Warfighting and Maneuver Warfare
I've looked at John Schmitt, 1989 FMFM 1 Warfighting and John Schmitt, 1997 MCDP 1 Warfighting, which both have sections on Maneuver Warfare.
The 1989 version is fairly short:
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MANEUVER WARFARE
The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. But in order to fully appreciate what we mean by maneuver we need to clarify the term. The traditional understanding of maneuver is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver in space to gain a positional advantage. However, in order to maximize the usefulness of maneuver, we must consider maneuver in time as well; that is, we generate a faster operational tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage. It is through maneuver in both dimensions that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.
Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.
From this definition we see that the aim in maneuver warfare is to render the enemy incapable of resisting by shattering his moral and physical cohesion--his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole--rather than to destroy him physically through incremental attrition, which is generally more costly and time-consuming. Ideally, the components of his physical strength that remain are irrelevant because we have paralyzed his ability to use them effectively. Even if an outmaneuvered enemy continues to fight as individuals or small units, we can destroy the remnants with relative ease because we have eliminated his ability to fight effectively as a force.
This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On the contrary, the suppressive effects of firepower are essential to our ability to maneuver. Nor do we means to imply that we will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We will concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes. But the aim is not an unfocused application of firepower for the purpose of incrementally reducing the enemy's physical strength. Rather, it is the selective application of firepower in support of maneuver to contribute to the enemy's shock and moral disruption. The greatest value of firepower is not physical destruction--the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly--but the moral dislocation it causes.
If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy's cohesion, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which he cannot function. By our actions, we seek to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and faster than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy must be made to see his situation not only as deteriorating, but deteriorating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.
Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of combat, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. Through the use of greater tempo and velocity, we seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late--until eventually he is overcome by events.
Also inherent is the need for violence, not so much as a source of physical attrition but as a source of moral dislocation. Toward this end, we concentrate strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and how it will cause the greatest damage to our enemy's ability to fight. Once gained or found, any advantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly. We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness, against which we will direct all available combat power. And when the decisive opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion.
The final weapon in our arsenal is surprise, the combat value of which we have already recognized. By studying our enemy we will attempt to appreciate his perceptions. Through deception we will try to shape his expectations. Then we will dislocate them by striking at an unexpected time and place. In order to appear unpredictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibit imagination and initiative. In order to appear ambiguous and threatening, we should operate on axes that offer several courses of action, keeping the enemy unclear as to which we will choose.
The 1997 version seems to follow the above (I did not do a word for word) and adds but a paragraph to its MW section:
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Besides traits such as endurance and courage that all warfare demands, maneuver warfare puts a premium on certain particular human skills and traits. It requires the temperament to cope with uncertainty. It requires flexibility of mind to deal with fluid and disorderly situations. It requires a certain independence of mind, a willingness to act with initiative and boldness,
an exploitive mindset that takes full advantage of every opportunity, and the moral courage to accept responsibility for this type of behavior. It is important that this last set of traits be guided by self-discipline and loyalty to the objectives of seniors. Finally, maneuver warfare requires the ability to think above our own level and to act at our level in a way that is in
consonance with the requirements of the larger situation.
The 1989 version then goes to its section PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND. The 1997 version inserts a section ORIENTING ON THE ENEMY and then PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND.
Chapter 4, The Conduct of War, section headings in 1989
—The Challenge
—Maneuver Warfare
—Philosophy of Command
—Shaping the Battle
—Decision Making
—Mission Tactics
—Commander's Intent
—Focus of Effort
—Surfaces and Gaps
—Combined Arms
Chapter 4, The Conduct of War, section headings in 1997
—The Challenge
—Maneuver Warfare
—Orienting on the Enemy
—Philosophy of Command
—Shaping the Action
—Decisionmaking
—Mission Tactics
—Commander’s Intent
—Main Effort
—Surfaces and Gaps
—Combined Arms
—Conclusion
Now, having eaten up too many bytes showing what my question is based on, my question is:
What is (are) the major difference(s) - if any - between 1985 Lind-Wyly vs 1989 Warfighting vs 1997 Warfighting ?
Regards
Mike
Rorschach! Oh ya...know what you mean
Rorschach...lol...good discription! Agree but in its defense the slides are probably 25% of the information. Boyd's "Patterns" brief was 8+ hours of talking directly at and about those slides and Boyd talked like a M-60 machinegun. Unfortunately, except for the slides, Boyd never wrote his stuff down...I remember Lind and Wyly joking they were going to lock Boyd into an office and trade food for manuscript pages.
Oh remembering the Battles!
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
Now, having eaten up too many bytes showing what my question is based on, my question is:
What is (are) the major difference(s) - if any - between 1985 Lind-Wyly vs 1989 Warfighting vs 1997 Warfighting ?
Regards
Mike
Really they are all the same. 1981 to 1985 Lind and Wyly were rebels sowing an insurgence at the grass roots level (Captain level). There was no offical support for the thing until General Grey got involved when he was the 2nd Division Commander. At one point Wyly would be sent to the career "plenalty box" and later released by Grey. Of course, when Grey became Commandant MW became a done deal. I think it was 82-83 the Commandant (Kelly maybe) make a public statement that MW folks needed to stop meeting in the cellars of DC. That was a direct reference to the unoffical AWS MW seminar that met at Lind's house once a week. The Wyly and Lind stuff "evolved" into the 1989 version of Warfighting.
Afraid of the Communist Hordes!!
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
The Russians would get hold of Patterns? Sorry, why was that an issue?
Well that is Gold DUST!!! Cos that is the first I have heard of a whole brief being recorded!! Seriously!
At the time, MW was a method to fight outnumbered and win, at least, that is what we said in those days. I think in Boyd's mind, if the Russians adopted it ...game over? Remember, this is back in 79-81 time frame and we were trying to think of how a Marine BLT could defeat a Russian Army Group. ;) RIGHT!
I just dug the cassettes out of the old cardboard box room. There are eight 60 minute cassettes; 5 are labeled "Patterns in Conflict"; one is labeled "Organic C" (Command) and two are labeled "On Strategy". Looks like I managed to get three lectures. I remember CSC would not schedule Boyd as a lecture for the whole class but they did allow a small group of us to meet in a conference room. I threw a hand cassette recorder into the middle of the table...quality is not the best.
I'm not a Lind fan but he got that bit right.
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Originally Posted by
Chris jM
...he states that it is an art, and some people will have the skills, imagination and flair and others will not.
Totally true and while even the best artist isn't infallible, a good artist will be beat a good mechanic at his art.
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...Better we are prepared to come up against an enemy position, apply overwhelming force through combined arms through which he can't resist and then exploit as required rather than rely upon the orchestrated, undefinable artistry of the so-called 'manoeuvrist approach'.
That is the mechanical solution -- it is necessitated by the democratic nations rather foolish effort to be fair in promoting people to command; if one cannot have an artist, one must give his mechanic all the tools available and if one uses more mechanics than artists, then one must have tons of tools...:rolleyes:
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As I said earlier, I think MW has got a lot right for the wrong reasons.
We can agree on that as a generalization but Lind and others are correct on the Art versus science bit and the benefit of having a few artists.
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Indeed, surface-and-gaps makes sense in the MW reading of warfare but it doesn't have all that much utility to a commander under fire and fatigued when he has to penetrate an enemy defensive position without walking into a pre-planned EA.
Not necessarily; depends on the Commander. For most, generally mechanics, you're obviously correct. For the rather more rare artists, not necessarily -- far more often than not they'll pull it off, even against the odds...:cool:
The problem is that a democratic and 'fair' personnel system in a bureaucracy cannot tolerate artists..
Until there's a big, real, tough war (see Freyberg, B) ... :wry:
I'll bet you like metrics...
That's not an insult, just an observation. The world in that respect is divided into those who wish to apply them and those who do not...
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Originally Posted by
Chris jM
How, though, do we identify the artists vice mechanics?
By observation and subjective judgement. Subjectivity is anathema to bureaucracies and politicians because it is, after all, only an opinion. Whereas objectivity produces empirical results. Which can be and often are fudged...
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Training is able to produce and test competency based upon known, established and proven criteria. Some flair and artistry is allowed within this framework...
But not much. It upsets the bureaucracy and the personnel folks who want objective criteria only to determine who gets to do what. It also upsets the politicians who want everyone to be treated fairly. Heh. What they really want is no complaints from non selectees that cannot be shown to be based on objective data so they can say "you didn't make the grade and this proves it." A proven competent and experienced commander who says "...promote Heebly, he's good; do not promote Phugabosky, he'll get people killed.." is anthema to the 'system.'
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...- charismatic leaders often get promoted, for example...
Charisma has nothing to do with it; competence in an art form -- and combat is an art, not a science -- has everything to do with it. Not one of the best Commanders I had in combat was charismatic -- only three of about a dozen got to be Flag Officers, the system does not tolerate guys who are great tactically but not pretty or socially adept.
A mechanical Commander trained conventionally who is a good mechanic and has some experience will beat an inexperienced intuitive Commander. He will rarely beat an experienced intuitive Commander.
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Beyond that, the most successful military commanders are really products of their own organisation and training (at least, in my view of things). Claiming someone is an 'artist' is really just saying we can't identify or understand his or her way of working.
I agree with your first generalization, though that's from our choices, not from necessity nor is it demonstrably better than other processes.
I disagree with the second. To put it as simply as possible, that 'artist' will arrive at correct decisions by pretty much the same process as will a good mechanical type -- he or she will just do it faster and is highly likely to omit some steps. There's been plenty of research and there are tons of papers out there. Googling "Intuitive Military Commanders" gets 616K hits, most garbage but some gold. (LINK).
The issue is not that we cannot do it; the issue is that in democratic societies in peacetime who have a fetish for worrying about a huge mobilization force, the dual emphasis of PC 'fairness and objective criteria' and designing training to mass produce people for spaces it isn't going to be done.
Not to worry, as I said, they always come out in wars. Then a lot of the mechanics get to take charge of Post Exchanges... :wry:
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I see the science-vs-art debate as placing overly simplistic guidelines upon military undertakings. Better we look at competent vs less-competent within the framework of what we do know and can assess.
Yeah, many say that. That's what we're doing now. How's that working out for us? Most mid grade and young senior NCOs and Company and Field Grades in the US will tell you not so good...:rolleyes:
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And if popular perceptions are correct, artists are only appreciated only once they're dead. I'm not sure that depending upon post-death popularity is that desirable a quality for military leadership ;)
The desirable quality is a competent, experienced practitioner who can win and keep more of their own troops alive while doing so. I've seen a lot of intuitive commanders, artists in that sense, do that -- I've seen a lot of mediocre mechanics get too many people killed unnecessarily while failing to successfully complete missions and then get promoted because, screwed up or not, they had checked all the right boxes, they played that system you cite. :mad:
There's more truth in that comment in the context of this sub-thread than
you probably realized...;)
I learn new thing here every day...
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Originally Posted by
Chris jM
Honestly though, no - I'm far from a metrics man.
That, as our Martha Stewart used to say, is a good thing...
There's a time and place for metrics, they're absolutely imperative for many things. My observation has been that tactical decision making is not such a thing.
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I don't intend to come across as the argumentative type - and I hope that I'm not raising petty argument for argument's sake. I will make no apologies, though, in continuing to draw you and others here into debate.
Understood and not a problem.
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I agree with you in a lot of what you say. However, I would challenge your view in that the system and the organisation relies upon producing and fielding the mechanics.
I think it does, at least here in the US, for several reasons. That methodology works, it's broadly proven in two big wars and works adequately in little ones. It is easier to do than is the identification and development of talent. It is politically palatable. It allows more people to be accepted into the fold, thus allowing a larger pool from which talent may rise when needed. There are more, not least the laziness of trainers but those are the principal reasons for developing mechanical processes (like the MDMP) and the pretty much standardized use of the mechanical approach in most Armies.
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Perhaps I'm tackling this in the wrong manner - basically, how could the system develop it's artists without undermining it's own structures enforcing the basics of tactical success that demand mechanisation in most undertakings (tactics, logistics, appreciations, etc)?
Heh, that, too. So many thing are indeed mechanical that casting 'mechanics' aside is impossible; it is easier to use the template for most everything. The real issue is not developing 'artists' -- it is that most Armies stifle them (and thus they leave early...) mostly due to the group think you wisely wish to avoid. I suspect that group think syndrome has different precipitators from nation to nation...
I wouldn't change much in the current system but I would institutionalize the acceptance of mavericks and talent to a greater extent than is now the norm. Note I say 'greater extent' rather than totally -- totally would result in unmilitary chaos...:wry:
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It seems that your/my system is sufficiently good at a) providing sufficient quality forces, b) having those forces adapt to meet the demands placed upon it and c) getting the right people to the right spots, when required.
Totally agree.
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but how can you do it otherwise without damaging the working system?
I have seen senior commanders who encouraged their talented folks -- perhaps tolerated them is a better word (give that some thought...) -- as opposed to most of their peers who would not do so. The real problem is, IMO, with the personnel policies and that problem is part politically coreect ('fair,' 'objective assessment,' 'balanced') and part ease of effort for the Per folks. Life is easier for Per weenies if every LTC is potentially able to command a Battalion.
I say LTC because I believe that most should be allowed to get to Captain, at Major culling begins and command and staff tracks are locked and a goodly number are allowed to command battalions -- and that's where the hard cuts start.
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Trust me, I like the idea of a meritocracy based upon purely upon outputs and abilities rather than assessed/ proven ability in replicated training. I just don't see it as feasible given the flaws inherent to any large organisation of people. Judging, identifying and then elevating those artists seems to me an aspirational task that will be codified and regimentalised (hence: mechanised) at all turns.
In reverse order; that's why we're where we are; it is not infeasible, it is simply difficult and therefor avoided for the most part; war provides the ultimate meritocratic selection and democratic societies for a host of reasons are unlikely to stop training good mechanics, start accepting talented mavericks and go completely meritocratic. A hard war brings out that talent and it rises fairly rapidly to the top.
That's reality, I know that -- what I also very strongly believe is that a good intuitive commander can whip an excellent mechanical commander. Against an outstanding mechanic -- and a few of those are about -- you'd need an excellent or better intuitive guy. Intuition and talent give an edge, they are not infallible. There are a host of very competent mechanics out there. Kiwi Grunt modified one my smart aleck comments to say "there are those who can count, those who can't and then there are the Artists." True -- I'd modify that to say there are those who must count ot paint by the numbers; there those who can count and paint without numbers -- and Artists who can do both. Tactically speaking, the 'artist' knows when to be mechanical and when that is not advisable; he take shortcuts -- and good ones. Wars bring that out...
In the meantime, we can be happy that the system produces a large pool of competent folks from which talent can be gathered when needed and that there are some senior commanders who tolerate if not encourage talent.
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My point exactly! The 'artist' of MW is the wrong way of looking at it - better we find and promote those who can do the mechanics of designing, executing and adapting combined-arms plans well. We know how combined arms works within our doctrine and TTPs, so lets reward those who demonstrate ability in that field.
I don't think we're in total agreement on that but we're probably close enough for government work. :D
I say that because I believe the odd or rare good intuitive guy who sticks around will generally demonstrate more ability... ;)