Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
Some of your suggestions sound reasonable, others not so much, but what do any of them have to do with the AF and COIN - or the wars we're in currently? At most they seem like tertiary solutions only designed to save a bit of money.
Just responding to Cliff’s query.

To address USAF and COIN I guess the first challenge is to get the Air Force to culturally realize they are a "support" service first and foremost.

I'm going to offer an oversimplification here: The only way to completely defeat your enemy, particularly in COIN, is to occupy his land with your people (and by “your” people I mean they can be our troops or indigenous personnel on our side of the COIN). You do not have to kill them necessarily, but you do have to be physically present on the ground. That is the essence of the infantryman.

Everything else the military does is done to support him.

COIN is conflict with both a knife and a handshake, and while having air “power” is nice, it’s not always necessary, air transportation is much more important. It is difficult to win hearts and minds and show people you care from 30,000 feet. Although today you certainly can kill them more accurately from up there.

Having total control of the air certainly makes the infantry’s job easier. But typically in COIN the opposition has no aircraft of note, so it’s a moot point.

Having space superiority certainly makes the infantry’s intel support better. But typically in COIN the opposition has no space capability of note.

So were does the USAF fit in the COIN picture? First must come that essential realization they are a "support" service first and foremost (and yes I believe Douhet, Doolittle, Arnold, and LeMay will roll in their graves). Then seriously asking the Army and Marines what the USAF can do for them to best assist them in the fight. I suspect the answers would be more airlift, UAVs, and ISR capability.

Perfect their CAS capability. If this means more A-10’s, so be it. Get more UAS assets into service. If it means having operators who are not rated, so be it.

Put the F-22/F-35/Tanker issues on the back burner and move to the front things that COIN actually needs, but that means looking at COIN from the practitioner’s POV and not from the Air Forces’.

“there's only so far you can go in being a jack of all trades before you become a master of none.” That’s the Marines motto! Although it’s more along the lines of being a jack of all trades yet a master of few. You do what you must to get the job done. Sometimes the USAF does suffer from over specialization.

“..you may have to accept that if you would like the US and its forces to be able to operate, you might need Air Superiority as a prerequisite.” That depends on where we operate. Air Superiority in not a prerequisite for us to operate, it is something very, very nice to have. When was the last time US ground forces were subjected to sustained air attack? Not that it couldn’t happen in the future.

“I am not trying to start arguments.” But this is a great place for argumentation, in the polite sense, as long as we can agreeably agree to disagree while avoiding being disagreeable.

“What level of risk are you willing to accept in this area? What AOR should the risk be accepted in? Or will you attempt to use another system to achieve the same effects as the F-22? If so what system?”

I guess I could counter with what relevancy does the F-22/F-35 have in COIN? Who is it we are looking to use the F-22 against? China? Iran? Russia? Lichtenstein? If so, when and where?

I do not get to see what our National leadership is really thinking but I do know that at this moment in time we are in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and not in China and Russia. Our primary focus should be on how we defeat an implacable enemy in those two arenas, an enemy I might note without a single aircraft, before we seek to pick a fight somewhere else.