Air Power in the New COIN Era
Air Power in the New COIN Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions
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With insurgency growing in importance as a national security problem, it is receiving new interest across the services, in the Department of Defense (DoD), and elsewhere in the U.S. government. Although ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq give particular immediacy to the problem, the challenge of insurgency extends well beyond these specific conflicts. It is important, therefore, that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) consider how to meet the growing demand for air power in joint, combined, and interagency counterinsurgency operations and that other services’ and DoD-wide reassessments of the subject take the potential roles of air power in counterinsurgency fully into account. In particular, airmen should take the lead in exploring how air power might work in combination with other military and civil instruments to help avert the development of an insurgency or perhaps to check a growing insurgency long enough to allow political and social initiatives (the heart of any successful counterinsurgency strategy) to take hold.
To address these and related policy challenges, RAND Project AIR FORCE conducted a fiscal year 2005 study entitled “The USAF’s Role in Countering Insurgencies.” This study addressed four major policy questions:
(1) What threat do modern insurgencies pose to U.S. interests?
(2) What strategy should the United States pursue to counter insurgent threats?
(3) What role does military power play in defeating insurgencies?
(4) What steps should USAF take to most effectively contribute to counterinsurgency?
This work builds on more than 40years of RAND Corporation work on insurgency, peace operations, and other types of lesser conflicts. This monograph has several purposes and audiences. First, it seeks to be a short primer on the problem of insurgency, counterinsurgency principles, and the role of air power in countering insurgencies. It is hoped that it will be a valuable introduction for airmen new to the topic. Second, it is hoped that the analysis on the potential demand for advisory assistance, as well as the data collection and analysis of recent 6th Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS) missions, will offer new insights to counterinsurgency practitioners in USAF. Finally, the monograph seeks to offer senior USAF leaders a way ahead to develop increased capability in this area without sacrificing the Air Force’s edge in major combat operations...
Frustration All Around...
It is a terrible, terrible fact that "transformation" has been high-jacked by those who see high-ticket, high-technology solutions to every problem-set we now, and will for the foreseeable future, face. I have been working these issues (urban, asymmetric, IW, COIN, etc...) for ten years. Every time I think we have turned the corner and the light bulbs are popping on someone or some “program” flips off the switch. IMHO, the USAF and USN are most guilty – but others are too. Programs that have emanated out of JFCOM’s J9 over the last several years smack of inmates taking charge of the insane asylum. Moreover, as has been posted on another thread here today – our ground forces are still struggling for solutions – and not necessarily at the tactical level…
AFROTC may not be the best indicator...
I don't know what AFROTC is doing.
I am doing the AF's Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) by correspondence right now, and I think a lot of SWJ folks would be surprised by the amount of focus on Small Wars in the courses.
I'm on the 5th of 7 classes. The first was on leadership... std mil leadership stuff.
The National Security class focused extensively on the interagency... 2/7 lessons were mainly dealing with the interagency process, mostly using OIF and OEF Phase IV as the examples. State's Coord for Reconstruction and Stabilization was discussed extensively. Weak and Failing States and Terrorism was another lesson, for a total of 3/7 in the National Security lesson on topics similar to what I've read here. The other lessons are the basics of how the NSC, PDDs, etc work, and then a WMD lesson.
The Strategy and War (SW) class, you would think, would focus mostly on the F-22s kicking down the door for B-2s to take on the IADS and HV tgts... but no, it mostly focused on small wars.
The strategy lesson of the SW class was standard... what is strategy, examples, etc. The War lesson focused on how a war is really won after the "Shock and Awe" is done, and the vanquished need to be made a functional country again.
The American way of war lesson was the closest to what I would have expected, but included some articles about the effectiveness of the traditional American way of waging war.
The other ways of war lesson included an article by SWJ's own Steve Metz, as well as one by Col Nagl.
Even the Transformation and OIF lessons in the SW class focused on Phase IV ops... other than a Cebrowski article, the other readings dealt with Stabilization/reconstruction or 4GW...
The Expeditionary Airpower class was mostly history of airpower and foundations, but had some pretty good stuff on Vietnam, and the treatment of OIF and OEF had some frank discussions, as well as articles like "EBO in Small Wars" and "The Phase IV Fight".
3/7 lessons in the NS class on Small Wars-type stuff.
5/7 lessons in the SW class.
Some good stuff in the Airpower class.
So far I have read very little about Shock and Awe, or big air campaigns... in fact, almost none. All this in the AF's premier PME course, the one that is supposed to take Majors from tacticians and take them into the realm of operational art and strategy...
Now, I know that I will once again be seen as defending the AF. Which I am, because I am part of it. :) But I have to tell you that the AF in general is very focused on the fights in OEF and OIF in particular, and pretty focused on Small Wars in general (almost too much at times if you ask me). Is it in the way folks on this forum would like? Maybe not - I think we tend to look more at what our capabilities are using high intensity systems to support the low-end fight.
That said, a couple facts:
The AF has about 6000+ folks deployed with the Army on "In Lieu of Taskings".
Under Total Aircrew Management Initiative (TAMI 21), 180 young fighter pilots are being sent to Predator and to U-28s and PC12s to support the GWOT. The single squadron of U-28s is being augmented by an unspecified number of PC-12s, according to Air Force Magazine.
Predator CAPs are being boosted from 12 to 21 according to DefenseNews.
I am sure not everything is as it could be if we had a lot more money to spend. But as I've said before, if you don't have enough F-22s and F-35s to stop those who by 4th gen fighters and double digit SAMs, then you're not going to have to worry about the small wars for long, because pretty soon someone will decide to go for a big one.
I think the USAF is caught in the position of having to org, train, and equip for a high end war as well as low end, while in two low end fights. That combined with a lot of old airplanes means that you have to balance risks. I think with the Army neccessarily having to focus more on the low end, it makes sense for the USAF and USN to support that effort while hedging on the high end - reduces the risk of us getting caught flat footed in the near term.
Anyway, it has been instructive to go through some of these classes after having been involved in the discussions here. I look forward to learning more - my next class is the Joint Forces one so I am sure I will be asking some questions.
V/R,
Cliff
I do not mean this to be derogatory or in any way
insulting, it is a serious, non-snarky comment appropos of yours -- I have seen that for many years (believe it or not, the USAF existed before I put on a war suit, not long, mind you but it was there...) and I am convinced it has a lot to do with attitude. A whole lot...
Have to comment on this one.
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Originally Posted by
120mm
The current AF moves remind me of a "####bird", who spends the 30 days prior to his OER, "apple-polishing" for the boss, in order to make up for not doing his own job all along. To say that because the rest of us can see through the USAF's b.s. and critize their misdirected efforts, isn't the same as saying "that there are many out there who, for whatever reason, will criticize the service no matter what it does."
I obviously disagree with this on a fundamental level, but I don't really think it matters what evidence is cited - some folks will just feel the way they feel.
Using the logic above, you could also apply your comment on the "not doing your job all along" to the Army's COIN doctrine at the start of OIF phase IV, and the correction made more recently.
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Originally Posted by
120mm
So the question remains: "How come the Air Force isn't hounding Congress to fund their COIN CAS aircraft, exportable air-transportable hospital packages and additional funds for cargo airframes?" The answer, I believe, is that no matter how many airmen they put on perimeter or convoy security, is that the USAF doesn't give a stroke and a crap about the current fight.
The AF has a stated requirement for more C-17s, just like it does for more F-22s. Unfortunately the civilian bosses get to decide what the services ask Congress for.
As for the USAF caring, I'm sorry you feel that way. I know the folks who I work with are well aware and all do care- almost every unit has someone deployed to the AOR. One of my two NCOs got mortared twice yesterday at Balad.
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Originally Posted by
120mm
And don't get me wrong: We need either the F-22, or a much larger Air Force flying less capable planes, for the possibility of a larger, more conventional conflict.
I'm not trying to say the AF and Army are committed at the same level - but as you just said, the AF is having to hedge against a lot of potential nastiness in the not so distant future. Would you rather the AF buy a COIN aircraft in great numbers and let China or Iran be able to use SA-20s to prevent us from deterring them, or do the COIN role with Predator, Reaper, A-10, F-16s, and B-1s? Until the budgets are increased it unfortunately is close to a zero sum game. Again, it's kind of like asking why the Army is asking for FCS and not a purpose built COIN system of systems. The entire military is forced to balance future high end threats against the current coin fight.
I'm not looking to start a big arguement here. Just pointing out that you can make similar arguements about any service.
V/R,
Cliff
Based on watching inter service rivalry for
many more years than I care to recall, I think you've really summarized the problem very well:
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Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
A great deal of this has to do with how the AF tends to present itself to the public and other services...
I don't think anyone is saying that the AF doesn't do good things. But it's important that the AF (like any other branch) stop from time to time and try to see itself as others see them...
Attitude...
One can be arrogant and dismissive (see me for an example ;) ) but one has to be prepared to take the flak for doing so. To come on strong is fine; to whine about being called for it invites derision...
Air Force must do more for war, Gates says
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Pentagon chief: Getting aircraft to Iraq, Afghanistan 'like pulling teeth'
Article is here
Having been a fly on the wall at air force bases...
I think we're underestimating the degree of internal conflict in the Air Force. The message from the top is "Everything begins and ends with F-22". When was the last time you saw an AF graphic that didn't have an F-22 in it? When you get down to the Majors and Captains, you'll actually hear advocates for real jointness, as opposed to Douhet/H.G. Wells/Billy Mitchell's Air Power for COIN (but at heart, the old school folks' loyalty lies with the fighter community that emerged during Viet Nam).
As an institution, the Air Force does not value what they provide for the greatest value-added in COIN; comm, airlift, and ISR (I'm not denigrating the firepower, but for COIN, firepower in the sky is secondary to comm, airlift, and ISR from above). If we can get a generation of AF generals who don't kowtow irrationally to their own divinity as zipper-suited sungods, the problem will resolve itself. But as it stands, their fantasy of gun kills in dogfights is as rational as the really old school Navy vision of capitol ships duking it out. Dogfighting and battleships trying to cross the T might be relevant someday, but not in the near future given current geopolitics and technology.
Don't get me wrong, we'd have a lot more trouble with the current conflict without the capabilities the Air Force brings to the fight, I just wish their COLs and BGs would see that.
Oh, and Umar- for cost cutting, why do general officers in the air force maintain their flight status? Just the flight hours so they can fly is hundreds of thousands of dollars a month, it keeps them from doing the things Generals really should be doing, and it keeps the Lieutenants and Captains out of the airframes they should be current on. Put 'em in Cessnas from the Aeroclubs and Civil Air Patrol if they want flight hours.
Tidbits from the SecDef...
"These new realities and missions should be reflected in our training and doctrine. The Air Force will be increasingly called upon to conduct civil-military or humanitarian operations with interagency and nongovernmental organizations and partners and deal directly with local populations."
"All this may require rethinking long-standing service assumptions and priorities about which missions require certified pilots and which do not."
Who knows, perhaps our next air-to-air combat ace will be a senior airman (the horror!). :D
So the SECDEF got their attention (somewhat)
A lot of chatter among the air guys about the efficacy of a prop airplane. In truth, props are bad, it would be much better to mod F-15s to run at a coupla hundred bucks per operational hour instead of whatever it costs now. The mods should also allow maintenance by largely illiterate populations with materials readily at hand.
As far as "BPC" goes, don't worry about it. Some enterprising company will step up to fill the void. Blackwater is already active in the air world; wouldn't take much to develop a core of contractors to advise HN air forces (or Army Air Corps in countries who keep the relationship in order.)
That way, OUR air force could fly air superiority missions against ...um..
To understand the present . . .
. . .it quite often helps to look at the past. I am currently reading Lee Kennett's The First Air War 1914-1918. I heartily recommend it to those who are trying to figure out where the attitude and culture of the worlds' air forces come from. We have not heard from our non-American readership about the other air forces of the world, but I suspect their reports would not be that different. Kennett has some interesting discussion that I find explains much of it quite handily. But, I suspect there is more to this as well.
While working in a strategic intelligence unit that was a tenant in USAREUR, my troops and I were treated by the folks from 7th Army units with an attitude similar to that expressed here by ground forces types about the air arm. On an almost daily basis we were subjected to comments like "get a haircut" and "try sleeping in a tent for a change." My troops would be jerked awake at 0500 (after working a second shift and getting back at about 0100) by Jodies about them "sleeping in," yelled by the neighboring FA Bn's batteries as they ran by in their PT formations. I suspect some part of it was envy/sour grapes on the part of the FA and Armor guys that we affectionately referred to as "treads." And, within our joint organization, interestingly enough, the Army INSCOM folks made similar snide comments about the Air Force and Navy personnel worked along side us. My point here is that some of the attitude expressed by members of the junior service may be a defense mechanism while some is simply an expression of group rivalry.
Headline: Grunt defends Air Force.
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Originally Posted by
Umar Al-Mokhtār
...To address USAF and COIN I guess the first challenge is to get the Air Force to culturally realize they are a "support" service first and foremost. :eek:
Yes and no. In the air, they are primary; for land warfare they are indeed support and I suggest that dichotomy is a part of their character and thus gives rise to the attitudinal problem.
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I'm going to offer an oversimplification here: The only way to completely defeat your enemy, particularly in COIN, is to occupy his land with your people (and by “your” people I mean they can be our troops or indigenous personnel on our side of the COIN). You do not have to kill them necessarily, but you do have to be physically present on the ground. That is the essence of the infantryman...Everything else the military does is done to support him...Having total control of the air certainly makes the infantry’s job easier. But typically in COIN the opposition has no aircraft of note, so it’s a moot point.
True and that is the here and now -- but there's a reason that is true...
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“...you may have to accept that if you would like the US and its forces to be able to operate, you might need Air Superiority as a prerequisite.” That depends on where we operate. Air Superiority in not a prerequisite for us to operate, it is something very, very nice to have. When was the last time US ground forces were subjected to sustained air attack? Not that it couldn’t happen in the future.
Having been subjected to enemy air attack, friendly air superiority is indeed nice to have. Very, very nice. I 'm personally a fan of us having all the air superiority we can get. Your points on COIN are correct -- but neither you nor I can guarantee that COIN will be the role we'll always be in or even that our very next war will be a COIN fight. It's important to recall that we are and have been in several COIN fights in recent years in large measure simply because the Air Force, the Navy and the Marines can all mount a successful air dominance battle. I for one would greatly prefer to keep it that way.
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I guess I could counter with what relevancy does the F-22/F-35 have in COIN? Who is it we are looking to use the F-22 against? China? Iran? Russia? Lichtenstein? If so, when and where?
Fair question. Do you know the answer?
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I do not get to see what our National leadership is really thinking but I do know that at this moment in time we are in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and not in China and Russia. Our primary focus should be on how we defeat an implacable enemy in those two arenas, an enemy I might note without a single aircraft, before we seek to pick a fight somewhere else.
Wise words. Hopefully our national leadership will heed them. Who's prepared to guarantee that others will play by our rules...
The F22 is necessary; so is the F35 (even more so IMO -- and it will be an F16 on steroids in the COIN fights). More C17s, 130s and re-engining the C5Bs would be nice. Nice and necessary are different. Not to mention that as Cliff and Entropy pointed out, there's a body od folks in the AF who are on board with you on that score (notably AFSOC). DoD and the mil contractors can be faulted for gold plating equipment, excessively long development cycles and poor procurement practices but I'd note that is a DoD wide (EFV, MV22, Commanche, LCS, Virginia class anyone???) problem and is far from Air Force specific. The USAF can be faulted for misplaced priorities off and on over the years and for having an attitude problem but to be fair, they've done a lot more good than harm.
A short aside from the current tour de argumento
Air Superiority is very important. OK
What other assets besides just the airplanes themselves help maintain air superiority?
Are there perhaps some being left out of this discussion which might have a lot to say about more cooperative and/or integrated ways of fulfilling the requirement?
And if so would this not allow for more measured approach to specialized order but more in the realm of whats truly necessary vs what might just be more comfortable?
Only if you can very accurately
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Originally Posted by
Ron Humphrey
...And if so would this not allow for more measured approach to specialized order but more in the realm of whats truly necessary vs what might just be more comfortable?
predict what the next war and, given todays development times, the one after that will be like, I think...