Rethinking the US Army

Rethinking the US Army – 10 October Los Angeles Times by Peter Spiegel and Julian E. Barnes.

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Absorbing the lessons of a troubled war, U.S. military officials have begun an intense debate over proposals for a sweeping reorganization of the Army to address shortcomings that have plagued the force in Iraq and to abandon some war-fighting principles that have prevailed since the Cold War...

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates is expected to weigh in today in a major address in which he will warn that the Army is unlikely to face a conventional war in the future and must reorganize to fight in unconventional conflicts…

Gates also will single out the need for changes in Army personnel policies to better recognize and reward young officers who show promise in less traditional areas, including those skilled in foreign languages and in advising foreign forces…

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On the foreign military training issue:

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The leading advocate of establishing a stand-alone advisor corps within the Army is Lt. Col. John Nagl, a co-author of the Army's new counterinsurgency field manual who is considered a rising star within the service.

In an article published in a policy journal in June, Nagl, who served as an operations officer in a battalion in Iraq three years ago, proposed a permanent force of 20,000 advisors...

"If we need advisory teams for a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, it makes sense to build this force structure permanently," Nagl said.

In his speech, Gates is expected to emphasize that such training missions could prevent future wars...

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Related from today's New York Times - Faster Army Expansion Plan Approved.

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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has approved a plan to ease the strain of two wars on the military by increasing the size of the active-duty Army to 547,000 by 2010, two years sooner than planned, officials said Tuesday.

Mr. Gates approved the accelerated timetable in a Sept. 26 memo that also barred the Army from reaching the goal by lowering its recruiting standards or employing “stop loss,” a practice of prohibiting soldiers from retiring...

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but we need to make sure we get SEC Gates thoughts from today:

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Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates is expected to weigh in today in a major address in which he will warn that the Army is unlikely to face a conventional war in the future and must reorganize to fight in unconventional conflicts…

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While the LA Times may be the weather vane of what he is to say, it'll be the SEC DEF's public thoughts that will provide indication for us of where he sees the Army going. Not that my humble opinion matters, but so far SEC Gates has proven to be an impressive SEC DEF because he seems to go out of his way to understand the problem and consider the angles and consequences (perspectives and effects), then accepts the risk needed to reach the best solution. From what I've watched and read, the man talks to people, not at them - this is a leadership style that is inclusive, and when dealing with intelligent, self motivated subordinates, allows for better decisions to be reached that stand up to the test of time.

Best Regards, Rob

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Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

so far SEC Gates has proven to be an impressive SEC DEF because he seems to go out of his way to understand the problem and consider the angles and consequences (perspectives and effects), then accepts the risk needed to reach the best solution. From what I've watched and read, the man talks to people, not at them - this is a leadership style that is inclusive, and when dealing with intelligent, self motivated subordinates, allows for better decisions to be reached that stand up to the test of time.

Best Regards, Rob

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Kind of the "anti Rumsfeld," no?

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On the foreign military training issue:

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The leading advocate of establishing a stand-alone advisor corps within the Army is Lt. Col. John Nagl, a co-author of the Army's new counterinsurgency field manual who is considered a rising star within the service.

In an article published in a policy journal in June, Nagl, who served as an operations officer in a battalion in Iraq three years ago, proposed a permanent force of 20,000 advisors...

"If we need advisory teams for a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, it makes sense to build this force structure permanently," Nagl said.

In his speech, Gates is expected to emphasize that such training missions could prevent future wars...

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If you read the piece its interesting to see LTG Chiarelli's thoughts.

Its a tough call. On the one hand we need balance and flexibility, on the other I believe the establishment of an "Advisory Corps" of reasonable size could provide benefits beyond just having a ready pool to streamline the our commitments.

The article infers that LTG Chiarelli's opposition stems from rationalizing that if SOF needs augmentation then they can get it from GPF because we don't have the resources to create more specialized force structure for separate purposes. I think its also worth considering that reduction in available BCTs means higher OPTEMPO for ARNG and USAR forces as well as AD BCTs at least as long as our commitments remain as they are, or close to where they are - how do we get to the goals stated by the CSA of X amount deployed and Y amount refitting in CONUS or home station for Active and Reserve component forces? There are related recruiting and retention issues to consider.

But we also have the challenge of looking further forward - toward what capabilities we'll need in the future. I believe the Advisory Corps is worth the risk as long as it does not become an end unto itself. What I mean is that it cannot become a separate branch or even an elite regiment like the 75th. I think it would serve two purposes. First as LTC Nagl has stated, it provides the means to not only streamline the fielding of advisory teams of all flavors, while building those advisory mindsets. Second, it could provide a means of getting certain attributes, skills and traits back out into the force so our GPF forces benefit in ways that make them more flexible for the demands we expect them to meet. By going out on a TT you learn to stretch yourself and think differently - the leadership that works in more rigid organizations will not always work on a TT, and you grow. I think this has the potential to increase the effectiveness of our GPF across the full range of military operations. I think by increasing these skills we create expandable capabilities and by doing so generate options for campaigns that we have not foreseen. For example, if we decided to do a major UW campaign somewhere that outstripped our SOF capability - would we be able to do that effectively? or would we decide that it was beyond our capability and as such go with something we really wish we had a better options for?

These are tough questions, but I think we can do both without creating a hard/no cross line between force structure - in fact I believe we can benefit by having an organization (like an Advisory Corps) where soldiers can develop new skill sets and employ them, and then return to the larger force to strengthen those formations.

I'm glad the SecDef is leading/fostering the debate, we have to be in line with how the civilian leadership sees us being employed to remain relevant to the policy objectives and needs of the nation.

Best regards, Rob

From Steve,

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Kind of the "anti Rumsfeld," no?

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You know I'm always amazed at leaders who can strike the right balance between telling somebody what they want them to be able to do (and why) and telling them how to suck the egg. This is particularly interesting since as the civilian leader, Sec Gates (or any SecDef) realizes he's up against a strong, conservative organizational culture that knows that regardless of who wins in 2008, it won't be President G.W. Bush. Having said that, his leadership has to be bipartisan and be somewhat in line with how the potential presidents will come to see the world while being true to the way the world really is. He must convince the Army (and the broader DoD) and the civilians that these are the challenges that lie before us, and we have an opportunity to consider how to best meet those challenges, because he also has the responsibility to guide and overrule if the answer he gets back is inconsistent with challenges ahead. A job no one in their right mind would covet, but one which must be done.

I don't know who the potential presidents might consider as SecDef for their adminsitrations, but it seems to me they'd want leaders who understand the challenges as well as Sec Gates seems to.
Best Regards, Rob

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Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

From Steve,


You know I'm always amazed at leaders who can strike the right balance between telling somebody what they want them to be able to do (and why) and telling them how to suck the egg. This is particularly interesting since as the civilian leader, Sec Gates (or any SecDef) realizes he's up against a strong, conservative organizational culture that knows that regardless of who wins in 2008, it won't be President G.W. Bush. Having said that, his leadership has to be bipartisan and be somewhat in line with how the potential presidents will come to see the world while being true to the way the world really is. He must convince the Army (and the broader DoD) and the civilians that these are the challenges that lie before us, and we have an opportunity to consider how to best meet those challenges, because he also has the responsibility to guide and overrule if the answer he gets back is inconsistent with challenges ahead. A job no one in their right mind would covet, but one which must be done.

I don't know who the potential presidents might consider as SecDef for their adminsitrations, but it seems to me they'd want leaders who understand the challenges as well as Sec Gates seems to.
Best Regards, Rob

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Rob,

As I understand it, Gates had some turbulent times in his previous DC days. The difference between him and Rumsfeld is that Gates learned the right lessons. There are as you well know thousands of Gates-Rumsfeld Yin and Yang clones out there. The system--such as it is--is designed to work with the first and endure the second. Means that nothing happens really quickly unless stimulated by a sea change event. One would think that 9-11 was enought to do that and in many ways it did. But the system was already in the endure mode under Rumsfeld by the time 9-11 took place. The rest is the history we are all living.

Best

Tom

Here's a link to the speech Secretary Gates made on October 10:

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/...?speechid=1181

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Originally Posted by Rifleman

Here's a link to the speech Secretary Gates made on October 10:

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/...?speechid=1181

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What a great speech. Everything I read from SecDef Gates only increases my respect for him. What a change. It pains me to imagine how things might be different if he had been SECDEF on 9/11.

I was also extremely proud to see my Brigade featured at the end of the speech - and the tribute to Travis Patriquin. :cool:

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Originally Posted by Cavguy

I was also extremely proud to see my Brigade featured at the end of the speech - and the tribute to Travis Patriquin. :cool:

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You were in that brigade? I just checked out Capt Trav's PPT presentation. Simple, a little humorous, yet incredibly effective. That's sad the Captain didn't see it come to fruition. What a great man and leader he must have been and there's no doubt he's watching from above. Cavguy, it's amazing what you guys did.
Thank you. :)
Ken

Ski,

Thanks for the props. I did two tours for a total of 29 months in Iraq based out of 1/1 AD "Ready First". (Although proudly cross-attached to 2ACR in OIF1) The brigade was in Baghdad most of OIF 1, and then re-took Najaf(2ACR) and Kerbala (1/1 AD) during the Sadr Rebelion. The last rotation began in Tal Afar and shifted to Ramadi.

If you're interested in more detail on Ramadi, I began a pretty detailed thread on Ramadi here. An interview with my former BDE Cdr is here. A great article on Travis's effect (and many other articles) done by a UK newspaper is here. Page 2 has the link to his article.

Travis was a very smart, energetic, humorous, and light hearted guy. He did see the beginning of his success, but was killed by an IED in December after dropping some reporters at a company outpost. A huge loss we were unable to fully replace. He was so revered the local sheiks named the new police station in west Ramadi after him. THAT's effective COIN when the locals name things after you.

12 October Slate - Secretary Gates Declares War on the Army Brass by Fred Kaplan.

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... He issued the call about halfway into the speech, when he noted that future wars will be more like Iraq and Afghanistan—"asymmetric" conflicts that don't play into the American military's traditional prowess for large-scale, head-to-head combat...

To the civilian newspaper reader, this may seem a passage of dry common sense. But to an Army insider, it's practically a declaration of bureaucratic war.

The heart of the establishment Army is the tank and infantry corps. Its key mission is high-intensity, open-field combat against an enemy army of comparable capability.

Yet here was the secretary of defense saying that this kind of warfare isn't likely to recur any time soon. More than that, he was proposing that the Army move away from the mission of fighting any kind of war. Here was the hair-raising line:

[A]rguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.

Granted, Gates did not say "the War on Terror" is the only war that the Army has to gear up for. One of the Army's "principal challenges," he said, "is to regain its traditional edge of fighting conventional wars while retaining what it has learned and relearned about unconventional wars." But then, he added that these unconventional wars are "the ones most likely to be fought in the years ahead." ...

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More at the link.