Some insight taking from the German and Soviet interviews and Finnish observations
If we look at the fundamentals I think we can draw several conclusions concerning effective long-range combat shooting against competent opponents.
Some tentative insight:
1) Only men which are not effectively suppressed can kill effectively over long distances (tautology alert)
2) Only tactical skill, care, patience and camouflage can make detection and thus suppression or death difficult enough, but fierce battles and firefights help the sharpshooters to conceal themselves in the fury of battle (but put them at high HE risk).
3) Only optics allow for effective observation and shooting at longer ranges and under difficult light situations. Binoculars are considered by experienced users essential (as well as NV for night combat). A good spotting scope can be of the greatest value and a periscopes a very useful supplement. (Thermal sights could greatly facilitate observation.)
4) Only one or at the very most two shots are advisable (or possible before death) outside a (major) firefight when good true enemy snipers are on the battlefield. (Modern sound suppressors should make a huge difference. Mitigation of the thermal signature could also be of great importance)
5) Only independent positioning and action allows for truly effective observation and rifle fire during "calm" periods and firefights. (This is linked to camouflage, detection and suppression. Sharpshooters who bunches up with a squad which blasts away can be suppressed with far greater ease than somebody working in front, the rear or on the flanks. )
6) Only a team of sharpshooters can keep up a constant, high standard of observation and readiness over a long period of time and deliver effective rifle fire out to extreme ranges and in adverse conditions (changing side winds, etc.)
... Last but not least ...
7) Only well trained and suited men and women with suitable equipment can be effective sharpshooters. Not too many can be trained for this task(s).
Thoughts:
For the reasons mentioned above, accurate long-range shooting might be delivered better by an independent section at platoon level or even company level or higher than by soldiers in a normal rifle squad. This doesn't mean that a "designated marksman" with a versatile weapon is futile at the squad level. Both the cost of the equipment and the training should be prohibitive...
Firn
Sniping posts copied to here
Moderator's Note
I have copied some of Firn's posts on sniping to this thread, as they are appropriate here and had originally been posted on an Afghan-related tactics thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9942
Warning Armchair General'a opinion follows: Stryker Bn Snipers
I have always thought that the sniper section attached to the Stryker Battalions adds a unique capability which would be better employed at coy level as precision HVT/long range engagement assets rather than as specialised "snipers". Each three man team includes an M24, a 12.7mm M107 and an M4/M203 combo. pool three or four such teams under a section leader and attached to the coy wpns platoon would be force multipliers to be reconed with especially in SBF situations or on defensive operations. They would even be valuable in patrols (assigned to recon elements) with their specialised observation skils as well as providing direct precision fires in MOUT/FIBUA (or FISH & CHIPS) situations esp. the M107 against machine gun/sniper positions for instance.
[/B]Warning Armchair Marksman's opinion follows:[B]
I have a couple of opinions which may or not stand the test of time or criticism but occurred on air farce exercises I was involved with.
Generally the best shots are your most valuable people and there being taking away to become a DM when pre-deployment training is about to start, can occur. This is an issue that needs to be looked at before a deployment but the best made plans.... Just in time training often isn't.
Secondly being given a special weapon, different to the rest of the section whilst good for the individual does leave them singled out, making them a target if the other side has marksmen as well.
Thirdly because of their skills they could be employed as a body guard for the OIC and not used in their proper role.
In my case I was the most skilled and best shot with pistol or rifle out of three squads, so was used with the SNCO to provide fire as required. I had not done DM training but was the most experienced NCO. This is of course what the DM should be used for. I was strong enough in those days to shoot an L2 heavy barrel SLR (FN-HBAR) from the shoulder unassisted but was employed to fire single shots accurately with its bipod at longer ranges and on full automatic as a surprise.
Later on everyone was issued the Steyr AUG. The Steyr AUG is easier and more accurate for the ladies to carry but not my preferred weapon.
I will write a more in-depth comment later, for now I will just post "facts"
I forgot to add the link, the very words led also to this one.
Chances are high that a great deal of the German experience and writing came from the Austrian/German mountain divisions/training centers. The German mountain jaeger were also at least partly skimobile due to basic training in the Alpine environment and fought often in close cooperation with the Finns along the Northern Front (see also the second link). The password "Garmisch-Partenkirchen" denotes a town in the Bavarian Alps with one of the most important training centers of the Mountain Jaeger. Of course the Karelian forests were just one of the environments in which Skitroops fought. The Taiga for example also forced specific adaptions.
The rifles:
While the manual prefers to have the sights on semi-automatic rifles, semi-automatic rifles and scoped ones are often treated as different entities. This makes sense as most German and captured Soviet scoped rifles were operated by bolt-action. The preference to scope the semi-automatic rifles is interesting, perhaps they were simply in many circumstances the better compromise between accuracy and quick shooting (See also the interview of the Austrian snipers, which served also mostly in Mountain divisions IIRC).
The training:
Quote:
In training the individual rifleman, the most important thingis marksmanship. The various firing positions will be practiced with and without skis. Training as sharpshooters with rifles equipped with telescopic sights, and with semiautomatic rifles, will
be particularly stressed. Every man must be trained in the use of the light machine gun and the submachine gun. A knowledge of the most common infantry weapons of the enemy is desirable.
I quoted this again as I missed the part which seems to indicate the better shots of the riflemen should get sharpshooter training and prefer (unscoped) semi-automatic rifles over (unscoped) standard ones. But there something might have been lost in translation as the Germans might have used different terms for the K98k ("Karabiner") and the Gewehr 43 ("Gewehr"). Anyway both would fit at the maxim to get most firepower with good mobility.
Quote:
The guiding factors in selecting personnel for these ski groups are aggressiveness, marksmanship, and proficiency in skiing.
There are also many other interesting aspects detailed in this manual, from the importance of radio to the high need of much fieldcraft. To remain in the realm of firepower the light mortar often seems to have not been worth the weight - a single 81mm mortar with plenty of ammunition (4 akjas à 18 rounds, air-bursting grenades were often desirable, smoke was also carried) was prefered by larger raiding parties (roughly 60 men).
I also forgot to add the second akja of the Squad, which was often pulled behind the rest of the squad (with the SIC tail). The weapons akja was in front. While rifle grenades are clearly included in the first part ("at least one grenade discharger per squad") they are not detailed in the second part. Maybe simply forgotten or sacrificed in larger raining parties for more heavy mortar bombs. With a sighting device with a small spirit bubble and new war-time fuzes the grenadier could engage indirect targets at 300 m (500 m with better quality HE-grenades which allowed for more propellant. The light German 2-inch mortar was of course a better indirect fire choice, but lacked the semidirect firepower of the rifle grenades and was overshadowed by the attached 81 cm.)
Firn
P.S: Of course weight was a big issue even back then - the worth of modern vehicles like the Bandvagn or the Nasu can not be overestimated. Who had the experiences of a long ski march uphill and a nice drive will know why :D
Quote:
In selecting equipment to be taken along, the aim must be to achieve the greatest possible economy in weight. The equipment which will permit the individual soldier to maintain his fighting strength must be based on the tactical requirements of the contemplated action.
Quote:
Originally Posted by First joint Sissi patrol (forum link)
For the first time in our life we (7. mountain division) saw the Finns' so-called Sissi combat and reconnaissance patrol food supplies which consisted - that being for us at that time completely new - to a large extent of concentrated food, which were easy to handle and also transport. Nescafe dried egg pulver, Special chocolate and similar things were given us by the Finns and the weight of our backpack was reduced at least around 2/3. It was interesting, that this food supply was almost exclusively of American origin.
Additional German, British and Japanese WWII manuals are available here