Airpower bombing Muzzlem head choppers back to the stone age!:):):)
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Airpower bombing Muzzlem head choppers back to the stone age!:):):)
Pentagon is confirming that F-22 Raptor
lead the raids!
Raw footage of first Air strikes against ISIS>
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qA6mXr1CTAg
Once again we confuse air power and targeting with strategy, and once again it will fail if there isn't more to the strategy. The only thing stone age about this is relying on air power as a substitute for strategy. I posted this on the blog.
An Arab and western coalition bombing extremists is an important step in the conflict against Islamic extremism, but if it isn't coordinated with ground forces it won't have much of an impact. According to sources in Syria Assad was notified, which only makes sense from a force protection aspect. Shoot at our planes and we'll crush you. Can't help but wonder if we and the Arab coalition would be willing to form a temporary alliance with the devil to crush ISIL? Mao and the Chinese Nationalists formed a temporary alliance to fight the Japanese, and then went back to killing each other. Initial reports are that the targeting had minimal impact on ISIL because they already dispersed and moved into private homes effectively neutralizing air power. When you have that many in the coalition the probability of the designated targets being leaked is high, so we're spending a lot of money on high end munitions to accomplish what? Strategic communications? Overall I remain hopeful we will take decisive action when the conditions are set, but will also remain suspect unless there is more to the strategy.
Bill. After 13 years and 2 Trillion dollars of failed boots on the ground the President didn't have any choice but to switch to the always dependable Air Force and Navy Air Operatons and then phase II CIA/SF operations of training a local Arab Army and finally to phase III operations of destroying ISIL . Sounds like Strategy to me.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Sounds more video games and cartoon hour to me. Means and ways disconnected from ends at the strategic and operational levels and minimal impact at the tactical level. The illusion of doing something for political gain is a strategy, but not a good one.Quote:
Originally Posted by slapovideo 61462
So what other options does the poor guy have (can't believe it I actually am defending President Obama:eek:)We have had the greatest failure of Generalship since Vietnam.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
The only Strategy we offer the President is..........
1-spend more money we don't have
2- spend more us lives while the locals laugh at us
3-spend more time we don't have
4- create more us maimed and PTSD injured from years of violence
and all for what? Who wins rich Arabs,Iran,Russia,China?
IMO we should be using hash tag bombing. B-52s wing tip to wing tip,nose to tail and fly east to west one day and then north to south the next(hash tag pattern). Then drain every Rich Arabs bank account in the entire middle east.
We need Major Kong!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=snTaSJk0n_Y
Hard to compete with Bush's administration to invade Iraq and then the subsequent management of it for a strategic failure of leadership that weakened the U.S..Quote:
So what other options does the poor guy have (can't believe it I actually am defending President Obama)We have had the greatest failure of Generalship since Vietnam.
Using your logic above, certainly airpower doesn't answer 1-3 and the last part of part 4.Quote:
The only Strategy we offer the President is..........
1-spend more money we don't have
2- spend more us lives while the locals laugh at us
3-spend more time we don't have
4- create more us maimed and PTSD injured from years of violence
and all for what? Who wins rich Arabs,Iran,Russia,China?
The bottom line is that air power is essential, I'm not anti-airpower, I'm anti confusing airpower with a holistic strategy. For this type of targeting you need guys on the ground to both identify targets and then exploit the results of the bombing (take and control the terrain, and enable pursuit of the adversary). Sec Kerry said there were a lot of folks on the ground, implying regional country intelligence services, which is probably true and they can enable targeting. Then again what do we ultimately want to accomplish? That isn't clear to me yet. What does defeat of IS mean? We do have a lot smart people in JCS, State, and NSC, I know shocking coming from me, so hopefully there is more in the cards than we're seeing.
Bill,
The President does have a Strategy by the current definition of a Strategy "Ends,Ways,Means". Problem is that isn't going to work anymore,especially against this crew. You essentially have an Psychopathic Islamic Army and yes Islam...the Koran is the source! Until we face that we are lost. The noted British Strategy analyst Liddel Hart warned that htis could happen and it would be as big a threat as Communism, but it fell on deaf ears.
The answer as always is in the Rings of Violence.:) Read the below paper and pay special attention to the Strategic Targets which we have done very little to Affect after all this money,time,and blood.
The "Magic Triangle" of targeting is Manpower,Money,and Media. We do pretty good at degrading the manpower but I was shocked to find how little we have affected Money and Media, both of which are critical for operations and recruiting.
Until we get back to creating an Affect against the right target in order to create the desired Effect we are just Target plinking until the next election.
Link to paper Unleashing Warden's Rings!
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=438609
Until we can face the fact that there will be NO end as long as there is a book, a religion and religious leaders that preach that it is OK to kill for Allah. There will only be Targets and the never ending Mission.
Slap,
I think Warden's theories and knowledge have been debated here before, that caveat aside I am wary of following his model in 2014. Secondly the paper was published in 2002 and one hopes there is greater knowledge today.
Terrorism does not follow a set model, we may wish it did and if there is one lesson since 9/11 is that they can be far more adaptable than their opponents (a general phrase).
ISIS have survived as a group for many years, when Iraqi and non-Iraqi opponents were attacking them (Outlaw09 makes the point local Jihadists existed under Saddam Hussein too). As AQI they moved into Syria, truly "a land of opportunity" and developed into the force able to take cities in Iraq, without defeat (from memory, so qualified last two words).
What President Obama and his coalition appear to have today IMHO are tactics without a strategy. Reducing the capabilities of ISIS with attendant pictures, in the assumption even hope that capable local forces can contain ISIS and at sometime roll them back physically. Their jihadist message remains. This is Containment.
Containment is a political objective for today and tomorrow, not for the long-term.
I shall leave your finals entence for another day.:)
Thats right which is why I posted it. If you watch this Air Campaign (which may take years) they are really focusing on Ring #2 now. The process/system essentials ring. In this case they going after the finance process which is not just banking but illegal oil sales. If they can properly affect the oil sales bombing oil facilities) they will start to impact the organizations ability to pay their Army. Which will really start to degrade the organization ability to function. Which is what phase one Degrade is all about.Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
As for the other sentance..... Nigel Farage will save the UK.:)http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_RKEhT6-f8
Just to make sure I understand what you say, Slapout: 'destroying Daesh refineries' (cough) - either needed by Syria in the future or run by local Arabs to earn money to survive - and plenty of empty buildings is 'Ring 2' and therefore 'strategy'...?
But, cutting off the supply of that oil to the regime in Damascus and black market (including Daesh supporters) in Turkey - not?
And it is not so that this 'shock & awe' air show - with 'genuine' princes and princessess as secondary characters - is more spectacular for the media than _actually doing something that makes sense_ against the Dash, no matter how little of the Daesh it's hitting?
(For example, and if you 'must' deploy air power because it's so flashy: then at least try interdicting major concentrations of the Daesh west, east and south of Kobane).
Below a photo released by one of Jihadists yesterday, showing the town of Kobane - but also what an open area this is: considering all the UAVs flying there, guess that's making it 'extremely hard' to distinguish the Daesh, its tanks, artillery, and plenty of vehicles, from the YPG and FSyA that are operating no heavy weapons in this part of Syria at all...? :rolleyes:
Crowbat,Quote:
Originally Posted by CrowBat
I will try to answer your questions as best I can since I only have access to open sources.
1-They(USA) are trying to degrade the income producing capability of ISIL and only ISIL (not Syria in general) at this time.This will put pressure on the organization as a whole as it will degrade their capability to pay/support their soldiers and personnel. This may change in the future but for now that is what they are trying to do.
2-Often when they hit a so called empty building it is because they want to deny any future usage to the enemy.
3-Some of the targets you ask about are ring#5 targets (Fielded Forces) they will get to these but for now they are going after targets that degrade the organizations ability to regenerate long term. And they are trying to do this with precision so they don't create any more future cost of repair then they have to.
Hope this helps, anymore questions feel free to ask.
Well, indeed, there must be something about such games I do not understand at all, so I guess you'll have your hands full of explaining me a few things now.
For example, I would expect that the people writing targeting lists for air shows of this kind would - after 14 years of continuous warfare against such groups like the Daesh - have learned that targeting 'headquarters', 'storage sites', 'captured air bases', even 'refineries' (whether 'true' refineries in sense of industrial facilities, or various makeshift refineries 'constructed' run by dozens of Syrian families in NE of that country) means absolutely nothing.
I would expect the same people to understand that this is not going to degrade Daesh's capability to continue spreading terror the least. Just like bombing 'refineries' in Syria, while doing nothing of that kind with much larger facilities under the Daesh control in Iraq, is actually counterproductive.
Thus, my first question: since every 18-years old recruit in a military based on draft is drilled to pack and get out of the barracks within the shortest period of time (usually 5-10 minutes) in the case of any sort of an alert, would you be so kind to specify: in what fashion is blasting of empty buildings going to 'degrade' the combat effectiveness or at least capability of a force like the Daesh is one to continue spreading its terror?
For example, do you think that's going to prevent it from overrunning the Kobane pocket?
To make few things clear: I have no doubts that 'bombing a [empty] house' looks better on any LANTRIN-video than 'bombing two black dots [read: humans, tanks, artillery pieces etc.] in some open space'. Plus, houses are renowned for not running around and thus for being easier to hit (word is that this is a sort of tradition for houses and quite common between them since something like 11,000 years)...
But still, I'm simply not getting that with relation between the Daesh and empty houses....
....
Anyway, field forces are No. 5 in that strategy. Hey, that's great. Good organization, fantastic and throughout thinking, excellent checklist: keep it going. 'Guess they've spent several hundreds of millions plus a number of years to think about this all, plus needed help and consultation from a number of private companies and think-tanks, of course, so I can't but conclude: 'job well done lads'.
Now, what would you say, when is it likely that the people writing these targeting lists might come to the idea that it's about the time to 'go for Ring 5', i.e. when can the YPG and FSyA units defending the Kobane pocket expect at least some of all the planes flying over NE Syria to come to their aid?
a) When US-led coalition has bombed all the empty buildings that it thinks are going to degrade Daesh's combat effectiveness;
b) When the Daesh overruns the Kobane pocket
c) When the Daesh idiots start slaughtering any combatants and civilians they catch in the Kobane pocket?
d) Or when all of this will be over and Daesh idiots start posting videos of their 'victory' on Twitter and Facebook?
Please feel free to take your time with answer. I guess it's obvious that nobody (except the Daesh) is in a hurry here.
I don't think many people in the air force buy in to the 5 ring targeting theory. The systems Warden talks about are models we construct in our minds, they do not represent reality. It is an amateurish way to conduct a war and just like our COIn doctrine it hasn't received any gold medals. We won't put a dent in their multiple means of financing by targeting one source ineptly with these strikes. Targeting empty buildings is for theater. Killing members of IS is valuable as is destroying their vehicles. They should have been the first target before they disperse and become less vulnerable. We can blow up fixed targets like empty buildings later. Studies on the effectiveness of air campaigns indicate that hitting an adversaries armed forces have been considerably more effective than deep attacks on strategic targets. I think both have a role but in this case it needs to be the focus. The fielded forces are real, the systems are figment of our imagination used to make sense of complexity, but complexity is still there and these systems rapidly change and continue to function.
My goodness CrowBat!:eek:,Quote:
Originally Posted by CrowBat
I cant tell where the question or questions begin and you personal commentary begins, despite the fact that I really do enjoy reading your posts.
I will answer what I think you want to know.
The Strategic concept was to use an American Air Force to support a local Arab Army to finish off/Destroy ISIL(Daesh). The problem is we don't have a reliable, compentent Arab Army to support with our Air Power at the present time and press reports say in maybe a year or more before we (USA) can train and or find one to support. So this Camapign is going to go on for awhile before you see any major results.
OK, let's start from the start: to say I'm clueless about US air power would be an understatement. I know to distinguish a F-15 from F-16, but I have no clue about the methods and processes related to targeting selection of the USAF, USN, USMC etc.
I'm just somebody with 'above average' interest in obscure air forces, incl. specific Arab-, Iranian, and few African air forces. The less-well known, the more interesting for me they get. Thus, the SyAAF is something like my 'speciality', between others (IRIAF, former IrAF, and few others would be additional examples, as can be seen from all the titles that can be found on the link here). When researching about such air forces, I go slightly further than most of my colleagues, i.e. I do not only research aircraft types, camo patterns and markings, and I do not copy-paste from other publications all the time, but I did quite some travelling around the areas of my interest, I do have quite a few '1st hand contacts'. Foremost: I'm a curious person and want to understand how things function and why they function the way they do. Therefore, I'm researching about 'how comes', and then 'capabilities and intentions' too.
Bottom line: I can tell you the recent loss of a SyAAF Su-24 to Israeli PAC-2 was a result of reckless behaviour by the Su-24-crew. But, I couldn't tell you anything about these five 'rings' of US air power strategy (at least nothing else than what can be found in this thread) and similar 'stuff'. My avatar is insignia of the former No. 31 Squadron United Arab Republic Air Force (from 1958-1967 period), and I can describe how it came into being, and tell you the history of that unit (which included a number - then 'future' - Arab air force commanders and even statesmen), but I do not understand even the logic of the people running the US air power.
In this very case, my point is this: the Daesh has at least 4,000 idiots, supported by between 20 and 40 MBTs, IFVs, and artillery pieces in the process of assaulting Kobane/Tel Abyad.
In essence, this means that the Daesh has concentrated most of its forces available in NE Syria within an area that was (and still is) decreasing in size in quite dramatic fashion, the last week (see the map below).
This translates into something like THE opportunity to smash a major Daesh force in Syria.
The pocket is defended by combatants of the YPG (major Kurdish militia in Syria), and the FSyA: both are declared 'allies' in the war against the Daesh. For both it is known that they have no heavy weapons in the given area (well, except one of Daesh's MBTs they've captured yesterday).
It is on hand that, once the Kobane pocket will be overrun (which appears a 'matter of time' to me, considering Turkish blockade of this area, perhaps even provision of artillery support for the Daesh - whether intentional or not, at least the artillery in question is hitting the YPG and FSyA positions, not those of the Daesh), the Daesh is going to:
a) slaughter anybody its gets into its hands,
b) fill the internet with videos and photos of doing that, and then
c) disperse.
Now, as mentioned above, I'm clueless, and it is perfectly possible that my logic is anything but applicable for the US air power. I am ready to agree that the business of tracking down and then hitting moving columns of the Daesh, or Daesh hordes manoeuvring on the battlefield, might be beyond the ability of different Saudi, Emirati, Bahraini or whatever other princes'.
But to me it's not only 'obvious': it's crystal clear that this Daesh concentration off Kobane should be the target No.1, No.2... No. 5... No. 15...No. 50....No.99 and all the way thru No. 9999 on anybody's target list there.
But instead, all that happens is that CENTCOM (according to its own report) flies two strikes to knock out two MBTs...?!?
If this is not enough, let's take a closer look at another aspect of this 'Rings-related targeting checklist' nons...cough... theory. Please read the WP article about fighting in Hassakah Province, here for the start. Reason: let's say it's a good indication of what I happen to know about the situation there, but foremost it's useful for listing most important Arab tribes in NE Syria.
By sheer accident, it is these tribes that are running most of 'refineries' now bombed by the US-led air power.
Notable between these tribes are such like Shammar. This was the first important tribe to raise against the AQI in Iraq and help US forces there - just to be left down by Washington and then screwed up by Maliki. And when they were abandoned in such a classic fashion, they've been stabbed in the back by the Daesh too, and left without solution but to pledge allegiance to it. Nevertheless, they and some other tribes there have recently launched a de-facto uprising against the Daesh, brutally suppressed by these idiots, as can be heard from 1st hand sources in situ, or read here, here, here, and in many other places.
And now they are bombed by the US and allies - because the 'refineries' they're running are the 'Ring 2' of some imaginary 'air power strategy' - while the Daesh concentration at Kobane is not, because 'that's Ring 5 and we're not yet there'...?
Can you explain me this logic?
Quote:
Originally Posted by CrowBat
Crowbat,
Today is your lucky day. Most people in the military don't understand Air Power. But thats OK I will take care of that!;) So lets start by understanding what an Air Campaign is. I have posted this before but here it is again just for you.
http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/Uplo...esentation.pdf
Well, not only you avoided answering any of my questions, but what can be read on the link you posted has imposed a number of further questions. Including:
- Warden clearly says, '[war is] a means to end an objective, that 'all war activity should be conceived and executed to realize only those objectives achievable by force.
What objectives are 'achievable by force' - especially so when deployed air power is blasting empty buildings, for example?
Or, newest 'appearance' and then one that should be of major concern for anybody interested: this campaign is missing the Daesh, it's missing the JAN and it missed the Ahrar ash-Sham (which meanwhile dispersed). On the contrary, it has meanwhile killed more Syrian civilians than extremists. According to reports like this report (in Arabic), at least 43 Syrian civilians were killed yesterday alone - and this while the US-led air power was blasting empty buildings and makeshift refineries.
Keep in mind: it is precisely because of concerns it could end hitting Iraqi civilians that the IRIAF (Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force) has ceased its attacks on Daesh in Iraq, something like 20 days ago. Namely, the Daesh dispersed after being hit by the IRIAF some 20 times, through August and in early September, leaving the IRIAF - which is actually a US-trained air force, still very much following even USAF's doctrine - 'without clear targets' (I'm citing 1st-hand source here).
So, now I'm curious to hear: what kind of objective are planners of this campaign trying to achieve through such action?
- He's 'writing' about 'change in enemy beliefs', and 'prevent an enemy from doing something'. What part of Daesh's beliefs do you think have these air strikes changed so far?
And in what fashion was Daesh prevented from 'doing something' (for example: from continuing its assault on Kobane pocket)?
- He's writing about 'exit strategy'.
Who has defined the US exit strategy for this campaign, and what is that looking like?
- Finally, Warden is writing about factor time: how long is this campaign going to last? Indeed, he's writing about 'time value of action' (page 13), and is stressing 'highly compressed, highly parallel' action.
On the contrary, this campaign is developing in particularly slow fashion, with more planes arriving in very gradual fashion and thus the intensity of operations developing only gradually. Or would you say that this campaign developed precisely along Warden's theories?
Whatever is the answer: that means that the enemy is left with more time to repair and reconstitute, to prepare a counter-offensive, to acquire allies (the latter process already began: in the light of all possible reports about high numbers of killed Syrian civilians, more than 200 defections from the JAN to the Daesh have been recorded in the last few days, and more than 50% of defectors are Syrians)... Indeed, if this campaign goes on like this, the Daesh is going to get time to 'employ novel weapons', and the 'world opinion' is likely to 'shift' too (especially in the light of heavy suffering of Syrian civilians).
The US has entered this war with its own public weary from 14 years of anti-terror war that is actually still going on - and was thus never won. How long do you expect the domestic support to last this time?
Our targeting process has allowed IS to maintain the initiative. This appears to be little more than theater to demonstrate to our voters before the midterm that we're tough on terror. Just get a bag of popcorn and watch the show. There isn't one military analyst who thinks this will work if someone's ground forces are not following up on these attacks.
As for civilians being killed maybe, but could also be propaganda.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...onslaught.html
A sane strategist wouldn't be hitting empty buildings when a Kurdish town is about to be overrun.Quote:
Late on Saturday, the town’s prayers finally appeared to be answered, as a salvo of US air strikes hit distant Islamist positions in the nearby villages of Marj Esmael and Alishar, less than five miles from Kobane.
But as night fell, the American strikes appeared to have had little effect as Islamic State forces continued to pound the Kurdish positions with mortar shells, which shook the earth nearly a mile away across the Turkish border. Plumes of white smoke rose above the areas where the heavy artillery had fallen, and the smell of gun power hung in the air. In reply, the Kurdish forces offered only rifle fire, interspersed with occasional machine gun shots.
Indeed. The US-led coalition flew some 48 air strikes over Syria yesterday early in the morning, primarily targeting the JAN in Der'a, Hama, Hasakah and Idlib. While supposedly hitting the Khorasan (AQ's 'A-team' sent to Syria), at least according to this report, hits on various JAN bases provoked fierce protests and even threats from that group, the leader of which responded with threats against other insurgent groups and declaration that this is a 'war on Islam'.
From what I get to hear from them, many of insurgents say that Khorasan never existed and that targets hit yesterday were almost exclusively different JAN HQs. There is plenty of anger between them because of such attacks. They have weakened the JAN so much that this enabled the regime to advance in several places: no surprise here, then JAN and insurgent units are intermixed in plenty of frontlines. Weakening the JAN is creating holes in these.
Furthermore, the Daesh was left entirely unmolested while assaulting and capturing FSyA-held Bir Sana and Mahmudli, north of Tabqa: with this, it is now in control of entire Raqqa Province...
More by accident than by design I guess, some air strikes have hit (Daesh-held) Tel Abyad yesterday, targeting 'warehouses' - and makeshift refineries again. About a dozen of civilians were reportedly killed: I am yet to find anything about any Daesh idiot getting killed (too).
Now, there are Twitter reports that air strikes have forced the Daesh to withdraw from the outskirts of Kobane (they were that close to the town, meanwhile), but also: YPG and FSyA defenders keep on demanding attacks on Daesh tanks and artillery, which means these were not hit.
The 'strategy' here is outright amazing: if the US air continues in this fashion, in few weeks there will be no insurgents left to join its 'anti-Daesh' army because they'll be either overrun by the regime or the Daesh - or undergoing training in Jordan and Saudi Arabia... :rolleyes:
According to following report, here's the key figure behind target selection in this campaign:
Meet The 'Invisible General' Leading The War On ISIS
If he goes on like this, I guess that Austin might soon need some help from Superman, Ironman, Captain America - and few Mars People too...Quote:
A man who was once described as an "invisible general" who holds master's degrees in both education and business management is in charge of the military operations against the jihadist group Islamic State and the Al Qaeda franchise Khorasan in Syria and Iraq.
A Department of Defense spokesperson confirmed to Business Insider in an email Tuesday that General Lloyd J. Austin III was the "combatant commander" of the operations in both...
Quote:
Originally Posted by CrowBat
CrowBat,
Sorry it took so long to respond to you. So before I forget, here is the sound file (MP3 file)that I should have posted along with the Power Point Presentation that Colonel Warden gave to the Aussie Air Force. Hear is the link below. Really good stuff make sureyou listen.
https://app.box.com/s/c4tpycyduzecumv6oinm
As for the rest. You seem to ask and then answer your own questions so I am not sure how to respond some times but I will do better. I will put up a separate post and try and answer your questions point by point.
OMG he went to Auburn not Alabama......that's it we are done.:DQuote:
Originally Posted by CrowBat
I sure Nick Saban will help him if he calls:D
None that I know of except as I explained earlier.Quote:
Originally Posted by CrowBat
I don't have an answer for that as I am wondering the same thing.Quote:
Or, newest 'appearance' and then one that should be of major concern for anybody interested: this campaign is missing the Daesh, it's missing the JAN and it missed the Ahrar ash-Sham (which meanwhile dispersed). On the contrary, it has meanwhile killed more Syrian civilians than extremists. According to reports like this report (in Arabic), at least 43 Syrian civilians were killed yesterday alone - and this while the US-led air power was blasting empty buildings and makeshift refineries.
Keep in mind: it is precisely because of concerns it could end hitting Iraqi civilians that the IRIAF (Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force) has ceased its attacks on Daesh in Iraq, something like 20 days ago. Namely, the Daesh dispersed after being hit by the IRIAF some 20 times, through August and in early September, leaving the IRIAF - which is actually a US-trained air force, still very much following even USAF's doctrine - 'without clear targets' (I'm citing 1st-hand source here).
So, now I'm curious to hear: what kind of objective are planners of this campaign trying to achieve through such action?
No he isn't! And that is important you cannot change somebodies beliefs with force, but you can use force to physically stop them from doing something. Listen to audio file I posted, he talks about that very subject.Quote:
- He's 'writing' about 'change in enemy beliefs', and 'prevent an enemy from doing something'. What part of Daesh's beliefs do you think have these air strikes changed so far?
They weren't as far as I can tell.Quote:
And in what fashion was Daesh prevented from 'doing something' (for example: from continuing its assault on Kobane pocket)?
That is a very good question and I would like to know the answer myself along with alot of other CongressmanQuote:
- He's writing about 'exit strategy'.
Who has defined the US exit strategy for this campaign, and what is that looking like?
You get a gold star! Time is one of the most critical elements of Strategy and we don't have one that I know of. And NO! we are not following Warden's theory at all.Quote:
- Finally, Warden is writing about factor time: how long is this campaign going to last? Indeed, he's writing about 'time value of action' (page 13), and is stressing 'highly compressed, highly parallel' action.
On the contrary, this campaign is developing in particularly slow fashion, with more planes arriving in very gradual fashion and thus the intensity of operations developing only gradually. Or would you say that this campaign developed precisely along Warden's theories?
Again your are correct IMO. WE started with a simple and pretty good idea. Use American Airpower to support a local Arab Army.......but we don't have the Army part figured out yet. So we (USA) are trying to execute 1/2 a plan. And it is going to take 3 or more years to do it and nobody has given any costs estimates (at least that I know of). So we are not following any kind of true Strategy at least that I can tell. We do not have a clear "Future Picture" We do not have a peace Plan. We have 1/2 a War plan and we are just using the Air force to react to the enemy.Quote:
Whatever is the answer: that means that the enemy is left with more time to repair and reconstitute, to prepare a counter-offensive, to acquire allies (the latter process already began: in the light of all possible reports about high numbers of killed Syrian civilians, more than 200 defections from the JAN to the Daesh have been recorded in the last few days, and more than 50% of defectors are Syrians)... Indeed, if this campaign goes on like this, the Daesh is going to get time to 'employ novel weapons', and the 'world opinion' is likely to 'shift' too (especially in the light of heavy suffering of Syrian civilians).
The US has entered this war with its own public weary from 14 years of anti-terror war that is actually still going on - and was thus never won. How long do you expect the domestic support to last this time?
No a good way to run an Airline:)
Did I answer your questions this time? If you have anymore just ask.
At least you tried, Slap.
I believe it's obvious even to crows on my roof, that the actual overall objective of the US military action in Iraq and Syria is 'maintaining status quo'. And that's the essence of the problem on hand.
Obama seems to be hell or bent on proving himself a 'true US president'. So much so, he's blindly insisting on keeping everything in the Middle East the way it was (before he was elected, for example): the GCC should keep their oppressive dictatorships and Assadists should remain in control of Syria; the artificial Franco-British creation of Iraq should remain intact; Kurds shouldn't get their state, and Iran should be kept out of at least Iraq (plus not go nuclear).... With other words: all the reasons and major sources of extremism should remain in place, but extremism should be 'bombed into stone age'...?
The next problem any theoretician of air power should have with this operation is that Obama is - in typical US-fashion - insistent on ripping things out of their context too. Namely, the stated goal of this 'USA & Friends Co KG Ltd GesmbH SA' operation should be the 'destruction of the Daesh'. Therefore, the military aspect of this enterprise should be run entirely unrelated to all the other things that are going on in Syria, and especially about zillion of all imaginable interests (but those of the US)?
Frankly: while I can very well imagine... no, sorry: while I know very well indeed, that there are plenty of idiots in the DC thinking this is a good idea...
...is there anybody around this forum seriously thinking this is going to work?
But hey: that's the 'starting point' of this military operation.
Little wonder then, the first results of its military part have resulted in a qualified mess. Trying to keep things really short, the way this campaign is waged - a creepily slow start, pin-prick attacks against few targets strewn all over Syria, etc., etc.... to me this seems somebody there has a giant problem because his/her checklist is not applicable for this situation: elements necessary for the force to work the way it was designed, equipped and trained are not in place; 'Ring 1' type of targets are out of reach because... was it the intel that lacks the info or whatever other reason? ... so, somebody there has got to improvise and decided to start with 'Ring 2' type of targets - because they are the most obvious...?
But wait, it's getting better: the few attacks on the Daesh are publicised the most. However, when I count them, attacks on the JAN are (or were, so far) more numerous. Not to talk about those on the Ahrar: this group has already decided to scatter and dive into anonymity....
Fantastic: attack the wrong party, a 'lil bit, so the others know they are in danger and have time to go hiding...
... sigh...
Sorry mate, but I think I'll stop asking you for anything here: I really don't know whether I should cry or laugh at this tragicomedy...
The only thing I'm sure is that I'll not learn anything about methods of applying modern-day air power from this example: only all possible ways about how NOT to do it (which, as so often, is bringing me back to that Churchill's, 'you can always depend on Americans to do the right thing, after exhausting all the alternatives').
Air power failed even quicker than I anticipated. IS is laughing us, reportedly al Nusra made overtures to IS, the Syrian populace is furious with the US for not attacking Assad, and a key Kurdish area is getting ready to be over run, which will be a human tragedy and a major psychological victory for IS. It demonstrates that Warden and his few disciples didn't understand the true nature of war. It has never conformed to system theories. It is like we're back in Vietnam with McNamara's wiz kids. Another sad episode in our history because we fail to learn from history.
Bill,Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
It isn't Warden's plan he has been retired for years. It is General Dempsey's plan and he is Army the last time I checked. But like l say Warden won his war. Maybe if we start listening to winners and how they do things the situation would be different.
Enjoy your interpretation of history, I'm not wasting anymore time with Warden's theory, which has been proven not to work. Fortunately your arguments aren't gaining traction with anyone, but I'm sure the jihadists are getting a good laugh at them. Even if Warden's approach could work against some weak kneed states, it would still be inappropriate for this type of war. Air power is not "the" strategy, it is a valuable weapon system that is currently be misused for theater. You can afford to believe in myths, I can't. People don't conform to simplistic system theories, they never have. We were left scratching our asses before in Vietnam when we assumed they were a system and we could prick here and there and then the "system" would fold to our will. Furthermore, if you think the CJCS does targeting, then you know little about how the military works.
I'm not blaming the pilots, they're tacticians doing what they're told to do, and they're doing it well.
One rule in strategy is to divide the adversary, or to sever his alliances. As a former CIA analysis wrote we should either attack ISIL or al-Nusra, not both because we'll risk driving them together. We're all surprised by this news I'm sure.
http://www.jewishpress.com/news/brea...ia/2014/09/29/
.Quote:
The Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra (Al Nusra Front) terror group in Syria is reconciling with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
The two groups have been at odds for most of the past year. However, last week’s U.S.-led air strikes in northern and eastern Syria have prompted Jabhat al-Nusra to renew its ties with ISIS, declaring the strikes a “war on Islam” in an audio statement released this past weekend
http://http://www.presstv.ir/detail/...led-coalition/
This should be no surprise to anyone, and this is one reason they wanted us to attack, especially with airpower, because it is ineffective yet provides theater that they use to show we're waging war on Islam. The more videos we share with the media, the more recruiting material we give them. I guess for now the most important audience is the American people because of the mid-term election, then after that maybe we'll actually focus on what is important to reduce the threat instead of increasing it.Quote:
Did you forget your numbers of injured and killed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia? Did you forget the horror of September 11? Did you also forget the US navy ship Cole (attacked by bombers in Yemen) and the threatening of your interests in the region,” he said.
“I am asking the Western people if you have forgotten how much you have paid and are still paying from your money for your reckless wars, which will result in a great economic crisis?” Golani said.
Well let me be the the first to say thank you for sharing that with me but I had figured that out long ago.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
If you would ever take the time to read you would find out that this campaign is being run in the exact way it should NOT be run according to Warden. CrowBat did an excellent job of seeing and understanding that. Why can't you?Quote:
Fortunately your arguments aren't gaining traction with anyone, but I'm sure the jihadists are getting a good laugh at them. Even if Warden's approach could work against some weak kneed states, it would still be inappropriate for this type of war. Air power is not "the" strategy, it is a valuable weapon system that is currently be misused for theater.
No I cant afford it and neither can the nation. To much time, money and people have been ruined and wasted on a process that is not working.Quote:
You can afford to believe in myths, I can't.
Never said they did and certainly Warden never said that.Quote:
People don't conform to simplistic system theories, they never have. We were left scratching our asses before in Vietnam when we assumed they were a system and we could prick here and there and then the "system" would fold to our will
I don't believe that and have never said I did. What I do believe is what General Dempsey has said the plan is : We are going to use Air power to support a local Arab Army which may take between 1 and 3 years. So don't blame Warden for a plan he had nothing to do with.Quote:
Furthermore, if you think the CJCS does targeting, then you know little about how the military works.
First off Slap I read Warden's book, and reread sections from it rather recently and find it to be even more inaccurate and misleading in the way he represents war, and prioritizes targets using the five rings. What worked in Desert Storm was targeting the 5th ring, his ground forces, and everything else accomplished little beyond imposing costs. Imposing costs is not the same is compelling someone to quit, and difference isn't slight.
We're all frustrated, but attempting to replace our CT and COIN strategies, which admittedly have failed miserably with a 5 rings strategy will simply result in more frustration because we're ignoring the basics of war. I'm not sure how you switch from a few posts back describing how this bombing campaign is exactly line with Warden's 5 rings strategy, and then when you realize it is not only failing, but making things worse, then claim it isn't Warden's strategy and the Army planned it? Are you attempting to make rational arguments, or are you blindly defending a model? Only you can answer that.Quote:
No I cant afford it and neither can the nation. To much time, money and people have been ruined and wasted on a process that is not working.
Many times you have written it is all about the system. I admit Warden correctly identified the limits of viewing the adversary as a system in his book, but I haven't seen that from you in your posts. Design thinkers use system theory also, but most know it is flawed, and as long as you realize it is one approach to gain some understanding, but not complete understanding it is a viable "tool," but when it is taken to the level that it was in EBO, that A+B=C we are setting ourselves up for failure.Quote:
Never said they did and certainly Warden never said that.
You wrote:Quote:
What I do believe is what General Dempsey has said the plan is : We are going to use Air power to support a local Arab Army which may take between 1 and 3 years. So don't blame Warden for a plan he had nothing to do with.
It is time to move past the debate on Warden's five rings, it isn't the answer to our challenges. There may be parts of it that are relevant that can be incorporated, but anytime we try to impose a template on a complex problem without understanding the strategic context, and worse not knowing what we're trying to accomplish, we will have started down the road to nowhere.Quote:
It is General Dempsey's plan and he is Army the last time I checked.
Slapout,
The problem with systems approaches, including Warden, is that systems are incredibly resilient and once untethered from their known foundations (i.e. assumptions), respond (and escalate) in unpredictable ways. Systems usually are not destroyed outright but instead adapt to changing circumstances. And even when systems appear to be destroyed, they manifest or express themselves in surprising forms. This necessarily results in repeated reciprocal escalatory actions that quickly test (or break) the parameters of the political object defining the conflict.
We (the U.S.) should be considering how to bring the conflict to a close (read: the exit strategy) rather than embarking on open-ended campaigns with limited results and unpredictable end-states. The U.S. counter-terrorism strategy is very effective at killing terrorists (and those in their immediate vicinity) but not so much in reducing the long-term threat of terrorism. This is the percent increase from 2006 to 2012 in terrorist attacks per country from Global Terrorism Database:
Afghanistan: 420.21% (282 to 1,467)
Iraq: 71.80% (837 to 1,438)
Syria: 17,500% (1 to 176)
Yemen: 6,140% (5 to 307)
How will exclusive use of air power reverse this trend?
Slap,
before you encounter yet heavier flak: could it be you were slightly too enthusiastic and have expected a Warden-like campaign, but this turned to be an amateurish air show?
*************
After an 'all out effort' (cough, cough!) of 48 strikes against targets in Syria, two days ago, the AFP is reporting the CENTCOM to have flown 'record-breaking' 22 strike sorties - that is: against targets in Iraq and Syria, yesterday. Eleven of these against targets in Syria.
Either it's so that the Saudis are running out of princes, and Emiratis out of female F-16 pilots, or the screw-up is even intensified...
While everybody is happy about these air strikes (haha!) supposedly hitting the Daesh around Kobane, reporters in situ - no matter if US freelancers or those from the Austrian state-owned ORF - report no attacks on the Daesh in that area. Nearest they saw any of 'allied' aircraft was about 15-20 kilometres outside that town....
Sure, the YPG and the FSyA have meanwhile managed to push the Daesh some 7km away from Kobane in the south, but in the west the idiots are driving a wedge into the town and are now back to only 2km away from it.
But, don't worry: Turkey is now massing troops on its side of the border and announcing these would be 'at the highest state of alert'. Yeah, Turkey is now going to save Kobane - because it's 'logical' that an Islamist government in Istambul is going to rush to the aid of the Syrian-wing of the PKK - which the YPG is, de-facto - fight extremist Islamists in Syria... Makes sense, doesn't it - especially if one takes things out of context and ignores politics and religion...
And while the Turkish parliament is about to decide whether to go or not to go to war with the Daesh, later today, they're demanding help from the NATO too. Hey, the small Turkish military can't really go facing 20.000 idiots in north-eastern Syria... plus, its security has tollerated so many of them inside Turkey the last few years... well, who knows where are all of them now and what they are about...?
And while all of this babbling is in such a high esteem, thanks to extensive use of chlorine gas (see: 'chemical weapons') and air support in form of US air strikes agianst the JAN (see: now you know why the USAF deployed F-22s to attack the 'Daesh in Syria'; what other aircrat should the US otherwise send into the SAM-congested airspace over Damascus to hit...erm... the JAN?), the regime has re-taken the entire town of Adra, as can be seen on the two maps below. This operation was a giant success - especially air strikes: the JAN de-facto melted there and has only two intact battalions left in the area...
Another reason not to worry is: Gen Allen is about to meet leaders of Syrian opposition in Jordan, the next week, at least according to the WP.
Let me guess what are these talks going to look like:
Allan: Hello, my name is John. I'm here to unite you and lead you into a war against Islamofascists.
Insurgent leaders: Welcome! Welcome Sir! Islamu' Aydikum for coming here and your fantastic idea. Would you like to have a cup of chay?
Allan: Well, thank you: but, I came here to talk business...
Insurgent leaders: We too. Call us again when you stop providing air support for the regime and ignoring the Daesh.
Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
AP,
I had to do a double take to see who this was at first. Warden calls this the Hysteresis effect, which means...... well exactly what you said and he consistently pounds that point home when he talks about the whole system of war planning.
As for the answer to your question of course it can. The Rhodesian Fire Force is an excellent example. People of confuse Air power with an Airplane or Air Force which is understandable but it is not the same.
Here is a good example of the Army Air power!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjBSJV0yHA8
The short answer is yes. When I started this thread you will notice it has very short comments, I didn't mean for it to turn into a Warden debate but thats OK, comments take many turns here. I only have access to open sources so I was just commenting on daily events. But when I began to see patterns and when I found out there are know JTACS on the ground:eek: it was time to re-fuel and re-arm cause this is going to take a while. I really like reading your posts.Quote:
Originally Posted by CrowBat
Which book did your read. The Air Campaign or Winning In Fast Time? Cause I think you are confusing some things.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
That's right and I will answer it. I did not start the thread as a Warden thread(If you notice I always put his name in the title if I want to do that) it was simply to comment on Airpower in Syria. Which I thought would generally follow his guidelines but when I began to see through open sources which is all I have (sorta) I saw things are very different. This happened around post 6 or 7 when I said we need to do Hash Tag Bombing!Quote:
We're all frustrated, but attempting to replace our CT and COIN strategies, which admittedly have failed miserably with a 5 rings strategy will simply result in more frustration because we're ignoring the basics of war. I'm not sure how you switch from a few posts back describing how this bombing campaign is exactly line with Warden's 5 rings strategy, and then when you realize it is not only failing, but making things worse, then claim it isn't Warden's strategy and the Army planned it? Are you attempting to make rational arguments, or are you blindly defending a model? Only you can answer that.
I am short on time but will respond to the rest later.
Slap,
I think the point of divergence is determinng whether this strategy is good policy or good politics. I think it's good politics but bad policy - and not because airpower does not have a legitimate role in warfare, but that airpower in this circumstance will be insufficient for the high bar the U.S. has set for its political goals. And for this reason, the U.S. has once again fallen into a commitment trap: because of the bad policy, it will become good politics to increase U.S. commitment when it's apparent the policy is not working.
So I think this is less about airpower's legitimacy and more about policy selection and decision-making. And when we combine this approach with our theoretical understandings of resistence movements, interstate conflict, it becomes quickly evident that there are very few 'good' policies available to the U.S.
OK, since you like reading my posts, here something I consider a good example for 'how to do it'.Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
In your answer to AP, you mentioned Rhodesians. I find it estranging that it seems everybody, literally all the serious students of 'small wars' and 'modern air power at war' got struck with the RhAF in the 1970s. Even more so because the ascendant from that air force provided a 1st class example for much more serious 'expeditionary deployment' in relatively recent times.
Early August 1998: Zimbabwean Defence Forces were put on alert for deployment to the DR Congo. Nobody expected a 'war': task was to control the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from there.
That is: unless certain General Kabarebe (RPA) - better known as big friend of various 1 or 2-star generals at AFRICOM, a great COIN adviser, 'innovative thinker', even 'revolutionary military mind' (cough!) within the ranks of quite US Army scholars - came to the idea to launch a de-facto 'airborne' invasion of Kinshasa: he led one of RPA's SF-units over the border into Goma (eastern DRC), commandeered at least four, perhaps five airliners are the local airfield, then stuffed these full with his troops (Rwandans), few Ugandan units etc. and then flew all of that to Kitona AB, in western DRC, on the Atlantic coast.
Once there, Kabarebe's force swiftly overpowered the Congolese guards of about 15,000 ex-Mobutu troops held in 're-education camp' and then this mob rushed in direction of Kinshasa, 300+ kilometres away.
With Kaberebe's force approaching Kinshasa, Zims were left without the choice: in order to save Kabila's gov, their ally, they used even civilian C-47s (yup, old transports from WWII) to rush about 800 paras, two of their SAS squads, and then four each of Hawks, FB.337s, AB.412s, and several Alouettes of their Air Force (Air Force of Zimbabwe, AFZ) to N'Djili IAP.
That's about 1,900 kilometres as the crow flies from Harare to Kinshasa.
Again, this is a very, very short version (full story can be read here) so let me just summarize that a combo of SAS ambushes followed by AFZ strikes has slowed down Kabarebe's advance so much that he reached south-western outskirts of Kinshasa only on 27 August, by when the Zim para battalion has already established a defence perimeter and was reinforced by a squad of Cascavel armoured cars. Early on that morning, Kabarebe then attempted to overrun the Zims at N'Djili with help of a ploy, but that attempt failed. That is: it failed partially. Rwandans, Ugandans, and 'mutineers' found themselves in possession of the southern half of the runway, the Zims in control of the northern part.
The point was (and remains): N'Djili has a runway some 5,000+ metres long. So, the Zims used their half of the runway to fly strikes against enemy entrenched - literally - 'at the other side of the runway'. But foremost: Zim commanders didn't guess about what to do, didn't hesitate nor waste their time with philosophic recourses about strategy and tactics, about target selection or how to hit 'Ring 1, Ring 2....' etc style targets somewhere in Rwanda, 1,500 kilometres away. They hit the enemy that was clearly in front of them: well, that with 'clearly' was relative, then the mass of Kabarebe's force was concentrated on the eastern side of N'Djili slum.
Anyway, the Zims flew so intensively for the next few days, that the engines of their aircraft and helicopters were turned on in the morning and off only late in the evening; even cooks and caterers were trained in preparing bombs and hauling them to planes...
After losing all the heavy weaponry the Congolese mutineers brought with them (including several Type-62 and Type-59 tanks, plus plenty of ZPUs and all of Ugandan artillery), and after enjoying being at the receiving end of this onslaught for some four days, the Rwandans began falling back, and then the Zim paras - supported by Cascavel armoured cars - launched their counterattack. The battle was over about a week after it started, with remnants of Kabarebe's forces fleeing in chaos through the jungle and over the border to northern Angola - from where they were evacuated by Viktor Bout's transports at Christmas 1998 (actually, Kabarebe has left not only all the Congolese but a significant bunch of Ugandans behind; Zim and then Angolans have spent two months mopping up all of these).
While Kabarebe's force suffered several thousands of casualties (KIA and WIA combined, though of course most of these were Congolese that fought on this side), Zims lost some 20 KIA; while most of involved AFZ's planes and helicopters were hit by ground fire not only once, none was shot down. And despite pitched and days-long fighting through kilometres-deep slums of N'Djili, 'collateral' damage was minimal - so much so, the locals were more than happy to greet Zims as liberators (highest number of reported casualties stopped at about 300 civilians - and this despite Hawks levelling several of local churches: these were used by Rwandans with predilection because of their strong construction...BTW, if you ask Rwandans, this battle 'never happened'; they were 'forced to withdraw' because of Angola's entry into the war).
And all of this without any use of sat intel, with no ELINT and minimal SIGINT, next to no HUMINT (most of it was useless, anyway), no LGBs, no GPS-guided PGMs, no stealth planes, no APCs or MBTs developed for 20+ years and at the price of several billions - and none of all other sorts of high-tech wizardry used by the US military.
Now, I can understand that such 'obscure' battles remain unknown in the general public, or that the US military would never come to the idea to do something like the Zims have done and rush a relatively small force into a completely isolated place encircled by 10-fold more numerous enemy, 1,900 kilometres from nearest US base. (And, to make sure: I do not 'demand' anything of that sort). I admit having my problems with understanding that such battles remain unknown within circles of specialists: after all, it would be their job to find out about them, and 'learn lessons'.
But, what I cannot understand the least is that the US military - whether in total or CENTCOM only - can't even do its work in regards of something it should be capable of 'doing in sleep': namely, organizing and running an aerial campaign against the Daesh in Syria.
By side all the problems related with political strategy that is mindlessly nonsensical: but the sheer fact the military can't cope with the task is, ladies and gentlemen, simply a shame.
Bill,
here is the rest of the response to your post.
EBO is gone as it should be and I said that when it happened, complexity with no benefit. However it is all about the System and I will always stand by that just a scientific fact. But the problem usually is you have to be able to accurately identify what is inside the system, which as you point out is constantly changing because it is a living system. You like the ASCOPE model anPeopled so do I for that matter, but they are all the same thing. People equipment,weapons,information,locations and finally actions against something or somebody. The SALUTE spot report model would work well with dynamic as opposed to deliberate targeting if that makes more sense to you. There is a poster here named "evwebber" or something like that but his avatar is aircraft carrier and his tag line is "All models are wrong. Some are useful. when he first posted I made a big deal about what a great line that was because it is very true.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Again I think your are missing something. there is always an a larger External System(Strategic Context if you will) and then a smaller internal/organizational system in focus(often the enemy system). So IMO the answer is not to move on but review of the entire process.Quote:
It is time to move past the debate on Warden's five rings, it isn't the answer to our challenges. There may be parts of it that are relevant that can be incorporated, but anytime we try to impose a template on a complex problem without understanding the strategic context, and worse not knowing what we're trying to accomplish, we will have started down the road to nowhere.
I don't think we are diverging at all. The more I find out the more I think you are correct.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
CrowBat,Quote:
Originally Posted by CrowBat
that was great report thanks for posting. I will probably order the book someday as soon as I catch up on the rest of my reading. Around 2016:eek:
All insurgents are civilians...
Just one more reason that Clausewitzian (or Wardenian) war logic does not apply very well to population-based conflicts. The strategic paradigm is different, and many of the terms and concepts lead reasonably to lines of logic and actions that are, frankly, counterproductive at best.
But if we accept that the states of Syria and Iraq no longer exist in their legally defined and recognized terms, and that a new, de facto Sunni state currently under ISIL leadership has emerged, then one can actually apply Clausewitz or Warden against that new, de facto state. Doing this, however, accepts that the former, formal states no longer exist as defined. I think we should do this, but I don't think we are ready to.
Our strategy is much more in defense of the increasingly irrelevant Sykes-Picot agreement and our own plan for Iraq than it is a pursuit of a future, naturally stable Levant where US interests are not at risk. Doubling down on the past may produce temporary effects (like led to our initial withdrawal from Iraq), but are highly unlikely to produce an enduring result.
Full agreement here. Though, I'm going a step further and say: Obama is doing whatever is possible to return the situation to that before 2011, at least before 2013.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
And that's never going to work: it's an entirely different game meanwhile.
Bob,
What does a "naturally stable Levant where US interests are not at risk" look like in your estimation?
We may never know in our lifetimes - particularly when the US is so heavily invested in sustaining the status quo of a handful of gov to gov relationships.
President Washington wisely cautioned against forming designated friends or foes either one, and no place more than the Middle East and the far East do we do both.
I think Samuel Huntington nailed the issue fairly well when he observed that the US "needs to see the world as it actually is."
Latest CNN interview of Colonel Warden on situation in Syria and Iraq and why this is NOT an Air Campaign and what a real one would be like.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tcg4...ature=youtu.be
link to Daily Beast Article on "Americas WTF Airwar" some quotws from Warden are in the article.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...in-syria.html#
I don't think Warden's Five Rings is applicable to IS, but do agree with this comment.Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
Not so sure about this one.Quote:
A very big difference is intensity; the current operation against the IS appears to be significantly less intense (even on a relative basis).”
I agree with this, and as Carl has mentioned on more than one occasion, the U.S. does not fight to win anymore. Once we decide to use force, we generally need to use it decisively. We violated several principles of war/warfare to include violating surprise, initiative, mass, objective, and offense (persistent, overwhelming, and unrelenting). Frankly we defaulted to a campaign based on show that many are already seeing through. IS has already adapted, and they are gaining psychological advantage by demonstrating they can continue to gain ground despite our lame air campaign. The air campaign won't work without ground forces if our goal is to destroy IS, but it sure has heck can do better than this in degrading them.Quote:
Some analysts argue U.S. airpower is constrained because of the lack of target spotters on the ground. Even so, Warden says, “Many (perhaps the majority) of important strategic targets can be found through drone and satellite observation.”
Quote:
While Kurds – and Syrian Sunni rebels -- come up with conspiracy theories about the U.S. holding at arm’s length those who are fighting ISIS on the ground in Syria, the American approach seems more in keeping with the “hesitation and half-steps” of the Obama administration that former spy director and Pentagon chief Leon Panetta complains about in his forthcoming book, Worthy Fights.