“…I know it when I see it.”
“…I know it when I see it.”
What Sparks' doesn't get - from our about page:
“Small Wars” is an imperfect term used to describe a broad spectrum of spirited continuation of politics by other means, falling somewhere in the middle bit of the continuum between feisty diplomatic words and global thermonuclear war. The Small Wars Journal embraces that imperfection.
Just as friendly fire isn’t, there isn’t necessarily anything small about a Small War.
The term “Small War” either encompasses or overlaps with a number of familiar terms such as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, support and stability operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and many flavors of intervention. Operations such as noncombatant evacuation, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance will often either be a part of a Small War, or have a Small Wars feel to them. Small Wars involve a wide spectrum of specialized tactical, technical, social, and cultural skills and expertise, requiring great ingenuity from their practitioners. The Small Wars Manual (a wonderful resource, unfortunately more often referred to than read) notes that:
Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small Wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.
The “three block war” construct employed by General Krulak is exceptionally useful in describing the tactical and operational challenges of a Small War and of many urban operations. Its only shortcoming is that is so useful that it is often mistaken as a definition or as a type of operation.
We’d like to deploy a primer on Small Wars that provides more depth than this brief section. Your suggestions and contributions of content are welcome.
You're entitled to your opinion
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Originally Posted by
120mm
I would question airborne operations above an LRS/SOF team level at all.
even if you are wrong... :D
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IMO, we can project power properly, or we cannot. The US will never actually put a large unit at risk, doing Airborne ops properly, so they serve no practical purpose, except to preserve the "Airborne Spirit", IMO.
I've discovered that use of the word never with respect to the US is not a good idea. We have surprised a number of people over the years by doing things we were not supposed to do. As I just told Reed on another thread, Omar Bradley in 1949 said there'd never be another major amphibious operation -- and a year so later, there I was at Inchon... :cool:
Never's not a good word.
Be that as it may, a lot of folks question parachute units just as you do. I've been listening to 'em for about fifty or more years -- and the units are still here because, as expensive as they are, they offer a capability that cannot at this time be matched in any other way. As to the "Airborne Spirit" there's some truth in that; not least in that the kids know three things; they stand an excellent chance in a combat jump of never getting to the ground alive (and they'll still go); they are probably going to fight outnumbered and surrounded and the other guy better watch out (Hey, long as they believe, who am I to argue...); and like Privates in every Army in the world, they get covered up with manure daily; like Privates in every Army in the world, they dig out and smile -- they just know they do it faster and smile bigger than most. :D
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Now that I've ticked off my Airborne friends, it's time to go after my fellow Cavalrymen: Frankly, it's been about the vehicle for too long. Recon needs to become a mission.
As an old Cav Guy (whose last TCPC run was in an M41A1C...), I totally and wholeheartedly agree with that.