Page 1 of 8 123 ... LastLast
Results 1 to 20 of 141

Thread: Pakistani Army commentary

  1. #1
    Council Member wm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    On the Lunatic Fringe
    Posts
    1,237

    Default General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani

    I'd like to get members take on Musharraf's move to make this guy his replacement as the Pakistani army chief.

    Several questions come to mind:
    1. Why did Musharraf see the need to step down?
    2. What do we know about the new guy besides that he's a Punjabi and a USA CGSC graduate?
    3. What are the impacts for OEF in AF?
    4. What are the impacts on the search for UBL/neutralizing of AQ in view of the general belief that the Northwest Tribal regions are a primary launching point for global "Islamic" terrorism?

  2. #2
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    SOCAL
    Posts
    2,148

    Default

    To answer question #1 only, it may have to do with Bhutto's negotiations over her return, amnesty for her on corruption charges, and some sort of power-sharing deal. Maybe he realizes that he already has a tenuous hold over power, and doesn't need anymore heat.

    That's been a hot topic on NPR lately.

    http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/...ow/2423271.cms

  3. #3
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    New York, NY
    Posts
    1,665

    Default

    The need for Musharraf to surrender either the uniform or the presidency was also at the heart of his dispute with the Supreme Court as well, though the issue has gone beyond that to his attempted subversion of the one of the last non-militarized institutions in Pakistani society.

    BBC profile.

  4. #4
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    11,798

    Default Switching roles

    Several questions come to mind:
    1. Why did Musharraf see the need to step down?
    2. What do we know about the new guy besides that he's a Punjabi and a USA CGSC graduate?
    3. What are the impacts for OEF in AF?
    4. What are the impacts on the search for UBL/neutralizing of AQ in view of the general belief that the Northwest Tribal regions are a primary launching point for global "Islamic" terrorism?

    From my "armchair" in the UK:

    1. Musharraf to retain the presidency, not by popular vote, but by national and provincial legislators, had to compromise and step down from Army CoStaff. He assumes that as president he can retain power over the Army, a point many would challenge. Retaining both posts was no longer acceptable, for example Benazir Bhutto's widely reported deal with Musharraf was conditional on him standing down. How the Pakistani electorate will vote early in 2008 is unclear, will a coalition between Musharraf's supporters and Bhutto win?

    2. I've not searched, but somewhere is a commentary on the Pakistani Army hierachy. The Pakistani Security Research Unit at Bradford University, UK maybe be worth checking and Indian sites - like saag.org and satp.org.

    3. None, given Pakistan's stop-go cycle of military action in troublespots, determined by a variety of factors (internal politics, divisions within the Army over who is the enemy, external pressure and currently an apparent reluctance to confront in the lower ranks, let alone fire at extremists).

    4. None, action in the Northern Territories is even more difficult than in North-West Province. The Pakistani state is even weaker there. If UBL is there. In NWFP stop-go remains and confronting AQ is not a top Pakistani priority. I am sceptical that Ms Bhutto as Prime Minister in 2008 would support a US air strike on his location, as reported earlier this week on Al-Jazeera.

    Behind all the rhetoric realistically what can the USA / UK expect from Pakistan in the fight against terrorism?

    davidbfpo

  5. #5
    Council Member wm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    On the Lunatic Fringe
    Posts
    1,237

    Default

    I guess part of my concern relates to the general's last position as chief of ISI, especially with the allegations about ISI and its Taleban/AQ connections. I think this also relates to the on-off phenomenon davidbfpo mentioned. Another concern I have is the impact of his selection on Indo-Pakistani relations, particularly since US-Indian military cooperation seems to be a growth area.. I understand tKiani has had a play in that area in the past as well.

  6. #6
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    11,798

    Default Indian profile of the General

    http://www.saag.org/papers24/paper2399.html

    This makes interesting reading and downplays the ISI role as he was / is a Musharraf appointee. Happy reading.

    davidbfpo

  7. #7
    Council Member wm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    On the Lunatic Fringe
    Posts
    1,237

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    http://www.saag.org/papers24/paper2399.html

    This makes interesting reading and downplays the ISI role as he was / is a Musharraf appointee. Happy reading.

    davidbfpo
    I concur that it is interesting reading. Besides the downplay of the ISI post you mentioned, also conspicuous by its absence is any mention of his role during the India-Pakistan crisis as described here.

  8. #8
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    11,798

    Default Calming two militaries?

    I'd say the absence of the Kargil episode, when India and Pakistani's confrontation went lethal up in the mountains, in the Indian analysts piece, indicates this episode is being hidden. It serves both nation's interests to play down the history of confrontation and preserve peace.

    I recall a public briefing in London, where a Pakistani general stated the local forces, i.e. para-miltary and local garrisons, could not cope with demands to confront militants. Higher grade troops, up to 80,000, were re-deployed from the Indian border.

    If Pakistan was to take military action in NWFP and elsewhere having a calm border with India is required. More likely is the need to deploy the army for the forthcoming general election.

    Back to my armchair

    davidbfpo

  9. #9
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Feb 2007
    Posts
    16

    Default Musharaff's Smart Move: Kiyani's Appointment

    General Musharaff, under enormous pressure from both within and without Pakistan, has accepted the fact that the U.S. will not support him if he declares martial law in order to remain both Pakistan’s COAS and President. Ignoring the U.S. administration isn’t an option either if the generous cash flow is to continue that has helped Pakistan revitalize its economy. Yet, as with previous Pakistani leaders, Musharaff has a hard time giving up the kursi (Urdu for “chair”). To seek, and win, another five year term as President (which is now a done deal, although the Supreme Court hearing of petitions is a temporary hitch to the plan) is the way Musharaff sees himself holding on. Although, removing his uniform as COAS will diminish his grip on power, ensuring that the new COAS is a strong ally is one way to try to maintain a revised status quo (and to stay safe).

    It appears Musharaff had both luck and the good sense to tap Kiyani –who just got his 4th star along with General Majid—as the new VCOAS while retiring General Ahsan Saleem Hayat on Oct 8th. As luck would have it, Kiyani has the seniority to justify his appointment. Historically, COAS’s were always deep selected from amongst the more junior flag ranks based on a perception (proven false) that they would --out of gratitude?-- act like sycophants, only to have these “appointees” launch coups of their own (like Zia and Musharaff, the two with the longest tenures in power besides Ayub).

    Kiyani has a reputation for being both competent and loyal. Furthermore, notwithstanding the dismal results of the Pak army’s strategy in the Tribal belt, especially in South and North Waziristan, he has proven to be effective at coordinating the various entities in hunting down Islamists, especially those behind the Musharaff assassination attempts. His reward: Directorship of ISI. He is a moderate Muslim in an army that at the lower ranks is morphing into a more conservative institution (read: Islamist sympathizers). He is a uniter based on his ethnicity and background: a Punjabi from the Potowar Plateau region near Jehlum (known as the soldier factory of the country for good reason) and the son of an NCO. The fact that he comes from a relatively humble background at a time when within the NCO ranks morale and disgruntlement with the army leadership is at an all time high, is a morale booster. This is also unprecedented and it gives the lower ranks a glimmer of hope that one day their sons too can hold one of the highest offices in the military.

    Given the ongoing humiliation of the Army in the FATA and the recent Lal Masjid incident (which involved some casualties that were kin of NCOs who had sent their children to its madrassas, both the boys and girls sections), Kiyani as the future COAS would definitely be a much needed morale booster that should not be underestimated. The perception: finally that damn Mohajir (refugee from India) i.e. Musharaff is being replaced by one of us (a Punjabi aka Kayani) and he’s an NCOs boy!

    Kiyani as COAS would be perceived favorably by the Punjabis (the overwhelming majority of the population), by the enlisted ranks, by his fellow officers who admire (and envy) his abilities and by Bhutto, who he served as military secretary in her first term. He will not be appreciated in both Baluchistan and the NWFP (inc FATA) where he is seen as a Musharaff stooge and the architect of the army’s intervention into the FATA, with disastrous effects all round. But his presence will have a soothing/stabilizing effect for the army that also controls Pakistan nuclear arsenal.

    Wana 88

  10. #10
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Thumbs up Good post, Thank you.

    Always great to get the intangibles and nuances.

  11. #11
    Council Member wm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    On the Lunatic Fringe
    Posts
    1,237

    Default

    Nice post. Adds information of the sort I was seeking on this thread

  12. #12
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2006
    Location
    Fort Leavenworth, KS
    Posts
    1,512

    Thumbs up Very cool,

    helps me get a feel for the relationships that must be maintained. I appreciate you providing your insights.
    Best regards, Rob

  13. #13
    Former Member George L. Singleton's Avatar
    Join Date
    Feb 2007
    Location
    South of Mason Dixon Line
    Posts
    498

    Default Pakistan Army sells out new civilian gov't.

    http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/wo...stan.html?_r=1

    Read this that the new head of the Pak Army and his ISI have again caved to the Taliban, whom they outnumber more than 4 to 1 inside Swat, by agreeing to imposition of Sharia Law.

    Damned those bearded 'persons'. They undercut every effort at democracy for Pakistan, and Swat is not a past source of Taliban terrorists, it was flatly invaded by these bums.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-16-2009 at 09:52 AM. Reason: Remove unsuitable word agreement from George below

  14. #14
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Come on George, you and I both know nothing in that

    region is as it it appears. There are always wheels inside of wheels. Can't tell much from a newspaper report. It may take six weeks or six months for the real truth to come out.

    I also need to ask you a favor. We're all grownups and most of us have forgotten more combinations of cuss words than we can remember but we do try to not use them here; It would be helpful if you could do that also.

  15. #15
    Former Member George L. Singleton's Avatar
    Join Date
    Feb 2007
    Location
    South of Mason Dixon Line
    Posts
    498

    Default

    Apologies for my colorful language. We all slip up but shouldn't and I appreciate your comment.

    It [my raw language[ reflected genuine anger as I hear directly, daily from young Pukhtuns being slaughtered in Swat, as well as from highly educated Pukhtun family members here in the States whose opinions and views I believe now, which I failed to believe shortly after 9/11 when I gullibly was willing to believe that one shoe fits all.

    Such "ceasefires" are how we lost bin Laden and his #2 when we first started fighting in Afghanistan. Just last year at this same time another such bogus cease fire allowed the Taliban, and al Qaida, both to maneuver and to be resupplied under the protection of, and by, that really irks me, by, the ISI/Pak Army themselves/itself. Imagine rearming and resupply those who you are supposed to be fighting. Mentioned before and here now the Pukhtun troops in FC and other parts of the Pak Army at lower ranks are both young, more and more "bearded" and undependable, we don't get public reports of troop mutinies but such happens/has happened in last 24 months inside Pakistan.

    **Remember a firefight on the Afghan border last year when allegedly a Pak Major and several of his soliders were allegedly killed by NATO fire from Afghanistan into Pakistan? Those troops were in league with and co-manning together with Taliban fighters the firing pits being used to first and foremost fire across the Duran Line into NATO forces on proper patrol inside Afghanistan. Etc.

    We have similarly had the Pak bearded FC warriors refuse to fight their blood relatives and fellow terrorist verison of Pukhtuns, which is what has the non-terrorist Pukhtuns up in arms against the Taliban, the Pak Army, and the Pak Central Government, in addition to their secondary reason which is their to me [my opinion, to be clear] foolish and vain hope of an "independent" Pukhtun homeland made up of much of Afghanistan and NW Pakistan.

    Here is one small example of Pukhtuns talking on Hujra Online today about Pak troops not fighting Taliban, both being ethnic Pukhtuns all wearing beards....which is not proper miliary decorum even for the Pak Army in today's world, reflecting the bad situation in the manning of today Pak Frontier Corp in N. Paksitan:

    You have pakhtuns there in Swat, all of them with beards and look no different from the Talibaan. If you are a soldier (forget being a civilian) and you are approached by two people, how do you distinguish between a talib and non talib? The talibs are cowards that are hiding among civilians and therefore all these civilian deaths.

    Most of these guys are talibs by day and humans by night and vice versa and if caught and killed; then the public, you and I start shouting that an innocent has died. If all of these guys are innocents then there are no talibs in our area and we all should be happy. But in reality you and I both know that is not the case.

    Innocents and humans have mostly moved away from Swat. They do not care for their lands, shops and houses and would rather live in peaceful punjab and give their children a future than live among the animals called Talibs.

    The army if told to move out, which might very well happen if our only hope, unless you really want FM to represent you and you want to live under his stupidity which he calls Shariah. Trust me, you would rather have the army with all its flaws than the Talibs and their so called Islam....
    http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/showthread.php?t=2295

    This and other on line conversations from today and recent days from inside Swat and elsewhere in adjoining Pakistan are a good read.
    Last edited by George L. Singleton; 02-16-2009 at 05:19 AM.

  16. #16
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,098

    Default

    CEIP, Mar 09: Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan's Transitional Democracy
    The purpose of the present report is to analyze the intelligence agencies’ role in Pakistan’s political life through a better understanding of the agencies’ objectives and mechanisms. Because Pakistan’s civilian governments have been victims of the agencies’ manipulation in the past, the new and very fragile government cannot ignore the decisive role of the intelligence agencies in Pakistani politics if it wants to counter the direct and more subtle manifestations of military control. The domestic political role of intelligence agencies is always a combination of three elements: militarization, comprehensive political surveillance, and state terror. The intensity and relative importance of each component varies over time and according to the specific situations in each country, but all three are always present. Terror as it applies to individuals or groups can be carried out by proxies and is intermittent, but it remains an essential element of the system. An intelligence agency’s reputation for ruthlessness is often as important as its actual efficiency.

    The reform of the intelligence agencies is therefore imperative, and the depoliticization of the intelligence process is as much an element of national reconciliation as of consolidation of power. To achieve its objectives, this report draws on interviews conducted in Pakistan as well as on related literature. It also examines similar attempts at reasserting civilian control over intelligence agencies in two democratizing military dictatorships, Indonesia and Chile. In all three countries, intelligence agencies were—and in the case of Pakistan still are—trying to achieve a similar set of objectives regarding social control, the need to protect the regime against all sources of disturbance, and promoting the passive acceptance of regime policies by the population. Neither Indonesia nor Chile has been completely successful in bringing its intelligence agencies under democratic control but both were forced to reform their intelligence services and simultaneously reduce the scope of military autonomy vis-à-vis elected officials. This is what Pakistan will have to do in order to consolidate its nascent democracy.....
    Complete 109-page paper at the link.

  17. #17
    Former Member George L. Singleton's Avatar
    Join Date
    Feb 2007
    Location
    South of Mason Dixon Line
    Posts
    498

    Default 109 page report link, wow!

    Thanks for the short intro but the link is too much for my decrepit old home pc...will have to wait until I am on my office or the library pc tomorrow to look into that longer report.

    The unique problem Pakistan's ISI has are the ties to radical Taliban and al Qaida, which ISI even with one so far attempt at reorganization under President Zardari appearing to have flopped/failed thus far.

    The head of the Pakitani Army was hand picked by Musharraf, who was his mentor, for what that is worth.

    With 5 attempts on Musharraf's life while he was President
    it is hard to image that Musharraf or his direct proteges would like the Taliban...but who knows?

  18. #18
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    11,798

    Default Pakistani Army commentary

    Attached are three comments provided by an open source analyst, Hamid Hussain, who is based in the USA and writes regularly on such issues. He can be contacted via PM to davidbfpo.

    One concerns: One the forthcoming process for the promotion of general rank officers; Two another the choice of Chief of Staff in 2010 and Three a general comment on the role of the military in COIN.
    Attached Files Attached Files
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 09-05-2009 at 01:26 PM. Reason: Add details of author on 5/9/09 after clarified happy to be id'd and not as anonymous.

  19. #19
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    11,798

    Default Commentary Two

    System only allows one attachment being loaded to a thread and so here is the Chief of Staff paper.
    Attached Files Attached Files
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 08-31-2009 at 08:20 PM.

  20. #20
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    11,798

    Default Commentary Three

    Final one, a more general comment post-Swat valley etc.
    Attached Files Attached Files

Similar Threads

  1. Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success
    By Shek in forum Training & Education
    Replies: 50
    Last Post: 05-16-2010, 06:27 AM
  2. Vietnam's Forgotten Lessons
    By SWJED in forum Training & Education
    Replies: 23
    Last Post: 04-26-2006, 11:50 AM

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •