Who are the great generals?
I recently read with interest the article 'A Failure in Generalship' posted on this website. It expresses the beleif that there is a crisis in the upper levels of the military leadership. It rasies the question who are the great generals, why were they great and why are we not producing their equivalents today?
I would be interested to hear from the wider forum and not just about the most well known but others like the Duke of Marlborough or Alfred the Great who may not be so well know outside Europe.
Comments?
JD
Socety and the Military Leadership
For what its worth, I think John Monash and Rommel were the great generals of the 20th century but Alexander of Macedon was perhaps the greatest of all time. He proved his tactical genius over and over but it was his ability to create and hold an Empire by adopting and using local customs and institutions that marked him as great. Toward the end of his life the majority of his army was not Greek but Asian and after his death, his Asian conquests remained loyal while the Greek regions rebelled. He must have been a remarkable leader to have instilled such loyalty and formed such diverse regions of sworn enemies into an Empire.
A fundamental issue with western society is that we do not accept error. The Nike founder recently said that the problem with America is not that too many errors are made, but not enough. There is a saying in motor racing that if you aren't crashing once in a while, you're not really trying but society somehow expects senior military leaders to control something as chaotic as war and never make a mistake. Not only that, but they are unfarily held responsible for the actions of personnel over which they have little if any direct influence. Is it any wonder that in such an environment, senior leadership is unwilling to take bold decsions or devolve decsion making to lower levels?
Alexander would not have thrived in such an environment. He attacked a Persian Army at least seven times bigger than his own on a field of their choosing. He took up the customs of his Asian subjects. He defeated enemies in battles and then immediately reinstated them as vassal kings. But, unforgivably, he made mistakes. His army mutinied twice and he nearly destroyed his army in the deserts through his own mistakes in judgment and inadequate logistical planning. Can you imagine such a man keeping his job as a General today? And that's before discussing his relationship with Hephaistion!
Should it be Flags or Generals?
One of the great criticisms of many generals has been their inability to see beyond land. Certainly its a criticism of many German generals. The inability to consider the joint realm as it is named today would indicate an inclination toward personal constraints.
Rare is the flag who can employ air, land and sea-power in a complimentary and synchronous manner to achieve an end.
In today's arena we see COCOMs that are not land generals, but AF generals and Navy admirals. I see no reason why we should limit our list to generals who have employed land forces, rather I propose we expand it to those flags who have commanded land and/or sea and air forces to achieve an end. There is no reason why we should constrain ourselves:D
Regards, Rob
A little iconoclasm and some oldies but goodies
Since Rob and Ken have already argued for an expanded list, my proposal for a very high ranking "fly boy" addition to the list is:
"Smiling" Albert Kesselring
Another German defensive specialist would be:
Gotthard Heinrici from the Russian Front. (Anyone who was unfortunate enough to have to take command of an Army Group previously led by Himmler gets special points. The fact that he was successful in leading it too during the 1945 campaigns gives him many positives strokes in my book.)
And his Russian counterpoint:
Vasili Chuikov, defender of Stalingrad and captor of Berlin.
Many names offered up fit into the category of great captains (I particularly like Ken's list), but I think many of those names are much more tactical hot shots than grand leaders at the operational/strategic level--Rommel being a prime example. BTW, a close reading of his descriptions in Infantry Attacksshows that he was at his best leading from the front in a small group operation.
As requested in the original post, I have added a few "older" leaders for consideration:
Frederick the Great of Prussia
Prince Eugene of Savoy (His co-leader, Marlborough, was already noted.)
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden
Saladin/Salah al-Din from the Crusades/Horns of Hattin/Capture of Jerusalem fame
Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra
Marcus Aurelius
Deborah/Barak (tough to tell from the literature who was really in charge)
Joshua
The fact of the matter is that many "great" generals/leaders are so only because of the great set of advisors and planners that they have/have had working for them. Too bad a lot of those folks get swallowed up in the archives because they do not have good press agents.
Should you do something just because you can?
Ken,
I wonder about that as well. Kind of like when does the ground component guy (if organized that way) take over from the Maritime guy in an amphibious operation - generally when enough forces are established ashore as to provide C2 and enough combat power to pursue the LOO toward the objective(s).
But what about a guy like Nimitz? What about when a state is primarily a maritime power - like the contest between Athens and Sparta? Since man lives on land, the bulk of questions decided reference man will be answered there - land power compels - the others really coerce (probably made a few folks nervous with that one, but I think there are more historical examples in favor then against).
That should not mean that an AF general or an admiral could not use land forces to do so - I think its more a question of the means at his disposal, and his ability to understand the nature of the war and its conditions (METT-TC w/ a "P"). Since a person can generally only be truly proficient in so many things, it reasonable to assume somebody versed in land power their entire life is going to understand more of the nuances then say a sea or air guy (and vice-versa). If the flag has a good "joint" staff, and the professional judgment to put it to use, it should be fine. I'll give you though that there are more historical examples of Generals who used sea power to attain operational advantages on land and effect strategic outcomes then admirals - Brassidas, Wellington & Eisenhower to name a few.
You raise a great question, that in my mind raises other relevant questions about how we assign COCOMs - and the whole issue of interdependence. It also raises the issues of definitions and if we should reconsider them- either to reaffirm them, or change them in light of present conditions.
I honestly need to cogitate some more on that one. :D
I think the nation and DoD ned to do that as well
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
Ken,...
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You raise a great question, that in my mind raises other relevant questions about how we assign COCOMs - and the whole issue of interdependence. It also raises the issues of definitions and if we should reconsider them- either to reaffirm them, or change them in light of present conditions.
I honestly need to cogitate some more on that one. :D
Good points all and I agree. My sensing, mostly from my father and Navy and Marine friends who were in the Pacific during the war is that much of Nimitz's success was due to good strategic vision, an ability to pick good subordinates (as diametrically opposed to having them forced on him by a personnel system), to delegate and then to let people do their jobs.
I think any good FlagO can do the geographic CinC job. A mediocre or bad one will foul up to one degree or another. The key isn't suit color or community, it's the right guy for the job and generally, that entails not being 'fair.'
He --or she -- selected for that job has to be able to select senior subordinates (hear the Services wail...) and, more importantly, has to be able to trust them and to do just that -- trust them.
We've lost the ability to trust one another (I blame the personnel system but that's another thread another day. :D )
The thing in this thread I have grave reservations about is that 'military advice' to the Prez and SecDef is nominally restricted to the CJCS, that we insist on rotating the services through that and by definition, that is a political appointment...
What's wrong with that picture?
I wonder how much military advice a President and the
Congress receive these days other then the CJCS? With all the Think Tank guys, paid military affairs correspondents on the media and opinions on the blog-sphere that float/filter up through staffers, how much influence does one single guy have these days?
How much influence does a COCOM have given the media, the personality of a president, the experience and comfort zone of a SEC DEF and their bias, the crisis at hand?
I'm not sure there are too many other ways to do it. I mean the President could pick his or her CJCS without worrying about which Joint Flavor of the month it is, but that too has its ills. He/She cold delegate it to the SEC DEF, but again, personal bias may enter in. I'm sure as it is, politics plays a role in the nomination, which at the level is probably some what natural - given the convergence of policy and strategy.
I guess there is also the JFK solution, but we may already have something akin to that with think tanks anyways:(
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We've lost the ability to trust one another (I blame the personnel system but that's another thread another day. )
I'd say parochialism spawned by the acquisition system (The "whose rice bowl is it anyways" game show) typified by the debates such as the one on UAS/UAVs, and the professional lobbyers on the Hill- a necessary ill these days for sure in order to justify why we need this or that to fulfill our missions:(.
You know, I don't think I saw Marshall on anybody's list. It may go to our fascination with the tactical - where men die, things are blown up, and celluloid records. I think when you consider the scope of his role, the various personalities involved, and the manner in which he kept himself from becoming politicized, it is humbling. If not one of our greatest generals, he is certainly one of our greatest citizens.
Regards all, Rob