Economic Cost of Raiding Strategy
I would suggest exploring the economic costs of raiding and imprisonment. Below is one cost-prison in the state of Massachusetts.
The Cost to Taxpayers
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Overcrowding
- MA prisons are at over 140% of their capacity, with many operating at more than 200% of their intended capacity, and some over 300%.
- As of March 2011, there were 11,388 inmates in 18 facilities managed by the Department of Corrections. That number is projected to grow 26% — to almost 14,000 – by 2019.
- Parole rates in MA have dropped dramatically, from 58% in 2010 to 35% in 2011.
The Cost to Taxpayers
- It costs about $46,000 a year to house just one inmate in MA, 56% more than the national average.
- In 2010, MA spent $514.2 million on prisons, up from $408.6 million in 2001.
- Inmates are far more expensive than parolees and those on probation. In 2008, prisons cost an average of $79 per inmate per day, while it costs only $3 to $8 per individual per day to administer parole or probation services.
- Massachusetts spends nearly $100 million a year on prisoner health care, nearly double the cost from 2001.
Phase 0 Counter-insurgency
I'd like to quote Bob Jones from 2 years ago, FID or COIN? does it matter - Big Difference:
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As to last US COIN; as I have stated on other threads I have come to believe that it is most helpful to look at COIN as Governance. COIN is a condition between a governance and its own populace. When you travel to another country to intervene in the relationship between that governance and populace you are either conducting UW or FID (in US doctrinal terms), depending on which side you are there to assist.
Arguably, viewed in this manner, all governance and every populace in every country is at some level of COIN/Insurgency at all times. Most are bumping along in what I would call "Phase 0". It is only when the government loses the bubble on the populace, that some segment of discontent will rise up from the masses to compete with the government for the support of the populace through illegal and typically violent means. This is when one enters Phase I Insurgency and typically needs to bring in military assistance to help move the conditions back down into Phase 0, or within the Civil government's span of control.
The major points are differentiating "COIN" from UW and FID; and also the introduction of a Phase 0 to "COIN".
Graphically, Phase 0 (and the normative Phases 1-3 of Mao) looked like this to Bob (12-17-2009):
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...1&d=1261104721
More generally, I looked at it using different terms, as so (12-17-2009):
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...6&d=1261107331
My small green "Rule of Law" triangle (under the red "Violence" line) corresponds to Bob's Phase 0 "COIN". The larger blue "Laws of War" area corresponds to Bob's Phases 1-3 "COIN". As Slap points out, TTPs "legal" in a "Laws of War" context are not necessarily "legal" in a "Rule of Law" context.
In terms of the nuts and bolts of it, Bill Moore has pointed up a few basic rules (whether the situation be FID, UW or "COIN") to support the overall concept of Be flexible, be realistic (12-06-2009).
Regards
Mike
Small-Town Cops Pile Up on Useless Military Gear
The title of a 'Wired' article on an issue that lingers around and irregularly returns, as seen in:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15971
The article has information I'd not seen before on the scale of this largesse, if not greed:
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the Fairmount Police Department. It serves 7,000 people in northern Georgia and received 17,145 items from the military. The cops in Issaquah, Washington, a town of 30,000 people, acquired more than 37,000 pieces of gear.
In 2011 alone, more than 700,000 items were transferred to police departments for a total value of $500 million.
Citing a former Seattle PD chief:
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.. having small local police departments go around with tanks and military gear has “a chilling effect on any effort to strengthen the relationship” between the community and the cops. And that’s not the only danger. “There’s no justification for them having that kind of equipment, for one obvious reason, and that is if they have it, they will find a way to use it. And if they use it they will misuse it altogether too many times,” said Stamper.
Link:http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012...tary-gear/all/
Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent Battlespace
Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent Battlespace
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Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs
Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs
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Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs
Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs
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Persistent Area Surveillance
A short PBS video (7 mins):
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A report from the Center for Investigative Reporting and KQED delves into a wide-scale surveillance system being developed for police forces. How can the trade off between safety and privacy be negotiated as technology gets more and more sophisticated?
Link with a transcript:http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/new-p...vacy-concerns/
The system originated from a counter-IED tactic in Iraq, so the clarity of the images has been reduced, so for example a number plate cannot be read. The system is more of a pointer after the event to look at other CCTV. That might explain why no-one has purchased it.
Tom Ridge on DHS mission creep
Within a short article reviewing the growth of the DHS In New Mexico. centred around Albuquerque, are some comments by Tom Ridge, ex-DHS head, which I have not seen before:
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The last thing in the world you want is a Department of Homeland Security involved in a day-to-day basis with traditional and state and local law enforcement. It’s not their role or their function, unless it’s related to terrorist activity.
On "fusion centres":
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I think fusion centers are a great idea. I think the proliferation of fusion centers makes no sense. My vision then was to start with building fusion centers that covered four or five states for all hazards, natural weather events and law enforcement sharing. They’ve gone much beyond that. It would be foolish to build that capacity and limit it exclusively to dealing with terrorism..
APD's deputy responded the rejected the notion that DHS has become too involved in local policing:
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I don’t believe they are taking on too active of a role. We are collaborating with HSI as a force multiplier and we are sharing resources.
Link:http://www.abqjournal.com/390807/new...uparmored.html
Community Policing in a ‘War on Terror’ Environment: More Difficult, More Vital
Community Policing in a ‘War on Terror’ Environment: More Difficult, More Vital
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