentive to get fully ready.

As far as bringing people with us goes, how do you propose to distinguish between those who are at risk from working with us and those who just want a ticket on the gravy train?


You made the point that there was no way around dealing with the Pak Army/ISI because of supply considerations.

It was done briefly, at a time when everybody expected access would eventually be restored, as it was. That doesn't mean it would be sustainable.

Even without the access issue, options for dealing with Pakistan are limited. We could top giving them money, but that wouldn't stop them from doing what they believe is in their interest. All very well to rant about "fixing" or "doing something", but what exactly do you propose to do?


I think, just me, that regardless of how you go about making the promise, you incur the same moral culpability if you don't fulfill it.

Did anyone make a promise? Who? When? To whom? Did this hypothetical promise involve eternal support and security?

[Entropy]

When I think of "abandoning" Afghanistan, I think of what we did in the early 1990's which was to essentially dump all resources and interest in Afghanistan down the drain. We (the USA) didn't have a policy on Afghanistan for Pres. Clinton's entire first term; the CIA had few contacts and no presence in the country and State Department interest consisted of one mid-level official working in the US embassy in Pakistan. I doubt there was one country we gave less of a crap about than Afghanistan.

Whatever the emotional baggage one attaches to the word "abandon," I would hope that our withdrawal doesn't amount to the kind of "neglect" we practiced during the early 1990's.

[jcustis]

Entropy, your post leads to an excellent follow-on question for the group.

Assuming we remove all GPF from AFG on schedule, but do continue to try our hand at the ANSF development line of operation on a limited scale and we have some SOF tie-in to deal with AQ, what strategic national interests remain in the support to the country?

The only thing I have seen advertised that makes any sense is preventing a resurgence of AQ, but do you think that's anything we really need to worry about, or anything that would justify substantial expenditure of resources?

Does AFG factor into a larger balance of power issue in the region?

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Entrophy


When I think of "abandoning" Afghanistan, I think of what we did in the early 1990's which was to essentially dump all resources and interest in Afghanistan down the drain.

I keep hearing this and have yet seen any evidence that there anything we should have done in the early 90s. When the Soviets pulled out they left a proxy government gov in place that held for a couple of years. Are you and others suggesting we should have provided (or perhaps continued to provide) support to the Taliban that finally ousted the proxy government after the USSR collapsed?

I think this myth started when the book and then the movie "Charlie's Wilson's War" became popular. A retired SF officer allegedly advised President Bush that we couldn't repeat the same mistake of pulling the rug out from under the Afghan people's feet, which is partly what got us into this nation building mess.

Highly recommend reading the article at the link below and other historical accounts of what actually happened when the Soviets pulled out, it doesn't nest with our emotional narrative.

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/2012summer/Fivecoat.pdf


Unable to obtain a military solution, Gorbachev described the war in Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound.”14 He called for Soviet forces to return home quickly and switched to a strategy that utilized military and diplomatic instruments.15 His decision was a de facto acknowledgement of Afghanistan’s unsuitability for communism, the Soviet Union’s unwillingness to make a long-term commitment, and his aversion to widening the war to stop the flow of arms, money, and fighters from Pakistan. To point things in the right direction, the Soviet Union removed Karmal in May. They saw his replacement, Mohammad Najibullah, the former head of KhAD, as better organized, hardnosed, and a “serious, pragmatic politician who understood the Soviet desire . . . to disengage from Afghanistan.”16 Similar to his 1985 ultimatum, Gorbachev charged Najibullah with unifying Afghanistan over the next two years as the Soviets departed.
The Soviet Union began to “Afghanize” the war by turning most of the responsibility for combat operations over to the DRA.

Afghanistan was and remains equally unsuitable for modern, liberal democracy.


By early 1987, the Soviet Union concluded the situation was dire. Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister, declared “in essence, we fought against the peasantry. The state apparatus is functioning poorly. Our advice and help is ineffective.”24 Searching for a way out, Gorbachev focused on modifying Afghanistan’s political policies, pursuing an international diplomatic resolution, while continuing military and economic support. The improved orchestration of the instruments of power helped set the conditions for the Soviet Union’s withdrawal in 1988 and 1989.

Not sure on this one, but it seems we have an adequate level control of the major urban areas and most of our combat operations are directed against the peasantry also. Probably true for most forces that invaded Afghanistan.


While talks continued in Geneva, the Soviet Union engaged the Americans directly at a September summit in Washington, D.C. Gorbachev proposed to withdraw the 40th Army in seven to twelve months after an agreement was signed.28 He still hoped he could end American support for the mujahidin as a precondition.
Militarily, the 40th Army fought only when attacked and focused on training DRA forces. The Afghan forces continued to grow to over 323,000 soldiers and the militias grew to 130,000 fighters.

Supposedly Gorbachev, according to another historical account, made a case to President Reagan that we should cooperate with USSR in stabilizing the region after they withdrew because radical Islam was a common threat to both our nations. Would like to find a credible source for this if it exists.


The Afghan government’s expenditures grew due to the ceasefire payments and the expanding military. Its revenue declined because of the cancellation of the back taxes of all refugees and the decline in natural gas exports. To cover the shortfalls, the Soviet Union increased its aid 83 percent more than in 1986 to 64 billion afghanis ($1.2 billion.)34

Gorbachev said better money than the lives of our people.


From 1 January 1988 until 15 February 1989, Gorbachev combined unilateral declarations, negotiations, a dramatic increase in military and economic aid, and a two-phased withdrawal to navigate the Soviet Union out of the “graveyard of empires.”35 Within Afghanistan, Najibullah continued to use the National Reconciliation Policy but reoriented it towards regime survival and an Islamic foundation.36 The skillful orchestration of the diplomatic, military, and economic instruments allowed the USSR to depart on its terms.


As part of its long-term commitment, the USSR discretely left 200 military and KGB advisors in Kabul.44 Although the Afghan forces’ 329,000 men had led the last two years of fighting, the departure of 25 percent of the combat power in nine months, as well as the removal of the 40th Army’s aviation and firepower support, resulted in a considerable increase in insurgent violence.

When then the advisors finally depart?


As the last soldier crossed the Freedom Bridge on 15 February 1989, Soviet leaders were uncertain how long Najibullah would remain in power. While the Afghan government controlled the cities and roads with a combination of conventional forces, the KhAD, and militias, the budget shortfalls and insurgent threat presented serious challenges to the government. Yet the Russians’ exit energized Najibullah; he “took much more courageous steps [with the National Reconciliation Policy] in terms of opening up the government and society, establishing links with tribal leaders, and shedding its communist image—all of which helped the DRA government to survive into 1992.

Unfortunately for the government to gain credibility with its people they'll probably have to shed their association with the US and its ideas also. They won't be able to do that if we stay in large numbers.


The regime was immediately challenged—the mujahidin tried and failed to capture Jalalabad in April 1989, and the Minister of Defense tried and failed to conduct a coup in March 1990. Despite these emergencies, Moscow toed the line of no direct military support; however, Gorbachev pledged that “even in the harshest most difficult circumstance—we will provide you arms.”48 Surprisingly, the Afghan forces fought extremely well at Jalalabad and later seized the Pagham stronghold near Kabul. The insurgency, however, conquered Khost in 1991, significantly weakening Najibullah’s grip on power. Then General Dostum and his Uzbek legion defected in early 1992. This, along with the end of Soviet aid, made Najibullah’s collapse a foregone conclusion.

The Black Swan was General Dostum, who knows what the Black Swan will be in 2014 and beyond, and whose side it will benefit.


Even as the USSR slid toward its own demise, it continued to provide billions of afghanis in support of the DRA.49 Eventually, the USSR and the United States signed an agreement to end their support for their proxies. When the Soviet aid stopped in January 1992, the Afghan government could no longer pay the militias or the military. Najibullah fell from power four months later as Massoud and Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s troops occupied Kabul and its environs.50

Much more in the paper and other historical documents, but the bottom line is our assistance to the Afghan resistance had little to do with humanitarian objectives, and very much to do with strategic objectives related to the USSR. The USSR withdrew and left a functional government in place that held for two years (almost totally dependent on foreign aid from the USSR). Were we supposed to continue to support the resistance who by that time we knew were radical? The Saudis and Pakistanis continued support (the same support we were providing), so how would have continued assistance contributed to a different outcome?

I think years from now when we can look at this situation without emotion, we may find serious fault with Charlie's approach to "winning" instead of providing just enough assistance to ensure Afghanistan remained a quagmire for the USSR. Suspect the outcome would have been the same. We made a deal with the devil (Saudi and Pakistani extremists) to fight the USSR, now we're reaping what we sowed. Our current approach won't change any of that, and now like the Soviets we're unwilling to carry the fight into Pakistan, so we can probably guess what the outcome will be in 3-5 years after we downsize. We can only learn from history if we can study it without bias.

[Entropy]

I keep hearing this and have yet seen any evidence that there anything we should have done in the early 90s.

The lack of interest at all levels with respect to Afghanistan in the early-mid 1990's came back to bite us in the ass. We had almost no one in the government who could speak Pashto or Dari. We had no insight into what was going on in the country. We had few contacts and those we had we generally ignored. All this left us with fewer options and less influence than we would have had when UBL became a threat, and it left us scrambling when 9/11 occurred.

I'm simply suggesting that we not repeat the mistake. We should certainly withdrawal military forces, but we need to be able to know what is going on in the country afterward and be positioned to influence events if necessary.

[Entropy]

Assuming we remove all GPF from AFG on schedule, but do continue to try our hand at the ANSF development line of operation on a limited scale and we have some SOF tie-in to deal with AQ, what strategic national interests remain in the support to the country?

That's a good question. Personally, I think Congress will probably repeat what we did after the withdrawal in Vietnam and cut off support to whatever remains of Karzai's government. I think our interest is mainly to prevent the reemergence of the kind of support and infrastructure AQ had in the late 1990's.

[Bill Moore]

The lack of interest at all levels with respect to Afghanistan in the early-mid 1990's came back to bite us in the ass. We had almost no one in the government who could speak Pashto or Dari. We had no insight into what was going on in the country. We had few contacts and those we had we generally ignored. All this left us with fewer options and less influence than we would have had when UBL became a threat, and it left us scrambling when 9/11 occurred.

I'm simply suggesting that we not repeat the mistake. We should certainly withdrawal military forces, but we need to be able to know what is going on in the country afterward and be positioned to influence events if necessary.

Agreed, I thought you were implying we should have intervened in a substantial way after the Soviets pulled out as many have implied (the Saudis, Paks, and others never quit intervening). Although based on open source reports on the initial operations in Afghanistan it appeared that at least the CIA had some contacts in Afghanistan going back to the 90s, so I don't think we were completely blind. On the other hand we were paralyzed politically and failed to act before 9/11. That is another story altogether.

[Bob's World]

I don't particularly like having the genesis of this thread attributed to me. I simply made the following observation in a thread that proposed that we had "lost two wars":


It's just time to recognize that we don't need to control, directly or indirectly through the Northern Alliance, Afghanistan to prevent it from being an AQ sanctuary. To recognize that the Northern Alliance has absolutely no interest or desire to be the government we want them to be. To recognize that we are better off simply packing up and going home than we are executing any kind of phased out exit plan

Certainly there was a "war" phase to both Afghanistan and Iraq, but they were short, and largely one-sided. A UW war in Afghanistan where we shifted the balance of power to leverage the Northern Alliance into power. Not because we believed in the Northern Alliance, but rather because we wanted to punish the Taliban for providing sanctuary to AQ and not turning them over to us upon our demand. Then a conventional war in Iraq to defeat the government and military of that country.

It is what we convinced ourselves we needed to do after those short wars that has caused us problems. The reasons for this are myriad and disputed. For any smart answer someone else thinks they have a smarter one. Fine. We should at least agree that we really don't understand these things very well, and are so in love with our own narrative we can never grasp that others would simply reject solutions to their problems that we offer, particularly when both the problem and the solution are defined by us to suit our interests and perspectives.

In many ways there is a tremendous resistance to such meddling by the US in many places. Our intentions are largely moot to the populaces they affect, particularly when they are reasonably working to get their own governments to evolve to meet their evolving expectations of governance. We don't know if we should provide CT and BPC support to keep the old regime in power, or UW support to help some popular movement prevail. So we do a bit of both without much rhyme nor reason to our approaches. We go where the Intel guys tell us to, which means AQ leads us about by the nose as they leverage our fears of what a changing world means to US influence and power.

This was never about Afghanistan. It was never about Iraq. Even AQ is as much a symptom as a problem. It is time to stop agonizing over specific places or organizations or individuals and begin thinking about who we are and how we best define and secure our interests in the changing world emerging around us.

Debates over who "won" or who "lost"; or excessive hand-wringing over a particular place such as Afghanistan where we happened to act out on these fears is not that helpful.

[Ken White]

I don't particularly like having the genesis of this thread attributed to me...Heh. Stuff like that happens when and where ever well intentioned persons meddle when there was no real cause to do so...:wry:
This was never about Afghanistan. It was never about Iraq. Even AQ is as much a symptom as a problem. It is time to stop agonizing over specific places or organizations or individuals and begin thinking about who we are and how we best define and secure our interests in the changing world emerging around us.All true but agonizing over spilt milk apparently makes one feel good. It also seems to focus one on the symptoms rather than the causes...
Debates over who "won" or who "lost"; or excessive hand-wringing over a particular place such as Afghanistan where we happened to act out on these fears is not that helpful.Even more true -- in fact, it's instead harmful and a distraction from what's important.

[davidbfpo]

Originally Posted by Bob's World:
I don't particularly like having the genesis of this thread attributed to me...

Then Ken White:
...when there was no real cause to do so...

Such delicacy and to meet Bob's concern I have amended the Moderator's Note in the first post, the last line now reads: this thread was not started by Bob's World, rather I used it as the starting point.

This thread may venture into who "won" or "lost" Afghanistan, the key, uncomfortable theme is 'Afghan Exit:why, how and more in country and beyond'. A theme that SWC should consider and discuss - it might actually help!

[Bob's World]

No worries Dave. I appreciate very much what you do to keep this site what it is.

[Ken White]

Very much so.

No delicacy involved -- I've been accused of many things but that's a first :D -- just taking advantage of what I thought a non-issue as a reminder to all that the best of intentions (as in Afghanistan) can have unintended and sometimes not at all humorous but sometimes mildly humorous effects. :wry:

My apologies if you or anyone else was offended, no insult intended. The thrust of my comment was not that minor aside and poor attempt at humor but the contention that we tend to attack symptoms rather than the root of problems and, in the case of Afghanistan, my opinion stated in the last paragraph:

"...in fact, it's (Debates or excessive hand-wringing over a particular place such as Afghanistan) instead harmful and a distraction from what's important."

[carl]

I wonder whether millions of Afghanis have placed their trust in the US. Were that to be the case, I am inclined to believe that much less anti-Coaltion violence would be happening in the country. To say, correctly, that the rank and file Afghanis had placed their trust in the Coalition in general, or the US in particular, would be tantamount to saying that the the guys wearing the white hats (us) had "won their hearts and minds." And, had we won their "hearts and minds," then we could say we had won the population-centric COIN campaign. However, given that the opposition forces are still able to "move through the people as a fish swims in the sea." to quote Mao, I doubt that "millions" of Afghanis have much trust in the protection that the Coalition forces are supposedly providing to them.

In other words, the lack of progress in stemming the violence in Afghanistan seems to demonstrate that the Coalition has not established a believable claim to be the legitimate protectors of those Afghan people who Carl asserts will be sold out by US forces' departure. Without that legitimacy, I aver that neither the Afghanis nor anyone else in the world will view the Coalition's departure as a sell out. Anti-American/anti-Western voices may very well bruit the "sellout/abandonment" claim as part of their standard anti-American propaganda rhetoric/rant, but merely saying something does not make it true.

Afghan feelings about the US presence in Afghanistan seem much more like those of the citizens of Rock Ridge the day that Sheriff Bart arrived in town. (Blazing Saddles (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=upvZdVK913I))

Your contention seems to be that the continuing level of violence demonstrates that the "Afghans" haven't thrown in with us therefore won't be subject to being killed for revenge if Taliban & Co. take the place over again. That ignores two things, first there are a lot of different kinds of Afghans from the Hazaras to the Tajiks to the Pashtuns on this side of the valley vs. that side of the valley to this group who sided with the Communist Afghan gov to that group that didn't to on and on and on. Some of those groups threw in with and various individuals threw in with us.

The second thing it ignores is the effect of a shadow gov that will have you killed if you oppose its wishes. The level of violence isn't a sole measure of how Taliban & Co is liked or disliked, it is as much a measure of how good a hold a well run terror regime can have on a people.

You can slice it and dice it anyway you want but a lot of people, with names and faces and families, have thrown in with us. When we leave and cut off the money they will be subject to the revenge of Taliban & Co. MO and his boys aren't noted for magnanimity in victory. We should try and take those people with us.

[carl]

What would you have us do, annex Afghanistan as the 51st state and govern the place ourselves? Sooner or later they have to stand on their own, at which point it ceases to be our responsibility and becomes theirs. If we wait for them to be fully ready that will never happen, because as long as we're their they have no incentive to get fully ready.

Ah yes, the ever reliable fallacy of the false alternative.


As far as bringing people with us goes, how do you propose to distinguish between those who are at risk from working with us and those who just want a ticket on the gravy train?

You're right. It would be just too hard. That is always a good reason not to do what you should do. It's hard.


It was done briefly, at a time when everybody expected access would eventually be restored, as it was. That doesn't mean it would be sustainable.

It would be if you reduced your force level. Doesn't matter now though. Too late. And of course it would have been hard to do, always a good reason not to do something.


Even without the access issue, options for dealing with Pakistan are limited. We could top giving them money, but that wouldn't stop them from doing what they believe is in their interest. All very well to rant about "fixing" or "doing something", but what exactly do you propose to do?

Asked and answered on many occasions.


Did anyone make a promise? Who? When? To whom? Did this hypothetical promise involve eternal support and security?

You can go back to JMM99's post, print it out and wave that piece of paper around when you use this argument. It will work good.

[carl]

Assuming we remove all GPF from AFG on schedule, but do continue to try our hand at the ANSF development line of operation on a limited scale and we have some SOF tie-in to deal with AQ, what strategic national interests remain in the support to the country?

The only thing I have seen advertised that makes any sense is preventing a resurgence of AQ, but do you think that's anything we really need to worry about, or anything that would justify substantial expenditure of resources?

Does AFG factor into a larger balance of power issue in the region?

If Afghanistan were to be retaken by Taliban & Co./Pak Army/ISI we would be back to an Afghanistan controlled by Taliban & Co./Pak Army/ISI as it was before 9-11. Taliban & Co haven't renounced their ideology and the Pak Army/ISI is as it ever was and will be (until India smashes it) so I think it reasonable to expect that it would go back to being the sunny place it was for Islamist terrorists, whether the be AQ or something else. The last time that happened we found it unpleasant.

Not only would they have the safe place to play they had before, they would have a resurgence of morale and motivation that we can't really imagine. These guys are strongly motivated by religious ideology. If they were to take it over again after what could be seen as a decade long trial of their faith in which they were not found wanting...that would be a very big thing. It is my opinion that that would be seen as a sign from the almighty that the way they have been following has divine approval (even more than now) and they would strive to go on to bigger and better things.

What effect that would have can't be precisely predicted or quantified but I can't see how the effect wouldn't be a big one and one that would affect us.

All of the above assumes those guys will prevail in Afghanistan. I don't know if that will happen considering that India, Iran, Turkey, Russia and the Stans are quite interested in what transpires there.

[Dayuhan]

Ah yes, the ever reliable fallacy of the false alternative.

Have you got a real alternative?


It would be if you reduced your force level. Doesn't matter now though. Too late. And of course it would have been hard to do, always a good reason not to do something.

Reducing your force level would have consequences of its own... and even if you do it, what would you do then?


Asked and answered on many occasions.

Nope.


You can go back to JMM99's post, print it out and wave that piece of paper around when you use this argument. It will work good.

If you're basing a demand for a course of action on a need to keep promises, the issue of who promised what to whom really does need to be addressed.

[Gurkha]

I somehow don't think it will end in abrupt surgical departure.Gaining in confidence after his endorsement for a second term, Obama will definitely not wish to wash away whatever gains the West has made in the past decade. The majority of the troops will withdraw, the civilians will and so will many International NGOs.. but the special forces will continue, so will the funding, Karzai may change but an anti-Taliban regime will continue.It has to.. nobody in their right senses would wish to leave a Vipers nest behind. While it may not benefit the Afghans especially the 'South Helmand Farmer', the Taliban may not find it very easy to operate in an Afghanistan covered by satellites & UAVs : if they concentrate.. they will be taken out... so it may not be as unequal as you think. And hey.... 2016... another attack, another President, afresh set of military leadership rarin' to go.. who knows ? Perhaps finally the Indians may grow some balls to do something instead of whining as usual, because by 2016 Pakistan will be on fire & fragmenting as will Kashmir !!Who knows we will shake hands across the Indus !!:D

[davidbfpo]

In May 2012 a hitherto unknown US think tank the Center for National Policy (CNP) published a short paper on a strategy for NATO; one of the co-authors is Ryan Evans, whose work I have cited before.

From the summary:
The main elements of this plan, some of which are already in place, are as follows:

• Continue transition plans to place Afghan Government and Security Forces in the lead across the country by April 2013. However, “transition” must take on more substance than it has so far. The April 2013 transition cannot be a political fig leaf for home audiences, but an end to American and Allied (non-Afghan) combat operations against Afghan-oriented insurgents outside the scope of embedded mentoring and fire support.

• Dissolve the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and place Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) in charge of the military mission by April 2013. This will be accompanied by a drawdown of US-NATO troop levels to a force of approximately 30,000 – 6,000-8,000 of whom should be non U.S. military personnel. This large drawdown will ensure that “ownership” is transitioned
to the Afghan state. The primary military mission will be to continue the intelligence and direct action campaign against transnational terrorist networks in the region.

• Full transition of governance and development efforts in Afghanistan to the United Nations by April 2013. Governance and development efforts do not aggregate to form an American political strategy.

• The United States and NATO allies will provide enduring material and political support to the Afghan state in order to ensure sufficient stability around Kabul, the north, and the west and prevent transnational terrorist networks from operating from Afghanistan.

Keeping more troops in Afghanistan through 2013 will not result in appreciable and durable gains in consolidating the Afghan government's hold over the country. Therefore, the costs in blood and treasure associated with a more gradual drawdown are simply not worth the meager gains they will deliver.

Link:http://cnponline.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/38128

I noted they recommend paying attention to how the USSR withdrew!

[Dayuhan]

In May 2012 a hitherto unknown US think tank the Center for National Policy (CNP) published a short paper on a strategy for NATO; one of the co-authors is Ryan Evans, whose work I have cited before

This makes pretty good sense as far as I can see, and I can find little to argue with in it. I would point out that "enduring support" will have to walk a thin line between a desire not to fund corruption and acceptance of the reality that it is a patronage-based political culture and no Afghan central government can endure without indulging in a level of patronage that we will consider corrupt. How far we're willing to let that go before restricting aid will have to be worked out as we go along.

Of course this strategy can fail, but that will ultimately be in the hands of Afghans, as it must be.

[jcustis]

• The United States and NATO allies will provide enduring material and political support to the Afghan state in order to ensure sufficient stability around Kabul, the north, and the west and prevent transnational terrorist networks from operating from Afghanistan.

I like most elements, but not this one. Material support aimed at Kabul runs the risk of being squandered, and so it needs to be very clearly defined. I doubt we can do that in a satisfactory, honest way.

[davidbfpo]

A neat article on an issue some may prefer not being in the open; which opens with:
One of the outcomes of the current US-Afghan summit in Washington reported by Afghan media is the apparent emergence of a new Afghan special operations force, the “Foundation Force for Afghanistan”. Still there is no official confirmation of this. Our guest blogger Gary Owen(*) writes, however, that this would be very much in line with the US emphasis on Afghan SOF training and partnership and, when involving private military contractors, would enable the US to maintain direct influence over Afghan SOF while still withdrawing troops.

Link:http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=3199

I noted the re-appearance of Blackwater PMC, now known as Academi.

A longer backgrounder, by the same author:http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=3069

[flagg]

That's a good question. Personally, I think Congress will probably repeat what we did after the withdrawal in Vietnam and cut off support to whatever remains of Karzai's government. I think our interest is mainly to prevent the reemergence of the kind of support and infrastructure AQ had in the late 1990's.

Your post leaves me thinking about the Soviet withdraw from Afghanistan.

IIRC, it lasted approx 3 years.

But it fell in approx 3 months from the time the cash/aid tap got turned off.

Current day Afghanistan has approx $16-20 billion in spending(largely foreign aid), but only approx $2 billion in tax revenue.

[davidbfpo]

A short article by a novelist, which starts with:
The first British invasion of Afghanistan in 1839 ended three years later in disaster. In an exclusive extract from his new book, William Dalrymple draws parallels with the current campaign

There are some odd passages, more like a travel article, but at least he talks to Afghans and citing one tribal elder, from Gandamak:
Last month some American officers called us to a hotel in Jalalabad for a meeting. One of them asked me, 'Why do you hate us?’ I replied, 'Because you blow down our doors, enter our houses, pull our women by the hair and kick our children. We cannot accept this. We will fight back, and we will break your teeth, and when your teeth are broken you will leave, just as the British left before you. It is just a matter of time.

“What did he say to that?”

He turned to his friend and said, 'If the old men are like this, what will the younger ones be like?’ In truth, all the Americans here know their game is over. It is just their politicians who deny this.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9811223/The-Afghanistan-massacre-on-the-roof-of-the-world.html

[Bill Moore]

The first British invasion of Afghanistan in 1839 ended three years later in disaster.

At least they saw the light three years into their campaign, they didn't have wait 10 years plus to experiment with a better way and in the meantime continue to sacrifice our best people, our financial wealth, and our international credibility.

[davidbfpo]

A nice catchy headline, based on an internal UK MoD paper:
Both the Nato campaign and the 1979 invasion were initially attempts to impose "ideology foreign to the Afghan people", whose aims were quickly dropped when they ran into difficulty.

Nato, like the Soviets, has been unable to "establish control over the country's borders and the insurgents' safe havens", or "protect the rural population"....
"The [Soviet] 40th Army was unable to decisively defeat the Mujahideen while facing no existential threat itself, a situation that precisely echoes [the Nato coalition's] predicament"


The paper, Lessons From the Soviet Transition in Afghanistan, was prepared for the MOD's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), to provoke internal debate and challenge current military thinking.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9933150/Nato-troops-in-Afghanistan-in-a-similar-situation-to-failed-Soviet-invasion.html

For political reasons the UK, like I suspect most ISAF contributors, does not want a public debate around what has happened in Afghanistan.