British COIN (merged thread)

I assure you, "the answer" is indeed not in official doctrine.

That said, there is a great deal of tremendous concepts, TTPs, thoughts, etc in official doctrine. The problem is one of context. Military doctrine on COIN is written in the context of how military forces conduct COIN warfare.

Change the context, and re-read the same doctrine, and you find that 70% of it is definitely worth hanging onto, it just needs to be rearranged into a new context regarding how military forces properly engage to shape and support foreign policy abroad in lands consumed in insurgency.

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Originally Posted by Woland

It is hardly revelatory that a fundamental part of a COIN campaign is good J2, but perhaps another complicated Powerpoint presentation could set about explaining the UK's J2 shortfalls.

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Concur.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

So why say COIN? Thanks to incredibly sloppy thinking the word has lost any merit it may have ever once had.
Irregular Warfare works in exactly the same way as regular does. Defeating the enemy's armed wing denies him the ability to set forth policy using violence and returns to issue to politics and diplomacy. That is what force does. You use it against their force.

If it's not Warfare then why is the US Army involved?

OK, so how in "Bob's World" are people using violence to set forth "political ideas" countered?

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...but I was just doing a quick scan of SWJ as I got back into uniform after a little PT. I currently am extremely fortunate to be supporting US SOF in a British led NATO HQ that is armpit deep at the moment in these very matters, so while I am learning a great deal from my front row seat, it is a seat I need to get back to! As my current boss is apt to say ""in a dull moment" I will get back to you!

Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future" by Andrew Mumford, University of Nottingham. Published by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

LINK

Do not believe this has been posted or discussed here. I note that, like some here including me, he believes mostly bad lessons derive from the Malayan experience.

I don't think he discussed one area of deficiency by the British that is not to some extent shared by the US. The problem in both nations is, I suspect, a combination of a risk averse political establishment (in total but party dependent with respect to bellicosity as the 'out' party will generally object to anything the government of the day decides... :rolleyes:) and an also risk averse and very bureaucratic military and Defence / Defense establishments (important distinction there, both the military folks and their civilian masters are at fault)...

Pity.

Ken,

A good catch this paper. On my first reading the arguments appear to be similar to Frank Ledwidge's, in his book 'Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan', which has been discussed on 'The UK In Afghanistan' thread (post 816 is first, debate 840-850).

It would be interesting if the traditional place for military discussion and learning, RUSI, invited both authors to present their arguments in Whitehall. Alas I fear such is the strength of inertia and fear no-one serving would publicly say anything.

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

It would be interesting if the traditional place for military discussion and learning, RUSI, invited both authors to present their arguments in Whitehall. Alas I fear such is the strength of inertia and fear no-one serving would publicly say anything.

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Ooh I don't know; I can think of several serving officers who would love to have a pop, even if only from our cheap seats! :D

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Originally Posted by Ken White

[I]
very bureaucratic military and Defence / Defense establishments

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Extremely bureacratic. The UK has just formed up a Joint Force Command that at first glance looks like adding another stovepiped staffing chain to an already complex structure. Every time that I mention the increasingly bureacratic nature of the Army I am told that it is because things are more complex now. My riposte is that ultimately the problems are not more complex but the structures we use to solve them are. In the UK Army we have gone from a profession of generalists with a few specialists, to a profession of specialists with a few generalists.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

(important distinction there, both the military folks and their civilian masters are at fault)...

Pity.

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Definitely. Although in the chattering classes there is a feeling that our Generals got many things wrong in Iraq and Afganistan but we see no public acknowledgement from uniformed chiefs that mistakes were made by the military; and certainly not mistakes at the operational and strategic levels. It is a line that is wearing increasingly thin with politicans, pundits and junior officers alike.

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

Ooh I don't know; I can think of several serving officers who would love to have a pop, even if only from our cheap seats! :D

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and what would they say?

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

Definitely. Although in the chattering classes there is a feeling that our Generals got many things wrong in Iraq and Afganistan but we see no public acknowledgement from uniformed chiefs that mistakes were made by the military; and certainly not mistakes at the operational and strategic levels. It is a line that is wearing increasingly thin with politicans, pundits and junior officers alike.

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Its not as if the junior officers have been operationally savvy down at the sharp end. Watch the videos, read the books (Dead Men Risen etc etc) and note that not all the problems can be laid at the door of the generals.

Part of the problem is that 'six month wonders' have now become experts because so few have any real experience of how the war has and is evolving. This is not good for the military as a whole. But... it must be said that six months in Helmand is better overall experience than a few hours at the Iranian Embassy or on Op Barras (in Sierra Leone).

Now given the fact (as reported by you a while ago) that the Brit troops have no problem with the rules of engagement then even more so those down at the sharp end have less to blame on outside factors.

The question must be asked why do the Brits put their best troops into Afghanistan if there is no intention to close with and kill the enemy. Time for a major rethink I suggest.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Its not as if the junior officers have been operationally savvy down at the sharp end. Watch the videos, read the books (Dead Men Risen etc etc) and note that not all the problems can be laid at the door of the generals.

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Quite right, but the operational and strategic level mistakes can be laid at the Generals' door. At the tactical level there are examples of good and bad practice, like every other army iin every other conflict.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Part of the problem is that 'six month wonders' have now become experts because so few have any real experience of how the war has and is evolving.

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But the army as a whole has a very sophisticated and nuanced feel for how the conflict is evolving.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Now given the fact (as reported by you a while ago) that the Brit troops have no problem with the rules of engagement then even more so those down at the sharp end have less to blame on outside factors.

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The ROE are robust. Some will always want more leeway and some less, but the consensus (not just British) is that the ROE are good and workable.

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Originally Posted by JMA

The question must be asked why do the Brits put their best troops into Afghanistan if there is no intention to close with and kill the enemy. Time for a major rethink I suggest.

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Some would say it is a flawed policy and a flawed strategy. The army still seeks to close with and kill the enemy but only in so far as this will further the aims of the strategy. Of course if the strategy is flawed...

The view among senior officers at the moment appears to be that:


Decisive engagement in maritime, land or air environments is no longer an
effective means of achieving desired political outcomes.

The ascendancy of non-traditional domains of warfare: particulary cyber,
information and perception. The view that the outcome of most operations
is as much a matter of perception as fact.

I do not necessarily agree with the prevailing view.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future" by Andrew Mumford, University of Nottingham. Published by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

LINK

Do not believe this has been posted or discussed here. I note that, like some here including me, he believes mostly bad lessons derive from the Malayan experience.

Pity.

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Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future.

Ostensibly this monograph is about debunking 10 myths of British Counterinsurgency. I found it a poor read, incoherent, biased and in places just plain wrong. Arguments were both specious and spurious and the good points made were more then overshadowed by the poor quality of the overall piece.

The author lists 10 myths and analyses each in turn. I have to admit that most of the myths I had never heard of so I am not sure how widespread a belief they represent.

Myth 1: The British Military Is An Effective Learning Institution. This is a myth peddled in Nagl’s Learning To Eat Soup With A Knife. The British Army is not renowned as a learning organisation, far from it. It has never regarded itself as a learning organisation (it regards itself as a pragmatic, adaptable organisation) and has never been historically regarded as a learning organisation. Speed is also relative and I would suggest that 2 years to adapt in a dynamic environment is not necessarily slow (Malaya).

Myth 2: British Civil Military Coin Planning is Strategically Perceptive. I found this analysis of this element confused, not least because the author seems to confuse strategy with tactics. The Malayan strategy was not “Detention without trial, the forced relocation of elements of the local populace…”, these were tactical and operational methods; but they were not the strategy. While the author makes some good points about a lack of British strategy in Iraq the overall tenor of this section is to confuse strategy, civil-mil command and control and understanding of the context of a campaign to no clear result.

Myth 3: The British Military Has Flexibly Adapted To The Demands Of COIN. Again we see confusion here between Strategy and Tactics; the author citing the British Army Field Manual Vol 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency as strategic guidance – it was not. He also seems to think that this guidance was first produced in 2009; it was not. AFM Vol 1 Part 10 has been around since I joined the army in 1988 (and probably longer), the latest iteration was issued in 2009. Overall however I rated this as the best of the sections with some very perceptive points on British Army culture and the ebb and flow of ‘high intensity v low intensity’ demands on the army.

Myth 4: The British Military Has An Ingrained Educational Approach To COIN. Anyone who knows the British Army knows that it is a non-intellectual institution; ‘doers’ are favoured over ‘thinkers’. This applies across the board, not just to COIN. The section makes some good points about the educational requirements of COIN, but the author’s assertion that a reliance on training manoeuvre is largely irrelevant is in need of supporting evidence; I would question this. One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Myth 5: Iraq Represented The Zenith Of 60 Years Worth Of Modern COIN Thinking. Utter tosh! I do not know anyone who thinks that. Iraq represented the nadir of British Strategic thinking; no more no less. The British failure in Iraq was more because of strategy then it was because of COIN practice. Furthermore the author in this section ignores the impact of the Iraqi Government on the conduct of operations against Shia elements until 2008. I would also dispute that the insurgent campaign in Iraq was sui generis, totally alien to British historical experience; the British having fought insurgencies in Iraq, Iran, Waziristan and Oman previously.

Myth 6: the British Can Do COIN Alone. Again, I do not know where this ‘myth’ has arisen from. It has been accepted in the UK since the early 1990s that the UK is highly unlikely to undertake any sort of military operation in isolation.

Myth 7: The British ‘Don’t Talk To Terrorists’. There is a myth that the British don’t talk to terrorists, but it is a myth held only by the more gullible members of the public. UK Governments have always talked, and done deals, with whoever they have to. Conflict is political in nature and political processes always run parallel to conflict processes and to facilitate this lines of communication are always maintained.

Myth 8: “Hearts and Minds” and “Minimum Force” Are Sacrosanct Elements Of The British Way Of COIN. The author seems to confuse minimum force with minimal force in his argument. A great deal of force can be applied and it is still the minimum amount of force required to achieve the required effect. This section I found the worst of all. The author cites “the ill-treatment of detainees becoming an all-too frequent event”, yet with no evidence to support this. He fails to raise the issue that the British application of minimal force after the death of six military policemen at Major Al Kabir in 2003 lead to a loss of prestige and influence in the area from which they never really recovered; different societies have different expectations and norms regarding the use of force. Lastly the UK Armed forces have been historically pragmatic in their use of force, it is only recently with the entrenchment of liberal western values regarding human rights and the use of force in the West that a more idealistic stance has been taken; until then little was sacrosanct.

Myth 9: The Malayan Emergency Is The Archetypical COIN Campaign. There is no such thing as an archetypical COIN campaign. The section reads as a ‘Beat the Brits’ diatribe. An example: “A counter-insurgency campaign taking 12 years to eradicate an isolated insurgent group is not a glowing achievement…”. Why not? 12 years to maintain the isolation of a group, transition to independence and lay the foundations for a successful and stable state seems a pretty good result to me. 12 years in terms of societal change is not long. Furthermore the insurgent campaign was defeated long before it ended. The author states that context is everything in his analysis of the Malayan campaign, but then ignores much of the context of the Iraq campaign.

Myth 10: The British Military Are The Ultimate COIN Practicioners. The British Army, and indeed Britain, was guilty of hubris in the period 2003-2005. But again the author is skewed in his analysis. His comments on the insurgents in Iraq as being “well organized, strategically driven, tactically brutal and well supported from within and outside…” could easily apply to the PIRA. One does not however need to fight the ‘A Team’ of insurgencies in order to prove one’s worth as a counter-insurgent; the trick is to stop an insurgency from ever developing to the point that it has masses of support (internal and external) and becomes a ‘Grade A’ insurgency. That said there are some good points about the lack of intelligence capabilities at the beginning of any insurgency (a reflection on liberal values where the State spies by exception) and a good point always worth re-iterating that "If the military cannot succeed in reducing insurgent violence, then no manner of political measures will arrest the worsening security situation”.

All in all a disappointing read. :(

Interestingly, perhaps, I could apply your answers to the US Army with minimal change... :wry:

This from you:

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One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

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Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Interestingly, perhaps, I could apply your answers to the US Army with minimal change... :wry:

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Most armies are more alike then they feel comfortable with...

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Originally Posted by Ken White

This from you:Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

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I shout loudly from the cheap seats in the British Army - but I am not sure that anyone listens :rolleyes:

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

Most armies are more alike then they feel comfortable with...

I shout loudly from the cheap seats in the British Army - but I am not sure that anyone listens :rolleyes:

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Yes, to the first. On the second, some failures but some successes also, most after much time when they could become someone else's idea. That was and is okay... :wry:

So do not stop... ;)

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

Quite right, but the operational and strategic level mistakes can be laid at the Generals' door. At the tactical level there are examples of good and bad practice, like every other army iin every other conflict.

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To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry (even the Marines and the paras). Slow to learn, slow to adapt, slow to evolve. And it all returns to the single most important weakness in the Brit approach - that of short tours. The indictment of "one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for tea and medals" still holds good and effectively precludes the build up of tactical efficiency on the ground. One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.

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But the army as a whole has a very sophisticated and nuanced feel for how the conflict is evolving.

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That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking ;) I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.

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The ROE are robust. Some will always want more leeway and some less, but the consensus (not just British) is that the ROE are good and workable.

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OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?

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Some would say it is a flawed policy and a flawed strategy. The army still seeks to close with and kill the enemy but only in so far as this will further the aims of the strategy. Of course if the strategy is flawed...

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Well if you are not going to take on the Taliban and kill them why not just use low grade militia to do the defensive work and guarding duties. Like with NI the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.

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The view among senior officers at the moment appears to be that:

Decisive engagement in maritime, land or air environments is no longer an
effective means of achieving desired political outcomes.

The ascendancy of non-traditional domains of warfare: particulary cyber,
information and perception. The view that the outcome of most operations
is as much a matter of perception as fact.

I do not necessarily agree with the prevailing view.

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And how, dare I ask, does this apply to the troops currently deployed in Helmand? It seems like the military powers that be are starting to mentally detach themselves from the war in Afghanistan. Seen that before in people who have realised that they have no answers and they just shut the problem out.

One needs to remember that Rhodesia comprised 80% plus Brits most of whom had come out after WW2 and (speaking as a South African) they proved to be exceptionally intuitive, innovative and adaptable and achieved much with very little. So one really needs to put ones finger on where it has gone wrong in the UK since then and fix it. Something has happened to reduce the ability of the Brits to think and act using their initiative and this applies not only to the military (as you would well know).

The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.

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Originally Posted by JMA

To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry...that of short tours...One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.

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What if one recognizes those things, would change them if within ones powers -- but they are not?

In short, once again your ire is justified but your aim is atrocious. ;)

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That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking ;) I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.

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Yank Spin doctor, South African Prescriptive doctor, takes all kinds... :D

There are British and Americans there with no clue and there are more who fully understand the issues. They aren't the problem -- the problem is not in Afghanistan, it's in the places shown below. Everything, including recruiting, retaining and sending the clueless to Afghanistan, support, whatever and particularly what both the highly clued and the unclued can do starts there...

Everyone seem to understand that but you. ;)

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OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?

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I know this will amaze you but some of those clueless who shouldn't be there are senior, LTCs and even higher and can give commands and those types are often prone to tell troops that work for them that regardless of the ROE, "My ROE are designed to protect my career, so listen to me, not what you read..." That happens all too often. It did in Viet Nam and was usually ignored by most units -- the kids today can't do that due to Drones, Blue force Tracker, giant eyes high in the sky and so forth. Recall the White House Situation Room with a USAF BG running the video feed during the OBL raid. The Micromanagers have won -- this time...

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... the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.

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That's true and good Commanders know and try to guard against that. Poor Commanders and Politicians encourage less aggressiveness -- easier to control. Not right or even sensible but it is reality in every modern democracy. recall also that the law of averages in Armies that emphasize egalitarianism first and merit second says half the Commanders are good, the other half less so...

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Originally Posted by Ken White

The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.

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You are correct he needs no help from anyone but go ahead... jump in. ;)

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What if one recognizes those things, would change them if within ones powers -- but they are not?

In short, once again your ire is justified but your aim is atrocious. ;)Yank Spin doctor, South African Prescriptive doctor, takes all kinds... :D

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'Short tours' is the biggest remaining problem for the Brits. It can be changed - easier now that the tempo of operations has slowed - and that must be stated no matter how much it irritates.

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There are British and Americans there with no clue and there are more who fully understand the issues. They aren't the problem -- the problem is not in Afghanistan, it's in the places shown below. Everything, including recruiting, retaining and sending the clueless to Afghanistan, support, whatever and particularly what both the highly clued and the unclued can do starts there...

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Yes there are sure to be a number smart 'six month wonders' who have figured it out (to some extent) but what's the point if they have finished their tour and are now sitting back at home?

Is it not important to try to identify the problems wherever they may be? Home or abroad.

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Everyone seem to understand that but you. ;)I know this will amaze you but some of those clueless who shouldn't be there are senior, LTCs and even higher and can give commands and those types are often prone to tell troops that work for them that regardless of the ROE, "My ROE are designed to protect my career, so listen to me, not what you read..." That happens all too often. It did in Viet Nam and was usually ignored by most units -- the kids today can't do that due to Drones, Blue force Tracker, giant eyes high in the sky and so forth. Recall the White House Situation Room with a USAF BG running the video feed during the OBL raid. The Micromanagers have won -- this time...That's true and good Commanders know and try to guard against that. Poor Commanders and Politicians encourage less aggressiveness -- easier to control. Not right or even sensible but it is reality in every modern democracy. recall also that the law of averages in Armies that emphasize egalitarianism first and merit second says half the Commanders are good, the other half less so...

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I have noticed that the primary response from serving soldiers these days is a shrug of the shoulders as a submissive acceptance that things can't be changed and they just have to muddle on. This is very sad.

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Originally Posted by JMA

'Short tours' is the biggest remaining problem for the Brits. It can be changed - easier now that the tempo of operations has slowed - and that must be stated no matter how much it irritates.

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It doesn't irritate, longer tours are militarily sound but politically infeasible given current organization and training -- and family matters... -- that simple.

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Yes there are sure to be a number smart 'six month wonders' who have figured it out (to some extent) but what's the point if they have finished their tour and are now sitting back at home?

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It doesn't take all of 'em that long to scope it out but the tour length's a problem, no question -- it, however, is not going to change.

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Is it not important to try to identify the problems wherever they may be? Home or abroad.

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Been identified, long before anyone here heard from you or me. Also been fought and lost so you're in effect preaching to the old choir. You continue to surface it and continue to be told (not just by me...) that you're right -- but! Politics hold sway. One can view little of what happens on these kinds of deployments today through the lens of other wars just one generation ago. The changes in the last forty years have been huge and few have been beneficial. Today's focus is not military, it's political, pure and simple.

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I have noticed that the primary response from serving soldiers these days is a shrug of the shoulders as a submissive acceptance that things can't be changed and they just have to muddle on. This is very sad.

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Yes, it is sad.

It is also acceptance of unpleasant reality; military knowledge and awareness in the civilian population in the UK or US is microscopic. Misperceptions in the political and chattering classes are endemic. The forces today are too small to have any political clout at all. Far different world than it was 30 years ago...

May I suggest your view might be colored by serving in an existential war, where the rules are vastly different (and will be again for anyone involved in such). Having served in a couple of far from existential efforts, the focus is different for everyone involved. Perhaps it should not be but it is. You see deterioration in many areas from your war and day to these expeditions. So do I -- but I'm a bit more sanguine because I'm quite confident that an existential effort, should one come, will cure a lot of current ills real quickly.

Until it's over, then everyone will go back to business as usual... :D

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Originally Posted by Ken White

This from you:

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

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Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

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I enthusiastically second that.

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

Myth 4: The British Military Has An Ingrained Educational Approach To COIN. Anyone who knows the British Army knows that it is a non-intellectual institution; ‘doers’ are favoured over ‘thinkers’. This applies across the board, not just to COIN. The section makes some good points about the educational requirements of COIN, but the author’s assertion that a reliance on training manoeuvre is largely irrelevant is in need of supporting evidence; I would question this. One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

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Mumford (the author is obviously a civvie) and as such tends to make broad statements about the military which obviously do not apply to all parts of the spectrum from Field Marshall all the way down to the private soldier.

To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).

Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be.

So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says. We are dealing on a number of levels here that must be taken into consideration.

(The levels are the command progression officers must pass through (being platoon/company/battalion/brigade/division) and experience command at each level. Where officers have not had sufficient experience in command at any of the levels (which should be three years at platoon and eighteen months to two years at each of the other levels) this limitation will become apparent the higher up the command structure he progresses (especially if his exposure at platoon level has been superficial).)

What Mumford does get absolutely correct is that COIN:

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... demands of military commanders a set of characteristics and leadership skills different than regular warfare, ...

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So I for one don't quite understand what you mean by:

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One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

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... in the context of the various levels within the force deployed in a COIN war.

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Originally Posted by JMA

To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry (even the Marines and the paras). Slow to learn, slow to adapt, slow to evolve. And it all returns to the single most important weakness in the Brit approach - that of short tours. The indictment of "one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for tea and medals" still holds good and effectively precludes the build up of tactical efficiency on the ground. One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.

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TTPs evolve week by week, month by month and are different according to which AO you are in and the threat faced. What is seen on TV is a combination of tactical good practice and bad practice. Details on UKSF Ops are extremely hard to come by so it is hard to state how effectively they have evolved. The use of SF has evolved considerably - but that was not necessarily an SF decision.
What most media coverage cannot show is the whole picture; the planning, the ISTAR coverage, the intelligence. I am not saying that mistakes have not been made, they have, especially in the early years, but the army now is different from the army then. The equipment and TTPs have changed out of all recognition.

There are problems with short tours and I agree that we should be on longer tours. Ledwidges comment (Losing Small Wars) on 'militarism' is both accurate and damning. Should we change things? Yes? Can we? No; it is not politically possible; we are already in drawdown.

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Originally Posted by JMA

That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking ;) I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.

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Au contraire my South African sparring partner! Our key intelligence and civilian affairs staff are on 12 month tours. Within our patch we generally know who the key players are, their families, their enemies, their friends, their rivals, their business partners, their business interests, their schools, what they thought yesterday, last week, and last year. What their aspirations are in public and quite possibly what their aspirations are in private; it is a very sophisticated knowledge of the human terrain. We know what weapons are favoured in what areas and at what times. Our knowledge of the terrain, human and physical is, I suspect, as good in many ways as what we had in N Ireland.

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Originally Posted by JMA

OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?

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Well British troops don't have that problem. There are always people who do not understand the ROE; this sounds like one of them.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Well if you are not going to take on the Taliban and kill them why not just use low grade militia to do the defensive work and guarding duties. Like with NI the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.

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NI was policing for most of the campaign. We enabled the police to carry out their duties and provided niche capabilities; N Ireland at its worst is probably what we would like Afghanistan to become. We realised in N Ireland that everytime we killed someone we were exacerbating the political problem, it caused a greater sense of political grievance, made martyrs out of volunteers and resulted in more even more volunteers; that is why from the mid to late 1980s we tried very hard to capture and not kill. Capturing them and sending them to prison stopped attacks, criminalised the struggle and discouraged others. Very few volunteers who served time in prion re-offended. Mark Urban's book Big Boys' Rules is a good account of the nuanced use of force in N Ireland while Kevin Toolis' book
Rebel Hearts: Journeys Within The IRA's Soul is a very good look at the impact of violence and how it fed the struggle.

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Originally Posted by JMA

And how, dare I ask, does this apply to the troops currently deployed in Helmand? It seems like the military powers that be are starting to mentally detach themselves from the war in Afghanistan. Seen that before in people who have realised that they have no answers and they just shut the problem out.

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Already at the strategic level the army is planning for life 2015+. The size and shape of the army in 2020 will be decided in the next 12 months or else 2020 will be come 2021, 2022, 2023...

As to having no answers, no country is prepared to pay the price in blood and treasure to win the conflict in Afghanistan; I suspect they never were. Early on in the UK's engagement in Afghanistan the MOD stated that the engagement would have to be at least 25 years in order to achieve what the stated aims were; 10 years in and we are leaving.

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Originally Posted by JMA

One needs to remember that Rhodesia comprised 80% plus Brits most of whom had come out after WW2 and (speaking as a South African) they proved to be exceptionally intuitive, innovative and adaptable and achieved much with very little. So one really needs to put ones finger on where it has gone wrong in the UK since then and fix it. Something has happened to reduce the ability of the Brits to think and act using their initiative and this applies not only to the military (as you would well know).

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WW2 and the Rhodesian Conflict were both existentialist conflicts where there is eveything to play for. In such circumstances it is adapt or survive. Iraq and Afghanistan were discretionary wars of choice where the imperative is to evolve so as not to be seen to

a) Fail
or
b) Be culpable

Plus society has changed considerably; we are softer and more liberal now.

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Originally Posted by JMA

To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).

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Agreed.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be.

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Agreed. And the tactics will be different and evolve for each conflict.

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Originally Posted by JMA

So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says.

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I don't think this is what he is saying. My reading of this was that he was disagreeing with the UK Army's wish to retain the ability to fight combined arms manoeuvre warfare at battlegroup and brigade level; an ability that has been severely degraded by the focus on Afghanistan. This capability he sees as not required for COIN. My argument is:

What is required is a technical mastery of your trade (gained through combined arms manoeuvre training) combined with an education system for our officers and SNCOs that is both broad and deep so that they have the knowledge set to apply their technical skills in a COIN environment. Training enables you to do what you do, education enables you to understand the context in which you are operating and therefore to better understand how to apply your technical skills in that environment.

It is also very difficult to train for COIN generically, especially commanders, int staff and civil affairs. This is because COIN progresses relatively slowly compared to combined arms manoeuvre (you are unlikely to win a COIN campaign in a two or even four week exercise) and because you need to understand the human terrain and interact with it. This latter element is difficult to replicate generically and in training. Technical skills (platoon attacks, patrolling, C-IED, using a military decision making process, conducting company attacks) are much easier to train and provide a transferrable skill set to COIN campaigns. Educating for COIN is however is a relatively simple matter. The aim here is to give individuals a broad based theoretical and historical knowledge of COIN together with a working knowedge of the social sciences in order that they can understand the context in which they may have to operate and deliver new solutions (quickly) to new problems.

Combined Arms Manoeuvre is a very difficult technical ability to master and it becomes exponentially more difficult to master as you progress in size from company to battalion to brigade to division to corps. If you lose it it is very difficult to get it back. As a capability it is required at sub-unit, battalion and possibly brigade level in a COIN environment. Even at a higher level in Iraq we (the Brits) noted that the ability of the US to comprehend and execute Corps level operations, flexing combat power across Iraq was highly effective. More salutory for us was that because in part we no longer operate at that level in the British Army we could not tap into that ability to flex assets to us; it was beyond the comprehension of our staff. So there is still a requirement to train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre because it is pertinent to COIN campaigns, let alone the fact that if we lose it it is very difficult to regain.

So train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre and educate for COIN.


As for Mumfords assertion that COIN demands a different set of characteristics and leadership skills from regular warfare I would go further. Every conflict has different characteristics and will demand different characteristics from its commanders and so every conflict will either see commanders adapt or fail. It is not a COIN versus Combined Arms Manoeuvre issue, it is a 'this conflict' versus 'that conflict' issue.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

It is also acceptance of unpleasant reality; military knowledge and awareness in the civilian population in the UK or US is microscopic. Misperceptions in the political and chattering classes are endemic. The forces today are too small to have any political clout at all. Far different world than it was 30 years ago...

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Yet it is really the historical norm in both the US and UK. Pining for the days of a massive draft-based force is really silly (note that I'm not saying you are, Ken). Prior to World War II the military had precious little clout, and when they did it was by making use of internal pressures (Indian wars) to motivate specific state delegations (Texas for one). Military experience from the Civil War didn't help them, either, as most of the legislators with experience had been Volunteers and remained quite hostile to a standing, professional military (John Logan is but one example).

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Originally Posted by Ken White

The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.

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Ken, for an old soldier you are remarkably sensitive to perceived sideswipes.

Reminds of the story out of John Masters' wonderful book The Road Past Mandalay. Here is the extract from page 139 in my paperback:

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… And I lured Bill out and to his tent. He collapsed on his camp bed and glared moodily at me. ‘You're all the same,’ he said. ‘Goddam British. Worse than Goldwyn. US, for Christ's sake.’

My own head was firm on my shoulders, but the little muzzy. ‘What?’ I asked.

‘US,’he repeated. ‘No goddam good. I ought to puch you all in the nose'.

At last I understood. Bill had been with us about two months. All that time he had been brooding about our army's habit of describing any article of equipment that had become useless as US. That's what it sounded like though in fact it was written u/s and stood for unserviceable. I had no time to explain. …

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OK, so don't pull a 'Bill' on me now please.

I came from a unit which had; pommies (Brits), Aussies (Australians), Kiwis (New Zealanders), yanks (Americans), Cannucks (Canadians), porras (Portuguese), slopies (South Africans), frogs (French), krauts (Germans) etc etc... and of course 2/3 Rhodesians.

Each nationality displayed some or other obvious national characteristic which was seized upon by the rest and used to rib them. Boys will be boys.

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

I don't think this is what he is saying. My reading of this was that he was disagreeing with the UK Army's wish to retain the ability to fight combined arms manoeuvre warfare at battlegroup and brigade level; an ability that has been severely degraded by the focus on Afghanistan. This capability he sees as not required for COIN.

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OK, when in doubt revert to the text in question.

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Consequently, a reliance on training maneuvers is rendered largely irrelevant.

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OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO). Training maneuvers were what we termed large scale exercises, remember? Before your time?

So given all that I stick by my interpretation.

All this said I do believe that you cant mix COIN with other training and expect unit to switch on demand.

This is why I suggested that in the US they take 250,000 each from active and reserves and focus them on small wars and insurgencies. Leave the rest to drive around the deserts and plains to make dust and prepare for the next big war. This allows for focus and specialisation and accepts that there are indeed a different set of skills required for the two types of warfare.

If you take Afghanistan for example there is little point in deploying armour and mechanised troops on a rotation as this over time will just confuse them.

Fuchs is correct (in his blog post) that warfare against poor/incompetent enemies leads to a loss of skills which will be paid for in blood if they ever come up against a competent enemy. But then again all raw units learn the hard way when they are inserted into a war. Think of those raw US divisions fed into the Pacific and Europe in WW2 who had to adapt along the way. And they learned quickly.

I am back to continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus.

The problem with the Brits is that whenever the solution is obvious they spend more time figuring out why the problem can't be solved than fixing it. Have you noticed (and this is not a sideswipe at the yanks) how the once "can do" nation, the Americans, are also moving in that direction. They increasingly accept the status quo with a shrug. Man it is such a pity.

What the war in Afghanistan has shown IMHO is that apart from the special forces (who have been magnificent) the rest of the forces have proved unable to adapt effectively to the type of warfare required. It is not that the individuals are incapable it is that there is a combination of misguided political direction (aka interference), doctrine weakness and inept generalship.

Where is a Cromwell when you need him?

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Originally Posted by JMA

OK, when in doubt revert to the text in question.

OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO). Training maneuvers were what we termed large scale exercises, remember? Before your time?

So given all that I stick by my interpretation.

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Okay, you stick to yours and I will stick to mine. :D The term manoeuvres as you describe it has not been in use by the Army since at least 1989 (and we were still doing Divisional and brigade exercises when I joined).

But to use your interpretation of 'large scale exercises' what exercises is he referring to? A brigade has not deployed in the field on manoeuvres since 2002; so it is not as if we are relying on it...

Quote:

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Originally Posted by JMA

This is why I suggested that in the US they take 250,000 each from active and reserves and focus them on small wars and insurgencies. Leave the rest to drive around the deserts and plains to make dust and prepare for the next big war. This allows for focus and specialisation and accepts that there are indeed a different set of skills required for the two types of warfare.

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Works for big armies.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by JMA

If you take Afghanistan for example there is little point in deploying armour and mechanised troops on a rotation as this over time will just confuse them.

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Is the issue deploying armour and mechanised troops or deploying on rotation?

Quote:

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Originally Posted by JMA

I am back to continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus.

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Sigh..:rolleyes: I know! ;)

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Originally Posted by JMA

The problem with the Brits is that whenever the solution is obvious they spend more time figuring out why the problem can't be solved than fixing it. Have you noticed (and this is not a sideswipe at the yanks) how the once "can do" nation, the Americans, are also moving in that direction. They increasingly accept the status quo with a shrug. Man it is such a pity.

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Not at all. The argument has never been why the problem can't be solved, but why the problem hasn't been solved (for which there are good and bad reasons).

Quote:

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Originally Posted by JMA

What the war in Afghanistan has shown IMHO is that apart from the special forces (who have been magnificent) the rest of the forces have proved unable to adapt effectively to the type of warfare required.

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Hmm. I don't know how the SF have evolved in Afghanistan and Iraq so I cannot comment. I do know that the green army (non-SF) now uses TTPs and equipment that were SF only capabilities until fairly recently.

The use of the SF has evolved but that was not necessarily an SF decision, but made at Theatre Command level.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by JMA

It is not that the individuals are incapable it is that there is a combination of misguided political direction (aka interference), doctrine weakness and inept generalship.

---

Plus lack of accountability and apathy. I suspect that this applies to the US as well, but for both Iraq and Afghanistan it was a case for the UK of an army at war but not a nation at war; that is very constraining.

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

Okay, you stick to yours and I will stick to mine.

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Agreed

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The term manoeuvres as you describe it has not been in use by the Army since at least 1989 (and we were still doing Divisional and brigade exercises when I joined).

But to use your interpretation of 'large scale exercises' what exercises is he referring to? A brigade has not deployed in the field on manoeuvres since 2002; so it is not as if we are relying on it...

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Remember Mumford is a civvie (or at least talks like one).

So the difference (not so subtle to us) between large scale exercises and field training like 'battle camps' is probably lost on him.

With COIN the training works upwards from the individual skills level to the stick (or what every the smallest operating call-sign will be) and on to sections and platoons. (What would you use a platoon for? Maybe a long term ambush and follow-up (tracking) operations and the like.)

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Works for big armies.

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True. And for smaller armies it requires smart thinking to make a little go a long way.

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Is the issue deploying armour and mechanised troops or deploying on rotation?

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Rotation? You mean we are back to short tours again? I suppose if they insist on taking part (to get the campaign medals and so forth) you can allocate them to road block/checkpoint duty, installation and route security and other crappy work like that ;)

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Sigh..:rolleyes: I know!

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Well yes so I say again... it is all about continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus... did you copy over?

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Not at all. The argument has never been why the problem can't be solved, but why the problem hasn't been solved (for which there are good and bad reasons).

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Well that is bound to take sufficient time to effectively kick the problem into next year. ;)

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Hmm. I don't know how the SF have evolved in Afghanistan and Iraq so I cannot comment. I do know that the green army (non-SF) now uses TTPs and equipment that were SF only capabilities until fairly recently.

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Oh goodie.. you mean they now operate in three and four man teams? No? Well then what's the point in getting them all the fancy kit like the black army? This of course brings us to another point and that is the deleterious influence the black army (SAS and hangers on) is having on the rest of the army. The stock question should be how and why should line infantry operating in platoon strength (or at least more than ten men) need the same TTPs and kit as special forces who operate in three or four man teams? If the answer is that the 'black army' does operate in more than ten men call-signs then the question should be asked if those tasks are indeed for special forces or should they be carried out by line infantry. (Hint: read Slim's comments on special forces at the back of his classic book - Defeat into Victory)

For example the new Fieldcraft pamphlet introduces 'break contact drills' for sections. This as we know is a small team recce type of drill and is necessary when in Indian country on a recce on bumping into the enemy. Its a get out of Dodge move. How often will this apply to a line infantry patrol of section strength? As I have said before if a full section is caught out in the open then yes they need to pull back. But once its over you reduce the section commander to the ranks and then jail him for good measure... then take the rest of the section (now with a new commander) through the basics again explaining why when you move (through vulnerable terrain) you always keep one leg on the ground when the other is in the air. (Basic stuff really)

I could go on...

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The use of the SF has evolved but that was not necessarily an SF decision, but made at Theatre Command level.

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It is well known that Patreus and McChrystal pushed kill-or-capture ops and they have been wildly successful. Dropped off recently for whatever reason. (Probably the new commander believes the Taliban commanders also have a right to life.)

But the bottom line why can't these kind of ops be carried out in their AOs by the line infantry already deployed there? The night is the time to do it as the night vision equipment (especially now with the fourth generation stuff) gives such an advantage it probably takes the fun out of it. ;)

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Plus lack of accountability and apathy. I suspect that this applies to the US as well, but for both Iraq and Afghanistan it was a case for the UK of an army at war but not a nation at war; that is very constraining.

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Oh dear, just when I thought it could not get worse. Now don't try to rope the yanks in on this (they have their own problems with those clowns in their congress) which makes your Brit problems seem like a mere sideshow.

Well you know the Brits have now lost the equivalent of three battalions killed or maimed in Afghanistan (400 KIA and 1,800 seriously wounded) and yet (the mind positively boggles) don't take the war seriously. I saw this mentality in South Africa where the war was a sideshow which distracted from the real business of peacetime soldiering. You fix this by firing the 'garatroopers'. (actually firing them is altogether a too gentle a process)

Quote:

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Originally Posted by JMA

With COIN the training works upwards from the individual skills level to the stick (or what every the smallest operating call-sign will be) and on to sections and platoons. (What would you use a platoon for? Maybe a long term ambush and follow-up (tracking) operations and the like.)

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The size of grouping very much depends on the size of enemy you are fighting. In the early years it was rare to go out in less then platoon plus strength because the insurgents were operating in platoon plus strength. Now they operate in smaller groups and so do we.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by JMA

Rotation? You mean we are back to short tours again? I suppose if they insist on taking part (to get the campaign medals and so forth) you can allocate them to road block/checkpoint duty, installation and route security and other crappy work like that ;)

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Armour and Mech both have their use in Afghanistan. The only reason the UK has not deployed them is that generally the Canadians and now the Americans had enough to go round (heavy armour). Warthog and Jackal in terms of firepower, mobility and protection are effectively a mech capability.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Oh goodie.. you mean they now operate in three and four man teams? No?

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No, but neither does the SF out there for the most part...

Quote:

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Originally Posted by JMA

Well then what's the point in getting them all the fancy kit like the black army? This of course brings us to another point and that is the deleterious influence the black army (SAS and hangers on) is having on the rest of the army. The stock question should be how and why should line infantry operating in platoon strength (or at least more than ten men) need the same TTPs and kit as special forces who operate in three or four man teams? If the answer is that the 'black army' does operate in more than ten men call-signs then the question should be asked if those tasks are indeed for special forces or should they be carried out by line infantry. (Hint: read Slim's comments on special forces at the back of his classic book - Defeat into Victory)

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Fancy kit starts with SF generally because it is more expensive and specialised and then percolates out as it comes down in price and or its wider utility is more experienced. Laser Light Modules started off as an SF only piece of equipment. Likewise Night Vision Devices - SF get the good stuff first and then slowly everyone else gets it. Where the SF has had a significant impact on 'green army operations' is in the targeting cycle at company and battalion level. The SF are used for tasks which match their training and capabilties - a good example of this can be seen in the Wardak CH47 Investigation Report

Quote:

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Originally Posted by JMA

For example the new Fieldcraft pamphlet introduces 'break contact drills' for sections. This as we know is a small team recce type of drill and is necessary when in Indian country on a recce on bumping into the enemy. Its a get out of Dodge move. How often will this apply to a line infantry patrol of section strength? As I have said before if a full section is caught out in the open then yes they need to pull back. But once its over you reduce the section commander to the ranks and then jail him for good measure... then take the rest of the section (now with a new commander) through the basics again explaining why when you move (through vulnerable terrain) you always keep one leg on the ground when the other is in the air. (Basic stuff really)

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But the unexpected always happens. It might not be vulnerable ground, the other leg might be armed persistent air surveillance or another section (in the context of a platoon move). Meeting engagements happen and sometimes the other side is better (and yes, sometimes our commanders are wrong). We were taught those basic break contact drills when I was a troopie for use in woods and jungles or for when we got caught with our pants down; they have not come from SF. But it is used very rarely.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by JMA

It is well known that Patreus and McChrystal pushed kill-or-capture ops and they have been wildly successful. Dropped off recently for whatever reason. (Probably the new commander believes the Taliban commanders also have a right to life.)

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It is reported as having dropped off, to be honest I do not know if that is the case and if it is, why.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by JMA

But the bottom line why can't these kind of ops be carried out in their AOs by the line infantry already deployed there? The night is the time to do it as the night vision equipment (especially now with the fourth generation stuff) gives such an advantage it probably takes the fun out of it. ;)

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They are.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by JMA

Well you know the Brits have now lost the equivalent of three battalions killed or maimed in Afghanistan (400 KIA and 1,800 seriously wounded) and yet (the mind positively boggles) don't take the war seriously. I saw this mentality in South Africa where the war was a sideshow which distracted from the real business of peacetime soldiering. You fix this by firing the 'garatroopers'. (actually firing them is altogether a too gentle a process)

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No! No! No! The military take it very seriously, the government takes it seriously, the nation takes it seriously, but it is not a nation at war. The nation's priority and focus is probably: the economy, the health service, the education system and then who is winning on X Factor. The war in Afghanistan just is not an issue; it is background noise. The UK has a population of 60.2 million and an Armed Forces of less then 200,000 (.3%). By the time you take immediate family involved you are lucky if 2% of the population knows someone who has been to Afghanistan. It is less to do with peacetime soldiering and more to do with the fact that most people just do not care. Because of this it gets the political and capital resources you would expect - minimal.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Ken, for an old soldier you are remarkably sensitive to perceived sideswipes.

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Sideswipes, mis statements, erroneous assumptions, casual asides -- all deserve correction if in error. All part of the service, no thanks necessary... ;)

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

The size of grouping very much depends on the size of enemy you are fighting. In the early years it was rare to go out in less then platoon plus strength because the insurgents were operating in platoon plus strength. Now they operate in smaller groups and so do we.

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No I don't think that is the correct approach.

The size of your operating call-signs should depend on the comparative military competence of your enemy and the location and the degree of mobility of your operational reserve.

Seems the Brit assessment is that of parity of soldiering ability? Surely not.

Then it is the impact of IEDs which requires a number of donkeys on each patrol to carry related 'stuff'.

Then what if any is the mobile reserve? The reserve section? Some vehicles with mounted MMGs which will drive on mined roads to support the patrol in contact?

Then (going back to exchanges I had with Wilf some time ago about) the aim of the patrol activity needs to be carefully assessed. You would have read 18 Platoon by Sydney Jary at Sandhurst (where it was I believe required reading) and learned that even then (between D-Day and VE Day) he (as a young subaltern) questioned the wisdom of patrolling for the sake of patrolling. From page 72:

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During the campaign, 18 Platoon carried out three types of patrols: reconnaissance, standing and fighting. The first two were invariably useful because they provided information, if only negative. Fighting patrols, of which I led many, were a different and contentious proposition. Unlike the German and American armies, we had a vigorous policy regarding fighting patrols, particularly at night and when things were static with both sides on the defence. The thinking behind this policy seemed to me, at times, be superficial and probably left over from the Great War. If, when detailed for a fighting patrol, young officers queried the wisdom of this given object, there was always the standard reply: “I quite agree with you, but it all helps to dominate no man's land.” There is undoubtedly a certain validity to this argument but was it worth the consequent loss of good young officers and NCOs? I doubt it.

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Note: for any young officers reading this you must read this book. For senior officers reading this make it available and required reading for your subbies.

I/we went through this period of (aimless) patrolling in Mozambique (1973-76) following Brit Malaya practice with fan patrols, base line patrols and river-line patrols etc etc where the large area and the low density of troops together with the lack of intelligence made the whole business very much a hit and miss affair. Sure we had chance contacts where they would shoot and scoot and we would drop our packs and give chase with generally low results - normally reported as a fleeting contact with no casualties either side.

Surely the idea of making contact with the Taliban is not once it happens to get rescued by air support or the arrival of vehicles to allow the patrol to pull back into their beau geste fort but rather to maintain the contact (iow fix them) then get a response/reaction team in to kill them?

I have suggested that you send out small patrols to make contact while an airborne reaction force is loitering just out of sound range and ready to come in and do the business once the Taliban have given away their position.

Hint: Read Skeens Passing it On - it proves that the Brits once knew what they were doing in Afghanistan. and sums up his paper as follows:

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To Sum up
That is all of use I can tell you. But I think I have said enough to show that, as the Manual says, while the principles of war remain
unchanged, “The tactics and characteristics of the inhabitants and the nature of the theater of operations may necessitate considerable modification in the method” of their application to warfare on the North-West Frontier of India. And that unless a good working knowledge of the methods indicated by experience is acquired in peace and applied in war, trouble if not disaster is bound to be the outcome. But I also hope I have made it clear that previous training, energetic and common-sense application, and unrelaxing care will give you and your men complete ascendency over an enemy whose great natural advantages at first sight may seem to be unchallengeable. And I trust what I been able to pass on of my own experience and of my observation of others will help you in this. If so I have discharged my debt to those who taught me and to those who taught them, and to those, my comrades in war, with whom I proved the truth of those teachings.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

When I hear "COIN vs CT" in general it sets my teeth on edge; for certainly that dichotomy of choices is no way to look at a foreign intervention and hope to attain a comprehensive, successful scheme of engagement.

However, that IS how we approached Iraq and Afghanistan, so to drill into how those terms were defined during the course of those operations, what types of operations were conducted under those banners; what types of effects were achieved, etc is indeed something worth laying open for inspection.

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The above is from another thread but the real problem was and is the setting of viable goals and objective conops.

A military organization that has COIN as a concept of operation has taken a long step toward poor performance and unwanted outcomes. (CT is fought in a different arena and is not further discussed here.)

Most people probably agree that military power is essentially coercive. Its effective employment is based upon taking the initiative: applying or threatening to apply force where it is damaging or difficult for an opponent to defend. To voluntarily adopt a defensive posture is – regardless of any subsequent pre-emption – to concede initiative to that opponent. Of course ‘counter’ in a name does not necessarily mean an entire doctrine given over to defence. However, ‘anti-insurgency’ as in ‘anti-submarine’ would be preferable. But why insurgency ?

In a dictionary and in thought the term insurgent means ‘ rebel. That is an opponent who is indigenous and whose concerns and activities could be entirely homegrown as in “rebel with a cause”. Insurgent/insurgency does not extend to include foreign nationals, sanctuaries in other countries, weapons suppliers, fund raising or other materiel and propaganda support provided by outsiders. To concede a point, give away a pawn, thoughtlessly or thoughtfully employ inappropriate words is to move closer to failure.

A lot of words to state the obvious. Mindset is important and poor choice of terminology is corrosive. COIN is a malapropism to be avoided like a highly infectious disease.

There was a time when the US military was more aware . For example when use of PAVN/Peoples Army of Vietnam was banned and replaced by NVA/North Vietnamese Army. But despite such overdue corrective action, the USA went down to defeat in Vietnam and the flawed conop of that era’s COIN was only a contributing factor.

The primary cause was the political goal imposed on the military. That goal was seemingly fixated on creating a state which was in large part an image of the USA: a functioning democracy that had obtained internal peace.

A person does not have to read Michael Howard to realize that a state or society can have either of two kinds of peace. In an orderly society, peace can be upheld anywhere by a single policeman (or woman) with a sidearm and radio. That individual has of course to be supported by others with weapons such as shotguns, and backed up by an infrequently needed riot squad.

In a disorderly society, open conflict is suspended and peace exists when a single policeman with sidearm and radio closely supported by a heavily armed police/infantry team can function and survive anywhere. Typically the coercive power of that team has to be supported by an on-call force of infantry/engineers/armour augmented in some instances by artillery/rifled mortars and a few helicopters.

Afghanistan is a disorderly society. It is divided by geography, tribal and religious history and beliefs. The Taliban are alleged to include a large number of religious and societal fanatics. But how can one describe the apparent zeal of the US administration in seeking to rapidly create a functioning democracy and orderly peace ? That administration was either affected by group think/collective stupidity or evangelism which is much the same thing.

To create a functional democracy in Afghanistan would require decades. So instead of COIN fixated on creating a mini-USA, a reset of the political objective and the military conop is long overdue. A major revision would be to focus on the second form of peace and hence peace-making operations in a disorderly society. The debased currency of COIN replaced by PMOPS.

Is there sufficient scope and time to redirect the distribution of sizable proportions of funds and resources directly to the village, district and whatever canton levels exist ? The pre-requisite for such arrangements would be the application of coercion to the autocracy in Kabul. The result would likely be an expanded form of plutocracy but at least that would be moving in the right direction toward what seems to be the eventual target.

There could be other ways in which to revise and realign political and military objectives. Some of those might be more realistic than that outlined above.

What is clear is that the USA and ISAF have to make a binary choice in the near term: ‘get real, or get out’. The pity is that after heavy loss of life and gross material expenditure the present US administration seems intent on getting out.

Well, for my money, "getting real" is very possible, but not very likely.

Getting real demands:

1. Recognition and understanding of the distinction of the revolutionary insurgency between the GIRoA leadership and their dedication to sustaining a Northern Alliance monopoly on the governance of Afghanistan and the former Taliban government in exile in Pakistan, (the primary, political, issue that must be addressed first); and the resistance insurgency among the people of Afghanistan that is primarily a function of the presence of ISAF and ISAF's efforts to push GIRoA "governance" out into the largely self-governed populaces of the country.

2. Recognizing that AQ draws their "sanctuary" not from any particular plot of dirt, but rather from the support of the revolutionary Taliban leadership, and the populace that that revolutionary leadership represents and draws their support from.

Once we accept that, we can pull back from the outrageously expensive (and offensive) "COIN" practices we wage across Afghanistan; and can also radically narrow and focus the CT activities we conduct vs AQ. We can then shift focus to hard political pressure on GIRoA to evolve to represent all Afghans and to disassemble the patronage Ponzi scheme that the current Constitution is. We can get serious about talks with the Taliban leadership as to what we can offer them in exchange for them withdrawing the sanctuary they grant AQ.

New Tactics, or new generals, or switching from a conventional lead to a SOF lead are not the answers. More COIN or More CT are not the answers. First we must re-frame the problem, and then focus on the fundamental aspects of the problem. I believe we will find that less is indeed more.

Or, we go home. Either way, the US and our allies will be more secure than they are due to the higher order effects of our current approaches.

Compost,

Western military power is indeed the expression of coercive power in support of the institution of the state, both physical and conceptual.

Unfortunately it has not yet percolated through much of the bioreactor of western decision making that the Western concept of the state having a central location/primacy within society, is not a concept shared by all of the world or an idea of the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Societies in these non western regions and places have fought, successfully over the ages, for primacy over the state.

This misunderstanding impacts the development, and implementation, of ideas such as insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counter-terrorism by the Western state.

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

Fancy kit starts with SF generally because it is more expensive and specialised and then percolates out as it comes down in price and or its wider utility is more experienced. Laser Light Modules started off as an SF only piece of equipment. Likewise Night Vision Devices - SF get the good stuff first and then slowly everyone else gets it. Where the SF has had a significant impact on 'green army operations' is in the targeting cycle at company and battalion level. The SF are used for tasks which match their training and capabilties - a good example of this can be seen in the Wardak CH47 Investigation Report

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We need at this point to refer to Fd Marshall Slim an his thoughts on Special Forces (page 546 in my book):

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Special Forces

The British Army in the last war spawned a surprising number of special units and formations, that is forces of varying sizes, each trained, equipped, and prepared for some particular type of operation. We had commandos, assault brigades, amphibious division, mountain divisions, long-range penetration forces, airborne formations, desert groups, and an extraordinary variety of cloak and dagger parties. The equipment of the special units was more generous than that of normal formations, and many of them went so far as to have their own bases in administrative organisations. We employed most of them in Burma, and some, notably the Chindits, gave splendid examples of courage and hardihood. Yet I came firmly to the conclusion that such formations, trained, equipped, and mentally adjusted for one kind of operation only, were wasteful. They did not give, militarily, a worthwhile return for the resources in men, material and time that they absorbed. To begin with they were usually formed by attracting the best men from normal units by better conditions, promises of excitement, and not a little propaganda. Even on the rare occasions when normal units were converted into special ones without the option of volunteering, the same process went on in reverse. Men thought to be below the standards set or over an arbitrary age limit were weeded out to less favourable corps. The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army, especially the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped corps d’elite could be expected to undertake them. ...

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That said we see the cap fits today as much as it did then.

The Rhodesian SAS did magnificent work during the war especially in the last two years. However, if one reads their Op Log one will note that 95% of the type of work they did prior to the end of 1977 would by the end of the war be routinely done by the RLI and even by elements of some of the Territorial Units (Reserves).

So when one looks at the work the 'black army' does its probably better we don't hear publicly what they are doing because if we did we would probably identify much of it as being work properly trained normal infantry should be or could be doing.

Compared to my day it makes sense to conduct night operations because the night vision equipment and thermal imaging gives the troops such a massive advantage over the enemy. Again how special is an operation where troops are inserted by chopper into an LZ at night and from there they fan out to take on an objective while being covered by Apache and Spector gunships? In my book that is a normal infantry operation for well trained troops. There are relatively few of these opportunities going around so (as I mentioned above) the special forces and their hangers on (SAS, Seals, Rangers, Paras) will hold onto those tasks as if only they could possibly succeed. The mindset needs to change.

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

Fancy kit starts with SF generally because it is more expensive and specialised and then percolates out as it comes down in price and or its wider utility is more experienced. Laser Light Modules started off as an SF only piece of equipment. Likewise Night Vision Devices - SF get the good stuff first and then slowly everyone else gets it.

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Generally yes but probably not with NV equipment.

Here’s an anecdote heard so long ago that OPSEC no longer applies. A member of the ADF serving as a peace keeper in the Middle East in the 1960s had early use of one of the first type of US starlight scope. He commented that he was very impressed because it enabled him to both see and recognise an Israeli liaison officer helping to lay a mine under a UN inspection track along a fenceline.

SF commonly stretch the limits of what is practicable for and with equipment.

The general case is that SF routinely operate all types of vehicles from ATVs to helicopters aggressively and with heavy loads yet appear surprised when vehicles fail. That cutting of corners carries through to obtaining new model equipment regardless of obvious design flaws. A recent example was procurement of a novel type of forward control light truck whose enclosed and reinforced wheel stations are apparently expected to provide protection rather than channelling mine blast.

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Originally Posted by Steve Blair

Prior to World War II the military had precious little clout, and when they did it was by making use of internal pressures (Indian wars) to motivate specific state delegations (Texas for one). Military experience from the Civil War didn't help them, either, as most of the legislators with experience had been Volunteers and remained quite hostile to a standing, professional military (John Logan is but one example).

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FWIW, I respectfully disagree with this assessment.

The inability of the American army to achieve its policy aims was more due to the tone of specific reformers--specifically Emory Upton and like minded soldiers-- in the army than to civilian indifference/hostility/disinterest in military affairs. As one historian of the Old Army put it.

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By proposing a military policy that the country could not accept, Emory Upton helped ensure that the country would continue to limp along with virtually no military policy at all.*

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Many soldiers and civilians made potentially viable suggestions for the reform and modernization of the army but, time and again, the Uptonians either shouted them down or refused to help build the kind of intellectual and political momentum that might have led to change.

By contrast, American navalists articulated a multi-faceted argument that made an intellectual, strategic, historiographical, political, cultural, and economic case for the a new vision of American maritime power.

Granted, given the realities of international and domestic politics as well as the vastly different traditional views of the army and the navy in American culture, the army had a bigger hill to climb than the navy. However, I am of the view that the army's "lack of clout" was more the result of miscalculations within its leadership than of external factors.

This distinction is crucially important today because contemporaneous discussions of military policy are still shaped by the ongoing acceptance of a trajectory of American military historiography. This trajectory accepts uncritically the views of Emory Upton, Peter Michie (his biographer), and William Ganoe (his advocate).

My $0.02

</hijack>
__________________________________________________ _____
*R. F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (1967), p. 281.

The difference between the Army and the Navy is due primarily to the difference in their peacetime roles. The US will always be a nation that benefits from a lack of peacetime ground threats (so no need for a large standing peacetime army to secure the homeland), and the requirement for unhindered access to global markets and resources, that demands a robust Navy in both peace and war.

This is not a matter of policy so much as a matter of geostrategic realities and common sense. Any policy or effort to somehow treat or view these two services as "equals" in times of peace is not well thought out at best, and at worst subjugated the needs of the nation to the desires of the individuals and organizations advocating for an excessive peacetime ground force.

Oh, and while we are currently a nation with troops in combat, we are not a nation at war, so to play the "we're at war" card every time one wants to justify more deficit spending on ground force capabilities is growing wearisome as well. Current "COIN" definitions and doctrine accentuate this problem.

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Originally Posted by JMA

OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO).

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British English is "manoeuvre", and that was prominent in French military literature even a hundred years ago already.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

British English is "manoeuvre", and that was prominent in French military literature even a hundred years ago already.

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Yes, I should have made it more clear. The American led warfighting concept of maneuver warfare in its current form is relatively new. The term certainly was not in use (with its current meaning) in Brit doctrine back in the 60s and 70s.

The current form basically goes back to the Lind gang of the 80's. See Maneuver Warfare Handbook.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

The current form basically goes back to the Lind gang of the 80's. See Maneuver Warfare Handbook.

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Yes, this use or misuse of terminology is problematic IMHO. Old terms and concepts are redefined and reworked to the extent that from a military history point of view one needs to learn that for a specific word the meaning prior to a specific date would be x and thereafter the meaning y. Can be confusing as Mumford shows.

Compare "manoeuvre priori" and "command push", "manoeuvre posteriori" and "recon pull".

Nobody seems to use the old terms any more, as if an army not exactly excelling in a war made its language unfashionable for foreign military theory.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

Compare "manoeuvre priori" and "command push", "manoeuvre posteriori" and "recon pull".

Nobody seems to use the old terms any more, as if an army not exactly excelling in a war made its language unfashionable for foreign military theory.

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One accepts that new developments and refinements of old concepts take place. All I suggest is that they create new words for the new stuff and not bastardise the old terminology and definitions. I really don't think that is too much to ask.

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot....f-gravity.html :wry:

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot....f-gravity.html :wry:

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You said in your blog post:

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It's OK to invent a new concept, but please name it accordingly - and don't misuse an old, famous and established term for it.

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Good we agree on something at last ;)

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Originally Posted by Red Rat

But the unexpected always happens. It might not be vulnerable ground, the other leg might be armed persistent air surveillance or another section (in the context of a platoon move). Meeting engagements happen and sometimes the other side is better (and yes, sometimes our commanders are wrong). We were taught those basic break contact drills when I was a troopie for use in woods and jungles or for when we got caught with our pants down; they have not come from SF. But it is used very rarely.

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I keep posting stuff from the distant past (not my past) but from the past from which I learned and from which the modern soldier should learn (rather than copying how he thinks special forces operate and of course wearing all the kit).

The break contact drills came from the time Vietnam and Borneo. You can argue with the yanks who developed what.

The question is whether the line infantry need this drill other than for when conducting a three or four man recce patrol. I don't think so.

Now here is some advice from 1756 which I suggest if followed by the lads in Afghanistan would lead to a marked and instant improvement:

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Rogers' Rangers Standing Orders
1. Don't forget nothing.
2. Have your musket clean as a whistle, hatchet scoured, sixty rounds powder and ball, and be ready to march at a minute's warning.
3. When you're on the march, act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer. See the enemy first.
4. Tell the truth about what you see and what you do. There is an army depending on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about the Rangers, but don't never lie to a Ranger or officer.
5. Don't never take a chance you don't have to.
6. When we're on the march we march single file, far enough apart so one shot can't go through two men.
7. If we strike swamps, or soft ground, we spread out abreast, so it's hard to track us.
8. When we march, we keep moving till dark, so as to give the enemy the least possible chance at us.
9. When we camp, half the party stays awake while the other half sleeps.
10. If we take prisoners, we keep'em separate till we have had time to examine them, so they can't cook up a story between'em.
11. Don't ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you won't be ambushed.
12. No matter whether we travel in big parties or little ones, each party has to keep a scout 20 yards ahead, 20 yards on each flank, and 20 yards in the rear so the main body can't be surprised and wiped out.
13. Every night you'll be told where to meet if surrounded by a superior force.
14. Don't sit down to eat without posting sentries.
15. Don't sleep beyond dawn. Dawn's when the French and Indians attack.
16. Don't cross a river by a regular ford.
17. If somebody's trailing you, make a circle, come back onto your own tracks, and ambush the folks that aim to ambush you.
18. Don't stand up when the enemy's coming against you. Kneel down, lie down, hide behind a tree.
19. Let the enemy come till he's almost close enough to touch, then let him have it and jump out and finish him up with your hatchet.

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Numbers #1 and #19 are my favourites ;)

But in all seriousness work through the points and find every one is as valid today as they were 250 years ago - and I did not have to go search in a special forces manual to find them.

Yes I know, this old stuff is not sexy, one does not get to wear fashion grade shades, designer body armour and webbing and a personal weapon different to the standard issue. ;)

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Originally Posted by JMA

No I don't think that is the correct approach.

The size of your operating call-signs should depend on the comparative military competence of your enemy and the location and the degree of mobility of your operational reserve.

Seems the Brit assessment is that of parity of soldiering ability? Surely not.

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Poor wording on my part. I think that the British approach is that the size of the grouping depends on the military capability of the opponent and by military capability I mean the effective combat power he is likely to bring to bear in any given engagement.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Then it is the impact of IEDs which requires a number of donkeys on each patrol to carry related 'stuff'.

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IEDs have increased the equipment load, both with ECM equipment and differing sets of detection equipment for differing types of IED threats. I think one of the most significant impacts on the load carried is the appetite for risk. As the appetite for risk has decreased the personal load has increased. The appetite for risk is largely articulated by politicians and is related closely to the public support for the conflict.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Then (going back to exchanges I had with Wilf some time ago about) the aim of the patrol activity needs to be carefully assessed. You would have read 18 Platoon by Sydney Jary at Sandhurst (where it was I believe required reading) and learned that even then (between D-Day and VE Day) he (as a young subaltern) questioned the wisdom of patrolling for the sake of patrolling.

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I know the book well. Patrolling for the sake of patrolling is bad. It does not feature in British doctrine or training at any level; I am not aware of it happening in practice. All the post operational reports and post incident reports that cross my desk indicate that this is not happening.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Surely the idea of making contact with the Taliban is not once it happens to get rescued by air support or the arrival of vehicles to allow the patrol to pull back into their beau geste fort but rather to maintain the contact (iow fix them) then get a response/reaction team in to kill them?

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That is the normal procedure. Of course very often the response team comes in the form of a precision guided munition. :D

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Originally Posted by JMA

I have suggested that you send out small patrols to make contact while an airborne reaction force is loitering just out of sound range and ready to come in and do the business once the Taliban have given away their position.

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That's been done and still happens. Like anything though do it too often and you set a pattern which makes you vulnerable, possible HLSs, fire support locations, interdiction points and overwatch positions are all very often mined or covered by fire. We found that placing snipers out before sending CallSign Tethered Goat out the front gate is highly effective as well.

PS - I have read Skeen's Passing It On, it sits next to Operations In Waziristan 1919-1920 and The Frontier Scouts on my bookshelves ;)

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Originally Posted by JMA

The Rhodesian SAS did magnificent work during the war especially in the last two years. However, if one reads their Op Log one will note that 95% of the type of work they did prior to the end of 1977 would by the end of the war be routinely done by the RLI and even by elements of some of the Territorial Units (Reserves).

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We see the same sort of process happening in some respects. However, as in N Ireland, I suspect that what we will see as Afghanistan enters drawdown is that many of the missions currently undertaken by regular soldiers will be once more undertaken by Special Forces. This is simply because that as 2015 approaches political appetite for risk will sharply decrease.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Compared to my day it makes sense to conduct night operations because the night vision equipment and thermal imaging gives the troops such a massive advantage over the enemy. Again how special is an operation where troops are inserted by chopper into an LZ at night and from there they san out to take on an objective while being covered by Apache and Spector gunships? In my book that is a normal infantry operation for well trained troops. There are relatively few of these opportunities going around so (as I mentioned above) the special forces and their hangers on (SAS, Seals, Rangers, Paras) will hold onto those tasks as if only they could possibly succeed. The mindset needs to change.

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Properly trained troops can take on that task, but the added value is in the backroom functions and processes that the SF have. if we resourced and trained everyone to the same level as the SF then we might not need the SF so much, but part of the reason they are so effective is because they are so well resourced and certainly the UK cannot afford to resource everyone the same.

As for night ops it - there are advantages and disadvantages to operating at night.

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Originally Posted by Surferbeetle

Compost,

Unfortunately it has not yet percolated through much of the bioreactor of western decision making that the Western concept of the state having a central location/primacy within society, is not a concept shared by all of the world or an idea of the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Societies in these non western regions and places have fought, successfully over the ages, for primacy over the state.

This misunderstanding impacts the development, and implementation, of ideas such as insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counter-terrorism by the Western state.

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I find myself in violent agreement here :D

Not only is the societal and social contruct different, it is based on a different style of logic and a different cocept of time. It is not just that we do things differently, we do things differently because we are fundamentally different.

In practical terms this may limit us to two options:

- Imposing our construct on them (unlikely to be acceptable to them, likely to be messy, unlikely to be acceptable to large parts of our liberal western society which dislikes imposing anything on anyone)

- Working within their construct (likely to be impalatable at home as the public is only likely to understand it and less likely to accept it as many parts of their construct are taboo in our current societal construct (ie: patronage, treatment of women, use of violence).

Messy either way!

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Originally Posted by JMA

But in all seriousness work through the points and find every one is as valid today as they were 250 years ago - and I did not have to go search in a special forces manual to find them.

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I spent a couple of hours at Rogers Island as part of a day trip early this summer and was a bit taken aback to find the monument which includes the Rules of Ranging to be in a generally unkempt status (below, after a bit of brushing up). The associated and recently refurbished museum on the grounds was quite nice, on the other hand: http://www.rogersisland.org/.

http://farm6.static.flickr.com/5306/...7321ac9b_z.jpg

A fun article about the raid on Saint-Francis—which ended up going almost as badly for Rogers’s men as it did for the Abenakis—should anyone be interested.