Crack and thump... and beyond
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Our training isn't great (In my opinion) but it is adequate; you asked about crack and thump training -- in US usage that is purely a technique for range estimation. It was taught in WW I and until post Viet Nam -- the ranges in Viet Nam were so short and the number of weapons being fired in most fights made it ineffective. It is often be taught in units and as you inferred, good units will do it and as units go through cycles due to personnel turnover, most are good at one time or another. It may be taught in institutional training now, they've added a bunch of stuff in the last few years. I doubt it, a real fire fight doesn't pose much need for it though it is handy for scouts and to estimate range to artillery or mortars.
So you asked about an esoteric technique which has some value but not enough to warrant spending initial entry time on it for the value derived.
Not sure mediocrity should ever become acceptable... under any circumstances.
Yes well I should have elaborated. Yes the basic 'crack and thump' takes you only so far. (probably as far as the fieldcraft manual envisaged). Here is what the Canadian fieldcraft manual states:
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CRACK AND THUMP
24. When a bullet passes near, one hears two noises: first, the crack of the bullet passing, then the thump of the weapon being fired. The crack is heard before the thump because the bullet travels faster than sound. The thump indicates the direction of the weapon. The
distance to the weapon can be estimated by timing the interval between the crack and the thump. The further away the weapon, the longer the interval between the crack and the thump. The time between the crack and thump at the following ranges is:
a. 300 metres — 2/3 of a second;
b. 600 metres — 1 1/3 seconds; and
c. 900 metres — 2 seconds.
25. Judging the distance to an automatic weapon is slightly more difficult. The last crack and the last thump must be picked out in order to establish the correct automatic weapon range. If the distance is great and the bursts are short, all the cracks of one burst will be heard, followed by the thumps.
Now having found that we needed to train troops in understanding and correctly reacting to the 'crack' we had to take this a stage further and beyond what the fieldcraft manual narrowly envisaged.
Follow this quote from Nick Downie - Brit SAS trained turned war TV camera man. (Who incidentally worked with Lord Richard Cecil the journalist killed while covering operations in Rhodesia:
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The standard tactic when 'assaulting' a known or suspected guerilla position is the sweep-line method described above. The advance is carried out at a slow walk, with little or no prophylactic fire, and, unless there is a particularly sinister-looking piece of scrub, the men depend on good observation and fast reactions. If anything moves, or they glimpse a patch of clothing, they will fire perhaps five or six aimed shots, or, in the case of a machine-gunner, a one-second burst. These contacts take place at a range of between two and ten yards. The killing is usually done by one man alone, although occasionally the next man in the line will join in if he too can see the target. As someone opens fire, everybody else pauses. The ones nearest the firing may flinch at the sudden noise, but most of the others do not even turn their heads.
The sweep-line waits while the body is checked and the weapons removed, and the advance then continues at the same measured pace. Once an enemy presence is confirmed, the Rhodesians continue sweeping back and forth until they are certain that all the guerrillas are either dead or have escaped.
Look at the bold type. It was important for all troops to be absolutely comfortable with the type of 'crack' and when the 'crack' indicated something personal. Clearly we could not accept ever man jack deciding when he felt like taking cover and opening fire. It was all about control and discipline and the stick commanders from L/Cpl to Lt had to enforce that. When more than one stick was joined together to sweep an area (normally under a sgt or officer) it was even more important to keep the line straight and maintain the impetus of the advance.
How did we carry out this training? I can only speak for myself.
The textbook crack and thump dem was carried out under basic training to teach first the crack and thump sounds and then to judge distance to weapon based on the interval and then to try to locate the shooter by the location of the thump. That was done.
What we needed to our troops to be able to differentiate between was the differences of crack from our weapons and theirs AK / RPD. Easy lie on the shooting range or in the bush and have those weapons fired over your head. This with the variant of shooting from very close but not directly over ones head to note the difference (in other wards note yes a weapon has been fired at close range but not at you.)
To indicate when it had really become personal we fired over the heads of troops at probably not more than two foot. Starting with high shots and working down closer until the 2 ft 'experience' when yes the soldier could start to dance around without having been ordered to do so.
OK, so part one, to differentiate between their weapons and ours. Two, at close range is the fire in your direction or in someone else's. If not in your direction hold your ground. And three when it moves from a sound to a 'sensation' then he can take the appropriate action.
To us on Fire Force where contact was made at extremely close ranges this training was vital, as said, to keep the line straight and maintain the impetus of the advance.
This training however would be valuable to all infantrymen likely to come into contact with the enemy.
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What you did not ask about was live fire training, of which we do a great deal, in initial entry institutional training, in unit sustainment training and heavily in pre-deployment training as well as in refresher training conducted in theater. I suspect US troops fire far more than most armies and there's plenty of training wherein the troops learn to diffrentiate near and far misses from the thud of a hit -- even if they don't do crack and thump routinely to ascertain the approximate range to a fired weapon...
I made a note to avoid this topic with you because of the comment you made which seemed to accept a 1-2% casualty rate during training.
Yes there will be some unintended positive consequence arising from live firing exercises. (depending on the type of firing done)
I my case It was a specific outcome that was required and therefore the training was tailor made to achieve the desired aim.
Which unit, which army shoots more or less is unknown to me. We shot a lot despite being continually on operations and enjoying plenty of action.
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It is not a concern to me that troops can decide for themselves -- occasionally with a little NCO assistance -- to seek cover; in fact, I wouldn't have it any other way. You have to give troops responsibility, no need to treat them like children. We tend to value life so we encourage taking cover then deciding whether one needed to do that. It takes about two firefights for the average person to sort that out properly. As they say, it isn't rocket science . It would concern me a great deal if NCO direction was constantly needed on that and other basic skills. In a real firefight, there's way too much noise and confusion for commands to be heard so the troops have to know what to do. We do generally get them to that point before deploying them.
That is obviously a personal opinion.
I couldn't find the US doctrine online and wasn't prepared to pay for a copy of the Brit manual so I settled for the Canadian manual which is available online.
Lets go to Section Battle Drills : Battle Drill Two - Reaction to Effective Enemy Fire (page 5-2-4):
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Execution. Effective enemy fire in this situation is enemy small arms fire which would cause casualties if the section continued on its course.
9. Sections must continue the advance in spite of the noise of fire directed at someone else and regardless of stray rounds amongst them. Most soldiers instinctively drop to the ground when under fire. This action is generally wrong because the enemy usually opens fire when a target is in a place offering little or no cover. The best course is to react effectively, as taught in this battle drill.
So it is then agreed (subject to confirmation through sight of the US doctrine) that the 'every man for himself' any time he likes is generally not a good idea. We on the same page now?
I could go on here Ken but I do believe that it is you who is out of step with the doctrine.
To turn your other argument on its head we had a very low casualty rate with a very high kill rate. The doctrine worked, it was not negotiable and the young kids were able to hold their nerve.