Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

[Hacksaw]

Dark Saga, as others have mentioned the scope of military activities in AFG will change in the coming months, but that was already well in the works.

As for the reporting on this incident, I'll take a mostly right account and consider the military ahead. Too often accounts are mostly wrong and require an inordinate amount of time to correct the record. Better things to do...

On a related note... Did anyone see ADM Mullen interview with Jim Lehrer last night? (link to interview: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/milit...len_07-22.html ) Lehrertook an unusually agressive tone wrt AFG and Iran. Essentially saying... 1) We would like to do more in AFG but we are still mired in IZ 2) We can't possibly consider Iran 'doable' given we can't divert more assets to AFG 3) If you support the current Commander and Chief, how can you do the same if Obama happens to win...etc... In essence Lehrer took a page out of the Congressional Committee SOP and asked questions in the form of a statement. Mullen was cool and corrected the record where appropriate (e.g. where Lehrer read into a response made earlier in the interview). I've always thought of Lehrer as one of the more 'agnostic' members of the media, but the fangs were out last night.

Just food for thought

[Tom Odom]

Latest on the investigation:

Afghan Officials Aided An Attack On U.S. Soldiers

By Eric Schmitt

WASHINGTON — An internal review by the American military has found that a local Afghan police chief and another district leader helped Taliban militants carry out an attack on July 13 in which nine United States soldiers were killed and a remote American outpost in eastern Afghanistan was nearly overrun.

Afghan and American forces had started building the makeshift base just five days before the attack, and villagers repeatedly warned the American troops in that time that militants were plotting a strike, the report found. It said that the warnings did not include details, and that troops never anticipated such a large and well-coordinated attack.

The assault involved some 200 fighters, nearly three times the number of Americans and Afghans defending the site.

As evidence of collusion between the district police chief and the Taliban, the report cited large stocks of weapons and ammunition that were found in the police barracks in the adjacent village of Wanat after the attackers were repelled. The stocks were more than the local 20-officer force would be likely to need, and many of the weapons were dirty and appeared to have been used recently. The police officers were found dressed in “crisp, clean new uniforms,” the report said, and were acting “as if nothing out of the ordinary had occurred.”

The attackers were driven back after a pitched four-hour battle, in which American artillery, warplanes and attack helicopters were ultimately called in. Still, the militants fought in ways that showed imaginative military training, if not sophisticated weapons.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

The alternative is to convince the Taliban to stop doing those clandestine visits and committing random acts of terror to keep the population docile. That's the long hard way to do it -- but it's the only acceptable way.

is convincing, not coercing, and assisting the local population to not be docile and do something to prevent the TB from committing random acts of terror against them. That was one of the main missions of the CAPs in I Corps: help the locals defend themselves against the local VC.

Actually, both probably should be done in parallel.

[Ken White]

is convincing, not coercing, and assisting the local population to not be docile and do something to prevent the TB from committing random acts of terror against them. That was one of the main missions of the CAPs in I Corps: help the locals defend themselves against the local VC.

And that was a spotty performance. It ranged from outstanding to poor. All CAPs and all villages were not created equal -- nor were the opponents of those two all equal throughout all of the I CTZ area. All those parameters were also in a constant state of flux for many reasons. There is no one best answer.

Actually, both probably should be done in parallel.

Agreed to an extent, and, as with the CAPs in VN and as I've seen done elsewhere, I think we're doing that. I submit, however, that given the varying quality of advice and assistance from us, the availability and quantity as well as the willingness of village manpower and then considering the enemy plans, capability and effort locally that the convincing of the bad guys has to take first place to a significant degree; the village self defense can follow closely.

[VMI_Marine]

Stars and Stripes has a redacted copy of the 15-6 on the battle. Part I and Part II.

Initial thoughts:

- The platoon chose to establish its patrol base near the village bazaar, and the OP was on slightly elevated terrain. It sounds to me like they chose not to occupy the dominant terrain features in the area. This was a significant tactical risk, and it is unclear how they tried to mitigate it.

- They assumed that risk in order to locate closer to the population, in order to better separate the insurgents from the population. This is in keeping with the mantra of the population as key terrain which I heard numerous times at JRTC last year. While I agree that in Iraq the population was vastly more important than existing natural terrain features, I don't believe this is the case in Afghanistan. The population is always important, but in AFG the natural key terrain must be taken into account.

- The Paratroopers showed great discipline in their individual actions in the Patrol Base, during stand to, etc. I'm surmising, from what little info I have, that it has a lot to do with why they were not overrun. Individual bravery accounts for a lot, but their disciplined approach to stand to ensured that they were awake, geared up, and ready for the attack.

FM 3-24 says that, "Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be." Certainly we saw that applied in Iraq, but I think Wanat is a counterpoint of sorts. We all know by know that to succeed in COIN you must secure the population, but I think the Battle of Wanat shows that a Counterinsurgent force cannot secure the population if it cannot secure itself. The Troopers of Chosen Co might have been more successful if they had established their VPB more along the lines of a "conventional" strongpoint defense and sacrificed some access to the population in favor of occupying key terrain. Otherwise, try to mitigate the risk by registering indirect fires on key terrain that you are not occupying.

If anyone has information that supports or refutes anything I said above, I'd love to hear it. I feel like this should be a case study in establishing a fixed position in a COIN environment. Unfortunately, the lessons drawn from Wanat are written in our Soldiers' blood, but to me that just makes it that much more important that we absorb those lessons.

[Ken White]

I haven't read but have heard from good sources, I think your assessment is on the mark.

I also strongly agree with you on the facts that, in many cases (and Afghanistan is certainly one), the population has to take second or even third place in the METT-TC assessment; and that a COIN unit has to be able to survive and protect itself in order to protect anyone else. Never let the doctrine lead you into dumb...

Been my observation that most fighting forces will if possible avoid a pitched firefight with any unit that appears to be disciplined, competent and to know what it's doing. That belief matured over many years in strange places -- and even though I'm old and out of it, everything I've read or heard inclines me to believe that is still totally true and is particularly true in the current ME/SA theaters..

Yet, apparently the Taliban (or someone) attacked a fairly competent force that had it's act together. Does that negate my belief? Uh-uh. Bad guys can get bad intel, make stupid frontal assaults and screw up just like we do...

Fortunately, they even tend to foul up a bit more than we do...

[VMI_Marine]

I think they believed that the terrain gave them enough of an advantage to negate the Soldiers' discipline and competence. Events seem to bear that out.

Another thought - the three attempts to reinforce the OP all ran directly to the OP itself. This appears to me to be the equivalent of rushing into the kill zone of a far ambush to reinforce the element in contact. From my couch in a well lit and air-conditioned room, with no one shooting at me, my first thought is to attack and seize key enemy positions, relieving pressure on the defenders at the OP, before seeking to move to the OP proper.

While talking with members of an ODA following an IED attack on my vehicle not far from Camp Blessing and the Waygal Valley, I mentioned that I immediately told the driver to keep going and get us out of the kill zone, even though I knew our gunner had been thrown from the turret. One of the team members thought it was screwed up that I was going to leave the gunner. I told him that it would have done the gunner no good to jump out of the vehicle and immediately get pinned down, if not get hit, in the kill zone. Far better to escape the kill zone and fight back to the casualty. As it was, the vehicle's engine was completely destroyed by the IED, and there was no accompanying ambush, so it was moot.

The gunner was fine, BTW. Just a few scalp lacerations.

[Ken White]

instinctive or training implanted. We'd all like to do THE right thing but it's not always obvious just what that is...

Interesting anecdote. I'd have done the same thing. I left Boot Camp at P.I. over 50 years ago with many things drummed into my head. Two were "If the BAR man gets hit, take his weapon, his ammo and keep moving." and "Don't try to treat, that's the Corpsmans job." Both those things came out of harsh experience in a really big and very busy and brutal war. Both stood me in good stead and I saw their merit in Korea and later in Viet Nam and a couple of other places.

Taking the latter first, the combat Lifesaver Program negates what I was taught and practiced. It is a good thing and I know it's saved lives since it was introduced in the 90s but I do wonder if in major combat it will not be a detriment. Don't know the answer, we'll see -- but it worries me...

On the take the ammo and automatic weapon and move out bit, years later in the Army, after Viet Nam (and I think the 'after' is important) I sometimes was criticized for strongly and constantly pushing variants of that guidance until and even after I retired (some in uniform hate hearing 'guidance' and training stuff from old civilian employees) which I believed and still believe to be correct but it was in conflict particularly with the Ranger and SF communities and the 'never leave anyone behind' mantra. That's a post Viet Nam (Viet Nam induced???) idea and I often wonder about it given a real busy and big war. Again, we'll see...

You may be correct on the terrain aspect giving them enough advantage; though I'm not sure, all things considered and the relative numbers of KIA and probable wounded counted, that events bear them out. Bad guys can flub, too.

[Bill Moore]

Ken and VMI_Marine, I agree that you have to get out of the kill zone first, then work your way back (if it doesn't result in mission failure) to any casualties. The leave no man behind mantra in some respects is a powerful tool for emboldening Soldiers to fight hard, but in many situations it violates our priorities and pre-empts the use of judgment.

I'm disappointed that an ODA member told VMI he messed up, but I'll assume it was a young ODA member. As VMI stated in his example, it is plain stuipd to jump out in the kill zone.

Every situation must be evaluated on numerous factors, and the leader must make that evaluation in seconds under the toughest conditions. Again I think the mantra makes the decision for the leader; therefore, judgment no longer applies. This may have terrible consequences if we get a tough war with numerous casulaties. The order of priority should remain the mission, your men, and then yourself. This is what we do, if we put ourselves or our men in front of the mission, then what have we become?

I recall getting taught that we were conducting an attack on an objective, you didn't stop and provide aid to the wounded enroute to the objective (you didn't divert combat power). You pressed with the attack, then took care of any casualties on the objective first to reinforce the combat power to resist a counter attack, then went back and collected/treated the remaining casualties. Obviously one needs to use to judgment, but this method seems to me to the most efficient militarily. Unfortunately the "leave no man behind mantra" precludes the use of judgment. On the other hand, it does seem to embolden our Soldiers, and they do (for the most part) live by it. I'm not 100% convinced I want to throw it out, but we need to address it more holistically in our leadership schools.

As for protecting the populace to separate them from the insurgents, if that was the mission, then in my opinion they set up appropriately to accomplish their mission. If they focused on the physical terrain and allowed the insurgents to access the populace, then they would have failed to complete their mission. You can argue the force was too small, but I don't want to get into the game of second guessing. Usually any fight for key terrain is a tough and bloody fight. I appreciate the respect that has been shown to these brave Soldiers throughout this discussion. I have a warm place in my heart for the Herd.

[Schmedlap]

On the take the ammo and automatic weapon and move out bit, years later in the Army, after Viet Nam (and I think the 'after' is important) I sometimes was criticized for strongly and constantly pushing variants of that guidance until and even after I retired (some in uniform hate hearing 'guidance' and training stuff from old civilian employees) which I believed and still believe to be correct but it was in conflict particularly with the Ranger and SF communities and the 'never leave anyone behind' mantra. That's a post Viet Nam (Viet Nam induced???) idea and I often wonder about it given a real busy and big war.

I specifically recall this point being emphasized during our train up for OIF III. Whenever a SAW gunner went down, if you were a rifleman, then you swapped out your weapon for his. Months later, when we were deployed, I remember one of our SAW gunners getting shot in the leg and a 19-year-old rifleman in his team promptly swapped out weapons with him. They'll do it if you train them to. Those lessons from Nam weren't forgotten by all units.

[Ken White]

are good because they do the basics well...

[Cavguy]

Summary of the CSI report draft on the battle over at Tom Ricks' blog.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...r_coin_failure

The Army's study of what happened in the Wanat battle a year ago in eastern Afghanistan is even harder on senior U.S. military commanders than I was in my series on it back in February, saying that they didn't understand counterinsurgency doctrine and also that some of their statements about the fight were misleading at best.

The report, which is still in draft form, contradicts a few aspects of the accounts provided by some of the senior officers involved, implicitly raising integrity questions. That's especially significant because two officials at Fort Leavenworth have told me that the Army inspector general's office is investigating how the Wanat incident was reported and reviewed. I also hear that congressional interest in the situation is growing.

The report, which has not been released and was written for the Army's Combat Studies Institute by military historian Douglas Cubbison, finds multiple failures by the battalion and brigade commanders involved, Lt. Col. William Ostlund and Col. Charles Preysler. The core problem, Cubbison writes, is that the battle resulted from "a failure of COIN [counterinsurgency] manifested in a major combat action that although a marked tactical victory, became an operational and strategic defeat." Indeed, the report concludes that the unit's attempts at counterinsurgency were so badly implemented that they "were more likely to foster hostility than reciprocity from the local population."

Interesting ammo for both sides of the COIN debate - COL Gentile can argue that "dogmatic" COIN approach did play a role, and I can confidently state that it isn't the fault of the doctrine, but poor application and understanding.

Of note, is the report praises the combat performance of the troops while questioning the operational concept.

[Ken White]

the Army's attempt to be honest about the action.

He provides one quote that many will be inclined to ignore. I think that would be a mistake:

The report quotes one soldier's view was representative: "These people, they disgust me...Everything about those people up there is disgusting. They're worthless." This is not an attitude that tends to produce productive relationships.

The basic problem with using the GPF in a FID/ SFA roles is not that the leaders cannot learn the TTP and apply them (though we obviously still need to work on that...) nor is is that decent leaders cannot control the actions if not the attitudes of young troops who feel as the quote suggests.

The basic problem is that some people are drawn to the application of force and many of these tend to get into the GPF. Others who see force as a tool to be applied sparingly and only when needed drift into SF or SF like organizations. Two different philosophies and approaches. The second can and will adapt to all cultures; the first is far less likely to adapt and very prone to insist or at some level believe that the other culture must adapt to them or, if it does nor, that said culture is not worth the effort involved.

Those are generalizations of course, with all the standard caveats but I've seen that effect too many places and too many times to discount its importance. To say that the GPF attitude is "look like me or die" is an oversimplification -- but not by much.

Once the training and education issue is fixed, the GPF problem in COIN will not be the troops who don't care for the culture, mission or location of the effort. The larger problem will be their leaders who feel the same way (no matter how good they are at suppressing or concealing that attitude). That deeply seated attitude affects what gets done and how it's done and the Troops are not insensitive to their boss's real thoughts and beliefs...

We need the GPF to be versed and trained in the TTP of FID /SFA, no question and we're working on that. More importantly, we also need to do our national best to avoid having to commit them to such efforts. Commitment of USAid, SF and other elements in an attempt to forestall future problems is vastly preferable. No matter how much avoidance costs, that effort will almost always be less costly to the US, the Host Nation and the local population than will GPF commitment.

[IntelTrooper]

The larger problem will be their leaders who feel the same way (no matter how good they are at suppressing or concealing that attitude). That deeply seated attitude affects what gets done and how it's done and the Troops are not insensitive to their boss's real thoughts and beliefs...

Absolutely. I expect young E-3s (and sadly, E-6's and E-7's) to make dumb comments like "F--- these goat f---ers." What is unacceptable was that I saw/heard these kind of statements made in the presence of lieutenants and captains who made no effort to correct that attitude. At that point it is a failure of the officers who should know better (and if they don't, they need to be riding a desk somewhere).

[Danny]

I am currently reading this long report and will hold my thoughts for now. I will weigh in later on his analysis of Wanat, some I agree with thus far and some I do not. It is a well written and comprehensive analysis regardless of agreement or disagreement one might have with any particular bit of it.

As for the issue of massing of troops that Cavguy brougth up earlier, this doesn't surprise me as it has been a mainstay in their mode of operation. I hate to shill for a post I wrote, but this is important:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...ing-of-troops/

In my own analysis of Wanat:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/...ttle-of-wanat/

I was very critical of a number of things that he also criticizes (such as the delay in setting up VPB Wanat and the proximity of OP Topside which caused most of the deaths that awful night), but I didn't criticize the practice of COIN for reasons I will address later after I am finished with his report. I think that it's easy and necessary to provide open and honest critique of TTPs and other inanimate objects, but when it gets personal it's much harder and more subjective.

I wish all of these men well and my respect goes out to them all.

[Cavguy]

Hersch,

A little off topic, but ...

As always, I enjoy your analysis, but find the Marine cheerleading a bit much throughout your blog. I love the marines, fought beside them, but there is a theme that constantly implies everything the Army does is bad and the Marines are always right. Also, the Marines didn't win Anbar, the US Military did. It's hard for me to stomach seeing that constantly in your blog when there were many services, and Army troops from 2004+ made up at least 40% of the troops in Anbar. A small point, but it does disservice to those soldiers from other services who also did quite well there.

Niel

[Danny]

I'm trying to think of where that might have appeared in the posts. W.R.T. massing of troops I don't think so, but I'll have to go back and look. Not pertinent to the topic.

As for Wanat, I think I might have compared setting up COPs in Anbar to taking a year and negotiating it with tribal leaders who didn't want to be seen negotiating with anyone because the Taliban might be watching. Dumb idea.

It happened to be different in every case of which I am aware at how it was done in Iraq and thus I mentioned it. My knowledge base is very limited to Anbar (not the balance of Iraq) and thus I must refer to how Marines did so and so in Haditha or Fallujah, or whatever (I do have some Army contacts from Anbar, but they are very limited compared to my Marine contacts). Sorry to offend, but it sounds Niel like there are some raw nerves there. Sorry to have hit one.

As for Anbar, yes, not only did Marines win Anbar, but Army (you) and some very good National Guard troops I know. My respect to them all.

[Cavguy]

I'm trying to think of where that might have appeared in the posts. W.R.T. massing of troops I don't think so, but I'll have to go back and look. Not pertinent to the topic.

As for Wanat, I think I might have compared setting up COPs in Anbar to taking a year and negotiating it with tribal leaders who didn't want to be seen negotiating with anyone because the Taliban might be watching. Dumb idea.

It happened to be different in every case of which I am aware at how it was done in Iraq and thus I mentioned it. My knowledge base is very limited to Anbar (not the balance of Iraq) and thus I must refer to how Marines did so and so in Haditha or Fallujah, or whatever (I do have some Army contacts from Anbar, but they are very limited compared to my Marine contacts). Sorry to offend, but it sounds Niel like there are some raw nerves there. Sorry to have hit one.

As for Anbar, yes, not only did Marines win Anbar, but Army (you) and some very good National Guard troops I know. My respect to them all.

Thanks. I know that is not what you mean, just how it reads. When you lose 80+ guys in Ramadi during 2006-2007, and transform the AO, it grates a little to hear "The Marines won Anbar". That's my raw nerve. After our article on Ramadi, I see it many places, but often on your blog. Then most of your Afghanistan posts tend to say (paraphrase) the Army should do what the Marines did in Anbar (or Hemland), when the Army has done those kinds of ops. You're not as bad as the guy over at Free Range International, who has some of the best commentary on AStan around but takes every opportunity to bash the Army, which isn't a monolith any more than the Marines are.

Don't get me wrong, I'm extremely hard on the Army for its failures. But the "Marines are always right" them just grates on me, because they're not. No more so than the Army is.

For example, you talk a lot about Marines transforming Fallujah/Haditha, but seldom mention a similar strategy executed successfully in Tal Afar by the Army in 2005 ... the Army knows this too - you would find a better commentary response from Army audiences if you used examples of where the Army did things well rather than chiding them for not being Marines ... different orgs, different culture, different purposes. For example, a look at 3/10 MTN's Afghan deployment of 2006 may be instructive, as it was related in Kilcullen's book.

Just an observation that may broaden your readership.

Also: Snippet from COL MacFarland on the joint effort:

"You old guys need to get over that s--t."

- Young Marine to Marine sergeant major when asked how he felt about fighting alongside an Army unit in Al Anbar, Iraq.

In the March-April 2008 issue of Military Review, Major Niel Smith and I wrote about the accomplishments of the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who fought in Ramadi from June 2006 through February 2007. I would like to elaborate on an important point raised in the article: the Al Anbar campaign was a model of joint operational effectiveness.


Altogether, the joint effort in Ramadi worked because, no matter what service uniforms they wore, professionals dedicated to the mission performed as expected. This professional dedication evinced itself in shared values and shared understanding. It was not uncommon to see Soldiers and Marines march forward side by side in final honors at memorial services for their lost comrades. At times, the helmets atop inverted M4 carbines reflected a mix of Army and Marine Corps camouflage.

...

The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps, each today without peer in its domain of land warfare, have not shared such a strong bond of common experience and understanding since the island campaigns of World War II. The services should nurture those bonds and sustain them over time. Those who share experiences on the battlefield with comrades from sister services can help strengthen these bonds and create closer ones by contributing to the discourse. Articles and other forms of media spawned from joint endeavors, co-written perhaps in cooperative cross-service efforts, will help feed the knowledge base for all services and make us stronger yet as a joint force.

[Danny]

Niel, there are two options for me. I might soon become very much a pro-Army blog if things work out. My son it appears isn't going to re-enlist in the Marines, but an Army recruiter is after him to take a big signing bonus to join up and go SF. If he decides not to do this, I'll shut my blog down.

Tim Lynch is a super nice and great guy and lot's of fun and informative to read. When I see his Oorah stuff I smile and continue reading. You're right. His is some of the best Afghanistan commentary on the web, and it is a must read as far as I am concerned. I don't miss his stuff.

[AdamG]

Somehow, not surprising, particularly for anyone who remembers how the Battle of Mogadishu was going to be buried until
Mark Bowden started researching it.

A military investigation that followed, led by Marine Lt. General Richard Natonski, blamed the deaths in part on dereliction of duty by superior officers of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and called for career-ending reprimands for company, battalion and brigade commanders up the chain.

Those recommendations were approved by Gen. David Petraeus, then chief of U.S. Central Command, which oversees American forces in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Army Secretary James McHugh then tasked Gen. Charles Campbell, the chief of the Army's Forces Command at the time, with reviewing Natonski’s investigation and taking appropriate action regarding the recommended letters of reprimand. After reviewing Natonski’s investigation and meeting with the chain of command, Gen. Campbell concluded that the officers were neither negligent nor derelict and rescinded the letters of reprimand.

Then the Army published their study of the battle – which, according to Dave Brostrom, put a large part of the blame on his son, who commanded the airborne infantry platoon at Wanat.

That report by the Army's Combat Studies Institute is now the official history of the battle, and Brostrom - a retired lieutenant colonel who is about to send his second son into the service – says the report needs to be re-written.

http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/201...battle/?hpt=C1