Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures'

27 April Washington Post - Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures' by Tom Ricks.

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An active-duty Army officer is publishing a blistering attack on U.S. generals, saying they have botched the war in Iraq and misled Congress about the situation there.

"America's generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq," charges Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, an Iraq veteran who is deputy commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. "The intellectual and moral failures . . . constitute a crisis in American generals."...

The article, "General Failure," is to be published today in Armed Forces Journal and is posted at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198. Its appearance signals the public emergence of a split inside the military between younger, mid-career officers and the top brass.

Many majors and lieutenant colonels have privately expressed anger and frustration with the performance of Gen. Tommy R. Franks, Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno and other top commanders in the war, calling them slow to grasp the realities of the war and overly optimistic in their assessments...

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Armed Forces Journal - A Failure in Generalship by LTC Paul Yingling.

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For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq's grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war.

These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America's general officer corps. America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress...

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"As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war"...

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Not a good sign to say the least. I suspect he will be cashiered at the worst, reprimanded or just left to die on the vine.

I'll be very curious to hear the opinions of the professionals on this board to this article. It's fascinating stuff, and it accurately reflects what I've been told repeatedly by the junior and midlevel officers I've talked to say, but being on the "outside" it's tough to know if these are widely held views.

Wow. Hard to believe LTC Yingling wants to stay on AD after this ... hard to imagine the fury he must be feeling to burn his career this way.

That LTC Yingling would publish this says a lot of good things about his candor, integrity, and belief in selfless service. His is doing what Patton and Eisenhower lacked the fortitude to do in the '20s and '30s (Forging the Thunderbolt: History of the U.s. Army's Armored Forces, 1917-45, Mildred Hanson Gillie).

It also speaks volumes about his frustration and concern for the future of the country as well as the Army.

What also indictates a systemic problem in the Army is that the most likely response from the senior leadership will be to formally or informally punish him, rather than to consider the statements, decisions, and actions by the senior leaders that caused LTC Yingling to write his book and examine what led up to it. Easier to punish a whistle-blower than to fix what got the whistle blown.

This demonstrates that the senior leaders have not learned a fundemental lesson of the media age; when things go wrong, don't cover up, tell the story early, and tell it yourself. Failure to follow this maxim consistently leads to scandal and public embarrassment.

To be completely fair, I haven't read the book (but will) and I don't know LTC Yingling or if there were circumstances that might have caused him to write from 'less than pure' motives (passed over for promotion, black marks in his record - not saying there are, but that I don't know).

He's echoing some of the things that Don Vandergriff has said (both on and off AD) regarding the Army personnel system. This is also the kind of thing you used to see in the old Army& Navy Journal. IMO it's long overdue.

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Originally Posted by Van

To be completely fair, I haven't read the book (but will) and I don't know LTC Yingling or if there were circumstances that might have caused him to write from 'less than pure' motives (passed over for promotion, black marks in his record - not saying there are, but that I don't know).

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I know the man and that is not the case. LTC Yingling maybe one of the smartest individuals I've ever worked around or with. A BN command selectee and SAMS graduate, LTC Yingling is without a doubt one of a handful of officers I would follow anywhere.

Here is a link to a Combat Studies Institute interview of LTC Yingling conducted last September.

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if I had to condense [my advice] into a pithy little bullet it would be: don’t train on finding the enemy; train on finding your friends and they will help you find your enemy.”

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Love this guy!

Tom

Even better...

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RH: The berm was an Iraqi idea?
PY: It was. We got that advice from Mayor Najim and Major General Khorsheed as well as from some Iraqi legislators whom we were in touch with. Although we didn’t quite understand it and it wasn’t something doctrinally that we anticipated doing, it was very good advice. One of the lessons I learned from this was to step outside of my Western skin and see the problem through the Iraqis’ eyes and take their advice when conducting operations because they have a perspective that we just can’t fully appreciate.

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He is making some very serious accusations but, on the whole, I have to agree with a lot of them. I would hope that he will not end up hanging out in the breeze, but I expect that he will. I'm still digesting the article, but I have to agree with what he says about the personelle selection system.


Marc

My last on the interview...which you really do need to read to get a sensing of where the AFJ article comes from as in this:

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PY: The thing the Army institutionally is still struggling to learn is that the most important thing we do in counterinsurgency is building host nation institutions – building security forces, building local government capacity – and yet all our organizations are designed around the least important line of operations: combat operations. There is a real danger in over-determination based on the organization’s design. There’s the old saying, “If you give a man a hammer, he sees every problem as a nail.” Similarly, if you give a unit tanks and Bradleys, they see every problem as a movement to contact. That’s an oversimplification, but it is a problem. I’ve now had two combat tours where I was involved in developing ISF and I’ve been to every Army school you can go to as an officer, and no one has ever talked to me about that challenge. No one has ever given me any classes on how to do that. Thankfully there are a lot of great Elizabeth Hellers (ph) out there and other smart people who are just figuring things out because there are problems and they just have to be solved. The institutional Army, though, has not caught up in either professional education or organizational design with the challenges of counterinsurgency. So as I go into battalion command, I’m going to focus my troops on those tasks and give them the mental models that will allow them to anticipate those problems and solve them. Eventually the institutional Army will catch up and they’ll get that stuff into schools and there will be MTOE positions for security force development and civil-military operations; but until that day I think individual commanders will have to solve that problem on their own, because when we get into theater we certainly have to solve it. Waiting until we get there to understand that those are the problems we have to solve creates a lot of heartache. Our task as senior leaders is to anticipate those challenges and train for them before we have to go fight. That’s my big takeaway on the US side. On the Iraqi side, there’s just no substitute for having great Iraqi leaders whom we were just lucky enough to have. In Malaya the British said, “First you need a man, then you need a plan.” Well, Mayor Najim and Major General Khorsheed were the men and the plan was clear-hold-build, and certainly the most important part of that was the men. We could have done everything exactly as we had done it, but without those two the results would have been very different. In that sense, we were very grateful for their leadership and that was probably the most important part of all this.

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I've got to agree with RTK. Both as a SAMS guys and a future battalion commander, he has some pretty good credentials. I am very impressed with his candor. Since he was involved in Desert Storm, OIF I and most importantly, OIF III with 3 ACR and COL McMasters, he has a broad wealth of experience to call on. I don't see "sour grapes" as the motivation for this article. To be honest, I think he hit the nail on the head.

McMasters and his excellent book, "Dereliction of Duty" does a great job painting the picture of how poorly the General officers of the Vietnam era and the SecDef performed and the resulting diaster for our troops. I'm sure LTC Yingling was influenced by McMasters and felt like his article is highlighting what many junior and mid-level officers see as a major problem today. Take alook at the CSI interview provided by SWJED...its a great read. Alot of good lessons learned in there and you can sense the undercurrent of frustration with the higher ups.

I'm interested to see what the Army reaction is going to be. I'm hoping that cooler heads will prevail and you won't see any repercussions against him. I'd be surprised, however, if he still took command of a battalion this summer. If he is punished in some way, however, it merely proves his point.

Brave man for speaking out like this. I'm finishing up "The Praetorians", the sequal to "The Centurions" and I see alot of the same themes. Generals not wanting to adjust to the new realities of war, unable to demonstrate the mental agility to shift focus and the resulting chaos in which the troops must slog through, paying with blood because of the higher leadership's ineptitute.

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Originally Posted by sullygoarmy

If he is punished in some way, however, it merely proves his point.

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Exactly.

He's only putting to paper what has been said in most every TOC and chow hall in the last 4 years.

While he is obviously passionate about his point of view I think he would have been more persuasive if he had made his argument based on the competing strategies rather than personalities. Gen. Abizaid and Gen. Casey were believers in the "small footprint" strategy. To some degree that strategy worked in Afghanistan and was a failure in Iraq. The failure was not recognizing that the different battle spaces required different strategies.

While Yingling's passionate argument may effect his career, there have been some generals who have advanced because of their willingness to challenge positions of superiors. Norman Schwartzkopf did it as a young officer in Vietnam and Rifle De Long did it as a field grade officer with General Zinni. When you do it, it is important that you be right, obviously.

Yingling says, "Don't train on finding the enemy, train on finding friends and they will help you find your enemy". Fine, and as a dumb civilian, I ask, what does this friendship cost? What's the payback for them for helping to find enemies? Let me guess, they only want equal participation in Democracy, equal rights, equal opportunity, a purple finger and an Iraqi Thomas Jefferson. Of course they want security and I believe any cultivated friendship with a Sunni will have the payoff of identifying Shia' thugs and terrorists or anyone aiding said Shias. That should get the newly found friend first chance at new infractructure and jobs, right? Finding friends circumvents the dynamics of tribalism and religious sects but doesn't solve the problem, nor the problem of AQ playing each against the other. The cooperation of the Anbar Sheikhs is not a reflection of the democratic process or religious compromise. I can't be convinced to the contrary at this point in time. The selling point of COIN as a dynamic component in unifying Iraq into some homogeneous, cohesive, quasi-democratic entity capable of being a strategic friend to the US is still on the proving grounds. I want and hope it succeeds but you folks remain mission specific at this time and are not at the strategic table of foreign policy. I pray you are given a chair at that table. I presume Yingling will be talking to Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi who should be most receptive to him, and I'm not being sarcastic here either, just bitter.

I see that Yingling deployed again in March O5 for a another year's duty in Iraq. I'm wondering why it took such an obviously intelligent man another year to compile his thoughts and feelings into a report and said report manifests just as efforts are under the way to pull the plug on the whole shooting match. As a former L/Cpl and in going along with the format of openess and full disclosure, I would be interested in seeing a nice published report compiled by the rank and file of the Enlisted Men/Women on the Officer Corps in general serving in Iraq and Yingling in particular. They ain't fragging Officers, I know that much but not a whole lot more.

From LTC Yingling's article:

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The choice of making war to achieve a better peace is inherently a value judgment in which the statesman must decide those interests and beliefs worth killing and dying for. The military man is no better qualified than the common citizen to make such judgments. He must therefore confine his input to his area of expertise — the estimation of strategic probabilities…

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Civilian policymakers have neither the expertise nor the inclination to think deeply about strategic probabilities in the distant future…

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This is somewhat reminiscent of a conversation from the movie Dr. Strangelove –

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General Jack D. Ripper: Mandrake, do you recall what Clemenceau once said about war?

Group Capt. Lionel Mandrake: No, I don't think I do, sir, no.

General Jack D. Ripper: He said war was too important to be left to the generals. When he said that, 50 years ago, he might have been right. But today, war is too important to be left to politicians. They have neither the time, the training, nor the inclination for strategic thought. I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist indoctrination, Communist subversion and the international Communist conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids.

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Originally Posted by Dr Jack

Dr. StrangeloveGeneral Jack D. Ripper: I can no longer sit back and allow ... international Communist conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids.

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Generally, I prefer Sam Adams or bourbon.

But this is the dichotomey of being an officer in a system of civilian control of the military. Even if the officer is objectively right, he or she is still subordinate to civilian authority under the constitution.

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Originally Posted by Dr Jack

Civilian policymakers have neither the expertise nor the inclination to think deeply about strategic probabilities in the distant future…

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But the civilian policymakers are still in charge. LTC Yingling arrived at the conclusion that the current crop of general officers was failing in their duty to advise the civilian policymakers and took it upon himself to correct the problem. From the snippets I've read so far, he's done a very good job. Now to see what comes of it.

This makes an interesting exercise in game theory. He'll win big or lose big as far as an Army career goes. Do the rewards of success versus the cost of failure justify the strategy? Under what odds? With any kind of recognition for the book, failure in an Army career will be greatly mitigated by public speaking gigs and future writing, but that is also a gamble.

Re: my previous remarks about LTC Yingling's motivation for writing; I was stating my ignorance, not attempting to impugne LTC Yingling's character. No offence to anyone intended.

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Originally Posted by goesh

What's the payback for them for helping to find enemies?

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Is it so hard to believe that many of them are sick of going to funerals and figure by helping us out they may actually save their own life or the lives of their family?

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Originally Posted by goesh

I presume Yingling will be talking to Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi who should be most receptive to him.

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I doubt that very much.

RTK,

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Originally Posted by RTK

I doubt that very much.

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They'll be receptive because of the opportunity to collect sound bites they can deploy in the War on Bush. Learning anything from what he has to say, now that's a different matter...

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Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger

RTK,



They'll be receptive because of the opportunity to collect sound bites they can deploy in the War on Bush. Learning anything from what he has to say, now that's a different matter...

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They maybe receptive, but I doubt he'll be going to talk to them.

I read the interview and the 'General Failure' and found both to be very enlightning. The only point of contention for me is the emphasis that he places on congressional oversight of generals. I come from a state that just re-elected a congressman that was found with 90k dollars of bribe money in his freezer ( Rep. William Jefferson, D-LA). I agree that there should be more / better oversight, but laying the issue at congress' feet doesn't seem to be the correct solution.

I think the only way you could do it would be to have a small number of congressmen, probably ones on the Armed Services cmte's, focus on the generals as one of their issues alongside procurement, etc. The main body of congress is probably not qualified for sustained oversight, but a small, driven handful can open up some real possibilities.

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Originally Posted by goesh

I presume Yingling will be talking to Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi who should be most receptive to him, and I'm not being sarcastic here either, just bitter.

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Should we be concerned about what members of Congress may or may not do?

As a profession, who by definition should be a self-policing body, I think we shouldn't focus too much on what others may or may not do, and instead, concentrate on cleaning our own house. It is nearly four years since signs surfaced that maybe we were being handicapped by some of our own generalship in Iraq. If we had more of an ability for tough, but respectful discourse within the profession, where company and/or field grade officers could offer criticism of decisions made at the GO level, then maybe we might not be at this point where we're concerned about what members of Congress may or may not do.

I think that it is important to note that this piece was published in one of our professional journals, and so my kudos to LTC Yingling for submitting it, and to AFJ for printing it. This wasn't a bitter pill "leaked" to a newspaper for publishing.

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Originally Posted by Van

But this is the dichotomey of being an officer in a system of civilian control of the military. Even if the officer is objectively right, he or she is still subordinate to civilian authority under the constitution.

<snip>

But the civilian policymakers are still in charge. LTC Yingling arrived at the conclusion that the current crop of general officers was failing in their duty to advise the civilian policymakers and took it upon himself to correct the problem. From the snippets I've read so far, he's done a very good job. Now to see what comes of it.

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Many issues here. Policy & policy-making in, hopefully, the national interest -- politics and maneuvering for political power -- civilian control of the military.

All different things. Unfortunately, not different enough these days. Much of our pain is based on the slippery slope of tolerance for their convergence, our short term itis, and machiavellian justifications for compromises in the interest of power in the short run that we never quite get back around to applying for the reason we could justify pursuing.

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Originally Posted by Shek

...was published in one of our professional journals, and so my kudos to LTC Yingling for submitting it, and to AFJ for printing it. This wasn't a bitter pill "leaked" to a newspaper for publishing.

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This is a big deal. There are several generals out there who've been very critical of current leadership. But they all waited to get their retirement papers in hand before they went public. Obviously I'm not privy to what goes on inside the Pentagon, but on the face of it a LTC has a whole lot more to lose at that stage in his career than a division commander about to retire. He could have chosen to do exactly what you are suggesting -- sat down with some reporter on an "off-the-record" basis and given his criticism anonymously. Then it would be worth little more than the ongoing partisan bickering in DC.

As it is, there's no way it can't be taken seriously.

LTC Yingling should be commended for putting his reputation and professional future on the line. That's geniune leadership.

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Originally Posted by milesce

LTC Yingling should be commended for putting his reputation and professional future on the line. That's geniune leadership.

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Agree completely. The points he's making about the personnel system have been made before by at least one officer. But that doesn't detract from the value or the courage it took for him to submit that article.

And again, kudos to AFJ for running it. Seems like they're going back to their roots, and that is a good thing.

Why do I feel these bemusing rumblings of hackworth on 60 minutes so many years ago?

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"As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war"...

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I think the author has some gall. I actually know an enlisted Air Force Vietnam Vet that had to pay for a jeep he wrecked on some airbase in-country. I was shocked to say the least. I also used to know (now deceased) WWII highly decorated enlisted vet that served with the 82nd Airborne that complained bitterly about Patton making people wear ties on their shirts in the field. Nevertheless, I think it is a little unfair to hold generals to the same standards as a private losing his rifle. After all, all the private has to do is not lose his rifle, which is his own personal lifeline. A General losing a war is much more complicated with many aspects to review. With this in mind, a private publishing what this officer has published would be in a lot more trouble than the officer. So, would that make the enlisted man more courageous? I'm not impressed with officers and so-called experts and pundits venting their personal resentments. Truth be told, this officer probably saw some personal writing on the wall and this is his way of getting some payback. Revenge is a dish best served cold. So, if he gets disciplined than that is his own ass. What makes news are officers complaining. What doesn't make news are officers doing their duty, working around Catch-22 by improvising, and getting the job done in their immediate line of sight. Like the nameless C-123 pilot and crew that used chains tossed out the rear door to down a Soviet helicopter over Laos. The author's rant is nothing more than rancor that is getting attention. Very unprofessional and he deserves to get slapped no different than a private losing his rifle. I don't think he is very wise. For one thing the opportunity cost is too high and it is equivalent to some high school brat working at McDonald's and complaining at school about how inefficient the store is without even thinking that the corporation is one of the best in the world. The military is no place for quality circle management. Everybody wants to feel important. But that doesn't make it so.

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Originally Posted by Culpeper

Truth be told, this officer probably saw some personal writing on the wall and this is his way of getting some payback. Revenge is a dish best served cold. So, if he gets disciplined than that is his own ass. What makes news are officers complaining. What doesn't make news are officers doing their duty, working around Catch-22 by improvising, and getting the job done in their immediate line of sight.

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This is an officer that is due to take battalion command in two months. While the article certainly anonymously implicates GOs that are currently currently service by association, it specifically talks about the GO corps in general terms so that people concentrate on the systemic failure of our personnel system, one that is based on equality and not talent and rewards officers who remain on a narrowly tactical path into positions where you must also understand the world and strategy. This is the skill mismatch that LTC Yingling is speaking of. So, you have an officer that has been deemed worthy by the very system that he is criticizing (EDIT: LTC Yingling does have a masters degree in Political Science from the University of Chicago, so he isn't the standard mold rewarded by the system).

I'm finding it hard to believe where the implication that this is payback can be found, as well as the implication that he's not doing his duty given that he's already served on three operational deployments, with his last one being a major cog in the wheel of the most successful brigade to have conducted counterinsurgency operations in Iraq as deemed by the Army itself.

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Originally Posted by Culpeper

Truth be told, this officer probably saw some personal writing on the wall and this is his way of getting some payback.

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I'd recommend reading the rest of this thread on his background...

I find it interesting that whenever an officer writes something like this that goes against the wisdom from higher, the immediate reaction is that he must have some personal ax to grind. We cannot in the same breath expect candor and honesty from our officers and then attack them when they provide what we expect. How can we on one hand look down on the commanders of Vietnam for not speaking out and then try to look down on another officer for speaking out?

From everything I can see, LTC Yingling has a good record. Perhaps serving with COL McMaster opened his eyes and gave him the confidence to put into words what he and other officers are thinking.

Sure, officers and enlisted men work around the "Catch 22s", but that doesn't address the major problem that Yingling and others have brought up: the failure of our personnel system (especially on the officer side) to produce the kind of officers we need to succeed in Small Wars. If those workarounds DID work, we wouldn't be seeing some of the same things we saw in Vietnam. If people aren't willing to put some things on the line when it needs to be done, you'll just waste more privates with rifles in the future. "Shut up and color" may work in some situations, but it sure as hell doesn't work when you're looking at a personnel system that has been broken for years.

I respect his background as well as his education. I just don't think his story brings anything new to the table to solve. Just another negative story complaining about the same old tired problems. Only this time it is some officer with a line command. I'm not impressed. We discuss these very same problems all the time on the SWC. And I'm always suspect of any expert that wants to compare Iraq with Vietnam. Vietnam was a bitch. Iraq is a pain in the ass. I suspect some sort of hidden agenda with the author. I realize he is highly respected and I can see how someone would be impressed. But not me. How would this officer handle one of his enlisted men doing the same thing under his own command?

Incidentally, laying his head on the Double E isn't going to solve anything. Getting promoted and changing the system as a career goal is a worthy endeavor. If this article happens to get him there than power to him. Other young officers commending him isn't going to put food on his soldiers' table. It's going to get him a job at CNN wearing a suit.

If they are the "same old tired problems" then why isn't anyone fixing them? Sorry, but I just don't buy that reasoning. If people have to keep bringing them forward, that means that nothing's being done to correct the problem.

He's not alone, either. McMaster has mentioned this, as has Vandergriff and a whole series of officers from the Vietnam era. Still nothing's been done. "Self Destruction" was loaded with similar stories. Still nothing changes.

This sounds like shooting the messenger because you don't like the message. Maybe his personal agenda is that he wants to see the system change for the better and got tired of waiting for it to do it on its own.

I've compared Iraq to Vietnam before; not the ground war itself but the Army's response to the war. That is one comparison I think is valid. Granted the Army has done a MUCH better job adjusting to this war (but in all honesty it would be hard to do worse than it did adjusting to Vietnam), but many of the same institutional problems the Army faced during Vietnam are similar to what it faces in Iraq. The question of tour length, preparation before deployment, competency of the officer and NCO corps, troop levels, unit composition, and ROE all remain. Looking at the way the system responds to a conflict it wasn't prepared for is a valid process, and one that shouldn't be lost because the media wants to draw a direct comparison in all areas (which isn't possible).

That's why I think LTC Yingling's article is both valid and necessary. We may just have to agree to disagree here.

As a civilian I am not qualified to comment on the aspects of the article related to military personnel matters. But on larger strategy Lieutenant Colonel Yingling wrote the following:

"An essential contribution to this strategy of denial was the publication of 'On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War,' by Col. Harry Summers. Summers, a faculty member of the U.S. Army War College, argued that the Army had erred by not focusing enough on conventional warfare in Vietnam, a lesson the Army was happy to hear. Despite having been recently defeated by an insurgency, the Army slashed training and resources devoted to counterinsurgency."

The above excerpt is not what I recall the late Colonel Summers having written. What I believe he said was that the United States should have extended the DMZ to the Mekong river, fortified the line with five divisions, and waged a defensive war along this front. The result he argued would have been (1) to shorten the front and thereby fight the war with North Vietnam on terms more favorable to the United States and (2) to seal off South Vietnam from outside infiltration and sanctuary. This dual strategy may or may not have worked but I do not believe Colonel Summers argued that counterinsurgency and conventional war were mutually exclusive.

In the 1980s, it was our side that was supporting insurgency and it was the other side trying to counter it. We need to study this period as well as the 1960s for guidance on what works and doesn't work.

I can appreciate the dismay of younger officers if US civilian and military leaders have again committed to a war on terms unwinnable or have exhausted the patience of the American people with an ineffective strategy. But I hope Lieutenant Colonel Yingling's article contributes to a serious and open debate of larger strategic issues and the responsibilities of civilians as well as generals.

Steve

No problem. We just disagree on the major points. However, I don't disagree entirely with your arguments or anyone else's defense for this officer. If this officer is admired by his men, his commands have a good track record, and he is sticking his neck out for his men than what we have is a maverick. If the opposite is true and he turns out to be a shameful opportunist, as I have seen so often with officers that speak out, than what we have is a future pundit to be seen later during prime time on a regular basis. I hope I am wrong. I want to believe. Things are so convoluted these days that it is always the case that one man's optimism is another man's pessimism though each want to see the same goals accomplished.

As an aside, I don't mean that Vietnam should not be compared to the situation in Iraq. But it should be itemized or put into perspective when done because the casualty rates and destruction in Vietnam far exceeded what is happening in the Middle East. What would make a headline today wouldn't even have been reported during Vietnam. And the military was much larger during Vietnam and the problems with upper level officers was worse than it is today. With the exception of the good officers that fought during the Vietnam Conflict I would have to say that the abuse by officers at all ranks was epidemic. I just don't think people should use the Vietnam bug-a-boo to avoid having to write out a valid argument. Like Mr. Ricks has decided to do by quoting the officer as such in the Washington Post article...

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"America's generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq," charges Lt. Col. Paul Yingling..."

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But when you read the actual article by the officer you see this is out of context. I may be guilty of contempt prior to investigation.

The LTC took a big risk writing this. I give him credit there.

He has a lot of on the ground experience. His opinion is to be respected.

However, in my opinion, he should not have stated his belief that the war is lost. This was a mistake on his part as it detracts from his message. This statement places his arguments of mis-managment and failure beyond just a critical analysis and into the realm of politics. As an officer he should have stated his facts, his critique and then offered his educated opinion on what the next steps should be. At which point, he like a Dr could have offered his prognosis in an objective manner.

Further, while his commentary on personel assignment, evaluation and promotion is valid in many ways his assertion that congress should gain increased oversight is not. He claims that the GO selection and promotion process is tainted by what some call the 'good ol boy network' , well in some ways he may be right. But giving increased power to select to the Congress isn't the answer. Congress is a political organization we don't need to exchange one form of politics with another. I'll just leave it here.

-T

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Originally Posted by DavidPB4

As a civilian I am not qualified to comment on the aspects of the article related to military personnel matters. But on larger strategy Lieutenant Colonel Yingling wrote the following:

"An essential contribution to this strategy of denial was the publication of 'On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War,' by Col. Harry Summers. Summers, a faculty member of the U.S. Army War College, argued that the Army had erred by not focusing enough on conventional warfare in Vietnam, a lesson the Army was happy to hear. Despite having been recently defeated by an insurgency, the Army slashed training and resources devoted to counterinsurgency."

The above excerpt is not what I recall the late Colonel Summers having written. What I believe he said was that the United States should have extended the DMZ to the Mekong river, fortified the line with five divisions, and waged a defensive war along this front. The result he argued would have been (1) to shorten the front and thereby fight the war with North Vietnam on terms more favorable to the United States and (2) to seal off South Vietnam from outside infiltration and sanctuary. This dual strategy may or may not have worked but I do not believe Colonel Summers argued that counterinsurgency and conventional war were mutually exclusive.

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Dave,

COL Summers did argue that the Army failed to concentrate on conventional warfare enough. By concentrating on COIN (although COL Krepinevich's book The Army and Vietnam shows that this concentration on COIN was more lip service than substance), the Army and the nation was fatigued and therefore wasn't ready for the REAL threat, the NVA regiments that rolled south and seized Saigon in 1975. Given this, the appropriate action according to COL Summers was just as you described. In other words, COL Summers argued that COIN was irrelevant and actually harmful, and that the US should have pursued the conventional operations that you described from the start.

Shek

The "real threat" that the Army had to be prepared for in the 1960's and 1970's were Warsaw Pact formations. Although, now in hindsight, its easy to fault the Army for not "getting it" in COIN, I think we to readily forget where the Army felt its primary duty to the nation (and the free world) lay.
I don't believe that the army set out to merely put Vietnam out of its mind because it was uncomfortable with the type of warfare or the results. I think it emerged into the early 1970s fully realizing that it did not have the training or capability to fight on the European continent. To bend itself to fight another Vietnam would have been to prepare for the last war, not the next.
I think that the Marine Corps faced a similar point in the early 1930s. After an internal power struggle, Marine leadership decided to put their eggs into the basket of amphibious operations, not Small Wars. One wonders what would have been the implications in WWII, and to the Marine Corps, if they had chosen otherwise. (I think its also worthwhile to state that the Marine Corps never went to a Small War with the Small Wars Manual in hand--it was written after the fact, and as Keith Bickel relates in his book, there were significant differences in the Corps about what would work).
The doctrinal and training reforms that were instituted by the Army were initiated by very smart general officers. Starry knew what he was doing (by the way, his official lesson learned on armor in Vietnam is till relevant to what we face today). The turn away from Vietnam was deliberate to allow the Army to face the threat it could not afford to lose to.
As to the general case of junior and mid-grade officers protesting, as a mid-grade officer (LtCol) I'm of two minds. Any criticism, if well founded and thought out, is valuable. Blaming a whole class of officers, however doesn't do much for me. The general officers he takes to task were the colonels and LtCols of the 1980s and 1990s. Maybe that's where the problem lay--in their inproper training and education by the previous set of leadership. I don't think his solution, Congress, will work. Huntington pointed out that one of the downsides of our constitutional seperation of powers is that we force military leadership to become political--they have to answer to both the executive and congress. While not good, Huntington also mentions that the overwhelming good to the society of this seperation probably outweighs the negatives in military matters. I think that getting Congress more into the nuts and bolts of selection would just further politicize the process. We're at war now and congress is starting to ask some of the correct questions. But when we're not at war, in the prep phases, they tend to focus on quality of life, and looking at the military's place in society, not as a warfighting entity.

A pretty darn insightful post Phil.

"" Ditto.

Good post, Phil.

Phil,

Thanks for the cogent post. However, I do have a few quibbles with some of your points.

1. I totally agree that the services must make sure that they prepare for the next war and not the last. Thus, the decision of the Army to make Fulda Gap the focus of its rebuilding efforts in the 1970s was right on target. However, the issue that I have is the fact that the Vietnam experience was deleted from the hard drive as if it were a virus. No more Vietnams! You can see this in the catharsis that COL Summers' book provided, as well as the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines (ODS was an opportunity as well to try and eliminate the pale of Vietnam, with Bush 41's pronouncement that we've slayed the Vietnam demon).

Heck, how many officers were happy when Governor George W. Bush became president elect in December 2000 because he had stated "we don't do nation building" (I know that I was happy that we would jettison the Bosnias and Kosovos and get back to what we should be focusing on, which was warfighting - a reaction that I think was a product of the professional sentiment that we didn't want our jurisdiction to include the low end spectrum of full spectrum operations). So, I think that the decision to prepare for the Fulda Gap and to delete the institutional memories and lessons should be separated into two separate actions.

2. I think the criticism of actions many of the generals Vietnam is on target. This falls into the fight the war you have and not the war you want. I still agree that the concentration should have been on the more immediate risk to the national security, the Soviet threat, but if the policy makers decide on committing US forces, then we need to make sure we fight the war we have to the extent possible.

I think the following quote is quite interesting on the ability of the general officer corps to adapt to the COIN environment of Vietnam, http://www.wooster.edu/history/jgate...-ch5.html#fn16

Quote:

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General James L. Collins, Jr., has been quoted as saying that, "had we had an organized body of literature" dealing with the Philippine campaign, "we would have saved ourselves a good deal of time and effort in Vietnam." General Bruce Palmer, Jr. made a similar comment in 1989, saying "I wish that when I was the deputy chief of staff for operations at Department of the Army in 1964-1965, we had studied the US Army's campaigns in the Philippines during the insurrection." They may be correct, but one suspects that the availability of such a history would have made little difference, for it would have told Americans no more about successful counterinsurgency campaigning than the literature already available in the writings of the 1950s and 1960s. Palmer claimed that a 1988 article about the Philippine war in Military Review "would have been of tremendous help to us in sorting out our thoughts [on the situation in Vietnam]."[16] Palmer apparently had no knowledge of an excellent 1964 article on the war, also printed in Military Review.[17]

The American problem in Vietnam was not a lack of information, historical or otherwise; it was the frequent failure to act upon the sound information, useful ideas, and valid suggestions that were readily available. A detailed and candid study of the French experience in Indochina seems to have been totally ignored, for example.[18] One suspects that nothing one might have written in the mid-1960s about the earlier war in the Philippines or the ongoing war in Vietnam would have convinced U. S. Army leaders of the importance of the non-military aspects of irregular warfare and the counterproductive effects of the use of massive firepower. People in high places rarely listen to what they do not want to hear.

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3. You are totally on target with the following statement.

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Originally Posted by PhilR

The general officers he takes to task were the colonels and LtCols of the 1980s and 1990s. Maybe that's where the problem lay--in their inproper training and education by the previous set of leadership.

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However, this only highlights the fact that the problem is the GO corps as a body, as they are the ones making the decisions and grooming these leaders. In other words, as a body, the GO corps in a sense is "the system," and this is the dynamic that needs to be transformed.

To close, let's separate Congress from the equation and look at his proposals and whether they have merit.

1. A 360 degree evaluation system.
2. Advanced Civilian School and a foreign language.
3. The need to publish to demonstrate one's intellectual prowess.
4. The need to talk means, ways, and ends during confirmation hearings, akin to an oral examination.
5. Retire GOs at the rank at which they last demonstrated competence (you're promoted based on potential and then demoted based on performance).

(Given that #4 and #5 must involve Congress since they hold the necessary hearings, I understand that we can't fully separate them out of the equation)

So, what are the merits of these proposals. If we deem that there is merit, then the question becomes why hasn't the Army adopted those proposals with merit within the profession, as they have been on the table as options for at least a decade. If we can't adopt the proposals, then who outside should get involved to make sure that improvements in the system are adopted?

There is a tendancy in arguing strategy to make it personal. As I have noted before Gen. Abizaid pursued a small foot print strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has worked tolerably well in Afghanistan and it has not worked well at all in Iraq. Rather than argue about the officer selection process, it seems more productive to have a debate on when counterinsurgency warfare should be done with a small force and when it should be done with a greater force to space ratio. I have always favored the latter and I think that is what the current surge is finally doing in Iraq.

It seems to me that recognizing when each approach is appropriate and reacting accordingly should be our greatest concern.

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Originally Posted by Merv Benson

There is a tendancy in arguing strategy to make it personal. As I have noted before Gen. Abizaid pursued a small foot print strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has worked tolerably well in Afghanistan and it has not worked well at all in Iraq. Rather than argue about the officer selection process, it seems more productive to have a debate on when counterinsurgency warfare should be done with a small force and when it should be done with a greater force to space ratio. I have always favored the latter and I think that is what the current surge is finally doing in Iraq.

It seems to me that recognizing when each approach is appropriate and reacting accordingly should be our greatest concern.

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Merv,

I am of the opinion that if we had a larger 'footprint' early on - vacuum period post-May 2003 - then maybe we would not be facing the degree of insurgency we face now. Of course, the CPA foul-ups did not help things either. Still, the number one priority should have been security for the Iraqi population - we most certainly did not have enough boots-on-the-ground to provide that security.

Dave

Well, that puts the blame on the Secretary of Defense and perhaps General Franks for buying into it.

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Originally Posted by Culpeper

Well, that puts the blame on the Secretary of Defense and perhaps General Franks for buying into it.

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That is a start in the 'blame game'. Moreover, the CPA - Bremer - worked for the President via Rumsfeld. DoD shut out State and others of the interagency community and, even then, shut out those who were not of the party (GOP) line. Tom Ricks got it right when he picked Fiasco as the title of his book on this sad state of affairs.

Shek - Your two posts following mine make a good point, ie. the difference between what Summers actually wrote and what the Army thought he wrote. Summers wrote that isolation of the battlespace of South Vietnam should have been followed by counterinsurgency within the country, not that counterinsurgency could work without first isolating the battlespace or that conventional war alone was sufficient. If Summers became shorthand for downgrading counterinsurgency, then he became a symbol for something that he did not in fact favor.

On points two and three in your summary of Yingling, I can see some virtue in the intellectual discipline that publication requires, and specialized knowledge is vital to anyone serving in a sensitive region or technical field. But a blanket requirement for advanced civilian education and peer-reviewed publication worry me if they are meant as a way to make the armed forces more like other professional peer groups in which academic credentialism is growing.

There is also the question of whether more civilian education of officers will further widen the gray area between civil and military responsibility. The real need I see is for civilians to have more military content in what they learn of American history and civics, not for officers to spend more time in advanced civilian study. Civilians need a better understanding of military history and military institutions, and what these institutions can and cannot do, if they are to uphold the civilian end of the civil-military partnership. Civilian leaders need a basic military education more than military officers need more civilian education.

The greatest need is for civilian leaders (and generals insofar as they need to give advice) to be able to relate military commitments as means to long-range national or grand-strategic ends. We do not do a very good job of relating means and ends at this level, and those who define advanced study need to do a better job of relating them before making generals or anyone else undertake study with clarity in such matters as the intended purpose.

Should those of us sitting on the fence read, "Fiasco"? I tend to read neutral or sanitized books. At least in my opinion. For example, right now I'm reading, "A Table In The Presence", by Lt. Carey H. Cash, though I'm not particularly a right wing religious person (I just haven't seen anything like it published), "The Middle East", by Bernard Lewis, and "Among Warriors In Iraq", by Mike Tucker. I tend to shy away from books that appear at least to be taking a critical viewpoint on either side of the fence. That may be a shortcoming on my part. Nevertheless, these sort of books seem to become obsolete due to current events and other facts coming out later. I don't know but I'm open to advice and suggestion because this is an important topic. I may not be getting a well rounded picture due to being stubborn to some extent.

Quote:

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As I have noted before Gen. Abizaid pursued a small foot print strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has worked tolerably well in Afghanistan and it has not worked well at all in Iraq. Rather than argue about the officer selection process, it seems more productive to have a debate on when counterinsurgency warfare should be done with a small force and when it should be done with a greater force to space ratio. I have always favored the latter and I think that is what the current surge is finally doing in Iraq.

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Whatever chance the small footprint model had, it was dashed when the need (or was it silly desire?) to provide internet cafes, dry cleaning, and barbershops, drove us into super FOBs. I don't think the FOBs came first. The amenities (or at least pursuit of them) were a contributing factor in the rise of the FOB, and it killed us.

From a historical perspective, I offer this excerpt from a threat report signed by the Commander of the Army, Commissioner of Police, commander of the Air Force, Director General of Intelligence, and Commander of Combined Operations of Country X, and delivered to the leader of X, roughly 3 years before a political settlement was finally arrived at in one of the nastiest "small wars":

Military and Police. The continued and rapid construction of protected villages is essential if food is to be denied to terrorists and steps should continue to be taken to control the terrorist ability to obtain goods and cash internally.

Classical War. It is not anticipated that the (country X) Security Forces will be involved internally in classical war during this quarter, but transborder operations could escalate the situation towards a classical war.

Of over-riding concern is the present inadequate and diminishing force level with the resultant urgent need for additional manpower to even contain the situation, let alone prevent its inevitable deterioration.

No successful result can be attained by purely military means. It is now more vital than ever to arrive at an early political settlement before the point of no return beyond which it will be impossible to achieve any viable political or military/political solution.

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Originally Posted by jcustis

From a historical perspective, I offer this excerpt from a threat report signed by the Commander of the Army, Commissioner of Police, commander of the Air Force, Director General of Intelligence, and Commander of Combined Operations of Country X, and delivered to the leader of X, roughly 3 years before a political settlement was finally arrived at in one of the nastiest "small wars":

Military and Police. The continued and rapid construction of protected villages is essential if food is to be denied to terrorists and steps should continue to be taken to control the terrorist ability to obtain goods and cash internally.

Classical War. It is not anticipated that the (country X) Security Forces will be involved internally in classical war during this quarter, but transborder operations could escalate the situation towards a classical war.

Of over-riding concern is the present inadequate and diminishing force level with the resultant urgent need for additional manpower to even contain the situation, let alone prevent its inevitable deterioration.

No successful result can be attained by purely military means. It is now more vital than ever to arrive at an early political settlement before the point of no return beyond which it will be impossible to achieve any viable political or military/political solution.

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Rhodesia 1976?