Cavguy said:
EFPs?Quote:
Was thinking along 'Charlie Wilson's War' today, wondering what could have blunted the Russians within the Georgian capability to employ.
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Cavguy said:
EFPs?Quote:
Was thinking along 'Charlie Wilson's War' today, wondering what could have blunted the Russians within the Georgian capability to employ.
Curious if there was any discussion with Finnish officers (as opposed to the Finnish trained officers) about differences in Russ & Finn anti-ambush tactics - and the reasons for the Finnish tactics.Quote:
re: cavguy & kaur
....Finnish military school....
I suppose one reason might be that the Finns are such inherently sensitive people. :D
A better reason, I suspect, would be reflection back to the Winter-Continuation War and to avoid when advancing running into the defensive "motti" tactic (cutting up Russian armored columns into bite-sized pieces). Of course, Suomi has a lot more suomaat (swamplands) and erämaat (hunting wildernesses) to allow such tactics - and a hell of a lot of good ambush places to be "bombed"..
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The Finns elected the Spike, rather than Javelin, for their own defensive purposes.
http://www.generalaoun.org/july8-12.htmlQuote:
Finns buy Israeli missile tested on Lebanese civilians
Nicholas Blanford
Daily Star staff
Finland has agreed to purchase an Israeli anti-tank missile that members of UNIFIL’s Finnish battalion saw being test-fired against civilian targets in south Lebanon over a 16-month period. ....
http://www.eurospike.com/downloads/E...2-Aug-07-f.pdf
Finn use of Spike & not Javelin; going to MBT LAW for this year & next.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equipme...e_Finnish_Army
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spike_(missile)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FGM-148_Javelin
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NLAW
http://www.mil.fi/laitokset/tiedotteet/3635.dspQuote:
Puolustusvoimille uusia lähipanssarintorjuntaohjuksia
20.12.2007 09:25
Puolustusvoimat hankkii uusia, huippunykyaikaisia NLAW-lähipanssarintorjuntaohjuksia, jotka toimittaa ruotsalainen Saab Bofors Dynamics Ab. Hankinnan arvo on 38 miljoonaa euroa. ...
How good is Russian IR capability and profilition?? Is it close to matching ours from the mid to late 90's? Also any word on effectivness of the Russian "Active" defenses against the Javelin? I ask becouse good IR capability could be a strong counter to the Javelin.
Reed
Wouldn't Finnish tactics be somewhat predicated on a lack of available manpower (ie cannonfodder), a perennial shortage of ammunition and equipment, and an institutionalized national unwillingness to acquire new territory?
All of which are issues not relevant to the average graduate of Frunze.
SISSI,
R
The Russians claim that they're upgrading their T-72's with gear to deal with IR ATGM's, but like many Russian claims it is to be taken with a grain of salt. The T-90 is supposedly armed with the appropriate sensors and devices for dealing with IR and laser-guided missiles and the Russians claim it can deal with Javelin, but how well it works in actual combat... (shrug).
In any event, Javelin is good, but would not have been effective in this war because the rugged terrain was controlled by the Ossetian irregulars, who would have simply taken out any hunter-killer teams that tried to set up there. I am not sure how well you are familiar with the mountainous terrain of the region, but once you get away from the foothills that you saw near Tskhinvali, the terrain goes pretty much vertical and it's pretty much impossible to move through it without serious mountaineering gear or on the established roads -- which were under the control of the Ossetian irregulars. The terrain makes Afghanistan look like Florida ruggedness-wise. Once tanks reach the plains, then you have the problem of the sheer size and bulk of the Javelin system plus vulnerability to air strikes plus tanks and artillery using HE on you. It is not until you get to the cities that the hunter-killer teams would become effective, and Russia avoided sending tanks into the cities and towns until it was clear that the Georgian military had evacuated them.
In short, Javelin is good but it is not a "magic bullet" by any means. If you control the rugged terrain beforehand (which Georgia did not), you can do a Hezbollah and gopher into the hillsides along the only usable routes for tanks, but Georgia did not have that option here. You may be able to get a few hunter-killer teams into place despite all of this via some serious mountaineering, but the size and bulk of the Javelin system means that they couldn't bring many in, they'd be able to take out a few tanks at best, and the Russians would just push the burning tanks off the road into the gorge and keep going.
Finally, regarding NATO, treaty obligations, and so forth, treaties are worth the paper they're signed on in the real world. Nations uphold things like mutual defense treaties when it is in their national interest to do so. If it is not in their national interest to do so, they say "Sorry, you're on your own." That is real world, as vs. fantasy land. I have been thinking hard and cannot think of any NATO state that would see going to war against Russia over Georgia as being in their national interest. Even if Georgia had actually been a NATO member, the response of many major NATO states would have been "Sorry, but you incited this by shelling Tskhinvali, so you're on your own," which, given that NATO actions require unanimity, would have tabled any NATO response. Even under the more stringent standards of U.S. tort law, if you consider the NATO treaty as a contract, Georgia's shelling of Tskhinvali would have been considered "bad faith" and thus rendered that self defense clause null and void (is it self defense if you yourself started the war?). Some folks here seem to have an overly ambitious notion of the power of paper. Sorry, folks. In international relations, it all boils down in the end to enlightened self interest and power. The paper is useful only insofar as it makes explicit such. Otherwise, it is just a piece of paper. In the case of the current Georgian action, Georgia having that piece of paper in hand would have changed things not a lick -- it is not in the self-interest of Europe to start WWIII over Georgia, and thus it would not have happened.
NCW, 15 Aug 08: Wanted Chechen Commander Leads his Battalion against Georgian ForcesQuote:
Originally Posted by kaur
Quote:
Kavkazky Uzel reported on August 13 that members of the Chechen-manned Vostok battalion of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) were among the Russian forces that invaded Georgia. According to the website, the Vostok fighters were located in area of the Georgian town of Gori along with Sulim Yamadaev, the Vostok battalion commander. Yamadaev, who became a target of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov’s wrath following a confrontation and apparent shootout last April involving Vostok members and security forces loyal to Kadyrov, was put on Russia’s federal wanted list earlier this month.
Kavkazky Uzel quoted a correspondent for the Gazeta.ru website as saying that he had been told by several Russian servicemen that Yamadaev and the Vostok battalion were deployed in the “conflict zone” in South Ossetia. Meanwhile, the website of the newspaper Gazeta, reported on August 12 that the Vostok battalion was located near Gori and that Yamadaev had led it in an assault on the Georgian village of Kvemo-Nikoz.....
That's not an entirely accurate reading of Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which doesn't require any unanimity at all for individual member states to take action. However, the treaty doesn't require armed force in response to an armed attack, but rather "such action as [each state] deems necessary."
Treaty obligations, i would argue, have somewhat more weight than simply transitory self-interest, for a variety of reasons: the create incentives to demonstrate credibility, they modify public and international expectations, and they create webs of institutional interest and interaction that modify the ways situations are analyzed and interests are perceived within government. NATO membership, for example, has profoundly changed the way that the Canadian military, the Canadian government, and the Canadian public view the world.
Indeed, its precisely because most NATO members see the Treaty and alliance as something more than a fiction that most were opposed to Georgian membership.
Assuming the sequence of policy > strategy > operations > tactics, the predicates you cite (Russian preponderence in manpower and equipment; and Finland's non-interventionism) go more to its national defense policy - defensive & counterpunching.Quote:
from Render
....Finnish tactics be somewhat predicated on a lack of available manpower (ie cannonfodder), a perennial shortage of ammunition and equipment, and an institutionalized national unwillingness to acquire new territory?
Counterpunching operations would depend on the path(s) of the Russian invasion: (1) coastal plain - Viipuri, Helsinki, Turku-Tampere, Vaasa, Oulu, Tornio (as in the successful 18th & 19th century Russian attacks); and/or (2) into Central Finland from Russian Karelia (not successful in Winter-Continuation War).
All of that would end up driving tactics, but those would depend on what personnel and equipment are still available; and the landscape (which in Central Finland is tough - except to Finns).
The MoD is tight-mouthed about scenarios; and Russia is not featured as the big, bad enemy.
http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?l=en&s=61Quote:
The new White Paper, The Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy, published in September 2004, guides national defence policy. The document is prepared cooperatively in different ministries and is approved by Parliament. The latest report focuses on Finland’s changing security environment and defines the line of action in the field of defence policy.
But, why else have 64 F-18s - to attack Sweden ?
Finnish equipment is not bad, but it is not about to defeat Russia in an all out attack - see links in # 63 and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnish_Defence_Forces
Georgian Defense Forces were not in the same order of magnitude as Finland's - assuming the latter can get mobilized before the Novgorodians cross the border.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Georgia
---------------------------------------
What I make of the 2004 White Paper and associated documents - Phase I would be a conventional defense, hopefully killing as many of the enemy as possible before getting killed.
Phase II, not really stated in official documents, would be the Juho Paasikivi policy, as related in spring 1944 by John Scott, a Time-Life reporter:
The idea of this mutual suicide pact is to require Russia to answer the question: "Do we really want to do this ?" Uncle Joe Stalin answered "nyet".Quote:
Repeating to me what he had probably told Molotov - a description of what the result would be if Russia overran Finland. Paasikivi stood up, shook a bony finger in the air and said: "We will shoot from behind every stone and tree, we will go on shooting for 50 years. We are not Czechs. We are not Dutchmen. We will fight tooth and nail behind every rock and over the ice of every lake. I will not fight long. I am old, but others will fight."
Since Suomi is a homogeneous country, what it may or may not do has little relevance to Georgia. But, it will be interesting to see what effect Russia's Georgian adventure will have on upcoming Finnish defense budgets. Right now, quite a few euros are being spent on improved command, control and communication networks - all in the White Paper & associated documents.
Not to contradict a rising star such as yourself, but my take is that when there are only a handful of roads, you know the lines long before the war starts and you can also place EFPs long before the war starts. Maybe it wouldn't have worked in S. Ossetia, but the Russians didn't stop there.
Relevant, because there are only a handful of roads through the mountains between Iraq and Iran. Also, I believe Hezbollah was able to take out some tanks with EFPS/deep buried IEDS placed before the war started/ (From memory; I could be wrong.)
I'm not sure I follow. What does the size and bulk of the Javelin have to do with anything, especially bringing in many systems? You can move them in the back of a pickup truck if you have to.Quote:
In short, Javelin is good but it is not a "magic bullet" by any means. If you control the rugged terrain beforehand (which Georgia did not), you can do a Hezbollah and gopher into the hillsides along the only usable routes for tanks, but Georgia did not have that option here. You may be able to get a few hunter-killer teams into place despite all of this via some serious mountaineering, but the size and bulk of the Javelin system means that they couldn't bring many in, they'd be able to take out a few tanks at best, and the Russians would just push the burning tanks off the road into the gorge and keep going.
The bottlenecks were all north of T town. South of T town were almost Ukraine-like lowlands agricultural areas.
Seriosu mountaineering could have been avoided by helicopter insertion from the rear slope.
The firing position choice for ATGM teams would have been delicate, though.
Forward slope would have been suicidal.
The ridges were apparently mostly without concealment, probably too easily dominated by helicopters. And rear slope is not for Javelin employment, at best for waiting.
I believe it comes down to quite the same success factors as in comparably slow lowlands warfare;
- keep enemy air power away and
- keep enemy artillery suppressed or at least seriously hindered by counterfire.
Some LRRPs could have guaranteed effective artillery fire without much high-tech for the Georgians, but I guess that's just like a raid on the tunnel something that the Georgians simply forgot to do.
..and Spike more so. The video is a bit out of date, but the FO guidance is just scary.
I have been shown a video from the Lebanon where they flew the missile over a village to hit a rocket truck on the other side, that had been picked up by a UAV.
Yes, Spike has small war-head but when you can target a tank hatch, that's a bit academic.
...so IMO, with good tactics and the right equipment, you should be able to turn Georgia into an MRD grave yard... and vice versa.
As a tanker, long range, high powered, top attack, fire and forget ATGM's scare me. I'll admit it. And there's no good countermeasure, although the Russians claim some. Fortunately, the only armies that have them in bulk are friendly to us.
Agreed, with the right tactics and employment, it could do a lot of damage to a numerically superior mechanized force.
Fuch said
Strix mortar round would be good alternative.Quote:
The ridges were apparently mostly without concealment, probably too easily dominated by helicopters. And rear slope is not for Javelin employment, at best for waiting.
About military geography. Why Russians moved to town Gori? This is out ot LO borders, this is out of OSCE conflict zone borders? My humble opinion is that here starts the huge plain terrain until Tbilisi. It's easier to fight possible Georgian counter-attack. If this is the rationale, then tail wags dog or how the saying is.
About Finnish plans.
http://www.mil.fi/perustietoa/julkai...nglanti_02.pdf
About T-90
http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2008/item2/article4/Quote:
Moreover, because of design differences between the domestic and export versions, the small batches of tanks ordered for the Russian army are expensive to produce. For example, the price of a T-90 rose from 42 million rubles in 2006 to 58 million in 2007 – an increase of 38%. This level of inflation can hardly be matched by similar increases in defense budget allocations, so a massive armored forces capability increase is highly unlikely.
Destiny of 1 Georgian squad.
http://vasi.net/2008/08/14/gruzinska...jj_osetii.html
Infantry attempting tank killing is actually well covered in concept terms. The Soviets developed the Corps level Machine Gun Artillery Battalions, and you also have the all the English and Simpkin stuff written in the 1980s.
While I am a fan of guided weapons in terms of infantry fire support I don't think infantry companies should aim to fight units of armoured vehicles, while dismounted. I think it requires highly mobile, well trained Formation level Guided Weapons Companies.
You have to be more mobile than the MBTs they are taking on, or else they can simply be evaded. I am also unsure of how useful the term "ambush" is. "Attack on a moving enemy" is useful, but lurking in a wood hoping the enemy is nice enough to drive by, is not the acme of tactical skill.
- yes you can hope that they are ordered to do something stupid, as in the Lebanon, but once they understand what you are doing, you are dead in you bunkers.
Yes I think there is a for dismounted infantry when taking on armoured formations, but I don't see it as being the decisive one.
Good point. If the Georgians could move in and out of ambush position - or whatever you want to call them - the Ruswsian "blast everything" tactic is less effective.
Georgia will never be able to decisively defeat Russia. Constant "little cuts" until the Russians decide it ain't worth it is the best they could hope for. As I said before, the Russians would probably respond by flattening Tbilisi, so rolling over and showing their belly was probably the Georgians best option. Not very manly, but it works for my dog.
I concur. I was referring to decisive action at the tactical level, without which you tend to loose lots of folks, though you may win the war.
I do think that Georgia could exhaust Russia by attrition over time, to allow the diplomatic means to kick in. An all out 14-day effort is not beyond asking, in terms of an achievable capability.
Not nice stuff - should be required viewing for all politicians who would lightly send men off to war.Quote:
from kaur
Destiny of 1 Georgian squad.
Booklet is a good summary of FDF overall; even though as 2002 document (so, based on 2001 White Paper), it is before 2004 White Paper.Quote:
from kaur
About Finnish plans.
Follow-up reading would be that 2004 paper and defense projection to 2025, at MoD:
http://www.defmin.fi/files/311/2574_...er_2004_1_.pdf
http://www.defmin.fi/files/674/Secur...ategy_2025.pdf
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For those that don't know, Finland Proper (Turku region) owes its original settlement (a few 1000 years ago) to people from Estonia, who crossed the gulf by ship. Or, in the view of one a bit drunken Karelian, "Estonians are Finns who didn't learn to swim." Since I'm Ostrobothnian, I had to disagree, of course.
One ancestor, Pahwals Pass (and his two brothers) were from, or of ancestry from, the island of Runö. Family story from ca. 1500 - so, not easy to prove (although it is plausible).
Not really, loss of vehicles means more than casualties, it means a loss of combat capability. With the Russians (and there are others) who don't care about casualties, their own or anyone else's, the casualty factor is not a significant issue -- but combat capability has to be one...Possibly true -- that it was successful obviously owed a very great deal to Israeli incompetence and miscalculation, so the 'credit' is not all due to Hezbollah. It is quite dangerous to assume that a tactic that works in a particular geographic, state of training and cultural setting (and all are very important) can be universally applied. Not to mention that whenever someone pulls off a successful offense or defense, every military guy in the world studies it in an effort to develop a counter -- usually successfully...Quote:
...By any definition, Hezbollah conducted a successful defense.
Now that's true -- but I suspect there's a lot more to it than that. On both sides. Russia's op was a FSB op with the well prepped and rehearsed military as an instrument. What was Georgia's?Quote:
But if the point you're making is that Georgia was stupid getting into a war with a much bigger, better armed opponent, your point is well taken.
@Kaur:
STRIX has a terribly small footprint. I don't remember the correct data, but it's so small that a single target should better not move.
To aim at a road when a coluimn is passing might be promising, but some self-guided munitions have a tendency to not lead enough on fast moving targets afaik.
Hmm, actually that's one of the methods that produced the best kill ratios in the past afaik.Quote:
You have to be more mobile than the MBTs they are taking on, or else they can simply be evaded. I am also unsure of how useful the term "ambush" is. "Attack on a moving enemy" is useful, but lurking in a wood hoping the enemy is nice enough to drive by, is not the acme of tactical skill.
The art is to choose the right place and time, and to pull it off. It's nice to get away and repeat it elsewhere, of course.
The emphasis on mobility is a bit questionable imho. Getting away is important, but any emphasis on being faster is probably misleading.
The mobility-emphasizing tank destroyer concept of WW2 was not the expected success, whereas the StuG concept (always inferior in mobility to its major enemy T-34) that rested much of its AT tactics on old field artillery ambush tactics was a success (different environments and generally difficult to compare, but the opinions about the TD concept are afaik still rather negative).
The other reason is less military history than OR-like.
What does "more mobile" mean? It's terrain negotiability aspect is irrelevant in many terrains (not quite in mountains) because MBTs can already negotiate most terrains.
The speed aspect is the one that convinces me the least.
- not the tank's speed counts, but the tank unit speed
- 40-75 km/h depending on surface/type and depths of probably 5-15 km before the tanks do a lot of harm:
How much time does that give for leading an AT unit into a favourable position, probably more than once? Consider that the AT teams don't dictate the direction of the attack, they have time lags because they have to react.
A success in an AT mission requires imho either well-prepared ambushes, a lot of brute fireower or a combination of enemy mobility degradation and own mobility.
The MBT's speed is imho quite uninteresting. It's the unit's speed that counts, and that's under influence by some external factors (real and fake minefields, ECM against radio comm, intimidation by multi-spectral smoke walls - who wants to move into the unknown?).
Btw, what did you mean with "or else they can simply be evaded"?
@ I am not trying to suggest that anti-armour ambushes have not been historically successful, but that is not the point. As you say right time and place, so ensuring you have the freedom of action to exploit the opportunity is critical. Being on foot with 52kgs of equipment is not a way to lengthen the odds in your favour. If man power and resources are limited, you can't be ready on ever route, and if there are very few routes, the enemy is pretty much going to guess you may seek to deny them those routes and act accordingly.
@ More mobile means retaining the freedom of action, to move. Speed is only one parameter in that regard. If you can go places he can't, you have greater freedom, and speed may be totally irrelevant.
@ If he has greater mobility, he can simply bypass you or disengage. What is more, if you lack mobility relative to the enemy, you cannot exploit.
exploit=pursuit?Quote:
What is more, if you lack mobility relative to the enemy, you cannot exploit.
Pursuit is a risyky & difficult activity anyway.
To destroy a withdrawing opponent requires a lot of excess speed.
Pursuit was historically probably more about territory gains than destruction - but AT units rarely if ever have the mission to gain ground.
The whole speed issue loses relevance once one considers a battlefield with many units instead of a unit duel. A tank battalion that evades an AT company might run into another deadly threat.
also...... :D
some pictures
This is apparently a photo from northern SO (north of T town). It might be from Northern Ossetia as well (I cannot guarantee that it's from SO).
http://img91.imageshack.us/img91/8119/northernsoqy0.jpg
http://img91.imageshack.us/img91/811...8b0c771d76.jpg
Have a look at the terrain.
No good opportunities for concealment- neither for those in the valley nor for ambushers on high ground. FO's on high ground and aerial recce would have had perfect conditions, though.
This is south of T town.
http://img399.imageshack.us/img399/8...ofttownmn6.jpg
http://img399.imageshack.us/img399/8...fc13887446.jpg
Excellent mechanized/armoured unit terrain. Terrible terrain for infantry. Terrible terrain for an army under air attack.
A T-62 with partial slat armour, part of a late-coming unit (late-coming unit of 19th MRD or from another unit).
http://img81.imageshack.us/img81/262...thslatsle0.jpg
http://img81.imageshack.us/img81/262...cc60f14d95.jpg
In 2008 probably only useful as a good weather infantry fire support vehicle.
Nevertheless; it shows that the Russians used some very old equipment (also some BTR-70's).
I've already seen articles that claim a Russian technological superiority; T-80's and -90's, BMP-2 and -3, Tunguska, BTR-90 - of these were so far only Tunguska and BMP-2 confirmed afaik. Mediocre variants of T-72, BMP-1/2 and BTR-80's were afaik typical, especially for the five advance guard battalions and the peacekeepers (which had teh BMP-1's without ATGM).
Camouflaged (I think that this could be called "concealed" as well) Tunguska:
http://img504.imageshack.us/img504/9499/340xmn0ln9.jpg
http://img504.imageshack.us/img504/9...7a1c236fb3.jpg
The first photos of the war showed no other camouflage than what the factory had applied. Later in the war appeared some photos of bushes with guns like this and photos of tanks wih marginal foliage for camouflage.
Maybe they only applied some camouflage materials once they had some longer breaks. They seemed to lack camouflage netting.
(I had to break this into two replies because the forum software counted 8 instead of 4 photos due to the integral links).
Nice pics. Thanks, I learned a lot.
The Beirut barracks bombing destroyed very little military equipment, yet lead to a complete withdrawal: like you say, every case is different.
Back on topic: the fact that the Russians aren't averse to causalities left the Georgians with few realistic options.
Google Earth already helps a lot to understand the terrain (as do good maps, of course).
I cannot post the snapshots from Google Earth due to copyright limitations, but everyone can use that free program and see quite acceptable quality imagery of South Ossetia.
There were four major different terrains;
- valley without much concealment (north of the combat zones only)
- mountains without much concealment (east/west, but not very close to the combat zones
- the city and several villages
- agricultural fields
The Russian march to the combat zone offered very different conditions for potential combat than the areas where the decisive combat took place at apparently rather short ranges - and then there's again a lot of long line-of-sight agricultural terrain south of the combat zone (and where the Georgian artillery and other support were apparently exposed to Rusian air attacks).
and you left this off your quote of me:
"With the Russians (and there are others) who don't care about casualties, their own or anyone else's, the casualty factor is not a significant issue -- but combat capability has to be one..."
Had you not forgotten that portion of my comment, it might have occurred to you that we and the Russians have quite different idea on casualties. That's a cultural thing. Loss of combat capability is a very practical thing that transcends culture.
The withdrawal from Beirut was an indicator of loss of will. It was one of several US failures that directly contributed to our being in Iraq today. Still, it was not a combat confrontation between opposing armed forces and is not really germane to your point -- or mine.
Could hunter-killer teams at the bottlenecks north of T-town stopped the Russian advance? Answer: No. That territory was controlled by the Ossetian militia. Same deal with the mountain and valley terrain all the way to the military tunnel. You could not simply drive a pickup truck full of Javelins up the road and stash them all over the place as reloads for your Javelin teams. You could not blast out hidden bunkers into the slopes for your teams to use for concealment as the Russians approached. The most you could have done would have been to insert a few teams onto backslopes via helicopter and have them mountaineer to the foreslopes. That is where the size and weight of the Javelin system comes into play. Basically, you could not have sufficient reloads available to take out more than a couple of tanks with any given three-man team because you simply couldn't hump enough reloads to do more than that. The Russians would have simply shoved the burning tanks off the side of the road after taking out the hunter-killer team, and moved on.
South of Tskhinvali, the terrain gives over to agricultural fields. There, the open view lines make the tank the queen of the battlefield. Infantry are either bypassed or blown up with artillery or direct fire at long distance. The mobility to get your hunter-killer teams into place in front of whatever line of advance the tanks intend to use is impaired by artillery and air support, meaning that the majority of your hunter-killer teams are pinned down where their missiles will do no harm. Once again you will perhaps manage to take out a few tanks with the few hunter-killer teams who happen to be in place in whatever line of advance was chosen for the tanks, but once again you are not going to stop the Russian advance with hunter-killer teams in this scenario.
Immediately to the north of Tskhinvali was hilly wooded terrain. This is the ideal place for hunter-killer teams. If Georgia had possessed good ATGM's, this is where they would have done the most good. Georgia actually did control most of this terrain during the early parts of the fighting, and were using it to fire artillery down into Tskhinvali, resulting in most of the Ossetian militia evacuating the city other than a small rearguard that they left behind as a delaying action until Russian assistance came. A hundred or so Javelins here would have made life tough for the Russians, because they would have had to send in the infantry with artillery support to clear these woods after the first few tanks blew up. The eventual outcome would have been the same though because the Georgians simply did not have the manpower to mount a defense in depth here and had not had time to dig in deep enough to make it hard for infantry to root them out since this was terrain that had been controlled by the Ossetian militia prior to their offensive.
In short, this pretty much shows you why the Georgians want South Ossetia so bad. You basically cannot defend Georgia from attacks coming from Russia unless you have South Ossetia and do a Lebanon on it -- build bunkers and implacements all along the route from North Ossetia and fill them to the brim with ATGM's. Everything south of Tskhinvali to Gori is tank country and you aren't stopping the Russians there.
Compare/contrast to Lebanon. There, Hezbollah controlled the terrain prior to the war. Lebanon's border with Israel is very short, and the population of young military-age men is high because the Shia breed like rabbits. Hezbollah dug into the hills like gophers and overcame the mobility advantage of Israeli tanks via the simple expedient of sheer manpower -- wherever an Israeli tank went, there was a Hezbollah hunter-killer team with bunkers filled to the top with ATGM's behind them. Hezbollah could not actually stop the Israelis from going anywhere they wanted to go, but they could make it either very slow for the Israelis since the Israeli infantry would have to dismount and go de-mine the roads and fields and clean out the hunter-killer teams, or if the Israelis went fast Hezbollah could make it very costly for the Israelis. Israel was very casualty-aware and eventually, despite tactical victory in every encounter with Hezbollah, decided that their strategic objective (the elimination of Hezbollah) was not achievable within costs that Israel could afford, and left. In short, the constricted geographic area, the ability to prepare the terrain beforehand, and the high available manpower eliminating the mobility advantage of the tanks by simply assuring that wherever the tanks went, there Hezbollah would be. All these factors combined to make it too expensive both in casualties and money (because Israel had to call up her reserves, which shuts down the entire Israeli economy for the duration) for Israel to achieve their strategic goals.
However, it is much easier for Russia to achieve their strategic goals here. Possession of Tskhinvali was easily achievable within costs that were acceptable to Russia, thereby putting Georgia and the world on notice that at any time Russia could send their forces further into the country and destroy anything they wished to destroy -- such as, say, those pipelines. I think the Russians are quite satisfied right now, thank you very much. I think good ATGM's and MANPAD's in the hands of the Georgian military could have made the Russian victory more difficult, but given the limited Russian objectives in this offensive, and the fact that the defensible terrain was controlled by the Ossetian militia prior to the war, I seriously doubt they could have changed the outcome.
1. Ratzel, you mean this strategy?
http://www.aeinstein.org/
This worked once :)
http://www.singingrevolution.com/
2. Fuchs, what can do German artillery EMP shells against this kind of columns? Are they already in depots or still on designers tables?
Strix has small foot print, but if you add to my description of Estonian terrain, which has nice narrow channels of movement "little" handwork with saws and demolition, then this should not matter.
3. About NATO/US military plans by RAND.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG112/Quote:
Chapter Five:
European Theater: A Russia-Baltics Game
[Quote:
B]The Russian-Georgian War: Implications for the Middle East [/B]
Ariel Cohen
http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/S...he_Middle_EastQuote:
Lessons from the War
Lessons for the Middle East and Israel from the Russian-Georgian War abound, and apply both to military operations, cyber-warfare, and strategic information operations. The most important of these are:
Watch Out for the Bear - and Other Beasts! Russian continental power is on the rise. Israel should understand it and not provoke Moscow unnecessarily, while defending its own national security interests staunchly. Small states need to treat nuclear armed great powers with respect. Provoking a militarily strong adversary, such as Iran, is worthwhile only if you are confident of victory, and even then there may be bitter surprises. Just ask Saakashvili.
Strategic Self-Reliance. U.S. expressions of support of the kind provided to Georgia - short of an explicit mutual defense pact - may or may not result in military assistance if/when Israel is under attack, especially when the attacker has an effective deterrent, such as nuclear arms deliverable against U.S. targets. In the future, such an attacker could be Iran or an Arab country armed with atomic weapons. Israel can and should rely on its own deterrent - a massive survivable second-strike capability.
Intelligence Failure. U.S. intelligence-gathering and analysis on the Russian threat to Georgia failed. So did U.S. military assistance to Georgia, worth around $2 billion over the last 15 years. This is something to remember when looking at recent American intelligence assessments of the Iranian nuclear threat or the unsuccessful training of Palestinian Authority security forces against Hamas. Both are deeply flawed. There is no substitute for high-quality human intelligence.
Air Power Is Not Sufficient. Russia used air, armor, the Black Sea Fleet, special forces, and allied militias. Clausewitzian lessons still apply: the use of overwhelming force in the war's center of gravity by implementing a combined air-land-sea operation may be twentieth century, but it does work.6 Israel should have been taught this lesson after the last war with Hizbullah.
Surprise and Speed of Operations Still Matter - as they have for the four thousand years of the recorded history of warfare. To be successful, wars have to have limited and achievable goals. Russia achieved most of its goals between Friday and Monday, while the world, including President George W. Bush, was busy watching the Olympics and parliaments were on vacation.
Do Not Cringe - within reason - from taking military casualties and inflicting overwhelming military and civilian casualties at a level unacceptable to the enemy. Georgia lost some 100-200 soldiers and effectively capitulated. A tougher enemy, like the Japanese or the Germans, or even Hizbullah, could well suffer a proportionally higher rate of casualties and keep on fighting.
Information and Psychological Warfare Is Paramount. So is cyber-security. It looks like the Russians conducted repeated denial of service attacks against Georgia (and in 2007 against Estonia), shutting down key websites. Russia was ready with accusations and footage of alleged Georgian atrocities in South Ossetia, shifting the information operation playing field from "aggressor-victim" to "saving Ossetian civilians from barbaric Georgians." These operations also matter domestically, to shore up support and boost morale at home.
Here is one fresh table about military activites (in Russian).
http://www.kommersant.ru/ISSUES.PHOT...ast_flag_1.gif
First symbol shows the area controlled by Russian forces.
http://www.kommersant.ru/ISSUES.PHOT...145m-05-01.jpg
http://www.kommersant.com/p1012852/R...etia_conflict/Quote:
Gen. Vyacheslav Borisov eased up on security and allowed dozens of journalists to enter Gori. They were allowed no farther than the checkpoint before. The general himself rides around the city in a black Land Rover with Georgian license plates and gives orders. When asked when the army would leave the local area, he answered loudly, “We came here first and we will leave last. When we receive the order.”
Quote:
Ossetians provoked Georgians intentionally, and any response, tough or mild, would have been used anyway as a pretext for attack. Even if Georgians had taken it lying down, then Abkhazians would anyway have started their prepared operation of cleaning-up the upper Kodori. When the war is planned, there is always the pretext.
http://en.novayagazeta.ru/data/2008/59/01.htmlQuote:
According to testimony by witnesses, the missile brigade of the 58th Army was put on the Georgian territory through Rokskiy Tunnel. This brigade is equipped with the MLRS “Uragan” and ballistic missiles “Tochka-U”. The “Grad” systems with caliber of 122 mm, unlike the more powerful “Uragan”, are little effective when striking cities or dug in troops. The “Tochka-U” (with the range of 110 km) is capable of reaching Tbilisi and vicinities from the district of Tskhinvali. Its high-explosive and fragmentation warhead covers 3 hectares, while the cassette one covers 7 hectares.
MLRS “Uragan” and “Tochka-U” were used in mass for shooting in Chechnya in 1999 and 2000, which caused mass death of innocent civilians and the destruction. Last week some targets in the Western Georgia were shot at from Abkhazia with the use of rockets “Tochka-U”. The launches were registered by the American global system of monitoring the missile launch. Abkhazian authorities stated it’s them to have done that shooting. Now Russia may allege it’s Ossetians shooting at Tbilisi as a revenge for Tskhinvali. Similar attacks, undoubtedly, would cause a terrible panic in Tbilisi, which might help overthrowing the Saakashvili’s regime.
http://en.novayagazeta.ru/data/2008/59/00.htmlQuote:
In the meanwhile, the Human Rights Watch working in the zone of conflict has made a statement about unreliability of information about the number of killed. “Judging from experience of other armed conflicts, the number of wounded is three times as big as that of killed” said the organization’s expert Tatiana Lokshina, who is in the South Ossetia now, to a Novaya Gazeta correspondent. “If the Russian media speak of 2 thousand killed, then there must be at least 6 thousand wounded people, and probably tens of thousands. However, when visiting the field hospitals in the Northern and South Ossetia, the doctors reported to us about tens – not even hundreds – of the wounded. In this conflict we are dealing with inhuman quantity of misinformation. No one can really understand what has actually happened here”.
You do good work...;)
Asia Times, 20 Aug 08 (same piece published restricted-access in JDW two days ago):
Georgian Planning Flaws Led to Failure
Quote:
.....In light of the combination of fundamental tactical shortcomings and serious strategic blunders in the Georgian campaign to retake South Ossetia, it seems clear that the flaws in Georgian military planning were based on two key factors: an over-confident assumption of its own combat readiness and capabilities, as well as by a serious underestimation of the scale and scope of the Russian response.
The first of these factors, an over-estimation of Georgian capabilities, is rooted in the US-run $64 million Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) and the subsequent Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP). Yet despite the seemingly impressive US effort, even after several years of training and equipping, the Georgian military essentially remains divided between four light infantry brigades, consisting of US-trained group of comparatively well-paid, professional servicemen, and a much larger, poorly-trained conscript force plagued by low morale and inadequate pay.
Moreover, neither US program was ever aimed at enhancing the combat readiness or offensive capabilities of the Georgian armed forces. Designed as a flexible, time-phased training initiative, GTEP was never aimed at providing the Georgian military with offensive capabilities, but merely provided training and equipment for 2,600 Georgian army and Interior Ministry forces using company infantry tactics with the intended goal of acquiring limited counter-terrorism capabilities. Similarly, the goal of the US-run Sustainment and Stability Operations Program was merely to prepare select Georgian units for deployment to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
While the limited value of the US military assistance did not seem to lower Georgian confidence, the second factor of under-estimating the Russian response was rooted in Georgia's mistaken threat perception. Specifically, Georgia's strategic assessment, reflected in its three guiding plans, the National Security Concept, National Threat Assessment and National Military Strategy, each disregarded any direct threat from Russia, stating that there was "little possibility of open military aggression against Georgia", and defining "the probability of direct aggression" against Georgia as "relatively low".
And perhaps most importantly, the actual state of readiness of the Georgian armed forces suggests that although the Georgian offensive may have been more than adequate against local forces in South Ossetia, they faced insurmountable challenges when confronted by a much more combat-capable and over-powering Russian force.
Thus, Georgian deficiencies from not being able to wage or defend against large-scale combat operations involving a major armed force, lacking any combined-arms experience or training, and from having insufficient logistical support and inadequate air defenses, combined to doom Georgia's operational goals in South Ossetia from the very start.
The Russians taking the US humvees that where at the port and reportedly Georgian security forces hostages.
You don't suppose those will end up being the
US backed Georgian and Chechnian Rebel fighters who were reportedly on their way to stir up things in Gori
Also in the roundup
Link
AK-47's?
Not the AK-74's and AK-74u's seen in numerous photos of Georgian troops?
I've already seen one picture of a South Ossetian (Russian allied Cossack) militia member carrying an RPK with an M-4 carbine slung on his back.
I would imagine the Georgian in country stockpile of M-4 carbines and their 5.56mm ammo would have been limited to training material used by Georgian troops bound for Iraq and therefor in rather short supply.
===
I'm guessing the SAM defences around the Roki tunnel entrances must be pretty thick by now...
LOST
OPPORTUNITIES,
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Investigators Can't Count the Bodies
http://www.kommersant.com/p1013890/R...etia_conflict/Quote:
The Russian Prosecutor General’s investigative committee presented preliminary results in the criminal case connected with events in South Ossetia. The committee has been able to document the deaths of only 133 civilians, although the leadership of the unrecognized republic reported 1492 deaths. The number of peacekeepers killed remains unknown. However, genocide of the Ossetians carried out by Georgia has been established.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7572635.stm
Got a kick out of this RIA Novosti O&A regarding the Russian fleet vs the USN in the Black Sea. The last sentence strikes me funny however, with analysts concluding the very capable Georgia military, but with no spirit to fight. The reports we have from our teams abroad indicate otherwise.
Quote:
"Our first encounter with far from the best foreign army has shown that the Georgians were equipped with better aircraft, tanks and communications. And what if they had fighter planes and state-of-the-art air defenses? It was our luck that Georgian soldiers proved to be so chicken-hearted."
Quote:
U.S. could tie down Russia's Black Sea Fleet - analyst
The United States could send its warships to help Georgia. Yesterday the Russian General Staff confirmed this news: according to its sources, American naval forces will enter the Black Sea by the end of August. If this happens, Russia's Black Sea Fleet will be tied down, Georgia finds itself protected by U.S. ship air defenses, and all of the North Caucasus will come within the range of U.S. naval missiles.
... in the opinion of military expert Konstantin Makiyenko, even a modern cruiser and a few destroyers will be enough to neutralize Russia's Black Sea Fleet: "Today it is a museum-like collection of mismatched forces."
Theoretically, Moscow could send forces from other fleets to the Black Sea, but there is practically nothing to send. "The Northern Fleet acts as a nuclear deterrent," Makiyenko said. "The Pacific Fleet is too far away and has no forces suitable for the task."
The Baltic Fleet is compact-sized and well-balanced and has what is required, but its ships will be exposed to NATO's might while still en route to the Black Sea.
"If the Americans approach Poti and Batumi, we will have only one option left to save face: turn our ships back," said a Black Sea Fleet source.
The pro-nuclear bias should be corrected, and as soon as possible, say specialists.
I'm sure there will be more confirmed eventually regardless of what might have to be scewed or slightly redefined in order to do so.
In the meantime if I were someone in SO who managed to get big bro pulled into this whole mess on apparently such inaccurate and inflated information, I think I'd be sweating a lot right now, not to mention making sure I had my LWAT filled out:eek:
Another part to the whole thing is just like any crime scene, Since the Russians have been taking so long to "withdraw" their forces, by the time any internationally recognized investigators actually get to look into things it would be having a frat party at a crime scene then trying to come in and gather usable data.
Then again I'm sure that's not the intent??
Is there anyone who can explain me the logic?
On the first photo, there are Georgian villages.
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/EEF4F1A349D9B4CB852574B0006D71D9/$File/unosat_DMG_geo080825.pdf?OpenElement
On the second photo, there is Tshinvali, which was under both side land and air forces attack during 2 days.
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/1269E9CB4650B9B3852574AD007513A6/$File/unosat_DMG_geo080822.pdf?OpenElement
Why are villages more destroyed than Tshinvali?
Georgian MFA gives explanation.
http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang...1&info_id=7664Quote:
Purpose of this document
In seeking to justify its invasion of Georgia, Russia has claimed that its forces entered Georgian territory only after a purported "surprise Georgian assault” on Tskhinvali; however, Moscow continues to refuse to make public the time at which Russia launched its invasion into Georgia.
As the following timeline makes clear, Georgian Government forces advanced into the Tskhinvali region only after days of intensive shelling that caused civilian deaths in villages under Georgian control —and after confirmation that a massive Russian land force had begun invading Georgia through the Roki Tunnel.
This was the culmination of months of meticulous planning by Russia; 40,000 Russian troops were soon occupying Georgia, as part of a simultaneous land, air and sea assault, unfolding a premeditated strategy that had little to do with Russia’s stated claim of protecting its recently created "citizens” in the Tskhinvali region.
the democratic countries are at a decision-making threshold.
Quote:
“We are face-to-face with behavior on the part of Russia that the European Union and NATO must take into account when making future choices, because these are organizations with member states and partners that are united by common values and ideals of freedom that Russia has now called into question,” the Estonian Head of State said, which he feels necessitates the restoration of the NATO security planning process, among other things. “In a situation where there is wish to destroy the democratic order and European values, it is of primary importance that the European Union and NATO maintain their solidarity and support for other democratic countries.”
Both President Ilves and Chancellor Merkel assessed Russia’s actions against Georgia to be illegal aggression against a sovereign nation.
According to the Estonian Head of State and the German Chancellor, Russia’s decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which are located on Georgian territory, as independent countries only increases tensions in such a complicated situation and violates the principle of the territorial integrity.
HRW, 29 Aug 08: Georgia: Satellite Images Show Destruction, Ethnic Attacks
Quote:
Recent satellite images released by the UN program UNOSAT confirm the widespread torching of ethnic Georgian villages inside South Ossetia, Human Rights Watch said today. Detailed analysis of the damage depicted in five ethnic Georgian villages shows the destruction of these villages around the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, was caused by intentional burning and not armed combat.
“Human Rights Watch researchers personally witnessed Ossetian militias looting and burning down ethnic Georgian villages during their research in the area,” said Rachel Denber, deputy director of the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch. “These satellite images indicate just how widespread the torching of these villages has been in the last two weeks.”
The new satellite images, taken by a commercial satellite on August 19, were analyzed by experts of the Geneva-based UNOSAT program, which is part of the UN Institute for Training and Research and produces satellite-derived mapping in support of UN agencies and the international humanitarian community. UNOSAT experts identified visible structures on the images that were likely to have been either destroyed or severely damaged. The expert analysis indicates clear patterns of destruction that are consistent with the evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch researchers working in the region.....
Not sure where else to put this yet...
===
Georgian Artillery Inventory prior to Russian Invasion:
The BBC is lying (again)...
Didn't anybody else notice that the bulk of the Georgian artillery inventory was left abandoned to the South and East of Gori?
Dana 152mm SP guns parked on the side of the road to Tblisi, a whole row of D-30 122mm guns left lined up on a Gori city side street. The photographic evidence of this is stark and irrefutable.
Globalsecurity/FAS reports that pre-war Georgia had just one (1) 203mm Pion 2S7 SP gun, just one (1) 2S19 SP 152mm gun, thirteen 2S5 SP 152mm guns, twenty-four 152mm Dana SP guns, fifteen (or sixteen) BM-21 MRLS, six (or eight) RM-70 MRLS, and other sources reveal less than a dozen of the Israeli made GRADLAR MRLS systems, only one of which has been confirmed as of the long range (45km) variety.
That single long range truck mounted GRADLAR system may have been the only Georgian heavy artillery to have actually responded to the Russian invasion when it was reported firing on the Russian tank column exiting the Roki Tunnel on the night of August 8-9. That firing may be indirectly confirmed by the finding of a single unexploded M85 DPICM munition, which could only have been fired by the Israeli made GRADLAR system – or placed in its found location by Russian disinformation.
The Georgian towed artillery included fourteen 152mm guns, and one hundred and eight 122mm guns.
No matter how one adds up the Georgian artillery park, it doesn’t come close to the BBC’s claims of over 300 guns. My own estimate is less then 200 total pieces in the entire inventory, the majority of which appear to have never fired at the Russians (who were outside of the normal range of those guns), but were lost in the rout south and east of Gori.
It should also be noted that for all of the visible damage sustained within the city of Tshkinvali, there were very few actual impact craters.
MY
NAME
IS,
R