All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread) [Archive] - Page 2

Ken White

11-20-2010, 06:38 PM

I doubt there is anyone contributing to this forum that has more experience with air mobility than I do.As an aside, that's a bad bet around here, surprising folks pop out of the woodwork to respond to challenges. :D
I am telling you, using helicopters as the primary mode of force projection for a large force is impractical. It briefs well, but the cost, maintenance, weather, and fuel considerations make it nearly impossible.I for one agree -- but no one has, to my knowledge, suggested moving a large force; rather they have suggested randomly moving a number of small forces who could then be foot (or light vehicle) mobile and be resupplied by air sporadically.

That of course implies competent, confident units, not always present and the will to trust LTs and CPTs, not a plentiful commodity in the US Army. Both those shortfalls can be remedied. :(
It is a tool in the tool bag, but large armies have always and will always move along the ground.No question. What constitutes a large Army and where and when it is deployed and in what type of warfare it is engaged can however determine the ratio of ground versus air movement. Or should...

Fuchs

11-20-2010, 07:32 PM

The Air-Mech-Strike stuff for example.

It's professionally called "vertical envelopment".

The German air mechanisation concept of the 90's was probably a racket meant to justify two army helicopter programs against peace dividend demands, but it's nevertheless the gold standard for idiotic helicopter warfare ideas imho.

SJPONeill

11-21-2010, 07:25 AM

William F. Owen

11-21-2010, 08:13 AM

The feasibility issues of the ground versus helo argument aside, doesn't opting for air movement/mobility essentially cede the land environment and the all-important and much vaunted people to the other guy...? An element of devil's advocacy here...while I'm not a bid believer in the stated value of 'the people' to the outcome of these types of conflicts, I certainly don't think it's going to help the war effort if troops are whop-whop-whopping 'safely' overhead while the poor old people endure IEDs, bombings, intimidation etc etc on the ground...

Everything you say is true, if the folks employing the helicopters are stupid. It always amazes me that we just assume that given a tool, folks will be stupid.
The skill to apply the tool within context is required. Armies actually have to be good at warfare.

SJPONeill

11-21-2010, 08:49 AM

Sweet...how will an unstupid heliborne force maintain the same level of contact with the people while avoiding the same threat that MRAP was meant to (key = meant to) mitigate?

Subject to any advice from the aviation fraternity, does a helicopter not become exponentially more vulnerable every time it gets close to the ground and they will have to do that a lot to maintain the same level of environmental engagement...

I think that MRAP v Helo becomes moot when you consider the comments quoted by Ken White on the first page of this thread relating to boots on the ground (rergardless of delivery mechanism being how to win this kind of conflict...

And, with all respect to more learned contributors, but ML has a point...anyone who hasn't spent time on the support side of an aviation TG or TF probably hasn't a good handle on exactly what is involved in keeping large organisations of aircraft operating...

William F. Owen

11-21-2010, 11:33 AM

Sweet...how will an unstupid heliborne force maintain the same level of contact with the people while avoiding the same threat that MRAP was meant to (key = meant to) mitigate?
By dropping off and recovering foot patrols.

Subject to any advice from the aviation fraternity, does a helicopter not become exponentially more vulnerable every time it gets close to the ground and they will have to do that a lot to maintain the same level of environmental engagement...
It does. Use deception plans. Employ escorting AH. Fly at night, etc etc etc. Using helicopters means running risk.

I think that MRAP v Helo becomes moot when you consider the comments quoted by Ken White on the first page of this thread relating to boots on the ground
Concur. Match the tool to task.

And, with all respect to more learned contributors, but ML has a point...anyone who hasn't spent time on the support side of an aviation TG or TF probably hasn't a good handle on exactly what is involved in keeping large organisations of aircraft operating...
Maybe, but I've I believe spent enough time around military helicopter and, more importantly, helicopter maintainers to effectively understand their limitations within the scope of this basic argument. That is that, effective helicopter support is good to have and requires skilled and sensible employment. The basics of the argument depend entirely on the flight hours available per crew and aircraft, and the operational (not peace time) flight limitations. Cost is really arguing about voodoo magic.

Additionally, I would add that, for example, the US Army or RAF way of doing X or Y with helicopters may not provide the optimum performance that may actually be possible. The truth is usually that X organisation cannot do Y because of A,B,C. Not because it is actually impossible.

Moreover let us not confuse the great skill required to pilot and operate a helicopter with the level of knowledge required to task it effectively. Back in 1970, large quite complicated 14+ aircraft operations were routinely, planned and briefed by 22 year old SF NCOs. In same time period, moving light infantry Battle Groups over 100km were planned by unit commanders and aircraft captains in less than 1 hour. Since then, we have helicopters that are substantially easier to maintain, fly and navigate.

jcustis

11-21-2010, 12:07 PM

3 weeks? Show a time and place where this has happened? OK, Arctic circle and Northern Norway. Possible.

...but between the Tropics...SOG operations ran throughout the monsoon. I know of one patrol in Ulster that was "weathered in" for 4 days. Weather got very bad in the Falklands, but it never stopped helicopter operations completely.
None of the Lima Sites in Laos was ever socked in for 3 weeks, - that I am aware of- and numerous locations where Helo-supply only. I'm far more worried about MANPADs than weather.

Wilf,

The reality about weather conditions and flying in limited visibility conditions is simple. It isn't done, I suspect (even when there are times when it's probably really necessary), due to risk and the perceptions on the backlash should several a/c go down trying to fly in "red air". The ability to do it isn't really the issue, just the same as there are a litany of things that impact operations and what/when we are able to operate that would make you scratch your head and go, "how the frack did we let that get like that?" Perhaps M.L. can weigh in on this notion of Wx constraints a bit more.

jcustis

11-21-2010, 12:58 PM

I pointed at the truck convoy dependency as an indicator for the inability to dodge the road ambush problem entirely. Targets are available for the Taliban in abundance, and they can simply focus on the supply convoys and less on the patrols at will.

Outside of a few spectacular successes along Route 1 that have garnered more media hype than had actual effect, the TB aren't very good at targeting the logistical tail. These are not your Daddy's mujahadeen.

And, at least for the USMC, logistical support convoys aren't a drain on combat formations. The CSS guys (and gals) do it themselves.

To get back to the original thrust of this poster's question (and BTW, I think we missed the fact that he has not resurfaced with any more input), if not the MRAP in future war, what is the alternative?

I posed the point a few years back that the IED was a revolution in military affairs, but that was understandably knocked down. I'd like to pose to our scholars here a variation on that question. If the IED, used in future applications similar to how it was in OIF and OEF, drives reactions in wheeled and tracked veh development for the future, can that be considered a RMA?

We don't need MRAP, in my opinion, if we lose tactical mobility as a result. We might as well just walk, in most terrain situations. If you need to patrol in vast expanses where there are no people, then no, you don't need MRAP. The deploy I just returned from proves that.

Geronimo's post, which seemed more like an executive summary of sorts, but was back up by comments I agree with, still stands...Will we need MRAPs for the future?

In the Marine Corps, this is a serious question to address if the amphibious capability has to be retained for future contingencies. MRAP constraints are total game-changers when it comes to planning STS movement and even pre-boating them in the first place.

tequila

11-21-2010, 02:40 PM

MRAPs should be recognized as the emergency (panic?) measure that they were at the time. We were suffering disproportionate casualties from IEDs at the time in Iraq. MRAPs were seen as a technological, off-the-shelf solution that we could deploy quickly to the troops. Gates was a huge pusher of the MRAP from the understandable desire to "get the warfighter what he needs now", but I don't think any real thought was put into what we would do with a large fleet of engineering vehicles in the future.

I agree with Jcustis that we need to be ruthless about it and junk the MRAP for future operations given the limitations it puts on the force, saving certain design elements should be saved for future light vehicles. Unfortunately, budgets being what they are, I'm not sure if this is in the cards.

TAH

11-21-2010, 04:38 PM

Outside of a few spectacular successes along Route 1 that have garnered more media hype than had actual effect, the TB aren't very good at targeting the logistical tail. These are not your Daddy's mujahadeen.

And, at least for the USMC, logistical support convoys aren't a drain on combat formations. The CSS guys (and gals) do it themselves.

To get back to the original thrust of this poster's question (and BTW, I think we missed the fact that he has not resurfaced with any more input), if not the MRAP in future war, what is the alternative?

Glad to see that we can expand our discussion back to the "tail". That is where the biggest bang for the buck is :D Sorry, could not help myself.

Seesm to be general agreement that the current crop of MRAPs/M-ATVs are something less then ideal troop carriers out at the sharp end of the stick.

However, back in the "rear" where the MSRs live its another story. Not alot of stelly eyed killers (With a nod to our Marine breathen, who appear to be able to self-defend their convoys/Combat Logistic Patrols). For several years now, the Army has been deploying National Guard BCTs for the sole purpose of MSR security/convoy escort.

If that remains the case, then this maybe the best place for MRAPs to operate, in the rear along the MSRs. If not as equipment in mission profiled BCTs then as attachements or plus-ups to either MP companies, truck companies or both.

Ken White

11-21-2010, 04:55 PM

SJPOneill:
And, with all respect to more learned contributors, but ML has a point...anyone who hasn't spent time on the support side of an aviation TG or TF probably hasn't a good handle on exactly what is involved in keeping large organisations of aircraft operating... With an equal amount of respect, how much of that strength is desired versus necessary, a result of peacetime emphasis on factors that receive undue emphasis in such times and are of lesser concern during war? (The US Army is not on a war time footing. Elements are but the Army and the nation are not...) How much is due to very real and necessary concerns for both flight safety and operational capability but exacerbated or increased by open societies and inquisitive news media and a bureaucratic fear of shortfalls? How much is due to the way we western democracies allocate funds in our governmental budgeting process that rewards the larger bureaucracy? How much is due to the residual effects of conscription that once existed in our forces and designed structures where manpower concerns were not an issue? How much is due to structural demands that insist for X rank to be allotted, Y persons must be assigned... ;)

In short, You have a valid point but some of us may have a handle not only on the numbers but the many variations of why. Regardless, reality intrudes and I certainly acknowledge the numbers but do not see them as a deterrent to what several of us have proposed.

I posited more aircraft and fewer MRAPs based on reallocation of funds. My suggestion of more airmobile insertion -- not airmobile operations in the fullest sense in most cases (those would be reserved for very rare occasions...) -- was not predicated on that once possible but now non existent increase but on current assets in theater; just applying some different rules on usage. ;)

Wilf:
Moreover let us not confuse the great skill required to pilot and operate a helicopter with the level of knowledge required to task it effectively. Back in 1970, large quite complicated 14+ aircraft operations were routinely, planned and briefed by 22 year old SF NCOs. In same time period, moving light infantry Battle Groups over 100km were planned by unit commanders and aircraft captains in less than 1 hour. Since then, we have helicopters that are substantially easier to maintain, fly and navigate.Very true. I may not have the same sort experience in air mobility as that of an Army aviator but I've planned the ground phase on dozens of CAs up to Bn size and smaller unit insertions and extractions, some peacetime but mostly in combat -- and that effectively meant telling the aerial truck drivers what I needed their trucks to do in the way of any required reconnaissance, actual and false LZ operations and so forth as well as the aerial gun jeep drivers what I needed them to do. It also meant getting the USAF FAC or flight leaders in on the show. I use that allegory not at all in the pejorative sense but merely to put some perspective on what's important about the use of air assets in ground combat. The training and skill of the air crews was and is unquestioned but all airborne and airmobile operations are backward planned -- the actions on the ground are first outlined then how to get there and do that is determined. The aircraft are in support.

jcustis:

The reality about weather conditions and flying in limited visibility conditions is simple. It isn't done, I suspect (even when there are times when it's probably really necessary), due to risk and the perceptions on the backlash should several a/c go down trying to fly in "red air". The ability to do it isn't really the issue, just the same as there are a litany of things that impact operations and what/when we are able to operate that would make you scratch your head and go, "how the frack did we let that get like that?" Perhaps M.L. can weigh in on this notion of Wx constraints a bit more.In answer to the valid question of how it got like that, my belief is that you guys are operating under a more restrictive and risk averse version of the same troubles we had in Korea and Viet Nam -- you're at war, the rest of the country including the services headquarters are not. That risk aversion was present in those wars but it was relatively subdued. It seems far more powerful today and that is, I think, a reflection of the increase of the syndrome in our society at large; the services are merely a reflection of the society to which they belong. The nation has gotten overly cautious, dragging the services along with them. My belief is that given an existential war, that syndrome would be forced into at least abeyance. I hope I'm right on that... :o

Hopefully, M.L. will weigh in on that. It would also be good if Geronimo would reappear -- he raised a valid question and his opinion is as important as anyone else's here..

And, at least for the USMC, logistical support convoys aren't a drain on combat formations. The CSS guys (and gals) do it themselves.Very true and good for the Corps. My son has a great tale about two convoys he went to aid in minor firefights in Iraq, one Marine and one Army. Very different approaches. The Army has yet to get that smart, partly, I believe partly due to branch turf battles, partly due to a latent inability, certainly an adamant refusal, to realize that every Soldier really needs to be a rifleman. Yet another legacy of WW I / WW II / Drafted manpower thinking in the US Army...

Tequila:
I agree with Jcustis that we need to be ruthless about it and junk the MRAP for future operations given the limitations it puts on the force, saving certain design elements should be saved for future light vehicles. Unfortunately, budgets being what they are, I'm not sure if this is in the cards.I think you're correct. However, I hope you're wrong... :wry:

Ken White

11-21-2010, 05:04 PM

For several years now, the Army has been deploying National Guard BCTs for the sole purpose of MSR security/convoy escort.

If that remains the case, then this maybe the best place for MRAPs to operate, in the rear along the MSRs. If not as equipment in mission profiled BCTs then as attachements or plus-ups to either MP companies, truck companies or both.Not only ArNG BCTs but also AC Airborne and other BCTs. That is a monumental and IMO inexcusable waste of combat power in the case of either component. It is a testimonial to outdated concepts and an abject failure to adapt.

People are expensive. Training is expensive. Misuse of both is fraud, waste and abuse. Failure to adapt to world conditions is borderline criminal. Two wrongs don't make a right and all that...:mad:

I go back to an earlier point on the MRAP -- their presence encourages misuses of units and personnel. The vehicles need to go or they will continue to do that.

Pete

11-21-2010, 06:52 PM

I posed the point a few years back that the IED was a revolution in military affairs ...
Does that mean Wilf is counter-revolutionary in things military?

JMA

11-21-2010, 06:57 PM

Future of the Army MRAP Force

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles have proven their worth in theater where they have obviously become an integral part of combat operations. And regardless of where US troops deploy in the future, the persistent threat of IEDs dictates the continued need for this type of vehicle.

But its not as easy as saying "MRAPs are good, the Army should have them."

[snip]

Conclusion
The MRAPs have proven to be an excellent mission specific mobility asset in the CENTCOM Theater that will undoubtedly be utilized by the US in future combat and contingency operations around the world. Incorporating the MRAPs into the operational Army structure in the ways I described above maximizes this asset’s availability while reducing the high logistical cost burden that would prove untenable in the future.

May I offer that the first difference is whether these vehicles are for the use of motorised or mechanised infantry.

To motorised infantry (I suggest) for the purpose of getting from A to B and not fighting from.

I recommend that one attempts to sidestep the procurement system associated with such equipment development. (How many soldiers must die before the clowns involved with the process get their act together?)

As I mentioned in another thread the modifications to existing vehicle configurations can be carried out in theatre (or in a friendly neighbouring state - not Pakistan) on an as and when required basis. In fact as these vehicles will probably not have any application outside the current theatre all the work can be carried out in this factory on commercially available chassis. After the war they can be handed to the ANA or scrapped.

In Rhodesia a total of some 2,500 landmines were detonated. (No figures for which were military/police or civilian vehicles.) 650 deaths and 4,500 injured. Had a number of drivers who had detonated 3 mines with only some hearing damage.

The photos below represent some of the cheap but effective methods used to protect troops from landmines. The Pookie detected mines and was built on a VW Beetle chassis. The Puma and Crocodile were built on a Isuzu or Nissan 5 ton chassis. The Pig was built on the Unimog 2.5 chassis. All (except the Pookie which used low pressure tyres) had water in the tyres.

http://farm5.static.flickr.com/4085/5194876317_2b768dc0aa_b.jpg

JMA

11-21-2010, 07:07 PM

Geronimo's post, which seemed more like an executive summary of sorts, but was back up by comments I agree with, still stands...Will we need MRAPs for the future?
.

Of course you will. The word has got out that the IED has discovered the soft underbelly of the modern army.

The trick is to be able to improvise and act quickly as the theatre circumstances demand.

Do a Rhodesia... bang them together in theatre on commerciallly available chassis. Follow up with the mods as and when required and ditch the stuff when you go.

JMA

11-21-2010, 07:11 PM

Don't forget the logistical side of helicopter operations. You could easily end up replacing half the infantry in-theatre with army aviation people if helicopters would replace MRAPs unless the overall strength is being raised, which creates again logistical overhead....

An alternative would be to accept that wars kill your citizens, and pro/contra war reasoning should take this into consideration - and thus end up saying no to wars of choice. You won't be able to opt out of the KIA/WIA mess simply by throwing several billions at the bureaucracy and more billions at the contractors whose PAC has supported you or your representative.

Surely not a wholesale change from vehicles to choppers? I guess at least one can expect a more intelligent balance in resources.

Infanteer

11-21-2010, 07:58 PM

I can't beleive I missed this one.

Plus villages are where the people live. The key is to travel light and never stay in the same place more than 12 hours. Not as much fun as working out in an ad hoc gym on a FOB that takes an occasional mortar round but eases resupply in many senses and is considerably more effective.

To an extent, yes. You gave me this advice prior to my deployment and although I took it to heart, it lasted me 30 minutes (as a Pl Comd, I didn't really have a choice). Infact, we travelled heavy - couldn't avoid it - and stayed in the same place for 5 months.

Why. To the first part, "travel light" was almost impossible. Water is heavy and we needed lots of it. There was no way of getting around this except for getting around two force protection concerns. First was we couldn't use local water - most of it was mixed with village waste and agricultural fertalizers. Second was to use a small gator to pack extra supplies, but this was a no-no as we had a patrol killed on one some years back and we tried to avoid roads and paths. Result is we carried lots of water and this limited our range unless we got helo resup; dismounted platoon patrols weren't high enough on the list to justify that.

I've heard of the Brits using local water in Helmand; perhaps this was away from the heavily populated areas?

As to "not staying in one place for 12 hours", someone has to stay in the villages - as you mentioned, that's where the people live. Just coming to their village for a fight is a sure way to really piss them off. Someone has to share the security burden with them against a guerilla opponent, otherwise you are just cedeing a vacuum to the enemy. Galula's "Static" and "Mobile" forces is a good analogy. However, putting highly trained and equipped infantry in the static role is, IMO, a waste of resources, as they should be the "mobile force". But, in Afghanistan, we really didn't have anyone else to do the static piece. :confused:

I planned week-long patrols; my NCOs gave me wierd looks when I proposed them. First, the idea of long range patrols were limited by an extremely small AO - I could walk from one end of my company AO to the other in a day. Kandahar, although a big province, features quite a dense concentration of forces. Most of the province is deserts and mountains so all the people, those fighting and not fighting, are in a small green space around the Arghandab River.

So, all this is to say that travel light and never stay in the place is a good practice if the METT-TC provides for it.

Outside of a few spectacular successes along Route 1 that have garnered more media hype than had actual effect, the TB aren't very good at targeting the logistical tail. These are not your Daddy's mujahadeen.

Agreed.

And, at least for the USMC, logistical support convoys aren't a drain on combat formations. The CSS guys (and gals) do it themselves.

Us to - service elements generally get their own "force protection" element.

Ken White

11-21-2010, 08:45 PM

I can't beleive I missed this one.Missing the low hanging fruit is the first sign of aging... :D

To an extent, yes. You gave me this advice prior to my deployment and although I took it to heart, it lasted me 30 minutes (as a Pl Comd, I didn't really have a choice). Infact, we travelled heavy - couldn't avoid it - and stayed in the same place for 5 months.Totally understandable on all counts. My 'advice' was actually a statement of what I thought should be the policy in-country and I was probably remiss in not having made that very clear -- I also my have not emphasized the METT-TC factors strongly enough (though I rarely miss an opportunity to flay that... :rolleyes: ).
Water is heavy and we needed lots of it.Having soldiered during the days of one canteen and drink the local water (yes it'll make you sick -- for a day or two, then your system adapts -- and I realize this is not acceptable to many today...) I'll simply pass on that item except to comment on this:
Result is we carried lots of water and this limited our range unless we got helo resup; dismounted platoon patrols weren't high enough on the list to justify that.That, as the Actress said the the Bishop, is a policy problem. Not to make light of it and I understand; I just do not agree with it -- though I acknowledge the thought of using a $20+M bird and four highly trained people to deliver a Blivet or pallet of water to a lowly grunts at a cost of ~$2K an hour or more is frowned upon by many. Shouldn't be but somewhat understandably is.

My solution, long ago was to use far cheaper birds with a single pilot (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hughes_OH-6_Cayuse) . The Marine's solution is far better (LINK) (http://www.armybase.us/2010/02/k-max-demonstrates-successful-unmanned-helicopter-cargo-resupply-to-u-s-marine-corps/).
I've heard of the Brits using local water in Helmand; perhaps this was away from the heavily populated areas?My son's unit also did that on his 2006 tour out of Kandahar. They had a larger AO and ranged down as far as Spin Boldak and below on two to three week patrols (HMMWV mounted). Water source selection is obviously critical and METT-TC again hits...
As to "not staying in one place for 12 hours", someone has to stay in the villages - as you mentioned, that's where the people live...However, putting highly trained and equipped infantry in the static role is, IMO, a waste of resources, as they should be the "mobile force". But, in Afghanistan, we really didn't have anyone else to do the static piece. :confused:Policy again...

Better decisions early on (i.e. What do we want to do here, is staying required?) might have resulted in a different orientation. Unfortunately, all of NATO is caught up in the failure of the US Army during the 1975-2001 period to address what and how to conduct such campaigns -- or, better, to conduct far differently designed campaigns to achieve the same ends at less cost.

Those "staying in the villages" should be locals, that highly trained Infantry should be doing what they get paid to do -- which is NOT playing Wackenhut Security Guard in a village of 100 people.
So, all this is to say that travel light and never stay in the place is a good practice if the METT-TC provides for it.I've seen it work and strongly believe that is correct with the caveat that METT-TC MUST rule. My apologies for not emphasizing what should be a force wide policy as opposed to what was or is and for underemphasizing the METT-TC factors. Hope you didn't get embarrassed by adhering to my ramblings...

Pete

11-21-2010, 09:27 PM

I'll simply pass on that item ...
Is that anything like Liddell Hart's concept of the "expanding torrent"?

Infanteer

11-21-2010, 09:43 PM

Hope you didn't get embarrassed by adhering to my ramblings...

Absolutely not - in fact my boss agreed with and shared my intent, and I think we were both dismayed when we were turned into Wackenhut Security Guards for villages. Hence my disillusionment with pop-centric COIN after doing it for 7 months.

Fuchs

11-21-2010, 09:59 PM

First was we couldn't use local water - most of it was mixed with village waste and agricultural fertalizers.

I heard occasionally that the U.S. forces lack good portable water purifiers.

There's some really good stuff available (if you are able and willing to buy enough replacement filters) and I really don't get why its so under-used.

Kiwigrunt

11-21-2010, 10:03 PM

Infanteer:

…"travel light" was almost impossible. Water is heavy and we needed lots of it. There was no way of getting around this except for getting around two force protection concerns. First was we couldn't use local water - most of it was mixed with village waste and agricultural fertalizers.

Ken White:

Having soldiered during the days of one canteen and drink the local water (yes it'll make you sick -- for a day or two, then your system adapts -- and I realize this is not acceptable to many today...)

Infanteer:

I've heard of the Brits using local water in Helmand; perhaps this was away from the heavily populated areas?

May be the Brits used purifiers here?
We started using them in Timor and for as far as I know, with great success.
Afghanistan is of course different and issues I can think of from my armchair could be:

• There has to be local water to begin with (duh). In your case, Infanteer, you mentioned that there was, be it contaminated.
• Can the purifier deal with the level of contamination?
• The ‘waterholes’ (well, pump, river…) should not be so few that they become predictable IED spots.
• Fluffing around with purifiers would glue a patrol to a waterhole for some time.

davidbfpo

11-21-2010, 10:05 PM

From my armchair I do wonder why such devices as those on the links are not used, adapted etc. Links: http://www.lifesaversystems.com/ and for a longer explanation:http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/michael_pritchard_invents_a_water_filter.html

jcustis

11-21-2010, 11:34 PM

The photos below represent some of the cheap but effective methods used to protect troops from landmines. The Pookie detected mines and was built on a VW Beetle chassis. The Puma and Crocodile were built on a Isuzu or Nissan 5 ton chassis. The Pig was built on the Unimog 2.5 chassis. All (except the Pookie which used low pressure tyres) had water in the tyres.

JMA, Pookie is reincarnated in "Husky", which is a very capable platform that does its job superbly. Kudos to the guys with the huge brass-ones who drive those things.

http://www.militaryimages.net/photopost/data/504/Husky.jpg

At the issue of water purification, if we could employ a reliable filter, we could really reduce a lot of reliance on bulk and bottle water. That is a significant chunk of our logistics tail.

The issue of using the CIF-issued filters came up at least once or twice in my last deploy, but the silly thing is that the in-line filters aren't even issued with specifications that lay out what they filter. That's a terrible flaw in our procurement system. We have filters, but no one in the chain of command knows what they are supposed to protect against. :wry:

SJPONeill

11-21-2010, 11:52 PM

Making 'good' water is not as simple as just filtration...I note that the Lifesaver bottle only 'reduces' chemical residues and does not filter salts (which are a far broader group than the stuff that is in sea water)...from memory, I don't think that there is any process or combination of processes that will render potable water from some contaminants...

I don't quite remember the one canteen days but definitely recall the days of two canteens and having to fend for ourselves for water for sometimes weeks...one of the factors that I think may have changed between then and know is that then most theatres had relatively good water i.e. not polluted or contaminated except by some local nasties...now, many of our AOs have water sources that are contaminated by industrial and agricultural products that are essentially poisons so the old 'crap it out, harden up' approach may not be as applicable as it once may have been...

However on the water supply issue, I do agree that small patrols, certainly up to company level should be able to be resupplied indefinitely by air with drinking water if the air environment allows (terrain, weather and the other guys)...I always hated the log/med tables that insisted that we had to provide dozens of litres per person per day or ops would be untenable when practicality and experience proved that unwashed soldiers were not necessarily ineffective or undisciplined...

Ken White

11-22-2010, 12:29 AM

The problem is that the US Armed Forces are required by law to meet US civilian water purity standards. There are plenty of portable devices or methods out there that produce adequately safe drinking water -- not least Chlorine or Iodine tablet; Aquamira Tablets, among others, are better than either. The problem is that the tablets and most of the devices or filters don't meet the EPA standard. That standard is massive overkill but the bureaucracy will have its way...

For current bulk water production this is used (LINK .pdf) (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/wsh/250.pdf) and it is to be replaced by this (LINK) (http://www.waterandwastewater.com/www_services/news_center/publish/article_001718.shtml) with increased capability and it mounts in / on a HMMWV instead of a HMTT or Mk28 MTVR. The Army has a large number of Water Purification and Distribution units and was prepared for a major war and making much pure water. They were not prepared for a small war and making a little bit of pure water.

There are several smaller variants, including a number of Kärcher units and SOCOM in particular buys and uses outpost sized units. For regular Army Co / Plat size patrols, units buy these (LINK) (http://www.katadyn.com/usen/katadyn-products/products/katadynshopconnect/katadyn-water-filters-backcountry-series-products/katadyn-vario-usa/) with own funds. They don't advertise that they have and use them due to the extremely stringent US EPA Water Safety standards. This new item (LINK .pdf) (http://www.miox.com/Images/PDF/MSR_MIOX_Purifier_Military.pdf) apparently meets the standards and is to be bought on a major contract. Note that it already has a NSN and a GSA contract.

I would make a comment about just ignoring civilian rules in combat zone but that might be considered subversion so I will not do that. Sigh... ;)

Ken White

11-22-2010, 12:46 AM

one of the factors that I think may have changed between then and know is that then most theatres had relatively good water i.e. not polluted or contaminated except by some local nasties...now, many of our AOs have water sources that are contaminated by industrial and agricultural products that are essentially poisons so the old 'crap it out, harden up' approach may not be as applicable as it once may have been...My info from folks in several theaters now or recently is that it's still every bit as applicable, it's just less politically and socially acceptable. We are all risk averse now... :rolleyes:

Note that is with the caveat, as always, that a bit of common sense must be applied. Do it on first arrival in theater, in the base area where the sickness (if any) can be better tolerated, that way if you later have to do local water -- or food -- operationally, your body will have already been conditioned to the resident fauna, flora and creepy crawlies. A few toxins now and then keep the immune system well tuned.

Still, even then one has to think. For example, one should succumb to thirst in a rice paddy only if one is really extremely parched. A side benefit to paddy water is that you do get the small Crayfish for protein as well. :D

At least, I think they were Crayfish... :o

Pete

11-22-2010, 12:52 AM

The filters used to purify water can be extremely expensive. During the mid-1980s the U.S. Army medics tried to develop a system that would purify potable water into what medical professionals call Water for Injection and then mix it with additives to make intravenous and irrigation fluids. As a consultant I wrote several iterations of the logistics plan for the system.

About 90 percent of the estimated military medical logistics burden for a potential World War III was shipping IV and irrigation fluids and medical-grade oxygen overseas. The Army medics decided sending products that are mainly water or air overseas on transport aircraft was patently ridiculous, so they tried to develop systems that would make those products in-theater.

The very expensive reverse-osmosis water filters reject about 40 percent of input water, but during development we found that recycling that water can cause what had been once been trace amounts of toxic minerals to become far more concentrated. Also, the logistics costs of MOS training, increasing the field water purification capability of the Army, transporting it to medical logistics battalions, and storing it in bladders there with the associated pumps and hoses would far exceed the cost of air transporting medical fluids overseas.

Also, there's another consideration -- which kind of IV fluid would you want, pharmaceutical quality or home-made, if you're wounded and about to die?

82redleg

11-22-2010, 02:47 AM

Not only ArNG BCTs but also AC Airborne and other BCTs. That is a monumental and IMO inexcusable waste of combat power in the case of either component. It is a testimonial to outdated concepts and an abject failure to adapt.

I'll be the bucket of water on this discussion, and I was in the AC Airborne BCT along with your son. We didn't escort CSS units- we escorted KBR and other contract vehicles. The CSS units escorted themselves.

You can say its a waste of combat power, but at least a BCT doing this mission can do something else the next rotation (or change during the rotation, like we did). The problem is that, in the overall force structure, we cut CSS units- we don't have enough Trans units to move everything we want to move, so we contract KBR (and others) to do it instead. If we have "enough" CSS units, we'd have less BCTS, and the CSS units wouldn't be able to do something else the next rotation.

My solution would be for everyone to live harder, and cut the number of useless HQs units, so we need less stuff in theater. I'm not sure how much difference it would make, but I'd bet we could cut the number of convoys in 1/2, or close to it.

Pete

11-22-2010, 03:09 AM

1331
"Division Artillery? I've got a
target for you, but you'll have to
be patient."

jcustis

11-22-2010, 05:51 AM

My solution would be for everyone to live harder, and cut the number of useless HQs units, so we need less stuff in theater.

Stop that crazy talk!

Ken White

11-22-2010, 05:56 AM

I'll be the bucket of water on this discussion, and I was in the AC Airborne BCT along with your son. We didn't escort CSS units- we escorted KBR and other contract vehicles. The CSS units escorted themselves.Well, thanks for the water, I guess...:confused:

However, I did not say he was in the BCT that did the route security / convoy escort mission. He was not, had departed for another assignment shortly before that rotation. I said he had responded to attacks on two convoys, one Army, one Marine. That was during an earlier tour in a different Bn, same Bde, outside Fallujah / Abu Gharaib in 2003-04. He and the Platoon responded because the attacks occurred in their AO and the firing was heard. The larger Army convoy was in deep trouble and his and another RD Platoon helped extract them. The Marine Convoy was smaller and in even more trouble and defended itself to the extent that when the 82d Platoon arrived, the GySgt (note the rank of the convoy commander...) in charge of the convoy said thanks for coming but we've got it covered, so the Platoon just pulled back and watched. :D

I separately mentioned the Airborne BCT and its mission without addressing any type of convoy, the issue was only the infantry BCT being misapplied to an MP mission. Who provided the convoys was immaterial.
You can say its a waste of combat power...I certainly can and I believe many would agree. I did not mention I find it particularly troublesome that the BCT had specifically trained for another higher priority mission at the request of a Cdr in-country and was diverted at the last minute to that totally different mission. I know Army politics when I see them and I find it troublesome -- always have, this is not new -- that troops can get yanked around because the Pachyderms are cross with each other and some Staffer does what he thinks (I use the word loosely) might please his Boss.
...but at least a BCT doing this mission can do something else the next rotation (or change during the rotation, like we did).True but that does not excuse the waste for the period of misuse and it totally ignores the disastrous effect on the Troops from such foolishness. Nor does it address the larger problem that it was a poor ad-hoc arrangement. I have no problem with ad hocery, totally support it in fact, it's the American way of war but I sure don't agree with ignorant hoccing. ;)
The problem is that, in the overall force structure...and the CSS units wouldn't be able to do something else the next rotation.All true but really indicative of a far larger problem than the number of CSS units or what contractors should do.

All this is illustrative of an Army that is attempting to operate just as it did when it had 12M personnel in WW II or even 2M in Viet Nam -- even 800K in Desert Storm. That is absolutely unsustainable and trying to operate as we do is patently failing. The Army has steadfastly refused to bite the bullet, reform an archaic personnel system, scrap a terribly flawed training system and impose needed and sensible force structure changes on Branch communities that play politics and conduct turf battles over end strengths and flags. It is not really fair to the people serving and it certainly isn't in the best interests of the nation. Afghanistan and Iraq are wake up calls that are being ignored to the maximum possible extent. That is terribly short sighted. Admittedly, Congress is part of the problem but the Army is so concerned with protecting the institution it seems they've lost track of reality. That's not harsh, that's an understatement -- the handwriting has been on the old wall since the 1980s -- over 20 years.

One can say "We did the entry and major combat mission well..." I would agree. I'll also point out that the caliber of the opponent, Saddam's apparent decision to minimally resist and roll into an insurgency and some luck aided that success -- and that takes nothing away from the commanders and units that did a great job. It does point out that the Army was not prepared to cope with the totally predictable after effects even though the Army itself did accurately predict those effects. :mad:
My solution would be for everyone to live harder, and cut the number of useless HQs units, so we need less stuff in theater. I'm not sure how much difference it would make, but I'd bet we could cut the number of convoys in 1/2, or close to it.I strongly agree in the short term. However, for the long term we -- the Army -- must radically rethink composition, equipment, roles and missions. To operate as some suggest -- more CSS, fewer contractors -- or as we are doing rotating units between AOs on a haphazard basis, using Tank and Arty Bns as Infantry, using Infantry Bns to substitute for MPs in the route security mission, having oversized CSS elements (and Contract elements) that cannot defend themselves has worked ONLY because it's all taking place in relatively benign theaters with fifth rate opposition and no real time pressure. The Troops have done great, they have coped. They deserve better. So does the Nation.

We are inviting disaster if we attempt this mickey mouse stuff in the FID role or anything like it against a reasonably competent determined enemy with any decent strength in numbers...

William F. Owen

11-22-2010, 06:13 AM

Does that mean Wilf is counter-revolutionary in things military?

Apparently, according to an IDF Colonel at their Staff Collage, I am "Classical Orthodox!"

...but as concerns IEDs, back in 1948, the UK designed the Saladin and Saracen, both of which were pretty good at protecting their crews against land mines like the TM-46. You'd loose a wheel and might roll over, but usually the hull held.

JMA

11-22-2010, 06:21 AM

Absolutely not - in fact my boss agreed with and shared my intent, and I think we were both dismayed when we were turned into Wackenhut Security Guards for villages. Hence my disillusionment with pop-centric COIN after doing it for 7 months.

Well to secure a population you don't need to live with them you can achieve that by isolating them from the insurgents... that is if they don't come from that village in the first place.

JMA

11-22-2010, 06:27 AM

I heard occasionally that the U.S. forces lack good portable water purifiers.

There's some really good stuff available (if you are able and willing to buy enough replacement filters) and I really don't get why its so under-used.

I posted a mention of this product some months ago.

Lifesaver Systems (http://www.lifesaversystems.com/)

You can recycle your own urine as well...

Note: I have no commercial interest in this product whatsoever.

JMA

11-22-2010, 06:29 AM

JMA

11-22-2010, 06:58 AM

JMA, Pookie is reincarnated in "Husky", which is a very capable platform that does its job superbly. Kudos to the guys with the huge brass-ones who drive those things.

The Husky has South African origins. Link (http://www.olive-drab.com/idphoto/id_photos_mrap_husky.php)

What are the Brits using?

William F. Owen

11-22-2010, 07:34 AM

I posted a mention of this product some months ago.

Lifesaver Systems (http://www.lifesaversystems.com/)

You can recycle your own urine as well...

Note: I have no commercial interest in this product whatsoever.
I've tried this. The CEO of the Company actually got me to drink some water out of the reflecting pools in Washington DC! I was very impressed. Works very well, and ideal for scavenging water from the environment.

Fuchs

11-22-2010, 11:11 AM

Fuchs

11-22-2010, 11:13 AM

Fuchs is pretty well correct, (...)

My plan is to make that a habit of mine.

82redleg

11-22-2010, 11:39 AM

Well, thanks for the water, I guess...:confused:

....

Ken,

You're right- when people moved gets vague very quickly as time passes.

I agree with all of the points you are making- but your're mis-reading the facts of what we did on that deployment in support of your points.

The change in mission, that you find "particularly troublesome" changed because of the surge- when everyone was extended, lots of AOs got switched to align rotations, and we ended up with a crappy mission- I don't think the politics of the pachyderms had much to do with that. Lots of units (a) went early, (b) went somewhere they didn't plan on going or (c) got moved around in theater. We politicked for the special mission (if its the one I'm thinking of), but were never assigned it.

Still, I agree with your points about updating our training and personnel system- just the specific facts of our deployment don't point to those issues as much as the ad hoccery that happens in war.

Ken White

11-22-2010, 02:52 PM

...your're mis-reading the facts of what we did on that deployment in support of your points.Not the facts of what you did, that's a matter of record and you acknowledge the mission. We only differ on the matter of how and why you got the mission.
The change in mission, that you find "particularly troublesome" changed because of the surge...Based on things told me at the time by several people not related, your points contributed to the change but were not the determinant.
We politicked for the special mission (if its the one I'm thinking of), but were never assigned it.Those folks also disagree on that first point but do agree on the second. The original was requested by one GO and was disapproved of, verbally, by another leading to a staff decision. There is no question that the original mission was ever agreed to or assigned by CentCom and MNF-I.

No matter, really, water under the bridge. Without being directly involved, we'll never know the totality of the rationales -- if any...

The basic point -- and the 'surge' effort and chaos clearly proves it -- is that the overall Iraq mission was not well conducted and, specifically, that the assignment of experienced infantry BCTs to route security while assigning Armor and FA Bns re-roled duty as Infantry is, ummm, questionable... :wry:

To go to such extremes in an existential war is understandable. To do it in a war of choice is folly.

TAH

11-23-2010, 01:07 AM

So, MRAPs and MSR security/convoy escort seem to be OK.

If we need/want CSS units to self-defend, we need to ensure they are: organized, equipped, manned and trained to do so.

Light/Medium Trcuk, Medium Truck and PLS Companies have 50-60 trucks each. HET Companies have 96.

So how many MRAP escorts should be organic to each company?

I'm thinking 1 MRAP per 8-10 mission trucks. If we add a unit of 8-10 MRAPs we also add 25-30 PAX to each unit.

If we swap mission trucks for MRAPs we would lose close to 20% of the lift capabiity and would still need to add 8-10 PAX as mission trucks will normally only have a 2-man crew and MRAPs shouild probably have at least 3, just like the existing MP gun trucks.

Pete

11-23-2010, 01:43 AM

I remember in the mid-1980s when the Military Intelligence branch suggested they should be in charge of rear area security in divisions and to do so they should have an assigned Infantry company so they could play Army just like the big kids.

82redleg

11-23-2010, 02:52 AM

The basic point -- and the 'surge' effort and chaos clearly proves it -- is that the overall Iraq mission was not well conducted and, specifically, that the assignment of experienced infantry BCTs to route security while assigning Armor and FA Bns re-roled duty as Infantry is, ummm, questionable... :wry:

To go to such extremes in an existential war is understandable. To do it in a war of choice is folly.

100% agree.

Ken White

11-23-2010, 02:56 AM

I don't think MRAPs are good for much of anything. The MPs are supposed to have the convoy escort / route security mission in the rear -- so let them do that with their M 1117s. If route clearance is necessary, that's an Engineer job with specialist vehicles, not MRAPs. One can only add so much armor, the best soution to IEDs and mines is avoidance or elimination.

A better question is how do we eliminate the need for preferably all, hopefully most but at least some of those manpower intensive convoys and escorts...

Convoys are big slow moving targets and have been for over 5,000 years. Add the fact that nowadays, there really is no rear area and you're confronted with the fact we need to look at alternatives. We discovered those facts in Viet Nam, 45+ years ago -- and did nothing... :mad:

Fuchs

11-23-2010, 08:33 AM

The elimination is simple. Use dispersed truck movement and secure the area or route.

Entropy

11-23-2010, 06:55 PM

From Tom Ricks (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/23/report_canadian_military_leasing_russian_mi_17_hel os_in_afghanistan):

I remember how I used to listen to various NATO officials complain about how member nations were not sending enough helicopters to Afghanistan. Now it appears that the chickens have come home to roost: The Canadian media is reporting that the Canadian Ministry of Defence has quietly leased a bunch of Russian helicopters to use in southern Afghanistan.

Again, I've been hearing about a general shortage of helo's in Afghanistan for a few years now. Just sayin.

Rex Brynen

11-25-2010, 08:01 PM

Apologies if this has already been posted elsewhere and I missed it, but I'm sure many will be nodding in agreement (not necessary on the M1 issue, but rather on the transportation/tactical flexibility/risk aversion issue):

Tanks, But No Tanks (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/24/tanks_but_no_tanks?page=0,0)
Why heavy armor won't save Afghanistan.
Foreign Policy Magazine
BY MICHAEL WALTZ | NOVEMBER 24, 2010

To be clear, fault does not lie with the MRAP, MATV, or any other armored vehicle. It lies with how commanders are using the vehicles due to their aversion to risk and their attempts to minimize coalition injuries at the expense of the broader counterinsurgency mission. The vehicles' size would not be a hindrance to that mission if junior coalition commanders were also authorized to use other smaller vehicles to access the difficult areas of Afghanistan. For example, if a unit needed to access a village that was only accessible by pickup truck or Humvee, then that is what they would use.

This, however, was not the case during my most recent tour in southeastern Afghanistan, which ended in February of this year. What I found is that commanders were mandating the use of MRAPs only. If a unit did not have MRAPs or some other type of armored vehicle, then troopers were not allowed to leave the base at all.

This sounds like a minor tactical issue, but its consequences are having strategic effects on how we conduct the war and our ability to access the population. As one frustrated company commander told me after the directive, "If an MRAP can't get there, we don't go there. I need the flexibility to decide what type of vehicle to use."

Another commander, looking up at the hills and mountains surrounding his camp, lamented that he was now unable to access more than 70 percent of his assigned districts. "My men can only walk so far with their body armor on," he said as we chatted near the line of Humvees he could no longer use. To make matters worse, there was an additional requirement of a minimum of four vehicles in order to leave the wire even when a unit didn't have enough working MRAPs to meet the requirement.

This seemingly cautious approach not only contradicts the principles behind our counterinsurgency strategy, but it is actually reckless: It will end up causing more casualties in the long run than it prevents in the short run. Using only these behemoth vehicles prevents U.S. troops from accessing large portions of the populace and allows insurgent IED cells to flourish in areas relatively easy to reach by other means. We cannot protect a populace we do not allow ourselves to access.

...

It may be counterintuitive, but we actually need less armor, and we need to be more flexible and unpredictable. Instead of dictating that no unit can leave its base unless in an MRAP or MATV, we must allow them to use Humvees, all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, and ruggedized pickup trucks when appropriate. Knowing their movements are being watched at all times, units need to use deception, such as varying the time of day and night they move, their routes of travel, and the types of vehicles in which they conduct missions, to keep the insurgents constantly guessing. Insurgents cannot possibly booby-trap and watch every road, trail, and wadi in Afghanistan but they can and do hammer us on the few roads that will support armored vehicles.

This is a very unconventional war being waged in the most difficult terrain possible, and we are responding very conventionally. Instead of allowing such ingenuity and its associated risk, the coalition's default response has been to add more armor and widgets to ever larger vehicles that are the very antithesis of basic counterinsurgency operations.

...

Cole

11-25-2010, 09:58 PM

JMA

11-26-2010, 01:02 AM

From the quoted article:
To be clear, fault does not lie with the MRAP, MATV, or any other armored vehicle. It lies with how commanders are using the vehicles due to their aversion to risk and their attempts to minimize coalition injuries at the expense of the broader counterinsurgency mission. The vehicles' size would not be a hindrance to that mission if junior coalition commanders were also authorized to use other smaller vehicles to access the difficult areas of Afghanistan. For example, if a unit needed to access a village that was only accessible by pickup truck or Humvee, then that is what they would use.

Not sure about this.

Given the number and (blast) strength of vehicle IEDs in Afghanistan I would suggest that if troops need to travel or deploy by vehicle they need to use MRAPs... and then only the latest upgraded versions. As IEDs account for the majority of KIA and a larger number of really severe mutilation injuries it would be criminally negligent for a commander to send troops out in a non MRAP vehicle unless for a very specific once-off purpose.

It has been said that the Northern Ireland IED threat was largely defeated through the intelligent use of helicopters and the judicious use of vehicles. If the US does not know this then the Brits obviously do and they should have known better themselves in Afghanistan. There is no excuse for this.

I wait with baited breath to hear how sending troops down mined roads in unprotected vehicles will contribute to the "counterinsurgency mission".

Risk aversion is a problem in Afghanistan, I agree, but not in this case.

William F. Owen

11-26-2010, 03:28 PM

It may be counterintuitive, but we actually need less armor, and we need to be more flexible and unpredictable. Instead of dictating that no unit can leave its base unless in an MRAP or MATV, we must allow them to use Humvees, all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, and ruggedized pickup trucks when appropriate. Knowing their movements are being watched at all times, units need to use deception, such as varying the time of day and night they move, their routes of travel, and the types of vehicles in which they conduct missions, to keep the insurgents constantly guessing.

This is just nonsensical and a poor defence of FM3-24 bad ideas. Tanks are a tool. They require skill to be used well, just as do any other vehicle. Use tanks, use Hummers, use Snowmobiles.

The Soviets were a 3rd rate army so discard their example.

Better to have a tank and not need it, than not have one. If this is not well understood, then there is a massive training problem in the US Army and apparently within the SF community.

When the article says "and we need to be more flexible and unpredictable" what he is really saying is "we need to be less stupid badly trained." Vehicles alone, regardless of type, will not help that problem.

Rex Brynen

11-26-2010, 05:09 PM

This is just nonsensical and a poor defence of FM3-24 bad ideas. Tanks are a tool. They require skill to be used well, just as do any other vehicle. Use tanks, use Hummers, use Snowmobiles.

Wilf:

I think you are misreading to a degree the thrust of the article, which is not really about tanks at all (despite the misleading title): it is about letting the mission (whether cast in FM3-24 terms or otherwise) determine the tactical employment of assets, rather than allowing the mission be determined by the provision of technological fixes ("widgets") and risk aversion.

JMA:

Ditto. Presumably if a Taliban troop concentration or sanctuary isn't MRAP-reachable (MRAPable?) that shouldn't put it out of reach if other possible methods can be found (whether helicopter insertion, other vehicles/routes, or on foot) that achieve the operational objective.

William F. Owen

11-27-2010, 06:51 AM

Wilf:

I think you are misreading to a degree the thrust of the article, which is not really about tanks at all (despite the misleading title): it is about letting the mission (whether cast in FM3-24 terms or otherwise) determine the tactical employment of assets, rather than allowing the mission be determined by the provision of technological fixes ("widgets") and risk aversion.
That was exactly my reading. When did any good army, not require such a degree of judgement?

Cavguy

11-27-2010, 08:37 AM

Better to have a tank and not need it, than not have one. If this is not well understood, then there is a massive training problem in the US Army and apparently within the SF community.

Amen. There's a whole bunch of grunts alive (http://www.amazon.com/Long-Road-Home-Story-Family/dp/0425219348/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1290846968&sr=1-1) because someone had a few tanks available (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/Sadr_City-Armor-Moore(Nov-Dec04).pdf). Alternately, there's a whole bunch of Rangers dead (http://www.amazon.com/Black-Hawk-Down-Story-Modern/dp/080214473X/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&qid=1290846935&sr=8-4) because the US didn't have any tanks available when needed. METT-TC dictates, but there is no tactical reason tanks can't be employed successfully in RC-S, the Canadians and Dutch have been doing it for awhile. The bigger strategic question is whether the increased logistics demand incurs greater vulnerabilities in other areas. (more convoys)

A little simplistic, but I've seen it over and over. When you're in deep doo doo, nothing ends a fight like a tank showing up. (see sig)

davidbfpo

11-27-2010, 10:06 AM

The Royal Danish Army has a mechanised infantry battalion in Helmand, with attached Leopard tanks. IIRC they were supporting the USMC at one point, maybe at Marjah, although the Danes are part of the UK brigade.

Overwatch has been cited before, I think by 'Red Rat'.

JMA

11-28-2010, 11:55 AM

JMA:

Ditto. Presumably if a Taliban troop concentration or sanctuary isn't MRAP-reachable (MRAPable?) that shouldn't put it out of reach if other possible methods can be found (whether helicopter insertion, other vehicles/routes, or on foot) that achieve the operational objective.

To start with I believe this article has some merit (in the broadest terms).

By grouping tanks with MRAP vehicles it becomes somewhat unsuck. The Marines have indicated a requirement for 14 tanks. Yes this may just be the thin edge of the edge but one must assume there are good, solid operational reasons behind their stated need for a handful of tanks.

(My first response to the tank deployment was surprise that tanks would be preferred over additional helicopter gunship effort. On reflection my thinking was that tanks were a means of defeating the ROE limitations on the use of CAS. And good to see some debate on this matter.)

The word helicopter was never mentioned in the article. He said:
"we must allow them to use Humvees, all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, and ruggedized pickup trucks when appropriate."

When I went on and on about the IED threat some months back my position was that when faced with a "road-side bomb" threat then stay away from the road-side as far as possible. Despite the Brits having largely neutralised the Northern Ireland IED (road-side bomb) threat through the intelligent use of helicopters they did not carry this success over to Afghanistan and them and the US seemed in a state of tactical paralysis as they sat back and took alarming and largely unnecessary casualties. I included IEDs aimed at foot patrols then but they do not fall under of the subject of this thread.

He gets a little further off course when he writes:
"When I raised such points in planning meetings, my coalition colleagues often asked how then I proposed to "defeat" the IED. My initial response was that the question was wrong: We should not be trying to defeat the IED. Rather, we should be working to defeat the insurgency that plants them."

Sure the "well how would you do it?" is the first response from those who haven't got the faintest idea of how to deal with the IED threat both to vehicles and foot patrols. (The same question was asked of me here by the equally clueless.)

His answer was clever in a sense but did not address the then current tactical threat if IEDs. So he really needed to supply his answer as the long term goal but be prepared to provide some idea of a solution in the immediate term. He may not have in the meeting he speaks of but he ends his article as follows:

We may not be able to "defeat" the IED, but we can make it irrelevant. To do so will require us to rely upon the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the junior leaders who are most in tune with the local dynamics and terrain, not on technology or defensive-minded mandates designed to prevent casualties at all costs. Marginalizing the IED will also require higher commanders to accept greater risk and allow their subordinates to sometimes make mistakes -- even deadly ones. But that's the only way to start connecting with the Afghan people, who are the ones who will defeat the Taliban in the end. It's time to start playing to win instead of trying to avoid losing.

To make IEDs irrelevant you avoid them. To avoid "road-side bombs" you avoid roads (as far as possible and when faced with no other alternative use MRAP vehicles with the necessary support to respond aggressively to any ambush.)

I learned during officer training that if during an assault of an enemy objective you find your platoon crossing a mine field (of the 1 mine per metre of frontage type) you continue to press on with your assault and accept 10% casualties. Now the Brits believe in many areas of Afghanistan they are in fact patrolling in a "medium minefield". My response is well then don't do it... avoid such areas.

How to avoid IEDs while still getting the job done? Well ask these junior commanders what they believe will do the trick. If he can't give you an answer put him on the next flight home (not reassigned... OUT!) Force these often complaining junior commanders to use their initiative or get lost.

JMA

11-28-2010, 06:02 PM

Outside of a few spectacular successes along Route 1 that have garnered more media hype than had actual effect, the TB aren't very good at targeting the logistical tail. These are not your Daddy's mujahadeen.

Now here's a good point.

The comparison between the TB and the mujahadeen. Are the skills of the mujahadeen being elevated by comparison to the TB because they were fighting a rather poor soviet contingent or is there real evidence as to their military superiority?

Clever insurgents should be going after stuff rather than people but maybe the TB living in the shadow of the mujahadeen are trying to achieve too much and have drifted away from the basics? [/QUOTE]

Fuchs

11-28-2010, 08:02 PM

Cavguy

11-28-2010, 10:35 PM

Cavguy

11-28-2010, 10:40 PM

How to avoid IEDs while still getting the job done? Well ask these junior commanders what they believe will do the trick. If he can't give you an answer put him on the next flight home (not reassigned... OUT!) Force these often complaining junior commanders to use their initiative or get lost.

I would say armchair generals need to put up or get lost, and provide me the evidence of these "complaining junior leaders". I work with a lot of them who give it their all every day and do quite well, thank you very much.

JMA

11-28-2010, 10:49 PM

I would say armchair generals need to put up or get lost, and provide me the evidence of these "complaining junior leaders". I work with a lot of them who give it their all every day and do quite well, thank you very much.

Did you read the article?

Pete

11-28-2010, 10:53 PM

I can't imagine why Cavguy might suggest this thread is getting divorced from reality. :rolleyes:

The Royal Danish Army has a mechanised infantry battalion in Helmand ...

There is nothing like a Dane
Nothing in the world
There is nothing you can name
That is anything like a Dane

JMA

11-28-2010, 11:34 PM

Superiority is relative. The TB were deprived of most of their repertoire because it's too risky against the Westerners. What's left are petty harassing and delaying actions.

The Mujahedeen faced a more permissive enemy, especially in regard to sensor technology.

The convoy losses comparison is afaik rather misleading, for the Soviets were actually escorting their own truck with MRD personnel and equipment, while much of the modern-day convoys are afaik regional truckers moving from one bribery checkpoint to the next.

Given the mercenary nature of the TB I am surprised that they to not go after soft targets such as these convoys as there must be much looting potential.

But on this particular topic I got the sense from Jon's post that he felt that the mujahadeen were superior to today's TB. I was hoped he would explain that.

JMA; avoiding IEDs won't help much either on the strategic level. De-valueing this tool in the TB's repertoire would merely push them to emphasis what's left of their repertoire; that would be attacks on ANA/ANP/officials plus mafia-like subversion, the maintenance of a parallel state.
The Western missions would drag on and on and on ... because nobody has the balls to make a step back and lure the TB out into the open and defeat them once they become cocky enough to be defeated.
Instead everybody is fixated on reducing the TB's options more and more and more in pursuit of - what exactly? You cannot defeat someone who doesn't dare to fight you any more. That exact situation is no victory either, for the enemy has still other options.

It seems that the H-word (helicopter) must not be mentioned when it comes to Afghanistan. It seems the options are either driving or walking but never a word of flying. Why?

Is the problem not that the ANA/ANP are so damn useless that the areas pacified by the ISAF troops will never totally secured? So what exactly is the point of all this military action under these circumstances?

Back to the point. The troops should be going after the TB. If the "black army" can locate and kill TB leadership then the logical next step is to kill the rank and file as well?

JMA

11-28-2010, 11:53 PM

Some of this discussion is departing reality and is taking on a curmudegonly "Back in the day ..." aspect devoid of reality,

It is impossible to operate in a country the size of California without using vehicles with the limited troop densities we have. Allied troops are not as inept at C-IED as JMA suggests, there are a raft of TTPs and Techniques that more often than not prevent IED deaths. While IEDs are responsible for 90 some percent of casualties, the actual numbers are quite low given the number of daily patrols and movements going on.

The one thing for certain is that Iraq and Afghanistan will be remembered for IEDs. That such a high percentage of casualties were inflicted through IEDs and that it took so long to make any impression on IED casualties or to alter tactics to reduce the exposure of troops to IEDs will not reflect well on the forces involved. This is such a pity.

Platoon Leaders and company commanders are not blindly walking into IED hotspots writ large as you suggest. There are always a few bone-headed leaders. Media doesn't report houses that don't burn down, or patrols not hit by IEDs.

Michael Waltz's article appeals for junior commanders to be "freed" to use their initiative to alter the tactical methods of deployment to ensure they can serve their whole AO. There appears to be too much top down control in his experience.

This isn't to say we can't or shouldn't improve, but really. You suggest I walk my troops from, say, Spin Boldak to Kandahar on patrol? Who is divorced from reality here?

Here's a novel thought... fly. Insert here... uplift there. As Waltz suggests, use initiative.

Come on. The criticism to be made here isn't of the tactical TTPs, but of the strategy employed. If you haven't noticed, for all the hubub about Keating and Wanat, over the past year a number of patrol bases were attacked by large numbers in an attempt to repeat those episodes, and in every case the enemy was routed. So our tactical game has improved markedly. There are many, many other examples of successful C-IED and such out there. We adapt, they adapt. As it always has been.

It doesn't mean things are getting better overall. It doesn't mean we're going to win. But the grandstanding going on here is getting silly and divorced from reality and fueled by nostalgia and dreams.[/QUOTE]

Waltz's contention is:

This is a very unconventional war being waged in the most difficult terrain possible, and we are responding very conventionally. Instead of allowing such ingenuity and its associated risk, the coalition's default response has been to add more armor and widgets to ever larger vehicles that are the very antithesis of basic counterinsurgency operations.

Is he correct?

Cavguy

11-29-2010, 03:03 AM

The one thing for certain is that Iraq and Afghanistan will be remembered for IEDs. That such a high percentage of casualties were inflicted through IEDs and that it took so long to make any impression on IED casualties or to alter tactics to reduce the exposure of troops to IEDs will not reflect well on the forces involved. This is such a pity.

Not ENTIRELY true. I know we began working it when they first appeared in '03. IEDs are immensely hard to find. We did counter several rounds of IEDs successfully - Remote controlled morphed to command wire morphed to pressure plate morphed to EFP. Each time they became harder to effectively counter.

That said, our COIN understanding didn't evolve at the same rate as our counter-IED ability. We could defeat the device but not prevent exponentially more from being placed until we changed our methods.

Michael Waltz's article appeals for junior commanders to be "freed" to use their initiative to alter the tactical methods of deployment to ensure they can serve their whole AO. There appears to be too much top down control in his experience.

Perhaps. I haven't served in Afghanistan (yet) but will let you know next summer. I know the unit I am replacing actually allows its soldiers to ride along in the back of Afghan Police Pickup trucks on patrol. Command risk acceptance is highly, highly chain of command driven. Additionally, the unit I will be replacing does a very high amount of dismounted patrols despite being a Stryker element. As will all war accounts, MAJ Waltz (with whom I only partially disagree overall), it reflects his experience in one place at one time, and not the larger picture.

Here's a novel thought... fly. Insert here... uplift there. As Waltz suggests, use initiative.

Damn! We never thought of that! :rolleyes:

Would be nice if we actually had enough helicopters. Unfortunately we don't, and won't until Iraq is finished. Iraq sucked down most of the army's Aviation asset. Until 2009-10, Iraq consumed 80% of the U.S. Army's combat forces of all kinds, while Afghanistan remained a secondary effort. We are only seeing change now.

Is he correct?

I don't think so. He is right we need to engage the populace. The as Wilf says above, the vehicles are not the problem. The leadership in such cases is.

In any Army of 400,000 you're going to get a diversity of outcomes. 25% of your commanders will be brilliant and aggressive. 50% will do mediocre or well. and the bottom 25% will not get it or do poorly. In the aggregate, we're doing much, much better in the the tactics department. Afghanistan is finally getting the Army's full attention, and we are seeing marked improvements in performance as a result.

My BLUF is that anytime someone chimes in "all we need to do" or "if just" my BS flag goes up. Most of it has been tried. There are real constraints in the real world - equipment, time, resources, etc. that constrain the optimal solution and walks us to the possible. As resources have been added to Afghanistan you are seeing this uptick.

Ultimately, even if we had the best tactics in the world it really matters little because our strategy is wholly unrealistic. Getting exercised over tactical innovations (which will soon be countered) as "the solution" is silly. People are treating the addition of 14 tanks as some sort of strategic shift? Really? It's a tactical answer to a tactical problem in one region where the tool fits. MAJ Waltz and others are overreacting to their introduction.

Infanteer

11-29-2010, 02:34 PM

Ultimately, even if we had the best tactics in the world it really matters little because our strategy is wholly unrealistic. Getting exercised over tactical innovations (which will soon be countered) as "the solution" is silly. People are treating the addition of 14 tanks as some sort of strategic shift? Really? It's a tactical answer to a tactical problem in one region where the tool fits. MAJ Waltz and others are overreacting to their introduction.

Thank you.

We've seen term a "strategy of tactics" before. Condcuting one is foolish and proposing one is shallow. I've seen examples of it from both the "pro-COIN" and the "COIN skeptics" sides.

Granite_State

11-29-2010, 02:43 PM

Command risk acceptance is highly, highly chain of command driven.

Are these decisions made at battalion-level in the Army?

Would be nice if we actually had enough helicopters. Unfortunately we don't, and won't until Iraq is finished. Iraq sucked down most of the army's Aviation asset. Until 2009-10, Iraq consumed 80% of the U.S. Army's combat forces of all kinds, while Afghanistan remained a secondary effort. We are only seeing change now.

Do we still maintain as national policy that our military should be able to fight two regional, mid-sized wars (Korea + 1) at a time? I remember that was the case when I was in high school (over 10 years ago), but don't know if it still is.

TAH

11-29-2010, 05:10 PM

Are these decisions made at battalion-level in the Army?

Do we still maintain as national policy that our military should be able to fight two regional, mid-sized wars (Korea + 1) at a time? I remember that was the case when I was in high school (over 10 years ago), but don't know if it still is.

#1. Pretty sure the answer is no in many cases. Most likely, it gets "held" at Brigade level or higher.:mad:

#2. Not sure, but the "current" situation (2001-2010) would indicate that fighting two wars at the same time, particularily for extended periods, are the limit. Could we respond with more then a bobtailed division of a couple of BCTs a small fires Bde, a small Maneuver Enhancement Bde, an Avaition Bde and a small Sustainment Bde?:confused:

While probably within our capability, there are alot of other reasons why we dodn't have more then UAVs above Yemen and SOF guys on the ground.

IMO, if no war in Iraq from 2003-to ... then we would currently have 50-60,000 troops on the ground hunting down more underwear bombers.
:eek:

Ken White

11-29-2010, 06:01 PM

#1. Pretty sure the answer is no in many cases. Most likely, it gets "held" at Brigade level or higher.:mad:Commanders are people and the Personnel system can put an aggressive risk taker at Bde and give him Bn Cdrs who are moderately or highly risk averse -- that and all the permutations in between. He can direct them to be aggressive but short of an OER Driven Relief for Cause or preferring charges (both frowned upon in this modern Yankee Army...) he cannot make them do it his way. There are many ways to ignore or divert the wishes of one's Boss.

I've seen more than one aggressive Bde Cdr sabotaged by one or more Bn Cdrs. Co Cdrs don't have as much latitude as a LTC must be given but they, too, play that game. Co Cdrs know all theiur Troops and are generally protective of them, they can oput a brake on a Bn Cdrs ideas. Consider also that Bn Cdrs know at least some of their Troops, a good one will know many of his 800 or so bods -- and may be possibly protective of them. Bde Cdrs rarely know many or even any of their 3K or so souls and they know they've got a shot at a star so they tend to be more aggressive.

Doctrinally, Cdrs at all levels have a responsibility for mission accomplishment and for force protection -- how those two factors are balanced is very much an individual decision and all the METT-TC factors can play into that as well.

It's all about mission, people and a pot-luck personnel system. Every unit, ever rotation, every war is different. There are never any singular answers...

As for Yemen, we might have been that abysmally stupid but I'd sure hope not. Iraq, even if poorly done, made a little sense; Yemen would not make an iota. Hunting would be bombers is a LE job, not a military effort...

Uboat509

11-29-2010, 10:01 PM

MRAPs are the end result of a nasty, self-inflicted, vicious circle. In the early days in Iraq, our HMMWVs were underarmored to deal with the IED threat that was faced on the roads. The solution that was applied was to add more armor, and then add some more and then some more and so on. By the time I got there in '07 whatever generation of armor upgrade we were on was obscenely heavy and hard on the vehicle. It was fairly effective against most of the threats we faced on the roads, which was just as well because all the added weight meant that the vehicles were all but incapable of significant off-road travel. Still, there were threats that we could not meet with the armor we had so we added more. Eventually we hit the law of diminishing returns and kept going. When I left Iraq there were plans for a new generation of armor upgrade that was so heavy that turning at faster than thirty miles an hour caused the tires to blow out and I cannot remember what the top speed of the vehicle was but it was ridiculously slow. Interestingly, the idea of bypassing the roads, particularly those roads most prone to being IED'd does not seem to have occurred to a lot of commanders. When we would suggest it to nearby Big Army units they tended to look at us as if we had suggested levitating over the affected areas. IEDs are only effective if you can predict where your enemy will travel through and emplace them there. We made that easier by slavishly sticking to the roads and then we made it so our vehicles couldn't handle off road travel even if we wanted to.

So now we were road bound with vehicles that can survive most of the threats we faced on the roads, however, none of that mattered because no matter how much armor we added to the sides top, we could not do anything about the underbody IED which was, by far, the deadliest kind. So along came the MRAP. It is GREAT against underbody IEDs because that is what it is designed for. Other than that, it is, at best, a mediocre vehicle and at worst, a liability. Let's examine the pros and cons of this vehicle,

Pro

-Protection from underbody IEDs. Note that I say underbody IEDs. As far as I know it is not much more protected from other types of IEDs than vehicles like the Stryker.

Cons

-Size. These things are huge. They are as tall as a five ton and wider than a HMMWV. That makes them HUGE targets and also makes it difficult to maneuver in Urban environments especially in the sort of places we are fighting which tend to have fairly narrow roads.

-Weight. The Cougar is around 16 tons and the RG-33 is between 22 and 37 depending on the version. An M2 Bradley is only 27 tons. That kind of weight, along with its size can only complicate transporting it into theater.

-Mobility. These were made to counter the threats we face on the roads which is just as well because it isn't very good off of them. It is too heavy and too top heavy to be good at off road travel.

I imagine that they are also significantly more expensive than either the HMMWV or the Stryker but I don't have a good source on that so I will not include it on the list.

All in all, the MRAP does one thing well and it does that one thing very well but is it worth the cost? This thing is all but useless in a conventional fight against a peer or near peer competitor except as a troop transport behind the FLOT. It is taller than the Abrams and, depending on the version, heavier than the Bradley and has much worse cross country mobility as compared to either. In Iraq or Afghanistan where the primary threat is IEDs, you can get away with that but against a better trained enemy with access to significant numbers of anti-armor weapons, this thing is just a huge target. What future does the MRAP have? Hopefully, it will be reduction to small numbers for use in specific niche missions. Unfortunately it will probably hang around and when the next war comes along we will have to use them because there will be far too many of them not to use them. Eventually someone will end up standing in front of Congress to explain why we sent our soldiers into combat in these giant targets with poor off-road mobility but excellent protection from underbody IEDs when there is far less of an underbody threat than there is an ATGM threat.

Infanteer

11-30-2010, 12:46 AM

TAH

11-30-2010, 02:07 AM

Commanders are people and the Personnel system can put an aggressive risk taker at Bde and give him Bn Cdrs who are moderately or highly risk averse -- that and all the permutations in between. He can direct them to be aggressive but short of an OER Driven Relief for Cause or preferring charges (both frowned upon in this modern Yankee Army...) he cannot make them do it his way. There are many ways to ignore or divert the wishes of one's Boss.

I've seen more than one aggressive Bde Cdr sabotaged by one or more Bn Cdrs. Co Cdrs don't have as much latitude as a LTC must be given but they, too, play that game. Co Cdrs know all theiur Troops and are generally protective of them, they can oput a brake on a Bn Cdrs ideas. Consider also that Bn Cdrs know at least some of their Troops, a good one will know many of his 800 or so bods -- and may be possibly protective of them. Bde Cdrs rarely know many or even any of their 3K or so souls and they know they've got a shot at a star so they tend to be more aggressive.

Doctrinally, Cdrs at all levels have a responsibility for mission accomplishment and for force protection -- how those two factors are balanced is very much an individual decision and all the METT-TC factors can play into that as well.

It's all about mission, people and a pot-luck personnel system. Every unit, ever rotation, every war is different. There are never any singular answers...

As for Yemen, we might have been that abysmally stupid but I'd sure hope not. Iraq, even if poorly done, made a little sense; Yemen would not make an iota. Hunting would be bombers is a LE job, not a military effort...

At all levels lots boils down to what the specific officer can realistically assume is their overall potential. At the lower levels (Company grade) most have to "draw inside the lines" in order to not stick out too far in a negative way. At Field Grade, each officer should be doing an intraspective look and ask themselves, how far can I still go?

The attitude I had as a company commander in 1988-1989 was significantly different then the one I had as a Bn (2001-2004) and Group (2004-2005) CDR.

All Commanders are SUPPOSED to COMMAND. Not been my experince.

The ability to assess and approve risk is driven alot by the Army's over-emphasis on safety. Was surprised/shocked as a Bn CDR (O5) I could not approve any operations with a "residual risk" of Moderate. Those had to go to to the first O6, the Bde CDR. Tried to get him to delagate to his Bn CRs. No Go.

TAH

11-30-2010, 02:10 AM

As for Yemen, we might have been that abysmally stupid but I'd sure hope not. Iraq, even if poorly done, made a little sense; Yemen would not make an iota. Hunting would be bombers is a LE job, not a military effort...

Yemen would be.would have been a much tougher fight. About the same size in general terms of geography and population. Lots more mountains, a Huge coastline and an interior border with Saudia thats poorly defined and and patrolled.

Aso had/has its own home-grown set of internal security problems on top of AQ.

JMA

12-01-2010, 01:11 AM

Not ENTIRELY true. I know we began working it when they first appeared in '03. IEDs are immensely hard to find. We did counter several rounds of IEDs successfully - Remote controlled morphed to command wire morphed to pressure plate morphed to EFP. Each time they became harder to effectively counter.

It needs to be accepted that the TB using IEDs set the pace of the war and maintained the initiative. Of course you continue to play catch-up if you insist on driving down the same roads and walking down the same routes. The IED has become to modern insurgents what the AK-47 meant to those in the 60s and 70s.

It seems that only the targeting of HVTs by special forces kept the TB unbalanced if at all.

That said, our COIN understanding didn't evolve at the same rate as our counter-IED ability. We could defeat the device but not prevent exponentially more from being placed until we changed our methods.

That is a terrible indictment of the inability of forces on the ground to adapt to local war circumstances. But that said when foot patrols became nothing more than IED sweeps at 1.5km per day then there is/was little time for anything else.

Perhaps. I haven't served in Afghanistan (yet) but will let you know next summer. I know the unit I am replacing actually allows its soldiers to ride along in the back of Afghan Police Pickup trucks on patrol. Command risk acceptance is highly, highly chain of command driven. Additionally, the unit I will be replacing does a very high amount of dismounted patrols despite being a Stryker element. As will all war accounts, MAJ Waltz (with whom I only partially disagree overall), it reflects his experience in one place at one time, and not the larger picture.

Going in blind? I raise the not so insignificant matter of operational continuity (once again).

Secondly, as far as armoured units are concerned. They should only be deployed in their role. If there is no armoured role then leave them at home, or convert them to infantry or disband them.

Damn! We never thought of that! :rolleyes:

Maybe someone thought of using helicopters but quite obviously that didn't compute into action. Brit commanders still complain that the shortage of helicopter lift restricts them tactically.

Lets see how much of a joke you see the helicopter shortage issue as when you start losing troops unnecessarily.

Would be nice if we actually had enough helicopters. Unfortunately we don't, and won't until Iraq is finished. Iraq sucked down most of the army's Aviation asset. Until 2009-10, Iraq consumed 80% of the U.S. Army's combat forces of all kinds, while Afghanistan remained a secondary effort. We are only seeing change now.

Sorry I don't buy that. You owe it to your men to insist that you get the right tools to do the job. You should be prepared to walk if they don't.

I don't think so. He is right we need to engage the populace. The as Wilf says above, the vehicles are not the problem. The leadership in such cases is.

In any Army of 400,000 you're going to get a diversity of outcomes. 25% of your commanders will be brilliant and aggressive. 50% will do mediocre or well. and the bottom 25% will not get it or do poorly. In the aggregate, we're doing much, much better in the the tactics department. Afghanistan is finally getting the Army's full attention, and we are seeing marked improvements in performance as a result.

My BLUF is that anytime someone chimes in "all we need to do" or "if just" my BS flag goes up. Most of it has been tried. There are real constraints in the real world - equipment, time, resources, etc. that constrain the optimal solution and walks us to the possible. As resources have been added to Afghanistan you are seeing this uptick.

Ultimately, even if we had the best tactics in the world it really matters little because our strategy is wholly unrealistic. Getting exercised over tactical innovations (which will soon be countered) as "the solution" is silly. People are treating the addition of 14 tanks as some sort of strategic shift? Really? It's a tactical answer to a tactical problem in one region where the tool fits. MAJ Waltz and others are overreacting to their introduction.

So as you say even though you don't know you are going to oppose him anyway. I'm not sure I follow the mindset.

There are many ways to improve field command in a war situation. The US has enough of its own experience of this from WW2 and Korea and probably elsewhere to remove any excuses that may be thrown up for Afghanistan.

Look beyond his few words about the introduction of a few tanks to what he was saying about MRAPs. I don't agree with allowing junior commanders to turn ops into a Toyota war. He too missed the point that there are other possibilities or troop movement and insertion than vehicles and on foot.

Cavguy

12-01-2010, 02:21 AM

It needs to be accepted that the TB using IEDs set the pace of the war and maintained the initiative. Of course you continue to play catch-up if you insist on driving down the same roads and walking down the same routes. The IED has become to modern insurgents what the AK-47 meant to those in the 60s and 70s.

It seems that only the targeting of HVTs by special forces kept the TB unbalanced if at all.

That is a terrible indictment of the inability of forces on the ground to adapt to local war circumstances.

You're extrapolating greatly here. Plenty of case studies of units influencing the IED fight in their sector using innovative tactics.

Going in blind? I raise the not so insignificant matter of operational continuity (once again).

Who said we are going in blind? We have been in coordination with our transition unit a year out, and exchange data weekly. We just had elements do (not including myself, I had to mind the store here) a face to face sector recon for two weeks. I'm not going to post details about what we saw or where we're going here on a public internet forum though. My comment was simply meant, that like you, I am also subject to what I read here and am told. I know the platoons in the unit we are replacing does 60-80km of dismounted ops weekly, in conjuction with mounted movements across the AO.

Secondly, as far as armoured units are concerned. They should only be deployed in their role. If there is no armoured role then leave them at home, or convert them to infantry or disband them.

We essentially have converted many to infantry for the duration, see COL Gentile's many criticisms. The vehicles we have are used in theater.

Maybe someone thought of using helicopters but quite obviously that didn't compute into action. Brit commanders still complain that the shortage of helicopter lift restricts them tactically.

We're not the Brits.

Lets see how much of a joke you see the helicopter shortage issue as when you start losing troops unnecessarily. Sorry I don't buy that. You owe it to your men to insist that you get the right tools to do the job. You should be prepared to walk if they don't.

I never said it was a joke, and this isn't my first rodeo. Care to read any of my bio stuff?

I can't contain the simple fact that the U.S. Army Aviation is fighting two wars and simply doesn't have enough helis in the inventory to support 2 large theaters over a decade of conflict. As a relatively junior officer I have no control over that and see no point on falling on a sword over it when it is you that have made it into this existential issue.

It's not like units are getting wiped out or anything. By historical standards casualties are low compared against almost any similar conflict. Units are doing better than you allege, that's what I'm saying, and we're not as stupid as you imply.

He too missed the point that there are other possibilities or troop movement and insertion than vehicles and on foot.

I am sorry we can't all rise to your high standards of ops. Would love to live in the perfect world where I got everything I wanted. Instead I make do with what I have, and do pretty well at it. You're extrapolating from one article and one observation and applying it to an entire country. I'm saying there are many variations of what is being done, some good, some bad. But overall we're doing okay, even excellent in spots.

I'm not a defender of everything we do. But I do guard against blanket statements and accusations that are not true in the macro.

JMA

12-01-2010, 01:58 PM

You're extrapolating greatly here. Plenty of case studies of units influencing the IED fight in their sector using innovative tactics.

As long as the vast majority of KIA and WIA are caused by IEDs then ISAF are merely playing catch-up.

Who said we are going in blind? We have been in coordination with our transition unit a year out, and exchange data weekly. We just had elements do (not including myself, I had to mind the store here) a face to face sector recon for two weeks. I'm not going to post details about what we saw or where we're going here on a public internet forum though. My comment was simply meant, that like you, I am also subject to what I read here and am told. I know the platoons in the unit we are replacing does 60-80km of dismounted ops weekly, in conjuction with mounted movements across the AO.

The Brits are honest enough to admit that the first two months of each tour (of six months) to settle in. The inherent weakness of such short tours is obvious when compared with the permanent deployment of the main TB players. Time to question that as well and for units to conform to the demands of the war rather than blindly continue with the :this is the way we do it" approach.

The question that should be asked is what is the best way and with whom to prosecute this war?

We essentially have converted many to infantry for the duration, see COL Gentile's many criticisms. The vehicles we have are used in theater.

And you think that by switching from armour to infantry and back again is doing justice to the war effort?

We're not the Brits.

By that you mean you don't care about a shortage of helicopter lift capacity or you see no need or use for such?

I never said it was a joke, and this isn't my first rodeo. Care to read any of my bio stuff?

I didn't see anything about infantry qualifications there.

I can't contain the simple fact that the U.S. Army Aviation is fighting two wars and simply doesn't have enough helis in the inventory to support 2 large theaters over a decade of conflict. As a relatively junior officer I have no control over that and see no point on falling on a sword over it when it is you that have made it into this existential issue.

Maybe you missed it but according to your president and your generals the war is over in Iraq? So what will it take for the US officer corps to make a stand? Currently they just accept that they are issued with a second rate personal weapon (M4) and that there is very limited helicopter support. Perhaps when Burger King and Pizza Hut are closed down there will be an open rebellion?

It's not like units are getting wiped out or anything. By historical standards casualties are low compared against almost any similar conflict. Units are doing better than you allege, that's what I'm saying, and we're not as stupid as you imply.

You go tell that to the mothers of the 1500 odd US soldiers killed so far in Afghanistan.

I am not alleging that anything other than one needs to be thankful the TB are such a sub standard enemy and lament the fact that such a high percentage of KIA and WIA have been caused by IEDs an effective counter against which has yet to be figured out.

I am sorry we can't all rise to your high standards of ops. Would love to live in the perfect world where I got everything I wanted. Instead I make do with what I have, and do pretty well at it. You're extrapolating from one article and one observation and applying it to an entire country. I'm saying there are many variations of what is being done, some good, some bad. But overall we're doing okay, even excellent in spots.

I'm not a defender of everything we do. But I do guard against blanket statements and accusations that are not true in the macro.

As I say there should be a block booking for seats on every flight out of Afghanistan to take the failures and the non performers home. There is no sane reason to condone mediocrity (when soldiers lives are at risk). If only half the company commanders are competent then let the cream of the crop command 6 platoon companies in theatre... and if you can't find 6 platoon commanders who are competent to command the 6 platoons then make up the shortage with sergeants. (If you can't do that then best you pack up and go home.)

jtan163

01-23-2011, 10:47 AM

While I supported the MRAP purchase for Iraq (large caches of leftover munitions made this conflict unique in terms of IEDs), I don't think we should keep them.

Is this really true?
I suspect that the IED problem is one that has been around for a number of decades in various parts of the world - I was almost going to say -perhaps the fact the US hasn't encountered IEDs a whole lot might be a perception problem.

Except I recall seeing lots of pics of US forces in Vietnam riding on top of APCs, placing sandbags of the floors of their AFVs and trucks etc due to - IEDs.

Then of course you leave the US experience and you get as previously mentioned South Africa, Rhodesia. To which you can add Northern Ireland - where some parts of the province were only patrolled on foot or by air due to - IEDs.

IMO It ain't a new problem nor a unique one.

What we should do is incorporate some design elements, such as the V-hull, etc... into a new vehicle that fixes many of the shortcomings in the current MRAP fleet (lack of commonality, limited offroad mobility, not a fighting vehicle, etc...). That is, IF we decide to continue our strategy of fighting long, drawn out counter-insurgency campaigns. The MRAP issue might be solved with a more modest national strategy, but that is another discussion...

Not sure if you are saying what I think you are saying, but I think I am with you.
I reckon if you do need mine resistance (and I am not really sure how mine and IEDs really differ. I think that an IED used to be called a nuisance minefield, the only real difference being one use a factory made mine and one a home made mine), then it should be incorporated idealy into all of your vehicles - and if now then definitely in your AFVs, whether they be Strykers, LAVs, Bradleys, M113s whatever.

And IMO in the current political era where troop delopyments are unrealistically low (i.e. not enough troops to secure AOs or even routes over night) and the stomach for troop losses quite low (thankfully, compared with past eras), then you want to incorporate them into your B ("soft", perhaps better to say log) vehicles too.

sullygoarmy

01-23-2011, 04:06 PM

I'm a day late on this thread but I'll throw my $.02 worth.

We just left as the only maneuver brigade in all of Baghdad. We partnered with 6 Iraqi Divisions (4 IA and 2 FP) and with the district level Iraqi Police. Other than the SF partnerships, we worked with nearly every ISF unit in Baghdad Province. For our Commander to maintain his relationships with the ISF division commanders, we traveled nearly every day. Blackhawk movement was preferred when 1) the weather allowed it, 2) there were secure LZs available at the ISF compound and 3) when birds were available. As the only maneuver Brigade in Baghdad, our Brigade Commander did not have his own dedicated blackhawks so we were never guaranteed a ride.

We therefore spent a good deal to time on the road moving from FOB to JSS to ISF division HQs. Our vehicle composition depended on the route and threat. We had both up-armored HMMWVs and MRAPs available and we used both sets during the deployment.

While I agree with all the tenets through this thread about having boots on the ground, the importance of dismounted patrolling and securing key areas to ensure IEDs are minimized, how do you do that when you do not own the battlespace? The ISF owned the battlespace - we were their supporting partners. The funny thing was the Iraqi division commanders started acting like two-star generals and owning their own areas of operation. We could not conduct unilateral operations - everything was partnered. We could not send a US only dismounted patrol to look for IEDs, and with all the roadways in Baghdad, that would be impossible. Instead we had to coordinate our C-IED efforts with our Iraqi partners and did everything we could to conduct combined patrols, operations, raids and intelligence collection to ensure we were integrated with the land owners: the Iraqi Divisions.

Our battalions/squadron maintained relations with all the Iraqi Divisions and most of the Iraqi Brigade HQs. In order to maintain freedom of movement, the MRAPs were critical assets to maintain our partnership with the ISF. We could not fly everywhere, we could not walk across Baghdad: our Soldiers had to drive.

As I mentioned before, the vehicle type depended on the route. MRAPs were not pratical going through the Mulhallahs or along the canal roads. The damage they caused to the fledgling infrastructure along with their lack of maneuverability in the tight streets limited their uses for those missions. However, moving along better roads or from base to base, MRAPs were the preferred choice. I saw countless Soldiers walk away from IED hits which would have destroyed up-armored HMMWVs and kill those inside.

We worked with our ISF partners to conducted intel-driven raids to mitigate the IED networks. The sad part is, however, the politically established safe havens within Baghdad itself (Sadr City, Shulla, etc) severely limited conventional partnered operations. Even the SF guys had a hard time getting access since the ISF divisions owned the battlespace and started to crack down on Special Operations missions in their OE. If the SF wanted access, they had to work through us to work through our partners. Again, the Iraqis were in the lead, not us. Obviously this is not the case with Afghanistan and the ANA...but that should be the goal.

Of course I've only talked about our maneuver battalions. Everyone from our Transition Teams, Route Clearance Teams, logistic convoys and escorts ran MRAPs a majority of the time as well.

I'd offer to JMA that he's obviously not familiar with U.S. forces. While we would always request helicopter lift assets, the sad fact of the matter is there is never enough resources, even for the U.S. military. Iraq has switched roles with Afghanistan as the "forgotten war" resulting in a shortage of assets. Even in the land of plenty, there will never be enough lift assets to support all the movement requests needed. Air is the best option, but often is the most unpredictable.

Additionally, I'd offer that you can no longer tell the difference (for good or worse) between an infantryman or tanker, especially in the heavy brigades. Our Soldiers and leaders performed the same missions regardless of their occupational specialty. At the battalion level, we no longer have pure armor or mech infantry anymore. 10 years of combat has blurred the lines between combat arms troopers.

Not sure how much time you have deployed but I'd offer Cav Guy has a heck of a lot of time and experience having "been there and done that" and recently.

The MRAP is a valuable tool in our kitbag and should not be discounted. The need for increased MRAPs in the states for drivers training is critical - we suffered from a shortage of properly licensed drivers due to the limited training opportunities and it plagued us through most of the deployment. Everything is METT-T dependent but the need for MRAPs will not go away. It is another tool in the kitbag both leaders and Soldiers need to maintain proficiency with.

Sully Out!

SWJ Blog

02-11-2011, 12:10 PM

MRAP Future Discussion Paper (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/02/mrap-future-discussion-paper/)

Entry Excerpt:

MRAP Future Discussion Paper
by Ryan T. Kranc

Download The Full Article: MRAP Future Discussion Paper (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/676-kranc.pdf)

Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected Vehicle (MRAP) is a broad term encompassing three main vehicle categories with 28 specific types of vehicle. The vehicle family was procured and acquired in mass as a result of a growing improvised explosive device (IED) threat encountered in Iraq in 2004. Though there is no doubt that the MRAP family of vehicles has saved hundreds, if not thousands, of lives since it was first fielded and placed into operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the MRAP should not be incorporated into the US Army operational structure for a number of reasons. It offers protection against a specific threat type and does not lend well to the higher intensity realm of full spectrum operations. The MRAP incorporation into current brigade combat team structures is as infeasible as it is impractical. Finally, further evaluation and analysis is needed in terms of DOTMLPF in order to more fully understand the long term impacts of MRAP inclusion and fusion into the force. Until those issues are resolved it would be irresponsible, costly, and infeasible to incorporate the MRAP into the operational structure of the US Army.

Download The Full Article: MRAP Future Discussion Paper (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/676-kranc.pdf)

MAJ Ryan T. Kranc is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/02/mrap-future-discussion-paper/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog

05-16-2011, 11:10 AM

The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/05/the-impact-of-incorporating-mr/)

Entry Excerpt:

The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCTs
by Joe Parker

Download the Full Article: The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/764-parker.pdf)

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle had a highly publicized entry into the military ranks of vehicles, first with the Marines in 2004, and then eventually filling requirements with the Army to provide a dramatic increase in IED and blast protection than the ill-suited HMMVW for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rushed in to production by as many as nine separate contractors , the endstate resulted in an accelerated production of multiple variations of the MRAP, with the types roughly categorized as Category I, II, and III and based on number of occupants and mission specific mine/IED clearance operations Now, as the combat mission in Iraq has completed and leaders begin to discuss life beyond Afghanistan, the MRAPs usefulness is in question. The Department of Defense is actively pursuing a replacement for the HMMVW with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program , and the MRAP is facing an identity crisis. Is it a troop transporter or a combat system? What capability beyond the blast protection does it bring and how does that translate into future utilization? It would appear that the MRAP does have a future beyond our current conflicts as Defense Secretary Robert Gates instructed the military to incorporate it into the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization (BCTMOD) plan. What is yet to be seen is how well the MRAP incorporates itself into the BCTMOD plan, what role and capability it fills in the Brigade Combat Team, and what additional requirements it places on existing force structure.

Download the Full Article: The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/764-parker.pdf)

MAJ Joe Parker is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served three years in Iraq as a platoon leader, brigade maintenance officer, and company commander. He holds a BA in Communications from Wake Forest University, and is a graduate of the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course and the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

JMA

11-20-2011, 05:01 PM

May I offer that the first difference is whether these vehicles are for the use of motorised or mechanised infantry.

To motorised infantry (I suggest) for the purpose of getting from A to B and not fighting from.

I recommend that one attempts to sidestep the procurement system associated with such equipment development. (How many soldiers must die before the clowns involved with the process get their act together?)

As I mentioned in another thread the modifications to existing vehicle configurations can be carried out in theatre (or in a friendly neighbouring state - not Pakistan) on an as and when required basis. In fact as these vehicles will probably not have any application outside the current theatre all the work can be carried out in this factory on commercially available chassis. After the war they can be handed to the ANA or scrapped.

In Rhodesia a total of some 2,500 landmines were detonated. (No figures for which were military/police or civilian vehicles.) 650 deaths and 4,500 injured. Had a number of drivers who had detonated 3 mines with only some hearing damage.

The photos below represent some of the cheap but effective methods used to protect troops from landmines. The Pookie detected mines and was built on a VW Beetle chassis. The Puma and Crocodile were built on a Isuzu or Nissan 5 ton chassis. The Pig was built on the Unimog 2.5 chassis. All (except the Pookie which used low pressure tyres) had water in the tyres.

http://farm5.static.flickr.com/4085/5194876317_2b768dc0aa_b.jpg

Note: correction to my above post, it was the drive train of the VW Combi that was used for the Pookie. And the tyres for the Pookie were worn out Formula 1 racing tyres sourced from the scrap heap at Kyalami Race Track in Johannesburg, South Africa.

There have been a number of instances where the issue of urgent on the fly modifications or at least bypassing the normal (long and labourious) procurement could have been (or at least should have been) carried out to provide protection for troops traveling on vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This problem is incapsulated in the 2008 Study: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Case Study by Franz J Gayl (http://pogoarchives.org/m/ns/mrap/mrap-gayl-20080122.pdf)

It chronicles the horror story of a procurement bureaucracy gone mad at an unacceptable cost of life and limb to those fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Worse still it highlights how virtually all serving officers and enlisted men have been numbed into accepting that there is no solution to the problem. See quote below:

It is noteworthy that during the conduct of his 2002-2003 thesis research Maj McGriff continuously encountered push-back from operators at all levels, both enlisted and officer, when presented with the MRAP idea. As if conditioned with a sense of futility, his audiences shared a common first response that 1) the MRAP idea was unrealistic because the Marine Corps would not nor could not afford it and 2) the acquisition system would certainly reject MRAPs because it was something new that differed from/was outside of established Programs of Record (PORs). This same sense of procurement and process futility persisted even while their warfighter audiences agreed that the MRAP made operational common sense.

My experience here in SWC and reinforced by two recent conversations with long serving US soldiers finds the same. That is that the US soldier has been conditioned to accept that his country will send him into harms way without taking the necessary action to provide them with the necessary (and deserved) protection.

I sense that the mindset in the US (and probably also the British) military leadership has developed the belief that the best way to protect soldiers is to not expose them to risk in the first place rather than provide them with the best equipment and support available while insisting that closing with and killing the enemy still remains the primary role of the infantry and continues to be their daily operational duty.

The conclusion should be of grave concern:

The MRAP case study has demonstrated that Marine Corps combat development organizations are not optimized to provide responsive, flexible, and relevant solutions to commanders in the field.

Anyone freak out over this when it was published? ... or with a shrug was it just treated as a normal day at the office?

The following article remains essential reading in relation to landmine detection systems:

The Pookie - A History of the World's first successful Landmine Detector Carrier by Dr J.R.T. Wood (http://www.jrtwood.com/article_pookie.asp)

82redleg

11-21-2011, 02:08 AM

...blah blah blah
"...during the conduct of his 2002-2003 thesis research..."
blah blah blah...

The listed information is invalidated by its date, and invalidates any conclusions drawn from it- there was little reason to worry about this in 2002-2003. I deployed in JAN 04, and given the choice between Up-Armored HMMVWs and soft skins, we chose softskins- they were more flexible, easier to mount/dismount, offered better visibility, etc, etc. My brigade suffered no casualties to IEDs during its previous deployment to Afghanistan (as best I can recall), and our only IED casualties in Iraq were to dismounted troops. I realize that this is an anecdote and not representative. It does show, however, that there was contrary information that inhibited the decisions that appear so obvious in hindsight.

Fuchs

11-21-2011, 08:58 PM

I recall that South Africa sold some of those 70's/80's design MRAPs to IIRC India (Casspirs).

Quick google search told me they did indeed buy 165 refurbished Casspirs around '99-'01.

Firn

12-15-2011, 06:41 PM

After operating in them almost exclusively for the past four months (to my chagrin since I so do miss an LAV), I have gained a greater appreciation for the M-ATV, but also higher frustration with the procurement program.

Here are some issues I have with the platform:

-Visibility forward of the driver and vehicle commander sucks because of the size, and angle of the thick windows. The side windows are even worse, and only allow a passenger to peek out and see what is directly abreast of the vehicle. No way to conduct a "5 and 25" check of the ground without opening the suicide door. I know this limitation has to do with the blast resistance, but c'mon, can the engineering design take into account some functionality requirements too?

-There is no IR flood lamp on the vehicle. IR lamps have prooved indispensible on about every tactical vehicle we already use, because it facilitates the use of night vision devices, so why nothing on the M-ATV as a basic piece of equipment? The driver has a driver's viewer enhancer (DVE) that matches the thermal devices employed on tanks and LAVs to allow drivers to drive in all light conditions, but the vehicle commander does not have a similar capability. That means that under zero moonlight situations, it is very difficult to see through the thick windows, and try to guide a driver using a blackout drive light only.

-There are no AC electrical outlets in the vehicle. MRAPs have them, but the M-ATV is oddly left out. It is almost as if Oshkosh is saying, "well gents, we don't have that option on this model, but if you take the hallway past custromer service and go to our custom shop, you should be able to find that add-on." Huh? Was anyone at Oshkosh looking at how we employ massive amounts of devices (biometric, battery chargers, laptops, etc.) in the current environment?

It's like we went forward and back at the same time, and it is just so odd that these basic things are absent.

The last part seems to be typical for organizations, projects and humans in general. Something can be seen widely as basic and logic, but that doesn't mean that the project addresses and includes that.

Said that I really wonder why Power take-offs are not more often found in military vehicles. Electric "PTOs" really should be standard with all that electronic stuff you have to power, especially as it so easy to provide. You have already a generator and a big battery in your vehicle powering all sorts of things, so why shoud you not make that energy source available by a simple standard outlet?

Hydraulic PTOs should also be standard for light and medium trucks, as it adds just little in cost and weight but gives potentially very wide utility for each vehicle with a very wide array of COTS available. With every member of that (transport) truck familiy provided like that you have at little cost a lot of redundancy.

On a side note: Independent suspensions have become better and better and although they will never match a live axle for simplicity and for specific uses like extreme rock crawling they are rightly becoming more popular even for offroad use. There are very rugged and proven designs, from the swing axle of the Kuebelwagens, Tatras and Steyrs to the more modern incarnations. Nowadays actively managed suspensions can greatly adjust their response automatically and according to the input of the driver, although it remains to be seen how they perform under difficult situations in the field.

Certainly for advancing at a moderate or rapid pace over bad roads or riverbeds an IS is the much more comfortable and less fatiguing option.

PsJÄÄK Korte

12-17-2011, 09:20 AM

I have to ask what is difference between MRAP and wheeled APC? Because despite googling I am still a little puzzled.

Morgan

12-17-2011, 11:45 AM

To Korte....

I believe the primary difference between wheeled APCs and MRAPs is the former is designed to protect troops from shrapnel and small arms fire (SAF) while the latter does that PLUS protects from IEDs (up to a point).

Ken White

12-17-2011, 04:46 PM

I have to ask what is difference between MRAP and wheeled APC? Because despite googling I am still a little puzzled.Plus a major difference in tactical mobility. The wheeled APC is designed to provide a blend of mobility and protection generally for 8 to 15 troops and tilted toward mobility while the MRAP is designed to provide protection, period. Mobility is almost an afterthought for most of them. Most MRAPs also carry fewer people, 4 to 10 being the norm with the mean hovering at about 6. They do provide slightly better situational awareness by having more windows than do wheeled APCs...

B.Smitty

12-20-2011, 09:20 PM

A General Concept of Infantry Mobility

I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.

Perhaps a better concept for "general infantry mobility" might be the humble HMMWV. It has the following benefits:

* It comes in a wide variety of unarmored, semi-armored, or armored configurations.
* It can go places that MRAPS don't dare.
* It has a lower life-cycle cost than any APC or MRAP.
* It has a much lower logistics footprint than an APC or MRAP.
* It has a much lower deployment footprint than an APC or MRAP.

Yes, the HMMWV is not well protected vs IEDs, mines or HMG fire (or really anything). But that's what APCs and IFVs are for right?

Fuchs

12-20-2011, 11:58 PM

... and now imagine the length or pass time of a reinforced infantry company driving in vehicles with an average of only 2-3 men per vehicle, with proper military safety spacing (100 m, at the very least 50 m) and economical cruise speed of 80 kph.

Next, imagine what happens with all those vehicles once infantry dismounts to sweep a village. Would an entire platoon stay back to secure the many, many vehicles so school-aged boys cannot set them aflame?

This vehicle size (capacity) is of interest for dispersed actions, for skirmishing on an operational scale. It's no good logistically as general infantry vehicle.

B.Smitty

12-21-2011, 12:57 AM

You can fit an entire squad on a suitably equipped HMMWV troop carrier.

http://www.amgeneral.com/files/specs-sheet-m1152-domestic-04-10.pdf

That means at minimum four troop carriers per platoon.

An argument could be made to stretch that to six and use a mix or troop carriers and armament carriers.

Fuchs

12-21-2011, 07:26 AM

Add reasonable amount of fuel, tools and other equipment, individual backpacks, netting, foodstuff, ammo, one or two crew-served weapons, some AT munitions, spare parts (tires!) ... no more than 6 per vehicle is reasonable.

B.Smitty

12-21-2011, 01:16 PM

Six in back plus two up front is fine. With six HMMWVs, even with six additional drivers, there's still enough space for the entire platoon.

Add external stowage racks for rucks, spare tires and other gear.

BAE produced a field-installable armor kit for the M1152 that provides armor protection for troops in back as well as five weapon stations.

http://www.baesystems.com/ProductsServices/bae_mps_prod_m1152_troop.html

Fuchs

12-21-2011, 01:43 PM

There's a difference between theory and practice. In practice, even a 2+ ton truck such as Unimog can be small for a squad of ten simply because of all the gear.

Look at vehicle qty and personnel figures of large formations. The heads/vehicle ratio is surprisingly small even with the use of many large and outright huge vehicles.

I doubt that 10 men with their rucksack, individual weapon, webbing including canteen and other pouches and helmets fit into any of those "stretched Land Rover" or "stretched HMWWV" on a regular basis.

It's furthermore no good idea to use closed canopy vehicleswithout a substantial qty of spare seats in a unit; some vehilces break down and need to beleft behind at times. Which vehicle is going to carry their personnel if there's no spare capacity?

B.Smitty

12-21-2011, 02:02 PM

The US manages to fit 37-8 dismounts in 4 Strykers plus mounted element.

Six troop carrier HMMWVs per platoon carrying 2+6 allows for 6 drivers and 42 dismount seats. There's 4-5 extra seats, assuming a similar sized platoon.

That's more room than in the 4 Strykers.

IIRC, the Stryker platoon mounted element is normally 7 soldiers (4 drivers and 3 vehicle commander/gunners). So the ratio of dismounts to vehicle crews is similar between the two organizations. I didn't allot any gunners to the HMMWV platoon, but there is enough "space" for a few, if desired.

B.Smitty

12-21-2011, 03:44 PM

Six M1152s at GVW weigh around 33 tonnes. That's the same as two Strykers, or half the weight of a Stryker platoon's vehicles.

Assuming a generous $200k per M1152, you could outfit an entire company with them for the price of one Stryker ICV ($3.8M).

Firn

12-21-2011, 08:15 PM

I have to ask what is difference between MRAP and wheeled APC? Because despite googling I am still a little puzzled.

It is all very easy.

Tanks are an essential element of armed maneuver warfare. Yet, even this high-value, powerful weapon remains vulnerable to infantry anti-tank tactics especially in urban or confined environments. Hence, infantry accompany tanks to assist in suppressing possible anti-tank action.

During the Second World War, the Soviet tacticians incorporated joint infantry and tank attacks against German forces, both serving in roles to protect the other. Performance was less than desirable as infantry lacked the armored protection and rapid mobility of the tank, and thus unarmoured troops were vulnerable to enemy fire. This led to employment of armoured infantry carriage vehicles known as APCs which overcame these shortcomings.(Perrett 1987:65)

After the war, Soviet military analysed the high infantry casualty rate of combined infantry-tank attacks and concluded the lack of APCs were a major cause. This vulnerability in maneuver warfare was given high priority to remedy. The Soviet military industrial complex had its own designs, Lend-Lease vehicles such as the M3 Half-track and newly acquired German SdKfz 251 to serve as reference. (Perrett 1987:65)

The BTR-152 was one of the first Soviet armoured infantry vehicle after the Second World War. It was developed from November 1946 at ZiS plant by a team (it included K. M. Androsow, A. P. Pietrenko, W. F. Rodionow and P. P. Czerniajew)[1] led by B. M. Fitterman. The first two prototypes were completed in May 1947 and were followed by three experimental series. The vehicle was adopted by the Soviet Army on 24 March 1950. The vehicle was based on the existing ZiS-151 truck chassis. Despite an improved engine, the addition of 5 tons of armour resulted in the vehicle having insufficient mobility.

So first you take a truck chassis and uparmor it to make an APC looking like an MRAP. Sadly the heavy armor and truck heritage can result in a vehicle which lacks offroad mobility.

The BTR-152 and BTR-40, the first two Soviet mass produced APCs, developed after the Second World War given the Soviet Army useful experience with wheeled armoured personnel carriers. However even as they were designed they weren't suited for the needs of the Soviet Army as they lacked a roof (which was added in later versions designated BTR-152K and BTR-40B respectively). [U]The low combat value of BTR-152 and BTR-40 was exposed during the Suez Crisis when the Egyptian Army used them. This was one of the reasons for which the new APC was developed.[/I][U]

Between 1956 and 1957 a decision was made to convert all rifle and mechanized divisions into new motor rifle divisions and a requirement for a new vehicle was drawn up.

Thus the BRT-60 which "was a revolutionary design for its time" was developed, a 8x8 wheeled APC, fully amphibious and highly mobile, with independent suspension and an armor capable to withstand 7,62mm rounds fired from over 100mm away from each direction. It was introduced in 1960.

(All the links are from Wikipedia)

----

As has been written the design of a modern MRAP is to a good degree the result of trying to get a very high protection against blast mines. Thus the vehicles have a lot of ground clearance and are quite heavy for the numbers of people they transport. The rapid introduction addressing a specific need in a specific environment meant that other aspects as offroad mobility were not as seen as important.

Fuchs

12-21-2011, 11:44 PM

German experience was that APCs (SdKfz 251 mostly) halved infantry losses. APCs were only employed in motorised/armoured formations which tended to use aggressive (offensive) tactics, of course.

Firn

01-08-2012, 05:59 PM

German experience was that APCs (SdKfz 251 mostly) halved infantry losses. APCs were only employed in motorised/armoured formations which tended to use aggressive (offensive) tactics, of course.

I always wondered what an impact a (very) considerable numbers of a family of trucks like the Tatra 111 or Unimog would have made on the German war effort, especially in the East. Of course more of anything, be it AFV like tanks or APCs, artillery and ammunition would have had a potentially massive impact, but a great lot of a unexpensive, robust, and highly mobile/mobile family of easily mass-producable might have completely changed the mobility of the German forces. [Lack of key ressources like metal, rubber and especially fuel, but also the lack of capability/skill/ability to handle mass production (of a reduced range of products) like the US had of course their influence on that].

Said that the prices of the new APC/IFV like the Boxer and Freccia are quite stunning. Even for the ever smaller European forces it is pretty much impossible to switch the relevant brigades over to such vehicles. In this case economies of the state and of scale are hitting really hard.

davidbfpo

08-28-2012, 09:15 PM

This appears to be the main thread on MRAP and was originally titled 'MRAP JLTV concept of infantry mobility'. It is now: All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread).

There were other threads: What is the MRAPs future in the US Army?, (on SWJ Blog) The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s, (ditto) MRAP Future Discussion Paper and Military Claims Victory with V-shaped Truck.

davidbfpo

08-28-2012, 09:37 PM

A short article in Foreign Affairs, which ends:
Indeed, even if the United States drove all its MRAPs lemming-like into the Euphrates upon departing Iraq, the vehicles still would have been a bargain, not a boondoggle.

Link:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138049/christopher-j-lamb-and-sally-scudder/why-the-mrap-is-worth-the-money?page=show

Tukhachevskii

05-07-2013, 03:07 PM

...thread but someone closed it:( I'll post it here anyway (it won't quite sound/feel right but what the what).

Now, regardless of what you may all think about the “great” Mike Sparks/Sparky, I always found his concept of “battle-boxes” (http://www.combatreform.org/battleboxes.htm) quite intriguing (nay, sensible?). Looks like someone else has too! Specifically KMW’s Heavily-protected personnel transport (http://www.kmweg.com/11478-bD1lbg-~PRODUKTE~schutzausstattung~Mannschaftscontainer~M annschaftscontainer.html). I actually prefer the idea of these than the MRAP fetish now gripping the world’s militaries. I can’t see why an entire battalion couldn’t mount up in these on heavy trucks the logistics chaps would have anyway and be transported into their AO or a friendly rear (;)). Once there the Battalion would mount up in an APC Squadron/Regiment for movement over the line of departure. Given any army worth its salt would already have heavy 8x8 trucks in its transportation/distribution companies the only real costs would be the actual containers themselves. Furthermore, although I can’t fathom it from the limited literature available currently, Bn’s could be administratively moved by train without needing to debuss from the containers given they seem to be of standard ISO size and could simply be mounted on rail cars. At the rear area RV the containers (plus troops) would simply be lifted onto waiting trucks and “shipped” to their respective formation rear areas where (separate) APC battalions would be waiting for actual combat (did I repeat myself?! I can’t wait to tell my ex :rolleyes:).