The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Fuchs]

"Well all that assumes a direct cause and effect between actions and reactions, which is not what activity on current operations shows."

I don't really care about ongoing operations because the hostiles are extremely far away from a competent/well-equipped/well-supplied profile that I use for my theoretical work that's 90% related to actual national defence.

"First Week" = time till the enemy adapts to the long range threat.

TI: thermal sights are expensive and bulky. I see no need for more than two such sights per squad plus maybe one spare sight at platoon level.
Thermals should be regarded as special equipment to detect camouflaged hostiles and hostiles concealed by smoke or fog as long as thermal sensors aren't cheap (and energy efficient) enough for general use.
This is the smallest infantry TI known to me:
http://www.trijicon.com/user/parts/parts_new.cfm?categoryID=16


@kaur: SEALs are no general infantry. SF with their uncommon toys are almost irrelevant in the wars that I'm interested in.

[William F. Owen]

I don't really care about ongoing operations because the hostiles are extremely far away from a competent/well-equipped/well-supplied profile that I use for my theoretical work that's 90% related to actual national defence.
OK, that's valid, but my point was that operational history does not show new or improving infantry equipment capabilities as becoming irrelevant based on enemy behaviour. Equipment that does not work, gets ditched. I fully accept that, but equipment than gains a required capability, or increase in existing performance, nearly always endures. The Sniper sight referred to can be programmed with any ballistic algorithm you want, so you can clip it to an AT-4 and hit an object at 1,000m

I see no need for more than two such sights per squad plus maybe one spare sight at platoon level.
So one per fire team?

Thermals should be regarded as special equipment to detect camouflaged hostiles and hostiles concealed by smoke or fog as long as thermal sensors aren't cheap (and energy efficient) enough for general use.
I would define detecting camouflaged enemy as general use, especially in the highly dispersed conditions you allude to. I am strongly of the opinion that a 1kg TIWS is a better use of carried weight than the additional weight associated with a SAW.

[Fuchs]

So one per fire team?

One per squad as minimum, the second as insurance against Murphy's law and for the use in a 2nd observation post. It's not about fire teams at all.

TIs are expensive and require much energy - it would be nice to have one (especially if mated with LL sights (http://soldiersystems.net/2009/06/10/enhanced-night-vision-goggle/)) for every one, but that won't happen for a while because resources are scarce in reality and need to be allocated wisely.

The problem is that it's difficult to decide who should have one.
The leader? Could make good use of it ('situational awareness'), but wouldn't use it much of the time - wasteful.

The designated marksmen? They could use the sight as well, but primarily during a firefight on their rifle. That rifle tends to be longer and heavier than a carbine or assault rifle - so it would be very tiresome to scan the area as needed with the sight on the rifle.

Same (just worse) applies to machine gunners.

Finally grenadiers and other specialists (demolitions, AT, radio) - they could use the sight on their carbine, but that would be a waste during a firefight.

I say; keep the rails standardized and let the leaders figure out who's most reliable at detecting hostiles with TI.

The zeroing is likely the greatest problem for TI swapping in a team.


It's most easy with sniper teams; the observer should have the TI, he's the primary spotter.

[William F. Owen]

One per squad as minimum, the second as insurance against Murphy's law and for the use in a 2nd observation post. It's not about fire teams at all.
Well that's where we differ in our ideas about Platoon organisation. My guess is that our respective platoons would have 5-6 TI sights



The problem is that it's difficult to decide who should have one.
The leader? Could make good use of it ('situational awareness'), but wouldn't use it much of the time - wasteful.
I say; keep the rails standardized and let the leaders figure out who's most reliable at detecting hostiles with TI.
The zeroing is likely the greatest problem for TI swapping in a team.

Agreed. Flexibility seems to a capability in and of itself, providing that flexibility is defined.

[William F. Owen]

Maybe of interest to readers here. (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Alice_In_Warminster_RDS_Summer_09.pdf)

[baboon6]

Maybe of interest to readers here. (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Alice_In_Warminster_RDS_Summer_09.pdf)

Interesting article but from both documentaries on TV/internet and posts on other forums (specifically ARRSE) it would seem at least some rifle sections in Afghanistan are actually operating with 1xGPMG and 1xLMG (Minimi) per section i.e. 1 fire-team with GPMG and 1 with Minimi. Sorry have to go, more later.

[William F. Owen]

Interesting article but from both documentaries on TV/internet and posts on other forums (specifically ARRSE) it would seem at least some rifle sections in Afghanistan are actually operating with 1xGPMG and 1xLMG (Minimi) per section i.e. 1 fire-team with GPMG and 1 with Minimi. Sorry have to go, more later.

Why the "but." That's precisely my point!

[kaur]

Wilf, thanks for your new article. I found there also this article.

The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat.

http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Real_Role_of_Small_Arms_RDS_Summer_09.pdf

Dr Jim Storr said:


To conclude, small arms fire kills and incapacitates very few
people in a typical infantry battle. The location and identity
of those individuals is critical to the outcome. However, the
effect of small arms fire in suppressing the enemy is probably
more important. Suppression fixes the enemy to enable
movement, or for elimination by other weapons. Suppression
is critically important, but also generally very poorly done.

I have to admit that my English is not very good, but does this mean that you have to send metal pieces towards opponent that make him find cover. This makes him slow and your faster guys just catch the slower one. Caliber doesn't matter? This reminds me that Wilf pushed somewhere also HK new small ammo. Wilf any comment, please?

[William F. Owen]

I have to admit that my English is not very good, but does this mean that you have to send metal pieces towards opponent that make him find cover. This makes him slow and your faster guys just catch the slower one. Caliber doesn't matter? This reminds me that Wilf pushed somewhere also HK new small ammo. Wilf any comment, please?

Essentially you are correct. Suppression cannot win in and of itself and suppression only very rarely breaks the will to fight, but Jim Storr and I basically agree, based on the evidence, that small arms fire "fixes", while projected HE, and/or close range direct fire "strikes."

[Ken White]

and thanks for posting it. I did not comment on it simply because it made sense and I had nothing to add. I do wish that, like Kaur, I'd explored and pulled up the Colonel Dr. Storr article. I agree with Storr's conclusion -- but I get there by a slightly different route.

Thanks for doing that and posting it, Kaur.

Storr says:
A few studies are quite insightful. It appears that a soldier’s ability to hit a given target is typically reduced by a factor of ten or so when he is moved from a static rifle range to a field firing area where he has to select cover, move, shoot and so on. It is reduced by a further factor of ten or so if there is an enemy firing back at him. It is reduced by another factor of ten if the enemy has machine guns, or if he has tanks; and by a hundred if he has both.I have not seen those studies but my experience corroborates the thrust of that paragraph. I think the factors he cites range from reasonably accurate for green troops to terribly high for experienced troops. In short, experience can better performance. No surprise there but I also strongly believe that better, more intense and more realistic training can significantly better the performance of new troops.

The issue then becomes one of cost. Marginal performance can be obtained as we now train weapons use; to improve that will take a lot of rounds and will cost a bit more. IMO, the money should be expended as doing less is morally suspect to say the least...

An added cost factor is the possibility of a slight increase in training casualties. Sensible practice can minimize that but the realism required will create the potential.

Then this:
Another study reveals entirely different phenomena. It highlights that achieving surprise, or inflicting shock on the enemy are hugely effective. These are more effective than any likely force ratio, or the use of other weapon systems, and so on. Put very simply, if the attacker can find the enemy’s flanks and rear and attack him from there, or apply sudden concentrated violence to him and then exploit it, the enemy will typically give up quite quickly.Exactly -- calling for better, more imaginative and realistic tactical training for junior leaders and potential Company / Battalion commanders (and better operational and strategic training for senior people but that's another thread).

With respect to suppression, he says:
Get some fire down!’ is the wrong approach.

‘Suppress the enemy!’ is a better approach.

‘Suppress the enemy, to enable the platoon to attack him
from his rear’ is a better approach still.

Suppressive fire without purpose is just that: purposelessI very much agree with that and believe the vast majority of such fire is totally wasted and the wasters don't even realize it...

As you and I have agreed previously, 'suppressive fire' as it is generally practiced is not at all effective against well trained and experienced troops -- accurate fire OTOH will stop or slow them.

He also added:
The L110 (Minimi) Light Machine Gun (LMG) performs far worse in such trials. At best, only the first shot of a short burst passes close enough to suppress. However, subsequent shots in that burst go anything up to 6m wide of the mark at battlefield ranges. Since perhaps 3 to 5 rounds in 3 to 5 seconds are required to suppress, a typical LMG gunner will rarely achieve suppression. He would have to fire 3 to 5 bursts in as many seconds to do so. Furthermore, since only the first round typically passes near enough, he would have to fire a burst every 3 seconds or so to keep the target suppressed.Confirming my long held position that belt fed weapons do NOT belong in the Rifle Platoon other than in the defense (which should be avoided but that too is another thread...).

I agree that suppressive fire is needed but contend it must be reasonably accurate and that aimed fire is far more effective than are rounds in the general direction. I also agree that in many situations, HE is the killer but do believe that far better small arms training than is now the norm in desirable, achievable and that improvements can significantly improve the kill ratio of small arms versus HE effects.

[jmm99]

and this statement (based on the Rowland article which I couldn't find on line) doesn't make physical sense to me when I multiply by "factors of ten":


A few studies are quite insightful. It appears that a soldier’s ability to hit a given target is typically reduced by a factor of ten or so when he is moved from a static rifle range to a field firing area where he has to select cover, move, shoot and so on. It is reduced by a further factor of ten or so if there is an enemy firing back at him. It is reduced by another factor of ten if the enemy has machine guns, or if he has tanks; and by a hundred if he has both. [1]

[1] D. Rowland, The Effect of Combat Degradation on the Urban Battlefield. Journal of the Operational Research Society, Volume 42 No 7, 1991

Posit a rifleman who at range consistently shoots 100mm (4") or under, 5 shot groups at 100m (Storr, p.2). Thus, the following table using the "factors of ten" from the Storr article:

1. 100mm (4") - firing at range

2. 1000mm (40") - firing when executing fire and movement (3.3 feet)

3. 10000mm (400") - same as # 2, but under enemy rifle fire (33 feet)

4. 100000mm (4000") - same as #3, but adding enemy MGs or tanks (330 feet)

5. 1000000mm (40000") - same as #3, but adding enemy MGs and tanks (3300 feet)

For the last one, this exercise in multiplication yields a 1000m envelope at 100m distance to target. This doesn't seem to make physical sense.

Any idea of what Storr/Rowland means by a "factor of ten" ?

PS: The concept of Combat Degradation would seem to be very relevant to development of sensible ROE/RUFs and the need to train with them under realistic conditions.

[Fuchs]

@jmm99: He meant hit probability, not dispersion.


Get some fire down!’ is the wrong approach.

‘Suppress the enemy!’ is a better approach.

‘Suppress the enemy, to enable the platoon to attack him
from his rear’ is a better approach still.

As always: It depends.
He's right when destructive indirect fires are difficult, but he's wrong if shortages prevail in regard to
- ammunition for suppressive fires
- cover & concealment for maneuver

I always miss the element of artificial concealment (smoke) in discussions about suppression.
You often don't need to suppress if you can conceal.

Another caveat is about the maneuver (old school flanking) thing; it becomes predictable.
It's sometimes better to make them move (smoke on their position if they're on a delay mission, for example) so they expose themselves instead of exposing yourself.


Besides; suppression isn't really important for ambushers, and ambushes should be top priority because they're extremely unfair.



We're extremely short of infantry for major warfare - so we need to keep casualties and exhaustion down or else we would have 3rd grade infantry (cooks, engineers*, clerks, mechanics) real quick.

I have a strong preference for a huge emphasis on fieldcraft (for stealth), ambushes, sneaking up, movement in heavy APCs, movement with cover by smoke, long-range combat (400+ m) reserved to mortars and snipers and rather rarely raids with surprise as precondition.

The whole 'machine guns suppress, infantry moves' thing falls apart once you fail to ID a relevant hostile position (or simply face too many hostile positions). It worked satisfactorily in WW2 when a stray soldier had only a repeating rifle, not an automatic magazine-fed weapon. the other reason for the success in earlier times was the acceptable margin of failure; armies had more infantrymen than our armies have soldiers overall.


*: Not applicable to Germany, as Germans traditionally consider all engineers as (kind of) combat troops.

[William F. Owen]

Posit a rifleman who at range consistently shoots 100mm (4") or under, 5 shot groups at 100m (Storr, p.2). Thus, the following table using the "factors of ten" from the Storr article:


I think you may have misread the passage concerned.

A few studies are quite insightful. It appears that a soldier’s
ability to hit a given target is typically reduced by a factor of
ten or so when he is moved from a static rifle range to a field
firing area where he has to select cover, move, shoot and so
on. It is reduced by a further factor of ten or so if there is an
enemy firing back at him. It is reduced by another factor of ten
if the enemy has machine guns, or if he has tanks; and by a
hundred if he has both. We begin to see why many thousands of rounds can be fired, but very few actually hit.
He is referencing the total rounds fired, not the theoretical degrees of dispersion

[jmm99]

Thanks for the clarification.

[Ken White]

He said "...It appears that a soldier’s ability to hit a given target is typically reduced by a factor of ten or so..." That's specific, 'hit' is prettly simply defined, thus his hit potetnial is degraded by a factor of ten, etc. etc.

However, if you use the size of the round, say 5.56mm and a dispersion factor due to weapon, human, atmospheric and target considerations of about five, that yields a roughly 25mm circular error probable, not 100mm and if you degrade that by a factor of ten (250mm), then ten again (2500 mm / 2.5m). You can add his further degradation of another ten (25,000mm / 25m) but I don't agree that enemy MG, tanks or Artillery make that much difference; to most people, incoming fire is incoming fire -- type is of small note. However, I'll give him a bit and take half that last figure, that would mean 10-15m off target -- pretty reasonable at anything over 200m.

Taking Fuchs dispersion route, you get essentially the same result -- somewhere between 2.5 and 25m dispersion.

OTOH, use Wilf's total rounds fired you get, say three rounds for a hit at the Range; then 3 x 10 = 30 x 10 = 300 x 10 = 3000 rounds which may or may not have hit. That seems excessive. IIRC, a couple of studies showed US experience (Army) at ~800 rounds per small arms hit in Viet Nam. I think that's probably pretty accurate for Viet Nam and I'd be willing to bet it was less for the Army in Korea -- and I know it was less for the Marines there...

Though I do recall seeing a column of mixed Marine units fire easily over a thousand rounds from Carbines, M1s and M1919s at a lone Chinese soldier about 500m away with no success. He made no attempt to shoot back and just walked leisurely away...:D

[Ken White]

As always: It depends. He's right when destructive indirect fires are difficult, but he's wrong if shortages prevail in regard to
- ammunition for suppressive fires
- cover & concealment for maneuver.

It's sometimes better to make them move (smoke on their position if they're on a delay mission, for example) so they expose themselves instead of exposing yourself.

Besides; suppression isn't really important for ambushers, and ambushes should be top priority because they're extremely unfair.

I have a strong preference for a huge emphasis on fieldcraft (for stealth), ambushes, sneaking up, movement in heavy APCs, movement with cover by smoke, long-range combat (400+ m) reserved to mortars and snipers and rather rarely raids with surprise as precondition.All excellent -- and too often overlooked -- points.

This point in particular should be embedded in the memory of all commanders:
We're extremely short of infantry for major warfare - so we need to keep casualties and exhaustion down or else we would have 3rd grade infantry (cooks, engineers*, clerks, mechanics) real quick.Hmm. Should have said all commanders and their political masters...

[kaur]

Fuchs said:


Besides; suppression isn't really important for ambushers, and ambushes should be top priority because they're extremely unfair.

I suppose that this point starts again calibre debate. If you prefer ambush tactics and don't intend to use suppression (you don't intend to enter killing zone), you prefer ammo that destroys most. Like HK 417 slogan says "No need to double taps."

[jmm99]

from Ken
However, if you use the size of the round, say 5.56mm and a dispersion factor due to weapon, human, atmospheric and target considerations of about five, that yields a roughly 25mm circular error probable, not 100mm....

Am I positing correctly that this refers to the results at range ?

When I was shooting, I averaged ~1.5" (+/- .25"), 5-shot groups at 100 yds, with an AR-15 (semi-auto) shooting with the std receiver sight and with support (bench, tree stump, mound, etc.). Sid (a Marine sniper before a Bouncer took off his leg) did better with the same rifle, ~1.25" (+/- .25"). My wife on the same weapon was more like 1.75-2.00". So, your 1" groups are very good shooting (would beat Sid). Storr's 100mm (4") was based on what a reasonably well-trained soldier should be able to do at a minimum.

I can't go beyond the range so far as personal experience is concerned. There is such a thing as Match Degradation, where I've managed to go from a practice average off-hand of 85 on international targets down to the 40s. :o All a long time ago.

Thanks all for the help. Have to see a client now.

[Fuchs]

I suppose that this point starts again calibre debate. If you prefer ambush tactics and don't intend to use suppression (you don't intend to enter killing zone), you prefer ammo that destroys most. Like HK 417 slogan says "No need to double taps."

I look at 7.62 rifles, but for another reason.

The most important ammunition in AP ambushes should be command-detonated directional frag mines (a.k.a. "Claymore").

Firing small arms gives away your position. I'd rarely do that (I'm no small wars guy; I think about combat against equally dangerous forces).
Unless I'm confident that there would nobody be left after a few seconds to radio my position, of course.

[Ken White]

Group size is only marginally relevant, the location of every individual round on a target or in the target area is the discriminator. In the immortal words of Charlton Heston "Groups don't kill people, bullets do." All of the bullets one launches will almost never hit the X Ring under field conditions; under combat conditions they probably won't all hit inside the target frame.

Ability to group as tightly as you do improves the probability of putting a bullet where it counts but the vagaries I mentioned will affect even the best shooters (and I didn't even get to mediocre ammo...) and there will always be some dispersion. Do recall though, I said that trained and experienced troops will not have dispersion of anywhere near that 10x magnitude.

However, using his factor of 10, just look at a single bullet;

5.56mm ideal = 5.56mm
5.56mm field conditions = 5.56 x 10 = 55.6mm (2.2" dispersion * )
5.56mm field conditions + fired upon = 55.6 x 10 = 556mm (21.9" dispersion)
5.56mm field conditions + the end of the world = 556mm x 10 = 5.56m (=18+' dispersion)

You can visualize the best shooter is liable to not hold a really tight group under field conditions and if he's getting shot at, running, out of breath, hot or cold, possibly hungry, certainly tired, perhaps afraid, his ability to throw rounds outside his normally tight group is, uh, significantly enhanced.

You can also see the under such conditions throwing rounds out 20 inches or so at 200m is not at all unrealistic; OTOH, throwing one out 18 feet is perhaps unlikely -- though I suggest that in really bad conditions, one out eight to 10 feet is pretty common (most people in combat tend to shoot high, way high. A trait for which I have long been thankful... :D).

In any event, any time numbers are tossed about and someone says "Ten times..." I'm skeptical. Now, if he'd stated "The data shows that 'A' is off by a factor of 3.5; 'B' by 6.2 and 'C' by 2.8..." :wry:

Hmm, just put numbers down but I bet they're closer to correct for the three categories than ten. No matter, his point -- people under stress do not shoot as accurately ergo aimed fire is not a big killer -- is correct and we could quibble about how much until the Yooper Air Force retires for the Winter ** but he's a PhD, they like numbers and neat numbers are better... (Sorry, Marc, shoulda said 'many seem to like numbers'). I agree that his statement is broadly correct if slightly overstated; I also believe that can be fixed to the benefit of combatants.


* Your 1.5" group might expand to 3 to 5" on a brisk February day in the wilds of Houghton County; then to 20-30" if you were attacked by Mosquitoes and Sid was so uncharitable as to shoot at you while you were shooting at him. Once you got acclimated to the Mozzies and to Sid, you'd probably tighten the groups back down to 2-3" (field) and 8-10" (under fire) -- you a lethal Dude! :cool:

** Do they? Mosquitoes? Retire for the winter?

[RJ]

Fuch posted *: Not applicable to Germany, as Germans traditionally consider all engineers as (kind of) combat troops.

We American Marines consider our rear echelon support troops combat troops. and our Marine Cooks as expert combat troops. :rolleyes:

"Every Marine a Rifleman" is alive and well in todays Marine Corps.

[jmm99]

the Area of Dispersion.

Here's my figures. Used a 2" group at 100 yds, so the radius would be 1" (just to keep things simple using A = pi*r^2) - and 1" ~ 1 moa @ 100 yds.

diam.(in) radius(in) Area(sq in) [Situation - as in Storr article]

2" 1" 3 [range]

6" 3" 31 [f & m]

20" 10" 314 [f & m + ef]

63" 32" 3142 [f & m + eff]

200" 100" 31416 [f & m + efff]

So, if your target was between the eyes at 100 yds, you would have a lot of misses under the other conditions. But some would hit the human target not so precisely; most missing even that, but coming close enough. As in the middle situation (under enemy fire) 10'' to the side from the middle of my nose would cause me to duck - or take me out if it hit 10" low.

Anyway, under the worst conditions, at 200 meters the radial dispersion would be 200" from desired exact point of impact. This seems to be in the ballpark of Ken's real world experience. In fact, the middle situation is close on target for what he says.

-------------------
Sid would have been the lethal dude (I expect he was such in Nam, which we never discussed). I would never have got off a shot cuz I wouldn't have seen him - just, bang, bye-bye JMM.

He was a quiet guy who bought a farm with many acres way out in our boondocks - so he could set up what amounted to a 500 yds or better rifle range. He bought a collection of Ruger single-shot rifles (from 22-250 up to .458); and shot one of them every day. The AR15 was his baby (load development - but probably memories as well). Therapy I suppose.

One day he told us (a group of shooters) that he was selling the farm, the Ruger collection, and that it was time to go back to The World. Asked me if I wanted to buy the AR15, which I did. I've not heard from or of him since, but he is one guy that I hope his life in The World turned out as he wanted.

PS: No mosquitoes - about 50 and supposed to go down to 40s tonite. If it gets a bit colder in the next few days, we might have snow in July.

[Kiwigrunt]

Kaur said:


I suppose that this point starts again calibre debate. If you prefer ambush tactics and don't intend to use suppression (you don't intend to enter killing zone), you prefer ammo that destroys most. Like HK 417 slogan says "No need to double taps."

I believe that in the 7.62 era soldiers were also taught to double-tap, so that argument in the 5.56 vs 7.62 debate appears somewhat moot.



I look at 7.62 rifles, but for another reason.


Out of interest, may I ask for what reason?



Firing small arms gives away your position.

Just a thought on this, albeit a bit off topic. Maybe the use of sound suppressors needs to be taken more serious, for two reasons. One, it protects our hearing, especially in concrete buildings. Two, with regards to giving away our position. When I hunt goats without a silencer, they obviously scarper in the opposite direction after the first shot. However, when I use a silencer (suppressor), they usually just look around confused, and often start walking in my direction. They can of course hear the shots but can’t identify where they are coming from. Not sure to what extent this may apply to human goats.
I hate cleaning the rifle afterwards though!:mad:


Back on topic. What I get from the last few posts, and many previous ones, is that automatic fire is often overrated (especially at the lower levels of section/platoon). A hundred year ago the machinegun was said to be as good as 10 or 20 riflemen. Sure, as Fuchs said, when compared against bolt-actions, and in the open as an area weapon where the beaten zone becomes important. Someone mentioned in an earlier post/thread appreciating the ability to put lots of SAW fire down towards a building with many windows and potential targets (when trying to get out of an ambush). Even though I totally get that and I think I would probably feel the same way, I can’t help in my minds eye seeing all of that 5.56 aimlessly and wastefully hitting brick with very few coming anywhere near any window. So that would again appear to be a perception of suppression.:( An M4 with a reddot sight may perhaps be more effective and efficient in that sort of a scenario, supporting the Storr article.

Haha, I remember an exercise where the platoon commander repeatedly yelled at the Minimi-gunner (who was desperately trying to clear it) to ‘get that f@king gun going’. At debrief o’clock the DS-SNCO said: ‘Get that f#king gun going is not a fire control order, Sir.’
My point here is, we just appear to be totally programmed (brainwashed?) into believing that the gun will win the battle just by its mere presence, as long as it makes lots of noise.

And finally, (posted by Ken)


I agreed with your article, Wilf and thanks for posting it. I did not comment on it simply because it made sense and I had nothing to add.
Concur, I always look forward to your articles Wilf.

[Ken White]

...so the radius would be 1" (just to keep things simple using A = pi*r^2)...Cornbread r square, Pi r round -- Don't believe me, ask Slap... :D
Anyway, under the worst conditions, at 200 meters the radial dispersion would be 200" from desired exact point of impact.Yep, seems about right. I can buy that; poorer shots to start with would have a bit more but not terribly much.
I've not heard from or of him since, but he is one guy that I hope his life in The World turned out as he wanted.I can identify with that... :cool:
PS: No mosquitoes - about 50 and supposed to go down to 40s tonite. If it gets a bit colder in the next few days, we might have snow in July.Hah. Well, thank you -- that was enough to break the 107+ heat index here, rain this PM and more tomorrow. :wry:

[Ken White]

...Marine Cooks as expert combat troops. :rolleyes:

"Every Marine a Rifleman" is alive and well in todays Marine Corps.Rolls and the Messman who was concurrently the G.I. Man and the Salad chef or maybe it was Bologna sandwiches in the Guard Shack...

But I'm old and can't remember it. :D

[jmm99]

from Storr article - chart generated by fancy machine - based on fire & movement situation (obviously no Sid firing first ;) ). Interesting leftward bias (as one looks at the pattern).

---------------------
And a very brief comment on Wilf's article. This ...


Capability is something we all want. The ability to do useful and relevant things is good, but adding new capability generally means adding weight. Maybe we should stop doing it. Instead of chasing a capability – being able to do things – maybe we should just try to create improvements – do what we do better, while reducing weight.

brought back a pleasant memory. Of my dad discussing the M1 rifle (as opposed to the M1 carbine ), which he perceived as the finest rifle he ever used; but which was too heavy. He wanted a pound or two off (down to the 8# range), and maybe more magazine capacity.

So, Wilf, great minds run in the same channels. Thanks for the memory. :)

----------------------

His comment on the utility of the M1 carbine (not claimed on the basis of personal experience, I should add, but of others):

"Hit a German in the ass at 50 yds and he'd just keep running."

[Ken White]

totally believable pattern... :wry:

[jmm99]

could be due to 80% or so of us being right handed - so, the natural swing bringing up the rifle in movement would be slightly to the left - that's a theory - and also doing it a few times tonite (what a scientific process ;) ).

I do recall (that's dangerous) that my scores on the running boar coming out of the right hand house were better than when he came back from the left hand house. Checked my notebook, but didn't denote the scores between right and left runs - my bad. :o

Have no idea about why the high bias. People have been noting that from the advent of the musket. "Fire on the bulge in their pants." :D

[William F. Owen]

Storr's 100mm (4") was based on what a reasonably well-trained soldier should be able to do at a minimum.
.

Correct. 4" at 100m/yards was/is the British Armies minimum standard for grouping. To be an infantry man, you have to be able to do this, all day, everyday.

Hand held dispersion is incredibly important. It is what operational shooting is about. The current "Wilf Owen" combat shooting test is,


From standing, engage a 0.5 x 1m target at 100m, given a 5-second exposure. Fire as many rounds as you need. 1 hit per exposure is required, and you must score on 4 out of 5 exposures.
Repeat the same, prone supported at 300m. Same qualification required

That's a basic minimum standard, to be attained before you start all the more complicated stuff.

[Fuchs]

Fuch posted *: Not applicable to Germany, as Germans traditionally consider all engineers as (kind of) combat troops.

We American Marines consider our rear echelon support troops combat troops. and our Marine Cooks as expert combat troops. :rolleyes:

"Every Marine a Rifleman" is alive and well in todays Marine Corps.

I understand that this is meant in a self-defence or emergency context.

German 20th century engineers were meant as specialists attachments (flamethrower, demolitions, demining) in difficult (often deliberate) infantry assaults.

---------------
Leftward bias:
Many explanations are possible. it would take a video of the test and possibly an additional interview to explain it with certainty.
A soldier who was unaware of his weapon's lack of zeroing would explain it very well.

A sideward (or downward) bias is sometimes acceptable; enemies are usually next to each other and bullets deflected from the ground (with some dust splash) suppress as well. Only missing high is certainly wasteful.

By the way; I wonder how many of those very high bullets might have been deflected (and possibly been effective for suppression by their dust splash effect).

[jmm99]

What sort of pass-fail rate do the "candidates" have on this:


From standing, engage a 0.5 x 1m target at 100m, given a 5-second exposure. Fire as many rounds as you need. 1 hit per exposure is required, and you must score on 4 out of 5 exposures.

Repeat the same, prone supported at 300m. Same qualification required

First thought was how could anyone fail this. But, if you gave it to a random population in the US, the results might well be bleak. Hopefully, the population in Israel is more rifle-centric. :)

[William F. Owen]

What sort of pass-fail rate do the "candidates" have on this:
First thought was how could anyone fail this. But, if you gave it to a random population in the US, the results might well be bleak. Hopefully, the population in Israel is more rifle-centric. :)
As I have never tested it, I don't know. It's meant to be a standard that most people with some training can pass. Certainly young infantrymen should have no problem. That's the point.

[Michael C]

I am new to the forums, and new to this question, but I have some thoughts of my own.

When it comes to suppression of the enemy, I have been in Afghanistan when we employed suppressive fire--in every sense of the word. Enemy fire becomes horribly inaccurate once bombs or artillery are dropping. When a platoon or company has fifty caliber machine guns, 120mm mortars and bombs dropping, then the enemy quickly disperses.

Having said that, the terrain of Afghanistan has made most of this debate academic. How frequently do we engage targets we can see? When was the last time a platoon maneuvered up a mountain side to clear an objective? When distances between Soldiers and AAF are measured starting at 400 meters, why do M4s matter?

This brings me to my general point, the weapons we need are the highly accurate weapons that can devastate the enemy. These are sniper rifles and their ilk. A highly accurate weapon that yields one kill is ten times better then many automatic weapons yielding none.

[Ken White]

Having said that, the terrain of Afghanistan has made most of this debate academic. How frequently do we engage targets we can see? When was the last time a platoon maneuvered up a mountain side to clear an objective? When distances between Soldiers and AAF are measured starting at 400 meters, why do M4s matter?However, Afghanistan has not made this academic; the way we are fighting (so far) in Afghanistan has just moved it aside temporarily. It can and likely will become a big issue at other times in other places. Maybe even in Afghanistan in the future. Been place where Artillery and air weren't always available...

As for targets one can see, complex issue. I suppose you noticed that the ANA troops could spot movement or targets with the naked eye long before most Americans. It's an environmental conditioning thing and one that given our tour system most Americans will not adequately develop or acquire. That's one of the benefits of working with locals in such places. It's also an ability that can be improved with better training by us. Target identification and selection is rarely taught or trained nowadays because in the schoolhouse, it doesn't get a high 'Go' rate and therefor is embarrassing to the School Commandant and in the units, it gets moved aside for consideration of others training or other fluff having nothing to do with warfighting.

Last time hundreds of US Platoons maneuvered up hundreds of mountains was in Viet Nam. Time before that was Korea; then WW II before that, then -- well, you get the idea. It can happen again in your lifetime. We were not always as risk averse as we are today -- and probably will not be so averse in a future war. I wouldn't bank on that risk aversion always ruling how we do things...

I won't waste time on the M4 which was always a bad idea of Barry McCaffrey's but it is the weapon of issue and it works okay for most things. I can visualize the frustration of having to deal with it in Afghanistan. Though the 82d seemed to acquire a slew of M14s from somewhere. :cool:

The adoption of the M4 shows the stupidity (there is no other word for it) of thinking all wars will resemble any selected war (or any one persons idea of the future). They don't, they're all different and what works great in one may not work at all in another and the future's hard to see. Thus, equipment HAS to be a compromise that will work fairly well in almost any situation. The US army often forgets that and as it's the largest service, often drags the others who generally know better along.

Welcome aboard.

[COMMAR]

As for targets one can see, complex issue. I suppose you noticed that the ANA troops could spot movement or targets with the naked eye long before most Americans. It's an environmental conditioning thing and one that given our tour system most Americans will not adequately develop or acquire. That's one of the benefits of working with locals in such places. It's also an ability that can be improved with better training by us. Target identification and selection is rarely taught or trained nowadays because in the schoolhouse, it doesn't get a high 'Go' rate and therefor is embarrassing to the School Commandant and in the units, it gets moved aside for consideration of others training or other fluff having nothing to do with warfighting.



Great point!! & often overlooked. Funny thing is I was just reading about that earlier today in an article about Nat Sec Adviser & former USMC CMC Gen Jim Jones visit to Camp Leatherneck.

2nd MEB Cmdr Marine Brig Gen Nicholson (their are 2, 1s in the Army-RC South Dep Cmdr) brought that very pt up, and I had the same thought.

Even though we'll probably never get to the point of accuracy in A'stan as a 'Born & Bred' local Afghan, Target ID & Selection has not gotten the attention it deserves.

Fortunately, due to some go foresight by General Conway & Mattis, those are the very things the Combat Hunter Program was designed to address thru a comprehensive approach.


Combat Hunter's main pts of instructions: Concealment, Advanced Observation & Surveillance Techniques, Profiling, & Man-Tracking

[COMMAR]

Even though we'll probably never get to the point of accuracy in A'stan as a 'Born & Bred' local Afghan, Target ID & Selection has not gotten the attention it deserves.

Let me clarify, I meant accuracy as in recognizing whats out place and the sight acuity of slight movements as locals who know every crag & valley; not sight picture, aim, shoot accuracy.

[Michael C]

Sir,

An excellent point about ANA target selection. Absolutely they could see things that we frequently could not. Training on Target selection and Identification are vital skills we do not train. In fact, thinking of my battalion's last Weapon's Density, I don't think a single range incorporated difficult to see targets on any training on Target selection.

I guess I will clarify my intent on my earlier post. I would like to see two changes in this subject. The first is the adoption of long range marksmanship weapons at the platoon level. The best example I have is the M14 because of the range it gives a platoon leader. With the M14 needs to come much more detailed and thorough marksmanship training at the 500-1000 meter ranges.

Second, the Army needs to move towards a more holistic view of battle. The current thinking of the FM 7-8 of suppress, flank, assault dominated the discussion on accuracy earlier in this thread. I brought up Afghanistan, and I believe examples range from Iraq to Somalia (and probably Vietnam and Korea as well) where plenty of battles did not remotely resemble the FM7-8 paradigm. We need more flexible thinking when it comes to how we realistically fight battles.

Having said that, your point about the ANA is spot on.

[Ken White]

...The first is the adoption of long range marksmanship weapons at the platoon level.Well said. We adopted a weapon marginally suited for purpose at the time at least partly due to political maneuvering, the M16. We then engineered it to a point where it was LESS effective. Then shortened the barrel to make it still less effective...:rolleyes:

Moral of that story is generally adopt equipment that is capable of worldwide service and save theater or purpose specific items for small batch contracts. Obviously, it would be nice if we kept the domestic politics out of weapon purchases but I suppose that's too much to ask. :mad:
...The current thinking of the FM 7-8 of suppress, flank, assault dominated the discussion on accuracy earlier in this thread... We need more flexible thinking when it comes to how we realistically fight battles.You're absolutely right -- and good units make sure that is done. However, TRADOC, the Training Centers and the Schools generally do not pay that any mind because they want a rote process that is easy to teach and easy to test -- and that will have a high 'Go' rate so they look good. Units that are less than good -- and face it, all units are not equal -- don't find the time or take the effort to train innovation or foster initiative

It is a leadership problem. A significant leadership problem. That happens when uniforms and softball teams and such frippery are more important than training and combat skill. Regrettably, to entirely too many of all ranks in the Armed Forces, training is not a priority and initiative is something to be quelled lest it 'embarrass' the command -- or someone... :eek:

[jcustis]

won't waste time on the M4 which was always a bad idea of Barry McCaffrey's but it is the weapon of issue and it works okay for most things. I can visualize the frustration of having to deal with it in Afghanistan. Though the 82d seemed to acquire a slew of M14s from somewhere.

Ken, what frustraions are you talking about? Terminal velocity at longer ranges, like 400-500 meters, .55 grain bullet flight through light concealment, or the ability to hit a target at those ranges?

If a shooter can make consistent hits at with an M4 at 500 yds, I would imagine that would cover a basic necessity.

[Ken White]

If a shooter can make consistent hits at with an M4 at 500 yds, I would imagine that would cover a basic necessity.Partly true; first problem is that few shooters can do that; second is what does that too small pill do when it does hit at that range?

The M4 works, it's adequate -- but it is NOT a good infantry weapon for worldwide service.

[jcustis]

second is what does that too small pill do when it does hit at that range?

Then we're talking terminal ballistics, and you won't get an argument from me. I'm not so sure, however, that the average soldier can pull off the same long range shot from a M-14 similar larger-caliber rifle that he might with a M4 or M16.

[William F. Owen]

Then we're talking terminal ballistics, and you won't get an argument from me. I'm not so sure, however, that the average soldier can pull off the same long range shot from a M-14 similar larger-caliber rifle that he might with a M4 or M16.

This is all the area of the debate between technology, physics, and human performance in it's widest sense. We are remarkably short of some quite simple data in this area. It's always an argument between effectiveness and efficiency, and the like with like comparisons are pretty hard to come by because the data is actually lacking.

Once we have sensible benchmarks, we can have sensible debates. In the absence of testing, such bench marks are generally lacking.

[Ken White]

Wilf and for a lack of data, my subjective opinion is that I do not understand what you're saying, jon. I understand that the M14 is heavier and has greater recoil -- other than that, I don't understand why with halfway decent training (which is mostly lacking in the working level of all services) he shouldn't be able to obtain hits at 500 meters.

Admittedly, I started out with an M1 and the M14 I later used was lighter and had a lower recoil impulse and the M16 was of course yet lighter and had even lower recoil to contend with so each new weapon was 'easier' (or more fun / less work) to shoot -- but that doesn't mean that the others are hard to shoot. :confused:

[Fuchs]

500 m hits with M14 are reasonable range performance with an optical sight (preferably magnifying), while iron sights are quite poor at such ranges.

Scoring hits at such ranges requires rather good conditions in either case. No strong wind gusts, target moving at most steadily, shooter has the nerves/time/rest to hold the rifle steady and the rifle should still be zeroed.

500m should really be reserved for designated marksmen/sharpshooters/snipers.

[jcustis]

I've written two long posts, just to have internet explorer crash on me each time. We cannot produce shooters who can routinely hit with an m4/m16 at 500yds, so we definitely cannot make amends by trying that with a rifle with greater recoil.:D

[Ken White]

for Fuchs: Don't agree, I carried an M1 in Korea and routinely got hits at 5-600m and so did most Marines at the time. I've gotten hits at 500m consistently with an M-14 on many ranges. Both with iron sights, the first in combat, the latter not -- all under adverse weather and wind condition on occasion and with consistency over about 15 years or so in several different climates and terrain sets. It takes training and practice but it's not difficult to train, just takes a fair amount of ammo for most urban dwellers who aren't shooters, more than most nations now allocate.

For Jon: See my comment to Fuchs just above. I've never been able to get consistent hits at 500m with an M16 -- dare I suggest it's the weapon? Or, perhaps more accurately, the weapon, the sights (to include optics) and -- very much -- the ammunition...

Back in the day with the M1 and M14 in the Corps, it was not possible to fire Expert without at least a couple of 600 yard (548.64m) hits. I could usually fire 6-8 out of ten and rarely a possible at 600 yds -- and I was not a super shooter. That not least because the Corps made me shoot right handed (left handed and left eye is master eye. I can do better with a pistol :D ).

The M16 was predicated on a 300m max combat range (dumb but no one would listen to the many who said it was dumb. Later raised to 350m IIRC -- 500 was never really an issue). I've seen a lot of folks including me who could get consistent hits at that range -- very few who could punch consistent groups at 500m. The M4 has an much shorter barrel so I would logically expect less long range accuracy from it.

Not to mention less long range stopping power. I wouldn't even waste ammo trying to hit targets at 500m with an M4 (or an M249) nor would I let troops try -- unless there was a really good shooter around, then I'd restrict such shots to him. If your MG guys with the 240s are well trained, they should be able to finger off a single shot at that range with fair accuracy. ;)

[Kiwigrunt]

I’d agree that improved ballistics needs to be looked at (also mentioned on the M4 thread). The Mk 262 appears to be a good starting point but is apparently deemed too expensive for general issue as it is Match grade (and I’m sure that would totally blow the budget considering all those MRAPs and other such toys rolling around in the sandbox:rolleyes:).
And I still like the idea of a halfway-round, at about 6.5 mm, but that will never happen.

I do think that Wilf is bang-on with regards to optics, and agree with Jcustis, that we disregard recoil at our peril. Data exists (I don’t have it) to some point. When the Brits replaced the SLR with a lighter recoiling rifle with an optic, improvements in marksmanship went through the roof (same soldiers, same training). Same here with the Steyr. As they say, a hit with a .22LR is more effective than a miss with a .50.
Sure, training time and all that. But if a lighter recoiling rifle (with an optic, but you can put that on an SLR as well of course) gives you such a big head start, how much more training time would be required (and realistic) with something ‘heavier’? Hmmm, just realising, we really are talking about two separate things here: recoil and optics (oh, and weight!). So with the above mentioned data, what would have given the biggest advantage, the lighter recoil or the optic? I’d better stop now because I’m starting to confuse myself:confused:.

Now there's an idea Ken

Not to mention less long range stopping power. I wouldn't even waste ammo trying to hit targets at 500m with an M4 (or an M249) nor would I let troops try -- unless there was a really good shooter around, then I'd restrict such shots to him. If your MG guys with the 240s are well trained, they should be able to finger off a single shot at that range with fair accuracy.
Would there be an advantage in giving our gpmg's a semi-auto capability, like the Bren used to have? Especially since they are more frequently equipped with optics as well.

[Kiwigrunt]

Jcustis, you posted this on the M4 thread. I’ll comment here as I think this thread is more suitable.


One thing I think we definitely need to take a long, harder look at, is the use of rifle grenades, if for just the mere fact that regardless of whether a bullet-trap or blank-fired design is used, making an inert trainer can't be all that difficult, and incredibly more cost-effective than training with 40mm HEDP or TP rounds.

If we want projected HE capability that any shooter can employ, while not burdening the TL or grenadier down with the sole responsibility, how awesome it would be to issue every rifleman an inert RG, then send them out to a hasty range with a few blanks, at least once a quarter. We conduct similar training with pnuematic mortar systems, and it can't be any harder retrieving the device than it is looking for golfballs...even easier in a cleared-out area.


With the 203, what is actually the biggest issue? Is it familiarization with the weapon itself, is it the sighting systems, or is it skills regards judging distances? If it is the latter, than can that be overcome with training more specific to solving that issue, not requiring so much use of ammo?
On the NZ 203’s we have pretty basic (nay, crappy) sights but the Oz 203’s seem to have far better ones, with what looks like a red dot, similar to the ‘piggy back’ that you see on some Acog’s. see picture.

I think that the biggest issues with rifle grenades are weight and bulk, compared to 40 mm. I don’t know to what extent that may be justified by a potentially bigger bang at the receiving end. I seem to remember that the NZ army tested rifle grenades prior to adopting the 203 but the Steyr itself was not very keen on the recoil.

[Ken White]

Plus tolerance of recoil can be trained, it just takes more firing than many are willing to pay for -- though those same people have no problem in spending big money for pretty uniforms, bands, flags and such...

Simply a matter of what's important.
The Mk 262 appears to be a good starting point but is apparently deemed too expensive for general issue as it is Match grade...True, that's why the two others I linked to are being explored. The Mk 318 in particular offers, with slight modification, a good GP round -- right now it's a specific CQB round. The tungsten powder round still needs much work i'm told.
As they say, a hit with a .22LR is more effective than a miss with a .50.Then 'they' have never been in a major fire fight with lots of people milling about. Or had to deal with opponents in heavy winter clothing...
Would there be an advantage in giving our gpmg's a semi-auto capability, like the Bren used to have? Especially since they are more frequently equipped with optics as well.Idea even older than I am; well trained MG troopies and BAR gunners were doing that long before I was born. Maybe no one teaches trigger manipulation now days... :confused:

Using the .50 single shot is easy, just let the Bolt Latch do it's thing but with many other weapons, you have to possess a trained trigger finger. Lot cheaper and easier than adding single shot capability. Handy also to respond for long range targets without giving away the position of your automatic weapons, day or night. ;)

[Kiwigrunt]

The Mk 318 in particular offers, with slight modification, a good GP round -- right now it's a specific CQB round.

Hey, that looks interesting (somehow missed it in your previous post).
Wonder if that's a follow-on from the old (well, not that old) brown-tip which was solid brass and said to be still quite expensive. It's interesting to see that bullet weight is still 62 gr. and the 7.62 version is only 130 gr. Now if that works than we may have a case of performance improvement with reduced (if only slightly) weight and recoil:).



Then 'they' have never been in a major fire fight with lots of people milling about. Or had to deal with opponents in heavy winter clothing...

I get that with regards to making a hitting lighter bullet totally ineffective. That still doesn't make a missing heavier bullet any more effective though.;) (apart from maybe a suppressive effect)



Idea even older than I am; well trained MG troopies and BAR gunners were doing that long before I was born. Maybe no one teaches trigger manipulation now days...
Using the .50 single shot is easy, just let the Bolt Latch do it's thing but with many other weapons, you have to possess a trained trigger finger. Lot cheaper and easier than adding single shot capability. Handy also to respond for long range targets without giving away the position of your automatic weapons, day or night.

Would the accuracy potential not be increased with a semi mode to allow for following through on the trigger pull, as opposed to having to concentrate on a careful short and sharp trigger pull? Or am I being pedantic now?:p

[Ken White]

I get that with regards to making a hitting lighter bullet totally ineffective. That still doesn't make a missing heavier bullet any more effective though.;) (apart from maybe a suppressive effect)Suppression is mostly misunderstood -- trained troops will not be deterred by any volume of misses; they will be deterred by accurate fire. The key is simply to minimize the number of misses -- regardless of caliber.
Would the accuracy potential not be increased with a semi mode to allow for following through on the trigger pull, as opposed to having to concentrate on a careful short and sharp trigger pull? Or am I being pedantic now?:pPerhaps a slight increase; you still have with many automatic weapons the problem of the recoiling mass moving forward regardless of single shot cape or trigger manipulation. The Brownings escape that problem by firing from a closed bolt, as did the FG 42 and the Johnsons in WW II on semi auto (while switching to an open bolt for full auto). So does this LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LWRC_Infantry_Automatic_Rifle) little gem. If that new one works out, it'll be a while before they appear in large numbers and there a a LOT of MAG 57 / GPMG / M240 variants around. There are also too many Minimis but that's another thread... :D

[William F. Owen]

Suppression: An effect of action that causes the enemy to fail to act, through fear of harm.

Note: Suppression can be delivered by sensors as well as weapons, if the enemy believes that being detected will lead to his being harmed.

....so we use small arms fire to suppress the enemy, to fix him, so he will not move, and to prevent him firing back at us, so as we can deliver increasing effective harm against him.

Roger so far?

[Ken White]

and other HE or standoff weapons (among other things) aside from small arms and sensors. Then this
Suppression: An effect of action that causes the enemy to fail to act, through fear of harm.is okay.

So far... :wry:

[Rifleman]

.....'they' have never been in a major fire fight with lots of people milling about. Or had to deal with opponents in heavy winter clothing.....

A position (conviction?) formed from observing the effects of the .30 Carbine on the Chinese?

[kaur]

Just one table to illustrate Ken White's last page post about external ballistics.

http://web.archive.org/web/20071201144202/http://www.65grendel.com/graphics/grendelballistics.pdf

[jcustis]

I think suppression can absolutely come from the one guy who was milling about, and then went down, even though merely wounded, from a lone round. Everyone else scatters and begins looking around frantically.


With the 203, what is actually the biggest issue? Is it familiarization with the weapon itself, is it the sighting systems, or is it skills regards judging distances? If it is the latter, than can that be overcome with training more specific to solving that issue, not requiring so much use of ammo?
On the NZ 203’s we have pretty basic (nay, crappy) sights but the Oz 203’s seem to have far better ones, with what looks like a red dot, similar to the ‘piggy back’ that you see on some Acog’s. see picture.

In the case of what I have seen within the USMC, we do not hav enough ammunition in the quantities required to build up the skill at utilizing the crude sights. The picture you posted looks like out quadrant sight, with a miniature red dot instead of a screw-in post and ghost ring that flip out. The PSQ-18 sight was a nice try at improving accuracy, but it is so bulky and heavy that no one uses them...at least in the battalion I am in. The rudimentary front sight, good to 250 meters, is decent enough I suppose, but I personally never liked the awkward firing position you had to assume, nor the means of manipulating the trigger.

I don't know what the standard number of rounds required is, off the top of my head, for by-the-book qualification and sustainment training. I do know that when Gunner Eby was establishing pre-deployment training and qualification standards for 203 gunners going back to Iraq in 2004 with RCT-7, the number 27 comes to mind. 18 for training and 9 for a qual run. Nowadays and then, we're lucky to get 27 for all four 203 gunners in a platoon.

I like the idea of rifle grenades solely because you don't have to have the 203 mounted to be able to employ a fight-breaker. We don't even follow good practices by training grenadiers...it gets assigned as a collateral duty to the team and squad leader. If I were top dog, I'd enforce the proper MTO&E with a grenadier working truly in that role.

I had those two longer posts where I had a lot more to say, but I've been celebrating the 4th pretty heavily today guys, and the pitchers of sangria are doing me in. More to follow tomorrow.

And on the note of the 4th, you guys inspire me to do what I do, at here and abroad, and to try to be a better warrior. Hats off to you all who are working to make the modern warrior of the free world more lethal and efficient when he needs to be. :)

[William F. Owen]

Just one table to illustrate Ken White's last page post about external ballistics.

http://web.archive.org/web/20071201144202/http://www.65grendel.com/graphics/grendelballistics.pdf

Yes, that looks impressive and is actually pretty good data.
Especially interesting the range at which the round drops below supersonic, as there is some evidence that the "crack" caused, increases the suppressive effect.
The point of carried weight though needs to be considered as a "whole" of the weapons effects the man can provide. As I said in one of my articles, the weight of a 5.56mm weapon plus 100 rounds, and 2 rifle grenades, does not exceed the weight of some 7.62mm weapons, plus the same number of rounds. Assuming an 4-man fire team engagement at 300m, 8 rifle grenades, may provide effects beyond that which larger calibre's can provide. Obviously this is not an absolute condition.

[Kiwigrunt]

.
In the case of what I have seen within the USMC, we do not hav enough ammunition in the quantities required to build up the skill at utilizing the crude sights. The picture you posted looks like out quadrant sight, with a miniature red dot instead of a screw-in post and ghost ring that flip out. The PSQ-18 sight was a nice try at improving accuracy, but it is so bulky and heavy that no one uses them...at least in the battalion I am in. The rudimentary front sight, good to 250 meters, is decent enough I suppose, but I personally never liked the awkward firing position you had to assume, nor the means of manipulating the trigger.

That would suggest that better sights should make a difference. Here (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?p=3751873) are some pics of another sight that may have some potential.
And what about issuing a small range finder like this one (http://www.eurooptic.com/leica/Leica-Laser-Range-Finder.asp?category=XCRF&vendor=XXLE&parent=XXLE&gclid=CP_XwvWbvpsCFRFWagodWXNZBA). These civvie ones are probably not very soldier proof but conceptually it may work. It weighs less than a 40mm round.

I'm just trying to think of ways to (at least partially) overcome the shortage in training ammo (live and chalk) as it doesn't look like that will ever change:mad:.
Maybe some sort of electronic simulator, no idea what that would look like though.
On chalk, in my experience chalk rounds are not particularly consistent and not ballistically matched with live. That doesn't help things.



Nowadays and then, we're lucky to get 27 for all four 203 gunners in a platoon.
I assume you mean nine grenadiers? Must have been that last beer you had;)...cheers.



We don't even follow good practices by training grenadiers...it gets assigned as a collateral duty to the team and squad leader. If I were top dog, I'd enforce the proper MTO&E with a grenadier working truly in that role.
Concur. It is essentially a support weapon and as such deserves the grenadiers undivided attention. As much as the team deserves the leaders undivided attention, well, at least with regards to not multi-tasking him by giving him a support weapon.



And on the note of the 4th, you guys inspire me to do what I do, at here and abroad, and to try to be a better warrior. Hats off to you all who are working to make the modern warrior of the free world more lethal and efficient when he needs to be.
Hey, my pleasure (for as far as I can claim credit, which is not far). I do it for fun and out of genuine interest, but from my comfortable lounge. You guys are out there doing it! So let me take a huge big fat hat of to you.

[Ken White]

A position (conviction?) formed from observing the effects of the .30 Carbine on the Chinese?Also applied to even .30-06 and .45 though obviously to a far lesser extent. The milling mob applied to Viet Nam and elsewhere and to various calibers. As an aside, 9mm x 19 is worthless as a combat cartridge, only thing it offers is low recoil enabling a good shooter to achieve better accuracy with less noise in certain conditions.

Problem in a heavy firefight is that targets are fleeting thus 'good' hits are hard to obtain; that the sheer numbers occasionally preclude hits on person X because person Y suddenly gets in the way and absorbs or deflects the bullet. Add to that the difficulty of getting some folks to fire slowly and accurately when they are receiving fire, deflection of bullets by various things, even leaves, in or on an untidy battle space and the need to punch through some minor elements of cover -- you arrive at a desire for superior penetration and knock down power.

My son carried an M-14 on his second trip to Afghanistan, recoil / weight not withstanding. I would've also...

[Jones_RE]

Ken White,

You talked about training shooters to hit targets at 500m. How much ammunition did that require? What methodology did the trainers use?

[jcustis]

I'm curious about a similar question Ken...

What was the typical (if that term can be applied) combat load for the M1 and M14? I know it was probably easy enough to toss a bandolier of clips over the shoulder, but on the standard webbing, were the ten clip pouches typically loaded with a 8-rd Garand clip or 2x 5-rd stipper clips?

And when the M14 came into use, were the M-1956 universal ammunition cases really used? The wikipedia description of them say they were designed to be general purpose since weapons were in transition, but they don't seem to be all that functional.

When an M4-toting guy pauses to think of a stripped-down loadout of 80 (M1) or 120 (M14) rounds, I wonder whether the smaller round count wasn't a worry because the bad guys had comparable loadouts.

[Ken White]

the major difference being that it was far easier to get a hit at 600 yards with an M1 than it is at 500 with an M16.

LINK (http://www.marines.com/main/index/making_marines/recruit_training/training_matrix/marksmanship).

Back then it was 3rds to confirm zero (daily), 10rds 0ffhand / 200 yds, 10rds kneeling / 200 yds, 10rds Sitting / 300 yds, 10rds prone / 300 yds, 10rds prone / 600yds for a total of 53rds a day times five days = 265 rds per man plus for the 105 requiring makeups, another two or three days, say an average of about 290-300 rds per per man on the known distance range. Add Field Firing on pop-up and obscured targets at ranges from 25 yds to 600 yrds (it was 600 yds then with the M1, now reduced to 500 for the M16 [and that's optimism if I ever saw it]), three days of it at 80 rds per run including five for zero confirmation, thus 240 rounds per man + 290 = ~ 530 rds per man. Repeat annually and add in unit training live fire exercises and you get an annual requirement of about 1,000 rds per man for Infantry units. Minimum requirement, that. More would be better, upo to about 2,000 rds per man (allowing for the slop of people on leave, special duty, in hospital, etc. giving those present slightly more).

With todays weapons, ammunition and training enhancements, it could almost certainly be done with slightly fewer rounds -- and there are some people who should not qualify annually simply because they'll never likely fir a round in anger. Shooting is like riding a bike, if your initial training is really good, sustainment isn't all that necessary; just a refresher before you might have to use it. That does not apply to the Infantry who need to shoot more, not less but a lot of folks are shooting every year who do not need to do so.

Units other than Infantry would require much less, half that 1K rounds or even fewer. Figuring Infantry at about 25% of a modern force, you'd get a realistic ammo requirement of about 550-600 rds per man for each 100K persons in the force (100K x .25 x 1K = 25M rds + [75K x 500 rds = 37.5M rds] = 62.5M x .9 {because almost never will everyone fire every year} = 56,250 rds / 100K = 562 rds). At about .30 per rd, that's $180.00 per man in ammo and about $20. in targets and ancillaries; total of around $200.00 per man -- less than his working / combat uniform and boots.

Well less than the cost of a Kevlar vest and probably more beneficial...

[Ken White]

What was the typical (if that term can be applied) combat load for the M1 and M14? I know it was probably easy enough to toss a bandolier of clips over the shoulder, but on the standard webbing, were the ten clip pouches typically loaded with a 8-rd Garand clip or 2x 5-rd stipper clips?Basic load for the M1 was 184 rounds for most infantry; 10 clips of 8 in the belt (Airborne Infantry was less, 168 rds, 8 clips in 4 pouches on a pistol belt) = 80 (64 Abn) + 2 bandoleers of 6 x 8 = 96 == 176 (152 Abn) + one clip in the weapon = 184 (168 Abn). In practice, the bandoleers were sometimes taken, sometimes not and latitude was allowed the troops most of the time to determine their own ammo load. Most guys initially carried too much ammo and as they learned, rarely took the bandoleers; some frequently took the clips out of a bandoleer and put them in a pocket (bad idea, the ammo invariably got jamming dirty and / or displaced forward in the clip) but most didn't bother. Joe's pretty good at reading the real METT. So, you're right, 80 rounds plus 8 in the weapon for most the majority of the time...

Little stuff needs to be trained. The M1 functioned better when dirty -- and all combat rifles get dirty -- if the clip was inserted with the uppermost round to the right, so the old guys put their clips in the ammo belt so that each clip would be properly oriented in they had to reload in the dark or rapidly without looking at the placement. Just as all your old guys load their mags into the pouches properly oriented for a rapid reload without looking.

Five round stripper clips in .30 were rare and were never used with the M1; occasionally, the BAR guys would get some instead of cartons. BAR men carried 13 mags, 12 on the belt, 1 in the weapon (only issued 12 but they always had an extra; some had several extras they carried in their packs. Somehow, the extra belt issued for the Assistant AR man always seemed to get lost...
And when the M14 came into use, were the M-1956 universal ammunition cases really used?Yep, each pouch would hold two 20 rd mags for the M14, perfect fit. Five mags were issued per wpn, thus most guys carried 100 rds. Bandoleers with 12 5 rd stripper clips were available but were almost never carried; easier to scuff some extra mags and load ;'em, carry them in the Ruck. Basic load was 220 rounds, five mags plus two bandoleers. As with the M1, bandoleers were rarely carried and new guys quickly learned they were carrying too much ammo. Recall though, that the M14 was issued to most as semi-auto only.

The M 1956 pouches each would carry two 20 rd M16 mags comfortably, three with a tight fit & that's where the jerk string on mags came from; still around even though no longer needed :wry: I usually carried my survival kit in one pouch, three mags in the other, one mag in my Jungle trousers left pocket which had an inner pocket for that purpose and one in the weapon plus three or four cartons of 20 in my ruck (never used); 100 rounds in mags, never got down to my last mag.
When an M4-toting guy pauses to think of a stripped-down loadout of 80 (M1) or 120 (M14) rounds, I wonder whether the smaller round count wasn't a worry because the bad guys had comparable loadouts.Nope, not a worry. Why would it be? If I can shoot more accurately and can use my ammo wisely, I'll have some left when he's out even if he started with twice as much as I did. Even if he's as good and well trained as I am, we're nominally even -- I can handle that. I don't get your logic on that one...

The only reason that 300 plus rounds are being carried by many today is simply due to the fact they can waste ammo with no penalty. Try that on the beach after the Shore Party gets clobbered and the ASP gets hit with ten mortar rounds -- and there will be no more Ammo until tomorrow...

It's just like your canteens or camelback -- you can drink it all real quick or you can pace your usage. The ability to fire on full auto will be used -- and misused -- unless it is trained properly. Our fire discipline is pathetic. I've seen recent videos of people responding to mortar and rocket attacks with automatic weapons fire at night. :eek: :rolleyes:

I never fired my M16 on full auto and wouldn't allow people that worked for me to do so. Lotta firefights in my Platoon Sergeant days including a couple of big, multi-battalion fights and all the Troops were still alive when I left, carrying seven or eight 20 round mags -- or less... ;)

[jcustis]

Thanks for the detailed reply Ken.

On the issue of round count, your confidence in ability to outshoot opponents speaks to just what I was thinking. Knowing you could carry more didn't translate into a need to do so.

Your point about fire discipline makes me think on the matter of the Corps' current combat marksmanship training program. Lot's of emphasis on controlled and hammer pairs because so many of the table iterations are fired from 10-50m, but not a single point ever made by an instructor (in my four runnings of the courses of fire) that deliberate, well-aimed single shots remain appropriate for threats engaged at distance.

[Ken White]

...Lot's of emphasis on controlled and hammer pairs because so many of the table iterations are fired from 10-50m...However, so does this:
...deliberate, well-aimed single shots remain appropriate for threats engaged at distance.We need to avoid excessive concentration on one range / technique -- and to training actions that become too firmly embedded to the exclusion of thinking and alternative methods and thus become, to our opponents, very predictable.

That will get a lot of our people killed unnecessarily.

The total spectrum of combat must be taught and trained constantly. The Troops can handle it; problem is that's a LOT of work for the Commanders, leaders and trainers. Therefor... :o

ADDED: Off the wall question, Jon. Do they teach the kids to count rounds fired? You can generally tell a good pro from even a talented amateur -- the pro will always know how many rounds he has left in the mag and in total... ;)

[jcustis]

ADDED: Off the wall question, Jon. Do they teach the kids to count rounds fired? You can generally tell a good pro from even a talented amateur -- the pro will always know how many rounds he has left in the mag and in total...

No, that is neither taught, nor stressed, unless it comes down from a passionate small-unit leader. Heck, there are Marines (probably a majority) who can't recognize the sound and feel of a bolt carrier group locking back on an empty magazine. And actually, there's very little need to do so if you have one of these thing-a-ma-jigs (don't laugh, it is a very good magazine and I own many):

http://www.ustacticalsupply.com/ProductImages/magpul/pmag-window.jpg


We need to avoid excessive concentration on one range / technique -- and to training actions that become too firmly embedded to the exclusion of thinking and alternative methods and thus become, to our opponents, very predictable.

I've got specific thoughts on this part, and was drafting a long rant about the matter of fire and movement techniques, when IE started crashing on the other computer. I want to put a placeholder here because I have some honey-do things to accomplish, but need to come back to what I was writing yesterday.

[Uboat509]

...On a few of the topics here.


M203

I have carried both the M203 and the M79 and I have to say that I absolutely prefer the M79. I can understand the convenience and speed factors for having the grenade launcher mounted under the weapon but everyone I know who has fired both has always been much more accurate with the M79. Plus, it's nice not to have extra weight and bulk on the end of the gun or to limited to a minimum barrel length by the M203, particularly when it comes to CQC. ;) It's a shame that the M79 is no longer available.

Having the teamleaders carry the M203 was something we started doing in my company when I was a squad leader in 2000. The rational was partly a manpower issue, the rifle man was already carrying things like the AT-4 or the claymore, and partly an issue of giving the teamleader an additional signaling device. In any case, the teamleader leads from the front so giving him the M203 doesn't really distract him from his job much.


M14 v. M4

I love the M14. It is definitely a Superior weapon in terms of knock-down power and long distance accuracy. You can't argue that. The M4 is superior in terms of the weight of the weapon and the weight of rounds carried, although that never mattered as much to me as the knock-down power and distance accuracy. The problem comes in the CQC environment. Even the SOCOM version of the M14 is still a long weapon. I do not relish the idea of trying the maneuver that beast around in a house. The M4, with the right ammunition, is definitely a better weapon in that environment and we do spend a lot of time in that environment.

SFC W

[William F. Owen]

...On a few of the topics here.


M203
It's a shame that the M79 is no longer available.
There are modern M-79 equivalents. I've only ever fired the HK69A1 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HK_69) and it seemed pretty good.

Having the teamleaders carry the M203 was something we started doing in my company when I was a squad leader in 2000.
Having the team leader with the M203 is SOP in many IDF battalions.

The M4, with the right ammunition, is definitely a better weapon in that environment and we do spend a lot of time in that environment.
I suggest that support the Platoon level mix of weapons approach. 12 men = 9 x M4 + 3 x M14 perhaps, - which is most probably what you guys do anyway.

[jcustis]

I think that one of our larger failings in the Marine Corps comes from being terribly inconsistent in our doctrine. MCWP 3-11.2 of 2002 vintage is merely a re-labelling of FMFM 6-5 Marine Rifle Squad from 1991.

To let our small unit doctrine lie fallow for 18 years is pretty sad, considering the advances in so much technology, understanding of human factors in comabt, and the like.

The description of techniques of assault fire in the attack, found on page 2-32, is indicative of what irks me with our dated drivel:


(a) Riflemen and Assistant Automatic Riflemen. Both fire welldirected
shots from the pointing position. They should fire the weapon
using three-round bursts or they should pull the trigger each time the
left foot strikes the ground. They fire at known or suspected enemy
locations on the portion of the objective that corresponds with their
position in the assault formation. (See fig. 2-17.)

The insert photo shows a rifleman advancing with his rifle in an underarm firing position, as if he were participating in that classic "GET ON LINE!!!" technique which we abandoned so long ago. It's a good thing Marines are basically just rough and tumble SOBs. :wry:

Being tough isn't the sole answer though, and a newly-minted squad leader can't find a reference for controlling his fires in the attack that are rational and make sense. The USA may have such a pub, but we sure don't, and I've witnessed the slop as squads rush downrange, firing wildly and with little to no apparent focus. SAW gunners rushing forward as soon as the rifleman have barely dropped to a new firing position...Riflemen resuming their rushes just because the SAW gunner droped to his bipods...

The greater shortfall is that I have watched instructors at our formal schools critique these abortions using totally skewed criteria, such as solely how well the teams employed talking guns, or maintained speed and momentum (which was for some reason decoupled from how many tgts were successfully engaged during the run). We think we have it down pat, but are really far from cutting to thebeing as efficient as we could be.

[William F. Owen]

The greater shortfall is that I have watched instructors at our formal schools critique these abortions using totally skewed criteria, such as solely how well the teams employed talking guns, or maintained speed and momentum (which was for some reason decoupled from how many tgts were successfully engaged during the run). We think we have it down pat, but are really far from cutting to thebeing as efficient as we could be.

Not my place to criticise the USA or USMC, but I can tell you that Platoon Manoeuvre is widely mis-understood and mostly very poorly trained for. I've watched many UK platoons do "bunker busting" drills at the platoon level an they have them down pat. Highly skilled, highly aggressive, and mostly effective. Done it myself and last observed it being done at the NCO school in 2006.
Problem is that template drills do not test Platoon and Section commanders as to their understanding of how a platoon gets forward. Thus in the UK, you have the bones of an excellent system, that mostly people have no idea as to why they are doing what they do. They just do it.
Same thing screwed up the platoon and section tactics training in 1941.

[jcustis]

Not my place to criticise the USA or USMC, but I can tell you that Platoon Manoeuvre is widely mis-understood and mostly very poorly trained for. I've watched many UK platoons do "bunker busting" drills at the platoon level an they have them down pat. Highly skilled, highly aggressive, and mostly effective. Done it myself and last observed it being done at the NCO school in 2006.
Problem is that template drills do not test Platoon and Section commanders as to their understanding of how a platoon gets forward. Thus in the UK, you have the bones of an excellent system, that mostly people have no idea as to why they are doing what they do. They just do it.
Same thing screwed up the platoon and section tactics training in 1941.

You're on to something, and that is at the root of my frustration with what we do...very few understand the WHY, and far fewer can apply it smoothly when the parameters change.

That in turn results, IMO, with unecessary employment of supporting arms disproportionate to the threat, wildly inaccurate small-arms fires which run counter to our need to protect the populace in small wars, and unecessary casualties. Our men have the capacity to do it, but we fail them when it comes to applying time, resources, and mentorship to the training.

[Uboat509]

...there is this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M32_MGL) behemoth. I have not personally ever used this thing nor do I know anyone who has but I don't like what I see. I'm not sure what niche this thing fills. It seems like it's too big to carry along with an M4 but I wouldn't want to arm someone with just this thing.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:M-32_Grenade_Launcher.jpg

This strikes me as more of a solution in search of a problem.

SFC W

[jcustis]

...there is this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M32_MGL) behemoth. I have not personally ever used this thing nor do I know anyone who has but I don't like what I see. I'm not sure what niche this thing fills. It seems like it's too big to carry along with an M4 but I wouldn't want to arm someone with just this thing.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:M-32_Grenade_Launcher.jpg

This strikes me as more of a solution in search of a problem.

SFC W

I have not heard of any example, anecdotal or otherwise, where those things have been employed in the fight-breaker role we purchased them for. Not sure if we will either, but with the resurgence of offensive action in Afghanistan, maybe data will surface.

[Uboat509]

Not my place to criticise the USA or USMC, but I can tell you that Platoon Manoeuvre is widely mis-understood and mostly very poorly trained for. I've watched many UK platoons do "bunker busting" drills at the platoon level an they have them down pat. Highly skilled, highly aggressive, and mostly effective. Done it myself and last observed it being done at the NCO school in 2006.
Problem is that template drills do not test Platoon and Section commanders as to their understanding of how a platoon gets forward. Thus in the UK, you have the bones of an excellent system, that mostly people have no idea as to why they are doing what they do. They just do it.
Same thing screwed up the platoon and section tactics training in 1941.

I can't speak to how the Marines have done this drill but this does illustrate a problem we developed in the infantry in the Army. When I first came into the infantry in '95 the drill went something like this. The SAW gunner and one man would provide suppressive fire on the aperture(s) of the bunker that was to be taken out. They would continue suppressive fire on that bunker while the man designated to destroy the bunker crept into position, identified which aperture he was going to throw the grenade in and prepped his grenade, all while the SAW gunner was putting rounds into a target a foot away from him. The shift fire signal was when the man at the bunker had finished prepping the grenade he would raise it up to indicate that he was ready. The SAW gunner would shift fire at which point the man with the grenade would release the spoon, count to two thousand, punch the grenade into the aperture and role away. Once the grenade detonated he would get up and fire into the bunker to ensure that everyone was dead and then try to visually verify that the bunker was clear. Some time after that, however, I'm not sure when, somebody realized that there was some risk to that and the drill changed. Due to safety concerns we were not allowed to fire within fifteen degrees of another soldier. Depending on how far away the SBF position was that could equate to a sizable distance. Of course it was always preached that this was just for training safety, in the real thing we would do it the old way. I want to meet the guy who, in war, consistently does things the way they should be done rather than the way he has been training.

SFC W

[William F. Owen]

I have not heard of any example, anecdotal or otherwise, where those things have been employed in the fight-breaker role we purchased them for. Not sure if we will either, but with the resurgence of offensive action in Afghanistan, maybe data will surface.

Guys I've talked to, (UK-SF, USMC and Colombian SF) swear by them. With the new medium velocity ammunition, they're probably a better bet than a SAW-Minimi.

[William F. Owen]

May interest some folks here, but I’ve recently been crunching some numbers for an article and I thought I’d share them here.

An FN MAG-58/GPMG with 500 rounds weighs a total of 25.5kg. Distributed between two men this is 13.79kg and 11.76kg

An FN-LAR HB or modified HK-417 (heavy barrel, + bipod) with 500 rounds weighs about 21kg. This breaks down as a two man load of 10kg and 11kg.

Yes, magazines weight more than link, but the weight associated with belt fed weapons, tends to cancel this out, across realistic operational loads.

Now I have my own data sets, but I’d be grateful if someone wants to check those figures.

[Kiwigrunt]

I don’t think I like where you’re going with this;) but here goes.
Most of my data is from 1999/2000 Jane’s Infantry Weapons except the weight of a 100 belt of 7.62 which I have at 2.7 kg, and the Minimi.


MAG 58 (11.65 kg) with 5 x 2.7 kg = 25.15 kg
FN LAR (6 kg, Argy version 6.45 kg) with 25 x 20 rnd mag (0.715 kg) = 23.88 kg
SS77 (9.6 kg) with 5 x 2.7 kg = 23.1 kg
7.62 Minimi (don’t slap me guys:D)(8.2 kg) with 5 x 2.7 kg = 21.7 kg
L4A4 (8.68 kg) with 17 x 30 rnd mag (1.085 kg) = 27.13 kg

For L4 mag weight I used that of the 30 rnd mag for SG542 as I don’t have L4’s data.
Looks like the good old Bren is worst off. And SS77 is slightly lighter than LAR.
This does of course only work with 500 rnds. More is better for beltfeds, less is better for LAR, unless carried loose for reloading mags.

[William F. Owen]

I don’t think I like where you’re going with this;) but here goes.
Don't worry. You will!

L4A4 (8.68 kg) with 17 x 30 rnd mag (1.085 kg) = 27.13 kg Nearly spot on. I have all the figures for the L4 and it's 27.59!

This does of course only work with 500 rnds. More is better for beltfeds, less is better for LAR, unless carried loose for reloading mags.
Exactly, and that's the bit that needs clarification, and understanding. If you are adding weapons to fire teams, and not platoons, this might be important.

[Fuchs]

You're on to something, and that is at the root of my frustration with what we do...very few understand the WHY, and far fewer can apply it smoothly when the parameters change.

That in turn results, IMO, with unecessary employment of supporting arms disproportionate to the threat, wildly inaccurate small-arms fires which run counter to our need to protect the populace in small wars, and unecessary casualties. Our men have the capacity to do it, but we fail them when it comes to applying time, resources, and mentorship to the training.

I observed a rather disappointing intelligence of NCOs on many occasions.
Many took what they learned as gospel and weren't the slightest bit capable of discussing it.

It may be a personnel quality/availability problem. Maybe the previous education and the early training is simply not well-suited to make the average NCO understand what he does on a theoretical level.

They can be very competent in what training and experience told them and they can be quite creative if they encounter new problems - but they're rarely able to explain the advantages and disadvantages of different solutions to a problem.
In fact, I've listened more often to 'street language' about me supposedly having a wet pu**y than an intelligent answer in such cases.

Maybe it's the right approach to tell most leaders only what they need to know - and to reserve a more in-depth training and education for those who can grasp it.
Some tactical courses that focus on the development of tactics (developing them on their own) might be a good idea. Military history is rich (and unknown) enough to offer enough scenarios for tactical consideration (even back in ancient times).



I can't speak to how the Marines have done this drill but this does illustrate a problem we developed in the infantry in the Army. When I first came into the infantry in '95 the drill went something like this. The SAW gunner and one man would provide suppressive fire on the aperture(s) of the bunker that was to be taken out. They would continue suppressive fire on that bunker while the man designated to destroy the bunker crept into position, identified which aperture he was going to throw the grenade in and prepped his grenade, all while the SAW gunner was putting rounds into a target a foot away from him. The shift fire signal was when the man at the bunker had finished prepping the grenade he would raise it up to indicate that he was ready. The SAW gunner would shift fire at which point the man with the grenade would release the spoon, count to two thousand, punch the grenade into the aperture and role away. Once the grenade detonated he would get up and fire into the bunker to ensure that everyone was dead and then try to visually verify that the bunker was clear.

Where's the smoke? Bunkers can be blinded quite easily.

What did you do if the aperture was properly protected by a mesh wire shield and camouflage netting?
First one defensive hand grenade to remove it?

What did you do when the bunker wasn't isolated, but part of a network and in fact covered by two others (as was the 'right' thing to do with fortifications since at least Vauban).

I thought the modern (post-50's) and internationally preferred method was rather to use AT weapons on bunkers from a relatively long distance (200-2000 m).

Bunker busting is in my opinion actually one of the infantry activities with the greatest change since WW2, and your drill of '95 sounds a lot like an awfully incomplete drill from the 30's.

[Uboat509]

Where's the smoke? Bunkers can be blinded quite easily.

What did you do if the aperture was properly protected by a mesh wire shield and camouflage netting?
First one defensive hand grenade to remove it?

What did you do when the bunker wasn't isolated, but part of a network and in fact covered by two others (as was the 'right' thing to do with fortifications since at least Vauban).

I thought the modern (post-50's) and internationally preferred method was rather to use AT weapons on bunkers from a relatively long distance (200-2000 m).

Bunker busting is in my opinion actually one of the infantry activities with the greatest change since WW2, and your drill of '95 sounds a lot like an awfully incomplete drill from the 30's.

My intent was not to describe our entire TTP for assaulting a bunker system. I was simply using this particular drill to demonstrate how safety concerns had changed how we train. Of course we use smoke when it is available and appropriate. Of course we use stand-off weapons when available. The point was that drills like the one I described developed trust and confidence among team members. There is, in my opinion, a world of difference between rounds from the SBF impacting a foot away from you and when they are impacting twenty-five meters away from you.

SFC W

[Ken White]

It may be a personnel quality/availability problem. Maybe the previous education and the early training is simply not well-suited to make the average NCO understand what he does on a theoretical level.

In fact, I've listened more often to 'street language' about me supposedly having a wet pu**y than an intelligent answer in such cases.In both cases that's a result of the way they were treated...
Maybe it's the right approach to tell most leaders only what they need to know - and to reserve a more in-depth training and education for those who can grasp it.As exemplified by that attitude. Most people can and will accept knowledge that is properly imparted, learn to think constructively and apply judgment and that knowledge to problem solutions. OTOH, if they are conditioned to do what they're told and never question their 'betters' you'll have the reactions you cite.
Where's the smoke? Bunkers can be blinded quite easily.Use it quickly -- as more thermal viewers proliferate around the world, that will no longer work (and yes I know of thermal obscurants. I also know of supply and resupply failures among other things).
I thought the modern (post-50's) and internationally preferred method was rather to use AT weapons on bunkers from a relatively long distance (200-2000 m).Great plan -- if you have them. If not due to lack of resupply or for other reasons, what do you do? A satchel charge or a pole charge is better than a hand grenade but UBoat's point was that even mediocre training is ruined by excessive concern for safety and costs -- and that truth is why they were using a grenade instead of a pole charge and why they were not using a rocket or missile. They were doing a direct infantry attack for training because every thing in war doesn't always work the way it's supposed to and somebody has to do the hard practical stuff to keep things going. His broader point that people will do in war what they do in training is true.

That training is poor is an indictment of the training regimen in most democracies where the armed forces cannot train adequately due to politically correct concern for safety, an irony for a trade where safety is not really a viable option. It's also constrained due to cost constraints -- we cannot spend some money to save some lives. Fascinating logic.

That it is poor is also an indictment of all armed forces that treat their NCOs in such a manner as to breed the attitudes and reactions you mentioned. People tend to react as they are expected to -- don't like the way some react?

Change the expectation.
Bunker busting is in my opinion actually one of the infantry activities with the greatest change since WW2, and your drill of '95 sounds a lot like an awfully incomplete drill from the 30's.Not really -- change that is. The preferred method in the late 30s was to blast the bunker with anti tank guns; attacking with charges or grenades was a last resort effort. Training to do that let people know they could do it if they had no better option. They had to do that during WW II, so that worked out okay. Still being done today. That hasn't changed. Only difference now is missiles or rockets instead of guns -- and now, as then, that desirable standoff weapon may not always be available.

Can't train totally for the best case in war, you have to train for the worst case. If you can operate effectively then life is better when things work out and you can go the best case route...

The well educated theoreticians often miss little things like that... :D

[Fuchs]

You missed an essential part of what I wrote


preferred method

I would call the use of an assault gun as an artillery tactic (although German infantry guns were under control of infantry regiments) and ignored it this time.
A bunker that can be successfully engaged with an infantry gun was a dumb idea in the first place anyway.

[Ken White]

better options.
A bunker that can be successfully engaged with an infantry gun was a dumb idea in the first place anyway.Agreed and there are a lot smart people who know that, thus taking it out the hard way becomes a nasty but necessary chore. :(

We used flamethrowers, don't guess one could do that nowadays.. :wry:

[Kiwigrunt]

We used flamethrowers, don't guess one could do that nowadays.. :wry:

How about thermobaric rifle grenades or 40mm?:wry: Sssssst, don't tell anyone:p

[Ken White]

Go figure... :eek::confused::wry:

[Kiwigrunt]

MAG 58 (11.65 kg) with 5 x 2.7 kg = 25.15 kg
FN LAR (6 kg, Argy version 6.45 kg) with 25 x 20 rnd mag (0.715 kg) = 23.88 kg
SS77 (9.6 kg) with 5 x 2.7 kg = 23.1 kg
7.62 Minimi (don’t slap me guys:D)(8.2 kg) with 5 x 2.7 kg = 21.7 kg
L4A4 (8.68 kg) with 17 x 30 rnd mag (1.085 kg) = 27.13 kg


Add around 0.8 kg per 100 rnd canvas belt pouch for the Minimi (http://www.fnherstal.com/fileadmin/header/image/News/Press_review/2008_Press_Review/rid_minimi762_2008.pdf) (didn't think they'd be that heavy) and probably similar for MAG58 equivalent.

[Kiwigrunt]

Go figure... :eek::confused::wry:

As long as they're not hollow-point, because they really hurt and that just not fair. So bullet-through grenades are out, cause they're hollow-point.
Okay, enough of that nonsense, time for my flu-nap:mad:.

[jcustis]

When making the numbers crunch, don't forget that it's not all about raw weight. An item with a heavier gross weight might have a lighter "feel" if it can be carried easily and with little bulk. That's the predominant reason why I like the 100-rd "nutsacks" for the SAW. Yeah, they are lighter, but the distribute fairly well.

[Kiwigrunt]

Came across an article here (http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/docs/aaj_autumn_2009.pdf) that analyses marksmanship and rounds fired per kill by the Anzac’s in Vietnam. Article is ‘Bang on target’ on page 139.

[William F. Owen]

Came across an article here (http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/docs/aaj_autumn_2009.pdf) that analyses marksmanship and rounds fired per kill by the Anzac’s in Vietnam. Article is ‘Bang on target’ on page 139.

Gold mine mate! Good job. Very interesting and confirming some things I had thought for a while now. Excellent find!

[Ken White]

That is a great article. The Journal, as always, has great material...

Couple of things leaped out of the article:
Numerous reasons for the ‘poor’ state of infantry marksmanship were given. They included the lack of suitable ranges near unit barracks leading to insufficient shooting practice, poor fire control by NCOs and junior officers, soldiers deliberately aiming off because training with blank ammunition encouraged them to do so, carriage of excessive amounts of ammunition encouraging profligacy, failure of instructors to instil the desire to shoot to kill, and other reasons. Few of the
complainants mentioned the difficulties of acquiring a target in the combat conditions that prevailed in Vietnam.I know you two know this but a point or two on that bears voicing; The training complaints are almost certainly valid but the specific conditions in Viet Nam are more valid -- and the fact that the poor training prior was not rapidly adapted to the specific combat arena is troublesome. Not slamming Oz -- witness US performance in Viet Nam and today.

The problem is the bureaucracy cannot or will not shift gears with rapidity and a part of that problem is that the 'Trainers' (and Doctrine writers) are working in air conditioned comfort and tend to adapt what they write and do to cause minimum disruption to what is currently being done at home.

The solution of course is for Theater experienced people 9not short term visitors or observers) to do a trainup on units previously well schooled in the basics with local adaptations to a broad -- NOT specific -- doctrine. As an example from the article, the GPMG to the high ground rule is indicative.

Or an indictment...
If caught in an ambush or a patrol encounter the enemy usually sought to break contact quickly and escape into the jungle. They were very skilled at doing this and—using high volumes of fire and fragmentation effect from AK47s, RPD light machine-guns and RPGs—often broke contact before the 1ATF patrol could organise effective indirect fire support. Artillery responding to an infantry call for fire support usually took about 10 minutes to get effective fire onto a target. Air support could take even longer. But Table 3 shows that in more than 60 per cent of cases, the enemy had already broken contact and escaped in less than10 minutes.The western reliance on massive HE fire support to win small contacts is counterproductive. That time factor is ALWAYS problematic and numerous patrol actions have fizzled to naught due to the technique.

The 1ATF in Viet Nam was good, the only unit I worked with, 3 RAR, was better than most US units at most everything. Still, the number of VC / NVA initiated contacts they had was very similar to US experience.

If the other guy is initiating most contacts, you're doing something wrong.

Lastly, they wrote one very scary thing in that article. Last paragraph:
Perhaps a future family of small arms will assist this process by capturing electronically the date, time, location, number
of rounds fired and sight picture every time the trigger is squeezed. Once analysed, this data might inform subsequent training and tactics leading to improved combat performance.Metrics are great. Metrics lend weight to arguments :rolleyes: Metrics such as those lend weight to weapons. Not a good plan.

It is a good article but contains no surprises. From it, Wilf will probably derive different lessons but mine are:

- Doctrine must be broad and generic; excess specificity in an attempt to cover all eventualities and directed rigid adherence turn it into dogma and will get people killed unnecessarily.

- Doctrine MUST adapt to the enemy and all the METT-TC factors of the moment. If it does not, it is wrong and must be discarded.

- Training must be thorough and well grounded in the basics of the trade and must allow for theater or enemy, area and time specific modification. Rigid adherence to one model or 'system' of processes is wrong.

- Theater specific training should be rapidly implemented and be ongoing in theater. All too often, we do not do the latter to avoid 'hassling the troops.' Training isn't hassling, it's life assurance.

- A Volume of fire is no substitute for adequate accurate fire.

- Western reliance -- dependence even -- on supporting fires and lots of HE is rarely applicable in Small Wars and training that emphasizes its use is damaging to not only unit initiative and aggressiveness but also to actual prosecution of contacts and even the war.

- Weapons must be selected with broadest possible usage in mind if funds are limited. If adequate funds are available, theater specific weapons should be procured and used.

- Units must be trained with broadest possible usage in mind if funds are limited. Adequate funds must be made available for theater specific weapons and training prior to commitment if possible and absolutely for follow on forces.

There is no one size fits all... ;)

Sommygun. Training and METT-TC. Amazing. :D

[William F. Owen]

It is a good article but contains no surprises. From it, Wilf will probably derive different lessons but mine are:


Wilf is actually always pretty happy to use other people's useful insight and be freed from the effort of creating his own!! Worked for Vauban!

...but joking aside. I was amazed that this level of data had been captured. Point being, it seems not to have informed UK thinking in any significant way. As of 1980, I was still being subjected to the then new fangled "Training the battle shot," that seemed not to work well even on the range!!

Fast forward 8 years later when I was running the CQB range on Cyprus, found that my platoon's 3F system "Fire till the F**ker Falls" worked pretty dam well!

[Ken White]

Fast forward 8 years later when I was running the CQB range on Cyprus, found that my platoon's 3F system "Fire till the F**ker Falls" worked pretty dam well!been true for eons... :D

No matter how well you train 'em, everyone will not be a good aimed shot person; fewer will be good snap shooters. All you have to do is get it ON the target and fate will handle the rest. :cool:

Problem is that 'on the target' is translated by many as volume of fire. T'ain't so, most automatic fire is frequently so far off target as to be value negative. Automatic fire should be limited to people that are well trained enough and who have a weapon adequately heavy and accurate to put most of their rounds in the target zone. :eek:

I'm a little dubious of the apparent accuracy and finite numbers in their study but I do strongly believe that their overall 800 rounds of small arms per enemy casualty is about right; IIRC, we came up with about the same thing there and in Korea and that tracks with my anecdotal evidence and deteriorating memory... :o

Really hope that many today note that a 10 minute lag was enough time for the bad guys to slip away -- some things don't change much with respect to METT-TC anywhere, anytime...

[Kiwigrunt]

What I got from this article was a bit of confusion. Many of us on this forum appear to agree that (relatively) accurate semi auto fire suppresses better (more effectively and more efficiently) than wild full auto. That is supported by some articles we’ve discussed here lately.

However, this article indicates (to me anyway) the need for ‘wild’ automatic fire at these very short ranges where the enemy simply cannot be seen. In these situations, how do you make your fire more accurate? And because the range is that short, even a relatively wide dispersion of rounds is not really going to be that far off as to be totally useless for suppression, I think:confused:.
Heaven forbid, it looks like a situation where you could almost justify giving everyone a Minimi-type weapon:eek:. By the time everyone has gone through their first 200 rnd belt, the job will be over, one way or the other.

So I felt the need to re-read the concept of Drake-shooting.
See here at thread SWC (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2464), pdf on SWJ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/rhodesian-cover-or-drake-shooting.pdf) and selousscouts site (
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/drake_shoot.htm).

It appears to me that the bush in Rhodesia may not have been as thick as the jungles in Nam and that the range, although still short, would have been a bit longer on average in Rhodesia than in Nam. So I am not sure that the concept of Drake-shooting could have been successfully applied in Nam.

Drake-shooting, as described here, does seem to rely heavily on a larger calibre round to penetrate cover.

And by gum, to apply this concept surgically at such a short range, you’d have to have a pair of hand-grenades for testicles (just don’t pull the pin…..there was actually no pun intended but hey:p…).

[Ken White]

...this article indicates (to me anyway) the need for ‘wild’ automatic fire at these very short ranges where the enemy simply cannot be seen. In these situations, how do you make your fire more accurate? And because the range is that short, even a relatively wide dispersion of rounds is not really going to be that far off as to be totally useless for suppression, I think:confused:I don't think so. Wild automatic fire puts a lot of rounds out but in heavy jungle, most of those round will go high, may be deflected and generally will not give the proposed recipient the impression he's being fired upon. Better technique is not too rapid semi automatic, aimed low because those deflections and ricochets will go at an angle off thicker trunks and will let the target area know it is just that. Note I said aimed, it has to be aimed. As the article says, that aiming will sometimes be at shadows, fleeting movement or sounds -- and that okay, it will let them know you know they're there -- provide you hold all your shots below waist level.

That's in secondary growth or rain forest with triple canopy. In more open bush (like most of Rhodesia and southern Africa but not much of Central Africa, SE Asia or most of the Amazon area), same techniques as temperate woodland will work and the ranges will be slightly greater.
Heaven forbid, it looks like a situation where you could almost justify giving everyone a Minimi-type weapon:eek:. By the time everyone has gone through their first 200 rnd belt, the job will be over, one way or the other.Not at all. Belt fed weapons are more problematical in heavy bush than they are ordinarily (which is mostly bad enough) because bugs (really) and sticks clutter up up the belts. The moisture doesn't help. Seen pictures of people in the jungle with exposed belts? You've seen pictures of people who were guaranteed misfires due to that clutter and to rounds being knocked out of alignment in the belt. There's a place for belt feds but a patrol is not it.

The actions of the opponent can vary, he may try to disappear; he may try to attack and that's driven by many factors. Every engagement, no matter how small, is different. The key is to spot him before he spots you. Regardless of the opponent, that can be difficult but is never impossible -- it takes solid and hard training and it takes knowing people so leaders know who to place where.

No matter; the key to jungle engagements is aimed (relatively speaking) semi automatic fire and the knowledge that the other guys automatics are likely to be sending three out of four rounds into the trees. :D
Drake-shooting, as described here, does seem to rely heavily on a larger calibre round to penetrate cover.That helps -- and the 7.62X39 is a better bush round than is the 5.56 -- but the 7.62X51 is better yet. :cool:

[Jones_RE]

Let me see if I'm following what you're saying, Ken.

The shooter should apply the fundamentals of marksmanship even in situations where the enemy cannot be directly seen. You may be aiming at shadows, moving branches or just where you think the sound is coming from but you are aiming at a specific point in space. You can't physically see an enemy occupying that point, but you aim anyway. Correct?

From reading the article it sounds like both the volume and aimed fire schools were missing this point. I wonder what would happen if you tried the different techniques on a target range simulating those conditions, i.e. brush so heavy that you can't physically see the targets but you get indicators like gunfire sounds and movement.

[William F. Owen]

To me it's all pretty clear... which may mean I am completely wrong.... but..

a.) In heavy forest/jungle you can't see the target but you still have to suppress them, so high volumes of fire across broad arcs is merited. The physics of dispersion means this will only work at pretty close range.

b.) At longer ranges, your fire has to be directed either at the enemy that can be seen, or at his suspected position, so more deliberate aimed semi-automatic fire would seem useful. This would also apply in the urban terrain.

Translating that into training may require some thought.

[Ken White]

Jones R.E.
...You may be aiming at shadows, moving branches or just where you think the sound is coming from but you are aiming at a specific point in space. You can't physically see an enemy occupying that point, but you aim anyway.Some times you see a few but not all, some times you see none, depends on many things; essentially if they're firing at you, you have targets, if vague and shadowy. The key is to fire low generally aimed shots; if your bullets go high, they won't impress anyone and they won't hit anything.
...on a target range simulating those conditions, i.e. brush so heavy that you can't physically see the targets but you get indicators like gunfire sounds and movement.Been done and was done at the olf Jungle Warfare School in Panama on a routine basis. What happens is that you get a few hits, IIRC the average was about 20-30%+, target placement dependent and enough to deter most opponents -- problem is that targets generally don't move so it's artificial. It works better against people because they have a fifty fifty chance of moving into as well as out of fire cones.

Wilf
a.) In heavy forest/jungle you can't see the target but you still have to suppress them, so high volumes of fire across broad arcs is merited. The physics of dispersion means this will only work at pretty close range.Agree except for the broad arcs; control in Jungle is very difficult and people do get out of line, ahead others or fall behind totally misoriented, etc. -- best solution with moderately well trained troops is to use a clock system. Fire is directed by a clock number and people restrain their fire to fifteen degrees on either side of that. As each clock number spans 30 degrees, that's easy -- if the word is enemy at 2 O'clock (or it's obvious that's were they are...), then everyone except the point and trail (men or parties) fire at from one to three o'clock. Point and trail get 270 degree arcs for obvious reasons. Most people in the good units in Viet Nam told their troops to flank into an ambush, fire one mag on full auto in short burst obver their arc and then switch to semi-auto. I'm genetically or geriatrically indisposed toward full auto so I always insisted on strictly semi-auto. I know, I know, we don't have to reload after each shot anymore; still...

NOTE; there are many variations, the above is a simple generic meeting engagement or ambush response. Train the basics thoroughly, apply METT-TC...

Whatever; the key is to make sure they aim below waist level and compensate for any slope -- some are amazed at what slope does to firing. Its effects are too often ignored; you can't do that.
At longer ranges...This would also apply in the urban terrain.True. Takes a lot of Ammo but not hard to train provided you can replicate the vegetation differences to a general level locally. Lacking real greenery, I've taken old shot-up E Silhouette targets and chopped them up a bit. Have also used camouflage nets which I then exchanged for new ones to the S4s distress and my satisfaction. We used BB guns to teach snap shooting in dense vegetation meeting engagements -- before there was Simunition and Paint Ball. :D

[William F. Owen]

I'm genetically or geriatrically indisposed toward full auto so I always insisted on strictly semi-auto. I know, I know, we don't have to reload after each shot anymore; still...


So fire as quickly as you can "re-charge your fire piece?" :D, but yes, well trained semi-auto is superior to full auto in many circumstances.

[Fuchs]

Unobserved fire can very well be aimed fire.

Think of the Drake shooting drill, for example.
It was a rather orderly triple-tapping of suspected positions, if possible with assigned fields of fire.

You still need the sights to do it right or you could still miss a couching opponent behind a small concealing object, even with three shots.

[Chris jM]

a.) In heavy forest/jungle you can't see the target but you still have to suppress them, so high volumes of fire across broad arcs is merited. The physics of dispersion means this will only work at pretty close range.

b.) At longer ranges, your fire has to be directed either at the enemy that can be seen, or at his suspected position, so more deliberate aimed semi-automatic fire would seem useful. This would also apply in the urban terrain.

Translating that into training may require some thought.

From my perspective, it's less a training problem and more a tactical problem.

I remember reading Sydney Jary's '18 Platoon' (accounts of a WW2 British rifle platoon commander) and he placed great weight on the commander being able to 'read the battle'.

Taking the example of close country, winning the firefight may often necessitate the rapid rate of fire to gain the initiative but then - in my opinion, anything goes. Maintaining the rapid rate and fire-and-manoeuvring forward - hey, it works. Being more aggressive, going watch-and-shoot and then assaulting so the soldiers only shoot at targets they id on the advance? Risky, aggressive, but it has a time and place.

I see the section/ squad commander being someone who should have the 'bag of tricks' up his sleeve and be able to pull them out as he 'reads the battle'. Controlling the wight of fire and method of movement comes down to training and drills, but templating how you shoot in what example, beyond the initial IA of returning fire, is to me unnecessary.

I did some training with a Canadian recce sect a year ago and their NCOs told me that they (whether this was the Canadian Army, their Bn or simply their recon pl I don't know) had given up on the concept of double-tapping in favour of a slower rate of single, well aimed shots.

Ken One thing I beg to differ in is calibres. My experience is completely limited to that of training, but I don't really see the need for a 7.62 round instead of a 5.56 in close country/ jungle. Your either shooting to kill the enemy or shooting to suppress him, and I don't really see 7.62 penetration doing much in punching through cover to justify the extra weight.

My opinion (and I have yet to find someone who shares it, which is probably saying something!) is that the rifle section is suited to a 5.56 LSW in all environments as the standard support wpn.

[Ken White]

...whether this was the Canadian Army, their Bn or simply their recon pl ... had given up on the concept of double-tapping in favour of a slower rate of single, well aimed shots.Yes they were...
From my perspective, it's less a training problem and more a tactical problem.You cannot separate the two; the one leads to the other and it has to be a continuous loop.
I see the section/ squad commander being someone who should have the 'bag of tricks' up his sleeve and be able to pull them out as he 'reads the battle'. Controlling the wight of fire and method of movement comes down to training and drills, but templating how you shoot in what example, beyond the initial IA of returning fire, is to me unnecessary.Control in the jungle is quite different than control in rolling terrain with some vegetation. Control in training is different than control in a fire fight. Combine the two and you are confronted with the FACT that ability to "read the battle" may be somewhat limited; ability to exercise control may be severely limited; the Leader may be a casualty and half dozen other things -- thus everyone has to know what to do. That occurs with good or even just decent training.
One thing I beg to differ in is calibres. My experience is completely limited to that of training, but I don't really see the need for a 7.62 round instead of a 5.56 in close country/ jungle. Your either shooting to kill the enemy or shooting to suppress him, and I don't really see 7.62 penetration doing much in punching through cover to justify the extra weight.First, an aside. Always shoot to kill, if you do that, it will 'suppress' the bad guys; shooting to suppress them will likely not suppress them or even impress them... :eek:

We can disagree on the caliber issue, not a problem. However, the 7.62 punching through cover is not the issue. The 5.56 being deflected by leaves is the issue.

I understand 10 mags is the norm for 5.56 carrying folks nowadays (way too much ammo and weight IMO) so you're looking at about 10 x 494g= 4.94 kg; a more sensible load seven mags of 7.62x39 would run about 7 x 750g or 5.25 kg kg. An adequate load of 100 rds of 7.62x51 would be 5 x 698g = 3.5 kg.

Thus I'm not sure I agree on the weight issue even if you add in another kg or two for the weapon. If one is more comfortable with additional ammo, add another 120 rounds, two Bandoleers of stripper clips and you only get another 3.5 kg = 7 kg. Small price to pay for more likely hits, IMO. YMMV.

All weapons are compromises, there is no perfect fit for all the variations possible in METT-TC. ;)

[Chris jM]

Ken, I've read your reply a few times now and I agree with pretty much everything your getting at. Not much that I can/ could add to what you have said.

Cheers.

[RJ]

First, an aside. Always shoot to kill, if you do that, it will 'suppress' the bad guys; shooting to suppress them will likely not suppress them or even impress them... Ken White

Best quote of the week!

One of the best examples is way back in the annals of WWI. Well aimed, bolt action rifle fire in the hands of expert riflemen devastated parts of three German units that were trying to reinforce hard pressed entrenched German troops in a battle that marked the high water mark of the German Army in its attempt to capture Paris in WWI.

The weapons were Springfield 1903, 5 shot, .30 caliber rifles in the hands of US Marines in their first fight as battalions and regiments in a land war.

After the victory Marines of the 5th and 6th Regiments, were recognized by a grateful French Government with the highest unit decoration France gives to foreign units that fight in the defense of France. The French Frourragere. In addition the French renamed the battle area the Wood of the Marine Brigade.

The Marines took high casualties attacking German machinegun nests that had interlocking fire in the tough terrain of heavy growth that was Belleau Wood. One of their battalion commanders said that there was a shortage of hand grenades and his men took the machinegun strong points with aimed rifle fire and bayonets. The Battle lasted 20 days. Supporting artillery was used sparingly, due to the closeness of battle lines. The Marines had a Machine Gun Battalion attached, but they were used to defend the town of the town of Chateau-Thierry on the River Marne.

The German units were from German Army Group Crown Prince - In Belleau Wood - the 461st Regiment of the German 237th Division; At Bouresches - elements of the 10th Division; Later reinforcements included elements of the 197th, 87th and 28th German Divisions.

Aimed fire and bayonet work was the reason the Marines were able to over come veteran German Divisions in this first fight of American Forces in WWI.

And if my memory serves me, US Army's Sgt. York with his bolt action, Springfield Rifle had a movie made about his capture of a German Battalion.

Never underestimate the power of a well aimed single shot.

[Bob's World]

A bit off topic, but my oldest son just assumed leadership of a team in the weapon's squad of his rifle company in Iraq. Pretty proud of him.

[Ken White]

Thank him for me and all my kinfolks... ;)

[Bob's World]

Wilco!

[Rifleman]

Never underestimate the power of a well aimed single shot.

On that note: http://www.worldwar1.com/dbc/woodfill.htm

I think I posted that somewhere before but I think it's worth posting again.

The actions of Sgt. York in the Argonne and the Marines in Belleau Wood are well known and deserve to be. Sam Woodfill's actions are less well known but just as impressive.

[jcustis]

a.) In heavy forest/jungle you can't see the target but you still have to suppress them, so high volumes of fire across broad arcs is merited. The physics of dispersion means this will only work at pretty close range.

I haven't fought in the jungle, but I've been in some very tight patches of veg in Thailand, so I understand the dynamics of old and juvenile growth in the bush...

Why do we presume that we can't see the target? Didn't the enemy sight their target before opening fire?

[William F. Owen]

Why do we presume that we can't see the target? Didn't the enemy sight their target before opening fire?

I suggest that enemy saw someone and fired. My own FTX experience and that I have garnered from others, is that in forest or jungle, often only one or two folks in each opposing group sight each other, and that is where the initial exchange takes place.
That leaves everyone else trying to contribute to the fire fight, while having no target picture, unless they can get forward to the point of contact - which is a valid drill.

[Bob's World]

I wish my uncle Hank were alive to weigh in on this. He carried an M1 Garand through several long years of jungle opns with the 27th regiment (Wolfhounds) of the 25th ID in WWII, and I mark his survival to the fact that he was probably hands down, the very best woodsman and marksman in all of Douglas County, Oregon. Uncanny eyesight and hearing, and an understanding of the environment born of a lifetime of hunting for his family's dinner and working in the woods as a timber faller.

I doubt he laid down much "suppressive fire," understanding that it gives away one's own position to do so. Particularly when you are not sure where the guys shooting at you are. I suspect he got very small and still, waited for some poor bastard to give away his own position, and then planted a .30 cal round vic. the middle of the guy's forehead, or whatever other body part he was careless enough to expose.

[William F. Owen]

I wish my uncle Hank were alive to weigh in on this. He carried an M1 Garand through several long years of jungle opns with the 27th regiment (Wolfhounds) of the 25th ID in WWII, and I mark his survival to the fact that he was probably hands down, the very best woodsman and marksman in all of Douglas County, Oregon. Uncanny eyesight and hearing, and an understanding of the environment born of a lifetime of hunting for his family's dinner and working in the woods as a timber faller.
No doubt a gifted and skilled man, but unless you can train those things into soldiers, for a reasonable price, then we are no further forward. The man we need to train, grew up in a city and has never slept a night outside in his life. The first rifle he had ever seen is the 2-3 MOA capable M4 you just issued him.


I doubt he laid down much "suppressive fire," understanding that it gives away one's own position to do so. Particularly when you are not sure where the guys shooting at you are. I suspect he got very small and still, waited for some poor bastard to give away his own position, and then planted a .30 cal round vic. the middle of the guy's forehead, or whatever other body part he was careless enough to expose.
I think context plays a fairly major part. If you get to shoot first, then an aimed shot is always best.
However, if you are being subject to heavy amounts of fire, from an enemy you cannot see, then I suggest a remedy may be found in doing the same but better.
Modern infantry tactics are in fact entirely built around the suppressive effects of small arms fire, so we cannot dismiss it lightly.

[Fuchs]

No doubt a gifted and skilled man, but unless you can train those things into soldiers, for a reasonable price, then we are no further forward. The man we need to train, grew up in a city and has never slept a night outside in his life. The first rifle he had ever seen is the 2-3 MOA capable M4 you just issued him.

I read a Vietnam autobiography of a LLRP and QRF soldier years ago. They had an indigenous scout as point man who taught him the whole point man thing and it seems as if the teaching took only a few months till he mastered it.

Sometime we need to learn to train our forces as if they were learning in actual combat (just with 100% survivors).

[Bob's World]

I believe that that stat is that if a soldier survives his first 30 days in combat, he is likely to survive his tour. Or said another way, those first 30 days are a bitch. The unit my uncle was in probably turned over in the neighborhood of 300-400% casualties each major operation it went in on. He said he got to where he could just look at the new guys and predict who wasn't going to make it, and that he avoided them in general as it was just too hard actually "knowing" so many people and having them die on you.

Not sure what the answer is, but we definitely owe the infantryman the very best gear we can. Too often that just isn't the case. The word "shoddy" is commonly understood to mean something of inferior quality. It is also a type of cloth used to make uniforms in the Civil War. I'm sure someone got quite rich.

[Compost]

An FN MAG-58/GPMG with 500 rounds weighs a total of 25.5kg. Distributed between two men this is 13.79kg and 11.76kg

An FN-LAR HB or modified HK-417 (heavy barrel, + bipod) with 500 rounds weighs about 21kg. This breaks down as a two man load of 10kg and 11kg.

Yes, magazines weight more than link, but the weight associated with belt fed weapons, tends to cancel this out, across realistic operational loads.

Now I have my own data sets, but I’d be grateful if someone wants to check those figures.

Definition of 7.62x51mm ammunition in STANAG 2310 has resulted in the national manufacture of rounds to various specifications. Most of those are for rounds which have a total weight in the range 370 to 393 grains, ie 23.98 to 25.47gm. (US Army data sheets published on the web have common ball, tracer and AP rounds in the range 387 to 393 grains.)

The weight of M13 links as covered by STANAG 2329 included the specification that 100 links should weight one pound, ie 454gm.

If those specs apply then a 100-rd M13 belt of 7.62 NATO will weigh 2.85 to 3.0 kg.

For light infantry, use of a free belt during tactical movement makes an MG liable to jam due to drag of the belt and especially its tendencies to twist and catch, and to collect and carry dirt into the action. So the system weight of such MGs should include one semi-permanently attached and easily refillable belt container (eg: MG3), or the weight of several quick attach/detach belt containers (eg: Minimi).

[RJ]

Bob's World posted

I believe that the statistic is that if a soldier survives his first 30 days in combat, he is likely to survive his tour. Or said another way, those first 30 days are a bitch. The unit my uncle was in probably turned over in the neighborhood of 300-400% casualties each major operation it went in on. He said he got to where he could just look at the new guys and predict who wasn't going to make it, and that he avoided them in general as it was just too hard actually "knowing" so many people and having them die on you.

What you said your Uncle said was typical of units in Vietnam 20 years later. FNG's that survived the first fire fight in good shape were included into the ranks and taught whatever was available or needed to survive. Those that didn't respond well after the first go round, usually didn't make it through their first month in the bush.

Again, not wanting to wave the Marine Corps Banner, but a lot of guys who I trained with were from NY City, South Boston and South Philly and assorted mid west cities like Chicago, St. Louis and Minneapolis.

The boys from the south were more familiar with the woods, bush or swamp, but after 5 or 6 months in a Marine Squad everyone in the squad was the same and in tune to night sounds and were suffiecently aware of what was going on. There were, of course shooters who took to the drill instinctively. The best point man I ever worked with was a Boston Southy named Breshahan. A tough, city boy who could move thru the bush without a sound.

Stealth can be taught and once aquired, never forgotten. I grew up in New York City, and my speciality after a couple of years in an infantry platoon was slipping up on my friends and scaring the crap out of them.

One of the kids in my squad was a stocky, fireplug of a man who would go on night patrols with out his boots on. He was from way back and beyond South Dakota. A small town guy who was beyond good in the woods.

Some people take to it naturally and others after a lot of practice.

When you are learning something that will keep you alive, the learning curve is high. It all comes back to leadership and training. When it isn't available, the lack of it will cost lives.

Country boys need to learn skills just like city boys. Rabbits and pheasants wont kill you, so just hunting will not make you a superior infantryman.

One of the drills we used to practice was taking out bridge guards with knife or wire from both ends of a bridge at the same time. More often than not we pulled it off.

The key was getting in place and then waiting for the No. 1 killer to make his move and distract the No. 2 guard long enough to let you taked him down. The guards knew we might be coming. Sometimes it took 3 or 4 hours to set them up. Everybody loses focus after awhile.

2 to 5 seconds after the slight commotion at the other end of the bridge got No. 2 guards attention was usually enough to put both guards down.

Practice does make perfect. In the drill we used tent pegs and clothes line.

Swift, Silent, Deadly isn't just a motto, ya know!:eek: Various platoons in the 6th and 8th Marines were not our friend. :rolleyes:

2nd Recon 60 - 61 after M/3/5 56 - 61

[William F. Owen]

So the system weight of such MGs should include one semi-permanently attached and easily refillable belt container (eg: MG3), or the weight of several quick attach/detach belt containers (eg: Minimi).

In my platoon(s) we just took a 58-Pattern Water bottle pouch, cut the top off and wired it the end of the feed tray on the GPMG. It carried 50 rounds. Everyone in the section was told to break belt belts into 50 round lengths.
The purpose built link containers, were heavy, noisy, unreliable and never used.

I guess we can factor in such weights, but they seem very marginal. I have 100-round Minimi link bag in the attic, so I guess I'll go weigh it!

[Kiwigrunt]

The purpose built link containers, were heavy, noisy, unreliable and never used.

I assume they are the metal ones you are referring to. Some nations, including Israel, have used a canvas 50 rnd bag, as pictured. I believe the US currently use a variation of this. I imagine that we will again be looking at something that weighs over half a kilo. Then again, with regards to Jcustis' remark about ergonomics (although he referred to the 100 rnd pouch under the Minimi) and Ken's reminders against dirt, it is IMO well worth the extra weight.

[William F. Owen]

I assume they are the metal ones you are referring to. Some nations, including Israel, have used a canvas 50 rnd bag, as pictured. I believe the US currently use a variation of this. I imagine that we will again be looking at something that weighs over half a kilo. Then again, with regards to Jcustis' remark about ergonomics (although he referred to the 100 rnd pouch under the Minimi) and Ken's reminders against dirt, it is IMO well worth the extra weight.
All sounds good. I consider some sort of carrier essential. The beauty of the water bottle pouch, was that is was very easy for the No.2 on the gun to reload.

I'd be amazed if they weighed as much a 500 grams, but I've been wrong before

[jcustis]

Thje Marine Corps Times is reporting in the latest edition that the IAR selection will be announced in Sept.

Betcha it will be one of the two Colts, although I don't think that prediction is a big stretch.

[William F. Owen]

Betcha it will be one of the two Colts, although I don't think that prediction is a big stretch.

I thought the Ultimax Mk5 was still in the running?

[Kiwigrunt]

I thought the Ultimax Mk5 was still in the running?

There are only four (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/02/marine_newsaw_020109w/) in the running, two from Colt, one HK and one FN.

The USMC are also putting scopes on their SAWs (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/05/marine_sawoptic_051809w/)

[RJ]

Remington just came out with a stubby .30 cal. hunting round for the AR-15.

The 30 AR upper mates perfectly with a .223/5.56mm lower. The round is the same over all length as the .223/5.56mm round. There are 750,000 civilian AR-15's in the hands of American shooters. The .30 AR has the exact same ballistics as the 300 Savage deer cartridge. The 30 AR launches a 125-grain bullet at 2800 fps from a 22-inch barrel.

This cartridge and the conversion engineered by DPMS could have several military applications. Especially in longer range accuracy and more brutal takedown power.

See the August 2009 Outdoor Life magazine article. It has a picture of the rifle on the cover, with the comment "Remington's new R-15 in .30 AR shot a 1.7-inch 20 shot group." Food for thought.

If my mind isn't blurring, 2,800 fps is what the standard .30 cal. ball ammo used in the M-1 Grand was rated at. Remington is producing two 125-grain bullets for it and FMJ is putting out a 123-grain practice round.

The four new AR's in the Marine Corps selection process now need to be rugged and easily maintained in extreme conditions. Heat, sand, Ice and snow, Rain and mud.

I'm looking forward to the results and the comparison write ups.

[jcustis]

There are only four (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/02/marine_newsaw_020109w/) in the running, two from Colt, one HK and one FN.

The USMC are also putting scopes on their SAWs (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/05/marine_sawoptic_051809w/)

I really wish we weren't putting optics on them. we could use that $33mil for so much more, like a good spares package for the new IAR, pruchasing new mockups and software modules for our ISMT marksmanship systems, and on and on.

[Kiwigrunt]

I really wish we weren't putting optics on them. we could use that $33mil for so much more, like a good spares package for the new IAR, pruchasing new mockups and software modules for our ISMT marksmanship systems, and on and on.

It would appear to me to be a good idea, what makes you think otherwise? (And the fact that some 30 % of the SAWs will be retired with the introduction of the IAR is probably not much of an issue as I’m sure the sights can be transferred.)
The Australians started putting scopes (1.5 X, as Steyr) on theirs quite some time ago. We never did and I was led to believe that the reason was that the gun is an area weapon and ‘needs’ to be used with an observer to correct the fire. Hmmmm, I’ve never quite understood that approach. I should think that adding a descent optic would allow the gunner, at least to an extent, to better observe and adjust his own fire. Especially for the SAW, which is more of a one-man weapon anyway.

I do wonder though, certainly with the current love-affair with the short-barrelled versions, if a red-dot sight might not be more useful (I realize that will not aid observing and adjusting fire). The UK see this weapon as having a max. effective range of 300, so relatively sort range, medium at best.
So, reserve magnifying scopes for the full-barrelled versions and for the gpmg’s.

The Dutch however have 6X scopes on their short-barrelled Minimi’s:eek:. Now that does seem a bit optimistic. Then again, they claim an effective range of 800:wry:.
For what its worth, they’ve not had them ten years and are already needing to replace 2000 of them as they are worn out. Now they do appear to be abusing them a bit with excessive rates of fire, but hey, their MAG 58’s are still going strong. Maybe Ken and others are on to something here…….

[jcustis]

Original USMC SAWs had an advertised max-effective range of 1,000m, without any optics. The ground truth was something a lot less than that, partly because we aren't all that good when it comes to training, but I'm not a big fan of magnified optics on basic-issue weapons in the first place.

I assisted a Reserve company with outfitting its para-SAW models with Eotech red dots that proved to be devastating at 75-150m. I didn't get feedback on longer range shooting, but I think we've regressed back from that capability with the shorter weapons anyway. I firmly believe that a SAW is best used as an area weapon, and in that capacity, scopes can be a funny thing, wherein the shooter loses wide-field of view ability and tends to get sucked into the scope at the detriment of rapid target aquisition across the sector of fire.

If we are going to go toward an IAR, then we need to resource it full bore, all out. Field it to infantry, LAR, and Recon battalions, and leave the rest of the SAWs alone. And heck, if we are going after the IAR because of mobility and weigt issues, why in the hell would we add any weight to the SAW? That issue is, after all, seven years old by now.

[Ken White]

I firmly believe that a SAW is best used as an area weapon, and in that capacity, scopes can be a funny thing, wherein the shooter loses wide-field of view ability and tends to get sucked into the scope at the detriment of rapid target aquisition across the sector of fire.ALL belt fed weapons are area weapons; their automatic fire and construction make them inherently inaccurate. They are marginal as suppression tools (other than the noise and the appearance of doing something) and are best at what they were designed for -- a large volume of defensive fire in a grazing or plunging mode, range dependent.

They can be applied to other tasks but are not optimum for most of them. When that failing is judged in relation to their weight, complexity and ammunition consumption (and thus logistic burden), they aren't nearly as valuable as many think...

[jcustis]

I got back to thinking about the Infantry Automatic Rifle concept and checked out several blog, industry, and forum pages discussing and critiquing the project.

We will be left with utilizing 30-round magazines only with any of the four contenders. It takes seven magazines to equal the capacity of one former 200-rd SAW drum, and SAW gunners can run a loadout anywhere from 200 to 600 rounds.

What I have not heard discussion of is the concept of employment for IAR-equipped gunners. It's obvious that we are past the point of the SAW vs. IAR debate, so what combat load should these IAR gunners carry? Is comparing 200 rounds in a SAW to 186 rounds in an IAR (accounting for -2 rds per GI-issue magazine for better feeding) a case of comparing apples and oranges, because the IAR is going to offer more precision and therefore a better hit-to-round fired-ration? I dunno.

[Kiwigrunt]

I do agree that beltfeds are typically area weapons, I just would have thought that giving them greater accuracy potential with a scope might help to cut ammo wastage down a bit and allow them to be used more efficiently when they are not required to be used for area support (so situations where they are used more in the AR or even IW role). Which, I imagine, would happen quite a lot given that there is 1 in every 4-man team (SAW anyway). All this under the ‘if we have them here anyway’ banner. Which of course goes a long way to supporting Ken’s standpoint.




We will be left with utilizing 30-round magazines only with any of the four contenders. It takes seven magazines to equal the capacity of one former 200-rd SAW drum, and SAW gunners can run a loadout anywhere from 200 to 600 rounds.

What I have not heard discussion of is the concept of employment for IAR-equipped gunners. It's obvious that we are past the point of the SAW vs. IAR debate, so what combat load should these IAR gunners carry? Is comparing 200 rounds in a SAW to 186 rounds in an IAR (accounting for -2 rds per GI-issue magazine for better feeding) a case of comparing apples and oranges, because the IAR is going to offer more precision and therefore a better hit-to-round fired-ration? I dunno.

Hmmm, I think you touched on a number of points there.
First of all, we are indeed not comparing apples with oranges because an AR is not an MG, as J. Eby reiterates in his article:


The automatic rifle is a small arm intended for short-term automatic fire missions against point targets. It is incapable of sustained automatic fire due to the lack of a quick-change barrel, which in turn, causes overheating, and the removal of the weapon from serviceable status. The AR is also fed from a detachable box magazine, not a belt, as is a true machine gun. Automatic rifles are NOT machine guns!

So I think you’re right. With a lower rate of fire and increased accuracy, you should not need the same 600 rnds that you would carry for the SAW. But I do think you would need to carry more than front-line for an IW as it is an automatic weapon and it will be used as such. Maybe some 300 to 400?
That would still give a very noticeable overall weight reduction (including weapon weight). But this would probably just have to be learnt and adjusted with experience.

Wilf, do you know what the Brits carried for their LSW before the Minimi came in?

Just out of interest Jcustis, you said in an earlier post that you use Magpull’s plastic mags. Do you under-load them as well? Or do they take 30 rnds without complaining?


More from Eby:

2/7 believes that the next step in increasing the lethality of the rifle squad does not consist of replacing the M249 SAW. Rather, squad lethality, both quantitatively and qualitatively, can be greatly increased in two very cost-effective ways. First, the M249 SAW should be used in the LMG role for which it was designed, not the ad hoc AR role for which it was purchased. Second, to ensure that each rifle FT possesses the automatic weapon necessary for the close combat fight, a true AR should be acquired.

This then raises another question. How many SAWs (as MGs) are still going to be used at squad level (to dilute the weight-gain of introducing an AR)? Another suggested option was to gather up to 9 SAWs into one support squad. That would seem to me to be a ‘solution’ to justify the new AR and keeping the SAW as well, which, at platoon level may well give an overall weight increase. Also, if you start using a 5.56 MG as fire support from squad to squad (effectively at platoon level), as opposed to within the squad, then the deficiencies of the calibre may well become more of an issue. That squad might be better off with 2 or 3 M240s, and/or some HE projection, me thinks.

So in my mind, I could only ever see an AR as replacing the SAW, not adding to it. That’s where the Brits are now, only they got there from the opposite direction. They now have one SAW and one LSW/AR (now disguised as DMR) per fireteam.
I fear also that if a number of SAWs will be kept within the platoon (even if on a golfbag basis) then they will eventually work their way down again to fireteam level.

It's really starting to look like we're getting far too many different toys to play with, just not necessarily the right ones. And we are looking to justify all of them:confused:

[jcustis]

Just out of interest Jcustis, you said in an earlier post that you use Magpull’s plastic mags. Do you under-load them as well? Or do they take 30 rnds without complaining?

Kiwi,

I keep them topped off minus the 2 rds more out of habit I suppose than anything else, although Magpul advertises a true 30-rd capability. I have tried inserting a 30-rounder in under a closed bolt, and I haven't noticed the resistance found when trying to do it with GI-issued mags.

My current mags are a personal purchase to transition to last deploy's GI mags that I modified with Magpul sef-leveling followers, which are the heat IMO. Magpul makes really reliable, sturdy stuff.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, do you know what the Brits carried for their LSW before the Minimi came in?


In a 4-man fire team, you were supposed to carry 4 x 30-round magazines for your IW, plus 2 x 30 round magazines for the LSW. So every man carried 6 magazines, plus a 150-round bandolier. - so 24 magazines in total, of which 12 were supposed to be dedicated to/support the LSW.

The real world reality was each man just carried 6 mags.

[jcustis]

Was the LSW a Bren?

[Kiwigrunt]

Was the LSW a Bren?

No, just the SA80 L86.
That's the silly thing with these classifications. The Brits adopted the L86 as their LSW. The Anzacs and Canadians adopted the Minimi as our LSW. When the Brits added a Minimi they had to re-introduce the term LMG, because the LSW slot was taken. Would of course be too confusing to have two LSWs.

The Bren in WWII era (one per section) actually had 25 magazines allocated, spread across the whole section.

[Fuchs]

About mech infantry squad sizes.

http://www.casr.ca/ft-editorial-cv90-lease-purchase-2.htm

[Rifleman]

To me it doesn't seem sensible to try and keep a traditional squad organization and size in units with vehicles designed for six or seven dismounts.

This is where some version of Wilf's fire team group platoon would seem to shine; three to five vehicles in a platoon each carrying a robust fire team, not part of a squad looking to find it's other half.

But I'm speculating. I've never spent a day in a mech unit.

[Ken White]

...This is where some version of Wilf's fire team group platoon would seem to shine...

...I've never spent a day in a mech unit.and I'm trying to forget it. Shudder...:(

Bad, bad things. Smell. Clank, clank... :eek::mad:

But I think you're correct on the Wilf Platoon for Mech, to get enough people and for vehicle combat redundancy (PC/AFVs do not have a great shelf life in MCO -- or even in mid intensity stuff...) you need Eight vehicles per Platoon with three man crews and five, not seven, dismounts each. Having some of the gear in follow on trucks will not work in mid level or greater. That gives you six 5 man Teams and a seventh team of Dismount Honcho (PSG /PL) plus two Medics, FO and RTO plus an eighth team with 60 mortar (.50 cal to 30mm on the vehicle does not replace indirect fire) or two GPMG.

Though why anyonewould want to stop being a light infantryman to ride on those things I'll never know... :D

[jcustis]

With any of these organizations centered on vehicles, the mission is the key. Are they recce troops, mechanized infantry, or something else? Do they support the vehicles, or is it the other way around?

In my community (light armored reconnaissance), the 3-man scout team has a tm ldr, AR man, and scout. The scout is templated to be the grenadier, but the M203 almost always resides on the TL's weapon. Among the four vehicles within a platoon, there is a senior (at times referred to as "chief") scout TL who can lead the other three teams during dismounted operations.

Massing of scouts for dismounted work has seen a variety of concepts come and go over the years, but our 25mm chain gun has some significant capabilities. I don't know what the CCV's gun is designed to shoot in terms of rounds, but I would hope it has the ability to select from dual feed for AP and HE with a switch adjustment.

I have to admit that even given a prescribed mission, even our boys perform tasks that are clearly outside the realm of recce. The same goes for a vehicle employment. It often seems as though we are willing for take on a much bigger opponent when we should in fact be sicking bigger dogs on it.:D

[Rifleman]

Leather Personnel Carriers.

Don't the Brits have a term for the action we call "humping." Something like "tabbing."

I like that term because it makes a good acromym: Tactical Advance By Boot.

[jcustis]

Leather Personnel Carriers.

Don't the Brits have a term for the action we call "humping." Something like "tabbing."

I like that term because it makes a good acromym: Tactical Advance By Boot.

I think it is also referred to as yomping.

[Kiwigrunt]

The Brit Para's use 'tabbing', the Marine Commandos use 'Yomping'.


Originally Posted by Rifleman
I like that term because it makes a good acromym: Tactical Advance By Boot.

You were close. It stands for Tactical Advance to Battle.

[Ken White]

With any of these organizations centered on vehicles, the mission is the key. Are they recce troops, mechanized infantry, or something else? Do they support the vehicles, or is it the other way around?kind that accompany Tank units. Mounted Infantry with no tanks is a different ball game, Recon is yet again different.

Recon requires different vehicles than than Mech Infantry. Some will say that's incorrect as the same type vehicles will confuse the evil enema. Any opponent worth worrying about isn't going to be fooled long enough for it to matter. That's usually just an excuse to avoid spending money on the right equipment.

Scouts need a small, highly mobile minimally protected vehicle to force them to use good TTP and not just go charging down the road until they get hit. We haven't had a good Scout vehicle since the M-114 died a too early death -- because the leadership wouldn't support Reconnaissance as a mission (when you don't know how to use something, you tend to think it's unnecessary... :rolleyes:).

You want me to Scout; I can do that -- and will take my time to do it right. You want me to move at a set speed, I can do that -- two different vehicle requirements. I can do the first with a 1/4ton (not a HMMWV, too big), for the second a LAV isn't well enough armored. Thus, if you have to balance those competing requirements, the LAV will work though it will have obvious problems at each end of the job. Still, all things considered, it will do the job -- and it was available. That's a lot better than an ideal vehicle that is not available. :D
I have to admit that even given a prescribed mission, even our boys perform tasks that are clearly outside the realm of recce. The same goes for a vehicle employment. It often seems as though we are willing for take on a much bigger opponent when we should in fact be sicking bigger dogs on it.:DAlways true and too often due to faulty employment. Goes with the territory, though. I've done 'economy of force missions' that should've had three times as many troops. Hmmm. since I got 'em done, maybe not. Great job, though, lot of fun... :wry:

[William F. Owen]

To me it doesn't seem sensible to try and keep a traditional squad organization and size in units with vehicles designed for six or seven dismounts.

This is where some version of Wilf's fire team group platoon would seem to shine; three to five vehicles in a platoon each carrying a robust fire team, not part of a squad looking to find it's other half.


Actually, I'd want the Platoon/Company/Unit organisation to be vehicle blind. Yes, 30 men can be 5 x 6 man teams in an MICV or use 4 x 8 man APCs/MICV.

The article Fuchs posted suggested that Fire Teams a primarily for reconnaissance. I agree with that. Then you need to be explicit about the roles of the platoon, and company.

[Red Rat]

The British Infantry is beginning to go down the path of a vehicle blind organisation - quite possibly because we have run out of vehicles!!

Light role battalions are beginning to look more like Mech and Armoured Infantry battalions in terms of their manning establishment. The underlying reason behind this is that in Iraq and more so, in Afghanistan, light role battalions are more realistically 'protected mobility' battalions possessing large numbers of vehicle variants.

The end result is that we amend the establishment, train on whatever vehicles are available (using them as Protected Mobility) and look forward when we get the proper vehicle fleet for pre-deployment training. ;)

[RJ]

Redrat,

NW Germany? Frankonia, Coberg Castle and Swienfurt?

I think that the Afgan War will be more about Infantry than Mech Infantry!

It is at least 110-degrees away from the Iraq situation.

[jcustis]

Gents,

I had a electronic copy of Wigram's notes/observation regarding battle drill, but it went adrift when I restored my hard drive in the wake of a malicious software attack. I'd like to get it back so that I can produce a hardcopy. Does anyone have a lead on this? IIRC, it was a few pages of a word document, but might be .pdf for all I know :confused:.

[davidbfpo]

Jon,

It was so fascinating I kept a copy on file.

davidbfpo

[jcustis]

Once again, you are a superstar David!


It was so fascinating I kept a copy on file.

It truly is...certainly more insightful than anything I have read from any number of more widely-published analysts from that era.

[Chris jM]

Having been away from the internet for a few weeks, it's taken a few hours to get through the points/ links posted - but it was well worth it. Thanks for the Wavell article davidbfpo - it links together a lot of what I read a month back in 'On Infantry'... and serves to confuse me that much more! I always thought that tactics came down to a choice between left flank, right flank or up-the-guts :confused:

One question I wanted to raise with the community here (I don't think this is side-tracking the issue, apologies if it is): the value of a 7.62 support wpn in the sect/ squad. If the individual wpn remains at 5.56 mm is it worthwhile keeping the Light Spt Weapon at that cal or is it worth going for the bigger round?

This relates to a number of discussions I've had within my unit, each of us with different views.

The LSW is not intended to replace a GPMG and that will still serve the role of fire spt/ veh mtd and as a crew served wpn in spt. Rather, I'm weighing up the merits behind replacing a 5.56mm Minimi with a 7.62 Minimi as the std issue LSW.

While I don't have data to hand I've heard reliable anecdotes that, while the larger Minimi doesn't have the heavier barrel of the GPMG (therefore reducing the ballistic capabilities slightly), the 7.62 Minimi is reliable and packs a greater punch than it's 5.56 brethren.

The cons (as I see it) are reduced quantity of belt that can be carried at the same weight/ volume and the inability to quickly relink or delink a universal round to either create more belt or more loose for the riflemen. I don't know if this is a tactical consideration, but I've done it A LOT in trg and consider it a definite 'nice to have'.

While I would say the information points to the 7.62 having more going for it, my personal view is more a from-the-guts feeling that figures if you want a 7.62 mm MG, then that's what the GPMG is for (and should be able to be sourced as a task specific wpn or carried if the threat/ theater situation demands it) and the LSW should match the riflemen's round. Interestingly most officer-level discussions tend to agree with the above, while most JNCOs I've tossed the issue to err to the 7.62 LSW option.

[jcustis]

I've read the Wigram piece several times and come away with a nodding head that he had really gotten it right.

Does anyone know what the response was from the Brigadier whom he addressed the correspondence to? In his closing, he asks for comment on his observations, and it would be beneficial to know if there were any.

Also, does anyone within the ranks have a copy of this: Lionel Wigram, Battle Drill and the British Army in the Second World War by Tim Harrison Place and published in War in History, Vol. 7, No. 4, 442-462 (2000)? It has got to be a gem, but Sage Journals Online requires $25.00 for a day's access.

Thanks in advance.

[William F. Owen]

I've read the Wigram piece several times and come away with a nodding head that he had really gotten it right.
...and the UK have still never put his work into effective practice! Having said that, the former Sgt Major ( now Major Gerry Long) of the Seniors Wing at Brecon, erected a Plaque to Wigram in the Sergeants mess, a couple of years back.


Does anyone know what the response was from the Brigadier whom he addressed the correspondence to? In his closing, he ask for comment on his observations, and it would be beneficial to know if there were any.
The long and the short, is that the letter, and some of his other comments were made known to Montgomery and it lead to Wigram getting sacked and demoted.


Also, does anyone within the ranks have a copy of this: Lionel Wigram, Battle Drill and the British Army in the Second World War by Tim Harrison Place and published in War in History, Vol. 7, No. 4, 442-462 (2000)? It has got to be a gem, but Sage Journals Online requires $25.00 for a day's access.
I have the book and have corresponded at length with the author. I can send you the article I wrote on Wigram for the British Army Review, if you wish? It covers everything (and more?) that the book does.

[jcustis]

I have the book and have corresponded at length with the author. I can send you the article I wrote on Wigram for the British Army Review, if you wish? It covers everything (and more?) that the book does.

Deal!

As for the sacking, I assume that had to do with subliminal critique of Regular Troops when Wigram was a Home officer?

[Fuchs]

I was less impressed by Wigram.

He got things wrong (just look at what he wrote about mortars) and didn't seem to have any skill in anticipation.
He wrote as if changes would not provoke reactions and as if all battlefields in the future would look like Sicily. He also failed to take into account that many of his observations are only valid in the special context of a German delay action in lateral hilly terrain.

He may have had several things (observations mostly) right, but I consider it inappropriate to cheer about someone who wrote a quite mediocre report three generations ago.
A real tactical talent would have had much better conclusions and advice. I expect more brainpower of every General than Wigram demonstrated.

Many German army basics and solutions that were certainly known to the British Army at that date could be used to solve problems cited by Wigram, yet he doesn't propose any.


On the other hand, the failure may simply be mine - I might have missed the point, of course.

[Kiwigrunt]

I have the book and have corresponded at length with the author. I can send you the article I wrote on Wigram for the British Army Review, if you wish? It covers everything (and more?) that the book does.

Yes please, I wish very much!:)

I too have read it several times and think he had some good idea’s. But as Fuchs points out, quite accurately I think, his observations may have been better than his idea’s. His idea’s are IMO a bit simplistic. One example I see (unless I’ve read/understood it wrong) concerns his platoon organisation in the advance where he splits the platoon into a riflegroup and a gungroup (with all the Brens). He appears to base the value of this approach on the fact that if the rifle group makes contact (Find) than the gungroup can immediately support (Fix). But what if the gungroup makes contact first? (remembering that the rifle group here has only bolt-actions.)

[William F. Owen]

I was less impressed by Wigram.
...as were a lot of British Army officers!


He got things wrong (just look at what he wrote about mortars) and didn't seem to have any skill in anticipation.
He wrote as if changes would not provoke reactions and as if all battlefields in the future would look like Sicily. He also failed to take into account that many of his observations are only valid in the special context of a German delay action in lateral hilly terrain.
Did anyone do better? He was well aware that any innovation would be countered, but he was faced with solving problems then for an(y) Army that was in real trouble at the tactical level. - the Report in written about Sicily.


He may have had several things (observations mostly) right, but I consider it inappropriate to cheer about someone who wrote a quite mediocre report three generations ago.
... because the observations had not been committed to paper by anyone else at the time. Wigram had commanded in combat at every level from Section to Battalion during his time in Italy. he was also the former CO of the Infantry Battle School and had developed modern battle Drill, almost single handed, - as it existed at the time. - and after 6 months fighting in Italy he realised he had to re-write it. He was killed before he could. Major Dennis Foreman wrote down Wigrams ideas in 1945, and it was produced as a manual/tactical note, but no copies survive!

A real tactical talent would have had much better conclusions and advice. I expect more brainpower of every General than Wigram demonstrated.
Again, who has done better? Who was the tactical talent? Literally tons of post operational reports were produced by the UK during WW2. Wigram's letter is one of the only documents of that date still regularly cited. The vast majority of his observations held true during fighting in the Falklands in 1982.

Many German army basics and solutions that were certainly known to the British Army at that date could be used to solve problems cited by Wigram, yet he doesn't propose any.
Wigram had access to all captured German infantry manuals of the time, and read them extensively. The issue is what the manuals did and did not say - plus he had to make them work with British infantry, and they were the near lowest quality manpower in the Army. - thus his emphasis on simple and effective solutions. - Platoon Grouping as opposed to Section.

[Fuchs]

...as were a lot of British Army officers!

Did anyone do better?

Eike Middeldorf

He was well aware that any innovation would be countered, but he was faced with solving problems then for any Army that was in real trouble at the tactical level. - the Report in written about Sicily.

Sorry, but that's not credible given quotes like this from Wigram's report:

"If we could throw some inc amn in our 25 prs we should have no further trouble with the Boche, and I suggest that something on the lines of the RAF oil bomb would be most effective. We can't blast him out but we could easily burn him out."

... because the observations had not been committed to paper by anyone else at the time.

That would be an incredible organisational failure.
Compare the German observations about army performance in 9/39 and the massive leader re-training effort prior to 6/40 to solve the problems (too hesitating infantry and so on). I don't know who was General of the infantry in 1939, but I strongly suspect that that guy was easily as good as Wigram.

Mediocrity may be exceptionally good in some organisations, but it's not worth to be praised - especially not after three generations.
WW2 was huge and thousands of others deserve to be more forward than Wigram in the line for praise.

Wigram had commanded in combat at every level from Section to Battalion during his time in Italy. he was also the former CO of the Infantry Battle School and had developed modern battle Drill, almost single handed, - as it existed at the time. - and after 6 months fighting in Italy he realised he had to re-write it. He was killed before he could. Major Dennis Foreman wrote down Wigrams ideas in 1945, and it was produced as a manual/tactical note, but no copies survive!

Compare to German officers who mastered infantry combat AND tank combat (most armour generals) or ground combat AND air combat (especially Kesselring) on small unit tactical to operational levels.

Again, who has done better? Who was the tactical talent?

I propose Middeldorf as a WW2 lessons learned author benchmark.

Literally tons of post operational reports were produced by the UK during WW2. Wigram's letter is one of the only documents of that date still regularly cited. The vast majority of his observations held true during fighting in the Falklands in 1982.

...which means little, as the Falklands ground combat was -as you agreed years ago- little different to WW2 ground combat anyway..

[William F. Owen]

Fuchs.

Yes Middeldorf is good. When did he write? 1950's?
English translations of Middeldorf? - none that I can ever find. - and he's GERMAN! How much good was that in November 1943?

There is absolutely no point in comparing him with Germans who survived the war, Germans of senior rank, or Germans with different combat experience.

Read my article on Wigram. He was a reserve Lt in 1941. He was regular Lt Col commanding unit in combat in 1943, plus he has set up the Infantry school and written it's primary manual. He pretty much single handily turned around British Infantry training. An incredible achievement.

The two key parts of the 4,600 word report - participation in combat and the Platoon Grouping were and remain unique for their time. They are true, useful, and it's a mystery as to why we have ignored them.
The whole subject never surfaced again until the mid-80's and then only because of Wigram.
Critically we now know Wigram's observations on combat participation closely correlate with SLA Marshall's but for reasons we can better explain - men are basically very scared in combat.

[Fuchs]

Middeldorf published in '54-'68, but he was responsible for lessons learned in the German army general staff in '43-'45, certainly writing a lot at that time.


Sit back for a while and have a look at what you write about Wigram and what you write about S L A Marshall. Both fail to deliver primary sources (interview transcripts) or proper statistics.

Where does this difference in judgement come from?
Did you learn about Wigram's report after you already agreed with him? Cognitive dissonance?

Or maybe Wigram's letter just fits nicely into what's believed to be known from many other sources? That would rate him automatically as nothing exceptional.

[William F. Owen]

Sit back for a while and have a look at what you write about Wigram and what you write about S L A Marshall. Both fail to deliver primary sources (interview transcripts) or proper statistics.
Sorry, but you cannot compare SLA Marshall with Wigram. Wigram observations were all first hand, as well as being gathered from talking to men he was fighting with.

It's not a letter! It's a post operational report! It's HIS OPINIONS based on what he saw! We only know about it, because Dennis Forman saved a copy of it, because he thought it important, and it cost Wigram his command!



Did you learn about Wigram's report after you already agreed with him? Cognitive dissonance?
Agreed with him on What?

Are his observations about the Sicily Campaign generally correct? - Yes,
Are his observations about men participating in combat generally correct? Yes, and made 4 years before SLA Marshall.
Does his Platoon Grouping system work, and was it an effective solution to a persistent problem. Yes

Was everything he wrote gold dust? No. He was a 36 years old, ill and exhausted. More over, if you actually study Wigram's entire body of work, some of his ideas, were frankly nuts! - but show me one other man who even comes close to his level of achievement and who's legacy is so enduring - yet almost unknown - in the British Army!

I learned about Wigram while I was researching suppression. I also found the only surviving copy of his privately published "Battle Craft" manual in an Army Archive. I subsequently tracked down Denis Foreman and Tim Harrison-Place, and interviewed them both for the Wigram article.

Or maybe Wigram's letter just fits nicely into what's believed to be known from many other sources?
Wigram was never, and is not now trying to prove anything. He made observations. Most of the important ones are generally correct.

[Fuchs]

Sorry, but you cannot compare SLA Marshall with Wigram. Wigram observations were all first hand, as well as being gathered from talking to men he was fighting with.

I think I did. I looked at similarities.
And honestly, I doubt that he did much fighting in Sicily. There's no neutral report on that available to me. People write a lot about their daring actions in wartime on long days (and especially so if they're keen on being regarded as battle-experienced).

It's not a letter! It's a post operational report! It's HIS OPINIONS based on what he saw! We only know about it, because Dennis Forman saved a copy of it, because he thought it important, and it cost Wigram his command!

I have a faint memory of someone who wasn't interested in opinions, but in facts and evidence. Statistics and such stuff. If I only knew what happened to him.

Oh, and it's perfectly OK to call a text according to its format. I can call a letter-formatted text a letter, I think. I wouldn't call blog posts "studies" either. He could have shed all the small talk if he didn't want it to be called a letter.

Agreed with him on What?

Are his observations about the Sicily Campaign generally correct? - Yes,
And you know that because of ...?

Are his observations about men participating in combat generally correct? Yes, and made 4 years before SLA Marshall.
Oh great, he's a journalist. He can collect opinions and multiply the info.

Does his Platoon Grouping system work, and was it an effective solution to a persistent problem. Yes
Oh great, he copied the German Stoßtrupp tactic. I am impressed ... NOT. Every Red Army infantry lieutenant knew about it.

Was everything he wrote gold dust? No. He was a 36 years old, ill and exhausted. More over, if you actually study Wigram's entire body of work, some of his ideas, were frankly nuts! - but show me one other man who even comes close to his level of achievement and who's legacy is so enduring - yet almost unknown - in the British Army!

A a bit more stringent criteria, please. The list of names would be too long like this. Especially if we consider all those who were forgotten.

What achievement? Setting up a tactics school at a time when hundreds were set up world-wide - and easily so, because ten thousands of new units were created out of thin air in a phase of arms race and global war?
Doing some basic lessons learned research and writing a letter-formatted 'report' that was quite lacking in good thought about what the specific experiences would mean under different circumstances?

The Americans had a general who moved from captain to General during WW2. Other nations had officers rising from junior NCO to Oberst (colonel) and serving with great success at all ranks.
There were junior NCOs rallying and leading entire companies on their own in the midst of extreme 10:1 of dds Soviet steamrolling offensives. Other junior NCOs did the same on the offensive, flanking the enemy after breakthrough with 'their' Coy, thereby collapsing the enemy division's front line.

We're discussing achievements in the context (opportunities and competitors) of WW2. What exactly is so impressing about Wigram? What?


I learned about Wigram while I was researching suppression. I also found the only surviving copy of his privately published "Battle Craft" manual in an Army Archive. I subsequently tracked down Denis Foreman and Tim Harrison-Place, and interviewed them both for the Wigram article.

Wigram was never, and is not now trying to prove anything. He made observations. Most of the important ones are generally correct.[
And you know that because?


Or maybe Wigram's letter just fits nicely into what's believed to be known from many other sources? That would rate him automatically as nothing exceptional.
.

[William F. Owen]

Fuchs.

Clearly we are never going to agree on this. I use Wigram to point out short coming in our beliefs about infantry training. He is a source I cite. He is not a light I follow.

Like you, I have read, studied most of the major infantry tactical doctrine works written since 1904/5. My opinion is that Wigram deserves credit. You may not agree. That does not change my opinion.

I suggest we continue this off-line and save all here from what will become a fairly pointless argument.

[Fuchs]

Sure, that was my point: Stop Wigram cold from becoming an art of war icon that he wasn't when he lived.

We actually seem to agree after some minor misunderstanding about the point I was really interested in.

[jcustis]

HK was picked to build the Infantry Automatic Rifle, utilizing its HK416 offering:

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/12/marine_IAR_120209w/

[Firn]

We will see how it performs in combat. Light and pointy is good as long as the recoil is not too heavy for its role. But there seems to have been quite some testing. It should be possible to purchase or to design a reliable ~100 rounds magazine for the IAR to give the gunner an interesting option to the standard mag. Such a high-capacity magazine looks like a good compromise between portability and sustained firesupport for a number of circumstances.

How is their GPMG support organized?

Firn

[82redleg]

How is their GPMG support organized?

Firn

I believe that the company weapons platoon has a machine gun section, with 3 squads, each of 2 x M240s.

There is also an HMG platoon in the battalion weapons company, which is usually combined with the TOWs to form CAATs (combined anti-armor teams). I'm not sure how the HMG platoon is organized, but it has a mix of M2 and MK19.

[Kiwigrunt]

HK was picked to build the Infantry Automatic Rifle, utilizing its HK416 offering:

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/12/marine_IAR_120209w/

That truly surprises me since it's little more that an M4 with a 16.5" barrel and a gas system. I would have thought that any of the other three are more of an AR, not that they appeal much to me. I would see this HK416 more as a realistic replacement for both the M4 and M16.

It will indeed be interesting to see how it will be received by the trigger pullers.

[William F. Owen]

HK was picked to build the Infantry Automatic Rifle, utilizing its HK416 offering:

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/12/marine_IAR_120209w/

I'm also surprised. When I was in Brussels, this week, I heard a presentation by the IAR Program manager and (spent some hours in the bar with him afterwards), and according to him, no decision had been made. In fact testing is on-going next month. Yes, the 416 is in the running.

[Kiwigrunt]

The Norwegians are having some minor problems with their HK 416's (http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2009/03/06/norwegian-soldiers-having-problems-with-hk416-2/).
There are a few more links regarding the HK 416 at the bottom of this article.

[jcustis]

An example of how not to use the weapons of your squad...

Silliness starts around the 15:00 mark.

[tequila]

Update on the IAR (http://militarytimes.com/blogs/gearscout/2009/12/03/usmc-iar-update-hk-is-not-a-lock/).


We’ve heard from sources in the DoD that the IAR program award is not a conventional contract award. From what we understand, this is actually a downselect to just one system as opposed to a contract win that gives the Corps the ability to make changes to the program that could include significant changes to the weapon or choosing an entirely different weapon in some circumstances. Acquisitions is more art than science, it seems, so bear with us as we try to get more clarity on this issue.

[Fuchs]

An example of how not to use the weapons of your squad...

Silliness starts around the 15:00 mark.

Did you intend to offer a link?

[jcustis]

Did you intend to offer a link?

I knew that...:D

http://www.france24.com/en/20091126-afghanistan-france-kapisa-afghanya-rima-marines-war-taliban-reporter

[Kiwigrunt]

An example of how not to use the weapons of your squad...

Silliness starts around the 15:00 mark.


A similar vid regarding a US unit and their fire-discipline was discussed here at SWC a few months ago.
Someone suggested then that it may have had something to do with putting on a show for the benefit of the camera. That may have been the case here; especially with that silly ‘mad minute’ at the end.

I wonder if there may also sometimes be a bit of frustration among these young heavily armed troops just wanting to make some noise in spite of stringent ROE and their inability to actually see the enemy and get stuck into them.

And by the way, that FKY-K spigot mortar sure is a quiet little weapon.

[Fuchs]

Question: Do we have a 40mm (LV/MV) expert among us?

[William F. Owen]

Question: Do we have a 40mm (LV/MV) expert among us?

I would never call myself an expert but I've written quite a lot about 40mm LV/MV and talked to all/most of the manufacturers.

I think 40mm MV has the potential to be significant weapon in dismounted operations.

[Kiwigrunt]

A bit more of an update on HK IAR (http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/tag/hk416/)
Politics or just gossip?

[William F. Owen]

A bit more of an update on HK IAR (http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/tag/hk416/)
Politics or just gossip?

See my other post> The 416 is in the running. So is a modified FN-SCAR like rifle. Neither is the front runner.

Of note, there were also 2 x NZ Army officers in the room, when the IAR program manager was presenting and they were certainly in the bar with us afterwards... :D

[Firn]

Harking back to the video and the idea of a 'trenchGL'.

I think we all agree that a little, cheap, camouflaged periscope might have been of great use for the pinned down men. As a matter of fact it would be rather easy to create the means to attack one to an UGL or a GL. I even made a rough design to figure out if one would be able to aim with it accurately.

To engage a target with effective short to medium 50-400m indirect fire you need the azimuth, elevation, range, wind and some other variables which can be handled by a decent FCS. If you are suppressed and you want to take your suppressor out you need to see and range it first. With a camouflaged periscope you can scan your target depending on the capabilities of your enemy in relative ease and range it roughly (mil dots) or precisely (LRF attached to it). It might also be sensible to be able to attach a digital camera to the eye piece, so that you can share the view with your section, fire support and other folk.

If the handler of the periscope (observer) and the grenadier have both an analog/digital compass on their system they can easily compute rapid and effective indirect fire if they are close together. With working digital maps and accurate positioning they can do so even if more distant - or the observer could just call in heavier IDF. However the observer and grenadier could be one and the same person if the latter has the periscope attached to his weapon. With two simple inclinometers (bubble levels with marks), the right way to attach the periscope, a capable ballistic computer and/or a lot of experienceand and maybe a guy reloading his GL he could put down quite some accurate, rapid, very reactive and easily adjustable firepower from behind cover.

It is of course for now just an idea, but it should be simple enough to be rather cheap and effective addition, especially for a certain type of environments and circumstances.


Perhaps I must add a rough sketch to make things more clear :D

Firn


P.S: I must still spellcheck

[Fuchs]

http://www.nrw2000.de/ns/pics_ns/ruhrkessel.jpg

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_V7Ehj7eG65Q/SBZBfavjMdI/AAAAAAAAAA4/08p7xBdHxYU/s1600-h/mg-peri.jpg (http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_V7Ehj7eG65Q/SBZBfavjMdI/AAAAAAAAAA4/08p7xBdHxYU/s1600-h/mg-peri.jpg)

http://media.photobucket.com/image/sniper%20periscope/bz6568/WWI/AustralianSniperUsingAPeriscopeRifl.jpg

Periscope-aimed weapons are old news. It works best if recoil is no problem:
Panzerfaust - recoilless
MMG - tripod handles recoil
Sniper rifle - single shot (recoil affects no follow-on shot)

Simple trench periscopes are even more common (although not officially supplied in many armies).

[Kiwigrunt]

....there were also 2 x NZ Army officers ....(snip)... and they were certainly in the bar with us afterwards... :D

Yup, that's where you'll find them.:p

[jcustis]

Question: Do we have a 40mm (LV/MV) expert among us?

No expert, but know enough to know we don't employ the weapon all that well. As for the round itself, I've fired enough and trained enough folks to fire, and have inadvertently stood on a pile of unexploded golden eggs at FT AP Hill, but what's the question or context of the question?

[B.Smitty]

Question: Do we have a 40mm (LV/MV) expert among us?

Has anyone here fired an MV round? I'm curious how much additional "effective" range they have, and their impressions concerning recoil.

[jcustis]

A bit more of an update on HK IAR (http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/tag/hk416/)
Politics or just gossip?

Okay, so the IAR is progressing...I am digging around on another board to elicit discussion about this weapon, but think better work can be done here. In no particular order, what are folks' thought about:

-What is the prescribed firing technique for this thing? Although capable of full-auto, if the rhythm is prescribed to be 3-6 rd bursts, what does it give us over a standard heavy-barreled carbine firing on burst?

-What is the recommended combat load, assuming a drum or large box magazine cannot be made to work well? I think 10-14 mags will be the starting point, and will slowly decrease to 8-10 from bulk and weight alone.

-How does the IAR factor into battle drill once it comes online? In open terrain fighting, do the other team members act to support siting and employment of the IAR, as they should be doing with the M249 SAW, or will this change the rules? The IAR, after all, was pursued even after marginal accuracy and suppression testing, because of the mobility complaints aligned against the SAW.

-What should qualification look like?

-This may be best suited to the world's most interesting man (Ken White :D), but what sort of pitfalls in training and employment should we be mindful of that also befell the BAR? Is the BAR even in the same class as the BAR, in terms of team/squad tactics?

I hope this primes the pump on good debate and discussion, because I'm afraid the equipment and new equipment training will come well before the doctrine has even been though out (or, in the case of the FMFM 6-5, simply omitted!).

[jcustis]

I think we all agree that a little, cheap, camouflaged periscope might have been of great use for the pinned down men. As a matter of fact it would be rather easy to create the means to attack one to an UGL or a GL. I even made a rough design to figure out if one would be able to aim with it accurately.

To make a periscope ruggedized enough for the average dismounted infantryman
would be to also make it too unwieldy for general carry and use, much like dragging around a spotting scope.

[Firn]

To make a periscope ruggedized enough for the average dismounted infantryman
would be to also make it too unwieldy for general carry and use, much like dragging around a spotting scope.

I would issue one per fireteam. Something else should be left at the base for it, as I think it is a pretty neat thing to be able to take a safe, long look over a wall or around a corner under enemy watch.


Let us google:

The Soviet Trench Periscope from 1940 (https://www.collectrussia.com/DISPITEM.HTM?ITEM=21302) seems to be not overly bulky and was considered to be very robust.

There is one (http://www.swatscope.com/) is newer and looks rather light. I have no idea how rugged it is.

Israel seemingly issues this periscope (http://www.uni-scope.co.il/categories.php?category=8). It is also part of Britain's fist, according to this link (http://defense-update.com/features/2009/sept/170909_fist_increment_1.html).

All in all periscopes seem to be in greater use than I imagined. :o

Well it was a great thing to have 90 years ago to scan the ground from behind safe cover, so it should be still a great thing to do the same job. At least it is worth a try.


Firn

[pumpkin644]

I have the book and have corresponded at length with the author. I can send you the article I wrote on Wigram for the British Army Review, if you wish? It covers everything (and more?) that the book does.
Wilf:

I am a Canadian attorney with an interest in the iconoclastic role played by certain lawyers in war-time. Wigram is a recent discovery. Can I take advantage of the offer you generously extended to jcustis and obtain a copy of your article.

Thanks muchly.

[Kiwigrunt]

I would issue one per fireteam. Something else should be left at the base for it, as I think it is a pretty neat thing to be able to take a safe, long look over a wall or around a corner under enemy watch.

It is also part of Britain's fist, according to this link (http://defense-update.com/features/2009/sept/170909_fist_increment_1.html).

All in all periscopes seem to be in greater use than I imagined. :o

Firn

IMO many of these gadgets (like periscopes and spotting scopes) certainly have great potential. These two in particular would be useful for static surveillance. I do however agree with Jcustis that all these gadgets add weight and bulk. I for one would not want them in my pack during a 12 day foot-patrol (are they still being conducted?.....don’t answer that:(). So, a toolbox in the back of a vehicle might work but beyond that….

There is perhaps another issue with creating an over- reliance on a kaleidoscope of gadgets. (disclaimer: my experience is pretty much pre-electronic gadgets). The need to drag them with you and the want to use them may well take some focus away from just getting on with the job. I was a good one for just that. I had my own belt-webbing made (issue stuff back then was crap) and collected plenty of stuff to fill it up with. My platoon commander commented on how impressed he was with the shiny kit and how he used to do that himself. Until he saw the light and did an about turn and started minimising right down to bare basics. As much as I am a gadget freak myself, I think there is a lot to be said for KISS.

Firn’s last link also shows the current fashion of tricking out the Minimi. That bipod is IMO cool for the likes of carbines, rifles and maybe AR’s. Not particularly suitable for MG’s though, partly because they don’t appear to cant.


Well it was a great thing to have 90 years ago to scan the ground from behind safe cover, so it should be still a great thing to do the same job. At least it is worth a try.

Here you may have shone a light onto something. 90 years ago trench warfare involved a lot of static surveillance. From there we evolved (back) to the big M's, movement, manoeuvre, mobility.
Now going by some of the vid’s I’ve seen lately, and taking into account the risk averse approach and the weights already carried, have we gone back to something that resembles trench warfare?:eek: In the last vid that Jcustis linked some days ago, that French unit just laid up behind that wall during the entire battle (if we can call it that). Hmmmm.:confused:

[Fuchs]

Taking cover doesn't equate Trench Warfare, but it doesn't equate Mobile Warfare either.
It's simply a necessity for water bag beings threatened by flying high-velocity lead.


One interesting trait of all periscopes is that they're almost impossible to detect & ID in a thermal sight. That's not very relevant for 'small wars', but very relevant for all stuff 'great wars'.

Any association with "Trench warfare" is therefore a huge problem because these items are really important for high-tech warfare (and thankfully they're also cheap for a change).

[Kiwigrunt]

-What is the prescribed firing technique for this thing? Although capable of full-auto, if the rhythm is prescribed to be 3-6 rd bursts, what does it give us over a standard heavy-barreled carbine firing on burst?

In the case of the HK, I would say it gives us nothing over any standard assault rifle with a bipod. In the case of the other 3 contenders I think it will only give slightly increased stability (as a result of weight) and (slightly?) greater sustained fire as a result of the open bolt and heavy-er barrel. Also, I wonder how long 3-6 rnd bursts can be sustained since even the Minimi has a prescribed rate of only 3-5 rnds.



-What is the recommended combat load, assuming a drum or large box magazine cannot be made to work well? I think 10-14 mags will be the starting point, and will slowly decrease to 8-10 from bulk and weight alone.

I’d be inclined to agree. But it would of course depend strongly on how the weapon would end being used.



-How does the IAR factor into battle drill once it comes online? In open terrain fighting, do the other team members act to support siting and employment of the IAR, as they should be doing with the M249 SAW, or will this change the rules? The IAR, after all, was pursued even after marginal accuracy and suppression testing, because of the mobility complaints aligned against the SAW.

And here is where I have my biggest reservations. This is where IMO the whole concept fell over for the Brits with their LSW (Wilf has been hinting on this….I think). The SAW, even though it was introduced as an AR, is clearly an LMG. Therefore it kind of deserves to be manoeuvred around and sited by the rest of the team. It’s potential (not going into the calibre debate) weight of fire justifies that doctrinal approach. The extent to which that is sensible at fire team level is another matter.

The IAR however is not an MG. Eby is also very clear on that. I believe that there is so little real difference between assault rifles and AR’s that a strong doctrinal differentiation is not justified and may lead to disappointment with the weapon. (see the Brit LSW again?)

I think we make a mistake to compare today’s AR’s with the BAR. First of all, the BAR was first introduced alongside the 1903 bolt action. There’s a big difference, to the point that within the realm of that comparison, the BAR was almost an MG. (Like the Bren versus the SMLE). The introduction of the Garand would have closed that difference a bit.
So I wonder if we should look at changes in doctrine not so much from a perspective of differences between the BAR and modern AR’s, but more from a perspective of the increased ability of rifles to take on the role of the AR (read for instance James Webb on squads).



-This may be best suited to the world's most interesting man (Ken White ), but what sort of pitfalls in training and employment should we be mindful of that also befell the BAR? Is the BAR even in the same class as the BAR, in terms of team/squad tactics?

Ken may also be able to tell us if, in his experience, the BAR was an improvement over the Gatling. :p(we have to tone that other thread down a bit:D).

[jcustis]

From there we evolved (back) to the big M's, movement, manoeuvre, mobility.
Now going by some of the vid’s I’ve seen lately, and taking into account the risk averse approach and the weights already carried, have we gone back to something that resembles trench warfare? In the last vid that Jcustis linked some days ago, that French unit just laid up behind that wall during the entire battle (if we can call it that). Hmmmm.

LOL, I think you are onto something. Current writings by some infantry officers are advocating a return to a very light infantry focus (reference the current Marine Corps Gazette). MRAPs certainly lend themselves to a sliggish form of fighting, if one could call it fighting at all.


And here is where I have my biggest reservations. This is where IMO the whole concept fell over for the Brits with their LSW (Wilf has been hinting on this….I think). The SAW, even though it was introduced as an AR, is clearly an LMG. Therefore it kind of deserves to be manoeuvred around and sited by the rest of the team. It’s potential (not going into the calibre debate) weight of fire justifies that doctrinal approach. The extent to which that is sensible at fire team level is another matter.

The IAR however is not an MG. Eby is also very clear on that. I believe that there is so little real difference between assault rifles and AR’s that a strong doctrinal differentiation is not justified and may lead to disappointment with the weapon. (see the Brit LSW again?)

I think we make a mistake to compare today’s AR’s with the BAR. First of all, the BAR was first introduced alongside the 1903 bolt action. There’s a big difference, to the point that within the realm of that comparison, the BAR was almost an MG. (Like the Bren versus the SMLE). The introduction of the Garand would have closed that difference a bit.

So I wonder if we should look at changes in doctrine not so much from a perspective of differences between the BAR and modern AR’s, but more from a perspective of the increased ability of rifles to take on the role of the AR (read for instance James Webb on squads).

Hmmm, so if the SAW was never really an AR because it deserved to be maneuvered like a MG, but the IAR is realistically not that much different from the other weapons of the team and therefore there might not be lessons to be derived from the BAR, where can we look?

I'm interested in the LSW matter now. Any good references?

[William F. Owen]

OK, I hope this helps.

An IAR and LSW are basically "ordinary" rifles with all or some of the following,

bipods,
better optics
Heavy/longer barrel.
Fully-automatic/selective fire.


There are many, many examples. The UK L-86A2, the Steyr AUG LSW, the FN-LAR etc etc. Almost every modern rifle has an LSW/LAR variant.
They are only creating more effective fire at longer range than the ordinary rifles. LSW are meant to use exactly the same mags as the rifles, and be manned by only one man, and usually scaled at 25% of the rifles.
Basically they are a rifle, with a better chance of hitting at longer ranges. Use them that way.

History here is not helpful, because form got confused with function very early on. The BREN was not an LSW (MG crewed by 3), but the BAR was sometimes (when crewed by 1).

If you have a fire team, of 4 men with rifles, you can make it more effective, for very little increase in weight/penalty by adding an LSW.

If you have a squad composed on a Rifle Group and Gun Group, you can make the rifle group more effective by adding LSWs - BUT - it may also be possible to concentrate 2-3 LSWs in the Gun Group and get better effects from an MG in the same calibre.

Written to more clarify my own thoughts, rather than preach to other folks - :D

[Rifleman]

Kiwigrunt,

Good post. Some thoughts:



The SAW, even though it was introduced as an AR, is clearly an LMG.

Agreed.


Therefore it kind of deserves to be manoeuvred around and sited by the rest of the team.

Agreed again, but is that a bad doctrine? Isn't that more or less what the Germans did with the MG42 and their nine man gruppe?


The extent to which that is sensible at fire team level is another matter.

Agreed. Three men may be too few to effectively work around and support an LMG the way eight German riflemen worked around and supported the MG42. Take one or two casualties in a fire team and that doctrine breaks down. This gets to what Paul Melody was advocating in his dissertation on the Army rifle squad as it is currently organized; essentially, Melody believes that an LMG is needed by squads but that one LMG per squad is enough and that more LMGs can't be effectively employed at squad level, thus the extra "firepower " really doesn't translate into more effective suppression.



The IAR however is not an MG. Eby is also very clear on that. I believe that there is so little real difference between assault rifles and AR’s that a strong doctrinal differentiation is not justified and may lead to disappointment with the weapon. (see the Brit LSW again?)

Then is it really needed? Or is the USMC too fixated on a modern BAR replacement because the BAR is what the fire team that they've had since 1945 was built around?


I think we make a mistake to compare today’s AR’s with the BAR. First of all, the BAR was first introduced alongside the 1903 bolt action. There’s a big difference, to the point that within the realm of that comparison, the BAR was almost an MG. (Like the Bren versus the SMLE).

I understand, but what else can we compare it to? Isn't it meant to fill a role that has been unfilled (as originally envisioned) since the demise of the BAR?


So I wonder if we should look at changes in doctrine not so much from a perspective of differences between the BAR and modern AR’s, but more from a perspective of the increased ability of rifles to take on the role of the AR (read for instance James Webb on squads).

I've read that article and Webb makes some interesting points. But if there isn't that much difference between modern assault rifles and ARs is a modern AR really needed? Or is the USMC too fixated on a modern AR because the squad and fire team organization that they've had since 1945 was designed around AR employment?

[jcustis]

I've read that article and Webb makes some interesting points. But if there isn't that much difference between modern assault rifles and ARs is a modern AR really needed? Or is the USMC too fixated on a modern AR because the squad and fire team organization that they've had since 1945 was designed around AR employment?

You could be onto something. We are often victims of the history that we strive to honor and understand, and the Marine squad organization has indeed been a long-standing organization that honestly has not been fiddled with much.

[Kiwigrunt]

Jcustis:

Hmmm, so if the SAW was never really an AR because it deserved to be maneuvered like a MG, but the IAR is realistically not that much different from the other weapons of the team and therefore there might not be lessons to be derived from the BAR, where can we look?

I wouldn’t necessarily say that no lessons can be learned from it (although I can't think of them), just to be careful not to make one on one comparisons, like Wilf says:


History here is not helpful, because form got confused with function very early on. The BREN was not an LSW (MG crewed by 3), but the BAR was sometimes (when crewed by 1).

Wilf pretty much hits the nail on the head again:


Basically they are a rifle, with a better chance of hitting at longer ranges. Use them that way.

If you have a fire team, of 4 men with rifles, you can make it more effective, for very little increase in weight/penalty by adding an LSW.

And of course some increase in ability to deliver auto-fire in a more sustained manner.
I think the key here is not to over-rate the weapon and base a doctrine on it that makes it the nucleus/pivot point of the team. It’s just a good tool that is handy at times, like the DMR, or 40 mm, or hand grenades, or Claymores.


Rifleman:

Agreed again, but is that a bad doctrine? Isn't that more or less what the Germans did with the MG42 and their nine man gruppe?

Well, that is indeed the question. But one separate to the AR conversation. And this is where I agree with Wilf again with regards to confusing form and function. For as far as I understand it, Melody talks explicitly about MGs, not ARs



Three men may be too few to effectively work around and support an LMG the way eight German riflemen worked around and supported the MG42. Take one or two casualties in a fire team and that doctrine breaks down.

And that is probably why it is not a good idea to have a ‘true’ (and heavy) support weapon at fireteam level under the assumption that the fireteam is there to support the weapon. I think that kind of defeats the purpose of the fireteam. That is why we used to have the gungroup/riflegroup combination. If every riflegroup (fireteam) becomes a gungroup, who’s gonna play riflegroup?
An LSW (or whatever we may call it) probably just wants to be a one-man weapon that is capable of giving some internal support to the team, but not one that becomes the reason for the team’s existence, like with a gun-group.



Then is it really needed? Or is the USMC too fixated on a modern BAR replacement because the BAR is what the fire team that they've had since 1945 was built around?

Exactly. That is pretty much my point. I don’t think it is really needed. Doesn’t mean it wouldn’t be handy though….



I understand, but what else can we compare it to? Isn't it meant to fill a role that has been unfilled (as originally envisioned) since the demise of the BAR?
…if there isn't that much difference between modern assault rifles and ARs is a modern AR really needed?

And again, that is my point. I can no longer see a need for that exact role. I think the very close gap between assault rifles and their AR versions make that need redundant.



Or is the USMC too fixated on a modern AR because the squad and fire team organization that they've had since 1945 was designed around AR employment?
That’s a good question. They may be…unless we are not seeing something. Maybe they are not envisaging a modern day mirror image of the BAR but indeed just an assault rifle with slightly improved support capabilities. Remember, they are not fully replacing the SAW, just adding to it and shifting some furniture within the platoons.

[Fuchs]

Considering that the IAR will simply be an assault rifle with fore grip and bipod, I assume that the USMC simply used this as work-around to replace the M-16.

By 2012 someone might claim that the USMC loves the IAR and will replace all ARs with IARs. Someone will publish a nice ppt to show that this is a revolution in firepower and they'll finally get rid of the M-16.

[Kiwigrunt]

Well, you could be right Fuchs.


Please bear with me guys as I sprout some more random thoughts and considerations. I’m just trying to:


[Write] to more clarify my own thoughts, rather than preach to other folks (Wilf)

And to add food for thought….or confusion….or obsession.


Let’s make some comparisons:
1.) Commonwealth section of the 70’s. Some 10 men with 7.62 rifles and a 7.62 GPMG in a gungroup. If you remove the gun, will you notice a difference? Most certainly.
2.) A similar size section with 8 M4’s and 2 HK416’s (I am of course picking the most extreme examples). If you remove the HK’s, will you notice a difference? Hardly, if at all.

When we used to establish a section night harbour we would dig a gunpit and take turns on the gun. Would we, in the second example, do that with the HK416? Might almost look a bit comical.


I’ve mentioned this before in an earlier post. When NZ first changed from 7.62 to 5.56, we maintained the original structure with one Minimi (which by the way is our LSW, so don’t confuse the concept of LSW with IAR) in a gungroup. Here the Minimi is the reason for the existence of the gungroup within the section. In the same way that the M240 is the reason for the existence of fire support sections at platoon and company level in US forces.
We then adopted the fireteam structure and added a Minimi, adding some substantial fire power. However, what shifted?
• Has the Minimi become a one-man weapon, like a support IW on steroids?
• Has the fireteam, consciously or subconsciously, become a default gungroup?
• Is the body-team the (default) gungroup or is it just the gunner and a rifleman?

The idea was of course to have balanced teams that can give each other mutual support. And that’s great. But (with LMGs at least) that almost leans towards having gungroupisch sort of teams that are reasonable well equipped for the support role. As the USMC have established, it is not so great for the ‘riflegroup’ role that the same teams need to be able to fulfil. The potential loss of flexibility and agility, and our habitual tendency to use the LMG as a true machinegun in the way that we used to, makes it harder for the fireteam to be anything other than a gun/support group.

So there does seem to be a shift from agility to weight and noise, which, as we know, goes beyond weapons carried. But maybe that’s just what the doctor ordered. Dunno. An example is some UK units when they first took Basra (is there an ‘h’ in there somewhere?). Apart from using the Warriors for awesome fire support, they were also mobile ammo dumps for the dismount sections that carried as many MGs as they could get there hands on. And that seemed to work. But then, we’re not talking light infantry here. Adding additional MG and other tools for specific tasks can of course always be done.

I’m starting to think that maybe we have two separate issues here. One is the physical constraints on the fireteam with regards to weight carried, versus their agility. The other is more psychological, with regard to truly understanding the roles (form and function) of the tools and the teams.

I’ll stop…..well, pause anyway….rambling and get my backside to work.

[Fuchs]

I worked on an infantry theory for defensive, low force density activities. It was about observing terrain and ambushing infiltrators.

The platoons were made up of four different types of teams in one stage of development:

"observation/sniping" and "soft ambush"
"observation/sniping" and "tank ambush"
"leader team"
"mortar team"

The first two were meant to switch roles from sniper team(2)+rear security element (3) to ambush teams. The change would happen by exchanging equipment (vests & weapons) in a hideout.
Very small infiltrations would be handled by sniping & mortar fire, with possible use of the security element's LMG against runners.

This quick change approach could help to minimise the weight carried in general.

[Firn]

I worked on an infantry theory for defensive, low force density activities. It was about observing terrain and ambushing infiltrators.

The platoons were made up of four different types of teams in one stage of development:

"observation/sniping" and "soft ambush"
"observation/sniping" and "tank ambush"
"leader team"
"mortar team"

The first two were meant to switch roles from sniper team(2)+rear security element (3) to ambush teams. The change would happen by exchanging equipment (vests & weapons) in a hideout.
Very small infiltrations would be handled by sniping & mortar fire, with possible use of the security element's LMG against runners.

This quick change approach could help to minimise the weight carried in general.


Rather interesting.

I actually wrote up some notes after viewing the video of the French operation and came up with the following for a platoon. Not that this are more rough ideas of functions than a clear presentation.

a) Mortar element - a mortar team which might cooperate with/also function as a UAV team. Frankly I have little idea how well that light UAV ability would work in practice. (Could give the mortar position away) It would only be advisable for mechanized infantry (weight!)

b) Observation team - tries to stay as hidden as possible, best if in depth and observe (identify, target acquisition). A sniping/sharpshooting capability can be added.

c) Heavy fire support group - Has at least one MG and maybe a supported, possibly specialised GL capability (ammunition shared, mulit-shot GL with good optics). Once again the exact composition depends alot on the METT-TC

d) Rifle element A - a small squad - when a decent AT is needed it will be split with one part going to B

e) Rifle element B - a small squad (could form a large squad with element A)

f) Leader element B


This was only a bit of personal thinking. I will try to make up my mind about the IAR and some other posts. Every element should have the chance to use a periscope. Some other than the observation element could put a spotting scope (or other optics) to good use. Depends a lot on the usual METT-TC.


Firn

[jcustis]

Considering that the IAR will simply be an assault rifle with fore grip and bipod, I assume that the USMC simply used this as work-around to replace the M-16.

By 2012 someone might claim that the USMC loves the IAR and will replace all ARs with IARs. Someone will publish a nice ppt to show that this is a revolution in firepower and they'll finally get rid of the M-16.

We have been experimenting too long on this to indicate that the USMC is looking to simply replace the M16. That's pretty far from reality, IMO. Just look at the history of the experimentation alone.

[Rifleman]

2.) A similar size section with 8 M4’s and 2 HK416’s (I am of course picking the most extreme examples). If you remove the HK’s, will you notice a difference? Hardly, if at all.

I think the USMC should ask themselves that question. In WWII and Korea, if they removed the BARs from the fireteams and just had four M1 Garands would they have noticed the difference? Most certainly. Now, with assault rifles, if they remove IARs from the fireteams will they notice the difference? Not sure, but likely not nearly so much as in the first example.


• Has the Minimi become a one-man weapon, like a support IW on steroids?

In US Army light infantry? Yes.


• Has the fireteam, consciously or subconsciously, become a default gungroup?

In US Army light infantry? Yes. How can anyone say otherwise when the SAWs will always be manned in an understrength fireteam? At least that used to be true. Maybe not today?


The idea was of course to have balanced teams that can give each other mutual support.

In the US Army that probably comes from an obsession of SLA Marshall's that squads have to be able to fire and manuever v. fire or manuever. That, plus Marshall's obsession with the idea that riflemen didn't shoot enough.


And that’s great.

Indeed it is, but it also strikes me as a watered down version of having balanced squads that can give each other mutual support.


But (with LMGs at least) that almost leans towards having gungroupisch sort of teams that are reasonable well equipped for the support role.

That, or gungroupish sort of squads that are equipped for the support role (with one LMG) but still have enought riflemen to clear a bunker or trench. Back to Paul Melody and the Germans again. Were they on to something? The more I read Melody's squad study and the German squad in combat paper the more sense they make to me. At least if you are limited to smallish squads employing the LMG at squad level.

That might not hold true for the big USMC squad, especilly if they drop the SAW from the fireteam. I don't know.


As the USMC have established, it is not so great for the ‘riflegroup’ role that the same teams need to be able to fulfil.

Then aren't you back to needing a basic element with only one LMG for suppression and enough riflemen for close combat? Yep, I'm gonna say it again, that may mean something close to a smallish squad that has to fire or manuever instead of fire and manuever.


I’ll stop…..well, pause anyway….rambling and get my backside to work.

Not me, I'm off today. :wry:

[Fuchs]

We have been experimenting too long on this to indicate that the USMC is looking to simply replace the M16. That's pretty far from reality, IMO. Just look at the history of the experimentation alone.

The really powerful people sometimes play with their pawns and allow them to move around a lot as long as they end up in the right place.

We Germans call that phenomenon "nützlicher Idiot" (useful idiot) - someone who is doing something wrong (edit: or something dirty), but is nevertheless useful to another one.

Also keep in mind we're talking about Generals. They were educated and trained for decades in tactics and strategy. I'm rarely impressed by high rank military competence, but I still think that they may be using deception tactics for a hidden strategy.
The frontal attack tactic has failed often enough against the AR-15.

[jcustis]

Also keep in mind we're talking about Generals. They were educated and trained for decades in tactics and strategy. I'm rarely impressed by high rank military competence, but I still think that they may be using deception tactics for a hidden strategy.

You give them way too much credit. :D

[jcustis]

Although the requirement for a larger box magazine may be withering away for the IAR (it's hard to tell based off the various news snippets), I understand that development of a 100-150 rd setup may be in the works.

Let's say a 100-rd magazine can be made to work with that long magazine well. Does that change the calculus of how much an IAR matters if it is taken away from a team? Even a 50-75 round curved magazine means something, but I don't suspect industry is going to try to crack that nut. Going bigger makes more sense.

One thing that leaves me scratching my head a bit is the barrel length of the HK416, as mentioned in articles so far. At 16", it is shorter than the M16A4 barrel, and a bit over the M4 barrel. I'm sure testing has demonstrated effects out to the desired distance, but it does make one ask...why not simply slap a full-auto feature on an A4?

[Fuchs]

...why not simply slap a full-auto feature on an A4?

There was a M-16A1 based AR in the 70's and early 80's, at least in the USMC. It was apparently disappointing.

[Rifleman]

There was a M-16A1 based AR in the 70's and early 80's, at least in the USMC. It was apparently disappointing.

It was simply a matter of designating one man in each fire team as the automatic rifleman. He had a bipod on his M16A1 and was supposed to fire in automatic bursts. I don't believe there was ever some kind of HBAR in service.

It seems the USMC is returning to the same thing, or nearly so. This 416 doesn't appear to be a modern BAR to me. Just an M16 with an operating rod.

[slapout9]

There was a M-16A1 based AR in the 70's and early 80's, at least in the USMC. It was apparently disappointing.

I was in from 72-75, all M16's were capable of full automatic. No problems once you learned the proper way to shoot full auto, but you will go through a lot of Ammo. It even had a lightweight bi-pod that could be attached but never saw it used much. A whole squad opening up on full auto at a designated target is some fierce fire power.

[slapout9]

It was simply a matter of designating one man in each fire team as the automatic rifleman. He had a bipod on his M16A1 and was supposed to fire in automatic bursts. I don't believe there was ever some kind of HBAR in service.



Rifleman, that is exactly right. You could not tell the difference between the AR man and a regular rifleman except he was designated as the AR man per squad organization SOP. Worked well IMO. The only complaint I ever heard was when they took the M-79 grenade launcher away and replaced it with the M-203.

[Kiwigrunt]

The only complaint I ever heard was when they took the M-79 grenade launcher away and replaced it with the M-203.

It's funny how people perceive things differently. I did my basic with the M-79 and couldn't hit the side of a barn with it. Well, I only ever fired a few shots with it. I had to drag it around a bit though and hated it. :mad:
On the 203 PI however, I was a bit of a sniper:D.....well....you know...
And soooo much easier to drag around with you.

[Kiwigrunt]

Rifleman:
That, or gungroupish sort of squads that are equipped for the support role (with one LMG) but still have enought riflemen to clear a bunker or trench. Back to Paul Melody and the Germans again. Were they on to something? The more I read Melody's squad study and the German squad in combat paper the more sense they make to me. At least if you are limited to smallish squads employing the LMG at squad level.

That might not hold true for the big USMC squad, especilly if they drop the SAW from the fireteam. I don't know.

Well, maybe the USMC are now on to the same thing. They haven’t yet defined how they are going to rearrange the furniture within their squads. It may actually work quite well for them as they could (and I believe that was one of the suggested options) have 2 SAWs in a support (heavy) fireteam and keep the other 2 teams light (ok, with their IAR). And when needed the 2 SAWs can split and attach to a team each, giving 2 x 6 man teams with a SAW each.

I am starting to think along the same lines as you, Rifleman. When the balanced fireteam setup with an LMG each first came out I thought it was ####-hot. I’m not so sure anymore.
Anyway, back to IARs.



Jcustis:
Let's say a 100-rd magazine can be made to work with that long magazine well. Does that change the calculus of how much an IAR matters if it is taken away from a team?

I doubt it will make all that much difference. First of all, if you were to use a full-auto A4 instead of an IAR, you can put that high-cap mag on there too. In fact, you can slap one on an M4. But either way, and depending on the particular IAR we’re looking at, at some point the weapon will over-heat. An A4 will of course do that a bit sooner than an IAR. A high-cap mag may invite for this to happen quicker. I think to justify a high-cap mag you need a pretty heavy barrelled IAR with open bolt, so almost a mag-fed LMG. And then you start to get to the point where you may as well stick with the SAW.



Jcustis:
One thing that leaves me scratching my head a bit is the barrel length of the HK416, as mentioned in articles so far. At 16", it is shorter than the M16A4 barrel, and a bit over the M4 barrel. I'm sure testing has demonstrated effects out to the desired distance, but it does make one ask...

Yes, that barrel length wouldn’t allow it to reach out very far, but then, standard 5.56 has it’s limitations anyway. So the emphasis appears to be on the full-auto capability rather than range. Then again, look at the barrel length of the now so popular Para-Minimi. That’s even shorter that the M4. Used to be a time when the heavier weapons, certainly MG’s, were the long-range weapons of the section.



… why not simply slap a full-auto feature on an A4?

And a bipod.
I’d say you would hardly notice the difference…..until it over-heats. And that is of course the main reason for an IAR. But the HK 416 does not seem to have a heavy barrel anyway.

I’ve searched the net (in vane) to see if I could find anything on the Dutch Marine’s Diemaco LSW (see picture, and these (http://home.comcast.net/~sfischer397/m16a2oblmg/index.htm) two (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WriIGNW1nKY) links for latest Colt version) It fires from an open bolt and has a fairly low rate of fire so sustained fire should be quite reasonable. The Danes have the same weapon but theirs fires from a closed bolt which may be part of the reason why it doesn’t work for them.


From Wiki:
The LSW used to be issued to "support gunners" in infantry squads. However in the future the Royal Danish Army will only use 7.62mm belt-fed machine guns for the support role. Most of the LSW's will be transferred to the Danish Home Guard since the weapon is perfectly suited for guard duty.
The main problem with the LSW, is that it's a new type of weapon looking for a role. For starters, it's not well suited to be a sniper type rifle. The 5.56 round in itself isn't accurate enough for longer ranges with a standard deviation of around 17mm at 100m. At least not when using a standard Nato round with steel penetrator core.
Secondly, in common with all light support weapons derived from rifles, the LSW is not a true fire-support weapon either. At least not when measured by the standards of a belt-fed machine gun like the MG3 (M/62), that is used by the Royal Danish Army. Without a quick-change barrel as found on true machine guns, the rate of fire is very limited as the barrel will overheat with any attempt at sustained fire. The Danish version of the LSW fires from a closed bolt and is prone to "cook-offs" (spontaneous firing of the weapon when a round is left in the chamber of a hot weapon) in the fire-support role. The drum magazines are prone to jamming and every fifth round must be lubricated when loading. (A solution to this feeding-problem is said to be underway however, according to the "Danish equipment service", but it remains to be seen as of June 2009).

The best use of the LSW seems to be from fixed positions or vehicles using standard magazines (see above) and where you would otherwise use the C7A1. It's heftier barrel ensures that the weapon still shoots true after prolonged single-shot firing. (Single shot firing mode is unique to the danish variant). With the C7A1 you need to compensate for a lower impact point after around 90 rounds fired according to Afghanistan veterans.


The plain vanilla Diemaco LSW does weigh 5.8 kg, which is (only?) 1 kg lighter than the original plain vanilla Minimi with full barrel. For some reason the Minimi keeps getting heavier, even with only half a barrel.

[Fuchs]

That design (Diemaco LSW, your attached image) is a poor one.
There's not always a need for automatic fire, and a smart design (open bolt operation in full auto, closed bolt operation in semi auto - that was already done in FG42 and earlier weapons) allows for a weapon that's both accurate AND capable of a high practical rate of fire.

That weapon wastes the accuracy potential of bipod and sight by mounting the bipod directly on the barrel. This disturbs the barrel's vibrations (not free-floating a all) and leads to terrible inconsistencies. Those inconsistencies may be intentional for auto fire at about 100 m, but it's otherwise just poor. (addition: The replacement barrel also has an additional bipod, same as with M60 - unnecessary weight!)


There may be a strong theoretical argument for a more even equipment with automatic weapons.
We agree that the BAR has lost its "special" status because its difference to a M1903 was much greater than to an M14.

We do most likely also agree that the suppression of only one or two true machine guns of your squad may be a problem (especially if things turn ugly in general).

We do most likely also agree that in some situations you want few very accurate shots while in others you prefer a high RoF, inside of covers even full auto fire.

It IS possible to mate that all in one design, and it IS affordable (assertion of mine based on imo enough background).

It could look like this
- intermediate calibre
- bipod
- free-floating barrel and other measures for 1.5 MOA dispersion @ 200 m
- 30-40 rds curved magazine
- closed bolt operation in semi auto, open bolt operation in full auto
- expensive 1.1-4x scope (or a cheaper combination of 4x scope and a 45° side iron sights fixed on 100 m)
- heavy modern metallurgy barrel that tolerates 300 rds in full auto without cooling break (or if compatible to dispersion requirement a quick-change barrel with grip*)
- A hand guard that protects the scope's field of view against hot air rising from the barrel (and helps to conceal the thermal signature of the barrel).

Such an "everyone's precision AR" assault rifle replacement might make real MGs as well as designated marksman rifles unnecessary and undesirable in the rifle squad. Heavier support weapons (real sniper rifle, real tripod machine gun) could be kept in a "base of fire" squad.

The rifle squad would be well-equipped for suppressive fires, precision fires with very low ammunition consumption and assault.


In short: A significant technical design step forward (or backward, if you think of the FG42) might provide what's needed to come to really nice compromises in infantry small arms problems.
Rifle squads could move without any small arms heavier than 6 kg loaded (without night sight) and would have unparalleled versatility and redundancy in regard to aimed /high volume fires.

*: It should be possible; an analogy are the modern rails that allow scopes to keep their zero after repeated removal and re-attachment.

[B.Smitty]

I don't know if everyone has seen these two articles, but they relate to the AR discussion.

Both are from Marine Corps Gazette,

Automatic Rifle Concept: Part I—History and Empirical Testing
by CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby

Automatic Rifle Concept: Part II—Reorganizing the Infantry Squad
by CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby

Here's a link to a repost of both articles on strategypage.com.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htweap/20070529/page2.aspx

[slapout9]

Here is the real answer the Johnny 7 OMA (one Man Army) with 7 guns in one and your Communications Helmet.:)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HbD91SNiE9g

[Kiwigrunt]

Such an "everyone's precision AR" assault rifle replacement might make real MGs as well as designated marksman rifles unnecessary and undesirable in the rifle squad. Heavier support weapons (real sniper rifle, real tripod machine gun) could be kept in a "base of fire" squad.

The rifle squad would be well-equipped for suppressive fires, precision fires with very low ammunition consumption and assault.

In short: A significant technical design step forward (or backward, if you think of the FG42) might provide what's needed to come to really nice compromises in infantry small arms problems.
Rifle squads could move without any small arms heavier than 6 kg loaded (without night sight) and would have unparalleled versatility and redundancy in regard to aimed /high volume fires.


I very much agree with you. This (http://www.lwrci.com/p-130-m6a4.aspx) in 6.5 Grendel could be a very good start. Although I question their stated weight for this weapon as being 7.4 lbs. I think they could be a pound out with that heavy barrel.

[slapout9]

The Stoner Weapons systems. Common Lower receiver that cound adapt to carbine,rifle,AR with magazine or Box magazine.




http://world.guns.ru/machine/mg41-e.htm

[slapout9]

Video of M16A3 Light Support Weapon with C-Magazine.



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WriIGNW1nKY

[82redleg]

Based on Melody's definitions, what both the USMC and US Army call "fire teams" are really "squads" (capable of fire OR maneuver, not both; the smallest, indivisible element, lead by a single leader) while what both services call "squads" are really "sections". However, the 4 man team is too small to be an effective "squad".

Proposal:
a. 6 man "teams" (the term doesn't really matter- we can call them teams in squads, or squads in sections)- 1 x LMG/IAR, 1 x UGL, 4 x rifles (including the leader).

b. 3 "teams", with leader and asst leader, makes a "squad" (again, I don't care if its teams in a squad, or squads in a section)= total is 20 pax

20 pax is plenty to conduct most operations in COIN independently, and much more robust (for all operations) than any currently fielded "squad", even if operating at the 75% strength that Melody says is typical.

A platoon composed of these "squads" would be huge (3 "squads" is 60 pax, plus weapons/MG squad, either organic or attached from weapons platoon), probably 75 pax or so.

Thoughts?

[Rifleman]

Based on Melody's definitions, what both the USMC and US Army call "fire teams" are really "squads" (capable of fire OR maneuver, not both; the smallest, indivisible element, lead by a single leader) while what both services call "squads" are really "sections". However, the 4 man team is too small to be an effective "squad".

I think he holds to that because that was the definition used by the 1946 Infantry conference.


Proposal:
a. 6 man "teams" (the term doesn't really matter- we can call them teams in squads, or squads in sections)- 1 x LMG/IAR, 1 x UGL, 4 x rifles (including the leader).

Six-man fire teams was proposed by James Webb due to his combat experience with understrength squads in his platoon.


b. 3 "teams", with leader and asst leader, makes a "squad" (again, I don't care if its teams in a squad, or squads in a section)= total is 20 pax

If a change that radical is to be made, I like Wilf's idea for a 30-man platoon divided into six five-man fire teams better.


20 pax is plenty to conduct most operations in COIN independently, and much more robust (for all operations) than any currently fielded "squad", even if operating at the 75% strength that Melody says is typical.

See above.


A platoon composed of these "squads" would be huge (3 "squads" is 60 pax, plus weapons/MG squad, either organic or attached from weapons platoon), probably 75 pax or so.

So a company is to be 200 plus strong? Or will it have fewer big platoons?


Thoughts?

My thoughts have changed several times since I began lurking on this board and reading other's input, but here goes:

Increasing the Army squad back to 11 men would be benificial and cause the least amount of disruption; same doctrine, but a more robust and resiliant organization and with a couple of extra riflemen for close combat.

That probably won't happen so.....if the Army squad is going to have to stay at nine men (usually just seven or eight actually present) go with Melody's recommendations and ditch the fire team subdivision and ideas of squad fire and manuever. The squad would be similar in organization and function to the WWII era German squad and fire and manuever would begin at platoon level. Four squads lets the platoon leader suppress with two, attack with one, and have a reserve.

I think Wilf's ideas have merit, but I just think the US Army won't go that far, at least not all at once. Of course, once four squads in the above platoon are attrited a little, it won't look too much different than Wilf's platoon anyway.

For clarification, let me say that I don't think of manuever as just moving. I think of it as enveloping, flanking, attacking on a new axis, etc. So when I say forget squad fire and manuever I'm not talking about bounding part of an element moving ahead while the rest of an element covers.

[jcustis]

Proposal:
a. 6 man "teams" (the term doesn't really matter- we can call them teams in squads, or squads in sections)- 1 x LMG/IAR, 1 x UGL, 4 x rifles (including the leader).

b. 3 "teams", with leader and asst leader, makes a "squad" (again, I don't care if its teams in a squad, or squads in a section)= total is 20 pax

20 pax is plenty to conduct most operations in COIN independently, and much more robust (for all operations) than any currently fielded "squad", even if operating at the 75% strength that Melody says is typical.

A platoon composed of these "squads" would be huge (3 "squads" is 60 pax, plus weapons/MG squad, either organic or attached from weapons platoon), probably 75 pax or so.

The easier choice might be to simply go with only two squads as part of the platoon (not including HQ folks) and you'd stay close to the USMC T/O strength for a rifle platoon. It might become unbalanced in a supported deliberate attack if you wanted two elements in the support-by-fire position and only one element in the assault, but that really just means moving a team out of a squad and attaching it to the SBF.

Not sure I'd want to keep any SAWs in those 6-man teams though. Perhaps only a couple in the Plt HQ, to be treated as true LMGs.

[Kiwigrunt]

Hehehe, the circle is complete;). We’re pretty much back to the platoon I suggested in my very first post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=42898&postcount=64).

Just not sure I still like that either. Rifleman, your 4 x 8 or so men sections/quads to a platoon keeps things simple and I think flexible. With a commando mortar and a .338 rifle at platoon HQ. And I’d have one gun (group) per section with a 7.62 gun with the ability to group them together, perhaps under the platoon sergeant. I think I'd prefer that over doing it the other way around, with the guns in a support section and dishing them out to the sections when needed there. End result is the same but it gives each gungroup a home without the need for that extra section. And it appears that in Astan they more often than not end up at section level anyway.

I’d forget about AR’s. Not rubbishing them for what they are, just don't think they are worth the.......well, distraction, almost.

There is indeed a lot to be said for the Wilf-platoon. For some reason I just can't take to it though. Perhaps just too used to sections, and not to fire-teams.

[B.Smitty]

I'm partial to keeping platoons smaller and attaching things like snipers/DMs and mortars from the company, as needed.

I like wilf's ideas about letting the mission dictate the internal structure of a platoon but I would start by giving the standard US Light Infantry platoon a haircut.

Basically remove the three, dedicated SL positions and have the SL command one fireteam and lead the other (8 man squads). Seems like 8 is easier to fit in vehicles (e.g. 2xHMMWV).

A platoon would be 32 soldiers,

PL HQ (8 soldiers)
1x PL
1x PSgt
1x RATELO
1x FO
2x GPMG gunners
2x Asst GPMG gunners

3x Squads (3x8 soldiers=24)
2xFire Teams, each with,
1xSL/ASL (Carbine/UGL)
1xGrenadier (Carbine/UGL)
1xCarbiner (Carbine)
1xAutomatic Rifleman (AR)

Yes, no LMG/SAWs. I could see having them available at the Company or Battalion level, as the mission dictates. But having all ARs in the squads means there are 24 soldiers in the platoon who can assault, room clear, etc.. And it lightens the fireteam loads and gets rid of one ammo type (5.56mm link).

The platoon could reorganize as 6x 5-man teams with a 2-man HQ, or other combinations.

32 soldiers will just fit in 8 HMMWVs, or 4 Strykers with seats to spare.

It would be nice if the carbines were modular like the German G36, allowing the carbine barrel to be swapped with a rifle barrel where longer-ranged engagements are expected.

It would be nice if the AR was based on the same modular carbine, but with a heavy barrel, open/closed bolt option, and a reliable, high capacity mag/drum.

I added a platoon FO, but I'm not sure if this should be attached from the company, rather than organic. Alternatives might be a medic, DM/Sniper, or GPMG squad leader. Each has advantages.

I would keep the company size at 130 like the US Army Light Infantry Company. This would allow 6 more soldiers at the company level to play with (by reducing the platoons from 34 to 32). My initial thought would be to add two to HQ to handle more ECO-like independent operations, and increase the Mortar Section from 6 to 10. That way it could have 3x60mm teams and a Section Leader. Or possibly allow them to swap out the 3x60mms for 2x81mm long-range mortars when foot-mobility is less important.

So the big minus is losing dedicated Squad Leaders. Is it worth the tradeoff?

Losing the SAWs is another potential issue. I considered increasing the company size to add an MG section that could be attached to platoons, as needed. But it seemed like just having SAWs available in an "arms room" at the company/battalion might be a better option.

All-in-all, it's still an austere unit, which may need augmentation from the Bn in many circumstances.

[jcustis]

The following message was released some while ago, and I just circled back around to read the fine print. Of note, six SAWs will be retained per infantry company (down from 27) and six for an LAR company (down from 14). I have no idea where those numbers came from, and since there are nine basic squads spread across three infantry platoons, a quantity of six does not offer balanced cross-leveling to the point of having one available per 13-man squad. It does, however, offer some interesting flexibility if it pans out that way, and I'm now even more curious about what sort of employment concepts will be developed for the IAR:


MSGID/GENADMIN,USMTF,2007/MARCORSYSCOM QUANTICO IWS// SUBJ/-INFANTRY AUTOMATIC RIFLE SOURCE SELECTION// GENTEXT/REMARKS/-REF/A/LETTER/MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND UNIVERSAL NEED STATEMENT FOR AN AUTOMATIC RIFLE (IAR) FOR THE INFANTRY CDTS # 01318UA/20NOV2002/ REF/B/CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT DOCUMENT FOR THE INFANTRY AUTOMATIC RIFLE, MROC DECISION MEMORANDUM 56-2007/18JUN2007/ REF/C/MARINE CORPS SINGLE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE INFANTRY AUTOMATIC RIFLE/ POC/XXXXXX/CTR/PM-IWS/TEL DSN: 378-XXX/TEL:
703-432-XXXX/EMAIL: XXX.XXXXXX@USMC.MIL
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THIS IS A REQUEST FROM MARCORSYSCOM (PROGRAM MANAGER INFANTRY WEAPONS) FOR USER REPRESENTATION ON THE SOURCE SELECTION EVALUATION BOARD (SSEB) FOR THE INFANTRY AUTOMATIC RIFLE (IAR).
2. BACKGROUND. IAW REF A AND B, A REQUIREMENT EXISTS TO ACQUIRE AN IMPROVED AUTOMATIC RIFLE FOR THE INFANTRY. THE IAR WILL REPLACE THE
M249 SAW AS THE ASSIGNED WEAPON FOR AUTOMATIC RIFLEMEN IN INFANTRY AND LAR SQUADS. THE IAR WILL ENHANCE THE AUTOMATIC RIFLEMAN MANEUVERABILITY AND DISPLACEMENT SPEED, WHILE PROVIDING THE ABILITY TO ENGAGE THOSE TARGETS OF MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO THE FIRE TEAM.
IAW REF C, PM INFANTRY WEAPONS (PM IW), MARCORSYSCOM, HAS INITIATED AN ACQUISITION STRATEGY TO PROCURE A MATERIAL SOLUTION TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS IN REF B. SOURCE SELECTION WILL BEGIN SUBSEQUENT TO RECEIPT OF SUBMISSIONS AND CONCLUSION OF INITIAL TESTING OF BID SAMPLES RECEIVED FROM INDUSTRY.
3. DESCRIPTION OF EFFORT. PM INFANTRY WEAPONS, MARCORSYSCOM WILL CONVENE A SOURCE SELECTION EVALUATION BOARD (SSEB) IN ORDER TO EVALUATE PROPOSALS FROM INDUSTRY, DOWN-SELECT TO ONE OR MORE VENDOR(S), AND AWARD A PRODUCTION CONTRACT(S) FOR THE INFANTRY AUTOMATIC RIFLE. THE SSEB WILL BE COMPRISED OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM MARCORSYSCOM, MCCDC, AND THE OPERATING FORCES.
4. UNITS AND QUANTITIES TO BE FIELDED. THE ACQUISITION OBJECTIVE FOR THE IAR IS CURRENTLY 4,476. THE IAR WILL REPLACE THE M249 SAW AS THE T/O WEAPON FOR THE AUTOMATIC RIFLEMEN WITHIN INFANTRY AND LIGHT ARMORED RECONNAISANCE UNITS. EACH INFANTRY AND LAR COMPANY WILL RETAIN SIX SAWS FOR MISSION-DEPENDENT USE AS NEEDED.
5. ACTION:
5.A. REQUEST MARFORCOM DESIGNATE ONE INFANTRY OFFICER FROM II MEF TO SERVE AS A MEMBER OF THE SSEB.
5.B. REQUEST MARFORPAC DESIGNATE ONE INFANTRY OFFICER EACH FROM I AND III MEF TO SERVE AS MEMBERS OF THE SSEB.
5.C. REQUEST MARFORRES DESIGNATE ONE INFANTRY OFFICER FROM MFR TO SERVE AS A MEMBER OF THE SSEB.
5.D. REQUEST ALL MEMBER NAMES, RANKS, ORGANIZATIONS, TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND E-MAIL ADDRESSES BE PROVIDED VIA E-MAIL TO THE MARCORSYSCOM P.O.C. NO LATER THAN 21 JULY 2008.
6. CONVENING DATES AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION.
6.A. ANTICIPATE SSEB MEMBERS WILL TRAVEL TO QUANTICO VA DURING THE FOLLOWING APPROXIMATE TIME FRAMES IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
EVALUATION: 14 SEPTEMBER 1 OCTOBER 2008, SSEB CONVENES TO EVALUATE TECHNICAL PROPOSALS AND RESULTS OF VERIFICATION TESTING. REPRESENTATIVES ARE REQUIRED TO BE AVAILABLE AND PRESENT FOR THIS EVENT IN ITS ENTIRETY. 5-20 NOVEMBER 2008, SSEB CONVENES TO EVALUATE FINAL PROPOSAL REVISIONS. REQUIRED ONLY IF DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFERORS ARE HELD. 1-18 JUNE 2009, SSEB MEMBERS SERVE AS ADVISORS IN IDENTIFYING THE RECOMMENDED SOLUTION FOR THE IAR. PARTICIPATION DURING THIS DATE RANGE IS DESIRED, BUT NOT REQUIRED.
6.B. DATES ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE BASED UPON PROGRAM SCHEDULE; HOWEVER, PM INFANTRY WEAPONS WILL COORDINATE WITH USER REPRESENTATIVES PRIOR TO THE ABOVE TIME FRAMES IN ORDER TO FACILITATE EASE OF TRAVEL AND MINIMIZE IMPACT TO MEMBERS SCHEDULES.
6.C. REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE BREIFED ON THE ACQUISITION PROCESS AS DESCRIBED IN SECNAVINST 5000.2C, AND THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATIONS, TO ENSURE THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES OF SOURCE SELECTION FOR COMMERCIAL ITEMS.
6.D. PM INFANTRY WEAPONS WILL PROVIDE ORDERS AND FUNDING FOR REPRESENTATIVES TRAVEL, LODGING, AND PER DIEM.
7. REQUEST THAT DIRLAUTH BE GRANTED TO PM INFANTRY WEAPONS TO COORDINATE WITH THE MEF-LEVEL REPRESENTATIVE.
//

[Kiwigrunt]

It appears a bit contradictory to suggestions made in other articles, like Eby’s.


THE ACQUISITION OBJECTIVE FOR THE IAR IS CURRENTLY 4,476. THE IAR WILL REPLACE THE M249 SAW AS THE T/O WEAPON FOR THE AUTOMATIC RIFLEMEN WITHIN INFANTRY AND LIGHT ARMORED RECONNAISANCE UNITS. EACH INFANTRY AND LAR COMPANY WILL RETAIN SIX SAWS FOR MISSION-DEPENDENT USE AS NEEDED.

Does that mean that they will be purchasing more later on or is 4476 enough to replace all ‘active’ SAWs, of which there are some 12000. So, with other words, what are the remaining 7500 SAWs currently doing if they are not with fire teams.


THE IAR WILL ENHANCE THE AUTOMATIC RIFLEMAN MANEUVERABILITY AND DISPLACEMENT SPEED, WHILE PROVIDING THE ABILITY TO ENGAGE THOSE TARGETS OF MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO THE FIRE TEAM.
That I get. I believe that’s how the USMC first got to the fireteam structure with 3 x BAR. In the dense jungle the teams lost contact with each other very quickly so each team needed it’s own support weapon. Currently though, and in all other armies that use the same principal, is the idea not also, and largely, to provide mutual support? That may still work, depending on the IAR, but this article would suggest that the IAR will be the heaviest support weapon at platoon level. Might make more sense to retain about 6 SAWs per platoon…..

It never ceases to amaze me how good the military are at treating their people like mushrooms. You’d think that by now people like yourself, jcustis, would have been informed as to what’s going to happen.:mad:
Oh, silly me, what was I thinking?:o

[82redleg]

Does that mean that they will be purchasing more later on or is 4476 enough to replace all ‘active’ SAWs, of which there are some 12000. So, with other words, what are the remaining 7500 SAWs currently doing if they are not with fire teams.


Not a Marine, but my artillery battery had 1 M249 (MTOEd as an LMG, with tripod and spare barrel, not as an AR) per howitzer, FDC, CP and a couple more (I think there were 5 or 6 in the supply section of 2 pax, that ended up in the hands of the ammo sections). I'd imagine that the USMC is the same way- quite a few M249s as LMGs in non-fire team units, where they can remain. The idea of the AR is to enhance the mobility of the infantry fire team- other units, especially those with vehicles, can benefit from the enhanced firepower of the M249 without being as negatively effected by its negatives.

[RJ]

82redleg - with respect "Not a Marine, but my artillery battery had 1 M249 (MTOEd as an LMG, with tripod and spare barrel, not as an AR) per howitzer"

Your experience is primarily battery security and not infantry ops. First you have to accept the depth and range of a 13 man squad with three 4 man fireteams under the control of a Marine Squad Leader compared to a Army 9 man squad with two automatic weapons.

The flexibility of the robust Marine Line Company Squad is a full third more effective in firepower and manuever against enemy strogpoints.

The Marine Infantry is transiting to a automatic rifle to increase manueveability and nimbleness on the battlefield.

JMHO but your experience is using M249 in the defensive mode to protect the guns, not to project the power of infantry in the assualt against enemy targets or strong points.

Two completely different applications. The grunts are in their attack mode and your guns are in a support mode.

We (grunts) love the artillery and naval gunfire to disrupt and destroy our natural enemy (the other guys grunts.)

The M-249 is a great defensive position weapon, but a lighter automatic weapon is needed to provide eye-ball support to the infantry in the assualt mode as an intergral part of a squad. In my day we had the BAR , a 19.5 pound, 20 round magazine fed bull of a gun.

Machine guns are an addition, and a welcome one, but as a base of fire or a strong point in a defensive position. But cheek by jowl an automatic rifle is a better assualt weapon than a machine gun.

As an old Marine Line Company Grunt, I appreciated the role and the support of the LMG .30's we had in our Weapons Platoon and their skill and backup was always appreciated. The cry "Guns Up!" always resonated with the Marines I led as a squad leader and later as a Platoon Sgt.

Machine Gunners were a special breed and could lay fire down that was the closest thing to a bullet proof vest as I
had ever encountered.

I'll let Ken White wax poetic about the flexibility and the impact on the battle field of a section of well trained guns. But they were supportive weapons for the guys with bayonets stuck on the end of their rifles.

Merry Christmas 82redlegs. If the 503rd Airborne Infantry Regt. (The Rock)
is part of the 82nd Airborne Div. I send my best wishes to them and theirs as well. I was priviledged to jump with with them in training jumps on Okinawa in the late 1950's and early 1960's to maintain my Jump status and collect jump pay.

They used to chant "AIRBORNE, ALL THE WAY!" while running in the mornings and as a member of the 5th Marine Regt. I enjoyed the motto as my Regt.'s Motto, dating back to WWI happened to be the same sans the Airborne appelation..

[jcustis]

RJ, I think you and 82Redleg ars saying the same thing. It appears that he was trying to highlight that there are M249s that exist in many other units besides the grunts.

Kiwi, if I read the slides and articles right, the IAR is scheduled to replace the M249s in the infantry formations, thus the small numbers.

[Rifleman]

First you have to accept the depth and range of a 13 man squad with three 4 man fireteams under the control of a Marine Squad Leader compared to a Army 9 man squad with two automatic weapons.

I admire the USMC squad. But I think it's pointless for light infantry soldiers to wish for it. The Army doesn't have it and they're not going to get it. It's not even likely that the Army will return to their former 11-man squad, which, when an M60 was attached to it, could be a pretty potent and flexible squad too.


The flexibility of the robust Marine Line Company Squad is a full third more effective in firepower and manuever against enemy strogpoints.

Point taken. No argument, but see above.


The Marine Infantry is transiting to a automatic rifle to increase manueveability and nimbleness on the battlefield.....a lighter automatic weapon is needed to provide eye-ball support to the infantry in the assualt mode.....In my day we had the BAR , a 19.5 pound, 20 round magazine fed bull of a gun.....But cheek by jowl an automatic rifle is a better assualt weapon than a machine gun.

Understood. But some people pointed out that having one BAR among three M1s was a different capability than having one HK416 among three M16s/M4s is likely to be.


Merry Christmas 82redlegs. If the 503rd Airborne Infantry Regt. (The Rock) is part of the 82nd Airborne Div. I send my best wishes to them and theirs as well.

They are now the infantry element for the 173d Airborne Brigade in Vicenza, Italy.


They used to chant "AIRBORNE, ALL THE WAY!" while running in the mornings and as a member of the 5th Marine Regt. I enjoyed the motto as my Regt.'s Motto, dating back to WWI happened to be the same sans the Airborne appelation..

They still do that. ;)

[82redleg]

82redleg - with respect "Not a Marine, but my artillery battery had 1 M249 (MTOEd as an LMG, with tripod and spare barrel, not as an AR) per howitzer"

Your experience is primarily battery security and not infantry ops. First you have to accept the depth and range of a 13 man squad with three 4 man fireteams under the control of a Marine Squad Leader compared to a Army 9 man squad with two automatic weapons.
...
They used to chant "AIRBORNE, ALL THE WAY!" while running in the mornings and as a member of the 5th Marine Regt. I enjoyed the motto as my Regt.'s Motto, dating back to WWI happened to be the same sans the Airborne appelation..

RJ- roger on all that. As jcustis deduced (evidently I wasn't clear enough), I was trying to point out that there are other places where M249s serve, besides in infantry fire teams. And Rifleman got the current location of the 503d right- 2 battalions in 173d ABCT.

As

[RJ]

Roger that, right back at chew. I understand and agree.

Merry Christmas and a healthy and Happy New Year for you and all your comrades.

[Doofous]

...but the small unit is a constantly changing entity, with reorganizations and realignments happening dynamically as casualties, tranfers and replacements can make the actual boots-in-boonies count fluctuate +/- 50%. Squad leaders become platoon sergeants and even platoon leaders, and the role and relationships within the platoon and squad reflect a reality unheard of at the strategic level. In WWII, infantry units wanted as many BARs and Thompsons as they could get for jungle and urban conflict; in Vietnam an extra M-60 gave much more than just firepower...it gave confidence. From what my friends in Iraq and Afghanistant tell me, it's the same today. "Weapons systems" have the same role as the M1s...kill the enemy...and that requires the firepower to be in the right place and in the right hands to inflict maximum hurt for maximum effect.

If you agree with this, then the organization reliance of formal roles and static relationships some support for riflemen become somewhat laughable. Flexibility, cross-training, and aptitude-based assignments are essential to coming back alive...something no TOE table will ever help with.

[Kiwigrunt]

Check out vids on Remington ACR (the old Masada) and Remington MSR bolt action here (http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/category/rifles/). Also the new UK DMR, the L129A1.

[Kiwigrunt]

And here’s (http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/category/weapons/) the MetalStorm 3GL 40mm Grenade Launcher.

Cool. Does add a bit more weight than a 203 though. And more length to an M4.

[William F. Owen]

And here’s (http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/category/weapons/) the MetalStorm 3GL 40mm Grenade Launcher.

Cool. Does add a bit more weight than a 203 though. And more length to an M4.

...if it works or when it works? Note the Video showed no down range effect. I've watched MetalStorm for 7 years now, and talked to them several times. As of now, I am very unimpressed, but I keep an open mind.

Might be good it we could just get 40mm MV into service!!

[Kiwigrunt]

Might be good it we could just get 40mm MV into service!!

Found these thoughts on Metal Storm by Anthony G Williams here (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/MetalStorm.htm):


2. Switch from the LV to the new medium-velocity (MV) rounds (which MS is already working on). These double the maximum range to 800m, but more importantly halve the trajectory height and projectile flight time to any range, providing far greater practical accuracy.
3. The only downside with MV ammunition is the increased recoil, since the muzzle velocity is raised to 105-120 m/s. It has been calculated that a weapon firing MV ammunition should weigh at least 5 kg to reduce the recoil to a level which the average soldier will find tolerable. A typical conventional single-barrel 40mm LV launcher, with stock, weighs around 2.5 kg, give or take a bit.

Could that be a reason why no one is yet acquiring the MV-rounds? A UGL under a rifle would just about come to 5 kg but would current UGLs like the M203 be able to deal with that increased recoil without falling apart? I recall being told that the standard scope on the Steyr drifts off by a few clicks after firing a number of rounds fired from the 203. That would no doubt be more profound with MV rounds and may not be limited to the Steyr.

[William F. Owen]

3. The only downside with MV ammunition is the increased recoil, since the muzzle velocity is raised to 105-120 m/s. It has been calculated that a weapon firing MV ammunition should weigh at least 5 kg to reduce the recoil to a level which the average soldier will find tolerable. A typical conventional single-barrel 40mm LV launcher, with stock, weighs around 2.5 kg, give or take a bit.

Huh? The whole point of MV is that it can use existing launchers. In fact it has been proven, and the recoil is well within limits, as is the chamber pressures. In fact the developers at MEI "de-tuned" MV to ensure all this. MV exists. It's not theory. (http://www.special-operations-technology.com/sotech-archives/52-sotech-2008-volume-6-issue-9/457-longer-faster-better-boom-for-your-buck.html)

I'll defer to Tony Williams when it comes to aircraft guns but I tend to disregard his writing on things infantry. He wrote an article for Jane's, about British infantry weapons in Afghanistan, which was less than great in terms of evidence, argument and conclusion.

[Fuchs]

(Para)militaries with Eastern bloc equipment tend to use the RPG-7 instead of BG-15/-25/-30, so basically a reloadable M72 LAW equivalent instead of the 40x46mm equivalent.

The larger warhead certainly helps in some cases, and I wonder whether they're up to a good idea.

There are quite lightweight 40mm HE-frag rockets (no supercalibre warhead) available for the RPG-7 and improving the RPG-7 in details and weight isn't too tough either (especially getting rid of the sustainer rocket in some rounds to minimize the visual signature).

The RPG-7 can be used with warheads in a range of 40 to 110mm (Panzerfaust 3 warhead, has been developed for the Polish Army), that should cover the whole range from grenadier to short range & cheap AT duty.


This might be worth some calculations and trials.


Btw, there's a little known Western weapon, it's a kind of reloadable M72 (range, calibre, weight): The French SARPAC. I think it's the most weight-efficient weapon in the ~67mm calibre range beginning with 2nd shot (unless you consider rifle grenades).

[Firn]

There are quite lightweight 40mm HE-frag rockets (no supercalibre warhead) available for the RPG-7 and improving the RPG-7 in details and weight isn't too tough either (especially getting rid of the sustainer rocket in some rounds to minimize the visual signature).

The RPG-7 can be used with warheads in a range of 40 to 110mm (Panzerfaust 3 warhead, has been developed for the Polish Army), that should cover the whole range from grenadier to short range & cheap AT duty.


This might be worth some calculations and trials.


It might very well be worth. It would be a relative light, dedicated weapon system with ammunition tailored for quite some needs. For the small warheads a reusable tube would be rather neat. That Sarpac sounds like an interesting take on the issue.

Wasn't the original Panzerfaust also used to a considerable extent as a very poor man's short ranged artillery?


Firn

[jcustis]

And here’s (http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/category/weapons/) the MetalStorm 3GL 40mm Grenade Launcher.

Cool. Does add a bit more weight than a 203 though. And more length to an M4.

In that video, the weapon is firing caseless, almost one-off rounds, right? I didn't see a case extraction process.

I'm curious how the firing sequence works.

Rig that setup in a special-purpose wpn the size of a M79 that I can sling over my shoulder, but not interfere to much with my primary carbine usage, and then we'll be talking. In it's current configuration, it is not practical.

[Kiwigrunt]

Huh? The whole point of MV is that it can use existing launchers. In fact it has been proven, and the recoil is well within limits, as is the chamber pressures. In fact the developers at MEI "de-tuned" MV to ensure all this. MV exists. It's not theory. (http://www.special-operations-technology.com/sotech-archives/52-sotech-2008-volume-6-issue-9/457-longer-faster-better-boom-for-your-buck.html)





Thanks for that link Wilf. And that does actually indicate that the 203 struggles with MV. The HK, seems to fare better.
Some quotes from that article:



That is something you can do with some, but not all 40 mm launchers. There are some launchers that can’t take higher recoil to fire up to 700–800 meters. We have teamed up with the companies who are developing new launchers to make sure that [our MV] system is the most flexible solution.”

He adds that ensuring the launcher can cope with the recoil forces is only part of the issue. “There has always been a question mark as far as the effect of recoil forces on thermal sights. There is more testing needed to say that it works, but as far as the launcher is concerned, it works.”


MEI had developed MV technology but had hitherto lacked a suitable soldier-level firing platform, due to recoil effects on the shooter and the M203’s inability to handle higher chamber pressures.

[jcustis]

“There has always been a question mark as far as the effect of recoil forces on thermal sights. There is more testing needed to say that it works, but as far as the launcher is concerned, it works.”

Interesting point. The use of certain thermals on M240 models was terminated because of the beating the optics were taking.

[Fuchs]

In that video, the weapon is firing caseless, almost one-off rounds, right? I didn't see a case extraction process.

I'm curious how the firing sequence works.

The rounds get the firing signal electrically. The forwardmost round is triggered, fires - and is propelled forward completely. Nothing stays behind except the later cartridges.

I only saw exmun, but the cartridges are most likely not caseless. They look (at least the exmun) a lot like all minie balls. The front is convex, the rear is concave - with the same shape. They fit into each other. The design of the exmun was conical.

[William F. Owen]

Thanks for that link Wilf. And that does actually indicate that the 203 struggles with MV. The HK, seems to fare better.
Some quotes from that article:

Yep, I did see that, but the guys at MEI and Chemring have developed MV to work in current issue launchers. The requirement for the UK is the AG-36 launcher. The whole issue for the development was to use existing launchers. The M-203 may "struggle", but until it's been deemed "un-safe" I suggest the pressures and forces are within limits.

[Firn]

Seems that the British infantry gets a new tool, a new sharpshooter rifle in 7.62 (http://www.defencetalk.com/new-sharpshooter-rifle-added-to-armys-arsenal-23747/).

Some ideas on how this will be used and integrated?


Firn

[William F. Owen]

Seems that the British infantry gets a new tool, a new sharpshooter rifle in 7.62 (http://www.defencetalk.com/new-sharpshooter-rifle-added-to-armys-arsenal-23747/).

Some ideas on how this will be used and integrated?


Firn

AAAAGH!!! :mad: I was told about this when I was back speaking in the UK last week!! I was told the plan is to put one in every deployed infantry fire team.

The weapon itself is OK, but all accounts, but I never cease to be amazed how the British Platoon manages to pile error upon error in a constant struggle to get it right and fail.

[SethB]

How so, Wilf?

I would have recommended a 5.56 weapon, but that's just me.

As an aside, a friend of mine was a consultant for LMT on the design of that rifle and he is the reason that it wasn't designed with a gas piston. Although I suspect the debate will rage on for a lot longer...

[Kiwigrunt]

I was told the plan is to put one in every deployed infantry fire team.



So what’s going to make way for it? The LSW? That is currently their default DMR in 5.56 but with a barrel nearly twice the length of this new one.
Their 8 man section is getting a bit small to fit all these different weapons in.
2 x L85
2 x L85 with UGL
2 x LMG
2 x LSW
2 x DMR
1 x GPMG (I read that’s back at section level in A-stan? So something would already have had to go)

Something’s gotta go and there aint many IW’s to begin with.
:confused: So I would assume that they may drop the LSWs and the GPMG???

[Fuchs]

Isn't it strange how infantry armament seems to move towards long range combat? Open terrain is generally not considered to be good infantry territory...

[Ken White]

and more lethality and shoot-through minor barriers (and shoot through in heavily wooded or jungle terrain where the 5.56 fails miserably) -- plus mountains (as in in Afghanistan where the west has its only current fight) also require added range. All that leads to two points:

The 5.56 was never and will never be a good combat round and is living proof that theorists should not have the final say on equipment purchases. * :mad:

The posited 200m combat rifle range which was and is fine for NW Europe is not universally applicable.:D

* (while the M4 is proof that Asst Cmdts at The Infantry School should never have the say on weapons purchases)

An allied point is that the light weight of the 5.56 only encourages profligate use of ammunition as does the dumb three round burst or full automatic option for most infantrymen. The Russian and later German use of lighter and smaller ammunition made sense for mass conscript Armies at the time. Unfortunately, the WW II Allies picked up the wrong message from that. Instead of focusing on small and lightweight, they should have focused on mass and conscript. Professional forces have significantly different equipment requirements. :rolleyes:

They also have significantly different training requirements...

[Firn]

I wonder how this rifle will work out in practice in the current fight. We already discussed the issue of the caliber quite at length, perhaps we will see if the cons or pros gain in the set circumstances mostly the upper hand.

@Kiwigrunt: I think the LSW will make way, albeight the use of this rifle might be highly depend on the specific METT-T. One per fire team seems to be a bit of a rigid concept.


Firn

[William F. Owen]

and more lethality and shoot-through minor barriers (and shoot through in heavily wooded or jungle terrain where the 5.56 fails miserably) -- plus mountains (as in in Afghanistan where the west has its only current fight) also require added range. All that leads to two points:

The 5.56 was never and will never be a good combat round and is living proof that theorists should not have the final say on equipment purchases. * :mad:

The posited 200m combat rifle range which was and is fine for NW Europe is not universally applicable.:D

Strangely while we agree on almost all else, this is where I slightly diverge from Ken White. - as a theorist!!! :D - but also former Infantryman though less experienced than Ken.

- Yes, 5.56mm is not a great round, but infantry rounds are as much about trade-offs as tank and aircraft design. Personally, I think the role of IW calibre is much over-stated in dismounted combat. Even back in the days of bolt action SMLEs, most UK infantrymen knew their rifle made very little contribution to winning the firefight. However, projected HE and MG fire did.

The real problem is that most infantrymen cannot hit targets under-stress and training has very clear absolute limits. You cannot train out the bodies physical reaction to fear,which is what degrades marksmanship at 100m by >90%. Regardless of operational conditions, 99% of the infantry cannot hit anything much over 200m, when using handheld IWs.


So what’s going to make way for it? The LSW? That is currently their default DMR in 5.56 but with a barrel nearly twice the length of this new one.
Their 8 man section is getting a bit small to fit all these different weapons in.
That's the problem! The new L129A1 is supposed to engage targets out to 800m - well so is the LSW, and so is the GPMG, and both are proven to do so. - so WHY?
The bolt action 7.62mm L-96s were supposed to graduate down to the platoons, as the 8.59mm L-115A3 had become the BN Sniper Rifle - but apparently the soldiers don't want to patrol with a bolt-action rifle - capable of shooting to 1,000m.

[kaur]

"Increasind small arms lethality in Afganistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer"

A Monograph
By
Major Thomas P. Ehrhart
United States Army

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=2515&filename=2516.pdf

[William F. Owen]

"Increasind small arms lethality in Afganistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer"

A Monograph
By
Major Thomas P. Ehrhart
United States Army

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=2515&filename=2516.pdf


The ability of the infantryman to deliver precise fire that incapacitates targets beyond 200 meters is limited by current equipment, training and doctrine.
This is opinion unsupported by data. The limitation of hitting targets over 200m under operational conditions is entirely human. It's nothing to do with equipment or doctrine. Yes, a magnifying optic sight and a bipod makes hits on the range more likely at longer ranges, but it will make no difference to combat behaviour.

First, the 5.56-mm cartridge has proven to be ineffective beyond 200 meters.
Again, opinion. No evidence and not true. "Ineffective" compared to what?" SS-109 5.56mm punch CRISAT at well over 300m dependant on barrel length! That will kill anyone hit in the head or chest, most of the time. There is a vast amount of casualty data to support this. Most knife wounds in the chest do less damage than 5.56mm yet are almost always fatal. Immediate incapacitation (highly relative) is not required at long range. At 500m you are not worried about someone still charging towards you with a machete!

The adoption of a conscript-Army mentality of marksmanship training, modeled for a defensive fight in Europe, fails to prepare soldiers for actual combat that could occur anywhere in the world.
True, but only if it done badly by stupid people.

Finally, a general lack of emphasis on appropriate small arms doctrine, written by subject matter experts, has resulted in poorly trained soldiers and leaders.
If he means most soldier do not understand infantry weapons or their employment, I would strongly agree! However some simple testing can very simply rectify this. It's been done and been ignored.