Now that his bona fides have bee established, would anyone like to comment on what he said?
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Now that his bona fides have bee established, would anyone like to comment on what he said?
This is where the issue was discussed on PS.com. Most people in the community are pretty pissed about this. I don't have TV right now so I did not see the interview and I doubt that I will read the book. What I am wondering though is what the point is. I near as I can gather, he is pointing out what is basically a bad call that was made on the ground in Afghanistan during the Tora Bora operation. My question is why? Whether it was a good, bad or indifferent call, it is an old call. What is bringing it up now going to do other than bring about a big old round of finger pointing, and possibly some scape goating?
SFC W
It sounds like old territory to me - much of the same was covered in other articles and books, although the request to mine the passes above Tora Bora was new to me. Given the realities of the time, it's not surprising that both of his requests (a blocking force or mining) were rejected.
The cynic in me suggests it might have something to do with the timing of his book being published.Quote:
What is bringing it up now going to do other than bring about a big old round of finger pointing, and possibly some scape goating?
I think the big point is that the guys on the ground did their job, that oversight and politics (to many cooks in the kitchen problem) screwed up the mission. I think from the interview the idea that the Afghanistan support really wasn't and that the missions are incredibly more difficult based on trying to make them (the locals) look good.
Great. A fellow AMU professor.
http://www.amu.apus.edu/Academics/Fa...?facultyID=997
No doubt he is a hero and a stud but I agree with other posters. Where is the so what of his story? The Muj couldn't be trusted, liked Bin Laden and often had agreements with the Talibs...nothing new there.
Could you please explain. Isn`t a blocking force one of the simplest and most basic ways to deploy troops.
Isn`t that highly relevant given that our strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan to this day is to turn over security to the locals. Do you really think that its old news to the millions of Americans and millions of 60 Minutes viewers who our going to be voting in the next 30 days. (For example, I had no idea the local went home every night, and were sleeping peacefully in their beds, when our guys were very close to Bin Laden and knew exactly where he was and I think I`ve learned a thing or two from hanging around here that the average 60 minutes viewer might not know.)
Back in 2001, we were buying loyality...plain and simple. There was no buring Afghan desire for love and home and country to help us out. We paid them...plain and simple. Things have changed for the better over the years but back in 2001 when this story is about, our "allies" were paid mercenaries we used to help us out since we did not have enough of our own forces in theater.
Having worked with, lived with, ate with and fought with Iraqi units twice, there always has to be some skepticism in the back of an advisors mind. I'm sure the Delta guys in this story either a) knew or b) had strong feeling their local indig forces may be playing both sides of the game.
Could this be a situation where someone may have violated the need to know principle? I mean, this guy was in Delta. I'm not sure we were supposed to be finding out about this so soon. I was uncomfortable watching it.
His book has been in limbo for awhile while some OPSEC issues were clarified. The author's homepage goes into more detail.
From the little I know it appears that a "risk averse" culture kicked in by the Higher Ups. I don't understand why a Ranger Blt wasn't deployed as another support element. Hats off to those guys who went in knowing their "support" was dubious at best.
http://rawstory.com/news/2008/US_off...kill_1006.html
I didn't see the original airing but have been following this on the author's homepage. Hopefully this is the original 60minutes piece without modification.
Here is the only "statement of facts" that I have:
http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/...ghlight=daltonQuote:
(posted at PS by Team Sergeant - from 2 Feb 2008 Army Times at 2nd url below)
Fury said that, as required by the agreement he signed when he left the unit and retired, he sent Delta a copy of his manuscript for security review.
“They came up with a list of redactions of items they thought ought to be taken out,” he said. “I told them I would honor every one of those. However, they were never ever given to me.”
Delta’s higher headquarters apparently intervened, according to Fury. “It’s not Delta’s fault,” he said. “It’s their higher command – JSOC and SOCOM have the say. And they … collectively decided not to provide me with any detailed redactions after a year of trying through my attorney.”
“All I got back was responses [reminding me of] my commitment to the classified information agreement that I signed … [and] basically threatening to possibly take me to court over this.”
Fury said that after SOCOM “stifled it,” he sent the manuscript to the Defense Department’s Office of Security Review.
“OSR failed to respond in any timely manner at all, after numerous requests from my attorney.
“The comment that SOCOM made was that the sensitive information was so thoroughly woven into the manuscript that any attempt at detailed redaction would be literally impossible. They chose not to do it.”
“We did receive a manuscript from [the author] for security review,” said SOCOM spokesman Army Col. Hans Bush. “The manuscript did not pass security review because it was found to contain classified information. We notified [the author] through his lawyer last fall. To date this remains unresolved. “We are still willing to work with the author in the even he resubmits a manuscript that does not contain classified information.”
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/0..._book_080131w/
The Ishmael Jones book, and the CIA PRB's refusal to clear it, has been discussed here.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5832
The agency's PRB review process is well regulated and subject to judicial review - sometimes in favor of authors, sometimes not (as in Frank Snepp's case).
The Fury process has multiple commands involved; and, I have no idea (no legal research done or intended) of whether judicial review is available or not. Since the Army has regulations for most everything, I presume there is some legal guidance somewhere - but I arz a dummy in this legal area.
The Jones and Fury books were both rejected for the same reason stated - " sensitive information was so thoroughly woven into the manuscript that any attempt at detailed redaction would be literally impossible." Both books were then published despite the rejection.
So far, no legal action has been taken in either case. Note: I am not calling for legal action in either case - just sitting on the sidelines watching.
Maybe, but subtlety doesn't really work in our nations discourse, in this case I reckon he would just come out and say it:
Ideological agendas cannot be pursued, and political and economic gains cannot be reaped, when you literally kill the pretext. With bullets and HE.
His brother is a professor there as well.
I've had a class with one of them, can't remember which one.
He instructed me as well for AMU's UW seminar a couple of years ago. Definitely a solid instructor; I learned a good deal from him, and he made the class really interesting. He also developed a great reading list for that course.
...I've been busy for a couple of days.
To answer your question, yes, in theory a blocking force is easy to deploy, but in practice I'll quote Ken: METT-TC applies. That blocking force has to be adequate to the task, able to deploy and operate along a stretch of 10k+feet series of peaks and saddles, in wintertime, with adequate supply and support. Assuming all that is available, there is the opportunity cost and risk which must be weighed against other missions for all the assets involved. Maybe the Rangers that were at Bagram could have done it (which was the only force available in a timely matter, IMO), but I don't know.
And even if the decisions had been different and the Rangers were in put in place, there's still no guarantee they would have got UBL.
Reading the book now for a SWJ review. I will save my comments for that purpose but so far it is interesting read.
Tom