Classic Principles of War
Had some homework in Grad School last week regarding contemporary application of the principles of war. Wanted to float it with you fellas.
Since 9/11, which principles of war have we best adhered to? In Afghanistan? In Iraq? Which have we neglected? Which principles are outdated? Do they still apply today? Or need revamped?
Right off the bat, I can name "unity of command" as a challenge/failure in Afghanistan.
I already did the assignment, so you are not doing it for me:)
Thought it was a great topic.
Objective is the major shortfall
Just a couple of thoughts, and with the caveat that I'm looking at the principles reference irregular warfare (where they fall short), but they're still very much relevant for conventional war.
Objective: a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. If you have this, then you obtain unity of effort with the right command relationships. This is a major shortfall.
Mass: Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time. This can be interpreted to mesh with irregular warfare, especially if you extend the time factor to months and years, and change combat power to security forces.
Offense: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. While offense will always play a role, it could be argued that a good defense is more constructive in irregular warfare. Protecting the population in many ways is an offensive operation against the insurgent.
Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Important at the tactical level, but arguments could be made that transparency is more importanat at the operational/strategic level.
Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. We initially violated this principle in OIF, still don't have a handle on it in OEF-A.
We could address all of them, just wanted to throw a couple out.
Question, Bill. I agree with what you say
but do have one comment and a question for clarification. Question first:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
...Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Important at the tactical level, but arguments could be made that transparency is more importanat at the operational/strategic level. (emphasis added /kw)
Sorry, I'm old and slow. I don't know what you mean by the highlighted comment???
Quote:
Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. We initially violated this principle in OIF, still don't have a handle on it in OEF-A.
Just an observation; I'm not at all sure that the enemy advantages in either theater were or are unexpected; I'd submit we were -- and more damningly, are -- too big, bureaucratic and inflexible to react to and / or pre-empt them...
There are some exceptions to that generalization, fortunately. Not enough, unfortunately.
Added item of commentary for Ol' Wilf:
Quote:
Mass: Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time. This can be interpreted to mesh with irregular warfare, especially if you extend the time factor to months and years, and change combat power to security forces.
While I broadly agree with you on the concept of principles, they are useful for some to organize thoughts. There are, as you noted, several such lists of varying utility. In any event, in US practice, 'Mass' is generally construed, usefully I think, as Bill stated it in that quote. ADDED: Wilf posted his acknowledgment of Bill's comment while I was typing... :(
Accepting up front that this is a major oversimplification
Could this be viewed from the perspective of a celebration. Planning requires all those involved to have a common vision of schedule, location, time, etc. Also an unfortunate sideeffect is that party crashers also know about it and will begin dedicating resources to it. The key to the tactical level surprise is who jumps out of the cake
Marilyn Monroe, or Seal Team One
Bob, I wish your world was the real one
as far as unity of command is concerned.:eek: Unfortunately, often the HN is not and cannot be in charge. Thus, HN in charge, becomes a goal to be achieved - preferably sooner rather than later. Equally unfortunately, the American Ambassador is not always in charge. The escape clause is the exception to the Ambassadorial appointment letter that notes that military forces do not come under the Ambassador when a major military operation is undertaken. But, then, neither do non-military elements of the USG come under the command of the military commander!
Do you happen to recall the "McCaffrey Wars" of the early 1990s? When GEN McCaffrey was USCINCSO he claimed authority over MILGP commanders in his AOR. It raised a firestorm. The US Ambassador to Colombia sent a blistering letter to everyone at State (and it leaked - no surprise). Ambassador Marilyn MacAffee in Guatemala canceled a military exercise that was already underway and ordered the US troops out of her country in 24 hours - it took 48! DEPSECSTATE Strobe Talbot tried to tell the Ambassadors that McCaffrey was right and they reminded him that they worked for the President not the SECSTATE (and certainly not a retread Time Magazine writer who just happened to hold the position of DEPSEC). In the end McCaffrey retired to become Pres Clinton's drug czar and Ambassador MacAffee continued to serve as an ambassador. Point is that the system while generally clear in normal times is very unclear when a major military operation is undertaken. Especially true in Iraq until the arrival of Petraeus and Crocker and still true in Afghanistan. And achieving unity of effort in iraq depended on the peronalities and will of the two men involved.
Cheers
JohnT
I cannot believe you called Ol' Strobe
a dipstick here. Accuracy is always applauded, tho'
Just think, he may come back...:(
P.S.
Of course you're correct on the HN bit and unity of command. Always fascinates me how many people -- some in extremely high places -- miss the significance of that...