Perfect parallel parking problematic?
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Originally Posted by
Umar Al-Mokhtār
is convincing, not coercing, and assisting the local population to not be docile and do something to prevent the TB from committing random acts of terror against them. That was one of the main missions of the CAPs in I Corps: help the locals defend themselves against the local VC.
And that was a spotty performance. It ranged from outstanding to poor. All CAPs and all villages were not created equal -- nor were the opponents of those two all equal throughout all of the I CTZ area. All those parameters were also in a constant state of flux for many reasons. There is no one best answer.
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Actually, both probably should be done in parallel. :D
Agreed to an extent, and, as with the CAPs in VN and as I've seen done elsewhere, I think we're doing that. I submit, however, that given the varying quality of advice and assistance from us, the availability and quantity as well as the willingness of village manpower and then considering the enemy plans, capability and effort locally that the convincing of the bad guys has to take first place to a significant degree; the village self defense can follow closely. :D:D
Based on everything I've read and a few more things
I haven't read but have heard from good sources, I think your assessment is on the mark.
I also strongly agree with you on the facts that, in many cases (and Afghanistan is certainly one), the population has to take second or even third place in the METT-TC assessment; and that a COIN unit has to be able to survive and protect itself in order to protect anyone else. Never let the doctrine lead you into dumb...
Been my observation that most fighting forces will if possible avoid a pitched firefight with any unit that appears to be disciplined, competent and to know what it's doing. That belief matured over many years in strange places -- and even though I'm old and out of it, everything I've read or heard inclines me to believe that is still totally true and is particularly true in the current ME/SA theaters..
Yet, apparently the Taliban (or someone) attacked a fairly competent force that had it's act together. Does that negate my belief? Uh-uh. Bad guys can get bad intel, make stupid frontal assaults and screw up just like we do...
Fortunately, they even tend to foul up a bit more than we do... :cool:
Yep. Reactions in the heat of things often get to be
instinctive or training implanted. We'd all like to do THE right thing but it's not always obvious just what that is...:eek: :confused: :o :cool:
Interesting anecdote. I'd have done the same thing. I left Boot Camp at P.I. over 50 years ago with many things drummed into my head. Two were "If the BAR man gets hit, take his weapon, his ammo and keep moving." and "Don't try to treat, that's the Corpsmans job." Both those things came out of harsh experience in a really big and very busy and brutal war. Both stood me in good stead and I saw their merit in Korea and later in Viet Nam and a couple of other places.
Taking the latter first, the combat Lifesaver Program negates what I was taught and practiced. It is a good thing and I know it's saved lives since it was introduced in the 90s but I do wonder if in major combat it will not be a detriment. Don't know the answer, we'll see -- but it worries me...
On the take the ammo and automatic weapon and move out bit, years later in the Army, after Viet Nam (and I think the 'after' is important) I sometimes was criticized for strongly and constantly pushing variants of that guidance until and even after I retired (some in uniform hate hearing 'guidance' and training stuff from old civilian employees) which I believed and still believe to be correct but it was in conflict particularly with the Ranger and SF communities and the 'never leave anyone behind' mantra. That's a post Viet Nam (Viet Nam induced???) idea and I often wonder about it given a real busy and big war. Again, we'll see...
You may be correct on the terrain aspect giving them enough advantage; though I'm not sure, all things considered and the relative numbers of KIA and probable wounded counted, that events bear them out. Bad guys can flub, too.
Tactical principle violated with leave no man behind
Ken and VMI_Marine, I agree that you have to get out of the kill zone first, then work your way back (if it doesn't result in mission failure) to any casualties. The leave no man behind mantra in some respects is a powerful tool for emboldening Soldiers to fight hard, but in many situations it violates our priorities and pre-empts the use of judgment.
I'm disappointed that an ODA member told VMI he messed up, but I'll assume it was a young ODA member. As VMI stated in his example, it is plain stuipd to jump out in the kill zone.
Every situation must be evaluated on numerous factors, and the leader must make that evaluation in seconds under the toughest conditions. Again I think the mantra makes the decision for the leader; therefore, judgment no longer applies. This may have terrible consequences if we get a tough war with numerous casulaties. The order of priority should remain the mission, your men, and then yourself. This is what we do, if we put ourselves or our men in front of the mission, then what have we become?
I recall getting taught that we were conducting an attack on an objective, you didn't stop and provide aid to the wounded enroute to the objective (you didn't divert combat power). You pressed with the attack, then took care of any casualties on the objective first to reinforce the combat power to resist a counter attack, then went back and collected/treated the remaining casualties. Obviously one needs to use to judgment, but this method seems to me to the most efficient militarily. Unfortunately the "leave no man behind mantra" precludes the use of judgment. On the other hand, it does seem to embolden our Soldiers, and they do (for the most part) live by it. I'm not 100% convinced I want to throw it out, but we need to address it more holistically in our leadership schools.
As for protecting the populace to separate them from the insurgents, if that was the mission, then in my opinion they set up appropriately to accomplish their mission. If they focused on the physical terrain and allowed the insurgents to access the populace, then they would have failed to complete their mission. You can argue the force was too small, but I don't want to get into the game of second guessing. Usually any fight for key terrain is a tough and bloody fight. I appreciate the respect that has been shown to these brave Soldiers throughout this discussion. I have a warm place in my heart for the Herd.
Nice to know. Proves that good units
are good because they do the basics well...
I'm not a fan but it is nice of him to acknowledge
the Army's attempt to be honest about the action.
He provides one quote that many will be inclined to ignore. I think that would be a mistake:
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The report quotes one soldier's view was representative: "These people, they disgust me...Everything about those people up there is disgusting. They're worthless." This is not an attitude that tends to produce productive relationships.
The basic problem with using the GPF in a FID/ SFA roles is not that the leaders cannot learn the TTP and apply them (though we obviously still need to work on that...) nor is is that decent leaders cannot control the actions if not the attitudes of young troops who feel as the quote suggests.
The basic problem is that some people are drawn to the application of force and many of these tend to get into the GPF. Others who see force as a tool to be applied sparingly and only when needed drift into SF or SF like organizations. Two different philosophies and approaches. The second can and will adapt to all cultures; the first is far less likely to adapt and very prone to insist or at some level believe that the other culture must adapt to them or, if it does nor, that said culture is not worth the effort involved.
Those are generalizations of course, with all the standard caveats but I've seen that effect too many places and too many times to discount its importance. To say that the GPF attitude is "look like me or die" is an oversimplification -- but not by much. :wry:
Once the training and education issue is fixed, the GPF problem in COIN will not be the troops who don't care for the culture, mission or location of the effort. The larger problem will be their leaders who feel the same way (no matter how good they are at suppressing or concealing that attitude). That deeply seated attitude affects what gets done and how it's done and the Troops are not insensitive to their boss's real thoughts and beliefs...
We need the GPF to be versed and trained in the TTP of FID /SFA, no question and we're working on that. More importantly, we also need to do our national best to avoid having to commit them to such efforts. Commitment of USAid, SF and other elements in an attempt to forestall future problems is vastly preferable. No matter how much avoidance costs, that effort will almost always be less costly to the US, the Host Nation and the local population than will GPF commitment.
That's a valid point, but ...
I'm trying to think of where that might have appeared in the posts. W.R.T. massing of troops I don't think so, but I'll have to go back and look. Not pertinent to the topic.
As for Wanat, I think I might have compared setting up COPs in Anbar to taking a year and negotiating it with tribal leaders who didn't want to be seen negotiating with anyone because the Taliban might be watching. Dumb idea.
It happened to be different in every case of which I am aware at how it was done in Iraq and thus I mentioned it. My knowledge base is very limited to Anbar (not the balance of Iraq) and thus I must refer to how Marines did so and so in Haditha or Fallujah, or whatever (I do have some Army contacts from Anbar, but they are very limited compared to my Marine contacts). Sorry to offend, but it sounds Niel like there are some raw nerves there. Sorry to have hit one.
As for Anbar, yes, not only did Marines win Anbar, but Army (you) and some very good National Guard troops I know. My respect to them all.