ANSF performance 2015 onwards
This is one of the five new threads on Afghanistan for 2015 onwards, its focus is ANSF performance.
There are a small number of OEF threads now closed on the:
1) ANA: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5384
2) ANP: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1584
3) ALP also appear in: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=10562
I do appreciate that there can be cross-over between the new threads, notably how the NATO mission interacts with the ANSF and Afghan politics.
Now the real fight begins: a mixed picture
One of the first comprehensive assessments of the ANSF, alongside the wider, mainly political context, by Professor Theo Farrell, of Kings War Studies, following a Q&A format:http://postwarwatch.com/2015/01/25/p...mixed-picture/
This theme did strike me as odd, about the ANA:
Quote:
Afghan army officers identify their primary mission as protecting the Afghan state in a very conventional sense. Their main concern is Pakistan, and the defense of Afghanistan against conventional Pakistani forces.....Yet this is not really what ANA commanders want to be doing.
What Campbell’s trying to hide is a disappearing army
I'd seen a headline on General Campbell restricting access to data previously published and missed its importance until this hitherto unkown blog comment appeared via Twitter:http://sunnyinkabul.com/2015/01/30/w...e-afghan-army/
Quote:
What General Campbell doesn’t want us to know is that the army that’s supposed to be taking over for the US to fight all the terrorist things? It’s disappearing. Even faster than usual.
So why is the Afghan Army quitting in droves? According to the Americans, it’s because…
…high operational tempo, sustained risk, soldier care and quality of life, and leave issues. Afghan casualties increased since the ANSF took the lead for security in June 2013. Although combat losses comprise a relatively small percentage of total ANSF attrition numbers, reducing ANSF casualties remains both a top morale and operational priority for ISAF and ANSF leaders.
But what’s underlying that is the uncertainty the Afghan forces feel after only a few years of existence. They haven’t been around long enough to know what it means to fight on their own. For most of those years they had their hands held by the most powerful military in the world. And by holding hands I mean we brought death from above in the form of all the A-10s and the B-1s and the F-16s and all the exploding things in the air over Afghanistan.
The Hardest (and Most Important) Job in Afghanistan
Sub-titled:
Quote:
A week on the frontlines with the Afghan National Police.
Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/ma...hanistan.html?
A good read, if depressing.
Mission creep for US forces?
A NYT report:
Quote:
Months after
President Obama formally declared that the United States’ long
war against the Taliban was over in
Afghanistan, the American military is regularly conducting airstrikes against low-level insurgent forces and sending Special Operations troops directly into harm’s way under the guise of “training and advising.”In justifying the continued presence of the American forces in
Afghanistan, administration officials have insisted that the troops’ role is relegated to counterterrorism, defined as tracking down the remnants of
Al Qaeda and other global terrorist groups, and training and advising the Afghan security forces who have assumed the bulk of the fight.
Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/wo...ghanistan.html
Easy prey for the Taliban?
Not a shock, but one wonders how long can the ANSF sustain itself:
Quote:
Afghan security forces are suffering record casualties in their first battles against the Taliban since the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan ended in December after more than 13 years. The number of killed and wounded so far this year is about 70 percent higher than during the same period last year, said Colonel Brian Tribus, director of public affairs for NATO’s Afghanistan mission.
Link:http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articl...s-with-taliban
Interesting to note the ALP get a mention:
Quote:
Ulumi said that local police have borne the brunt of the fresh Taliban offensive, which has targeted the northern provinces of Kunduz and
Badakhshan.
The "model" in Vietnam was Dau Tranh not Mao (though can be argued a variation on Mao
• Dau Tranh--Vietnamese Model
• 2 Elements--political and armed
• Opponent loses unless he wins both
• Organization is goal of Vietnamese variant
• Victory to side with strongest and most resilient organization
• New definition of Absolute War
• No such thing as a non-combatant
• People are an instrument of war
• Time is a critical element to ensure victory
• Importance of International support for Revolution
Douglas Pike, in his seminal work on the Vietnam War details the Vietnamese strategy of Dau Tranh (the “Struggle”) emphasizing that the strategy was beyond a purely military strategy but one which mobilized the entire population – a political struggle with the three now famous action programs (or “vans”): action among the enemy; action among the people, and action among the military. This was a comprehensive political-military strategy that had as a key element the psychological influence of its own people, its military, and that of the enemy. But the focus was not just on the enemy’s military force; it struck right at the heart of the enemy: the will of the enemy government leadership and its population.
Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1991), p. 216.
1 Attachment(s)
Dau Tranh Strategy: Integrated political and Military Struggle
In case you cannot download the attachment here is the text.
Political Struggle:
Dan Van - Action among your people - total mobilization of propaganda, motivational & organizational measures to manipulate internal masses and fighting units
Binh Van - Action among enemy military - subversion, proselytizing, propaganda to encourage desertion, defection and lowered morale among enemy troops.
Dich Van - Action among enemy's people - total propaganda effort to sow discontent, defeatism, dissent, and disloyalty among enemy's population.
Military Struggle:
Phase 1: Organizations and Preparation - building cells, recruiting members, infiltrating organizations, creating front groups, spreading propaganda, stockpiling weapons.
Phase 2: Terrorism - Guerrilla Warfare - kidnappings, terrorist attacks, sabotage, guerrilla raids, ambushes, setting of parallel governments in insurgent areas.
Phase 3: Conventional Warfare - regular formations and maneuver to capture key geographical and political objectives.
Obviously this is nothing new and pretty basic and has been (and continues to be) executed in various forms by various groups around the world.
Peoples Revolutionary Warfare
Quote:
Originally Posted by
max161
In case you cannot download the attachment here is the text.
Political Struggle:
Dan Van - Action among your people - total mobilization of propaganda, motivational & organizational measures to manipulate internal masses and fighting units
Binh Van - Action among enemy military - subversion, proselytizing, propaganda to encourage desertion, defection and lowered morale among enemy troops.
Dich Van - Action among enemy's people - total propaganda effort to sow discontent, defeatism, dissent, and disloyalty among enemy's population.
Military Struggle:
Phase 1: Organizations and Preparation - building cells, recruiting members, infiltrating organizations, creating front groups, spreading propaganda, stockpiling weapons.
Phase 2: Terrorism - Guerrilla Warfare - kidnappings, terrorist attacks, sabotage, guerrilla raids, ambushes, setting of parallel governments in insurgent areas.
Phase 3: Conventional Warfare - regular formations and maneuver to capture key geographical and political objectives.
Obviously this is nothing new and pretty basic and has been (and continues to be) executed in various forms by various groups around the world.
max161 thanks for posting this. Brings up points I have beeen saying for awhile about how the old school stuff still has a lot merit and all this new stuff ain't that new. Instead of struggling what to call this type of warfare call it what it used to be called. PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE.
It is behind the Marine Corps Gazette subscription paywall but there is an excellent article with good graphics you may like. The title is A Marine For All Seasons Maneuver Warfare vs. low-Intensity Conflict by LTC. H.T.Hayden September 1989 edition.
Thanks again!