Winning the War in Afghanistan

[slapout9]

Moa (Tse-tung) formed highly codified and organised units, with strict operational regulations. He was also an adherent of Clausewitz, and saw conventional operations as the only way to achieve decisive political effect. "Guerilla warfare" was merely a precursor to conventional and decisive operations. Is this the Taliban's plan?

Their means (weapon) is political or their aim is political. Point being, if they are achieving their aim throught non-violent means (politics), why are they expending huge amounts of resources using violent means?

1-Yes he did and each unit had a political commander as well as a military commander. Like the Taliban and the connection to their madrassas a religious/political organization with military capabilities. As TX Hammes has pointed out Guerrilla Warfare is evolving, they don't need a conventional Army to achieve their goals.

2-surprised you ask that, as you have said many times war is politics carried on with different means. Or as Mao said political power comes from the barrel of a gun.

[jmm99]

as to this:

from Wilf
Their means (weapon) is political or their aim is political. Point being, if they are achieving their aim throught non-violent means (politics), why are they expending huge amounts of resources using violent means ?

Since we both follow CvC and the Taliban are engaging in warfare, their end has to be political. As to means, military (violence) is an obvious means used.

Based on GEN McChrystal's report, the Quetta Taliban has established "shadow governments" in the regions they control, and in some of the areas controlled by other Taliban groups (p.15 of report). The portion of Astan controlled or contested by the Taliban, or not controlled by ISAF (two different metrics) is redacted (see attached snip from p. 15). So, another means is political.

-------------------------
As to this:

Steve the Planner
Finally, we are talking about Saul Alinsky and community engagement processes.

A number here have studied Alinsky's methodology, and we occasionally rear our heads (or posteriors). Good quote from Milt Bearden (and, in brief to Wilf, the direct support for the anti-Soviet insurgency came from Pakistan via ISI links - sound familiar ?).

Following Alinsky (cf. Mao, Giap, Lenin), the solution has to be bubble-up, indigenous and long-term - although all recognized the possibilities of some events akin to "punctuated equilibria" (e.g., insurrections, but in the context of underlying mass movements).

As Wilf can tell you (and cite valid historical examples), there also are various top-down solutions which can work in certain contexts. Bearden seems to think not for Astan. Steve Coll seems to be suggesting an enclave or demographic lines solution (both suggested, but rejected, in Vietnam).

Whatever the solution, it has to solve the key problems as perceived by the Afghanis (see attached). While the largest % problem is security (military and paramilitary areas), the remaining problems are largely civil.

The appearence of high prices (inflation) as a double-digit problem in 2008 is interesting, because the same thing happened in South Vietnam as our force levels increased.

The Asia Foundation has an Astan Section.

Have to run now and attend to my "day job" - if I can recall what that is.

Cheers to all

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

JMM99

Here's my two cents from a piece I'm submitting to the WP (who knows if it would ever get published?)

Steve

A Plan For Afghanistan?

October 6th is Planner’s Day on Capitol Hill, when state and local planners will descend to meet with their local representatives on a host of domestic planning, project and program issues.

Sometimes invisible, planners typically work behind the scenes to research and orchestrate community engagement to develop and implement the mundane but critical plans, regulations, budgets and projects to implement, enforce and deliver communities’ needs and visions, through effective and comprehensively planned, phased and budgeted projects and programs which minimize waste, and through a well-defined and generally transparent process which, on the whole, resists and precludes major corruption.

Their subject field is defined by highly technical work in Geographic Information Systems (GIS), engineering, environmental, and systems sciences. Still, to the greatest extent possible, a planner’s role is to interpret the complexity and define relevant choices for decision-makers and the public.

Typically, behind-the-scenes planning only enters the press sphere in the context of heated community debates over a proposed plan, but it is that context, community engagement focused on vetting and resolving future plans and activities, even where controversial or complex, that underscores the complexity and importance of the planning process. The planners’ role is to create and support that public process, and the means and ends of, hopefully, comprehensive, effective, and cost-controlled implementation.

What does domestic civilian planning have to do with the big foreign policy and defense issues before the Nation’s Capitol today? Everything.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently hosted a panel of experts on Pakistan and Afghanistan. At that hearing, Foreign Policy expert Steve Coll described the counter-productive effort of more troop deployments, yet the need to assure the Taliban never regained control of Afghanistan’s capitol.

He went on to describe a proposed strategy, grounded in the need to enforce stability in Afghan population centers, with emphasis on politics over combat, urban stability over rural patrolling, and Afghan solutions over Western ones.

Coll has described an end, but not a means.

Brush aside all the military and foreign policy jargon used in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, and you are describing the state of US civic affairs in the Tammany Hall days: major corruption, billions of dollars of waste on unneeded, ineffective, and ill-conceived piecemeal public and private projects and programs, and a complete lack of effective public engagement. The US Afghan reconstruction effort, as presently divided into discrete cones of economic, governance, democracy building, civil affairs, and managed by competing, and often conflicting, US agencies, NGOs, and international donor agencies, assures the delivery of disjunct chaos, and contains no possibility for progress.

Last week, a Special Forces veteran was explaining the importance of Saul Alinsky and community engagement on Small Wars Journal. So, where is this headed?

The irony is that the military is chock-full of civilian planners designing, maintaining and budgeting the continuous operation of vast and increasingly complex military base infrastructure, negotiating substantial impacts on adjacent communities, and routinely applying community engagement processes. Like Anthony Hopkins’ butler character in “Remains of the Day,” the planners are the butlers making possible the complex systems, infrastructure and buildings in which military and foreign affairs experts are increasingly debating how to do what those butlers do every day---keep the house running.

Afghanistan, as anyone familiar with it knows, is just too broken, backwards, and diffuse to lend itself to ready reconstruction, temporary “quick hit” projects, and passing military and foreign aid initiatives. So stabilizing Afghanistan, or just a few key urban centers, is a big, deep and complex challenge requiring substantial research which has not yet been done, and development, with realistic Afghan participation, of an overall multi-phased and hierarchically prioritized strategy. In Iraq, like Afghanistan, our efforts routinely focus on “quick hits” and “low-hanging fruit” that often prove unsustainable and ineffective. Progress can be made, but “more of the same,” delivered by our current structure of competing, conflicting, and uncoordinated efforts and staffing, even if “re-labeled” as planning and planners, will only produce more of the same.

When Planner’s day unfolds on October 6, 2009 with domestic planners coming to the Hill for their own domestic issues, perhaps it would make sense for military and foreign affairs leaders to ask them how they do what they do, and what lessons can be learned to close our substantial gaps in a critical component of the “big picture” strategy in Afghanistan. Knowing how to solve a problem is a big step on the road to a viable solution.

Stephen Donnelly, AICP, is a Planning Consultant from Crofton Maryland. He served as Senior Urban Planning Adviser to the State Department during the 2007/2008 Civilian Surge in Iraq, and will be on the Hill for Planner’s Day. He is a member of the American Planning Association, and its Institute of Certified Planners.

(Rights reserved)

[William F. Owen]

1-Yes he did and each unit had a political commander as well as a military commander. Like the Taliban and the connection to their madrassas a religious/political organization with military capabilities. As TX Hammes has pointed out Guerrilla Warfare is evolving, they don't need a conventional Army to achieve their goals.

Well the "Political officers" are basically your CA guys, with a smattering of PSYOPS. In Colonial times they were the "Civil Commissioners."
My point is, the Tailban is absolutely no different from the vast majority of Irregular armed forces throughout 3,000 of military history.
They are nothing new and nor are their methods - 99% weapons are over 40 years old. TX is plain wrong and I keep telling so. There is simply no evidence - just a belief.
To whit, what is "Guerilla Warfare" and how is it evolving?

2-surprised you ask that, as you have said many times war is politics carried on with different means. Or as Mao said political power comes from the barrel of a gun.

My enquiry is to the nature of your statement. Mao was paraphrasing CvC -poorly as it happens - but simply put, if the Taliban could not inflict casualties using violence, they would be politically irrelevant.

[slapout9]

Well the "Political officers" are basically your CA guys, with a smattering of PSYOPS. In Colonial times they were the "Civil Commissioners."
My point is, the Tailban is absolutely no different from the vast majority of Irregular armed forces throughout 3,000 of military history.
They are nothing new and nor are their methods - 99% weapons are over 40 years old. TX is plain wrong and I keep telling so. There is simply no evidence - just a belief.
To whit, what is "Guerilla Warfare" and how is it evolving?

1-That is my point to?! the Talban are not any different. The evolution part as it relates to Mao is that it is not going to be necessary to have a formal uniformed military force to achieve your objectives.

2-I don't understand all this IW,UW,FID,COIN stuff it is all the same to me. My definition of Guerrilla Warfare or Irregular warfare comes the SOE Syllabus on Irregular Warfare (declassified and for sale in the UK don't have a link; linked added: http://www.amazon.com/SOE-SYLLABUS-L.../dp/190336518X and not cheap).

Irregular warfare has 3 objectives, to achieve control of the Political, Economic and Military functions of the target Country/area. The methods are propaganda, sabotage,espionage,passive Resistance,secret armies and Political-Military uprisings. That is a condensed version anyway.

Exact wording can be found on pages 35-36 of SOE Syllabus of lectures.

[jmm99]

We often look too hard (IMO) at the "small wars" aspects of Mao and his ChiComs - though, no doubt, those "irregular warfare" aspects were important and laid the ground work for the future. We should also look at how Mao actually won in the major contest (ending with creation of the PRC, 1 Oct 1949), and his counter-unconventional warfare campaigns against Nationalist remnants left on the mainland after the KMT government fled to Formosa.

Lesson Learned No. 1 - Winning a conventional war, using unconventional warfare tactics in the enemy's rear areas.

The Chinese Civil War began in 1927 (somewhat earlier dates have some justification) and extended until 1949 (one could argue that it is still playing out in less violent forms). It was interrupted by the Second Sino-Japanese War, resulting in the two parties (KMT and CPC) forming a Second United Front (the First United Front had disintegrated ca. 1927). We best know Mao from his writings regarding the first phase of the Civil War and the Japanese War.

After the Japanese were defeated, warfare between the KMT and CPC was very much a conventional war (divisions, corps, field armies). It did, however, have an unconventional side from the CPC standpoint, with guerrilla units and cadre infrastructures established in nominally KMT-held areas. In addition, it also included a sophisticated subversion program within the KMT forces, which eventually turned entire units (corps, plural) to the CPC side - four KMT Armies (5th, 15th, 16th & 20th) defected within a month (this Google Book, pp. 132-133).

The numbers (from the Wiki link) tell it all:

KMT Strength

4,300,000 (July 1945)
3,650,000 (June 1948)
1,490,000 (June 1949)

CPC Strength

1,200,000 (July 1945)
2,800,000 (June 1948)
4,000,000 (June 1949)

A reasonable generalization, which is Infanteer's point:

First, the Taliban are not taking anything over with 100,000 NATO soldiers in that country. They tried Mao Phase III in Kandahar in 2006.

is that "irregular threats" can be disruptive and deadly; but they generally are not existential, unless they can reach the winning conventional phase (which requires them to either develop adequate conventional forces, Mao and Giap; or link-up with external conventional forces - the end game in old FM 31-21). Apparently, the intel folks in Bob's shop would disagree (are they in the mindset that we are akin to the Cuban Batista regime, which did fall without a conventional military phase ?).

-------------------------------
Lesson Learned No. 2 - Waging counter-unconventional warfare campaigns.

When the KMT government and its best forces departed for Formosa, they left behind over a million second rate troops and militia with instructions to wage guerrilla warfare against the ChiComs. Those KMT units were spread all over China. The three principal campaigns were:

Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Northern China

Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Central and Southern China

Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Eastern China

While the campaigns (and the sub-campaigns within them) were somewhat different (METT-T), they had roughly three phases:

1. Employment of regular CPC conventional forces (with militia holding already secured local areas) to defeat more conventional KMT guerrilla forces. Essentially this was "salami slicing" - breaking up the larger KMT forces into much smaller packages. The regular CPC footprint was generally kept to the minimum required to defeat the KMT forces which opposed them.

2. Once phase 1 succeeded, political cadres were deployed to the secured area - standard stuff: armed propaganda (including targeted assasinations), political agitation of the masses, development of local defense forces, etc. The number of political cadres was close to the number of regular forces (e.g., one instance of ~40K regulars with ~30K political cadres). Nice to have political commissars as the political struggle intensifies.

3. Once phase 2 succeeded (which also involved some "salami slicing"), the effort passed to what we would call a law enforcement effort along gendarmerie lines, where kill became subsidiary to capture and convert - the ChiComs being big on "re-education".

This was an indigenous effort. As to it working in Astan, it would have to be an effort by the Astan National Security Forces. You can judge whether that would be feasible under present and reasonably into the future conditions.

PS: When the Taliban captured Kabul in the 90s, their effort was very much conventional warfare - in Astan terms.

A List of Chinese battles.

Regards to all - interesting posts

Mike

PS - to BW: I too noticed the correlation between Karzai's mammoth vote totals and the "Taliban" areas as I was compiling his provincial totals. Don't know what (if anything - see last quote in my signature) to make of that. It is interesting to speculate on what Karzai really wants as his vision of a future Astan.

[Pol-Mil FSO]

I have to disagree with the contention that the Taliban are basically no different from any other insurgent group in past history. I believe that T.X. Hammes is on to something, especially his point about what he labels as the "generational" mismatch between the two sides in a conflict.

The Taliban have clearly evolved from the period during which they ruled most of Afghanistan. Not just on the military side, with the migration of TTPs from other conflicts and the linking up with international jihadists, but also on the political and psychological sides. Two examples that I'll cite: 1) after the Paris donor conference in June 2008, the civilians in the Kandahar PRT were passed a copy of critical Taliban talking points on PowerPoint slides. The points were extremely well written, to the point that they almost seemed to have been drafted by an NGO with deep experience in Afghanistan. In the pre-2001 Taliban regime I don't think that any Taliban official would have even known about this conference, cared about it, or had the education to effectively criticize it. These Taliban talking points drew a "wow" from the PRT political officers but there seemed to be little if any interest in them from ISAF, at least at the RC-South level. 2) In 2008, Canadian officials discovered that at least half of the National Solidarity Program projects in Zhari District in Kandahar Province had apparently been compromised by the Taliban. In some cases the money was reportedly being turned over to the Taliban once it got out to the field and in other cases the funding was being diverted at the bank account level. This from a program that is considered one of the great development success stories in Afghanistan. However, it now seems to be dawning on people, thanks in large part to a September 2009 media report on globalpost.com, that the Taliban have infiltrated the entire aid disbursement process and are receiving substantial funding from foreign assistance for Afghanistan. It reminds me of stories I've heard about the FARC insurgents in Colombia stopping people at roadblocks and using laptops to verify their financial status.

Getting back to T.X. Hammes' point about a generational mismatch, I like to use the following joke: What would happen if Mullah Omar and COMISAF put out edicts to their subordinates to compose a piece of music? In the Taliban case, they would round up some musicians and tell them to write a piece of music. It probably wouldn't be very sophisticated, but it would be done quickly and would be recognizable as music. On the other hand, if the ISAF staff was given this tasking, the first thing they would do is to create several cells of at least 25-50 officers each. One cell would analyze the history of music composition, one cell would analyze the structure of musical notes, another cell the psychological effects of music, etc. After several weeks of exhaustive work the staff would deliver several alternatives to the commander, none of which would be recognizable as music, at least not to Afghans. I think the Taliban is inside the ISAF OODA loop, and not just in the IO area.

[Steve the Planner]

Pol Mil:

Your description triggered a nightmare image of the meeting where the, no doubt, 100 slide powerpoint was haggled down to a final form for presentation.

Race horse designed by committee?

Steve

[Pol-Mil FSO]

Steve:

I think the decision brief would be slimmed down to 40 slides with 150 back up slides.

[William F. Owen]

1That is my point to?! the Talban are not any different. The evolution part as it relates to Mao is that it is not going to be necessary to have a formal uniformed military force to achieve your objectives.

Well nor did the Irish in 1921, the Jews in Palestine in 1948, or Castro in Cuba. Again, not new. I see no evolution.

2-I don't understand all this IW,UW,FID,COIN stuff it is all the same to me. My definition of Guerrilla Warfare or Irregular warfare comes the SOE Syllabus on Irregular Warfare (declassified and for sale in the UK don't have a link; linked added: http://www.amazon.com/SOE-SYLLABUS-L.../dp/190336518X and not cheap).

Concur and thank you for the link.

Irregular warfare has 3 objectives, to achieve control of the Political, Economic and Military functions of the target Country/area. The methods are propaganda, sabotage,espionage,passive Resistance,secret armies and Political-Military uprisings.

OK, so how does Irregular Warfare differ from regular in terms of "objectives."

My differentiation of Regular and Irregular is the Classical "Small Wars" construct of one or more parties to the conflict, not being Regular Military Force.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by JMM,

is that "irregular threats" can be disruptive and deadly; but they generally are not existential, unless they can reach the winning conventional phase (which requires them to either develop adequate conventional forces, Mao and Giap; or link-up with external conventional forces - the end game in old FM 31-21). Apparently, the intel folks in Bob's shop would disagree (are they in the mindset that we are akin to the Cuban Batista regime, which did fall without a conventional military phase ?).

It might be more accurate to state the insurgents will adapt whatever strategy is required to achieve their objectives, than state that they have to resort to "conventional" warfare. Conventional warfare simplifies the nature of the conflict to a conflict between opposing military forces (rarely is any conflict confined to such simple terms, but especially not this one), but this is a war focused on winning control of the populace (coerced or otherwise). I don't believe Mao called it conventional war, but rather something along the line of war of movement, or the strategic offensive phase. The intent of the phase is to defeat the remaining military forces and establish political control, if you execute too early you get your butt handed to you (e.g. the Tet offensive). Where Mao may have been more effective than we are in general (in this type of war) is that his military and political apparatus were largely integrated (one organization). On the other hand we're still struggling with how to make our interagency process work. In the mean time we attempt to separate the military from the political approach. It shouldn't be a surprise that our influence operations are so flawed.

Getting back to your question, do BW's analyst's think the insurgents can win without resorting to conventional war? I doubt that BW's analysts are of one mine, but historically I suspect there are more examples than Castro's surprise rise to power where insurgents won without resorting to a so called conventional warfare phase.

They can wage two types of strategies (or three if they combine the two) where conventional warfare isn't necessary. The first is to wage a war of attrition (simply create an unacceptable level of casualties). Second, they can wage an exhaustion strategy, which is focused on depriving the enemy of the resources he needs to continue the fight (Sherman's March). In theory, in some irregular warfare scenarios it is feasible that the insurgents could isolate the governing power from local and international support. I have no idea if this is the Taliban's plan, but from the limited reading I have done on this conflict it appears that the Taliban is waging a war of attrition against the U.S. and ISAF, which if effective will enable a strategy of exhaustion against Karzai's government (if he is cut off from substantial international aid).

Like many here I sometimes have a hard time distinguishing the sometime blurry lines between COIN, UW, IW, regular warfare etc., because most conflicts don't fit nicely into any one box. I generally find those who argue hardest about a particular definition are not the warriors on point, but rather the resource staffers who are attempting to protect their organization's interests. Perhaps a necessary evil in our system, but in the end it probably does more harm than good.

Recent history in simple terms (experts on this conflict please correct me if I'm wrong):

"various" Afghan insurgent movements with substantial support from numerous countries defeated the Soviets waging an attrition strategy against the Soviets.

then the groups were no longer unified, but the strongest tribe (the Taliban with support from Pakistan) shifted gears and waged a war of exhaustion against the government left in place, and since the Soviets cut off the support required, they couldn't hold the line, much like us pulling the rug out from underneath the S. Vietnamese.

The final fighting was pretty much peer to peer fighting (rather than truly pitched conventional battles). I'm not aware of any real large battles at this point?

When we first entered Afghanistan late 2001 in response to 9/11 we waged a hybrid of UW and conventional warfare. The Taliban and Northern Alliance were pretty much peer competitors at this point of the conflict, but the fire power we brought to bear on the enemy (conventional) quickly changed the calculation.

After the Taliban large maneuver forces were ousted they resorted to insurgent tactics against our occupation and then against Karzai's government. I believe with ample support from foreign donors.

If we're not careful we risk repeating history, if the world pulls out it will be very difficult for the current government to hold against an insurgent movement with substantial external support.

That's a long answer to your question, but the answer is "yes" it is possible to win without resorting to large scale conventional fighting if the government forces are not motivated to fight. Is it likely? Don't know.

[Fuchs]

I wonder why the idea that guerrillas need to go conventional to win on their own persists.

Unconventional warfare have proved its ability to restrict conventional forces - even into their bases.

Unconventional warfare has also proved its ability to cause mass desertion (break the enemy's will) at least among domestic conventional opponents.

There's no need for going conventional if you can gain control of 95% of the country and destroy conventional opfor without.

[Bob's World]

I suspect our heavily doctrinal approach to sequential phases for operations causes us to mirror image that onto Mao's three phases. The key is to understand the fundamental principles of insurgent warfare, but to always remember that there are no rules, no timelines, no movement sequentially through phases. Success can occur in any phase for the insurgent, and he is always seeking success, not the next phase.

The phase just helps understand what he is doing to succeed, not what he must do next to succeed.

Good COIN is like good yard work. No matter how great your yard looks on Saturday afternoon when you've just "finished" and put your tools away, it will start to look ragged in a few days without constant maintenance. It is not a failure of the yard that causes this to occur, it is the nature of things. One can blame the sun, the rain or invading insects, but they too are part of the natural process that one is attempting to "control" through their gardening efforts. Virtually every Gardener understands this, yet virtually every politician for some reason does not.

Here is a chart I've put together that tries to capture the essence of what I believe to be the essence of insurgency:

[slapout9]

Where Mao may have been more effective than we are in general (in this type of war) is that his military and political apparatus were largely integrated (one organization). On the other hand we're still struggling with how to make our interagency process work. In the mean time we attempt to separate the military from the political approach. It shouldn't be a surprise that our influence operations are so flawed.

Hi Bill, exactly! add to that a "department of criminal revenue raising" and you have a strong, survivable,tough organization.

[slapout9]

Again, not new. I see no evolution.

No it is not new. Mao was just my start point. For a better explanation of evolution read TX's book "The Sling And The Stone" he traces it out rather well I think.

[slapout9]

OK, so how does Irregular Warfare differ from regular in terms of "objectives."

My differentiation of Regular and Irregular is the Classical "Small Wars" construct of one or more parties to the conflict, not being Regular Military Force.

1-It doesn't it is the methods that are different.

2-The problem with the classic definition is both(more) parties could all be Irregular.

[William F. Owen]

No it is not new. Mao was just my start point. For a better explanation of evolution read TX's book "The Sling And The Stone" he traces it out rather well I think.

Read the book. Argued with the author. 4GW is a forcing mechanism, that is very comfortable with poor history, and some evidence free statements.

1-It doesn't it is the methods that are different.

2-The problem with the classic definition is both(more) parties could all be Irregular.

1. OK. That makes sense.
2. That's not a problem. It's still Irregular warfare, as in the Congo.