As a civilian I am not qualified to comment on the aspects of the article related to military personnel matters. But on larger strategy Lieutenant Colonel Yingling wrote the following:

"An essential contribution to this strategy of denial was the publication of 'On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War,' by Col. Harry Summers. Summers, a faculty member of the U.S. Army War College, argued that the Army had erred by not focusing enough on conventional warfare in Vietnam, a lesson the Army was happy to hear. Despite having been recently defeated by an insurgency, the Army slashed training and resources devoted to counterinsurgency."

The above excerpt is not what I recall the late Colonel Summers having written. What I believe he said was that the United States should have extended the DMZ to the Mekong river, fortified the line with five divisions, and waged a defensive war along this front. The result he argued would have been (1) to shorten the front and thereby fight the war with North Vietnam on terms more favorable to the United States and (2) to seal off South Vietnam from outside infiltration and sanctuary. This dual strategy may or may not have worked but I do not believe Colonel Summers argued that counterinsurgency and conventional war were mutually exclusive.

In the 1980s, it was our side that was supporting insurgency and it was the other side trying to counter it. We need to study this period as well as the 1960s for guidance on what works and doesn't work.

I can appreciate the dismay of younger officers if US civilian and military leaders have again committed to a war on terms unwinnable or have exhausted the patience of the American people with an ineffective strategy. But I hope Lieutenant Colonel Yingling's article contributes to a serious and open debate of larger strategic issues and the responsibilities of civilians as well as generals.