MikeF
02-12-2010, 03:39 AM
Interesting commentary. (H/T Dave Maxwell)
Outside View: Vietnam 1963 and Afghanistan 2010 (http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/2010/02/11/Outside-View-Vietnam-1963-and-Afghanistan-2010/UPI-31351265910248/)
Published: Feb. 11, 2010 at 12:44 PM
By LAWRENCE SELLIN, UPI Outside View Commentator
HELSINKI, Finland, Feb. 11 (UPI) -- According to a strategic assessment of security operations in Afghanistan prepared by U.S. Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey (Ret.) on Dec 9, 2009, the Taliban believe they are winning.
Additionally, the Afghan people do not know whether the current government or the Taliban will prevail. The population, particularly the majority Pashtuns, are hedging their bets. Most Afghans are dismayed by the injustice and corruption of the central government, in particular, the Afghan National Police, McCaffrey said.
Such observations follow closely those of U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal in his Aug. 30, 2009, report: "Many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans -- in both their government -- and the international community -- that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents."
The National Intelligence Estimate 53-63 "Prospects in South Vietnam" submitted by the director of Central Intelligence and dated April 17, 1963, contains the following paragraph:
"South Vietnam was and remains highly vulnerable to rural terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Its people have no tradition of loyalty to a government in Saigon. The Vietnamese peasant has always accommodated himself to whatever force was the best able to protect or to punish him -- or offer him a vision, however illusionary, of a better life. The 'government' meant the local officials with whom he was in contact, many of whom tended to be ineffective and often venal. Various forms of minor corruption and petty bureaucratic tyranny have long been rife in the provinces and the offenders were seldom disciplined by their superiors. Most peasants are primarily interested in peace and do not care who wins the military victories. Security is significant to the peasant largely in terms of how it affects him personally."
According to McCaffrey's report, the Taliban are politically rejected by nearly the entire non-Pashtun population and command support of only 6 percent even among their brother Pashtuns. Nevertheless, the Taliban are believed to have organized shadow governments in 33 of 34 Afghan provinces under the umbrella of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan....
Outside View: Vietnam 1963 and Afghanistan 2010 (http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/2010/02/11/Outside-View-Vietnam-1963-and-Afghanistan-2010/UPI-31351265910248/)
Published: Feb. 11, 2010 at 12:44 PM
By LAWRENCE SELLIN, UPI Outside View Commentator
HELSINKI, Finland, Feb. 11 (UPI) -- According to a strategic assessment of security operations in Afghanistan prepared by U.S. Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey (Ret.) on Dec 9, 2009, the Taliban believe they are winning.
Additionally, the Afghan people do not know whether the current government or the Taliban will prevail. The population, particularly the majority Pashtuns, are hedging their bets. Most Afghans are dismayed by the injustice and corruption of the central government, in particular, the Afghan National Police, McCaffrey said.
Such observations follow closely those of U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal in his Aug. 30, 2009, report: "Many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans -- in both their government -- and the international community -- that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents."
The National Intelligence Estimate 53-63 "Prospects in South Vietnam" submitted by the director of Central Intelligence and dated April 17, 1963, contains the following paragraph:
"South Vietnam was and remains highly vulnerable to rural terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Its people have no tradition of loyalty to a government in Saigon. The Vietnamese peasant has always accommodated himself to whatever force was the best able to protect or to punish him -- or offer him a vision, however illusionary, of a better life. The 'government' meant the local officials with whom he was in contact, many of whom tended to be ineffective and often venal. Various forms of minor corruption and petty bureaucratic tyranny have long been rife in the provinces and the offenders were seldom disciplined by their superiors. Most peasants are primarily interested in peace and do not care who wins the military victories. Security is significant to the peasant largely in terms of how it affects him personally."
According to McCaffrey's report, the Taliban are politically rejected by nearly the entire non-Pashtun population and command support of only 6 percent even among their brother Pashtuns. Nevertheless, the Taliban are believed to have organized shadow governments in 33 of 34 Afghan provinces under the umbrella of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan....