"Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations" (PDF)
To paraphrase one of the Scottish lairds in Braveheart, " A bit less cordial than we're used to";)
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"Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations" (PDF)
To paraphrase one of the Scottish lairds in Braveheart, " A bit less cordial than we're used to";)
Moderator's Note
I found five separate threads in this arena and have merged them after a review. (Ends)
Is anyone familiar with the British C-DICT (Countering Disorder, Insurgency, Criminality, and Terrorism) Theory/Doctrine? If anyone has this document or is familiar with the idea, please help.
Major Strickland, I have a bunch of stuff on this. Need some time to dig it up.
Adam,
I have a full CD on Brit OPTAG materials on COIN including the N. Ireland Bluebook I can send to you snal mail: need a military address sent by email (you have mine)
we have also uused some of this in our company level SOSO series of handbooks you can see on the CALL gateway.
Tom
I have the Brit Bluebook for N. Ireland, but was of the impression that this C-DICT was something new. Is it the same?
Thank you.Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
oneknievelfan@msn.com
adam.strickland@usmc.mil
British counter-insurgency in history: a useful precedent? Ashley Jackson British Army Review
Accurate assessment of British counter-insurgency successes requires abandonment of certain myths relating to military prowess in the application of 'minimum force' and recognition of essential contributions made by non-military agencies using unorthodox means to intimidate insurgents.
"In particular, it is argued that past counter-insurgency campaigns were won not by the British Army on its own, but by an array of security organizations, and that the threat of maximum force and methods of dubious legality were the keys to counter-insurgency success" (p12).
It is essential not to let such myths (for example, that COIN policy aimed to achieve an orderly path to independence rather than to resist decolonization altogether) shape current doctrine: "doctrinal publications must guard against elevating contested historical interpretations to the status of base-line truths" (p13).
From: http://www.mpr.co.uk/archive/schedule/BAR.HTM
This is an excellent article. Highly recommended and refreshing research which goes deeper than "we use beret when the US are patrolling wearing helmets".
Very good post and one with a lesson that I try and pass on: Brit COIN TTPs are the result of trial, successes, and ERRORS over quite a span of colonial and post-colonial episodes. Brit officers I have worked with are generally quite intellectually honest in stating the same thing.
Bottom line: yes, Brit COIN lessons are useful as are Brit COIN TTPs, as long as one goes beyond as Wagram says,BestQuote:
"we use beret when the US are patrolling wearing helmets".
Tom
I read this with much interest, and I found Aylwin-Foster's criticism to be accurate and credible, given his time with coalition. We are still grappling with the problems of centralized control of operations, separating ourselves from the population we seek to aid, and the woes of a shallow bench when it comes to personnel. He is also dead-on with his criticism that the Army's ethos of "can-do" sometimes overshadows critical thinking and judgement regarding situations in theater. Somehow I don't think that is what Powell had in mind when he wrote "optimism is a force multiplier." Great article!
We sit back here and see the changes that should occur in order to acheive any measure of success and I don't know about you guys but I am extremely frustrated at the almost pondering manner in which we seem to move in reaction to the adversary in Iraq. We know what we need to do, the changes that we need to make but we don't. Now, I know that there isn't much we can do to initiate change on the political side of the equation, but on the military/tactical where is the bottleneck? Why do we seem to insist on being predictable? Why are we still using pretty much the same playbook? Or, are we dramtically changing our TTP and I'm just not aware of it? Certainly, the news coming out of Iraq doesn't seem to do anything but get worse. Is it really worse? Rock confused.....
From my turret there is significant resistance to change in war prosecution at the Bn and above level. Obvious examples to the contrary are evident in the past three years, but if you look at Ann Scott Tyson's article in the Washington Post this morning, there are shining examples of BN level leadership that just doesn't get it.
Fighting COIN is a tactial, small unit endeavor. This takes Majors and Lieutenant Colonels out of the common, everyday decision making posture and they don't like it. It certainly isn't the same as a large, Bn sized frontal attack.
Changes are made daily in theater but they're made at the lowest levels. We are very good at tactically adapting to the enemy. We are very poor at capturing tactical keys to success through our professional development periodicals. We're having tough times finding anyone to even submit articles to professional magazines. Why? Because the guys and gals smartest on the subject right now are getting deployed and redeployed every 14 months or so. The last thing most of them want to do is write a bloody article on redeployment.
We're doing a good job of capturing battalion and brigade lessons learned through CALL after deployments. As most of us will acknowledge, however, COIN is a tactical, small unit fight. The lessons learned of battalions and larger, however important to capture, simply won't help the strategic corporal talking to the sheik in the province.
RTK
Thanks for this:
I have been singing that song as loudly as possibe for nearly 6 years. Please join me in another chorus.Quote:
We're doing a good job of capturing battalion and brigade lessons learned through CALL after deployments. As most of us will acknowledge, however, COIN is a tactical, small unit fight. The lessons learned of battalions and larger, however important to capture, simply won't help the strategic corporal talking to the sheik in the province.
Seriously, it is hard for brigade and battalion commanders to accept they in essence facilitate the fight. Some get it. Many don't.
Best
Tom
And this will continue to be a problem, I'm afraid. The Army never quite figured it out during 10+ years in Vietnam.
I brought this issue up recently with some higher ups in CALL. The response was essentially "good idea, when are you going to write a tactical lessons learned book."
I'm working on one in my free time, but I think it would be a subject worthy of someone's full time job right now, especially since we haven't put one out as an army after God knows how many tactical units have gone through twice.
RTK
Email me what you have and we can get started. I am looking for a VOL 7 of the Company-level SOSO series that I started here in late 2004.
Best
Tom
Not an issue.
I believe you know Lester Grau, if I remember correctly from a previous post. I think a great idea is a book much like "The Bear Went Over the Mountain" with historical vignettes and AAR's on real world tactical scenarios. This would take time, I know. I'd like to entertain his audience as someone who has done this type of book before to see what he thinks.
I'm looking for a link to the UK Army Field Manual Vol. 1 - it was referenced in MCIP 3-33.01. I think I also recall something called the UK Land Component Handbook, and would be interested in that as well. Does anyone have the links for these?
Failing that, does anyone know where the Brit liaison at Rucker or Benning is?
The reference is slightly off the mark but it matters not. You are looking for Army Field Manual Vol. 1 Part 10, published in July 2001. Written by Brig (Retd) Gavin Bulloch, the British Army's pre-eminent doctrine writer, it served its purpose and held out until a full review was put in place nearly a year ago. That review is nearly complete and has hit the mark with the internal market, taking on the problems of interventionist COIN, raising the issues of sovereignty and legitimacy, reassessing principles and establishing a new view of the Thompson approach of Engage-Secure-Develop. There are one or two final hurdles to clear and no doubt the challenging views of the Small Wars cogniscenti will hit on things we'd wished we had included but... One of the most obvious and important points I have made is to pick up on Steve Metz's view, again obvious, that insurgency is a strategy. Why important? If you are to counter it, you also need a strategy, not just a presence: being there is not a strategy. And military prowess is, as many contributors have made clear, not enough. If you have access to the Royal United Services Institute website or its August 2007 journal, you can read more about what my team has been up to.
Zombie Thread...Arise!:eek:
The British Approach to Counter-Insurgency: Myths, Realities, and Strategic Challenges, by I.A. Rigden (USAWC Strategy Research Project, 15 March, 2008):
Most of what this paper has to offer is not news to many students, let alone practioners, of COIN. But it is a good read, clear and concise, and we speed readers can digest it in about half an hour without missing anything. If one does not have to time or inclination to read Galula, Trinquiere, et al., this paper might be a worthwhile semi-substitute.Quote:
Modern British doctrine is founded on both myth and historical collective and regimental experience. Considered in the broader context of the total imperial experience a more comprehensive appreciation of counter-insurgency emerges. The realities of the British experience therefore become the premises for a counterinsurgency theory. What the study of the literature and experience suggest is a more general and inclusive list of realties that better define the basis for a comprehensive approach for the twenty-first century. It reveals at least 16 overarching premises that validate the current British principles and highlight areas not currently addressed in the AFM. Taken together these 16 premises constitute a British theory of counterinsurgency.
Colonel Rigden's 16 Premises for COIN (abbreviated extracts):
1. The first premise is that insurgency is war. War is a political act that requires an active decision to initiate it and a clear declaration of intent.
2. The second premise is that every campaign is unique and the nature of the conflict must be understood. It takes time to fully understand the nature of the problem faced and to develop the lines of operation to deal with it.
3. The third first premise is envisioning the long-term post-conflict end-state. As Sir Basil Liddell Hart wrote: “The object of the counter-insurgency war is to attain a better peace – even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.”
4. The fourth premise is that geography matters. World geography and the geography of a particular region is one of the most important factors when trying to understand the nature of the conflict and how to conduct a counter-insurgency. Geography does affect the mindset of the insurgent and the population.
5. The fifth premise is do not fight a war or campaign that you cannot win. There is a potential decision point in the planning or conduct of every war or campaign in which the astute leader may conclude that the costs of success or risks of failure far outweighs the benefits of any success.
6. The sixth premise is the requirement for a clear plan. This is one of Sir Robert Thompson’s five principles and is based on his experience in helping to formulate the Briggs Plan.41 It is an essential factor for success. The plan must, however, be tailored to the peculiar and unique circumstances of the insurgency.
7. The seventh premise is that there is always a learning stage at the beginning of each campaign and that it is vitally important to learn from mistakes quickly. It takes time to understand the nature of each campaign and, in the process of doing so, it is inevitable that some mistakes will be made. [Note: I would not agree with the invocation of Boyd's OODA Loop here].
8. The eighth premise is that politics is the focal point. Politics and war are social phenomena. One key to countering insurgency is therefore to understand the context and nature of the social environment. It is essential to understand what the people’s issues are and what can make them better.
9. The ninth premise is that hearts follow minds in counter-insurgency. In Hanoi in 1956, paraphrasing Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh stated that “The people are like the fish in the sea, they swim with the current.”
Making the people swim in the right direction, the legitimate authority’s current, is the key to winning in counter-insurgency. It is essential to alter their minds to reject the insurgents and accept the justness and legitimacy of the counter-insurgent’s cause and to concurrently win their hearts.
10. The tenth premise is that the requirement for a coordinated multi-agency government approach is paramount to success. This is true for governments externally intervening and for existing internal governments. The overall strategy and ensuing plans must be collaborative and involve multi-agencies and actors using all of the elements of national power of both the supported and supporting governments. In doing this the activities have to be coordinated and synchronized so that they work together and not against one another.
11. The eleventh premise is that it is essential to work within the rule of law. Rule of law is the visible symbol of moral justification. The aim must be to restore the civilian authority and police primacy if it does not already exist. Where it does not exist, the military must shoulder the burden until such time as the relevant civilian and police capabilities can be trained to fulfil their role.
12. The twelfth premise is that counter-insurgents must only use the appropriate force necessary for the situation faced. The appropriate use of force is the minimum amount of force required to achieve a particular legitimate objective. This can range from full scale warfighting against an insurgent base deep in the jungle to the single arrest of an insurgent in an urban area. The British military has relied heavily on flexible Rules of Engagement (ROE) to ensure that only the minimum force necessary is used for each situation. Force must be proportionate and justified and the intent to use force clearly understood.
13. The thirteenth premise is that campaigns must be appropriately resourced to be truly effective. Like all conflicts where fighting is likely, counter-insurgency campaigns are expensive in term of “blood and treasure.” It is, however, the “treasure” element of this equation that is often the most lacking in counter-insurgency campaigns. Such campaigns are often the most expensive to conduct and they generally take longer than conventional warfighting campaigns to conclude.
14. The fourteenth premise is that accurate and timely information and intelligence are essential to success. Insurgency and counter-insurgency both work in the same strategic environment and the currency is intelligence that can be used to act.
15. The fifteenth premise is that the use of indigenous forces is essential to building a an enduring peace for the country concerned. In all British campaigns local indigenous forces have played an important role. They have acted as the backbone of intelligence gathering, police forces and the local military.
16. The sixteenth premise is that every new campaign will face increasing constraints and less freedom in the conduct of operations. The world of the twenty-first century is very different from fifty years ago. The Malayan campaign and Kenya were fought largely out of the glare of the media whereas Iraq and Afghanistan have twenty-four hour news coverage. Conflicts in the nineteenth century were reported weeks later. If history is our guide, this will only become worse and is a significant factor when considering undertaking a counter-insurgency or conducting a counter-insurgency campaign.
Excellent find. A light reading over breakfast and maybe read again later - when printed. Interesting that this article by a British Army officer, studying in the USA and published in the USA. I wonder if it will be re-printed here, perhaps in British Army Review?
I cannot think of an equivalent review of the British experience in counter-terrorism, where the police / law enforcement / intelligence agencies have primacy. An experience with several different strands: Northern Ireland, domestic or mainland (not exclusively Irish) and overseas (e.g. Greece).
Perhaps others (Slap ?) know of a review of the American (inc. Canadian) CT experience?
From my armchair and not being a soldier I cannot comment on whether the military will gain from this. Not that the lessons of Basra will influence readers.
davidbfpo
PS Not sure if Wagram still visits SWC, so will email him to look again.
Good find.
I am somewhat concerned with Norfolk's synopsis of premise 7. Rigden does not limit learning to the start of the campaign. He notes the need for continuous reassessment as the campaign continues. As Rigden, rightly, notes, learning is not a "done once and over" process.
A corollary to premise 7, by the way, is that the fact that one does not make mistakes early on does not preclude the possibility of making mistakes as the campaign progesses.
Hi david, contrary to popular belief the Phoneix program was based primaraly on law enforcement. It is a good example of a LE how to do it approach.
The other was COINTELPRO of the 1960's of domestic spying of the US govt. on US population, good example of what you should not do!!!
more later busy at my day job.
a.) The British Army Review is an excellent publication. It is the sole bastion of real military thought in the UK.. but it's restricted, thus not on the internet. This is real spoiler for those of us who write for it, and a complete choker for everyone else as very few folks get to read it, and the print run in minute. I urge those of you who can write, to submit articles. PM me for the Editors contact details.
b.) British COIN TTPs (unlike our very mediocre platoon tactics manual) are not generally written down, or stay the same for very long, and are very often forgotten, and have to be re-learnt. However, their main strength is that they change very rapidly to adapt to the conditions and threats and get disseminated in detailed pre-deployment training. Thus copying, or mimicking the British Army can lead to disaster unless, you have some deeper context.. and if you're smart then it's not a problem.
To continue The Phoenix Adviser handbook has been posted on here several times and on the front page it designates the SVN National Police as the ones primarily responsible and as I said it was primarily a LE project which was part of CORDS program. During the same time the evil opposite was the COINTELPRO program being run at nearly the same time, supposedly to stop subversion,espionage,etc. in our country.
These two projects are the only ones that I personally know of and have read and or talked to people involved with these programs. One area that I did want to research was the now defunct School of the Americas. All top secret hush,hush so there is probably some good studies stored away somewhere.
Our own John T. Fishel has written(I love all his stuff having been south of the border a couple of times:wry:) and been involved with this in the Central/South American AO so when he reads this I hope he may respond. Do a search on back issues of Military Review and his name will pop up with some really good articles.
There used to be an International Police Academy run out of Washington,D.C. that did some good studies on LE in COIN type situations. Ken White will remember this one. Later Slap
I sense there's a strong revisionist current in the US "COIN community" (for abject lack of a better term) claiming the British aren't so good at COIN after all - and pointing to Basra as the proof. Abu Muqawama was talking about that a few weeks ago. That's part of the whole "patting ourselves on the back" phenomenon I find so aggravating among many American commentators.
To me the key is, as always, proper context. The Northern Ireland policing/stability ops did not prepare the British Army as well for Basra or Helmand as they thought. But one needn't look very hard to see the influence of Robert Thompson types in US doctrine, nor even British influence in how we've handled sectarian relations in Iraq. . .
Definitely an interesting read, Norfolk. Thanks.
Regards,
Matt
You are so right. The first 3-5 years of Northern where chaotic and counter productive. It was only 30 years of hard knocks, that made us any good, and the colonial experience was mostly irrelevant. Basra ran less than 5 years.
- but some Northern Ireland stuff has been very successfully applied in Helmand.
...if you know anything that Thompson said that was either original, insightful and useful, please point me at it.
Wilf,I think Kitson had a lot more to do with Ireland than Thompson. They also had the great advantage of speaking English.
I suspect that you are being rhetorical, but for what its worth:
1. his performance as a practioner in Malaysia;
2. his observations from SVN; and
3. Defeating Communist Insurgency(you may argue that there is 'nothing new or original' in it, that does not detract from the usefulness of the text as a succint analysis and description of an insurgency phenomena).
Cheers
Mark
Not rhetorical in any way. I am well aware of Thompson's reputation, and his written work, some of which I have read. I see both Julian Paget and Frank Kitson as being better writers, practioners and more useful, but based on your advice I may give him another look.
Thank you davidbfpo for having warned me...BAR is such a good read it's a shame it's so hard to find.
I have just acquired an original 1958 copy of the "Conduct of Anti-terrorist Operations in Malaya."
It's brilliantly written and complete antidote to the sort of FM3-24 stuff we see today.
What is more, stuffed in the back of the manual was 4 pages of a typed interview with FM Gerald Templer, hand corrected by someone unknown. I have no idea of how authentic it is, but it is extremely interesting and concerns his view pertaining to the US in Vietnam. It may well be un-published.
I think the interview date is about 1966/7, and it rather stresses the differences, rather than the similarities between Malaya and Vietnam.
He also refers to "hearts and Minds" as a "nauseating phrase"
The CATOM manual bears the name of "Lt Col P.G. Fleming, MA Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry"
Doing some "Googling" I found this,
http://koyli.com/remembrance/ltcolfleming.htm
This seems to be the man, who owned the manual. He only died recently.
Great find, Wilf! Beyond the inherent value of the content itself and the added value of the enclosed interview, the provenance of previous ownership is very interesting.
Wasn't the insurgency in Malaya a very unique case with little to tell about other small wars?
The population situation, the de-colonialization context, the ideological dimension - it looks to me as if that war is only good for good anecdotes (like that the CVR/T) family was allegedly designed to be not too wide to pass the natural rubber plantation's trees in Malaya - those trees were planted orderly in a specific spacing).
I think the CT Ops in Malaya laid the ground work for UK "best practice" for COIN, and that held up under scrutiny until Northern Ireland.
CVR/T copied it's dimensions from the FV-600 series which was used extensively in COIN Ops. In 1951, the FV-600 could withstand a 9kg land mine under any wheel station!!
see PM ; dimensions are off-topic, after all.
Hi everyone
I've been reading this forum with great interest recently, and thought it was time to sign up and post!
I'm currently doing my politics undergrad dissertation at Manchester Uni, which is under the working title of "What does it mean to promote a British school of counterinsurgency?"
This is based largely around the report prepared on Operation Banner that stated the 'model' from NI had successfully been exported to other COIN operations, and been adopted by the US army etc. I realise there has been a lot of criticism for the report online and elsewhere, so wanted to look at what promoting this NI model really means.
I'm interested in looking at it from the following angles:
-What actors within the army are promoting this model (ie those in charge now that were engaged in clandestine operations during the conflict etc.)
-How Operation Banner is portrayed by the British Judicial system and it's reaction
-Changes in military doctrine and the post-cold war need to redefine the role of the army (and whether this is blurring the lines between the traditional role of the army and police enforcement, crowd control etc.)
-The effect the 'War on Terror' has had on discourses on COIN, whether its making it more acceptable to discuss these things, whereas before it was seen in not-so-great a light, and whether it is just a rediscovery of what Frank Kitson suggested 30-odd years ago.
I apologise for the lengthy post, but I'm finding myself lost in a sea of literature on COIN, and would be grateful for any opinions/suggested readings etc.!
Many thanks
James
Do you mean Army Code Publication 71842? If so I know the author and I am sure he would be happy to talk to you.
The report does not assert that the 'model' from NI had successfully been exported to other COIN operations, and been adopted by the US army etc. The Forward makes some claims about the NI experience, but does not say what you say it does. The forward was written by the then CGS, and not the author of the report.
Not sure any are. The report does not develop a "model" that I am aware of. It shows what worked and what did not, in the context it was applied.Quote:
-What actors within the army are promoting this model (ie those in charge now that were engaged in clandestine operations during the conflict etc.)
That's all in the statute books, and ROE.Quote:
-How Operation Banner is portrayed by the British Judicial system and it's reaction
I doubt the accuracy of that statement. The British Army has been doing "crowd control" (without bayonets) for 50-60 years.Quote:
-Changes in military doctrine and the post-cold war need to redefine the role of the army (and whether this is blurring the lines between the traditional role of the army and police enforcement, crowd control etc.)
No one in the British Army "rediscovered" Frank Kitson. He was always well up in the discussions. Yes, COIN has become a fashion fad of late, probably because of the US involvement, but it has always been at the centre of non-US military thought and debate. Many many books were written on COIN prior to 911.Quote:
-The effect the 'War on Terror' has had on discourses on COIN, whether its making it more acceptable to discuss these things, whereas before it was seen in not-so-great a light, and whether it is just a rediscovery of what Frank Kitson suggested 30-odd years ago.
The UK is busy re-writing its COIN doctrine, which will (in the hierarchy of doctrine) slip in under the Stabilisation doctrine. The UK had pretty good COIN doctrine, it is just that few read it, even fewer understood it and there were bugger all resources to resource any of it! :rolleyes:
The new doctrine stresses that the nature of insurgency has changed while its essential character has not. Different ways and means, same ends and purposes.
The new doctrine lists 10 Principles, and increase from the extant 6. For comparison (I have highlighted the new or significantly changed):
New
Primacy of Political Purpose
Unity of Effort
Understand the Human Terrain
Secure the population
Neutralise the Insurgent
Gain and Maintain Popular Support
Operate in Accordance with the Law
Integrate Intelligence
Prepare for the longer term
Learn and Adapt
Old extant since 2007
Political Primacy and Political AIm
Coordinated Government Machinery
Intelligence and Information
Separate the Insurgent from his Support.
Neutralise the Insurgent
Plan for the Longer Term
What is interesting is that as 'Principles', briefings on them tend to encourage their use as a point for discussion and discussion. A welcome change in an organisation known to cherish the orthodoxy. :D
Some points raised:
Primacy of political purpose - whose? In AFG would that be the IRGoA, NATO, US or ?
Unity of effort in a coalition environment (as well as pan government)
Operate in accordance with the law - whose law?
It also looks like we will adopt a Shape Secure Develop model.
RR
Interesting.... Well, the UK Culture Doctrine (JDN 1/09) was really good. Is the new COIN doctrine available online?
Cheers,
Marc
I was sent this by a friend, and while it isn't new information I found it to be a very well done presentation.
It's a ppt presentation that is 7MB in size, so you have been warned. Available here: http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/co...w-clothes.aspx
I didn't see anything controversial or novel about it (which isn't a bad thing), and it kept me engrossed in it for a good 15 minutes. Very slick slideshow balanced by well reasoned content.
Of greatest interest to me was the 'periodic table' of COIN comparing the re-occurrence of COIN principles in British doctrine over the last fifty years+. Also, his 'COIN equation' seemed to be bang-on the mark with regards to reflecting modern COIN thinking. No reactionary or revisionism thoughts here, rather just solid thinking and a few robust models.
For quick reference, his conclusions were as follows:
Quote:
The British military had an enviable COIN reputation
The Empire’s clothes are not entirely new
The Insurgent Equation has changed
The ‘British COIN Model’ is not the panacea
Must use extant resources to counter insurgency
Just run through it once, but there are so many things wrong with this, I just do not know where to begin - Sorry to sound harsh, and if the author is out there PM me!
I know this is .ppt and not a Thesis, so I can only react to the slides.
a.) COIN principles? Why just accept they exist? They clearly do not - and there is no such thing as "COIN theory."
b.) Definitions of COIN? - If you cannot get a clear and useful definition, that may tell you something - which is why current UK "COIN" Doctrine is poor.
c.) The delineation of "Classical", ""re-classical," etc adds nothing and is without evidence. It's also highly selective. Irregular warfare has not changed! We have changed, for reasons that never get touched upon. - Context, context and context.
d.) Instead of this "Purity of the text approach," - quotes from manuals and books - why was there no analysis of why UK "COIN" has previously succeeded and why it now seems less effective? - The UK used to solve the problem and there is no evidence the problem has changed in a way that makes it tactically unfeasible to render a strategic end state.
The UK is not being operationally effective because it simply is not allocating the resources it needs to get the desired strategic end state.
If the UK is screwing up, it's far more likely to be a problem with Commanders, than Doctrine - as no one actually seems to read the doctrine anyway - because it is mostly rubbish... with the exception of Theatre Specific guidance like the CATOM - which I could find no reference to?
Yes the UK has lost it's way, because they gave up being good, not because the problem has changed.
I wouldn't be too hard on the Brits. The fact is, I can't really think of any example of effective military COIN.
The problem with applying the military to COIN is that they tend to think of it as warfare; when in fact, COIN is just internal politics gone very bad.
When the military is applied simply as additional resources and capacity to assist the civil government in regaining a handle on the situation and that same civil government takes to heart that the populace is in an uproar for a reason and seeks to address those failures, you have good COIN.
If you are a foreign army in a foreign land, you are not doing COIN.
If you are an army foreign or domestic, and you believe you have the lead for resolving an insurgency, you are not conducting smart COIN.
British "COIN", like American "COIN" are and were far more about maintaining national interests in foreign lands which creates a natural bias of perspective going in that is virually an "intellectual force field" to getting to "Good COIN."
So whether one is "threat centric" and out to kill all the insurgents to neutralize the threats to ones national interests abroad, of if one is "Populationc-centric" and out to put so much sugar on the government that you have carefully crafted to protect your interests so that the populace does not compain too much or too violently; you are still not conducting COIN in either case.
No, I just can't think of any examples of good military COIN. I can find plenty of examples of military forces being employed against foreign populaces either in support of, or opposition to, their sitting governments in order to either preserve or create opportnities for the national interests of the nations that provided that force. But that is not COIN.
At least not in Bob's World.
Well.
The slides for one are more or less incomprehensible, but as for the overall content I really think this 'if only we could do what we did in Northern Ireland' implication is very unhelpful. Between Northern Ireland and Helmand Province there are scant significant parallels which ought to be guiding our practices.
No-one reads the doctrine. If my official capacity I have never even seen the doctrine, and would make a tentative estimate that no-one on the ground has either, or if they have, they've dismissed it as overly complicated, completely unreadable and largely irrelevant at the ground level in a Helmand village. It is hardly revelatory that a fundamental part of a COIN campaign is good J2, but perhaps another complicated Powerpoint presentation could set about explaining the UK's J2 shortfalls.
The whole implication of the slides is that the doctrine is sound but the carrying out of it is not. But there is nothing to say why not - bugger the doctrine, why are we not as good at it as we used to be? Resources? Complicated command structures? Bureaucracy? Poor use of J2? Inadequate funding or CIVMIL relations? Inadequate traning in the first place? Too kinetically minded? Mission creep? Poor quality commanders? All of the above and more, most likely. Yet identifying these things is not at the crux of this presentation. It more looks at what mistakes have been made, rather than a proper introspective look at why. I very much doubt that the answer is in the official doctrine.
So why say COIN? Thanks to incredibly sloppy thinking the word has lost any merit it may have ever once had.
Irregular Warfare works in exactly the same way as regular does. Defeating the enemy's armed wing denies him the ability to set forth policy using violence and returns to issue to politics and diplomacy. That is what force does. You use it against their force.
If it's not Warfare then why is the US Army involved?Quote:
The problem with applying the military to COIN is that they tend to think of it as warfare; when in fact, COIN is just internal politics gone very bad.
OK, so how in "Bob's World" are people using violence to set forth "political ideas" countered?Quote:
But that is not COIN.
At least not in Bob's World.