The Economist covers Irregular Warfare and Western Military Transformation
Cover article in the Economist this week:
Brains, not Bullets; how to fight future wars.
http://www.economist.com/images/2007...uecovUS400.jpg
http://www.economist.com/research/ar...ry_id=10015844
http://www.economist.com/opinion/dis...ry_id=10024437
Quote:
Brains, not bullets
Oct 25th 2007
From The Economist print edition
Western armies are good at destroying things. Can they be made better at building them?
ANOTHER debate to do with Iraq and Afghanistan is building in America, one that could have important consequences for the West. This debate is being conducted in the Pentagon—and it has to do with the future shape of America's armed forces. With its far-flung alliances and commitments, the superpower rightly wants a “full spectrum” of military capabilities to deal with everything from an all-out war to a small policing action. But precisely what the mix should be is increasingly contentious—and could prove expensive.
If the biggest threat comes from rising powers, such as a belligerent Russia or a pushy China, America and its allies will need to invest in aircraft, ships and advanced weapons to cope. If the greatest challenge is the fight against militants and insurgents around the world—seen by some as a new and different “fourth generation” of warfare (see article)—then they will need more boots on the ground and, crucially, different sorts of soldiers wearing them. Sadly for taxpayers everywhere, the emerging answer from America is that a modern power needs to prepare for both challenges. But there has been a clear swing towards manpower from technology....
Irregular Warfare: After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers
Irregular Warfare: After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers - The Economist, 25 October.
Quote:
... Can America and its Western allies avoid similar humiliation in Iraq and Afghanistan? Martin van Creveld, an Israeli military historian, argues that insurgencies have been almost impossible to defeat ever since Nazi Germany failed to suppress Josip Broz Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia. Winning such wars requires one of two tactics: extreme restraint and patience, as shown by the British over nearly 38 years in Northern Ireland; or extreme brutality, as shown by Syria in 1982 when the army destroyed much of Hama, a stronghold of Islamist rebels, killing at least 10,000 people. Any other method, says Mr van Creveld, risks being too harsh to win the support of the population but not harsh enough to cow it into submission.
This rule is too stark. Experts point to successes such as the end of the insurgency in El Salvador, the collapse of the Shining Path rebels in Peru, the end of the civil wars in Mozambique and Angola, the demise of the Red Brigades in Italy and of the Red Army Faction in Germany. Much of this debate revolves around the meaning of victory and defeat, as well as the definition of counter-insurgency, civil war, counter-terrorism and so on. One school of thought holds that America's forces had largely defeated the Vietcong in Vietnam when its politicians lost the will to stop North Vietnam's conventional army from overrunning the south. That is to miss the point: in counter-insurgency one side can win every battle, yet lose the war...
Yep, sure does. You're doing great work. Some others
elsewhere could be as well but my spies tell me they're busy on, er, um, other tasks...
At the risk of minor heresy, my mind boggles at what just one SF Company could do in the 'Stan with an OpCon (I'd even go OpCom) light Infantry battalion and an Engineer Company plus a few other folks as far as training the ANA -- or even the cops...
Hmm. That may be major heresy. Absolute apostasy even. :wry:
Instead, we have to take ARNG Armor Battalions (Dismounted) and 'train' them to train others...
After Smart weapons, smart soldiers
The Economist has been going down hill for a while. I don't quite get what he was going for with this article.
[/quote]Even if America cannot imagine fighting another Iraq or Afghanistan, extremists round the world have seen mighty America's vulnerability to the rocket-propelled grenade, the AK-47 and the suicide-bomber. [/quote]
1. We had already shown this in Lebanon and Somalia.
2. What has really changed is not that our enemies have shown that we are vulnerable to their attacks, but that our public cannot withstand casualties and that they can.
3. What has changed EVERYTHING is technology. Whether it is cell phones or the internet, insurgents see immediate results to their actions and are not only able to use it for propaganda, but are capable of seeing its effect on their enemy (specifically the American civilians.) Unfortunately, knocking out satellite phone, cellular phone and internet service in Iraq doesn't seem to be an option. Everything is immediate today.
Also, the British had a much easier time with the geography of Malaya. They didn’t' have to deal with Laos and Cambodia. On top of this, the SAS was in its formative years and for this reason was most capable of adapting to the situation in every way. He also ignores the fight between the military and politicians. Politicians change often in Western governments and force the military to constantly appease their desires. This impact can best be seen in Northern Ireland. All of this effects small wars.
Note: I know I seem to always be critical in my posts, but that is only because I am a critic. LOL. :D. I just don't like mid-length articles. Their purpose is unclear. They are not a summary of the issues, they fail to explore issues in their entirety and most often fail to site anything to help the reader fill in the gaps. This unfortunately has become the trend/standard.
Adam
P.S. Sorry about that rant.:)
I'm inclined to agree with much of that, Adam
I really agree the Economist has lost it to a significant degree.
The "vulnerability" to the RPG, AK-47 and the suicide bomber is hyperbolic to say the least. It is also of no strategic, very little operational and not great tactical significance.
I'm not sure I agree that "our public" cannot withstand casualties. Certainly some object quite strongly to casualties for any war and possibly more to casualties for this war but I still firmly believe the largest majority of those disaffected by this war are less concerned with casualties than they are with performance. The bulk of the public, I think simply wants it finished and finished acceptably.
There is to my mind little question that they are trouncing us in the info war -- we have turned the corner tactically if not operationally but in the information domain we are getting zapped. :mad:
The Brits get a lot of praise over Malaya. Your point is well taken. They did okay but contrary to popular opinion, it wasn't a "win" -- it, like most other COIN ops, achieved simply an acceptable outcome. Folks also forget the massive advantage they had there -- they were the government. In Viet Nam, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, we had or have to get along with independent governments who were and are emphatically willing to operate on their own agendas and who did or do not care about US public opinion. Huge difference. :(
I'm sure you're correct on the target audience.
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Originally Posted by
mmx1
I was not expecting this crowd to glean anything new out of the Economist piece. However, we're not the target audience, and I'm interested in it mainly for its effects in educating the Western mainstream about small wars and the consequences it has for the organization of our militaries. This piece and the accompanying article on restructuring Western militaries for small wars made the cover of this week's edition. In particular, the irregular warfare piece can be better understood as a piece of supporting background information for the cover article on military transformation.
http://www.economist.com/opinion/dis...ry_ID=10024437
I believe the statement about ak-47's, RPG's, and suicide bombers is meant to be hyperbolic - they are universally understood symbols of the guerilla.
Almost certainly on the intent of the RPG, etc. inclusion as well -- my concern is that many readers of the Economist won't recognize the hyperbole...
More Truth Than You Realize.....
Originally posted by Adam L:
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We need to establish a DoJ program where we give hackers more lenient sentence and perhaps a special prison if they are willing to spend their time attacking terrorists online mainframe. This may seem a little silly, but with the amount of hackers we spend a fortune prosecuting every year, it would be easier to plea most of them out into a program like this. This would save millions and give us a more foot (or more accurately "finger") soldiers.
Give them a special "prison" (actually, a walled off apartment complex would work just fine), with a few bundled T12s (or really get serious and get them an even bigger pipe), all high speed wireless, 24 hour food service, and an open account at newegg (well, ok, a $100k limit) - hell, you'd never get them to leave. Oh, and btw, the guiding principle is "The Only Rules Is There Ain't No Rules" - and then stand back & watch.
Give this team 9 to 12 months to take on the jihadists - IT'S OVER!! The jihadists won't have a chance up against this bunch.
And guess what - it will be a whole lot cheaper than throwing them in federal prison. In fact, you might actually have a really hard time getting them to leave once their sentence was completed.
You ought to visit more often
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Originally Posted by
walrus
...
To put it another way, some of you just don't get it, and you don't know that you don't get it - which is why you don't like the Economists take on things.
Most of us here have been saying the same thing the Economist said for some time. I went on a rant longer than yours just about the stupidity of the words 'victory,' 'war' and 'win.' :wry:
I suggest there's a difference in deciding something is superficial as opposed to not "liking the Economists take on things" in the sense that anyone disagreed with it.
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The end state we eventually reach in Iraq is not going to be defined as a "win" or a "loss", that much is obvious already. Instead we will ultimately settle for some sort of political compromise that will have good parts and perhaps bad parts from our point of view. The Economist implicitly understands this.
Neither you or the Economist have a patent on understanding that problem. Again, a numberl of us have made that point
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What the Economist also implicitly understands is the total weakness of Foreign Army of occupation (any foreign army) against a well organised domestic insurgency movement that has a measure of popular domestic support. Look no further than the American War of Independence if you want an example.
Or that point. The recurring thread not only on this board but from most of the folks in the US DoD for some time is that we can screw it up, only the Iraqis and the Afghans can fix it. I guess you missed all that as well...
I'll also note that most of us are more than aware of the screwups, plural and by many actors, that got us to this point and have had no problems stating that.
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The simplest example I can give of this asymmetry is from my own past: I was once given that most delightful role you can have in a war game - playing the enemy, in this case the VC. We had a ball, and every night we went to sleep with the alarm clock set for 0200 or thereabouts when we would get up and carefully creep towards a perimeter, throw a few grenade simulators and make some noise, then we'de go back to bed in the knowledge that the poor guys in the base were going to be stood to for the rest of the evening. - Thats asymmetry - liittle effort by us - big effort by you.
That is a simple example. Having spent a couple of years in Viet Namese rice paddies against the real thing, they were a little more painstaking than you were -- they would almost never attack a fixed position without at least two painstaking reconnaissance peeks. They also had RPGs and AKs -- didn't do the suicide bit though, just got a lot of their own folks killed by getting caught before they got to the wire. :D
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Gen. Schwartzkopf, the greatest commander America has produced since WWII in my opinion summed it up brilliantly at a press conference I heard before Gulf War One....
We can differ on that...
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There is a video on You Tube of a radar controlled Gatling gun destroying incoming mortar bombs at Balad. Great demonstration of technology and a great video, but I couldn't help from thinking about how much it was costing in ammo to destroy each of these old $5.00 81 (or 82)mm mortar rounds. Same thing - little effort by insurgents - big effort by us. Thats asymmetry
Yes it is. It's also not smart on a couple of other levels but we have a bad habit of relying on technology rather than training and trying to insure troop comfort to almost the same extent we go to in protecting troop safety. Penalty of living in a democracy with a dim, panicky legislative body and collectively more money than good sense. *
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I also fail to understand the comment that:
""The "vulnerability" to the RPG, AK-47 and the suicide bomber is hyperbolic to say the least. It is also of no strategic, very little operational and not great tactical significance.""
No significance? How many billions have been spent on hardening vehicles? How many billions are spent on road blocks, checkpoints and god knows what other security measures to deal with these threats in Iraq??? Not significant???? Of course they are significant because they have constrained the way we must operate every day, all day!
The items have no significance -- the people using those things are quite significant. They are doing the things you state, so I guess you and the Economist missed that one. It's not the hardware, it's people and their mind and dedication...
Oh -- and those vehicles? Comment * above applies.
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"Winning" in counterinsurgency, as it was taught to me, involves getting people, including the insurgents, into a state where they think that its going to be better for them in future to either stop fighting or stop supporting those doing the fighting, and as we have sadly seen "Shock and Awe" just doesn't cut it as a motivator. The Economist seems to understand this.
Sorry for the rambling post, it saddens me deeply that some people just don't get this.
I think most everyone here gets that and has for some time. One could even say that's why this board exists (note the Title and headers). The Economist is apparently not a reader or contributor, others who stop by only sporadically may also miss some commentary. Nothing wrong with that. Except perhaps those real VC with their painstaking recon before attacking might have been able to show one something about taking the effort to know what one is attacking instead of assuming things...
We can disagree on that...
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Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
. . .
Also, I need to disagree with Ken's earlier point. The fact that 150,000 - give or take - US soldiers are tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan by people with PRGs and AKs greatly increases the likelihood of Iran getting the bomb and that obviously has major strategic geopolitical implications.
You do note that you and I say it's the people -- which was my point -- and not the tools? We can agree on that much. :wry:
I disagree that US Soldiers being occupied (as opposed to "tied down") in Afghanistan and Iraq is likely to greatly increase the likelihood of Iraq getting "the bomb." If it has any effect at all, it is more likely to deter them. Give it some thought.
Nor, for that matter, do I think that even if Iran had a nuclear capability that the strategic implications would be major -- acknowledging that you and I would probably differ on what constitutes 'major.'