That's exactly what it would take...
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Originally Posted by
TAH
...AND intentions (he is likely planning on doing) is important for the commander to make correct decisions.
Somebody has to go up and punch the guy in the nose in order to determine actual intent.
and is easier said than done.
Quote:
By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.
No one here is suggesting that, only saying that all the aggressive recon work in the world will not reliably and accurately provide you intentions. You ascertain capabilities and infer probabilities but you cannot determine intent.
Probabiliy versus Intention
Ken and Wilf say potato Luchs and I say patato :)
Within some limits, agressive recon/recce gives you insights into what the enemy may do next. However, there is a chance that that's exactly what the sneaky SOB wants you to think. :)
Target on the Mover ???:confused:
I could point out that Webster says Wilf and I are spelling it right...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
TAH
Ken and Wilf say potato Luchs and I say patato :)
Within some limits, agressive recon/recce gives you insights into what the enemy may do next. However, there is a chance that that's exactly what the sneaky SOB wants you to think.
Target on the Mover ???:confused:
Your "within some limits" sort of equals my "...you can ascertain capabilities and even, if you're lucky -- or really good -- probabilities but you can not determine the opposing commanders intentions." (all emphasis added / kw). That's sorta semantic, I guess...
As an aside, I agree with you on the principles of cavalry / reconnaissance operations and capabilities with the caveat that recon by stealth can work in MCO and it has been done by us if rarely. Other armies do it more often, we just don't usually have the patience for it ala your comment on OpTempo (as desired by some Cdr somewhere...). :wry:
So, as on old Cav Colonel once said "...we just go out looking for trouble and to do that, you have to have armor." :D
Huh? Sorry, I don't understand what that means. You gotta
remember, I'm old. A CAB to me is a Combat Avaiation Brigade. I could stretch it to include the new Combat Action Badge but beyond that...
I don't recognize your organization...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
gute
Below is a CAB organized to include recon as a general function and not the responsibility of an ARS:
A Troop 6x3 scout platoons, 1x4 tank, 2xmortar
B Company 4x3 inf platoons, 1x4 tank platoon, 2xmortar
C Company 4x3 inf plt., 1x4 tank, 2xmortar
D company 4x3 tank platoons, 2xmortar
E Company 4x3 eng platoons, 2xmortars
F Company FSC
However, working off what's there, I'm unsure why you've mixed things up as much as you have and I presume the "B Company" for example is what used to be called a Company Team with elements from two or more Companies under command of the B Co Cdr. I have no idea what logic dictates A Co, don't know what 6x3 Scout Platoons means (3 Plts w/ 6 veh each?). Why does D Co have no Inf? Why do I give the engineers mortars? May make sense, may not. Do I take the FSC with me or not? Depends...
Having said that, I would need a whole bunch more info than "going to Baghdad" ala the 3d ID in 03 before I use the organization you offer. For instance, while that 'situation' gives me a rough idea of the terrain, climate and enemy it does not give me adequate knowledge of the terrain to decide your organization would be acceptable to my plan and that plan would depend on a few other factors, i.e. leaving Kuwait? First day? Tenth day? Who else from what unit is where? Am I the lead Bn for a Bde or just in the column?
If I'm the lead and in the absence of more knowledge I would have if actually there, I'd go with two Cos of Tanks (w/ one Inf Plt ea) and two of Inf (w/ one Tk Plt ea. Open terrain, Tanks lead, close or urban, Inf leads; broad diamond in the open, Column avoided at all costs. Need to know medevac, fuel and resupply plan...
Also, I'm going to change my task organization and formations probably at least daily and most probably more often, situation dependent...
To go back to your original question to which I responded, the broad general answer is yes but there will be exceptions (METT-TC again...) and there will be shortfalls in performance unless the Bn in question has worked at the Recon effort a few times. It's not optimum but it will work.
That study from Leavenworth that you cited did a lot of damage because it was misunderstood and because the US Army solution to Reconnaissance is, basically, not to do it. We don't have the patience or the training to do it right, so our Cav elements too often just went out looking for trouble. That may be combat, may even be Cav to the max -- but it ain't reconnaissance.
Thus, in effect, for the US, we elect to have gaps and shortfalls in our knowledge of the terrain and enemy ahead because since late 1944, we have always had the combat power to make up for that shortfall so its been acceptable from then to now. It was NOT acceptable early in WW II in Europe or all through WW II in the Pacific, where we did do some great Recon work.
Prescribed Organization is relatively unimportant, Task Organization for combat can fix most of the ills the TOE designers foist on us. Just taks a bit of flexibility. And knowledge of METT-TC.
Mostly METT-TC...
Infanteer and Fuchs are right, Gute,
IMO excessive focus on the tree can obscure the old forest...;)
We mixed and matched Tanks and Infantry into Co Tms and Battalion TFs for specific missions as required for years with no problem -- now we're supposed to be so-o-o-o much smarter -- and that's too difficult for us to do?
BCT (that used to be 'Basic Combat Training' before that abbreviation got purloined by people who ignore history -- and common sense; one abbreviation for one item or you confuse the world...) or Bde Cdrs will always want more people -- they aren't boots, they're people or Soldiers or Marines, not boots -- Tough munchies for the Commandantes. They get what the TOE guys -- and the Bean Counters -- allot. The TOE is to provide a mean, no more.
Combat is not fought in TOE packets, but by forces task organized for the specific missions and conditions envisioned.
Given the fact that everyone acknowledges that the current concept is undermanned, trying to reorganize within existing authorizations strikes me as seeking to perpetuate flawed logic. IF a major wars starts, we will rapidly reorganize and all the flawed designs, driven as much by a more flawed personnel management system trying to provide enough Officer spaces so the HRC job is simplified, will go by the wayside as they have in every war.
We, the US, are penalized by several myths in combat organization. One is that with proper education and training, most all can command effectively in combat. Not so. Another is the triangular organization, adopted by the Germans to force better tactical though by not allowing balance formations in combat. Probably fair idea at the time but that was almost 100 years ago; things have changed a bit. The third is that Reconnaissance problem. We have never designed a force or used the idea well since mechanization appeared. You're correct on Recon and on surveillance but it takes training to do both jobs. If you're just going to charge out looking for bad guys, then a lot of extra training can be ignored. Thus our mediocre training (which can be fixed) and our aggressive impatience (which can also be fixed but is far more difficult and entails better selection for command criteria) lead us to just go charging into the fray. So, yeah, an Infantry Bn can do that.
The questions really are, should an Infantry Battalion be so employed and is their lack of all relevant training and capability acceptable; and is that failure to have Recon and Svlnc unit, be they Cav or whatever really the best solution?
For one answer to that question, look at the RSTA Sqns in todays Bdes. Their organization is questionable and tales I've heard on their employment could give even Custer gray hair. Go back in time, look at the Bn Recon Plts in Viet Nam -- almost all woefully misused leading to allowing the enemy to initiate far too many contacts. Smae thing is happening today in Afghanistan...
IMO, Bns need Scout or Recon Plts and a Bde needs a Co or Troop and they need to be trained as Scouts, as Surveillers and as Combat capable elements who can and will fight for information and who are capable of delaying an opposing force. We can easily 'organize' elements to answer that -- can we easily get the US Army to properly employ such units? The answer on that is decidedly mixed...
You can put Tanks and Mech Infantry together at Plt, Co, Bn or Bde / Div level. Where you do it is really sort of academic and all the various mixtures have advantages and disadvantages, not least maintenance and resupply. Regardless of how you do the organization, the critical factor is flexibility in adapting the organization to changing situation -- sometimes rapidly changing. So in the end, what is where and how many there are is not immaterial but it is not nearly as important as the mind set and the training of those who are in the units.
RE:Your question to Infanteer. Check this LINK, pull the wiring diagram up and zoom in on it. Google has plenty of links for more detail.
More familiarity with the bureaucratic morass than
I care to recall led me to make that statement. If you "redesign within existing allocations" all you're doing is telling the bean counters they were right -- and they rarely are. I found out years ago and the hard way that you have to challenge the system and processes to achieve glacial forward movement. It isn't easy but it can be done but they will try their hardest to convince you that nothing can really be changed, you can only tinker around the edges -- that way, life is better for them.
Shouldn't be the driver; missions accomplished at minimum costs should be. Unfortunately, they don't have to do the missions so that's not a major issue to them...
Resources have to be considered, no question, so do personnel and equipment availability but to constrain yourself to cutting and pasting -- which is the typical Army methodology -- instead of trying to a little imaginative and design a structure that is oriented to the most likely missions at hand and not cater to the personnel and RM folks is a better approach.
Instead of letting them force you into a familiar box with a bell and whistle or two, design one that may make them work a bit harder but that provides the tools for the guy on the ground... ;)
P.S.
With all due respect to Hacksaw, don't have planning cells. Make the operators plan; the planners tend to give you unconstrained plans. The guys who have to execute will be a little more realistic.
Balance in all things. Balance and METT-TC... :wry: