When I read comments and hear military commentators expressing frustration about counterinsurgency and "Hearts and Minds" activities, etc., I am reminded of an old saying: "When your only tool is a hammer, every problem is a nail."

My perception of the American military (biased of course because I'm Australian) is that it has been designed for the precision application of overwhelming firepower - which is something it does very very well, as was demonstrated in Gulf War One ( by my hero - Gen. Schwartzkopf).

The problem with a counterinsurgency environment is that firepower is not the issue, as we have sadly seen, the AK47, RPG, a few dud 155 rounds and a garage opener is quite sufficient to produce mayhem. The problem is not about having sufficient weaponry to apply to targets, its about finding the targets in the first place and then deciding what to do with them. Under such circumstances, as the Economist has pointed out, it's the brains of your troops and their training and experience that are your critical, limiting, asset.

I do not know enough about American training to be able to comment, but Australian infantry training, always emphasized the absolutely critical importance of junior leaders (Cpl, Lance Cpl) and section operations (about ten men). A very very high premium was placed on initiative, problem solving and independence, (almost to the point of insubordination).

I am speculating of course, but I wonder if this is where the gap is that The Economist is trying to delicately point out?


As for being sensitive about culture, anthropology, etc. etc. it's not about being namby pamby and group hugs at all. It's about getting inside the enemy's skull so that the message you are sending is coherent and understood, bearing in mind that to succeed against an insurgency, you have to convince the population that there are better things to do in life than become a suicide bomber.

I'll know that the message has gotten through when I see troops taking off their sunglasses before they talk to Iraqis.