Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Military Commentary

[Rank amateur]

You have to be more mobile than the MBTs they are taking on

Good point. If the Georgians could move in and out of ambush position - or whatever you want to call them - the Ruswsian "blast everything" tactic is less effective.

Yes I think there is a for dismounted infantry when taking on armoured formations, but I don't see it as being the decisive one.

Georgia will never be able to decisively defeat Russia. Constant "little cuts" until the Russians decide it ain't worth it is the best they could hope for. As I said before, the Russians would probably respond by flattening Tbilisi, so rolling over and showing their belly was probably the Georgians best option. Not very manly, but it works for my dog.

[William F. Owen]

Georgia will never be able to decisively defeat Russia. Constant "little cuts" until the Russians decide it ain't worth it is the best they could hope for. As I said before, the Russians would probably respond by flattening Tbilisi, so rolling over and showing their belly was probably the Georgians best option. Not very manly, but it works for my dog.

I concur. I was referring to decisive action at the tactical level, without which you tend to loose lots of folks, though you may win the war.

I do think that Georgia could exhaust Russia by attrition over time, to allow the diplomatic means to kick in. An all out 14-day effort is not beyond asking, in terms of an achievable capability.

[jmm99]

from kaur
Destiny of 1 Georgian squad.

Not nice stuff - should be required viewing for all politicians who would lightly send men off to war.

from kaur
About Finnish plans.

Booklet is a good summary of FDF overall; even though as 2002 document (so, based on 2001 White Paper), it is before 2004 White Paper.

Follow-up reading would be that 2004 paper and defense projection to 2025, at MoD:

http://www.defmin.fi/files/311/2574_...er_2004_1_.pdf
http://www.defmin.fi/files/674/Secur...ategy_2025.pdf

---------------------------
For those that don't know, Finland Proper (Turku region) owes its original settlement (a few 1000 years ago) to people from Estonia, who crossed the gulf by ship. Or, in the view of one a bit drunken Karelian, "Estonians are Finns who didn't learn to swim." Since I'm Ostrobothnian, I had to disagree, of course.

One ancestor, Pahwals Pass (and his two brothers) were from, or of ancestry from, the island of Runö. Family story from ca. 1500 - so, not easy to prove (although it is plausible).

[Fuchs]

@Kaur:
STRIX has a terribly small footprint. I don't remember the correct data, but it's so small that a single target should better not move.
To aim at a road when a coluimn is passing might be promising, but some self-guided munitions have a tendency to not lead enough on fast moving targets afaik.

You have to be more mobile than the MBTs they are taking on, or else they can simply be evaded. I am also unsure of how useful the term "ambush" is. "Attack on a moving enemy" is useful, but lurking in a wood hoping the enemy is nice enough to drive by, is not the acme of tactical skill.

Hmm, actually that's one of the methods that produced the best kill ratios in the past afaik.
The art is to choose the right place and time, and to pull it off. It's nice to get away and repeat it elsewhere, of course.

The emphasis on mobility is a bit questionable imho. Getting away is important, but any emphasis on being faster is probably misleading.

The mobility-emphasizing tank destroyer concept of WW2 was not the expected success, whereas the StuG concept (always inferior in mobility to its major enemy T-34) that rested much of its AT tactics on old field artillery ambush tactics was a success (different environments and generally difficult to compare, but the opinions about the TD concept are afaik still rather negative).

The other reason is less military history than OR-like.
What does "more mobile" mean? It's terrain negotiability aspect is irrelevant in many terrains (not quite in mountains) because MBTs can already negotiate most terrains.
The speed aspect is the one that convinces me the least.
- not the tank's speed counts, but the tank unit speed
- 40-75 km/h depending on surface/type and depths of probably 5-15 km before the tanks do a lot of harm:
How much time does that give for leading an AT unit into a favourable position, probably more than once? Consider that the AT teams don't dictate the direction of the attack, they have time lags because they have to react.

A success in an AT mission requires imho either well-prepared ambushes, a lot of brute fireower or a combination of enemy mobility degradation and own mobility.
The MBT's speed is imho quite uninteresting. It's the unit's speed that counts, and that's under influence by some external factors (real and fake minefields, ECM against radio comm, intimidation by multi-spectral smoke walls - who wants to move into the unknown?).

Btw, what did you mean with "or else they can simply be evaded"?

[William F. Owen]

@ Hmm, actually that's one of the methods that produced the best kill ratios in the past afaik.
The art is to choose the right place and time, and to pull it off. It's nice to get away and repeat it elsewhere, of course.


@ What does "more mobile" mean? It's terrain negotiability aspect is irrelevant in many terrains (not quite in mountains) because MBTs can already negotiate most terrains.

@ Btw, what did you mean with "or else they can simply be evaded"?

@ I am not trying to suggest that anti-armour ambushes have not been historically successful, but that is not the point. As you say right time and place, so ensuring you have the freedom of action to exploit the opportunity is critical. Being on foot with 52kgs of equipment is not a way to lengthen the odds in your favour. If man power and resources are limited, you can't be ready on ever route, and if there are very few routes, the enemy is pretty much going to guess you may seek to deny them those routes and act accordingly.

@ More mobile means retaining the freedom of action, to move. Speed is only one parameter in that regard. If you can go places he can't, you have greater freedom, and speed may be totally irrelevant.

@ If he has greater mobility, he can simply bypass you or disengage. What is more, if you lack mobility relative to the enemy, you cannot exploit.

[Fuchs]

What is more, if you lack mobility relative to the enemy, you cannot exploit.

exploit=pursuit?

Pursuit is a risyky & difficult activity anyway.
To destroy a withdrawing opponent requires a lot of excess speed.

Pursuit was historically probably more about territory gains than destruction - but AT units rarely if ever have the mission to gain ground.

The whole speed issue loses relevance once one considers a battlefield with many units instead of a unit duel. A tank battalion that evades an AT company might run into another deadly threat.

[William F. Owen]

exploit=pursuit?

Exploit in terms of core functions mean use the opportunity created. Realise the benefit of the strike. It may well mean withdraw.

Pursuit is risky at the tactical level, which is why the Russians have always taught/ tried to apply it at the operational level.

[Ken White]

also......

[Fuchs]

some pictures

This is apparently a photo from northern SO (north of T town). It might be from Northern Ossetia as well (I cannot guarantee that it's from SO).


Have a look at the terrain.
No good opportunities for concealment- neither for those in the valley nor for ambushers on high ground. FO's on high ground and aerial recce would have had perfect conditions, though.

This is south of T town.


Excellent mechanized/armoured unit terrain. Terrible terrain for infantry. Terrible terrain for an army under air attack.

[Fuchs]

A T-62 with partial slat armour, part of a late-coming unit (late-coming unit of 19th MRD or from another unit).


In 2008 probably only useful as a good weather infantry fire support vehicle.
Nevertheless; it shows that the Russians used some very old equipment (also some BTR-70's).
I've already seen articles that claim a Russian technological superiority; T-80's and -90's, BMP-2 and -3, Tunguska, BTR-90 - of these were so far only Tunguska and BMP-2 confirmed afaik. Mediocre variants of T-72, BMP-1/2 and BTR-80's were afaik typical, especially for the five advance guard battalions and the peacekeepers (which had teh BMP-1's without ATGM).

Camouflaged (I think that this could be called "concealed" as well) Tunguska:


The first photos of the war showed no other camouflage than what the factory had applied. Later in the war appeared some photos of bushes with guns like this and photos of tanks wih marginal foliage for camouflage.
Maybe they only applied some camouflage materials once they had some longer breaks. They seemed to lack camouflage netting.


(I had to break this into two replies because the forum software counted 8 instead of 4 photos due to the integral links).