Pakistan Predictions 2014
By now even I am scared of predicting anything, but a man's gotta do what a man's gotta do, so here goes
http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/201...ions-2014.html
Excerpt:
1. Dr A (source of the "Jihadi Army" prediction in 2009 and 2012) says he has NOTHING to change in his prediction from 2009. Pakistan ka matlab kya, La illah a illalah (What is the meaning of Pakistan? There is no God but Allah). All has been prepared for the feast. Apostates, liberals and Shias should book their tickets while Karachi airport is still operational. The triumph of the warriors of Allah is not far. Most of the current army will switch sides. And will then discover some decidedly unpleasant facts about their more Islamic partners from Waziristan. Zaid Hamid and Hamid Gul will be hanged in Islamabad BEFORE the attack on Red Fort Delhi ever begins. Somalia will look like a walk in the park compared to the #### that will fly in the land of the pure. Eventually, warlords and mafia gangs will break up the country and foreign powers will try to establish zones of influence in the more useful/governable areas. Or it may all vaporize in a nuclear exchange.
2. Comrade Zee's comments are awaited.
3. My prediction: I no longer feel confident of making any predictions. As Ali Minai might say, it is a complex situation and unpredictable phase transitions are the only safe prediction. It could be that there will be a stabilization of the Sharif regime and the army will gradually take action against all Jihadists in some mysterious order only they understand. But I must admit that even an eternal optimist like me now feels that it is more likely that phase one will be a continuing confused and inept response from the Sharif government, with the army simultaneously fighting the bad Taliban and undermining the elected government. When the #### has hit the fan in sufficient quantity (####-fan contact being a process rather than a singular event in Pakistan) the people of Punjab (the only ones who really matter as a people) will be so sick of MNS that the army will be "forced to impose Martial Law". Phase two would then be a temporary stabilization under army rule. At that point the British colonial roots of the army could hold, allowing it to act as a disciplined force to suppress true believers and brazenly lie its way through to bloody and shaky stabilization of pseudo-Islamic crony capitalist Pakistan. Or it could all fall apart after that, in which case the fate of the constituents depends on how well India and Afghanistan are holding up and what China and America are pushing for (with the minor safe prediction that China will make more rational choices in that situation than America will).
Predicting everything from Sharif stabilization to Army stabilization to complete anarchy is not really a prediction, its many contradictory predictions. That is where I am right now.
Add your predictions. The more concrete the better.
Pakistan Retrospects its Reality
This is from a column by Khaled Ahmed, a Pakistani political analyst.
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Every year,December 16 is observed in Pakistan as a moment of morose stocktaking,in which India is held responsible for the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. However,over the years,the Pakistani media has taken to mixing the message. It now balances the short-term culpability of India with the long-term culpability of Pakistan.
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But the media in Pakistan has mixed the message more than usual this time. The “secret” Hamoodur Rehman Commission report on the atrocities committed by the Pakistan army in East Pakistan in 1971 has been taken out of the state’s closet of collective conscience and quoted to great effect.
Unread books by honest military officers are now being quoted to the embarrassment of the Jamaat
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The idea of imposing Urdu on East Pakistan was born in the mind of a non-Bengali education secretary of East Pakistan,F.A. Karim,who was able to convince a dimwit Bengali central education minister in Karachi,Fazlur Rehman,to adopt it. It also caught the imagination of the governor of East Pakistan,Malik Feroz Khan Noon,not the brightest son of Punjab. He started the scheme of writing Bengali in the Arabic script. By 1952,there were 21 centres doing this in East Pakistan,funded by the central education ministry. The East Pakistan chief minister didn’t even know that this was happening outside the primary school stream.
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More significantly,the book called into question the “victories” against India in 1948 and 1965. The first war failed to achieve its objective because “we caved in without consolidating initial success”. The second war was first opposed by General Musa and General Ayub,but after they agreed to it,no authentic information was obtained about the “sympathetic” Kashmiri insurgency,and wrong assumptions were made about India’s capabilities of launching a major offensive across the international border.
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Here is the climax of the book: “[Enter Commander,East Pakistan,General Niazi,wearing a pistol holster on his web belt. Niazi became abusive and started raving. Breaking into Urdu,he said: ‘Main iss haramzadi qaum ki nasal badal doon ga (I will change the race of this bastard nation).’”
Raja adds: “He threatened that he would let his soldiers loose on their womenfolk. There was pin-drop silence at these remarks. The next morning,we were given the sad news. A Bengali officer,Major Mushtaq,went into a bathroom at the command headquarters and shot himself in the head.”
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The ex-foreign minister of Bangladesh,Kamal Hossain,in Bangladesh: Quest for freedom and Justice (2013),reports a conversation with Pakistan’s former foreign minister,Aziz Ahmed: “When pressed to suggest what should be done to those (Biharis) who were clearly eligible and entitled to go to Pakistan,but whom Pakistan was not willing to accept,Aziz Ahmed turned round and said,‘Why don’t you push them into India?’ When told that this was hardly feasible,he retorted,‘Then push them into the Bay of Bengal’.”
http://indianexpress.com/article/opi...tan-1971-2/99/
Pakistan crisis puts army back in the driving seat
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Pakistan crisis puts army back in the driving seat
Besieged Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has been assured by the country's military there will be no coup, but in return he must "share space with the army", according to a government source who was privy to recent talks between the two sides.
Last week, as tens of thousands of protesters advanced on the Pakistani capital to demand his resignation, Sharif dispatched two emissaries to consult with the army chief.
He wanted to know if the military was quietly engineering the twin protest movements by cricket star-turned-politician Imran Khan and activist cleric Tahir ul-Qadri, or if, perhaps, it was preparing to stage a coup.
http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/0...0QP5F720140819
Pakistan once again has lived up to its reputation as the 'sick man of Asia'.
Once again, democracy is tottering and the Army is easing itself in the saddle, but this time in a more 'gentlemanly' and benign way.
If again the Army takes control, then it will prove that there is something in the saying 'born under an unlucky star' because it will be the second time the democratically elected Nawaz Sharif getting unseated by the Army.
Nawaz Sharif has been a moderate face of Pakistan and so obviously that is not to the comfort of the Pakistan Army which has milked Pakistan dry with the handle of Kashmir and anti India rhetoric.
Pakistan conveniently forgets United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 which recommended that in order to ensure the impartiality of the plebiscite Pakistan withdraw all tribesmen and nationals who entered the region for the purpose of fighting and that India leave only the minimum number of troops needed to keep civil order.
Pakistan ignored the UN mandate, did not withdraw its troops and claimed the withdrawal of Indian forces was a prerequisite as per this resolution.
Pakistan failing to honour the UN resolution on Plebiscite apart, the Anti India histrionic calmed, which Sharif tried, then where would be the raison d'etre for the pampering and molly coddling the Army at the expense of the people of Pakistan, who are wallowing under the weight of poverty, insurrection, terrorism, sectarian violence and what have you?
One wonders why democracy cannot survive in Pakistan, when it is alive and kicking in India, with the Army having no say in the running of the State?
After all, India and Pakistan have a shared lineage.
And there are good people in India and Pakistan.
Then, where does the disconnect in Pakistan emanate from?
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Gentlemen’s Club – Military’s Maneuvers in Pakistan
Hamid Hussain has provided his viewpoint on the current scene in Pakistan, it is on the five page attachment.
He ends with:
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In my view three critical issues are casualty of current crisis. Country’s weak economy got another punch in the rib with flight of capital and in short term there is no likelihood of outside investment. Current crisis is distracting both civil and military authorities from fight against militancy which is now an existential threat. One issue which is below the radar and no one is paying attention to is that country is sleep walking into the sectarian conflict of the Middle East. It is quite clear that army gave a generous severance package to the leadership of militant organizations operating against India in Kashmir. Many mid level commanders and foot soldiers joined sectarian organizations as well as militants entrenched in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) as well as opening franchises in Southern Punjab, Karachi and Baluchistan. Lucrative outside sources are changing the dynamics and these groups are now heading to greener pastures and killing fields of Middle East that will exacerbate sectarian schism inside the country. This factor has the potential of unraveling the state if not handled in time. Military and civilian leaders have taken several rides on the roller coaster in the last six decades and one expects that now they are mature enough to know the limits of brinkmanship. There will always be friction and disagreements but these should be handled in a more mature way by both parties.
Did a ‘soft coup’ just happen in Pakistan?
A good WaPo commentary, covering "all the bases" as Islamabad reeks of tear gas and rubber bullets fly:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/...n-in-pakistan/
BBC on the tear gas plus:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-29000563
Cricketeer & Cleric radicalised to revolutionaries
The antics in Islamabad of the cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan and a usually in Canada cult religious leader Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri almost defy understanding - with a few thousand angry supporters - so this WoTR column by Myra McDonald helps to explain:http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/in-...coup-stalls/#_
Revolutionaries at the behest of the military establishment, well OK "usefulk idiots" is more appropriate:
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In the run-up to the elections, Pakistani media suggested that Khan was a particular favourite of Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha, then head of the ISI. The former cricketer, not well known for his critical thinking, happily espoused the army narrative that all of Pakistan’s problems could be blamed on its corrupt politicians, while disregarding the military’s own powerful role in setting policy.
Maybe it is now Nawaz Sharif's moment, after all he is the Prime Minister.
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2014 in Review & the Year Ahead – the Pakistan Army in 2014-15
Our regular correspondent on Pakistan and the Pakistani Srmy, Hamid Hussain has contributed a lengthy (five page) commentary, which is on the attachment. One section has been copied to the ISI thread as it refers to the Director General.
Recent Books on Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan
Probable' Pakistan knew of Bin Laden's whereabouts
Ret'd General Durrani was interviewed for Head to Head in Doha, not the Oxford Union and it is likely to be broadcast in April. Meantime somehow parts have become public:http://www.politico.com/story/2015/0...ni-115063.html
There is a thread here on the OBL raid and the Pakistani investigation:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=18472
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A History of Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections
I'd not heard of this book until the occassional SWC contributor Hamid Hussain sent a review (on the attachment). He starts with:
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Brian Cloughley’s A History of Pakistan Army is the fourth edition of a book originally written in 1999. Fourth edition adds many new chapters especially tenures of General Pervez Mussharraf and General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. Author is one of few foreigners with long association with some senior Pakistani officers going back to early 1980s. This gives the author an advantage to draw on his personal associations.
Book is a comprehensive review of history of Pakistan army starting from 1947 when country gained independence. It documents journey of Pakistan army over six decades.
A History of Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections by Brian Cloughley, Fourth Edition. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 588
On Amazon UK no reviews:http://www.amazon.co.uk/History-Paki...EZMQ91AWWD5JAQ
No reviews on Amazon.com either:A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections
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Marked for Death - Assassination Attempts on Senior Officers of Pakistan Army
Hamid Hussain our occassional SWC contributor has a short paper on this aspect, which IMHO is a strange price to pay when the Pakistani state has "relations" with a good number of its jihadist enemies. See the attachment.
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Someone asked about a little known aspect of current conflict and following was my response. On every trip to Pakistan, I visit local military graveyards and on every visit I see new and fresh graves of fallen soldiers.
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The late Colonel Sultan Amir Tarar
An update to the last post by Hamid Hussain our occassional SWC contributor:
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Last circulation of the targeting of senior Pakistani army officers prompted an officer to remind me about late Colonel Sultan Amir Tarar, aka Colonel Imam who was abducted by Pakistani Taliban along with Squadron Leader (R) Khalid Khawaja. Both were later killed by Hakimullah Mahsud (ironically accusing them for working for CIA) who in turn was returned to his maker courtesy of a drone. Monsters usually eat their own creators as well as their own children.
Here is a profile of Colonel Sultan Amir by his friend and colleague and my two cents in red in main text. One small typo error. He was commissioned in 2nd Pathan; now 15 FF.
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How the Pakistani Army explains
On the attachment is an exchange between Hamid Hussain and a ret'd Pakistani Army general, which illustrates how the army thinks. It is in the public domain.
General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan
Sahibzada Yaqub Khan died on Jan 25th 2016 after a long and eventful life. More famous as a diplomat than as a general (he was more of an armchair general, did well with introducing academics into the army but never did anything notable in the field), he was a pillar of the Pakistani establishment. I combined obituaries/notes from Dr Hamid Hussain, Major Amin and a family friend into one blog post.
http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/201...aqub-khan.html
Excerpt:
..Of course, Sahibzada sahib's career as Bhutto's ambassador to several great powers, as Zia's foreign minister, then as the establishment's chosen foreign minister to keep Benazir in check, and then as Musharraf's envoy to justify his coup, all indicate that he was a solid and upstanding member of Pakistan's ruling elite and was comfortable with military rule, and with the foreign policy priorities of the Zia and Musharraf regimes (including the jihad in Afghanistan and its softer version in the Musharraf era). He was also highly educated and well read and had an impressive personality that a lot of people remember with awe. And of course, he got high praise from people like Nixon and Kissinger. One imagines that had he been born into the elite of a great power (instead of being born into the fading North Indian Muslim elite) he could have been an Edward Grey, though probably not a Curzon or Palmerston...
..
Yaqub’s critics point to three incidents pertaining to three different times of his life. First is when he was in Kashmir war in 1947-48. Yaqub was ordered to rescue a small picket surrounded by Indians. He was a thinking officer and kept calculating his own likely action and enemy’s possible reaction. In the meantime, Indians overran the picket. Second was when he refused to carry out military action against Bengalis when he was commander of Eastern Command. Yaqub was sacked from the army for his refusal. At that time, almost all officers regardless of their rank and social background denounced Yaqub. Later, with hindsight, some changed their mind and thought Yaqub did the right thing. Third criticism relates to his post retirement career. He served at important ambassadorial positions under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and later served as Foreign Minister of Bhutto’s executioner General Muhammad Zia ul Haq without any qualms.
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Pakistan Army Military Operations – Summary
Hamid Hussain our occassional SWC contributor has a short paper, which is on the attached PDF (3 pgs).
Picking Pakistan's next top general
Shashank Joshi's article on Nawaz Sharif's choice - due in November - via the Australian Lowy Institute:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...p-general.aspx
A Pakistani satirist, who Shashank cites, has a different viewpoint:
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The once all-powerful Pakistan army has now retreated to only controlling the foreign policy, the ISI, all aspects of internal and external security, beating up errant journalists, extra judicial killings, policymaking in sensitive provinces like Balochistan, wheeling-dealings with all manner of ‘non-state actors’, and the nuke button. Some would say that Pakistan Army has even been rendered toothless — the power to unilaterally nuke India and getting Pakistan annihilated in subsequent Indian retaliation is hardly a symbol of power or a compensation for the inability to freely conduct coups.
How Pakistan’s Military Monopolised State Resources For Personal Use
A book review by an Indian "lurker" on this controversial author; the review starts with:
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In 2007, Ayesha Siddiqa touched a raw nerve by publishing Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. Then Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf branded her a traitor, blocked the book launch, threatened to try her for treason and hounded her out of the country. Her crime was documenting the Pakistani military’s business involvement (“Milbus”) at the cost of the public economy. The 2017 edition of Military Inc. adds details from the post-Musharraf era and concludes that Milbus has become a permanent feature now. There is also widespread public and media acceptance of Milbus through the Pakistan military’s successful efforts in brushing up its image as the most trustworthy security guardian even under civilian rule. According to her, “In post 2007 Pakistan, military power is more intensely entrenched”.
(Ends with) By 2016, the Milbus in Pakistan “seemed unstoppable” since the army was perceived as the only credible national institution for guarding national security, fighting terrorism and intervening domestically to be a “counterweight to the corrupt, unaccountable and inefficient image of the political class”. This has boosted the army’s media image. This was also because “all political, religious and ethnic parties have over the years developed a dependency on the military”.
Link:https://thewire.in/123455/pakistan-m...yesha-siddiqa/
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Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan
A commentary by Hamid Hussain, a SWJ contributor. The full title being: Past is Prologue – New Ebb in Civil-Military Relations of Pakistan. It is too long for here, so is on the attachment.
One passage should alert the reader:
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A look at the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) today may provide some more scary lessons. A dominant military dictated its wishes to civilians, with approval ratings of over ninety percent and admired and trusted by the general populace. Along comes a politician with only forty percent of the votes and a reasonable governance recipe. The TAF refused to adjust to this changed environment and a group of officers jumped the gun. The revenge was swift and brutal. The TAF was decapitated from the top with over forty percent of generals and admirals sacked and jailed, from the middle racks were eviscerated with the sacking of over 500 Colonels and dozens of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) booted out. The TAF is now a shadow of itself. Pakistan’s ‘Erdogan moment’ is not in near future; however nobody would have also predicted the fate of TAF just five years ago.
Two very different comments
A commentary on Anglo-Pakistani military relations by a Pakistani analyst @ RUSI, which is sub-titled:
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The long relationship between the British and Pakistani armies is transforming, from one based mostly on pomp, ceremony and personal friendships, to one based on shared strategic interests.
Link:https://rusi.org/sites/default/files...alam_final.pdf
Personally I found the article strange and concluded that it will be the Pakistanis who are chuckling at this relationship.
Hat tip to WoTR for this first-hand account of an officially sponsored trip by American analysts to North Waziristan, which sees things differently. It ends with:
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Indeed, one of the deepest disconnects in U.S.-Pakistan relations is rooted in threat perceptions. The Haqqani Network is America’s enemy and Pakistan’s asset. The Pakistani Taliban is also America’s enemy — but an enemy of much greater priority for Pakistan. This fundamental divide was thrown into sharp relief on a visit to a restive locale that provided a tantalizing glimpse of how much better things could become — but also a humbling reminder about the fragility of the progress that has been made there.
Link:https://warontherocks.com/2017/12/pr...th-waziristan/
From key Pakistani general to ISIS terrorist ‘killed’ in Jihad
A puzzling article by a former Pakistani diplomat in an Indian newspaper; the full title being 'From key Pakistani general to ISIS terrorist ‘killed’ in Jihad, the chilling saga of Shahid Aziz'. It starts with:
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It is very unusual for retired senior officers of a professional military to end up fighting alongside militants attacking soldiers they once commanded. But the recently reported saga of retired Lt. General Shahid Aziz — whose 37-year service in the Pakistan army included postings as director-general military operations, chief of general staff from October 2001 to December 2003, and commander of the IV Corps in Lahore from December 2003 to October 2005 — points to the hazard of allowing ideology to supercede professionalism in a modern military.
Other officers get a mention too - for being wayward.
Link:https://theprint.in/opinion/from-key...id-aziz/63221/
Book Review - Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace
This book featuring a long retired ISI Director and a ret'd RAW Director has aroused controversy in Pakistan, with their ex-soldier being stopped from leaving and is to face an inquiry. Below is a review by Hamid Hussain, our occasional contributor.
The full title is: Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace. A. S. Dulat, Assad Durrani and Aditya Sinha (Delhi: Harper Collins), 2018.
This book is neither a memoir nor an organized attempt to explain a theory. It is essentially a transcript of conversations. It covers India Pakistan relations, Kashmir, Afghanistan and other general regional and international topics. Two informed individuals from rival countries engaged in a candid conversation and some of their views are not fully in line with the official stance of their respective countries.
In view of unresolved issues between India and Pakistan, there have been several international attempts to bring high former officials of both countries together for dialogue. One effort was to bring former intelligence officials of both countries together. This effort called ‘Intel Dialogue’ was organized by the University of Ottawa. Dulat and Durrani met each other during these ‘Track II’ efforts and developed a kind of friendship.
A brief background of Durrani’s career will help readers to understand where he is coming from. He is a gunner officer with no previous intelligence experience. His career up to the rank of Major General was typical of any career officer with normal command, staff and instructional appointments. He is considered a cerebral officer by his peers. In 1988, he was appointed Director Military Intelligence (DMI) by General Mirza Aslam Beg. In 1990, when Benazir Bhutto’s first government was sacked by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, DG ISI Lieutenant General Shamsur Rahman Kallue was also removed from his post. Beg asked Durrani to have additional charge of ISI and for a while Durrani was running both agencies. When a new DMI was appointed, Durrani became the permanent DG ISI, where he served until March 1992. His next two assignments were Director General Military Training & Evaluation and Commandant of National Defence College (now University). In 1993, he was retired from service by army Chief General Abdul Waheed Kakar. In 1994, during the second Benazir Bhutto government, he was appointed ambassador to Germany (May 1994 – May 1997) and during General Musharraf’s government; he served as ambassador to Saudi Arabia (2000-2002). Durrani is not new to controversy. In 1990, he distributed money to politicians of an opposition alliance against Benazir. This was later known as the Asghar Khan case and the Supreme Court is currently hearing this case.
In Pakistan, retired officers are usually kept at arm’s length from current events. They may gather some general information when interacting with serving officers during re-unions. In general, General Head Quarters (GHQ) discourages the interaction of retired senior officers with serving officers outside of normal accepted norms. If someone shows indiscretion, then a message is quietly sent and many serving officers will avoid such senior officers like plague as it can jeopardize their career. Durrani retired from active service twenty-five years ago; therefore he is not privy to any classified information or details of current policies. He was part of the ‘Track II’ parleys. In some cases, members of Track II parleys are given informal general briefing about policy lines but in his case no such briefing was ever provided by GHQ. His credentials make him a good spokesperson for army’s point of view to international audience but there was never any direct line of communication with GHQ.
Durrani is candid about his approach. He admits that after retirement, he was exposed to the views of other people. He reflected on the difference between his own information and what others said. The conversation in this book is simply the outcome of that reflection. Others have the right to agree or disagree with his point of view.
Dulat and Durrani advocate for renewed efforts to start the India and Pakistan dialogue. The most interesting part is their perceptions about the American role in India-Pakistan rivalry. Durrani believes that American policies have had a negative impact on Pakistan and the country’s interests clash with American interests especially in the Afghanistan theatre. He views Washington’s closeness to Delhi as detrimental to Pakistan. On the other hand, Dulat believes that Washington still has a soft corner for Pakistan and if only Washington can steer away from Pakistan then Pakistan may change its policy. Dulat also believes that American defence establishment has a close relationship with the Pakistan army and this gives Pakistan a distinct advantage. In some cases, Washington comes in to defend Pakistan asking India to show restraint. Dulat recalls a 2003 meeting with CIA’s Director of Counter Terrorism Cofer Black who told him that ‘we are putting pressure on the Pakistanis to behave, so we hope you won’t do anything silly’.
On 03 March 2016, Pakistan announced arrest of a RAW officer Kulbhushan Jhadav. He was operating from Iran and Pakistan announced his arrest when Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was visiting Pakistan with a high-powered delegation. Iran and Pakistan have problems on various issues but usually governments try not to make them public to avoid deterioration of relations. Army Chief General Raheel Sharif (2013-2016) in his meeting with Rouhani raised this issue of RAW using Iranian soil. This was the right forum to raise the issue but surprisingly the army leaked this to the media. In a press conference, Rouhani was put on the spot and asked if this issue was discussed. Iran has very close relations with India and Tehran walks a fine line. Rouhani while admitting there were talks on wide ranging issues denies that this issue was discussed. Army’s spokesperson, Lieutenant General Asim Saleem Bajwa promptly released the transcript of the meeting to public while Rouhani was still in Pakistan embarrassing Iran. Durrani is of the view that ‘we should not have broached it with the poor Iranian President while he was an honoured guest. And it was embarrassing that this faux pas was committed by the army chief’. He does not elaborate on why it was done? I have my own opinion based on information at that time and later developments. At that time, many Pakistani officers expressed surprise to me and were confused about the army’s logic as these actions looked like a deliberate effort to sabotage Rouhani’s visit. I had come to know some early but not clear information in the spring of 2016 about Raheel’s parleys with new Saudi leadership. Pakistani army chiefs visited Saudi Arabia and meet with senior Royal family members and this is nothing new but in case of Raheel something was different. Raheel was retiring in November 2016 and working on either getting an extension or a Field Marshal rank. The Saudis were working on an anti-Iran alliance and negotiating with Raheel to lead it. There was clearly a conflict of interest case where a serving army Chief was negotiating his own lucrative post-retirement package with a foreign government. In my view, Raheel did this to earn some brownie points with Saudis. He finally got a golden parachute from Saudis right after his retirement.
Indian Book Review - Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace
No surprise a former Indian intelligence officer (known to the author) weighs in with a review and a devastating "taster":
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At the same time, their remarks on current decision makers or ‘hawkish’ career foreign service off#icials (Part IV: Kabuki) might excite the media, but do not help either country in finding solutions.
Link:https://www.outlookindia.com/magazin...f-spies/300246
I'd heard of the close ISI-Taliban relationship, but missed a RAW defector to the USA in 2004:
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Durrani claims that no ISI man had ‘def#ected’, like from RAW. Quite true. The last big defector, Rabinder Singh, could flee due to RAW’s own intransigence of not handing over the investigation to the IB. But then, no other official espionage agency has been in the swim with terrorists as the ISI. The classic example is ISI stalwart Col. Imam (Sul#tan Amir Tarar) who, along with Naseerullah Babar, had created the Taliban in 1994 with the help of then DGMO Pervez Musharraf, by giving them the entire Pakistani arms cache in Spin Boldak on the Pakistan-Afg#ha#ni#stan border.
A very short explanation:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabind...gence_officer)