The Helmand Province (merged thread, not UK or USMC)

[SWJED]

30 April AP via LA Times - NATO, Afghan Troops Target Taliban in Helmand Province (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghanistan30apr30,1,2955220.story?coll=la-headlines-world).


Nearly 3,000 NATO and Afghan troops began an operation before dawn today to drive Taliban fighters from a swath of their opium-producing heartland in southern Afghanistan.

The British-led operation is the latest attempt to extend the control of President Hamid Karzai's government in Helmand province, officials said.

Military officials said the effort involved about 1,100 British troops, 600 U.S. troops and additional forces from the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia and Canada. More than 1,000 Afghan government troops also were taking part.

The troops are targeting Helmand's Sangin Valley, an area near Afghanistan's strategic Ring Road that has "for too long been under the semi-control of the Taliban," said Lt. Col. Stuart Carver, a British commander...

[SWJED]

13 May NY Times - Top Taliban Commander Is Killed in Clash (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/world/asia/13cnd-afghan.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin) by Taimoor Shah and Carlotta Gall.


The Taliban’s top operational commander, Mullah Dadullah, has been killed in southern Afghanistan, and his body was displayed by Afghan officials in this southern city today.

The commander was killed in a joint operation by Afghan security forces and American and NATO troops in Helmand Province, the governor of Kandahar, Asadullah Khaled, said. News agencies reported that the Taliban was killed in fighting in the Nahri Sarraj district, a strategic area of Helmand Province that the Afghan intelligence service reported Saturday had been cleared of Taliban after an operation this week. A statement released by NATO confirmed his death...

[tequila]

Excellent news. He will be replaced, but he was a very experienced field commander who was with Mullah Omar from the beginning. Tough to just replace that sort of experience.

Also one of the worst war criminals in Afghanistan's recent history, behind many massacres of Hazara and other ethnic minorities.

edit: CSMonitor analysis (http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0514/p06s03-wosc.html)that lays out the case for Dadullah being a significant loss for the Taliban. That Mullah Omar could not name (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070514/ap_on_re_as/afghan_commander_killed;_ylt=Av0lEI8ZjHVqRNgdaEk8S NX9xg8F)an immediate successor also is an indicator here.



Ahmadi said Omar and his council of top Taliban leaders decided against naming an immediate replacement for Dadullah.

"Mullah Dadullah was the commander of all the fighting groups. Now all of the mujahedeen will carry on his same type of jihad. They will carry out attacks just as Mullah Dadullah did in his life," Ahmadi quoted Omar as saying.


New news: Dadullah replaced with his brother, Bakht Muhammad (http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070515/ts_nm/afghan_dadullah_dc_3&printer=1;_ylt=Aic.AYjzSv1QXQ9xnH3xwZhg.3QA).

[tequila]

Helmand: A Kinder, Gentler Taleban? (http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=337991&apc_state=henh) - IWPR, 21 Aug.


Musa Qala, in the north of Helmand province, is unusually peaceful these days. Children are getting ready to go to newly-opened schools, and farmers in this opium-rich region are busy preparing their fields for autumn planting.

In contrast to the rest of Helmand, security is good in Musa Qala. There is little crime, and the bitter battles that have scarred surrounding areas seem far away.

Nor do residents live in fear that the Taleban are coming – they are already here.

“The Taleban control everything in Musa Qala,” said Mohammad Aref, 26, a shopkeeper in Musa Qala bazaar. “They have reinstated some traditions from their old regime of five years ago. They collect food rations from every house, and they drive around in their trucks.

“But the Taleban don’t treat people badly, the way they did before. They are very calm and they respect people. Everyone is happy with them."

The Taleban took over Musa Qala in early February, after a tenuous truce brokered by tribal elders collapsed. So far, there is little sign that either the Afghan government or the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, is ready to intervene and change the status quo.

"We have no plans to recapture Musa Qala," said Ghulam Mahayuddin Ghuri, commander-in-chief of the Third Corps of the Afghan National Army.

Face to face with the Taleban, residents like Mohammad Aref are making the best of things.

"People are very happy that the Taleban have brought security," he said. "And they are not forcing families to give them a male fighter, like they used to ..."

Much more at the link, worth reading in full for a picture of Musa Qala under Taliban control. Some residents are critical, others not so much. Gives an idea how the enemy has adapted to try and regain local support.


"The Taleban are not forcing people, the way they did before," said Sher Mohammad, 20, a resident of Musa Qala. "But still, people are changing themselves, they are going back to the way they were during the first Taleban regime. For example, instead of playing music in the shops they now play Taleban songs. Women still go out, but not too much."

...

"People are not happy," said one resident, who would not give his name. "Many are afraid to come to the bazaar from neighbouring villages. They are afraid that the foreigners will come and bomb the district. They are afraid of an attack from the air, as well as from ground troops."

...

The Taleban do enjoy broad support among the population, said this resident, but there was an element of fear in the people's acquiescence.

"The Taleban are very serious in this district, and when they say something, they do it. People give them food, and other kinds of help, not because they are forced to but because they don’t want to upset the Taleban," he said. "People don’t play music at weddings unless they get permission from the Taleban."

Abdul Bari, another Musa Qala resident, is also disgruntled with the new government.

"Who knows how much they have changed?" he grumbled. "We can’t watch television, we can’t watch the news, and there are other restrictions that upset us."

The Taleban are also taxing local businesses, added Abdul Bari, although he would not disclose the percentage or amount ...

[Tom Odom]

This level of sophistication is scary and should be a wake up call to those who portray the Taliban as a bunch of red-eyed, bearded fanatics bent on absolute control. They may well be centered on that degree of control but this approach is a win-win. They win by open control and apparent pacification of an area. They win if the government comes in to disrupt that control.

Tom

[marct]

Senior Taliban commander killed, Afghan military says
Last Updated: Thursday, August 30, 2007 | 6:37 AM ET
CBC News

A wanted senior Taliban commander has been killed in a U.S.-led air raid in the south of Afghanistan, the Afghan Defence Ministry said.

Mullah Brother was killed in the pre-dawn attack in Helmand province.

Brother served as a top military commander for the Taliban government until its removal from power in 2001.

He was also a member of the movement's leadership council, which is led by Mullah Mohammad Omar.

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2007/08/30/talban-killed.html)

More at the link

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, 24 Oct 07:

Al-Qaeda Uses Jaish al-Mahdi to Gain Control over Helmand Province (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373736)

A movement called Jaish al-Mahdi (The Army of the Mahdi) has emerged in Afghanistan. The leader of Afghanistan's Jaish al-Mahdi is Abu Haris, an Arab commander who fought during the anti-Soviet jihad in eastern Afghanistan. Afghanistan's newly established Jaish al-Mahdi is a combination of Arab and Afghan fighters. In a statement, the movement noted that at its outset Jaish al-Mahdi enjoyed the support of 250 Arab and Afghan fighters, although it is still ambiguous as to which jihadi party these fighters were involved in during the Afghan wars. Today, the group has been attempting to recruit Afghan youth to help undertake operations and participate in what Abu Haris calls the "jihad in Afghanistan"....

[tulanealum]

KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghan government troops repulsed a fresh attack late Tuesday by Taliban fighters massed outside the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah in southwestern Afghanistan and killed at least 18 of them, the provincial governor’s office said Wednesday.

NATO spokesmen said the attack, the second in four days on that city, underscored the growing abilities of the Taliban, who have increased the tempo of their attacks as the seventh anniversary of their ouster from power in Kabul approaches.

The Taliban threat has led to a wide-ranging review of war strategy in Washington and to insistent calls from American commanders for more troops.

For more: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/world/asia/16afghan.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&ref=world&pagewanted=print

These attacks are interesting for a variety of reasons. First, they go against the Taliban's normal guerrilla warfare operating methods. Second, despite losing a lot of personnel during the first attack, the TB came back for more. Even though they are losing the battles, they appear to be scaring the crap out of the population in one of the only government held areas in Helmand...a place that was considered "safe." Despite losing the tactical battle, they could win the wider strategic IO battle on this...the people could lose more faith in the government, the security forces may become more scared and maybe they will look to change sides, and this could have second and third order effects on the population in urban and rural areas throughout southern and eastern Afghanistan. I'm not saying it's Tet, but on a small scale it could achieve some of the same things, at least in Helmand Province.

What are your thoughts?

[Tom Odom]

Honestly I am less concerned by their use of open attacks than I am by their use of parallel/shadow government. See:

Christian Science Monitor
October 15, 2008
Pg. 1

Shadow Government


Some Afghans Live Under Taliban Rule – And Prefer It (http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1015/p01s01-wosc.html)

By Anand Gopal, Correspondent

Porak, Afghanistan - After a gang of thieves had continually terrorized an Afghan neighborhood near here months ago, locals decided they'd had enough. "We complained several times to the government and even showed them where the thieves lived," says Ahmad, who goes by one name.

But the bandits continued to operate freely. So the villagers turned to the Taliban.

The militants' parallel government here in Logar Province – less than 40 miles from Kabul

That said, such attacks do speak to a greater willingness to go head to head with the ANA. Hopefully the ANA will continue to meet the challenge.


Tom

[tulanealum]

Tom,

I don't think this is about going head to head...I think it's about trying to demonstrate that no place in the south is safe and to convince the population that the government can't protect them...I highlighted this because these attacks are occuring for a reason...not sure what it is, but it has been some time since a provincial capital has been attacked...and repeatedly...

If the attacks undermine the populations already low opinion of the GOA, then they are successful...and let's face it, the insurgency has more control in Helmand than the GOA does...

But, we'll see...

[Tom Odom]

Tom,

I don't think this is about going head to head...I think it's about trying to demonstrate that no place in the south is safe and to convince the population that the government can't protect them...I highlighted this because these attacks are occuring for a reason...not sure what it is, but it has been some time since a provincial capital has been attacked...and repeatedly...

If the attacks undermine the populations already low opinion of the GOA, then they are successful...and let's face it, the insurgency has more control in Helmand than the GOA does...

But, we'll see...


I would say we are in agreement. 2 attacks on the ANA serve as a real manifestation of a shadow government. I never worried about "mad mullahs"; I do worry about smart ones

Tom

[davidbfpo]

Thought since the UK is the 'lead' nation in Helmand Province, this BBC News story might help: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7671118.stm
and this one from a different angle: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7674435.stm

Note the mention of an Afghan policeman shooting an US soldier, in Paktia Province.

Cannot find reports elsewhere, partly as other news dominates.

davidbfpo

[DaveDoyle]

I haven't seen much detail on the recent story about the Afghan police member shooting at and killing an American soldier. I can attest to the fact that engagements between Afghan police and American forces (in many conditions, both day and night) in the Bermel District are not unommon.

The Afghan police in Paktika (part of RC East), and in Bermel specifically have been "infiltrated," as another story suggests, for many years. COL Pete Johnson, a man I have served with and respect enormously, must be trying to handle a delicate situation with the ANP by being diplomatic.

Here's a link to the 30 September attack from the LA Times -

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan30-2008sep30,0,1343024.story

Here's a link to the 15 October attack from CBC News in Canada -

http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/10/16/afghan-ussoldier.html

[Entropy]

The Taliban tried going "head to head" with the non-afghan coalition in 06 & 07 and suffered heavy casualties whenever they tried to mass. Since then they've switched tactics to focus on the ANA. They've had more success there because air support to the ANA is slower and they aren't as proficient as western forces. There's some debate as to the Taliban (Quetta Shura) strategy: Either a concerted effort to take and hold terrain (ie. Musa Qala) or simply to show the ineffectiveness and, by extension, illegitimacy of the central government and coalition. It's probably both, depending on the situation.

[davidbfpo]

An up beat, nay optimistic report by the UK head of the Helmand PRT, which opens with:
As always, I’m spending plenty of time persuading friends, colleagues, and anyone who will listen, that: no, it isn’t all going fall to pieces after 2014.

Then there's:
If people trust their government they will support it – and this, rather than external support, will be the stoutest defence against the threat of relapse into extremism. With this in mind the focus of my team in Helmand has been on boosting the legitimacy of government in the eyes of the people....As we approach 2014 and accelerate our own draw down, we have to be candid about the risks. Our job is to mitigate them to the extent possible, not to be in denial. Many are concerned that the Taliban are poised to retake many districts as NATO troops pull back.

Link:http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/catrionalaing/2013/05/12/helmand-will-it-spiral-back-into-violent-extremism/

The author refers to an interview the American, Carter Malkasian who was the District Transition Advisor for Helmand PRT in Garmser for two years and the author of 'War Comes to Garmser'. I have the book, but have too many to read, perhaps one day. The interview is very interesting.

Amidst it is this passage:
Today’s government has brought schools and healthcare and just a little freedom for women. I do not think most Pashtuns want to see the Taliban return to power. Nor do I think most Pashtuns see the Taliban as hated enemies. I think that they would prefer peaceful reconciliation to years of war.

Link:http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/11/what-the-frontier-of-afghanistan-tells-us-about-the-war.html

Incidentally there are threads on the USMC in Helmand, the British in Afghanistan and PRT / political advisers.

[Dayuhan]

An up beat, nay optimistic report by the UK head of the Helmand PRT, which opens with:

How close to the ground is the head of a PRT?

It would be interesting to know if those views are shared by those who aren't the head...

[Stan]

Unlikely that anyone else feels that way !

When we pulled out of Eastern Zaire, only the locals were worried and only the command was pumping the BS. As far as we were concerned, seconds following our last wheels up, the place would go to Sierra.

Not only did it in a big way, it still is going down the tube.

I just realized why I hate journalists (err, public affairs) :D

[davidbfpo]

Dayuhan asked:
It would be interesting to know if those views are shared by those who aren't the head... and Stan posted:
Unlikely that anyone else feels that way!

A lurker has added:
There was a big, if not huge rift between the PRT and the military from her belief that the Marines, British and others should have focused more of the development side of things. This was counter to many soldiers who believed that their role was to set the security conditions, and the PRT was expected to get out from its warrens in Lashkar Gah and do what they are charged to do.

[davidbfpo]

The PRT Head on earlier blogs has twice referred to:
Our monitoring shows that by the end of 2012, only 5% of people in Helmand reported that they would support a Taliban return to power.

In January someone asked for details of this polling - no reply to date:http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/catrionalaing/2013/01/09/a-different-story-from-helmand-the-bbc-investigates-progress-in-civilian-institution-building/

[Stan]

My sixth grade teacher would have called it an incomplete on my final grade!

I think we are at over 80 billion dollars and counting, but yet most of the construction is little more than four walls and a roof a decade later.
The finance folks in DC are doing “high fives” and the soldiers are “smelling the barn”.

What we’ve done similar in Africa is a band aid with a Western infrastructure not only incomplete but by local means unsustainable. Why in God’s name would we build a road in the middle of nowhere when for centuries they were doing fine without one ?

We are not bolstering the local government; we are literally financing a political campaign.

Good lord, that guy is little more than another African dictator in Swaziland with the shortest life expectance rate known to man !

When we do Exit Stage Left, those four walls and roof will become building material for the guy down the street, or, at the very least, will become a great surface area for graffiti!

[davidbfpo]

Helmand Province features in several threads due to first the UK's intervention (with allies, Denmark notably), then the USMC arrival and being a "showcase" for what GoIRA and the ANSF can do. Now as ISAF draws down, not without casualties still, a thread on this key province will not go amiss.

Carter Malkasian's book 'War Comes to Garmser' has been reviewed elsewhere, but this short commentary on the Afghan Analyst Network (AAN) on the history and current scene in another district, Nahr-e Seraj illustrates the difficulties in claiming 'victory':
On a visit to Helmand in mid-December, UK Prime Minister David Cameron stated that when British troops withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of next year, they will have accomplished their main aim – leaving behind a basic level of security. But a new report by the Pentagon tells a different story. On its list of the most violent districts in the country, the top four are in Helmand, the province where most British as well as thousands of US troops have been based. The deadliest of these districts is Nahr-e Seraj where a multitude of power brokers within and outside the official security forces violently struggle for influence. Deedee Derksen with an overview of disarmament and rearmament trends over the past 12 years and the resulting security challenges for this and the next Afghan government (with input by Obaid Ali).

It ends:
Where this leaves Gereshk in the near future is difficult to assess. Its politics and military balance are in flux. International troops are leaving, the government has assumed responsibility for security, a new president should assume power next year and, at the level of the central government, efforts are underway to bring in the Taleban. However, whatever happens on a national level is complicated by local developments and the volatile and fragile politics and security situation in important towns like Gereshk. The insurgency is booming, at the same time the loyalty of security forces to the national government is not guaranteed. Local and personal considerations trump government policy. At the same time, the formal and informal security sectors are becoming increasingly fragmented. A new Afghan government will have a tough job keeping them in line.

Link:http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/armed-disarmed-rearmed-how-nar-e-seraj-in-helmand-became-one-of-the-deadliest-districts-in-afghanistan

The AAN article refers to a forthcoming book 'An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012' by Mike Martin; due to be published later this month and the UK's former top soldier, General Sir David Richards review is:
An Intimate War is, quite simply, the book on Helmand. I sincerely wish it had been available to me when I was ISAF Commander in Afghanistan. Military, diplomatic and development professionals involved in Afghanistan and elsewhere, for that matter read this and take note.

Link to Amazon UK:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Intimate-War-History-Conflict-1978-2012/dp/1849043361/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1391448335&sr=1-1&keywords=An+Intimate+War%3A+An+Oral+History+of+the +Helmand+Conflict%2C+1978-2012

Link to Amazon.com, note due out in April 2014:http://www.amazon.com/Intimate-War-History-Conflict-1978-2012/dp/1849043361/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1391448684&sr=1-1&keywords=An+Intimate+War%3A+An+Oral+History+of+the +Helmand+Conflict%2C+1978-2012

[davidbfpo]

A contrary review article by a Pashto lady, from Helmand and now a BBC reporter:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-27408292

[jcustis]

I've never liked the use of a number of open schools (even girls schools) as a metric for progress. I recognize that lady is not using it in the way a soldier or reconstructionist might, but it reads like oddly-placed hope.

Lose a teacher, receive a night letter or two, or get a visit from the local TB chief, and it all folds up.

I am not surprised the province still teeters.

[davidbfpo]

A headline that sadly was expected and no doubt is uncomfortable to officialdom and virtually all UK elected national politicians. It starts with:
Huge swathes of Helmand Province, the area of Afghanistan where hundreds of British soldiers were killed in eight years of bloody fighting, are once again in the hands of the Taliban, The districts of Now Zad, Musa Qala and Sangin have been overrun by insurgents after British troops withdrew to the security of Camp Bastion – the last remaining UK base in the province. The return of the Taliban to hundreds of square miles of territory which was previously liberated by British soldiers makes a mockery of Prime Minister David Cameron’s declaration of ‘mission accomplished’ in Afghanistan.

Link:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2681904/The-bloody-betrayal-Intelligence-emails-reveal-Taliban-taken-Afghan-strongholds-150-boys-died-for.html#ixzz36h2BIwVO

There's also a short commentary by Lt.Col. Tootal, ex-Para, who took the first soldiers into Helmand in 2006 and I cite just one sentence:
Now the nation must ask whether our long campaign in the troubled country of Afghanistan has been worth it.

[davidbfpo]

A better report from Sangin in WSJ and here's a taster, citing Suliman Shah, Sangin's district governor:
The situation is bad...The territory seized by the Taliban hasn't been retaken, and the government hasn't made any steps forward. The Taliban will take control of more territory.

In Sangin, lightly equipped Afghan police, including village militia outfits known as Afghan Local Police, say they have borne the brunt of the insurgent onslaught.

Link:http://online.wsj.com/articles/afghan-troops-struggle-to-retake-parts-of-key-province-from-taliban-1404670052

Note the role of the ALP, who fight till the ammo runs out and are overrun (dying one assumes) and the casualty figures:
Afghan officials said 27 Afghan National Army soldiers have been killed and 80 wounded in the recent fighting, along with 81 police killed and 67 wounded. Local community leaders said more than 140 civilians have been killed or wounded in the crossfire, with the bulk of the casualties caused by roadside bombs.

[jcustis]

The Taliban won't need to take Kabul outright.

They only need to control the centers of illicit profit like Helmand, and then can afford to encircle Kabul and Kandahar like a python constricting around its prey.

[Bill Moore]

A better report from Sangin in WSJ and here's a taster, citing Suliman Shah, Sangin's district governor:

Link:http://online.wsj.com/articles/afghan-troops-struggle-to-retake-parts-of-key-province-from-taliban-1404670052

Note the role of the ALP, who fight till the ammo runs out and are overrun (dying one assumes) and the casualty figures:

David,

I don't have time to read the article now, but in my opinion I think we pushed a bad strategy in regards to relying the ALP to help stabilize the situation. It is an approach that can work only where the insurgents are unable to mass to achieve dominance over a local security force. Obviously the Taliban, partly or largely due to the safe haven in Pakistan, can mass forces in Helmand and other areas. Instead of using the oil spot strategy, which can work, we used the oil driblet strategy, and driblets are unable to defend themselves without U.S. advisors and firepower. If we actually cleared the area and was able to secure the broad area with the military, at least to the point the Taliban couldn't mass, the ALP could be useful in defending against small groups of infiltrators and tying the village to the national government. We're all about quick and short term effects, but terrible when it comes to pursuing longer term ends. A lot of my friends involved in the ALP/VSO effort believe it is a farce and the positive results are over hyped. I suspect the truth lies somewhere in the middle, and if we were capable of doing honest assessments instead of using assessments as a marketing tool to justify what we're currently doing, then we have changed course a little.

[Bob's World]

"Clear-Hold-Build" is a fundamentally flawed concept.

It is like driving one's arm into a tub of water, and believing that the space their arm occupied will remain free of water once the arm is removed.

Until we get to a more intellectually honest appreciation about what insurgency is in general, and why insurgency exists in Afghanistan, we are unlikely to develop and adopt policies for foreign places that our military can actually enforce.

For the military, we defined this mission in the context of what we in the military do, and while that is a natural response of most institutions (USAID, State, DEA, and NGOs have done the same), it does not lead to an approach that is very helpful for Afghanistan getting to some degree of natural stability.

So long as the governance in Kabul (and at lower levels as well) is perceived as fundamentally illegitimate by many who live there (primarily those who had patronage power under the Taliban and now suffer under those who have it under the regime we put into power), there will be revolution.

So long as foreign forces occupy Helmand (and Afghan forces from the north operating in Helmand are perceived as being nearly as foreign as British and US forces operating there), there will be resistance.

This is natural. This is human nature. This is really not much about advancing some "Taliban" system of governance as the West envisions - but more about revolting against a system of governance the West imposed, and resisting those forces sent to enforce that il-formed policy decision.

[Bill Moore]

"Clear-Hold-Build" is a fundamentally flawed concept.

It is like driving one's arm into a tub of water, and believing that the space their arm occupied will remain free of water once the arm is removed.

Until we get to a more intellectually honest appreciation about what insurgency is in general, and why insurgency exists in Afghanistan, we are unlikely to develop and adopt policies for foreign places that our military can actually enforce.

For the military, we defined this mission in the context of what we in the military do, and while that is a natural response of most institutions (USAID, State, DEA, and NGOs have done the same), it does not lead to an approach that is very helpful for Afghanistan getting to some degree of natural stability.

So long as the governance in Kabul (and at lower levels as well) is perceived as fundamentally illegitimate by many who live there (primarily those who had patronage power under the Taliban and now suffer under those who have it under the regime we put into power), there will be revolution.

So long as foreign forces occupy Helmand (and Afghan forces from the north operating in Helmand are perceived as being nearly as foreign as British and US forces operating there), there will be resistance.

This is natural. This is human nature. This is really not much about advancing some "Taliban" system of governance as the West envisions - but more about revolting against a system of governance the West imposed, and resisting those forces sent to enforce that il-formed policy decision.

You're conflating issues, tactically clear and hold works, but to do it effectively like Chang did in China against Mao (until the Japanese intervened), the Brits did in Malaya, and French in Algeria, it can require a high degree of brutality, which runs against our moral grain. If it is going to be employed it must be done in a logical manner, not random acts of securing a village here and there, while insurgents have freedom of movement to maneuver around the village.

I'm not advocating a clear and hold approach, but in fact that is what we're attempting with the VSO program. We're currently in a long war of attrition, which in our case isn't sustainable politically and our adversaries know it.

I actually agree with your points, but at the end of the day they're irrelevant to the guys on the ground who have been asked to achieve objectives that will generate continued resistance as you correctly pointed out. Assuming we're going to have that resistance, and that those on the ground can't change the policy ends, we can at least discuss a better tactical approach, without it always delving into the policy realm. We're stuck with the policies we're given, or more accurately since we're both out of uniform now, our uniformed members are stuck with the policy ends they have been told to pursue using military force. From that optic what would you recommend to Battalion commanders and below?

[Bob's World]

"...ours is but to do and die"? Ultimately Bill, you are right, at some point the military has to simply do the best they can to enforce the policy decisions of our civilian leadership.

But this does not somehow validate the stupidity of the frontal assaults of the Somme; nor the stupidity of Clear-Hold-Build in Helmand.

As I recall Mao prevailed in China, as his tactics supported a valid strategy. Chang was run off of the continent.

In Malaya the British military tactics bought some time and space, but it was the British policy decisions to give up on dreams of restoring the Colony, giving up the political control once vested in the Colonial Office; working to extend political and economic opportunity beyond the Malays to the ethnic Indian and ethnic Chinese populations equally; and to help establish a new sovereign member of the Commonwealth that made those tactics stick. We did none of that in Vietnam. All tactics, no strategy. (kind of like a cowboy who is all hat and no cattle).

Likewise the French only suppressed insurgency and defeated insurgents for short periods of time in Algeria with their military approach to attempt to prop up improper and unchanging policy.

So, no, my points are not "irrelevant to the guys on the ground." Because the Generals are part of those guys; and while generals do not like to advise policy makers we cannot continue to give the generals sanctuary under that auspice from their responsibility to inform civilian leadership that no acceptable, suitable, feasible military solution exists to enforce what they are seeking to impose (coupled with suggestions of alternative policy approaches that history indicates may actually be supportable by our military action).

Even at Battalion level, commanders have a tremendous degree of latitude as to "how" they pursue the missions they are given. I saw Brian Petit do this every day in 2010 RC-South as we conducted the big push to clear Marjah and were preparing to do the same outside Kandahar. But you are right. We cannot fix this at the Battalion level. Our strategic failures are occurring much higher than those conducting tremendous tactical effort in support.

We need to stop reading history with rose colored glasses; and we need to stop giving our Flag-level commanders a pass for failing strategically simply because they are effective tacticians. In short, we need to change our military culture if we hope to be more successful in the strategic environment we live in today. Perhaps that will be done by the frustrated junior leaders coming off of today's battlefield for tomorrow; just as it was done by the frustrated junior leaders coming out of Vietnam.

[Bill Moore]

Mao would have likely been defeated if the Japanese didn't invade, but we will never know. I agree our strategy is deeply flawed, and the generals are partly partly to blame. On the other hand generals who addressed strategy flaws under both Clinton Bush administrations were not treated well. Not too long ago a civilian in OSD told 4 star he had no business developing strategy, his job was to implement it. It seems that the only time civilians want military input is after their strategy fails.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

This is the challenge of the current strategic environment. The problems the military is being sent out to "fix" or "defeat" are by and large NOT MILITARY PROBLEMS.

We are at a point in our strategic analysis where most communities, civilian and military alike, will admit that the strategic environment has fundamentally changed and continues to change at a nearly exponential rate. Then, in nearly the same breath, espouse some version of "therefore, business as usual - but I need more stuff if you want success."

We need to get to the point where we recognize that we must fundamentally change as well; and that we cannot simply use the military as some sort of "little Dutch Boy" to go stick our proverbial fingers into any number of proverbial dikes that are crumbling around us. It appears that the military can not only buy time and space for civilian leadership to succeed. We can buy time and space to allow it to fail as well. Did not the Roman Legions conduct a delaying action as the Barbarians made their way to Rome?

What we do today is not much different; and likely will end in similar fashion if we fail to shift from comfortably studying and applauding our tactics, and do not begin spending a great deal more time getting uncomfortable as we confront the realities of our policies and strategies.

I actually see a glimmer of hope in what I suspect is happening in Syria and Iraq. But then I may be assuming things that are not there, and giving credit where none is due - but I remain an optimist.

As to taking shots from civilians who feel like some individuals or aspects of the military are imposing on intellectual turf they arrogantly believe is uniquely theirs, I have two words. Moral Courage. We need more of it.

[AmericanPride]

I agree with Bob about the need for moral (and I'd add intellectual) courage.

My thought is that an unquestioningly obedient general officer corps undermines the democratic institution of the country. If the military is only responsible to the executive (and narrowly only accountable for the execution of predetermined policy), then that leaves no room for conversation about the most effective means when the executive more or less has the power to pursue military operations without Congressional input. DoD needs to adopt the slogan "See something, say something" into its values system. Even if the goals were unattainable, that does not excuse the senior military leadership from accepting it without question.

[davidbfpo]

I have long thought when the Afghan state decide on their national strategy, even their survival, keeping large numbers of ANSF in Helmand Province will evaporate within a short time. Before 2006 it was of marginal importance to them, one weak ANA unit in the provincial capital and little else (plus a US SOF unit and protective infantry).

Yes there is an income from the heroin trade, but I'd wager most of the profits go south, as does most of the product. Ah, goes west to to Iran too.

Now the terrain of the 'Green Zone' may account for a small part of the province, but it is where the people are. From my reading in the fighting season - when it is green - it is not a good place to fight in (when using ISAF ROE).

There are more important places for GIRoA.

[Bill Moore]

I agree with Bob about the need for moral (and I'd add intellectual) courage.

My thought is that an unquestioningly obedient general officer corps undermines the democratic institution of the country. If the military is only responsible to the executive (and narrowly only accountable for the execution of predetermined policy), then that leaves no room for conversation about the most effective means when the executive more or less has the power to pursue military operations without Congressional input. DoD needs to adopt the slogan "See something, say something" into its values system. Even if the goals were unattainable, that does not excuse the senior military leadership from accepting it without question.

I am aware of specific situations where Generals did push back against prevailing strategic ideas put forth by administrations, but personalities close to the president were still able to push their flawed strategies through despite professional military advice recommending against it. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz come to mind as self appointed experts who could influence the president to ignore advice to the contrary. It didn't help that general Frank's wasn't much of a strategist.

There is a tension sometimes between being a good citizen and a good soldier. Both want to the right thing for the nation, but in the same light a good soldier, as a good citizen, wants to ensure the military remains subordinate to civilian leadership. That can be a very gray line sometimes. Yes we have senior officers who look after their career above all else, but they don't reflect the whole. Too many comments are made with too wide of brush.

[Bill Moore]

I would add that since we are subordinate to civilian leadership why do we always leave that variable out of our discussions?

Where are our Lincolns who have the moral courage to stand up to military leadership going in the wrong direction?

Another area I think we under appreciate is the influence of our multiple think tanks. Kagan who was the one who pushed the surge in Iraq and he was in a think tank. Bob talks about the need for fundamental change, yet a powerful think tank just recommended that DOD justify their budget with a big war scenario or risk cuts. More cowbell please.

We have leaders in the military with moral courage, but that is only a prerequisite for change; it is not a road map to change.

[carl]

Regarding the WSJ article.

If the story is accurate one very great big thing stands out to me. The Afghans, especially the local police, fight hard. They may get beat but they fight hard. That is a very big thing.

The next big thing is if they are fighting hard, they are hurting Taliban & Co. Their loss figures as stated in the story, again, if accurate, show that. That has an effect.

Also the story states that the locals need the Afghan Army around to back them up. They know that and state that.

The story states also that this is a repeat of last year's pattern. Taliban & Co took some places, then were slowly pushed out. Where they were pushed to is most likely Pakistan, where they have been going when pressed for years.

So it seems to this 4 eyed, 4F, pencil necked geek forever a civilian that the Afghans are doing as well as we could have hoped for on their own and the big thing now is the same big thing that has been extant for the last 13 years, the existence of the Pak Army/ISI supplied sanctuary over the border. That sanctuary and the support provided Taliban & Co by the Pak Army/ISI, those devil's spawn, must be dealt with or the thing can't be done.

[carl]

I forgot something. The story also states more than 140 civilians have been killed or wounded with the reappearance of Taliban & Co, mostly by roadside bombs. The local civilians know who sets roadside bombs. This is another big thing.

[Bob's World]

Carl,

Who do you think "the Afghans" are? Who do you think "the Taliban" are?

I know this may sound trite, but Afghanistan is not America. The concept of patronage as it exists in Afghanistan is a world away from the politics, governance and path to personal and family opportunities that exist in the US.

"The Afghans" (as I believe you are dividing society) are primarily those individuals, families and tribes who enjoy patronage-based opportunity under the current government that we elevated into power.

"The Taliban" is by and large the other half of Afghan society who's families or tribes, or themselves individually, were deposed of power and opportunity by our intervention, or who maybe never had power or opportunity but would still like some. This is augmented by "little t Taliban" who are either bored young men who would rather ride with Crazy Horse and fight the invaders than live on the reservation and eat government beef; also those who have been injured by our operations and presence and naturally resist what they reasonably see as an illegitimate foreign intrusion.

Much of our problem in Afghanistan policy-wise is that we ignored Afghan culture and devised and imposed a system that appealed to our Western sensibilities. Then, militarily, we waged a campaign and built military capacity that equally was much more tuned to our Western ideas of what insurgency is than to the realities of the insurgency we were up against.

This is why Mr. Karzai has come across as ungrateful when he dares to stand up and challenge some of our more disruptive approaches, perspectives and activities. Sure, he is very grateful for being handed the keys to power and opportunity in Afghanistan. Sure he is very grateful for the Billions of dollars we have poured into the country that have enriched those with patronage power beyond they wildest fantasies. Sure he is grateful that we could not see that the constitution he and a few buddies put together served far more to centralize patronage into a giant Ponzi scheme because all we could see was "centralized government." But he is not grateful when we do things that flame the fires of resistance insurgency and make his backdoor deals more difficult and expensive to sustain.

Best we leave Afghanistan to Afghans. All Afghans, not just those we put on our team. They will sort things out and will quickly walk away from much that we have worked so hard to emplace and see as so essential to success in the terms we value so much, but that mean so little there.

[carl]

Carl,

Who do you think "the Afghans" are? Who do you think "the Taliban" are?

I know this may sound trite, but Afghanistan is not America. The concept of patronage as it exists in Afghanistan is a world away from the politics, governance and path to personal and family opportunities that exist in the US.

"The Afghans" (as I believe you are dividing society) are primarily those individuals, families and tribes who enjoy patronage-based opportunity under the current government that we elevated into power.

"The Taliban" is by and large the other half of Afghan society who's families or tribes, or themselves individually, were deposed of power and opportunity by our intervention, or who maybe never had power or opportunity but would still like some. This is augmented by "little t Taliban" who are either bored young men who would rather ride with Crazy Horse and fight the invaders than live on the reservation and eat government beef; also those who have been injured by our operations and presence and naturally resist what they reasonably see as an illegitimate foreign intrusion.

Much of our problem in Afghanistan policy-wise is that we ignored Afghan culture and devised and imposed a system that appealed to our Western sensibilities. Then, militarily, we waged a campaign and built military capacity that equally was much more tuned to our Western ideas of what insurgency is than to the realities of the insurgency we were up against.

This is why Mr. Karzai has come across as ungrateful when he dares to stand up and challenge some of our more disruptive approaches, perspectives and activities. Sure, he is very grateful for being handed the keys to power and opportunity in Afghanistan. Sure he is very grateful for the Billions of dollars we have poured into the country that have enriched those with patronage power beyond they wildest fantasies. Sure he is grateful that we could not see that the constitution he and a few buddies put together served far more to centralize patronage into a giant Ponzi scheme because all we could see was "centralized government." But he is not grateful when we do things that flame the fires of resistance insurgency and make his backdoor deals more difficult and expensive to sustain.

Best we leave Afghanistan to Afghans. All Afghans, not just those we put on our team. They will sort things out and will quickly walk away from much that we have worked so hard to emplace and see as so essential to success in the terms we value so much, but that mean so little there.

That's seven paragraphs and not a word about the Pak Army/ISI and the support given Taliban & Co by them nor the sanctuary given within Pakistan. As I said about actions, if nothing be done about those devil's spawn, the Pak Army/ISI, the thing can't be done. And without intellectual recognition of the problem, no action can be taken. And it will be impossible to arrange this "Best we leave Afghanistan to Afghans. All Afghans, not just those we put on our team. They will sort things out and will quickly walk away from much that we have worked so hard to emplace and see as so essential to success in the terms we value so much, but that mean so little there."

I disagree that it is the poor downtrodden Pathans being led by the plucky Talibanis in a noble effort to regain what is rightfully theirs. I've read too many accounts of Pathans being killed by Taliban & Co for disagreeing to think things that simple.

[JustJrEnlisted]

I have long thought when the Afghan state decide on their national strategy, even their survival, keeping large numbers of ANSF in Helmand Province will evaporate within a short time. Before 2006 it was of marginal importance to them, one weak ANA unit in the provincial capital and little else (plus a US SOF unit and protective infantry).

Yes there is an income from the heroin trade, but I'd wager most of the profits go south, as does most of the product. Ah, goes west to to Iran too.

Now the terrain of the 'Green Zone' may account for a small part of the province, but it is where the people are. From my reading in the fighting season - when it is green - it is not a good place to fight in (when using ISAF ROE).

There are more important places for GIRoA.

Little America demonstrated quite convincingly that Helmand acquired outsized importance simply due to it being the terrain the USMC wanted. Then the extremely competent USMC propaganda machine went into overdrive, convincing many of the strategic importance of Helmand. I spent most of 2012 there, and could easily see that the gains made were not tenable. I certainly agree with you that the Afghan government realizes Helmand is not strategically significant, and has only committed troops in any number there to mollify the US and UK. ANSF will be quickly redeployed to more critical areas within the next year or 2.

The Vice documentary "This is What Winning Looks Like" is an incredibly accurate portrayal of Helmand.

[davidbfpo]

Little America demonstrated quite convincingly that Helmand acquired outsized importance simply due to it being the terrain the USMC wanted. Then the extremely competent USMC propaganda machine went into overdrive, convincing many of the strategic importance of Helmand. I spent most of 2012 there, and could easily see that the gains made were not tenable. I certainly agree with you that the Afghan government realizes Helmand is not strategically significant, and has only committed troops in any number there to mollify the US and UK. ANSF will be quickly redeployed to more critical areas within the next year or 2.

The Vice documentary "This is What Winning Looks Like" is an incredibly accurate portrayal of Helmand.

JJE,

I've not read 'Little America' and the cited film appears to be one I missed. It is by Ben Anderson, an intrepid sometime BBC reporter whose work and views have appeared on SWC before.

This is a link to the documentary (90 mins) and accompanying text:http://www.vice.com/en_uk/vice-news/this-is-what-winning-looks-like-full-length

Something to watch later when the football is on.:D

[Bob's World]

Teams are based on Patronage, not being Pashtu

Many Pashtu individuals, tribes and families did not have patronage under the Taliban that do under the current Northern Alliance-based government.

Second; Pakistan will always see it to be an absolutely existential vital national interest to exercise influence into Afghanistan through their shared Pashto population. So it has been, so it will always be. Get over it. We are the interlopers from afar. Interlopers who worked with this "devil's spawn" during our first foray into this region when our interest in thwarting Soviet occupation of Afghanistan aligned with the Pakistan interest of having influence over that same space and populations.

Now we work with the same Afghans we worked against during "Charlie Wilson's War"; and equally are at cross purposes with former and current Pakistan allies. We demand that Pakistan act against their vital national interests. Then we get pissed when they drag their heels in doing something that they knew would be horribly disruptive to their national stability; and then we blamed the instability that followed once they finally did what we coerced them into doing on their slowness and half-hearted efforts, rather than recognizing that it was because of what we asked them to do, not how they were going about doing it.

None of this is about who is "right" or who is "wrong" - there are always winners and losers and in this patronage-based society it is very nearly a zero-sum game. Winners and losers have flipped several times over the past 40 years as a result of Western meddling, and it has created even more chaos and enmity than the traditional norm as so many have been on both the winning and the losing side, often more than once, in their lifetime. Very different than if one lives their life as seeing being on the outside as the norm. Their is far less acceptance of being squeezed out, particularly when one can reasonably rationalize that "but for" the help of some foreign power, one would still be on top.

This is not about fact and American interests. This is about perception and the interests of the people, families, tribes and nations that actually live there. We've read this one wrong from the start, and then have overly focused on forcing our ill-conceived solution to work, rather than adjusting to a more realistic solution based on the place where we actually are and reality as it actually is - and then making that work.

That is the real lesson of the Brits in Malaya. They went to Malaya to execute plan A, restore the colony; the Brits then succeeded once they gave up on plan A as infeasible and instead implemented plan B, enabling the creation of the common wealth nation of Malaysia that was much more inclusive of ethnic Indian and Chinese populations.

We need a plan B if we want to "succeed" as well. Sometimes winning is folding a losing hand and drawing new cards. We just keep throwing more money into the pot and blaming the other players with better cards for not folding. That doesn't make our cards any better.

[jcustis]

Sir,

I sat kneecap to kneecap with a Pakistani general officer earlier this year in Islamabad, and the topic of Pakistan's interests relative to India and Afghanistan came up at his prodding.

Your point about perceptions and interests of the people on the ground and directly involved in the matter is spot on.

He conceded that the US lost several thousand killed during the 9/11 attacks, then asked the rhetorical if I knew how many had died or been wounded in Pakistan during the aftermath and last 13 years.

Being stuck on Plan A is an accurate, and tragic, analogy.

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

This is the challenge of the current strategic environment. The problems the military is being sent out to "fix" or "defeat" are by and large NOT MILITARY PROBLEMS.

We are at a point in our strategic analysis where most communities, civilian and military alike, will admit that the strategic environment has fundamentally changed and continues to change at a nearly exponential rate. Then, in nearly the same breath, espouse some version of "therefore, business as usual - but I need more stuff if you want success."

We need to get to the point where we recognize that we must fundamentally change as well; and that we cannot simply use the military as some sort of "little Dutch Boy" to go stick our proverbial fingers into any number of proverbial dikes that are crumbling around us. It appears that the military can not only buy time and space for civilian leadership to succeed. We can buy time and space to allow it to fail as well. Did not the Roman Legions conduct a delaying action as the Barbarians made their way to Rome?

What we do today is not much different; and likely will end in similar fashion if we fail to shift from comfortably studying and applauding our tactics, and do not begin spending a great deal more time getting uncomfortable as we confront the realities of our policies and strategies.

I actually see a glimmer of hope in what I suspect is happening in Syria and Iraq. But then I may be assuming things that are not there, and giving credit where none is due - but I remain an optimist.

As to taking shots from civilians who feel like some individuals or aspects of the military are imposing on intellectual turf they arrogantly believe is uniquely theirs, I have two words. Moral Courage. We need more of it.

Bob,

Interesting thoughts as always. I can't recall who wrote this, but I read a book a while back that two things are likely to prevent change. One is legalistic (policy, regulations, laws, etc.), and the other is tactical success. I think we're impacted by both, and would add to that the impact of our culture and our bureaucracy, which by definition is resistant to change.

The impact of the current security related challenges related to Syria, Iraq, Israel, the election crisis in Afghanistan, the mass migration of Latin American children to the U.S., Russia's activities in the Ukraine, the disputed territorial claims in East Asia, and the many challenges throughout Africa seem to indicate that what we once perceived as the norm for the world order no longer applies. We're in the midst of change, and as the world's only superpower we desire to shape it (much better us than China or Russia in my opinion), but so far have been largely ineffective, which in itself should be a cause for deep self-reflection on why.

Unlike you I'm not optimistic, but I do see opportunity for U.S. leadership, which is lacking at the moment. It isn't about supporting the doves or hawks, but developing an entirely new approach for the ways we pursue our ends, and re-examining what those ends should be. Some ends will employ the full spectrum of DIMEFIL to pursue because they're critical to us, other ends are what we would like to see, and those are the ones we need to stop relying on the military to pursue.

When will the new National Security Strategy be published?

[AmericanPride]

There's a couple of things going on here, some with counter-vailing impacts on the others.

First, structurally, the United States is committed to maintaining its hegemony in the short-term. This is represented in its fiscal priorities: defense expenditures represent approximately half of all discretionary spending; this number increases with the addition of the expenditures for the VA and Homeland Security (and other security or intelligence functions). Investments in infrastructure, innovation, education, and health are relatively minor. The largest social spending programs (Social Security and Medicare) are dedicated to improving the living conditions of the elderly. Of the already meager international aid budget, 25% goes to the top four recipients: Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The U.S. also leads in global arms sales, making this a primary source of revenue as well as a linkage to other governments. This means that institutionally the United States is geared towards maintaining its position in a specific strategic environment: one that requires the exercise of military force and wide-ranging security programs to sustain superpower status. The decline in U.S. military purchasing power also means that a greater amount of fiscal resources will be required to sustain a diminishing return on security effects. Without change, this means that the U.S. will eventually retreat from previous strategic priorities since it will not be able to sustain its security committments and will suffer from the consequent loss in credibility.

Second, absolute power is not as important as relative power. U.S. absolute power remains two to three fold ahead of the next competitor in military capabilities (Russia). However, there is a perception that (1) U.S. military capabilities are slowing in development relative to competitors and (2) U.S. military capabilities are either insufficient or inappropriate in their application. This explains the crisis in foreign policy debates about U.S. decline. But it also is empowering to elites in Moscow and Beijing; reference dependency is important. Moscow has two: the Soviet era and the Yeltsin administration, so current conditions (Russia has lost 1 war in 10 since 1991) give Russia confidence. The steady growth of China's capabilities is not revolutionary but methodical; but in the context of changings in U.S. relative power, that suddenly becomes a threat. This is similar to the situation prior to World War I when German and Austrian elites felt severely insecure about the long-term threat of Russia, even though Russia was decades behind in military development. It was the rapid growth of military and economic capabilities relative to Germany and Austria that produced the fear, not the absolute power.

Third, Russia is clearly dissatisfied with its position in the international community, while China's view is less clear (in my opinion). Russia will continue to openly challenge the U.S. while it appears that Russia's power is on the ascent relative to American power. In this situation, the declining power has no good options: as its strength declines, time works against it in restoring the status quo (and note, the status quo is always referenced as the apex of power, not the actual current conditions). Because potential losses are always more weighted than potential gains in measuring risk taking in policy decisions, there is an inherent incentive to preserve the remaining capabilities and not risk a hegemonic war, even though continued trends means that the prospect of a favorable outcome actually declines over time.

So, the U.S. is stuck in this paradigm that defines the parameters of its strategy options, even as its options become increasingly irrelevant and/or ineffective over time because the paradigm itself is changing. The U.S. needs to recapitalize on the generators of power itself (i.e. development, innovation, health), not the materialization of that power (i.e. military capabilities).

[davidbfpo]

A long detailed report on the mistakes made in Helmand, that predated the current fighting around Sangin, from the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), the full title is:
Snatching defeat from victory: How ISAF infighting helped doom Sangin to its ongoing violence

Link:https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/snatching-defeat-from-victory-how-isaf-infighting-helped-doom-sangin-to-its-ongoing-violence/

Everyone gets a mention, IMHO it dissects much of what SWC have discussed about this 'small war'. Indeed in places you can get lost at the pace of themes and places: Marjah, 'government in a box', the UK PRT, civilian advice if not direction, human terrain, negoitation with the Taliban etc.

Hitting a potentially defecting local Taliban leaders meeting with 500 pound bomb(s) I expect prompts the article's title.

[JMA]

Not quite David,

Most od the discussion on Helmand around here (SWC) comprised criticism by a few and blind loyalty - to failing strategy and tactics - by the majority.

I guess this quote from the article sums it all up pretty well:


“The whole sorry recent history of Sangin encapsulates so well our failings in Helmand, and Afghanistan in general,” said a former British diplomat, “each branch of ISAF with its own agenda, its own imperatives and, more than anything else, its own egos.”

History will judge this Afghan adventure harshly - as has already begun - and the respective militaries - specifically the officers who commanded there - will not be spared.

I would go so far as to state that this has been the final humiliation for the British military. The fish has finally rotted from the head down.

Remember this conversation between German generals Erich Ludendorff and Max Hoffmann:


Ludendorff: The English soldiers fight like lions.
Hoffmann: True. But don't we know that they are lions led by donkeys.

But before that in Crimea a Russian officer had said that British soldiers were ‘lions commanded by asses'.

Scottish independence - should it occur - will provide the mercy killing for this once great military. A desperately sad situation.

PS: Lind has warned that the same "rotting from the head down" is taking its toll on the US military.




A long detailed report on the mistakes made in Helmand, that predated the current fighting around Sangin, from the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), the full title is:

Link:https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/snatching-defeat-from-victory-how-isaf-infighting-helped-doom-sangin-to-its-ongoing-violence/

Everyone gets a mention, IMHO it dissects much of what SWC have discussed about this 'small war'. Indeed in places you can get lost at the pace of themes and places: Marjah, 'government in a box', the UK PRT, civilian advice if not direction, human terrain, negoitation with the Taliban etc.

Hitting a potentially defecting local Taliban leaders meeting with 500 pound bomb(s) I expect prompts the article's title.