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"Taliban" controlled areas
I put "Taliban" in quotes because those "Islamic scholars" are not a monolith - as GEN McChrystal's report makes clear, there are three major groups.
In late 2007, the Senlis Council (not quite mainstream) was chided for its claim that - More Than Half of Afghanistan "Under Taliban". By 11 Sep 2009, VOA was broadcasting the ICOS (International Council on Security and Development in London) report that the Taliban have a "permanent presence" in 80 percent of Afghanistan.
As so often he does, Bill Roggio provides us with two different pictures:
3 Sep 2009 - Data from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry; map from Reuters.
11 Sep 2009 - The ICOS' meaningless map on Taliban presence in Afghanistan.
and provides brief explanations for both maps - which prove that how you define terms has a definite impact on use of statistics. ;)
A large (8MB pdf) version of the ICOS map is here.
Roggio makes this point, which seems valid:
Quote:
If you want to know about the level of Taliban presence, it makes more sense to break out the country by districts. And you need to look at more than just attacks and sightings. Are the Taliban collecting taxes, running a parallel government, openly recruiting fighters? Are local security forces providing security or are they holed up in district centers? Does the Taliban run the region from dusk until dawn? Do schools remain closed due to Taliban threats? Were the people in the district able to vote in the last election? Etc.
Very much standard stuff (much of it keyed to the presence & extent of "shadow goverenment"), which is well to be reminded of.
The attached snips from the map based on data from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry shows a fair amount of "Taliban" activity north of Hwy 1 (approx. location shooped in by me). It supports Roggio's point that a district by district analysis is required, which is not an armchair sport to be attempted at home.
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3% of what segment of the populace?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
I put "Taliban" in quotes because those "Islamic scholars" are not a monolith - as GEN McChrystal's report makes clear, there are three major groups.
In late 2007, the Senlis Council (not quite mainstream) was chided for its claim that -
More Than Half of Afghanistan "Under Taliban". By 11 Sep 2009,
VOA was broadcasting the ICOS (International Council on Security and Development in London) report that the Taliban have a "permanent presence" in 80 percent of Afghanistan.
As so often he does, Bill Roggio provides us with two different pictures:
3 Sep 2009 -
Data from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry; map from Reuters.
11 Sep 2009 -
The ICOS' meaningless map on Taliban presence in Afghanistan.
and provides brief explanations for both maps - which prove that how you define terms has a definite impact on use of statistics. ;)
A large (8MB pdf) version of the ICOS map is
here.
Roggio makes this point, which seems valid:
Very much standard stuff (much of it keyed to the presence & extent of "shadow goverenment"), which is well to be reminded of.
The attached snips from the map based on data from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry shows a fair amount of "Taliban" activity north of Hwy 1 (approx. location shooped in by me). It supports Roggio's point that a district by district analysis is required, which is not an armchair sport to be attempted at home.
As I have stated before, I am a big fan of polling as the best way to gather the most valuable information for shaping FID engagement and advising a HN on their COIN activities. But also, of course, we all know how one has to always be cautious when dealing with any "measure" of such subjective things.
So, given that a very effective insurgency can be driven by a very small portion of a state's total populace, my first observation would be that the percentage may well be fairly small in a poll if asked this question. Similarly if on would have polled the American colonies, particularly outside of Massachusetts, in 1776, one would probably not made an overwhelming case for an independence movement either.
I would be curious though to see what percentage of the insurgent populace believes that their primary objective is the removal of the Americans and their allied military presence? These things are complicated; as an example of that complication, as I looked at the "enemy controlled" map it looked almost identical to "Karzai controlled" maps I had seen from the election... Not shocking in that both Karzai and the Taliban represent the same main regions and ethnic groups; but complicated. I haven't seen much discussion of this apparent incongruity.
Newsweek "The Taliban - In Their Own Words"
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
is the evidence at hand with respect to this:
Among Astan's Biggest Problems as perceived by Afghanis (
chart posted earlier), "Interference of foreign countries" (I marked that item in the chart with an *) resulted in responses:
2006 - 1%
2007 - less than 1%
2008 - 3%
So, on the narrow issue as stated, the SMG has tossed the COL a fastball - I'd have to call it a strike, unless the COL has some evidence to the contrary.
The Afghanis' perception of higher prices (double-digit problem in 2008) might be due to inflation caused by US and other international spending in Astan, which would include a component of military spending. However, the same problem (if that is the cause, which is quite possible) would be magnified by a much larger civilian and FID effort (as some have proposed).
Added after last BW post: "PLENTY of evidence". Have to say this - fellow attorney: Make your case. Prove it. :)
Nice to see both of you back on this thread in fine form. :D
Regards
Mike
Ok, this is single source, and I don't offer this as conclusive by any means, but it is collaborative of the point I am making. In reading this summary of interviews with several Taliban members, there are subtle, yet important windows into how they think in how they phrase their comments.
Example:
Pg 41: Kahn: "The Americans and their Afghan allies..."
(If this were a revolution, I would expect him to say this in the opposite order)
Pg 41: Akhundzada: " There are famous Taliban poems about how mujahedin come to free villages from occupiers at the point of a bayonet."
(We should remember that Taliban motivation and purpose when we first invaded the country is very different than it is now as they come back to remove the invaders. Certainly they hope to take power and return to their fundamentalist Islamic approach, but while they may achieve the first, the latter will be much less likely in today's environment - particularly if the US remains engaged with whatever government emerges in Afghanistan, and does not isolate itself from a victor that it does not approve of)
Pg 41/42 Haqqani: " Between 2006 and 2009 I have personally raised hundreds of new recruits to join the resistance...The unpopularity of the Karzai regime helps us immensely. In 2005 some Afghans thought Karzai would bring positive change. But now most Afghans believe the Taliban is the future. The Resistance is getting stronger day by day."
Ok, like I said single source. Newsweek has an agenda, as do all of the men they spoke with. Take it with a grain or two of salt, but don't just discount what these men say. Hell, our intel guys quote everything that AQ puts out as if it were carved on stone tablets, and far more of the content of those carefully crafted bits of propaganda are BS than these candid comments from rank and file Taliban.
These guys are not AQ, and are fairly open about their disdain for the Arabs. We should be leveraging this. The Taliban could expel, capture, or kill AQ in a matter of days if they wanted to, certainly they could shut them down in Pashto lands quickly and indefinitely. I simply offer that we may have lost our perspective as to why we are in Afghanistan in the first place, and that by changing our approach to the Taliban we could most likely get much more quickly to an end of AQ in the region, and a relatively stable Afghanistan and Pakistan with legitimate, self-determined governments in place that are at worst neutral toward the US.
This a danger of a threat-centric approach that tends to expand the scope of an operation rather than limit it. Also the danger of "War on AQ" approach that leads to the tendency to try to make AQ connections to bring "threats" into the band of authorities for action.
When we start treating the Taliban more like a political party and less like a militant arm of AQ we will begin moving in the right direction.
Some pointers from on the ground
I once again recommend reading: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/ which makes valuable points that ISAF have not learnt: use of Afghan highways (including blocking Highway 1 for hours), off-FOB night time work by the French (unlike most ISAF), ISAF response to highway accidents and working with the Afghans - cited below:
Quote:
ISAF is here to bring security to the people of Afghanistan so they can re-build their economy and infrastructure. But ISAF can’t protect the people of Afghanistan – they cannot even protect themselves. The reality is that we have this backwards – it is the people of Afghanistan who are able to provide the protection and security us foreigners need to operate outside the wire. All we need do is demonstrate commitment to the people thus providing a reason for them to believe in us and support our mission. (My emphasis).
That is why my son and I can travel around as freely as we do – the people protect us – they warn us if danger is about – they look after us when we walk around the bazaars. The reason the people protect us is because everyone in Jalalabad knows who we are and what we are doing and they appreciate it. In Gardez the Taliban came to several of our projects and asked what was going on. The local people told them in no uncertain terms that the rehabilitation of their karez’s and canals was the first good thing which has happened to them since the Americans came and that if the Taliban interfered the people would fight them. The Taliban did not interfere and I suspect many of them were working on our projects – 6 bucks a day is good pay for unskilled laborers in Afghanistan.
Our FOB’s are full of men and woman who would love to have the freedom to operate like we do so they too could make a difference. I recieve emails from them daily. But our military system will not let them off the FOB’s, out of the body armor, or out of the large stupid, dangerous MRAP’s. Instead we continue to bring “security” to the local people at the point of a gun. How stupid is that?
davidbfpo
A answer on low provincial voting
Quote:
Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
From JMM earlier: IEC Election Results (with a nice interactive map). Karzai lost in most "Northern Alliance" provinces; he won in Pashtun provinces (the questioned votes). Very regional and ethnic from all appearances; but a province by province study would have to be made.
Thanks for the link. Can anyone here offer an explanation on why so few people across the country voted in the provincial elections? It is very marked.
davidbfpo
A reply came from a SWC rare lurker:
Quote:
There are many reasons why provincial counts were lower. The first is levels of education. Many of the voters did not know who the provincial candidates were or what they represented. This is, of course, sometimes a problem here in the West, despite all our advanced channels of communications. The lack of even basic infrastructure in parts of the country
means that this is far more of a problem in Afghanistan.
The second problem is that the emphasis was on who becomes the president. There was a lot of interest in the elections at 'street/village' level. There was a degree of cynicism of course but I observed a great deal of enthusiasm for the elections on election day. The turnouts were higher than expected, but all the focus was on presidential candidates.
In some provinces, voters appeared to be either happy or indifferent towards their provincial governors; both also explain lower voting patterns.
On the election generally:
Quote:
In certain communities (eg some of the kuchi nomads), it is alleged no one voted or that headmen stuffed ballot boxes. So far, until the ECC work is complete, there is no way of substantiating this rumours. I did not see any of this practice. I heard a lot of rubbish being spouted by journalist in Kabul - some of whom hadn't even been on the ground at all (except in the safe Kabul and Panjshir areas).
The writer recommends this website (international election observers): http://democracyinternational.com/afghanistan/
I believe they've learned those things, David --
Quote:
Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
I once again recommend reading:
http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/ which makes valuable points that ISAF have not learnt: use of Afghan highways (including blocking Highway 1 for hours), off-FOB night time work by the French (unlike most ISAF)...
However, they're politically constrained from using the same techniques in most cases due essentially to fear of casualties that cannot be 'explained.' :eek:
it is ludicrous that casualties from big fire fights that accomplish little can be 'explained.' :mad:
FWIW, a lot of folks other than the French are operating in the wee hours. it just, correctly, is not publicized -- partly due to the reason I stated above... :rolleyes:
You forget the power of money...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
...Certainly they hope to take power and return to their fundamentalist Islamic approach, but while they may achieve the first, the latter will be much less likely in today's environment - particularly if the US remains engaged with whatever government emerges in Afghanistan, and does not isolate itself from a victor that it does not approve of..
No question. That at least partly explains the Taliban. What about the drug dudes and the Smugglers, the Afghans who simply do not want an effective powerful central government -- or simply a Pushtun dominated central government. Need to be careful not to oversimplify the issue, that can lead to flawed decisions...
Quote:
These guys are not AQ, and are fairly open about their disdain for the Arabs. We should be leveraging this. The Taliban could expel, capture, or kill AQ in a matter of days if they wanted to, certainly they could shut them down in Pashto lands quickly and indefinitely.
True, they could -- but they won't because AQ are Muslim, rich and provide international intelligence information not otherwise available in addition to funds.
On another note, I draw your attention to this op-ed piece by a gentleman who, as I do, offers a counterpoint to your oft repeated -- yet doomed -- plea for American minimalism; LINK .
Two Chinese Lessons Learned
We often look too hard (IMO) at the "small wars" aspects of Mao and his ChiComs - though, no doubt, those "irregular warfare" aspects were important and laid the ground work for the future. We should also look at how Mao actually won in the major contest (ending with creation of the PRC, 1 Oct 1949), and his counter-unconventional warfare campaigns against Nationalist remnants left on the mainland after the KMT government fled to Formosa.
Lesson Learned No. 1 - Winning a conventional war, using unconventional warfare tactics in the enemy's rear areas.
The Chinese Civil War began in 1927 (somewhat earlier dates have some justification) and extended until 1949 (one could argue that it is still playing out in less violent forms). It was interrupted by the Second Sino-Japanese War, resulting in the two parties (KMT and CPC) forming a Second United Front (the First United Front had disintegrated ca. 1927). We best know Mao from his writings regarding the first phase of the Civil War and the Japanese War.
After the Japanese were defeated, warfare between the KMT and CPC was very much a conventional war (divisions, corps, field armies). It did, however, have an unconventional side from the CPC standpoint, with guerrilla units and cadre infrastructures established in nominally KMT-held areas. In addition, it also included a sophisticated subversion program within the KMT forces, which eventually turned entire units (corps, plural) to the CPC side - four KMT Armies (5th, 15th, 16th & 20th) defected within a month (this Google Book, pp. 132-133).
The numbers (from the Wiki link) tell it all:
Quote:
KMT Strength
4,300,000 (July 1945)
3,650,000 (June 1948)
1,490,000 (June 1949)
CPC Strength
1,200,000 (July 1945)
2,800,000 (June 1948)
4,000,000 (June 1949)
A reasonable generalization, which is Infanteer's point:
Quote:
First, the Taliban are not taking anything over with 100,000 NATO soldiers in that country. They tried Mao Phase III in Kandahar in 2006.
is that "irregular threats" can be disruptive and deadly; but they generally are not existential, unless they can reach the winning conventional phase (which requires them to either develop adequate conventional forces, Mao and Giap; or link-up with external conventional forces - the end game in old FM 31-21). Apparently, the intel folks in Bob's shop would disagree (are they in the mindset that we are akin to the Cuban Batista regime, which did fall without a conventional military phase ?).
-------------------------------
Lesson Learned No. 2 - Waging counter-unconventional warfare campaigns.
When the KMT government and its best forces departed for Formosa, they left behind over a million second rate troops and militia with instructions to wage guerrilla warfare against the ChiComs. Those KMT units were spread all over China. The three principal campaigns were:
Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Northern China
Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Central and Southern China
Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Eastern China
While the campaigns (and the sub-campaigns within them) were somewhat different (METT-T), they had roughly three phases:
1. Employment of regular CPC conventional forces (with militia holding already secured local areas) to defeat more conventional KMT guerrilla forces. Essentially this was "salami slicing" - breaking up the larger KMT forces into much smaller packages. The regular CPC footprint was generally kept to the minimum required to defeat the KMT forces which opposed them.
2. Once phase 1 succeeded, political cadres were deployed to the secured area - standard stuff: armed propaganda (including targeted assasinations), political agitation of the masses, development of local defense forces, etc. The number of political cadres was close to the number of regular forces (e.g., one instance of ~40K regulars with ~30K political cadres). Nice to have political commissars as the political struggle intensifies.
3. Once phase 2 succeeded (which also involved some "salami slicing"), the effort passed to what we would call a law enforcement effort along gendarmerie lines, where kill became subsidiary to capture and convert - the ChiComs being big on "re-education".
This was an indigenous effort. As to it working in Astan, it would have to be an effort by the Astan National Security Forces. You can judge whether that would be feasible under present and reasonably into the future conditions.
PS: When the Taliban captured Kabul in the 90s, their effort was very much conventional warfare - in Astan terms.
A List of Chinese battles.
Regards to all - interesting posts
Mike
PS - to BW: I too noticed the correlation between Karzai's mammoth vote totals and the "Taliban" areas as I was compiling his provincial totals. Don't know what (if anything - see last quote in my signature) to make of that. It is interesting to speculate on what Karzai really wants as his vision of a future Astan.