Nah, you're wrong on this:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
...I believe the reason is because you have officer corps who do not study their profession. Sorry to be harsh, but they are clearly doing something stupid...
Not an Officer Corps guilty of that, many study it and are quite competent. Unfortunately, far too few of that variety become Generals.
Not having been a General, I can't say for sure
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
On reflection Ken, I have met few truly ignorant senior US and UK officers. I would admit, that many are skilled and competent practitioners -which is what we pay taxes for, but when it comes to force development and doctrine, the results are so variable as to indicate some degree of a serious problem. (I believe there is a really good case study to be had with the RAF.)
Where is the disconnect? Aren't generals a self selecting meritocracy? If so, then why do they select the men they do?
However, having observed a number of them rather closely for a great many years, I'll quote one of the best I ever worked for; "All Generals are mediocre. I'm mediocre. If you aren't mediocre or don't act like you are, you'll never be a General. The competition is too stiff and your contemporaries will kill you if you're too good." That bit of introspection was brought on by the fact that his son had recently entered the Officer Basic course as a brand new 2LT and he had told the son "Be good but not too good. If you're too good, your peers will gang up on you." It bothered him a great deal. That, of course, is simplistic and there's more to it than that -- but, in my view, he had a very valid point. Competition for promotion above Major in this Army is brutal.
Edited to add: That quote of his words may not be verbatim but it's pretty close -- been a while. I don't agree with his self assessment, he was a good one, he'd just had a bad and frustrating day. Generals have those too; probably, due to the rank and the responsibility, more of them than most of us. And they aren't allowed to publicly bitch and snivel like the rest of us...
Another good one when I asked him why as a Major he and I had agreed on all the ills of the Army and now, in a position to change some of those things he was just shrugging his shoulders, told me that "You've got to stay in your lane. I can walk with the best of them but if I stick my elbows out too far, I'll get them cut off. If you make people uncomfortable they react defensively and irrationally so you comply with the norms. I don't like that but if I don't behave, they'll just get someone who does. At least I can stop some of the B.S as long as I'm here.."
It has been my observation that most of them change little from Colonel to One Star. The second Star seems to be the crossover point. I've known a few that got to that level and who were exceptionally good in my opinion. Not one of them got picked up for a third Star. I've known a few more that were pretty good and got that third Star but they were not the same persons I'd known at lesser rank. I've known and talked informally to only two four Stars. I thought both were good but the former wasn't a boat rocker. He was the Vice Chief for a while, the other was the Chief of Staff of the Army for a while -- and I'll give both credit, they tried to change things and the second one tried, literally, to shake up the entire Army. He was a boat rocker. He did some great things but much more he wanted to do got stalled and stymied by the bureaucracy, they just waited him out.
That is a debilitating factor in our case; the insistence on rotating as many people as possible through as many jobs as possible and the concomitant fable that any General can do any job. Possibly true but some people do some things better than others, if a guy is too good at a job, they'll move him. Sort of a cutting down the tall Poppy bit. I've had several make the statement to me that "...just about the time I really learned the job, they moved me..." or words to that effect.
Another factor is that while we give our Generals a lot of nice perks, we also really jerk them around. The US Army tries to give the troops at least 90 days warning before a move -- not so with General Officers, I've seen a number moved with literally a days notice. Also been my observation that they frequently do not treat each other well.
So I guess it is indeed a meritocracy -- but a part of that merit entails not trying to be an agent of major change. Sad.
The good news is that most of 'em are good guys and are competent and all of them are smart; they are constrained by a system that rates conformity over innovation and are firm believers that a big part of their job is as Stewards of the Institution; protecting it is seen as very important.
I'd also suggest that a big part of the force structure problem is the overweening bureaucracy that exists in both our armies that are devoted to that function. Having worked with our force Structure crowd on more occasions than I'd like I'm convinced that they have an Eight to Five mentality and are far more concerned with the minutia of the effort than with installing effectiveness. In fairness, they have to cope with a lot of Congressionally mandated rules and ideas (not all of which are law, merely desires expressed as "If you want $$, we think you should..."). Can't say for the UK but in the US Army, the Resource Managers have entirely too much sway; the budget rules -- way too much so...
on generalship and the new FM's
Generals of the US Republic are in many ways similar to those of the Roman Republic. Roman Generals in the Republic age were well trained and capable; all had come up with experience through the ranks of Centurion etc. They lead arguably the finest, best equipped troops in the ancient world. But they were uninspired; they were checked and kept in check by bureaucracy. They were deliberately kept mediocre in order to not let them become a threat to the Republic or to the Senate from whence they came and received appointment. The enemies they faced could all be overcome through the superior organization and execution at the tactical and operational levels by the Legion itself. The General was ancillary. Until they met Hannibal.
Hannibal represents the dynamic, warrior general that cannot be replicated in our system. To defeat Hannibal the Republic eventually had to place more power, freedom of action and duration of Command into the Generals hands. Scipio Africanus became that type, a general who was developed in independent command and given the ability to have a true Commander-in Chief role. Ultimately, and I greatly oversimplify here, this would lead to the end of the Republic as Generals began to see greater and greater autonomy over time leading to the rise of the Caesars.
Ok not the likelihood in the US but the point is the system is designed to create managers. Managers who can and will follow prescriptive actions in order to employ great troops, incredible equipment and assets so as to formulaically defeat any standard adversary.
The problems arise when the Manager Generals face non-standard adversaries, the dynamic warriors those not tied to doctrines and dogmas. In the end victory can still be had but not until the reigns of control are loosened.
The FM’s we use to train ourselves are very good, but they are formulas. Unfortunately many beleive that if you read it and apply liberally to the situation success will occur. FM’s should always be read with a historical study lying right next to it and a working knowledge of practical combat behind. They like the principles of war and other formulas should be used as guidelines and nothing more.
I now step off the soapbox.