Insurgents vs Terrorists -- Is there a difference?

[GPaulus]

Sir,

Thank you for your patients with my rambling on this topic. I believe based on what I have learned from the war and in my studies that there are fundamental and significant differences between insurgents and terrorists.

Not only in their motives and their Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTPs) but in our military response to each--how we fight. However, some experts will quickly say that insurgency and terrorism are inextricably linked. In doing so however, they would fail to recognize the consequence of this association. In my studies, the two are only loosely connected but often each gains tremendous momentum when the two are used interchangeably. I also believe that when we misrepresent one as the other, we do damage to our effort. It is, in our terms "a combat multiplyier" for the enemy in its most synergistic form. For example, when I associate what is happening in Iraq to a religious Jihad or a struggle against demoracracy, it gives the appearance of unification of one large group against another, and of a large scale almost global struggle. The risk is that we incite globally--“Beware the zealous leader who bangs the drums of war in order to whip the citizenry into a fervor, for this is indeed a double-edged sword. It both emboldens the blood, just as it narrows the mind. And when the drums of war have reached a fever pitch and the blood boils with hate and the mind has closed, the leader will have no need in seizing the rights of the citizenry. Rather, the citizenry, infused with fear and blinded by hatred, will offer up all of their rights unto the leader, and gladly so. How do I know? For this is what I have done. And I am, Caesar.” Quote from Julius Caesar.

I think a new thread would be helpful to me too. We should define the two.

Here are some of the things that I believe are the salient differences between the two:

Insurgencies are conditions in which the insurgents spawn within a population because the government will not, or simply cannot provide the appropriate governance for life (law, order, security, water, electricity, sanitation, etc. This population can be likened to the criminal gang and organized crime elements more then freedom fighters or terrorists. Their cause is never an ideology or idealistic dogma, (it is more primal and basic) and therefore they will have the propensity to ebb and flow based on the need of the day and the targets of opportunity. In other words, their cause can change based on the situation. Today insurgents might attack American fighters in response to the surge, tomorrow they might strike a Mosque in a form of sectarian retaliation, the next day it is the Iraq security forces. Their targets are most often tactical. Their goal has nothing to do with winning although they don't mind the enemies (plural) failing--they will fight anyone who tries to bring order. They win if the struggle is protracted because it is from the pure chaos that they get their Utility. Insurgencies are not religiously motivated; in as much as “they” want to present the appearance that they are religious in nature. This is in direct conflict with the traditional paradigm that the war fighter is accustomed. It is important to recognize that religion is ideological; an insurgency is not. This is not to say that religion and religious rhetoric is not important--it is to the insurgents because it gives the appearance of broad support, and it quickly organizes society for them into “us against them.” They gain if they breed hatred and distrust among other religious groups: Sunni, Shiites, Muslims and Christians. However, because they are not driven by a single ideology, members can quickly apostatize. This can be used as a COIN tool, and their members can be reformed.

The insurgents in Iraq are decentralized in their operations, are local within a small territorial range (kilometers from their home) and recruit their fighters from local talent. Here is an equation that predicts the probable distance from an IED strike to the insurgents' home base. P(b) = A * e**-Bx Where A and B are empirical constants determined from the enemy data sets. It is an exponential decay function. As the distance X from the insurgent’s base increases, the less probable that a single group committed it. It is believed that 90% of all insurgent attacks will occur within 15 km of their base.

The Terrorists on the other hand, have very much centralized command and control (decentralized in their execution) and will operate hundred up to thousands of kilometers from their command and control base of operations.
Their struggle is based on the terrorist’s commitment to violence as a small group (usually ranging in group size from few to less than one-hundred- fifty "card carrying" members) in order to intimidate a population or government to cause their perceived fundamental change. The group size is limited by command, control and confidentiality capabilities. Their cause is always ideological and political, based on group-actualization rather than self-serving. In other words, their belief is that what they do is for the "Public good"--acting on behalf of "all." It is aimed at the establishment, not decapitated states. Terrorism however enjoys the freedom to organize and operate unabated in failed states. Finally, rarely will anyone ever develop a counter-terrorist strategy to change this group’s apostasy--it is analogous to trying to change Rush Limbaugh from the right to the left--it simply cannot be done. Their beliefs are so deeply held that they appear to the world as radical and extreme. Terrorists may or may not be highly trained and their operations are top driven and centralized from the command and control elements. Their targets are always strategic. Because the terrorists act on behalf of all, they will never engage in grass roots fighting unless cornered into it. As a result, in my "Opinion," we have very few terrorist cells living in Iraq. Although the insurgents hope that we think differently.

I think a new string would be very helpful.

[jcustis]

I think a new string would be very helpful.

Done sir. Your original post in the Philippines thread remains, and this is a copy to begin further discussion.

[BRUZ_LEE]

Sir,

I believe based on what I have learned from the war and in my studies that there are fundamental and significant differences between insurgents and terrorists.

Not only in their motives and their Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTPs) but in our military response to each--how we fight.

I think a new string would be very helpful.

I think that you can't differentiate between insurgents and terrorists in that way.

Insurgency is in my opinion the overall term and encompasses all members of an insurgency movement. That is the Leaders, Theorists, Financers, Sponsors, Helpers, Computer-Experts, Media-Experts, Technicians, Bomb-Makers, Spies, ..... and of course the actual fighters. Among the fighters you may then find the terrorists, simply because Terror is a useful method insurgents use to achieve their goals.

This makes it also clear, that by military means alone you can't win against an insurgency movement, because it's made of more than just fighters and terrorists.

The fight against terrorists is therefore just a part in the fight against insurgents.

There are, of course, other terrorists as well, which are not related to an insurgency and which also can't be directly compared with insurgents one on one.

[Tom Odom]

I agree with Bruz Lee. My own experiences in Lebanon, Sudan, Turkey, and Rwanda as well as time as a regional and terrorist analyst makes any attempt to draw clear lines between terrorists and insurgents. Terrorism and terrorist are labels with variety of meanings attached. They are also a means or a tactic. And they are also a statement of intent.

Insurgent is somewhat better defined and perhaps clearer in the intent of its meaning. Even so there are great debates and I am sure you have heard them about whether or not someone is an iinsurgent or a wave of violence is an insurgency.

Because of the connotations and simultaneous spin associated with the term terrorists, I have over the years shifted to the word extremist.

Best

Tom

[marct]

Hi Folks,

In general, I agree with Tom and Bruz, but I do have a few cavils or caveats on that agreement (hey, I'm an academic, what did you expect? :rolleyes: ).

First off, how be if we drop the personal forms and look at the group forms: "insurgency" and "terrorism". This makes it easier to examine since individuals may be affiliated with more than one group form.

Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency) defines an insurgency as "An insurgency, or insurrection, is an armed uprising, or revolt against an established civil or political authority." The OED defines insurgency as "The quality or state of being insurgent; the tendency to rise in revolt", an insurgent as "One who rises in revolt against constituted authority; a rebel who is not recognized as a belligerent." and an "insurgence" as "The action of rising against authority; a rising, revolt." (personally, I always preferred the OED).

So, the core relational meanings of the term are:

a "rise", "uprising", "revolt", "rebellion"
against "authority"; defined as "an established civil or political authority" in Wikipedia and as "constituted authority" or just "authority" in the OED.
with the implication of conflict; defined as armed revolt in wikepedia, undefined in the OED.


The relationship is between two groups, #s 1 & 2 and takes the form of 3.

Let's look at the groups in this little social drama. A "rise", "uprising", "revolt", "rebellion" against "authority" (of some type). The implication of this is fairly obvious, group 1 lacks "authority" that is held by group 2. As such, an "insurgency" implies a redefinition of "authority" between the two groups.

Let's look at the relationship (#3) next. In its broadest form, the OED definitions, it does not state the type of authority other than "constituted". This means that the authority relationship is, in all probability, housed in some type of institution: political, military, religious, academic, familial, etc.

As to the specific tactics of such an insurgency, the OED only uses the phrase "a rebel who is not recognized as a belligerent". Now, the definition of "belligerent" is crucial to this - "A nation, party, or person waging regular war (recognized by the law of nations)" [n] and "Waging or carrying on regular recognized war; actually engaged in hostilities" [adj]. Now this certainly implies armed revolt, but I would also point out that conflictual metaphors are common in many non-kinetic conflicts. More importantly, note the use of terms such as "regular war" and "regular recognized war". This implies the existence of rules of combat, and these rules can exist only within institutions. For example,our current "Rules of Warfare" derive from the Treaty of Westphalia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_westphalia). Notice, however, that all institutions have specific rules of "conflict" (broadly construed), and hat all the OED definitions really say is that an insurgency is characterized by tactics that stand outside of the "accepted" (socially contracted) rules of conflict within the institution.

Okay, let's shift to "Terrorism":


from Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism) - "Terrorism is a term used to describe violence or other harmful acts committed (or threatened) against civilians by groups or persons for political or other ideological goals."
from the OED - "A system of terror", "Government by intimidation as directed and carried out by the party in power in France during the Revolution of 1789-94; the system of the ‘Terror’ (1793-4)", "A policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized".


Terrorism is a specific "social contract" or system. The term was originally coined in France - "terrorisme (1798 in Dict. Acad., Suppl.)" - and referred to the system put into place by Robespierre. It is systemic and aimed by one group against another - originally by a government against its citizens, later by any group advocating political or ideological goals and choosing to use these tactics. Originally, this tactic took place within a social contract, but that seems to have dropped from the definition fairly quickly.

So, back to definitions: an "insurgency" is an attempt to redefine power / authority relationships within an institution, while "terrorism" is a specific tactic or system employed by one group against another to achieve specificf ends.

Marc

[jcustis]

And when a bad guy pulls out his weapon to participate in an RPG party against a wayward convoy one day, and then drives an explosive-laden Caprice Classic into a crowded market the next (under directives from a centralized cmd) he can be both, depending upon interpretation.

Semantics aside, they are both bad, and both need to be dispatched with careful precision.

[BRUZ_LEE]

...they are both bad, and both need to be dispatched with careful precision.

If you are fighting a simple terrorist without popular backing than you are right.

If you are talking about a terrorist-fighter within an insurgency movement it can be better not to kill him (i think that is what you mean by "dispatching") but to get him over to your side. Than you get the most valuable Actionable Intelligence you can get and you may be able to drain the insurgency.

[Steve Blair]

I would also add a geographic component to the discussion. Insurgents tend to operate in (or near) the region they are rising against/in, while terrorists (in the classic sense) are trans-national. They operate where and when they can. The contention that terrorists have a centralized command structure is also something of a misnomer. They can and do operate as independent units without a central command aside from a shared ideology, while insurgents can have a central command structure.

It's also important to mark a difference between a terrorist and terrorist-like methods. Insurgencies can use terrorism as a weapon, but they are not classic terrorists in my view. Insurgents have a geographic focus or base of operations, while terrorists can, but do not have to.

I think the confusion arises because terrorism is a tool as well as a group naming methodology. One can use terroristic tactics without being a terrorist, and this applies to insurgents and organized crime elements alike.

There are a number of other differences as well, but I'd need to organize my thoughts a bit better. Perhaps the biggest (to me) lies in the realm of legitimacy or perceived legitimacy. Insurgents often have (or can present themselves to have) legitimate and justified complaints against the regime existing in their region (usually tied to concrete and achievable changes or goals), while a terrorist group may have a political/ideological "goal" or "statement," but its objectives are usually Utopian or unachievable. By the second generation, most groups use these "goals" simply to justify more killing and bloodshed, and they become more nebulous and unattainable. Tom's use of extremist is good, but that term also does not convey the level of violence that a fully mature terrorist group can and will use.

Because of the political nature of many terrorist groups, you will often find disenchanted members joining an insurgency, or even providing training to such groups.

[marct]

Hi Folks,

'fraid we can't "leave the semantics aside" JC:) . "Semantics" = "meaning", and if we don't have some solid, agreed upon meanings, then we might as well just say "let's kill all the bad guys" (yeah, I know, Bubba says "YEAH!"). Besides that, the more accurate we are in our terms, the more likely we are to be able to use them to produce accurate models that will generate a "win" situation. "Semantics is your FRIEND!":D


I would also add a geographic component to the discussion. Insurgents tend to operate in (or near) the region they are rising against/in, while terrorists (in the classic sense) are trans-national. They operate where and when they can. The contention that terrorists have a centralized command structure is also something of a misnomer. They can and do operate as independent units without a central command aside from a shared ideology, while insurgents can have a central command structure.

Generally I'd agree with you on this, Steve. I think that it may be importan to note that what bis really important is the "authority relationship" that is the basis for an insurgency. Certainly, in the past, this has meant that insurgencies had to operate geographically but, would suggest, that not all of them do now what with rapid global communications. A "community of practice" can exist globally and so, in my mind, can an insurgency.


It's also important to mark a difference between a terrorist and terrorist-like methods. Insurgencies can use terrorism as a weapon, but they are not classic terrorists in my view. Insurgents have a geographic focus or base of operations, while terrorists can, but do not have to.

I think the confusion arises because terrorism is a tool as well as a group naming methodology. One can use terroristic tactics without being a terrorist, and this applies to insurgents and organized crime elements alike.

Absolutely!


There are a number of other differences as well, but I'd need to organize my thoughts a bit better. Perhaps the biggest (to me) lies in the realm of legitimacy or perceived legitimacy. Insurgents often have (or can present themselves to have) legitimate and justified complaints against the regime existing in their region (usually tied to concrete and achievable changes or goals), while a terrorist group may have a political/ideological "goal" or "statement," but its objectives are usually Utopian or unachievable. By the second generation, most groups use these "goals" simply to justify more killing and bloodshed, and they become more nebulous and unattainable. Tom's use of extremist is good, but that term also does not convey the level of violence that a fully mature terrorist group can and will use.

Because of the political nature of many terrorist groups, you will often find disenchanted members joining an insurgency, or even providing training to such groups.

I'll look forward to those thoughts :D

Marc

[Stan]

I would also add a geographic component to the discussion.

I can better relate to Steve's recent posting, but Bruz, Marc, and Tom hit home equally well.

I can comment on insurgents from an African and later Estonian point of view.

Where Tom would end up for his last tour in paradise, there were basically two factions, and the outcome was fairly clear. But in Zaire, there were more than 400 tribes. Even though only a handful were more powerful, they still were unable to convice the rest to go along. Intimidation or religious belief was not nearly enough. The money was worthless, so that's out. Exactly what's left ?

In Estonia the insurgents are all now deep into politics. Much like Zaire, the parties and beliefs vary to the point, that it makes the whole process to complicated and only a civil war would break the tie.

Perhaps I'm wrong, but if you have 400 factions that all have a different view on things, how then would say one of the 400 create an effective uprising (insurgency), if the other 399 didn't care ?

It is geography as Steve put so well. Perhaps the Arab insurgents use the Americans to gain momentum and create a stir. That won't work where I am now as well as in Sub-Sahara. The Africans hated the Belg and French, but you still could not get all 400 tribes to agree.

Regards, Stan

[Steve Blair]

There are, in my view, some basic differences between a terrorist and an insurgent. As mentioned before, to my way of thinking the first of these is geography. I also view both terms as neutral in the great scheme of things. There can, from some perspectives, be “good” terrorists and “bad” insurgents, as well as the reverse.

I don't deny the impact of “global community” thought with this, but the relationship between “struggle with authority” (however that may be defined) and a group based on a particular tribe or local issue is to me at the heart of an insurgency. Once it begins leaving local borders, and takes on the trappings of the “global community,” it may well cross into a trans-national insurgency or terrorism. To be more precise, it may become a trans-national insurgent group or terrorist group. I make a distinction between terrorist tactics and methods (terrorism) and groups that practice terrorism.

The base of a typical insurgency remains geographic. While they may solicit outside support and assistance, their goals remain reasonably local (nationalized land holdings, revoking nationalized land holdings, correction of perceived or real social wrongs, and so on). If outsiders can help attain those goals, or distract the local “powers that be,” an insurgent group will use them. I would also argue that while some insurgent groups may have a loose command and control network (although this is not always the case), they still feel responsible to a fixed goal or vision. This is also something that can be easily measured (like the goals mentioned before). Tribal insurgencies, as Stan points out, may have issues getting off the ground, but each tribe remains fairly fixed in its goals and objectives. By this measure, groups like ETA may actually straddle the fence between terrorists and insurgents.

This geographic focus also places, to my view, some limits on the methods an insurgency can employ. These limits are determined more by their base constituency or recruiting pool, and not so much by outside considerations. For example, an insurgency would lose momentum if it continually committed atrocities against its own core population (this is, of course, assuming that the insurgency is not being controlled by others and used for their own ends...my thought here is the Viet Cong by about 1965, although the transition could have taken place earlier). Once they take that step, they become more committed to terrorist methods and the basic profile changes.

Terrorists, on the other hand, have goals and objectives that cannot be easily measured or attained (bringing Ireland under a Socialist/Marxist/whatever government, for example). For them geography is a consideration but not a focus. Also, these groups tend to spin out of control over time, becoming much more hazy in their goals and more violent in their methods. They become, in short, addicted to the killing (their own methods) and less focused on what those methods are supposed to achieve. Some insurgencies (like the ETA, the Khmer Rouge, and others) transition into terrorist groups as their goals become less clear and their methods more violent and less focused.

To me, a trans-national insurgency runs the very real risk of becoming a terrorist group because they lose that geographic focus. One of the first signs of a terrorist group spinning out of control is the conversion to a more hazy political or socio-political goal. “Global Community”-type insurgencies would be especially vulnerable to this, as their leadership would be dispersed and more open to influence by more radical (or extremist) elements. And once they start shedding their self-imposed limits, they run the real risk of falling into the classic terrorist spiral of violence.

Just some slightly more organized thoughts...

[Steve Blair]

I would further propose that a great deal of what we see now is a more evolved form of terrorism, considering the base that the recruiting efforts are tapping into. Iraq is, for the most part (in my view) a variety of insurgency in terms of the geographic components and social objectives of most groups involved, but it is also vulnerable to the terrorist sway I mentioned earlier.

[marct]

You know, Steve, I still have that caveat about geography :). I would argue that what we are seeing, in the broader scope of the GWOT is really a global insurgency against the particular weltanscauung established by the Treaty of Westphalia. I would certainly agree that they are using terrorist tactics, but I would classify the MB and its intellectual children as insurgents.

In Iraq, I would tend to agree with you that it is a variety of insurgency. On that note, however, I think that we need to create a new term to cover what we have been calling "criminal enterprises". The main reason for creating a new term is that calling something "criminal" means that there must be a generally accepted legal code, and that isn't the case in many failed or failing states. I would further suggest that a "criminal enterprise" is, in actuality, a tactical option in the same way as terrorism is a tactical option. So, if we are going to "build a better mousetrap" (model), then we should clearly distinguish betwen tactics and group motivations.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Marc,

I do believe in the construct of what I call a trans-national insurgency, but I also feel that once you start spreading past certain geographic areas you cross from insurgency into terrorism. We may just agree to disagree here...:)

Criminal enterprises...now there's an interesting one. Terrorist groups use these sorts of activities to finance their operations, so the two clearly mix. I do feel that there is a difference between an organized criminal activity (such as the Mafia or larger cartels) and smaller ones that crop up in unstable locations. Perhaps "organized crime" might be a better term for the "criminal enterprises" in disorganized territories, with the enterprise term limited to the criminal tactics and not the organization.

[marct]

Hi Steve


I do believe in the construct of what I call a trans-national insurgency, but I also feel that once you start spreading past certain geographic areas you cross from insurgency into terrorism. We may just agree to disagree here...:)

Quite possibly :). Let me give you what I consider to be another example of a trans-national insurgency (I like the term): the anti-globalization movement. I think that an argument could also be made that many of the diasporic communities that have come into existence as a result of political conflict in their homelands may, at times, also act as trans-national insurgencies (TNIs), even though hey may have a geographic focus.

Hmmm, maybe that's a way to distinguish them: their focus - geographic, ideological, etc.


Criminal enterprises...now there's an interesting one. Terrorist groups use these sorts of activities to finance their operations, so the two clearly mix.

That's why I was identifying it as a "tactic", rather than an "aim".


I do feel that there is a difference between an organized criminal activity (such as the Mafia or larger cartels) and smaller ones that crop up in unstable locations. Perhaps "organized crime" might be a better term for the "criminal enterprises" in disorganized territories, with the enterprise term limited to the criminal tactics and not the organization.

I think that there is a difference; probably something to do with the degree of social integration of the "criminal organization". After all, the Mafia and gangs in general are really quite an accepted and integrated part of US society, whether anyone likes it or not <wry grin>. In effect, in a stable society, these groups fulfill functional requirements, i.e. they meet the needs, of a segment of the population even though the society in general has specifically said that these needs may not be met legally in that form. Usually, this is in the form of actions / needs that society has defined as "immoral".

In disorganized territories, I think we are dealing with something quite different - more of an attempt to both fulfill needs and, also, to carve out a moral sanction from the general society to do so.

Maybe we should start categorizing these groups in the following way:


Aim or goal - what they hope to achieve
Focus - geographic, ideological, "religious", economic, etc.
Tactical preference - e.g. terrorism, "criminal activity", IO, etc.Marc

[Steve Blair]

Hmmm, maybe that's a way to distinguish them: their focus - geographic, ideological, etc.

I think that there is a difference; probably something to do with the degree of social integration of the "criminal organization". After all, the Mafia and gangs in general are really quite an accepted and integrated part of US society, whether anyone likes it or not <wry grin>. In effect, in a stable society, these groups fulfill functional requirements, i.e. they meet the needs, of a segment of the population even though the society in general has specifically said that these needs may not be met legally in that form. Usually, this is in the form of actions / needs that society has defined as "immoral".

In disorganized territories, I think we are dealing with something quite different - more of an attempt to both fulfill needs and, also, to carve out a moral sanction from the general society to do so.

Maybe we should start categorizing these groups in the following way:


Aim or goal - what they hope to achieve
Focus - geographic, ideological, "religious", economic, etc.
Tactical preference - e.g. terrorism, "criminal activity", IO, etc.Marc

That was my breakdown with the idea of a TNI: once it leaves a specific geographic region (or geographic focus) it then becomes trans-national. I did have the anti-globalization folks in mind, but there are other examples (MB in a sense). One thing with a TNI - it becomes more susceptible to loosing its focused identity and concentrating on means (terrorism) more than ends (its original goals). At that point I really feel it transitions into a terrorist group.

With organized crime and the like, it may be best to think of "criminal enterprises" in an unstable region as more tactics than movements (at least initially). Some of them will clearly be attempts to make ends meet or obtain services and goods that might be otherwise unavailable, but in other cases it will be insurgent and/or terrorist groups using the activity for their own purposes (be it financial or logistics).

I like your list. It puts into words the mental methods I was using to put this construct together.

[Tom Odom]

Steve

This is exactly why it keep it as simple as possible when using the T-word.


Criminal enterprises...now there's an interesting one. Terrorist groups use these sorts of activities to finance their operations, so the two clearly mix.

Insurgent groups rob banks. So do extremists (AKA Terrorists). Insurgent groups use drug production to finance activities. Extremists do so as well.

As for the Global War on Terrorism, I (and I guess Marc as well) see it as a global COIN regardless of what you call the opposition. If we try and put it as a Global War on Terrorists (versus Terrorism) we end up fighting the insurgent and not the insurgency. To wit in a strategic COIN, we concentrate on lethal strike operations --which may play well inside the US--against high value targets and we neglect the global COIN objective of that neutral or passive Muslim majority centered in the even greater neutral or passive global majority.

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

Tom,

One of the reasons I don't like the use of terrorism with GWOT is the fact that terrorism was around before the rise of Muslim extremists, and they will be there after they're gone. Linking the two has the danger of stripping attention away from groups and individuals who are immune to COIN and only susceptible to direct action of some sort or another. COIN can work very well with Muslims, but it will have no impact on RAF/IRA-type groups.

What I think Marc and I are grappling with is a more suitable (to our minds, at least) way of categorizing things.

[marct]

Hi Tom,


Insurgent groups rob banks. So do extremists (AKA Terrorists). Insurgent groups use drug production to finance activities. Extremists do so as well.

That's why I'm trying to categorize these as tactics, or preffered tactics.


As for the Global War on Terrorism, I (and I guess Marc as well) see it as a global COIN regardless of what you call the opposition. If we try and put it as a Global War on Terrorists (versus Terrorism) we end up fighting the insurgent and not the insurgency. To wit in a strategic COIN, we concentrate on lethal strike operations --which may play well inside the US--against high value targets and we neglect the global COIN objective of that neutral or passive Muslim majority centered in the even greater neutral or passive global majority.

Exactly! Part of the reason I get so picky on wording is that certain words gain semantic accretions (emotional and referential stuff that's associated with them) in the popular press. This, in turn, influences our ability to conduct global COIN. I've said it before i a number of threads, but I think it's worth repeating: this war is an ideological fight first and foremost.

Marc

[marct]

Hi Steve,


What I think Marc and I are grappling with is a more suitable (to our minds, at least) way of categorizing things.

Certainly, although I am a touch more ambitious - I want to go beyond a taxonomy and into a descriptive and, hopefully, predictive model.


Marc

[slapout9]

You could try an LE model the group is usually identified by a leader or group title (Gotti,Crips,MS13,etc.) from there it is categorized by Motive(cause,ideology) Method(Terrorist,Insurgent,Robbers,Drug dealers, etc.) Opportunity(Time and Location) ??What say ye??

[Steve Blair]

I like descriptive models as well, although my historical background makes me somewhat wary of predictive models.:o

I've always considered criminal activity of the sort we were discussing as a tactic. Organized crime refers more to the group that is using the tactic, and the fact that it has become their preferred tactic (indeed, possibly their main method of operations). What got me interested in this was the blanket use of the word "terrorist," often with a total ignorance of anything that came before Sept. 11. Trans-national insurgent groups are certainly vulnerable to COIN, and can be defeated by ideas. In my view, the hardline terrorist group is pretty immune to this approach, especially once they've entered their third generation of recruits. You may be able to isolate them from their recruiting sources, but the violence they cloak with ideological labels will normally attract more from other places.

When you face a mix of TNI and TGs (terrorist groups), targeting the TNI for COIN is certainly the way to go. TGs can use the goals of TNIs as a cloak for their activities, but if the TNI is defeated or changes its basic goals the TG is exposed.

Like I said, my framework is historical and not based in anthropology. The techniques are somewhat different.:D Not to say either is better, mind...just different.

[Steve Blair]

You could try an LE model the group is usually identified by a leader or group title (Gotti,Crips,MS13,etc.) from there it is categorized by Motive(cause,ideology) Method(Terrorist,Insurgent,Robbers,Drug dealers, etc.) Opportunity(Time and Location) ??What say ye??

This is actually close to the premise I was working from, but centered more on ideals and goals than actual leader. Terrorist groups can have very elastic leadership chains, where a classic insurgency will often have a charismatic leader(s). The group framework (MS13 and so on) is most likely a better LE approach to take.

LE ideas and techniques are critical to COIN, so keep those ideas comin'!

[marct]

Hi Steve,


I like descriptive models as well, although my historical background makes me somewhat wary of predictive models.:o
....
Like I said, my framework is historical and not based in anthropology. The techniques are somewhat different.:D Not to say either is better, mind...just different.

I've got nothing against descriptive models per se either - I just get a touch worried when they are taken as if they were predictive models, which the press has a tendency to do <wry grin>.


When you face a mix of TNI and TGs (terrorist groups), targeting the TNI for COIN is certainly the way to go. TGs can use the goals of TNIs as a cloak for their activities, but if the TNI is defeated or changes its basic goals the TG is exposed.

I agree. Your point about multiple generations is also taken as well which, by the way, also gives us the timeline to shift perceptions - 3 generations <sigh>.

Marc

[Stan]

Criminal enterprises...now there's an interesting one. Terrorist groups use these sorts of activities to finance their operations, so the two clearly mix. I do feel that there is a difference between an organized criminal activity (such as the Mafia or larger cartels) and smaller ones that crop up in unstable locations. Perhaps "organized crime" might be a better term for the "criminal enterprises" in disorganized territories, with the enterprise term limited to the criminal tactics and not the organization.

Steve,
The Estonian Central Criminal Police use that term even to this day to describe not only organized elements in disorganized territories (Russia) but concluded after an FBI course in NOV 05, that the locations no longer need to be unstable (although easier to maneuver and recruit), the tactics simply change to mesh with the operational area.

Why then would it be any different for a somewhat organized terrorist cell working abroad ?

I would think it would be much the same, a little homework (afterall, time is on your hands) and objective.

Yes, I have a rather modest view, less complicated and what I think is logical (I function, not operate the very same way).

Regards, Stan

[Steve Blair]

I agree. Your point about multiple generations is also taken as well which, by the way, also gives us the timeline to shift perceptions - 3 generations <sigh>.

Marc

It's an even shorter timeline than you might think, Marc. Terrorist generations are defined by the members. Any time the majority of a group's founders are killed/captured/drop out, the next wave is referred to as the next generation. The German RAF went through 2-3 generations in about 4 years.

[Tom Odom]

COIN can work very well with Muslims, but it will have no impact on RAF/IRA-type groups.

I agree, Steve. In that realm I look at them as extremists and you cannot alter their mindsets. Certainly terror and terrorism, and terrorists are terms that predate what is called GWOT now. I also agree that GWOT is not the proper term; as you probably recall, there was a brief period where the White House actually started to use extremist. That soon stopped.

But we deal with those same terms as they applied in current context, as the terms terrorist and insurgent were juxtaposed to begin this thread.

My point is simply that the terms terrorists, terrorism, and terror have been used on so many contexts that their meanings muddle rather than clarify. And that confusion seeps into our strategy.

Best
Tom

[kaur]

Here is quite good article, which is trying to define difficult (often emotional) terms.

http://ictconference.org/var/119/17070-Def%20Terrorism%20by%20Dr.%20Boaz%20Ganor.pdf

[GPaulus]

The article you referenced "Defining Terrorism:
Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?
by Boaz Ganoris" is accurate in its definition of Terrorists and groups of Terrrorists. The article rightly defines Terrorism based on three critically important elements:
1. The essence of the activity—the use of, or threat to use, violence. According to this definition, an activity that does not involve violence or a threat of violence will not be defined as terrorism (including non-violent protest—strikes, peaceful demonstrations, tax revolts, etc.).
2. The aim of the activity is always political—namely, the goal is to attain
political objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power,
changing social or economic policies, etc. In the absence of a political aim, the activity will not be defined as Terrorism. A violent activity against
civilians that has no political aim is, at most, an act of criminal delinquency, a
felony, or simply an act of insanity unrelated to terrorism. I also add ideological aims to the list of political aims. The motivation—whether ideological, or political is relevant for the purpose of defining terrorism. In this
context, the following statement by Duvall and Stohl deserves mention:
Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most
analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as
logical or necessary aspects of terrorism. But they are not. At best, they are
empirical regularities associated with terrorism.
3. The targets of terrorism are always "strategic" and aimed at innocent people (civilians, noncombatants, public servants, military not engaged in hostililites e.g. 'USS Cole'.) Terrorism is thus distinguished from other types of political violence (guerrilla warfare, freedom fighting, civil insurrection, etc.). Terrorism exploits the relative vulnerability of the civilian “underbelly”—the tremendous anxiety, and the intense media reaction evoked by attacks against strategic civilian targets.
4) Terrorist activities transend boundaries where as insurgencies are local within kilometers of the insurgent's base of operation.

The paper does not discuss insurgencies but makes reference to violent activity against civilians that have no political aim as acts of criminal delinquency, a felony, or simply an act of violence aimed at chaos.
1. The essence of the insurgency activity—the use of violence to create chaos and to disrupt lawful activities within a community. According to this definition, an activity that does not involve violence, extortion or a threat of violence will not be defined as an insurgency (including non-violent protest—strikes, peaceful demonstrations, tax revolts, etc.).
2. The aim of the insurgent activity is never political —namely, the goal is not to attain political objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power, changing social or economic policies, or even winning the "war." It is however, aimed at protractedness and disrupting the lawful act of governance. A violent activity against civilians that has no political aim is included in the definition of insurgency. It is never an ideological struggle. Most analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives (sectarian, religious, tribal) as logical or necessary aspects of insurgencies. They are not. At best, they are attempts to incite others into the chaos by breeding hatred, mistrust and playing on strongly held belief systems such as religion. That is why religious entities are often targets.
3. The targets of insurgencies are targets of opportunity and "tactical" and although aimed at those that are associated with restoring law and order --they will include attacks on innocent people (civilians, noncombatants, public servants inorder to ensure protractedness. It is the protractedness that provides "Utility" to the insurgent population. Insurgency must also be distinguished from other types of violence (guerrilla warfare, freedom fighters, etc.) and others that have political aims. Insurgencies exploit the vulnerability of security and lack of security for civilians given that a government cannot secure the entire community at the same time.

In the end, it is important that we separate the two in order to effectly understand and engage each.

[slapout9]

In this
context, the following statement by Duvall and Stohl deserves mention:
Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most
analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as
logical or necessary aspects of terrorism. But they are not. At best, they are
empirical regularities associated with terrorism.


This is nonsense! There is always a motive. You may not understand it, but it is there. It answers the question who benefits.

[marct]

2. The aim of the insurgent activity is never political —namely, the goal is not to attain political objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power, changing social or economic policies, or even winning the "war." It is however, aimed at protractedness and disrupting the lawful act of governance. A violent activity against civilians that has no political aim is included in the definition of insurgency. It is never an ideological struggle. Most analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives (sectarian, religious, tribal) as logical or necessary aspects of insurgencies. They are not. At best, they are attempts to incite others into the chaos by breeding hatred, mistrust and playing on strongly held belief systems such as religion. That is why religious entities are often targets.


This is nonsense! There is always a motive. You may not understand it, but it is there. It answers the question who benefits.

And, I have to say, that a broad generalization of "The aim of the insurgent activity is never political" is equally nonsense. GP, do you think that Ganoris ever bothered to read Lenin, Mao or Guevera? I find it incredible that anyone who had, or had had studied any history, could make such an outrageous claim.


In the end, it is important that we separate the two in order to effectly understand and engage each.

I certainly agree with the sentiment :). I would, however, add in the caveat that such a separation does require that the terms not be completely redefined.

Marc

[jcustis]

And, I have to say, that a broad generalization of "The aim of the insurgent activity is never political" is equally nonsense. GP, do you think that Ganoris ever bothered to read Lenin, Mao or Guevera? I find it incredible that anyone who had, or had had studied any history, could make such an outrageous claim.



I certainly agree with the sentiment :). I would, however, add in the caveat that such a separation does require that the terms not be completely redefined.

Marc

I'm with the Canadian...I have no idea where this definition of insurgents is going sir. Maybe it's just not getting through my thick head, but are you really arguing that insurgents do not have political goals?

[GPaulus]

I'm with the Canadian...I have no idea where this definition of insurgents is going sir. Maybe it's just not getting through my thick head, but are you really arguing that insurgents do not have political goals?

Yes that is what is going around in my head--insurgents (at least in Iraq)are apolitical. I believe that insurgents have motives but that their motives are much more primal. I believe that others like freedom fighters, terrorist and others have more of self actualizing goals whereas the insurgents are much more fundamental in their needs. This population can be likened to the criminal gang and organized crime elements more then conventional war fighters or terrorists. The insurgency in Iraq is composed of primarily men 18-40. They tend to be local within a very small territorial range Km from the homes, and recruit their fighters from local talent. When the group gets too large (100+), there may be internal violence, mass killings and rival rifts as members compete for upward mobility. Their “Cause to Die For” is the failure of the government to meet the most basic levels of life. They almost always spawn from decapitated states especially if the levels of basic services do not improve with time. Their cause is never an ideology or idealistic dogma, and therefore they will have the propensity to ebb and flow based on the need of the day and the targets of opportunity. Because they are not driven by a single ideology, members can quickly apostatize. I believe that Insurgency warfare is not politically, ethnically or religiously motivated. Notice how this flies in the face of the conventional war fighter’s paradigm proposed by Clausewitz, “War is the extension of politics by other means.” If a word could describe insurgents, it is self-serving—power, money, lawlessness, food, freedom from oppression, survival, etc., and once spawned, their aim is protractedness; it is not about winning. Simply stated, insurgencies are protracted because that provides the most utility to the insurgents; they are not protracted because it is an insurgency. Insurgents don’t have a goal of winning although they would not mind seeing their enemy fail. They win if the struggle continues to gain momentum and they draw others into the fray—that breeds chaos. In addition, and contrary to popular belief, insurgencies are not religiously motivated; in as much as “they” want to present the appearance that they are religious in nature. This is in direct conflict with the traditional paradigm that the war fighter is accustomed. It is important to recognize that religion is ideological; an insurgency is not. This is not to say that religion and religious rhetoric is not important--it is to the insurgents because it gives the appearance of broad support, and it quickly organizes society for them into “us against them.” They gain if they breed hatred and distrust among other religious groups: Sunni, Shiites, Muslims and Christians. It is an attempt to give the appearance of unification of one large group against another of a large scale struggle. In some cases they will also turn the ends against the middle if that is the only way to disrupt recovery. After serving in the war that is the only thing that makes sense to me regarding the events in Iraq. You have a right to call me on it as I try to piece together my experiences. I saw insurgency targets change from government, to religious, to security, to military, American Journalists, to tribal targets--this tells me that they are attacking for the purpose of instability and not strategic and/or political.

[kaur]

GPaulus said:


I believe that others like freedom fighters, terrorist and others have more of self actualizing goals whereas the insurgents are much more fundamental in their needs.

GPaulus, what do you think about Jewish armed organisations (for example Lehi) that fought for independent Israel. If you find out facts about assassination of Lord Moyne, Cairo-Haifa train bombings, assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte etc. Those acts were clearly targeted against civilians. Where those acts not very fundamental. I think they were. Were those acts terrorist acts?

GPaulus, to define what is fundamental and what is not, you need to define what is politics. Bard O'Neill in his book "Insrugency and Terrorism" defined (if I remember correctly) it as process which decides who gets what, when, how, where and why. Those are very fundamental questions and I think that those are issues that terrorists are fighting for, also.

Terrorism is very often 1. step in insurgency strategy, which aim is to gather support, make propaganda (to recruit members, to inform national, international oppinion etc). This tactics is very often choice of weaker side because of security problems. Organisation has to live in hostile environment which is crowded with hostile security organisations. It is very hard to organise conventional batallion on the first day of your activity. Bla-bla-bla, i need to go back to work now :)

[jcustis]

I saw insurgency targets change from government, to religious, to security, to military, American Journalists, to tribal targets--this tells me that they are attacking for the purpose of instability and not strategic and/or political.

I regret that I did not see this same sort of transition across my time there. Perhaps Rob Thornton or RTK could weigh in with their observations. I saw the targets often become a target as a matter of timing (as they presented themselves), or often being attacked simultaneously.

I'm not sure I would classify former regime loyalists (FRLs) as lacking a political bent, or that they strive solely for instability. They may, for a limited time, seek instability for the purpose of reaching other goals, but I have a hard time seeing them perpetuating violence just because they can.


power, money, lawlessness, food, freedom from oppression, survival, etc., and once spawned, their aim is protractedness

I'd offer that freedom from oppression is itself an ideology (political), and the FRLs hold on to the belief that the best form of government for Iraq is neither Shi'a-dominated, coalition influenced, or Kurd-dominated. That drives them to attack these other formations, in addition to your more primal incidents, like the righting-or-wrongs, or honor attacks.

[Tom Odom]

This is nonsense! There is always a motive. You may not understand it, but it is there. It answers the question who benefits.

Agreed, Slap.

If you do not look at motives you will always be reactive, serving as a news reporter or a historian. And as for the latter, I always considered motives in writing history; that is one of the joys of contemporary history. You can talk to the participants versus looking at diaries, letters, and official records (which are never complete).

This also goes straight to Rule #2: They have an agenda in everything they do with you. That is, what is their motive in their interactions with you? If you do not ask that simple question, you cannot forecast where their motives (or their relationship with you) will take you next--or how you can steer the direction it takes.

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

Insurgents are certainly NOT apolitical. They may wish you to believe that they are, but that contention is untrue.

And Tom, good historians always look at motive. One of the problems I have with contemporary history is that the people you're talking to can easily spin their own actions and motives. The best history examines motive and uses all available sources. Anything else is a sham, or has an agenda of its own. Good examples of this are the "instant histories" that came out after Vietnam, as well as the flood that's being produced by Iraq. Some of them are good, others are not.


Insurgents don’t have a goal of winning although they would not mind seeing their enemy fail. -from GP's post

This is also certainly untrue. The majority of insurgencies have the goal of winning; that is, meeting their own political goals and objectives. That can be something as mundane (to us) as securing voting rights to something as major as carving out their own nation or "homeland" within an existing nation.

Where I think you're confusing things is that in Iraq you have insurgents AND fellow-travelers who happen to be terrorists. Terrorists thrive on chaos and bloodshed (in many ways it's the only actual goal they have). The two often exist side by side (and within the same umbrella group), and it isn't always possible to get a clean separation between the two.

[AdamG]

Bizarre tale of Shia messianic cult plot
By Roger Hardy
BBC Arabic Affairs analyst

More details have emerged about the shadowy cult whose followers fought Iraqi and US forces in a day-long battle in southern Iraq on Sunday.

Iraqi officials say 200 members of the group - which calls itself the Soldiers of Heaven - were killed in fierce fighting near the Shia holy city of Najaf.

A well-armed group, a charismatic leader and an audacious plot to attack a holy city and kill its religious leaders.

If a novelist had invented the story of the Soldiers of Heaven, it might have been dismissed as a dark fantasy.

But an account of the bizarre drama in southern Iraq, albeit with puzzles and inconsistencies, has now emerged from Iraqi officials and eyewitness accounts.

Messianic belief

A young Shia leader, Dia Abdul-Zahra, had gathered hundreds of his followers, including women and children, in an encampment a few miles north of Najaf.

They were well armed and had come to believe that Abdul-Zahra - also known as Ahmed Hassan al-Yamani and Samer Abu Kamar - was the Mahdi.

According to Shia belief, the Mahdi is a Muslim messiah who disappeared hundreds of years ago and whose return will usher in an era of peace and justice before the end of time.

Abdul-Zahra and his followers regarded the religious leadership in Najaf as illegitimate.

Iraqi officials say their extraordinary plan was to enter the city in the garb of pilgrims, declare that the Mahdi had returned, and assassinate Ayatollah Sistani and other senior clerics.

All this was to happen on Ashura, the holiest day in the Shia calendar.

Instead, the Iraqi authorities seem to have had a tip-off. According to their account, they attacked the encampment and foiled the plot.

At least 200 of the Soldiers of Heaven were killed. Officials insist these included the group's leader, though some clerics dispute this.

Among those captured were Sunnis as well as Shia and foreign fighters as well as Iraqis.

Unholy alliance

Iraqi officials have claimed the group had links with the militant jihadists of al-Qaeda.

Given that Sunni jihadists are fiercely anti-Shia, this seems unlikely.

They also say the group was working with former Baathists.

It seems the former Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein did try to use a Mahdist faction as a weapon against the traditional religious leadership in Najaf, whom he saw as a threat.

Whether those links survived the fall of Saddam is not clear.

Shia divisions

Iraq's Shia-led government may have an interest in promoting the idea of such an unholy alliance.

It may want to deflect attention from the embarrassing fact that the majority Shia community is riven with factions and divisions.

The authorities may also have exaggerated their own military success.

The signs are that they underestimated the strength of the Soldiers of Heaven and had to call for urgent American air support.

History of the Mahdi

There are both Sunni and Shia versions of the Mahdi tradition.

Throughout Islamic history, Muslim leaders have risen up in rebellion claiming to be the Mahdi or to be acting in his name.

Britain's General Gordon was killed in Sudan in 1885 during a Mahdist insurrection.

In Saudi Arabia in 1979, Sunni militants took over the Great Mosque in Mecca, claiming the Mahdi had returned.

But Shia attachment to the Mahdi tradition is particularly potent.

One of the most powerful Iraqi militias (which has no known link to the Soldiers of Heaven) is the Mahdi Army of the radical cleric Moqtada Sadr.

For many Shia, the idea of a Muslim saviour who will end suffering and oppression has a special appeal.

At moments of crisis and chaos, they are more susceptible to the idea that the end of time is at hand.

Iraq is experiencing just such a crisis.

And in current circumstances southern Iraq - the Shia heartland and traditionally the poorest and most neglected part of the country - seems fertile soil for zealotry.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6313433.stm

Published: 2007/01/30 13:22:46 GMT

(And the latest addition to FM 22-5 is "Front rank, kneel! Rear rank, stand!")

[GPaulus]

The fact that "All" human behavior ihas a motive and is motivated by one thing and one thing only "Self-interest" does not make all struggles the same. The major difference as I see it between the insurgency in Iraq, and other acts such as rebellions, civil war, freedom fighting and terrorists, and the reason that I content insurgents are apolitical is that the insurgents are all about them--WIFM. They want protractedness because that provides Utility for them, they want lawlessness because that provides utility--money, power, wealth, control for them.

Other struggles such as rebellions, terrorist operations, etc believe that their cause is a "Public Good" and that they are doing it for the good of all --selfactualizing, ideological, altruistic--selfless regard and acting for the well-being of others. These struggles are much more of an ideological struggle. Consider this difference--Using the Maslow Hierarchy --the terrorists operate at the Self-actualizing level (Political, Regime Change, Religious Freedom, selfgovernance) whereas the Insurgency, at least in Iraq, are at the Physiological level--food, water, money, selfcontrol, lawlessness.

I believe that the insurgents' fight is not a political, religious or ideological manifesto like the media leads us to believe. As a result, the insurgency in Iraq wins if the struggle is protracted. They want to keep the intensity up for as long as they can using every method available. And against anyone who strives to bring order--the local marketer who refuses to withhold produce from the market, the religious leader calling for peace, the ISFs, the Military, anyone who oposes them getting their primal needs for power, money...met.

[Tom Odom]

And Tom, good historians always look at motive.

True, Steve, but there is a large body of historians out there who greatly prefer to wait until all participants are dead. Then their examination of things like motive is through letters, diaries, etc.

And yes a source in an interview can lie; a diary or letter can be a lie as well. That is why we source and we try and confirm with other sources.

What a diary or a letter cannot do is even approach human emotion as measured face to face. Charlie Laurent (retired Belgian Major General and former commander of the Paracommandos when they jumped on Stanleyville) was as hard as they come; 20 years after the jump, he cried when he talked to me about losing young soldiers in the operation. His combat diary simply listed names with KIA or WIA beside them.

The same dynamic plays between SIGINT and HUMINT; when you can look in their eyes you can assess veracity as you go. You can't do that very easily in SIGINT.But I wander.

Getting back to the point: to describe an insurgent as non-political in a struggle for the support of the population is to ignore the very origin of the word political, the body politic, the people.

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

I believe that the insurgents' fight is not a political, religious or ideological manifesto like the media leads us to believe. As a result, the insurgency in Iraq wins if the struggle is protracted. They want to keep the intensity up for as long as they can using every method available. And against anyone who strives to bring order--the local marketer who refuses to withhold produce from the market, the religious leader calling for peace, the ISFs, the Military, anyone who oposes them getting their primal needs for power, money...met.

Any insurgency is either political, ideological, religious, or mixture of all three, GP. Your assertion about terrorists in an earlier paragraph is also flawed, as it does not reflect the changes that a terrorist group undergoes as it matures. Some may justify their actions using your categories, but at the end of the day the majority of the true terrorist groups do not care a wit about such things. They become more interested in "payback" and making big headlines through body counts. That's a matter of historical record, not speculation.

It's possible you're confusing the incorrect MSM use of "insurgency" (which covers a variety of activities) with a real insurgency. True insurgents have political goals, be they the creation of their own living space or ensuring participation for their specific ethnic group or religion.

And Tom, I agree to a degree with your observations about some historians but would also point out that the "instant history" school is deeply flawed when it comes to method and practice. The best balance comes from a combination of the two types, which isn't always possible.

[marct]

Hi GP,


The fact that "All" human behavior ihas a motive and is motivated by one thing and one thing only "Self-interest" does not make all struggles the same.[/qote]

What a cold worldview! Why do you take the obviously unsupportable position that all human behaviour is based on self interest?

[quote=GPaulus;9071]The major difference as I see it between the insurgency in Iraq, and other acts such as rebellions, civil war, freedom fighting and terrorists, and the reason that I content insurgents are apolitical is that the insurgents are all about them--WIFM. They want protractedness because that provides Utility for them, they want lawlessness because that provides utility--money, power, wealth, control for them.

Jeremy Bentham would, I suspect, have been quite disturbed by this assertion. Outside of your blatant misunderstanding of the principles of Utilitarianism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism), you seem to think that self interest cannot also be "political". I wuld remind you of a rather popular saying from the 60's and 70's - "The personal is political".

You are also making a categorical error in conflating all insurgents into a singular unit which cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, prove of any utility in combating the multiple insurgencies that we are dealing with. If we follow your line of reasoning, we can see the illogic - power and control disappear in a wasteland of death since the "insurgents" have killed off everyone, and wealth and money are likewise irrelevant since there is nothing left to purchase.


Other struggles such as rebellions, terrorist operations, etc believe that their cause is a "Public Good" and that they are doing it for the good of all --selfactualizing, ideological, altruistic--selfless regard and acting for the well-being of others. These struggles are much more of an ideological struggle. Consider this difference--Using the Maslow Hierarchy --the terrorists operate at the Self-actualizing level (Political, Regime Change, Religious Freedom, selfgovernance) whereas the Insurgency, at least in Iraq, are at the Physiological level--food, water, money, selfcontrol, lawlessness.

If you will return to Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs and reread it, you will discover that self control and lawlessness are not listed in it at the basic levels. "Self control" is part of the process of self actualization.

Somehow or other, and I have no idea where it comes from, you have inverted the commonly accepted meanings of the term "terrorist" and "insurgent". How can you define an insurgency as categorically different from a rebellion to the point of mutual exclusion? Let's go back to some basic definitions from the OED that I quoted in an earlier post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=8537&postcount=5) in this thread:


The OED defines insurgency as "The quality or state of being insurgent; the tendency to rise in revolt", an insurgent as "One who rises in revolt against constituted authority; a rebel who is not recognized as a belligerent." and an "insurgence" as "The action of rising against authority; a rising, revolt."


I believe that the insurgents' fight is not a political, religious or ideological manifesto like the media leads us to believe. As a result, the insurgency in Iraq wins if the struggle is protracted. They want to keep the intensity up for as long as they can using every method available. And against anyone who strives to bring order--the local marketer who refuses to withhold produce from the market, the religious leader calling for peace, the ISFs, the Military, anyone who oposes them getting their primal needs for power, money...met.

You are, of course, free to believe whatever you wish. That is, after all, one of the core values of the Anglo culture complex.

Marc

[slapout9]

The fact that "All" human behavior has a motive and is motivated by one thing and one thing only "Self-interest" does not make all struggles the same.

Sir, I disagree again. People are born Tabula Rosa (blank slate) as they develop the ability to process reality they may or may not develop the ability to see to their own rational self interest. The primary process for which one learns about this reality processing or personal operating philosophy is family,friends,school and initial exposure or non exposure to religion.

Which leads me to Tom's first rule. "They think different then we do"

[marct]

Hi Slap,


Sir, I disagree again. People are born Tabula Rosa (blank slate) as they develop the ability to process reality they may or may not develop the ability to see to their own rational self interest. The primary process for which one learns about this reality processing or personal operating philosophy is family,friends,school and initial exposure or non exposure to religion.

Not sure I'd agree with you on the tabula rasa argument, but I definitely do about the socio-cultural factors.

Marc

[GPaulus]

Hi GP,

[quote=GPaulus;9071]The fact that "All" human behavior ihas a motive and is motivated by one thing and one thing only "Self-interest" does not make all struggles the same.[/qote]

What a cold worldview! Why do you take the obviously unsupportable position that all human behaviour is based on self interest?



Jeremy Bentham would, I suspect, have been quite disturbed by this assertion. Outside of your blatant misunderstanding of the principles of Utilitarianism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism), you seem to think that self interest cannot also be "political". I wuld remind you of a rather popular saying from the 60's and 70's - "The personal is political".


Marc

Where I am going with my argument is that the way to beat an insurgency is to create a "Cause" that is greater than their "cause to die for." This group of individuals at least in Iraq can apostatize if we create the conditions to meet their primal needs. (by the way you will not be able to topple those at the highest level of the insurgency pyramid, they will have to be killed but below those most powerful, they will apostatise) You see, I firmly believe that all human behavior is motivated by selfinterest and certainly self interest could be selfish interests or even the opposite --even altruistic interest. Selfinterest is in the eye of the beholder, it could be political, ideological, religious, good or evil, or even selfishness like doing it for the money, power ... The terrorists are in general altruistic--willing to die or kill but doing it for the public good and in believing that their actions are really in the interest of others--but their actions are, like all human actions, motivated by and satisfy their selfinterest (as defined in their eyes). And by the way, you cannot change the terrorist's beliefs--in other words, you cannot create a cause to live for that is greater then their cause to die for--terrorists have to be killed, they cannot apostatize. This fact is why we hear so much about the religious Jihadist, religious extremists and why Terrorists are considered radicals--these conditions are very much at the actualization levels and they mirror belief systems that are so deeply held as to be extreme. Religion, democracy are selfactualizing concepts too. The Insurgents in Iraq are not acting at that level. When you are drinking from the same trough as your cow, you are not thinking about selfactualizing concepts. They will ebb and flow because their motives are selfish--it is all about them. These guys are locals, operating within KM of their own homes and there are many different groups. When I used the word utility, I did not mean Utilitarian. What I meant is in the purest definition of Utility--the quality or property of being useful--in other words, this insurgency in Iraq meets their primal need for food, money to acquire worth, power to control their neighborhood, self-security etc. and therefore, they only want the lawlessness to continue. The insurgency wants protractedness because they will ride the lawlessness as long as is possible. Their goal is not to win and that is why you never hear of an insurgency that wins--that is not their goal. You see if they were to win, then they would be responsible for caring for others, establishing a government, meeting needs of the local population, providing services and in providing Hope. Thank you for letting me discuss my radical ideas.

[jcustis]

And by the way, you cannot change the terrorist's beliefs--in other words, you cannot create a cause to live for that is greater then their cause to die for--terrorists have to be killed, they cannot apostatize.

The Rhodesians were quick to refer to their opponents as terrorists, and there is irrefutable evidence that specialized formations within the Rhodesian Army did change "terrorist" beliefs. Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, by J. K. Cilliers (which I think is within the SW Library) provides a smidgeon of detail, but sufficient evidence. Point of order here though...Notice that the Cilliers work uses the title term counter-insurgency, yet I said that rhodesians referred to the bad guys as terrorists (in admittedly a generic way)? My point is that the hair can only be split but so far.


When I used the word utility, I did not mean Utilitarian. What I meant is in the purest definition of Utility--the quality or property of being useful--in other words, this insurgency in Iraq meets their primal need for food, money to acquire worth, power to control their neighborhood, self-security etc. and therefore, they only want the lawlessness to continue.

I think that is quite a stretch sir. I had the chance to look a hardcore insurgent in the eyes after we captured him on the Fallujah peninsula. When I say he was hardcore, he was what some Iraqis like to call the Mujaheddin, or "The muj" by grunts. Long hair, a dirty beard, and piercing eyes. He wasn't gaining anything out of shooting RPGs at us from the nearby palm groves, other than being run into the ground after several days of running wild. Same goes for many bad guys picked up in the wake of the fight in Fallujah proper. Many of them were disillusioned foreigners who clearly identified themselves as being insurgents, but kinda lost their way when they were dropped off downtown with no money, no food, and no weapon. After reading the writing on the wall and plenty of leaflets, several of them seemed more than happy to become a patron of our DETFACs


The insurgency wants protractedness because they will ride the lawlessness as long as is possible. Their goal is not to win and that is why you never hear of an insurgency that wins--that is not their goal. You see if they were to win, then they would be responsible for caring for others, establishing a government, meeting needs of the local population, providing services and in providing Hope. Thank you for letting me discuss my radical ideas.

Have to go back to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe on this point...ZANU/ZANLA can be considered to have "won" Rhodesia, in certain regards, if for no other reason than Mugabe has been in power since what, 1981? He became responsible for the caring of others, but in his blood thirst to slay the golden-egg laying goose, he has run that beautiful country into the ground through ignorance, ineptitude, and flat out ass-hattery.

I could go on for a while in this vein, but I'll stop here. I guess what I'm mumbling about sir is that your ideas, while perhaps radical, really aren't getting us anywhere closer to being more surgical with a terrorist, or an insurgent.

EDITED TO ADD: As my parting shot to this thread, I think we often forget that an insurgent or terrorist may have no motive at all to what he does, beyond the simple fact that we are in his backyard, looking at his women, and hogging the roads. I call it the Red Dawn effect, and it's terribly powerful. Or maybe it's the simple fact that Americans seem to enjoy porn, and have no qualms about it.

[Steve Blair]

[QUOTE=marct;9077]Hi GP,
The terrorists are in general altruistic--willing to die or kill but doing it for the public good and in believing that their actions are really in the interest of others--but their actions are, like all human actions, motivated by and satisfy their selfinterest (as defined in their eyes). And by the way, you cannot change the terrorist's beliefs--in other words, you cannot create a cause to live for that is greater then their cause to die for--terrorists have to be killed, they cannot apostatize. This fact is why we hear so much about the religious Jihadist, religious extremists and why Terrorists are considered radicals--these conditions are very much at the actualization levels and they mirror belief systems that are so deeply held as to be extreme. Religion, democracy are selfactualizing concepts too. The Insurgents in Iraq are not acting at that level. When you are drinking from the same trough as your cow, you are not thinking about selfactualizing concepts. They will ebb and flow because their motives are selfish--it is all about them. These guys are locals, operating within KM of their own homes and there are many different groups. When I used the word utility, I did not mean Utilitarian. What I meant is in the purest definition of Utility--the quality or property of being useful--in other words, this insurgency in Iraq meets their primal need for food, money to acquire worth, power to control their neighborhood, self-security etc. and therefore, they only want the lawlessness to continue. The insurgency wants protractedness because they will ride the lawlessness as long as is possible. Their goal is not to win and that is why you never hear of an insurgency that wins--that is not their goal. You see if they were to win, then they would be responsible for caring for others, establishing a government, meeting needs of the local population, providing services and in providing Hope. Thank you for letting me discuss my radical ideas.

These are not so much radical ideas as they are poorly informed. I would say that Cuba's insurgency won, as did our own, that of India, and any number of others throughout history.

I think you confuse terrorists and insurgents. Many of the ideals you ascribe to insurgents are in fact more typical of terrorist groups. But, as Marc has pointed out, you are free to do so. But you must provide more than circular logic, sir, if you hope to win others over to your radical ideas.

[Merv Benson]

Most people awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor ignored their own self interest in order to serve a larger cause. In fact many in this country can not comprehend why our troops ignore their own self interest and volunteer for combat.

While the jihadis may believe they serve their self interest by punching their ticket for Paradise, delusional beliefs do not make it so.

[Maphu]

Most people awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor ignored their own self interest in order to serve a larger cause. In fact many in this country can not comprehend why our troops ignore their own self interest and volunteer for combat.

While the jihadis may believe they serve their self interest by punching their ticket for Paradise, delusional beliefs do not make it so.

Perhaps I'm wrong, but to me it looks like you're saying that those who sacrifice their lives for us are heroes but those who sacrifice their lives for the opposition are but fools.

Is that meant to imply that Muslims are less human than others? I think we need to try and learn more about what motivates the enemy than simply writing him off as a fool. I've been down that road before.

[emjayinc]

SWC Thread Center of Gravity Construct #82 has Jedburg link to Kilcullen paper that kind of pulls together much of what you all have discussed, very educationally for me. Especially noted that terrorists and insurgents in modern warfare can and do operate in ways that make it important to know, if possible, which one you've got in your sights. But also that the buggers may switch back and forth, depending on the strategic state of play. My first post, beg pardon if someone made this point earlier and I've missed it.

[Bill Moore]

Gentlemen,

With all due respect to the years of expertise gained through academia and muddy boots field work, I find it both alarming and refreshing we can't agree on to define insurgents and terrorists. Scary because I think it paralyzes us to some degree, as there are clearly different strategies for countering insurgents and terrorists. We all know one size doesn't fit all.

Refreshing in the sense that inability to agree may hopefully lead us to disregard the sometimes futile effort of trying to categorize the enemy, and instead more accurately describe the threat without the legacy terms and baggage that goes with them.

Let's face it, in the government these terms are tied to mandates, laws, and funding issues. If it is terrorism, then this organization owns it (and the funding that goes with it), if it an insurgency, then that one, if criminal then another one. We have a way of defining problems that tends to fit the interest of our organization, not so much our national security.

[marct]

Hi Bill,


With all due respect to the years of expertise gained through academia and muddy boots field work, I find it both alarming and refreshing we can't agree on to define insurgents and terrorists. Scary because I think it paralyzes us to some degree, as there are clearly different strategies for countering insurgents and terrorists. We all know one size doesn't fit all.

Refreshing in the sense that inability to agree may hopefully lead us to disregard the sometimes futile effort of trying to categorize the enemy, and instead more accurately describe the threat without the legacy terms and baggage that goes with them.

I know that Steve has been working on a think piece coming out of this thread, and I'm looking forward to it (hint, hint).

Bill, I think that your comment has captured the core difficulty with taxonomies, which is how the terms "terrorist" and "insurgent" tend to be used. By relying on definitions that conflate goals and operational tactics, I think we are locked into a reactive model that is poorly adapted to current realities.

Possibly more dangerous, at least in the long term, is that each evocation of a particular toxon, say "terrorist", will tend to also evoke its polar opposite, say "freedom fighter". In situations where these terms are highly politically charged, and you also have a polarized political scene, this means that you inevitably generate support for any group labeled "terrorist" simply because the people labeling it that are opposed politically. It's one of those "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" pieces of "logic".


Let's face it, in the government these terms are tied to mandates, laws, and funding issues. If it is terrorism, then this organization owns it (and the funding that goes with it), if it an insurgency, then that one, if criminal then another one. We have a way of defining problems that tends to fit the interest of our organization, not so much our national security.

This is one of the reasons I am arguing for a matrix organization (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=9987&postcount=114) in the GCOIN environment. Put another way, we are dealing with trans-national, non-state actors so why are our response units based on states (see this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2120&page=12))? Country teams make a certain amount of sense when most players are nation states or alliances of nation states, but little sense when dealing with non-state actors.

Bill, you are quite right in saying that "We have a way of defining problems that tends to fit the interest of our organization", and one way to get around that problem is to create a new institutional mindset and organizational forms to go with it. Why, for example, should membership in an operational or "project" team be restricted to Americans? For example, we can be fairly certain that radical Islamist groups are "fund raising" through defrauding government tax programs. The EU has already noted this publicly, and the Canadian government is also looking at it. The operational tactics of this type of defrauding are very similar and are operating through trans-national networks and, in my opinion, our responses should be as well.

Marc

[slapout9]

Marc, to a certain extent this is already being done. In Alabama criminal gangs,terrorist,hate groups are being pooled under the title "Security Threat Groups". Task forces are often organized a long the lines of what you call Matix management. Some of the most successful that I have seen personally are in the area of domestic violence/stalking cases. We used to have the DA who would prosecute the case plus a victim advocate and the primary investigator all assigned to the same prosecution team and would work through to conviction.

[Merv Benson]

Rather than tie ourselves in knots over describing the enemy, it is clear to me that whether they are called Insurgents or terrorist they are using a raiding strategy. The response to a raiding strategy is what we are now seeing in Baghdad with a troops surge that has a high concentration of force to space in the area where the enemy wants to operate. Their are check points to make movement to contact more difficult for the enemy. Troops patrol the area to look for the enemy and also make his movement more difficult. The enemy is most vulnerable when he is trying to move and these tactics inhibit movement.

The enemy in Iraq has shown little interest in a hearts and minds strategy. He seeks to dominate through intimidation in much the same way Saddam did when he was in power. Those facts argue in favor of calling him a terrorist. But what ever you call him he is still a raider.

[Bill Moore]

I think the "raider" strategy is a gross attempt at over simplifying the threat, nor does it offer much in designing a counter strategy. The enemy raids, infiltrates, occuppies, defends, establishes parallel shadow governments, etc. We're not fighting a one trick pony. If the only response to a so called raider strategy is to saturate the area, then we have lost, because we can only saturate so much area for so long. I'll meet you half way and admit the enemy uses raiding as one line of operation, and that robust population control measures will impede that line of operation, but the enemy will quickly adapt to the measures, and then we'll develop counter measures, and so the game is played.

The enemy is focused on the population, and we seem to forget there is more than one way to skin a cat. You can attempt to win the populations' good will, or you can demand it through coercion. Is it terror? Of course, but is also an insurgent strategy. Not all insurgents embrace Mao's little book, even Mao didn't follow it. You can swim in the sea by joining a school of fish and blending in, or you can become a shark and swim where you like.

We accept too way too many ideas as scared principles, when they are far from it. You don't have to win the hearts and minds. Did the Russians win the hearts and minds in Eastern Europe? Did Mao really win the hearts and minds? His new biography is revealing.

[marct]

Rather than tie ourselves in knots over describing the enemy, it is clear to me that whether they are called Insurgents or terrorist they are using a raiding strategy. The response to a raiding strategy is what we are now seeing in Baghdad with a troops surge that has a high concentration of force to space in the area where the enemy wants to operate.

Merv, I wold certainly agree with Bill that "raiding" is a tactical option rather than a strategy. Some of the confusion here might be coming fromn the specifics: "raiding", in the sense of a cultural adaptation, is quite commong amongst pastoralist groups (I'm not going to go into lecture mode, so don't worry :D). Even historically, however, "raiding" aimed at shaping the "hearts and minds" of the population that was being raided. Check out the Epic of Gilgamesh if you want an early example from Iraq. The point behind the tactic, however, was to get access to resources that the pastoralists had difficulty producing themselves; it's not a "war" strategy except in certain very limited cases.

Furthermore, and again with the historical examples, the set piece defense or saturation, doesn't work in the long term. As with most strategies of this type, you have to bind the raiders into a coalition or alliance system, historically usually based around kinship (see how Alexander dealt with the Sogdians). The trick is always to get enough of these groups into that alliance and use them against the ones who won't join. In modern Iraq, that would translate to getting a solid buy-in from the vast majority of the Tribal Sheiks and using them against the AQ crowd.


The enemy in Iraq has shown little interest in a hearts and minds strategy. He seeks to dominate through intimidation in much the same way Saddam did when he was in power. Those facts argue in favor of calling him a terrorist. But what ever you call him he is still a raider.

Here I have to disagree with you completely. Many of the insurgents are following their cultural codes. Check out an article by LtC Craig T. Trebilcock called The Seven Pillars of Modern Iraq (http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/KHYL-6XQNB5) in the February issue of Army Magazine. While I don't agree with everything he says (I think he is way too far over the edge in many of his comments), he does capture many of the realities of tribal life.

Domination through a "balance of terror" is nothing new. This is standard practice in many pastoralist cultures, and has certainly been the practice in many Western cultures as well. I think you are making a categorical error if you equate "Hearts and Minds" with "Bunnies and Light" :eek:.

Marc

[fthoya]

Sir I agree with your distinction between the two and as a new member I will be getting my feet wet with all the input by others. It has been my exp. in Afghanistan that there are few Terrorists and more insurgents, but what I have seen or understand is that the few Terror cells, control these insurgents. These uneducated misguided insurgents will shoot an RPG or dig in an IED for a few thousand Pakistan Rupees with no reason behind it, except to get money. They have no ideals and will go to the person that is paying the most. So what do we do target the Terrorists or the insurgents? I think it is a double edge sword, because if you kill the terrorists, more will fill the ranks because of beliefs and ideals. As for the insurgents they will lose heart because they have no real stake in the struggle but you will not get at the head or the money. I think if you have a solid IO campaign and specific targets you could stop the local recruitment and cut the terrorists pool of warm bodies off and then they will show themselves in desperation in order to discredit the government and or coalition. If I had to pick I would go after the insurgents and conduct a grass roots campaign getting into the villages and establishing relationships with these peoples families and friends.

[marct]

Hi fthoya,


It has been my exp. in Afghanistan that there are few Terrorists and more insurgents, but what I have seen or understand is that the few Terror cells, control these insurgents.

That certainly matches what I had heard from other sources, and it's one of thereasons why I think we have to be careful with our labels :wry:.


These uneducated misguided insurgents will shoot an RPG or dig in an IED for a few thousand Pakistan Rupees with no reason behind it, except to get money. They have no ideals and will go to the person that is paying the most.

Then the "simplest", and by that I don't mean either cheap or easy, solution is to rebuild their economy. I used to work with a friend who grew up in the camps around Peshawar and, from what she told me, you could easily hire an army of "insurgents" as long as you had enough cash and a decent cadre. Honestly, I think the best way to change this is to rework the entire refugee camp system (and I promise I won't start in on my UNHCR soapbox ;)).


So what do we do target the Terrorists or the insurgents? I think it is a double edge sword, because if you kill the terrorists, more will fill the ranks because of beliefs and ideals. As for the insurgents they will lose heart because they have no real stake in the struggle but you will not get at the head or the money. I think if you have a solid IO campaign and specific targets you could stop the local recruitment and cut the terrorists pool of warm bodies off and then they will show themselves in desperation in order to discredit the government and or coalition. If I had to pick I would go after the insurgents and conduct a grass roots campaign getting into the villages and establishing relationships with these peoples families and friends.

In general, I would agree. The problem, as I see i in the case of Afghanistan, is that a lot of the source pool is in Pakistan, both Pakistan proper and the border territories. Since Pakistan is an "ally", it is a touch tricky to send the troops into the areas where they should be going (e.g. N & S. Waziristan). I think some of these problems could be solved if Musharef would return those provinces to Afghanistan, but I doubt he would.

Marc

[Merv Benson]

Aggressors chose a raiding strategy because they are too weak to chose a more effective strategy. Some raiders are in it for the booty and some are in it for bigger prizes like the people or the real estate.

Using a force to space ratio adequate to cut off enemy communications and movement to contact has been used often. The Europeans eventually repulsed the Viking raids by building strategic fortifications along routes used by the raiders. Alexander used a similar strategy in Afghanistan.

Eastern Europe is an interesting example of an effective counter insurgency strategy by the Soviets. They infiltrated organizations that were attempting to resist their rule as well as the spy services in the west that were attempting to send aid and men to help the resistance. The history of US and UK infiltration into Eastern Europe is filled with failure. The people sent in were either caught and killed or turned in almost every case.

I am surprised that so little study has been done in the most effective counter insurgency operation in recent history.

[jcustis]

I am surprised that so little study has been done in the most effective counter insurgency operation in recent history.

Maybe it was because the communists attempted to take religion out of the equation, and our current fight is rife with it. In all seriousness, I think it's reasonable speculation.

[Jedburgh]

...I am surprised that so little study has been done in the most effective counter insurgency operation in recent history.
There has been a tremendous amount of study conducted on Soviet suppression of resistance and dissident networks, both in the USSR and in its satellite nations. However, most of that has not been in the context of COIN, but instead with a focus on a broad spectrum of HUMINT ops from the perspective of both sides. Not to mention the occasional crisis interplay of major geo-political actions (i.e. the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution)

But recently, some of those who have an interest in Dark Networks (http://82.194.71.46/workshop/pdf/Milward_and_Raab.pdf) have spent a considerable amount of effort looking at Soviet bloc resistance/dissident groups in that specific context, to glean lessons-learned for dealing with terrorist networks.

Here's one interesting look at the subject: When Dark Networks Become Desirable: What Can the Experience of Political Dissidents Teach Governments About Terrorism? (http://student.maxwell.syr.edu/phejnova/Hejnova_ISA.pdf)

[Merv Benson]

Thanks Jed, I will check it out.

[lysander6]

My first post: I have come to the thread late but I think the singular difference between terrorists and insurgents is the behavior toward noncombatants. Terrs advance their political agenda by preying on innocents. I think Caleb Carr's definition is intriguing in that it forces even Allied forces to consider their bombing of noncombatants (dresden, Hamburg, et al) to be acts of terror.

I think the use of IEDs, VBEDs and the whole motley lot of munitions in this category when used against Coalition forces in Iraq and A-Stan are force on force tactics not unlike our use of mines and grenades. The weaker opponent is employing a means it has at its disposal to eqilibrate the calculus of forces in their favor. I would consider the current state of the gov/media complex colluding to make every assault againt our MILITARY forces to be a terr act is absurd beyond belief.

We need to step beyond partisanship in our acquaintance with the goals of the Global War on a Tactic and consider that insurgencies are political entities employing armed force against uniformed forces for their own benefit. A reassessment of the value of limited and even surgical strikes would go along way towards salvaging what is now a countdown to Xenophon's march yet again in Iraq for US forces.

[GPaulus]

Sir I agree with your distinction between the two and as a new member I will be getting my feet wet with all the input by others. It has been my exp. in Afghanistan that there are few Terrorists and more insurgents, but what I have seen or understand is that the few Terror cells, control these insurgents. These uneducated misguided insurgents will shoot an RPG or dig in an IED for a few thousand Pakistan Rupees with no reason behind it, except to get money. They have no ideals and will go to the person that is paying the most. So what do we do target the Terrorists or the insurgents? I think it is a double edge sword, because if you kill the terrorists, more will fill the ranks because of beliefs and ideals. As for the insurgents they will lose heart because they have no real stake in the struggle.

"Then the 'simplest', and by that I don't mean either cheap or easy, solution is to rebuild their economy. I used to work with a friend who grew up in the camps around Peshawar and, from what she told me, you could easily hire an army of "insurgents" as long as you had enough cash and a decent cadre."Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D

Gentleman, you are right-on target. That is the reason I wanted to make it clear that we must make a distinction between a Terrorist and an Insurgent. The Insurgent has "no ideals and will go to the person that is paying the most," they are motived by primal human needs, wants and desires. The terrorist (individuals) on the otherhand are nothing but an Ideology. They have such deeply held beliefs that they are considered radical, and extreme. They will not apostatize.

I say this to make the point that in order to create sustainability in Iraq, we must jumpstart the economy through a government work program for the men 18-45. It is the "Velocity of Money" that will solve the problems in Iraq.

[Thepartisan]

Al Qaeda is the CIA's tool.

The Iraqi resistance does not and will not associate with them.

That being said, i think the real terrorists are the state terrorist imperialist occupiers.

Long live the resistance.

[SWCAdmin]

Al Qaeda is the CIA's tool.

The Iraqi resistance does not and will not associate with them.

That being said, i think the real terrorists are the state terrorist imperialist occupiers.

Long live the resistance.
That's an opinion we don't get around here every day.
Line 1 - that's just wacky.
Line 2 - increasingly so! Anything more to say? Maybe in this forum (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/forumdisplay.php?f=66)?
Line 3 - where you sit is often where you stand
Line 4 - see #3. But one day when you're not resisting, what will you do?

[Thepartisan]

When my grandfather fought and defeated the occupation of our country, he lived out the rest of his life in peace.
What's really wacky is your ignore the connections between the CIA and Osama bin ladin, just as you ignore the connections between the CIA and Saddam. Go watch your hate minute winston. :rolleyes:

Where i stand is against injustice, whether it's near my seat or not. Thankyou.

[RTK]

When my grandfather fought and defeated the occupation of our country, he lived out the rest of his life in peace.
What's really wacky is your ignore the connections between the CIA and Osama bin ladin, just as you ignore the connections between the CIA and Saddam. Go watch your hate minute winston. :rolleyes:

Where i stand is against injustice, whether it's near my seat or not. Thankyou.

I'm going to say the same thing to you as I have to others:

Your postings take on more meaning when we know where you're coming from. Update your profile and introduce yourself in the appropriate thread.

Until then you sound like a college student who is gunning for a history or drama major.

[Sargent]

"Then the 'simplest', and by that I don't mean either cheap or easy, solution is to rebuild their economy. I used to work with a friend who grew up in the camps around Peshawar and, from what she told me, you could easily hire an army of "insurgents" as long as you had enough cash and a decent cadre."Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D

Gentleman, you are right-on target. That is the reason I wanted to make it clear that we must make a distinction between a Terrorist and an Insurgent. The Insurgent has "no ideals and will go to the person that is paying the most," they are motived by primal human needs, wants and desires. The terrorist (individuals) on the otherhand are nothing but an Ideology. They have such deeply held beliefs that they are considered radical, and extreme. They will not apostatize.

I say this to make the point that in order to create sustainability in Iraq, we must jumpstart the economy through a government work program for the men 18-45. It is the "Velocity of Money" that will solve the problems in Iraq.

I think the problem is that there are three groups:

- Insurgents: Fight to overthrow an existing order.
- Terrorists: Whatever they are fighting for (money, an idea, a religion, the creation of a state, etc.), their tactic is terror.
- Poor Schmuckatellis: Will fight for money or not to be killed by one of the former.

Insurgents can use terrorism, and terrorists can serve in an insurgency.

Insurgents most certainly can be committed to an ideal. Nationalism is one, and the Chinese Communists in WWII are a good example thereof.

Terrorists most certainly can be superficial bastards out for little more than personal gain.

Poor Schmuckatellis deserve our sympathy and assistance. They are the sea within which the first two fight, and if they are given the means to be resolute in their opposition to the latter two, and are given the means to thrive otherwise, the first two will be losers (or just the odd crackpots or criminals with which even the most successful societies must contend).

[marct]

Hi Sargent,


I think the problem is that there are three groups:

- Insurgents: Fight to overthrow an existing order.
- Terrorists: Whatever they are fighting for (money, an idea, a religion, the creation of a state, etc.), their tactic is terror.
- Poor Schmuckatellis: Will fight for money or not to be killed by one of the former.
....
Poor Schmuckatellis deserve our sympathy and assistance. They are the sea within which the first two fight, and if they are given the means to be resolute in their opposition to the latter two, and are given the means to thrive otherwise, the first two will be losers (or just the odd crackpots or criminals with which even the most successful societies must contend).

On the whole, a good trichotomy! Let me toss in one final comment - the "Poor Schmuckatellis" also provide the next generations of both terrorists and insurgents. For me, it's not only about human decency and helping out someone who has bee shat on by fate - there is also a very rational, self-interest component to it :wry:.

Marc

[Van]

So assassination makes the user an insurgent or a terrorist? What about a VBIED?

I don't think it's the tactics so much as the targets, and the attitude toward collateral damage. Blowing up an Iraqi Police station is an insurgent attack, where commiting atrocities on random civilians (market goers for example) is terrorism. Were the badguys in Iraq to limit their targets to ones acceptable under the Geneva Accords, I would buy their claims to being insurgents. But a lot of their targeting is aimed at opposing factions civilians, so they are terrorists who are worth less than the bullet they richly deserve. They'll make excuses, but it always comes back to "you did this, look what you made me do", a denial of responsibility for their actions. If they won't accept responsibility for their actions, you can't negotiate.

It's kind of like telling a kid "If you want to be treated like a grownup, you have to act like one". Partisans have a clear status under international law, but to merit that treatment, they have to live up to certain standards. The terrorists in Iraq haven't displayed a willingness to act like they deserve recognition as anything other than bandits.

[Thepartisan]

Targeting collaborators is a completely legitimate thing. The geneva conventions doesn't have some clause against it.
And Why not? they target the resistance along side their american masters.
Traitors deserve to be executed. Traitors are more filthy scum than the mercinaries.
Assasinating the puppet leaders the americans set up, you act like it's a bad thing.
And just for the record, the resitsance would never hurt Iraqi civilians, the very people they are fighting for.


The cell leaders themselves said they were guided by a blend of Islamist teachings and pan-Arab nationalism. Both spoke disdainfully of “Wahabbis,” as hard-line Sunni Muslim followers are called. Abu Mohammed said there was no contact with members of al Qaida at his level;

...

“Can you describe a man who defends his country as a terrorist?” asked Abu Abdullah, who said he was 31. “Iraq is the land of prophets and the birthplace of civilization. We will fight until we shed the last drop of our blood for this country.”

...

“We are Islamist in that we are protecting our religion. We are nationalist in that we are protecting our country,” Abu Mohammed said. “We don’t care about our lives. We care about the lives of our fellow Iraqis.”


http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0913-08.htm

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TDK was it...


Your postings take on more meaning when we know where you're coming from. Update your profile and introduce yourself in the appropriate thread.

If you're curious about who i am and where i come form, why don't you just ask nicely?
But since i'm sure you won't, you'll just have to be patient and it will become apperant to you when i choose it to be.

[Steve Blair]

So I would take this to mean that anyone in a market square killed by a car bomb was a collaborator or traitor? Is a teacher one as well? Or a doctor? Some of the insurgents may well be acting in what they feel is defense of their country, but I would also advise you to look closely at those who join their ranks and look at their actual goals. Not everyone who claims to be a patriot has the same objectives you profess. Many of the worst terrorist groups rode the coattails of true insurgent groups until they no longer had a need for their cover, then they turned on those who'd given them legitimacy and meaning. For them the killing became the main goal...all else was just a smoke screen. I would observe that many of the groups active in Iraq are already at least halfway down this slippery slope. If you are in fact a patriot, how do you propose to deal with those within your own ranks who have different goals?

[skiguy]

And just for the record, the resitsance would never hurt Iraqi civilians, the very people they are fighting for.

“We are Islamist in that we are protecting our religion. We are nationalist in that we are protecting our country,” Abu Mohammed said. “We don’t care about our lives. We care about the lives of our fellow Iraqis.”




You must have missed this part .

One attack, he said, was scrapped at the last minute because a van carrying an Iraqi family pulled next to the targeted convoy and could have been hit by mistake. Typically, however, most attacks are carried out, and Iraqis who happen to be around are “sacrificed,” he said.

[RTK]

If you're curious about who i am and where i come form, why don't you just ask nicely?
But since i'm sure you won't, you'll just have to be patient and it will become apperant to you when i choose it to be.

That's as nice as it gets. Even the casual drop in has seen me say this to about 60 people in the last month. You aren't being singled out. Check out the rest of the site, introduce yourself in the introduction thread, and continue mission. That is all...

[Van]

Targeting collaborators is a completely legitimate thing. The geneva conventions doesn't have some clause against it.

This is pretty broad license. What rules of evidence are used to identify collaborators? Or is it anyone not actively resisting the opponents of the insurgency? If there is no due process or competent military targeting process, this is terrorism. Is the intent of targeting collaborators to neutralize a threat to security of the insurgency? If so, then this is the same as targeting a recon element. If the intent is to "send a message", or intimidate the civilian population into submission, it is terrorism. Is the insurgency keeping records so that it's leaders can be held to the same level of accountability that the insurgents would like to see President Bush held to?

I'm not saying this is the case, but reading both Western and Middle Eastern news sources, it appears that the various insurgent groups in Iraq are not prepared to hold themselves to the same standard they would like to see others held to. But this is not unique to Iraq, you see in virtually every small war, and frequently on both sides at the same time.



Assasinating the puppet leaders the americans set up, you act like it's a bad thing.

No, I did not say this, and if you got this impression, you misinterpreted my comments. Assassination is a tactic. Once an American acknowledges that the downing of Admiral Yamamoto's plane was a legitimate military operation, it is hypocrisy to repudiate assassination as a tactic of national power. Currently, popular opinion and political opinion in the U.S. is opposed to assassination on principle, but these people would say that the raid on ADM Yamamoto's plane was wrong if they were in possession of all the facts. But again, targeting, weapon selection, and intent. Is the target part of the military command and control structure, or the national government executive branch? Is the weapon to be used consciously selected to minimize collateral damage, and likely collateral damage been carefully assessed? Is the intent to directly degrade or disrupt the threat's military capabilities or other aspect of the apparatus that prosecutes the war? If it's yes to all three, it sounds like a legitimate targeting of a command and control node of the threat forces. Now if the insurgency says these things, then kills thirty bystanders and misses the target, or if the insurgency's intent is to intimidate members of the government or civilians, or to generate a media event, this is terrorism.

Frankly, nothing I've seen in the pro-insurgency media releases demonstrates these kind of processes. Not saying they're stupid, they're just not making an effort to concern themselves with international law, or looking beyond the perceptions of the Islamic world (but the insurgents and their supporters are so quick to accuse the West of the same failings...), and this is a short-sighted attitude. Perhaps the various insurgent groups should get together and demonstrate moral behavior superior to that of the West rather than murdering more of their own youth, women, and children, as
the "Iraqis who happen to be around are “sacrificed.”

In case it's not obvious, "Assassination; History, Theory, and Practice" from American Public University System's (www.apus.edu) graduate program was one of the best courses I've taken in decades.

[Thepartisan]

Mistakes and accidents can happen, especially when the occupiers frequently use people as shields. But it is never the intention of the resistance to hurt their own people, and it rarely ever happens. I've seen snipers not take shots because people are around. These are their families not yours. That said, an iraqi who is hanging around and discussing things with the occupation forces, is very suspicous and could be an informant.


This is pretty broad license. What rules of evidence are used to identify collaborators?

This includes, anyone in the puppet army, puppet police and any other security apparatus. Anyone involved in the political arena, and any iraqi contracted interpreters, truck drivers are legitimate targets. The resistance is not a military organisation, it does not have on head or central leadership, so what you suggest is ridiculous and by your definition all resistance movements would be considered terrorists. The purpose of targeting collaboratrs is not only to neutralize a threat against the resistance but also to squash any form of controll aparatus that the occupiers might leave behind. Every government or military infustructure you painted in your colours must be dismembered, otherwise it would not be a complete victory. And beyond just strategy, and more on an emotional bases, traitors are just scum that deserve to die screaming, the fact that they still walk the earth just brings shame to the nation.


If it's yes to all three,
The answer is yes to all three. When some assasination attempt takes place against a puppet 'leader', the only "bystandards" that seem to get hurt, are the highered body guards, who are just mercinaries anyway. It's very frustring how you can get so many body guards and the target is still somehow unscathed. Like Chalabi's latest assasination attempt only a few weeks ago.
You talk about terrorism and intimidating the population, let me ask you, was the siege against fallujah intended to crush the resistance, or was it intended to terrorise the population into submission. Because the Nazi's used the same sort of tactics against the french, when they saw any resistance from a town, they would demolish the town. Sound familiar? Where was your due process there?

If the fighters actually commit the crimes you accuse them of, then perhaps you would see punishment. For example Al Sadr just expelled 600 men from his forces because they where accused of secterianims. But as it were, those who plant bombs in market places and kill random people for no reason, are not the resistance, think logically, why would a resistance movement destroy the only thing that keeps it alive, a support base within the people? It's clear those who would benefit most are the occupation forces, and i wouldn't put it past MI5 and mossad. Sometimes they can act on their own accord and other times they may use a manipulated naive puppet. This fact is widely accepted among both civilians and resistance fighters. One need only look at history to see this is no conspiracy theory, these sort of tactics where used against Ireland and Vietnamn.
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That's as nice as it gets. Even the casual drop in has seen me say this to about 60 people in the last month. You aren't being singled out. Check out the rest of the site, introduce yourself in the introduction thread,

Is that an order?

[120mm]

Actually, just killing random Iraqis IS a tactic, as it destabilizes the polity and demonstrates that the government cannot protect its people. To assert otherwise is somewhat vacuous. You are also implying that there is "one" resistance with a unified goal. I would suggest that there is a large "layer cake" of insurgents/terrorists, a certain number of which would gladly sacrifice every Iraqi for their goals.

The coalition hides behind the population? That is some terrific Orwellian "spin" you have there. Though if the coalition could somehow pull that one off, I would applaud them. How can distinctly-marked and FOB-bound soldiers "hide" among the Iraqi populace?

[Thepartisan]

Ridiculous! As if anyone beliefs the puppet regime exist to serve and protect the people in the first place! Why would the people need protecting from the resistance, the people need protecting from the occupiers and the puppet who seak to enslave them. And why would the resistance want to send people a message that they need to be protected from them? It's like saying "Our families in iraq, don't trust us, we are here to slaughter you all, go into the arms of the occupiers and turn us in whenever you can".

That's how you'd like to think of us isn't it, that we are all just blood thirsty inhuman barbarians that would kill our own flesh and blood just to make some gains. Like some badly written hollywood action film. How convenient for you.

Who ever beliefs this lives in a land of fantasy, All gorrilla movements cannot survive without the support of the people, it is the people who hide them and supply them, it is the people that keep a resistance alive.

----------------

Soldiers use children as human shields.
http://img464.imageshack.us/img464/5739/childrenashumanshieldsfc2.jpg

[Mark O'Neill]

Who ever beliefs this lives in a land of fantasy, All gorrilla movements cannot survive without the support of the people, it is the people who hide them and supply them,


We have a live one here, amongst other things, - "Gorrillas?"

I suspect that a village somewhere is missing its idiot.

[RTK]

Is that an order?

No, it's a second request. Please fill out your profile to give us a perspective on where you're coming from. It's easy to figure out who I am, as it is to figure out who the regulars are on this site. We've filled out our profiles and introduced ourselves here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=11). Please extend to us the same courtesy.

[RTK]

That's how you'd like to think of us isn't it, that we are all just blood thirsty inhuman barbarians that would kill our own flesh and blood just to make some gains. Like some badly written hollywood action film. How convenient for you.


A poor generalization. Don't know where you were slighted by Americans in the past but it's jaded your perspective incredibly. I've been blown up a few times in Iraq but I don't believe all Iraqis are out to get me.

----------------


Soldiers use children as human shields.
http://img464.imageshack.us/img464/5739/childrenashumanshieldsfc2.jpg


Perception is reality. A picture, no matter how benign, can be interpreted many ways. Who knows the real story behind this picture? No one here....

[Steve Blair]

That's how you'd like to think of us isn't it, that we are all just blood thirsty inhuman barbarians that would kill our own flesh and blood just to make some gains. Like some badly written hollywood action film. How convenient for you.

Who ever beliefs this lives in a land of fantasy, All gorrilla movements cannot survive without the support of the people, it is the people who hide them and supply them, it is the people that keep a resistance alive.
Yet there are those among your "movement" who would gladly kill your flesh and blood to advance their cause or agenda.

And there are many examples of guerrilla movements throughout history that have terrorized the populace into supporting them, or simply not reporting them to any authorities. Most such movements have also harbored segments that steal from the populace, kill those who do not quickly give up what is needed, or simply kill because they enjoy it. They are there, and they have been found in every insurgent movement since the beginning of time. I asked this of another resistance supporter, and now I pose the same question to you: how do you plan to deal with those murderers in your midst?

[Mondor]

'fraid we can't "leave the semantics aside" JC:) . "Semantics" = "meaning

Last time I heard this was at a data modeling meeting. One government type complained that one of our SMEs was "harping on about semantics". Which was funny as the entire point of a data model is agreeing on the meaning of things.

On the terrorist V. insurgent argument I have always been a bit troubled when we treat these words as synonyms. The Germans actually issued an order directing everyone to refer to the French resistance as terrorists. An insurgent is not necessarily a terrorist nor is a terrorist necessarily an insurgent.

All military forces have used tactics to frighten its opponents. The use of a siege or the naval blockade of Germany in WWI and the very real fear of starvation could arguably be called a terrorist tactic. But only in the case that it causes fear in the target audience and will cause them to change their behavior (oops, my Psyop is showing). Yet a naval blockade is a legitimate tactic.

In a case more relevant today, the fear that ones house could be destroyed by a PGM or other bomb, with ones family in it, because insurgents are using your neighbors house to operate out of can be a cause of terror. This is not to say that bombing enemy C2 installations is a terrorist tactic, but it can cause terror.

I would think that it is the intent of the attack that differentiates between a legitimate military action and a terrorist attack. Of course that begs the question of defining intent.

[Thepartisan]

I've heard of many reports of Soldiers and marines returning from war, going crazy and opening fire on people in america, recently as well. How do you intend to deal with those murderers in your midst?

Same way as you'd deal with any other kind of murderer right? thought so.

[goesh]

Lordy-be, those two guys are listening for engine rattle - lifters/rods/valves not seating properly, etc. A good mechanic can walk by an idling engine and tell you if its timing is off. Listen close and they can do more diagnostics than you would believe. I bet they each got a pack of Salems for their troubles too. The gunner is bored sh**less looking around, away from his weapon and this is supposed to be a propoganda piece? If it was going to be propoganda for our side at least they should have been given a wrench to hold in their hands.

[Mondor]

I've heard of many reports of Soldiers and marines returning from war, going crazy and opening fire on people in america, recently as well.

Ok I'll bite, which reports are those? I don't recall news reports of military personnel opening fire on groups of people after their return from Iraq. Admittedly I only follow the US and UK, and a bit of Australian press on a regular basis so I may have missed it.

[Steve Blair]

I've heard of many reports of Soldiers and marines returning from war, going crazy and opening fire on people in america, recently as well. How do you intend to deal with those murderers in your midst?

Same way as you'd deal with any other kind of murderer right? thought so.

So you can't answer the original question? Somehow this doesn't surprise me. In fact, I'd be surprised if you even considered the premise of the original question, or the history behind it.

In any case, this thread has wandered well off-topic. I'd say we get back on topic or lock the thread.

[Mondor]

I'd say we get back on topic or lock the thread.

Good idea! My thinking is that it is the intent of the attack that differentiates between a legitimate military action and a terrorist attack. Thus intent is important in terrorist v. insurgent in the same way that the Common Law tradition differentiates between murder and manslaughter.

[Steve Blair]

My position tends to run a little away from that, as you might be able to tell from some of my earlier posts on this thread....:)

I lean more toward result as opposed to intent. Many terrorist groups either spin off from existing insurgencies or piggyback existing groups. They may announce that their "intent" is to strike a blow against the oppressive government, but instead of killing a policeman they blow up a school. Granted, that's an extreme example, but it ties closer to my main theory about terrorist groups. Over time (some sooner than later) they become more obsessed with "results" in terms of spectacular damage or body counts and less concerned with real goals or political objectives. This was the basis of the question I posed earlier that went unanswered by someone who has managed to get themselves in a position where they cannot answer....;)

The other reason I think it's important to be able to distinguish between the two (legal considerations aside) is that they require different tactics. Blurring or mistaking the two can have potentially catastrophic COIN repercussions, IMO.

[Mondor]

In WWII the Allies were trying to stop factories in occupied France from producing war material for the German army. They bombed the factory a number of times, but found that it was still producing significant amounts of war material.

To finally reduce factory output to zero they bombed the workers homes near the factory. The thinking was that if you destroyed the worker's housing then they would no longer be able to work at the factory.

The intent was to stop the factory's output. They did that by bombing the workers. This resulted in destroyed homes and civilian deaths. Using your definition this would have been a terrorist attack. I have some difficulty accepting that line of reasoning.

[Mondor]

The other reason I think it's important to be able to distinguish between the two (legal considerations aside) is that they require different tactics. Blurring or mistaking the two can have potentially catastrophic COIN repercussions, IMO.

I agree whole heartedly with this. However I don't think it is limited to COIN operations. I suspect that the person who lost a loved one in a hospital that was bombed during a conventional operation would any less upset than if the attack came from a car bomb.

It is just in COIN we can see the impacts and the secondary and tertiary effects up close and personal.

[Steve Blair]

Agreed. What I was referring to are tactics on the ground. For example, winning over the hearts and minds of third-generation terrorists (think German RAF, Japanese Red Army, some parts of the PLO/IRA) just isn't possible. Negotiation isn't really an option with most of them, because their demands have become so other-worldly that they cannot possibly be met. On the other hand, insurgents can be negotiated with and so on. So a heavy approach with them can be a mistake, just as a light approach with terrorists can have dangerous consequences.

Just examples, mind, but it's more where my thinking goes with this issue. Certainly there are hangers-on within terrorist groups, and there are also dedicated insurgents that cannot be negotiated with or diverted from their goals.

[Steve Blair]

In WWII the Allies were trying to stop factories in occupied France from producing war material for the German army. They bombed the factory a number of times, but found that it was still producing significant amounts of war material.

To finally reduce factory output to zero they bombed the workers homes near the factory. The thinking was that if you destroyed the worker's housing then they would no longer be able to work at the factory.

The intent was to stop the factory's output. They did that by bombing the workers. This resulted in destroyed homes and civilian deaths. Using your definition this would have been a terrorist attack. I have some difficulty accepting that line of reasoning.

Not necessarily. Targeting means of production (to include the workers) is a much different thing from blowing up a school bus or commercial airliner to protest the working conditions of those same workers. Consider that the average terrorist group practices very little in the way of target discrimination (often going for the easiest targets available...no matter what they are). A terrorist group would have set off a firebomb in a market nearby during peak shopping hours to protest the working conditions rather than launch a bomber raid (which has a fair amount of early warning) against the factory or nearby housing to stop production. They would also continue attacking the area as long as they could produce casualties.

[Mondor]

I agree with your post #93. The total environment needs to be such that acts of political violence are unusual and generate a police response. A subdued approach that minimizes violence will, in the end, do more to eliminate the "environment of insurgency" than any other approach. At least any approach we are willing to take.


Agreed. What I was referring to are tactics on the ground.

I would like to remind you that tactics in the air are tactics on the ground. You separate them at your own risk.

[Steve Blair]

I would like to remind you that tactics in the air are tactics on the ground. You separate them at your own risk.

Poor choice of words on my part. By "tactics on the ground" I refer to tactics within the entire area of operations, to include air, land, and sea/riverine. "Tactics in theater" might have been a better choice.