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After four years I have finally nailed down a thesis:
The Way Of War
A study of classical strategic theory focusing on Carl Von Clausewitz's, 'On War', and Mao Zedong's interpretation of 'Sun Tzu'. The thesis sets out to test the conceptual framework of what I will call 'the way of war' with specific reference to the contemporary applications of force, and understanding the often oscillating intensity of violence in war.
and good subject matter area. :)
Regards
Mike
Very interesting, may I bug you for more details? The reason I ask is I recently nailed down a similar topic for my thesis, concentrating on regional socio-cultural 'way of war' approaches and how well they explain the behaviour of Islamist violent non-state actors.Quote:
Originally Posted by Taiko
Slight change to thesis: A study of classical strategic theory focusing on Carl Von Clausewitz's, 'On War', and Mao Zedong's interpretation of 'Sun Tzu'. The thesis sets out to test the conceptual framework of what I will call 'the way of war' with specific reference to the contemporary applications of force, and explaining the often oscillating intensity of violence in war.
Chapters are as follows:
Ch 1: Introduction
Ch 2: Carl Von Clausewitz
Ch 3: Mao Zedong and Sun Tzu
Ch 4: The Way Of War
Ch 5: Nuclear Warfare
Ch 6: High Intensity Warfare
Ch 7: Low Intensity Warfare
Ch 8: Cyber Warfare
Ch 9: Conclusion
Fire away if you want anything specific. I'm fairly busy at the moment and will not be able to start writing until January 2012 if I can get the funding. I'm saving money from an Admin job right now...but I'll try and answer anything here when I can. For now this is more of a suppository for the conceptual framework, and the main reason I posted the thread is that there is no other place I would gladly take feedback from council members as most know a lot more about this subject area than me. Six years and still a novice :DQuote:
Very interesting, may I bug you for more details?
Question: Why does the level and intensity of violence change within a war and between wars in different time periods?
Within a war: The sides need a breather. Political imperative dictates so.
Between time periods: Political nature of the system in which wars are fought? The 30 Years War was more destructive than the Napoleonic Wars due to the battle for souls? Technology definately has a part to play - it became easier to increase the level of violence.
A bit superficial, but my initial thoughts on your question.
Within a war - this is often shaped by political and social conditions as well as military necessity and/or realities. Violence can taper, as Infanteer mentioned, because both sides need a breather. It can also be because the political leadership of nation X decides to tone down violence to send a signal of some sort. Likewise it can ratchet back up due to domestic pressure on political leaders in response to something that happened (or didn't happen) on the battlefield. The appearance of a "cause" can also cause violence levels to increase (sometimes drastically and quickly).
Between wars I think the same sorts of things apply. Nations exhausted by a major conflict don't seem to have the same stomach for aggression (at least at first), or they may feel that their demands/needs have been met. Political unrest at home can also lead to diminishing violence outside the borders as leaders turn their attention inward. In "ye olden dayes" armies had to be smaller due to logistics limits and obviously couldn't be moved as quickly. This mean that nations or rulers had to "pick their time and place" in a different way than they do now. It's worth considering the impact of social changes on this as well. The rise of communications technology (from printing on) and nation-states and (I think) the dominance of monotheistic religion also play roles.
Thanks for the imput.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=11715
See post #16 for an outline of what I am trying to pitch for.
I have read both Infanteer's and Steve's responses, as well as your post on the linked thread. My answer, I think, is complementary to all the above perspectives, perhaps coming from a slightly different angle. It's a good question, and one that has been bouncing around my head for the last few days since reading your thread.
I would suggest that the intensity of warfare refers to political will, in an explicitly Clausewitzian setting. If the political will is for complete and utter annihilation of another population group, then the violence will be total - witness the devastation visited upon Carthage or on the Eastern Front. If the political objectives desire a new balance of power then the need to co-exist post hostilities requires reduced levels of violence.
Political systems may sometimes topple themselves mid-conflict, which is why 'pauses' sometimes exist or the intensity of violence decreases. If the political system is unable to tolerate an ongoing offensive or military campaign due to materiel losses, economic cost, human cost or even parliamentary support, then policy may change, based on the omnipresent centre of gravity, political sustainability.
When the will for total destruction of another population is present as a political goal the violence will be absolute. When that political will decreases in intensity the level of violence, too, reduces. After all, states go to war with the intent of a better peace, so the means exerted will relate to their view and conception of the end-state.
This would explain why states involved in a civil war may often resort to extreme levels of violence as they do not expect to have to rehabilitate or coexist alongside the opposing political order. It would also explain why limitations are placed on even the most high-risk operations, such as the employment of gas in WW2 or nuclear weapons in the Cold War campaigns, as both sides intended to work with and not annihilate the opposing populations.
Perhaps I am rephrasing your question. I don't believe that the intensity of violence differs between time periods, but rather due to the objectives of politics. The trend for political systems to emphasise stability and the maintenance of a balance of power may have moved away from absolutes in conquest and destruction towards less costly and less permanent measures, and it is this phenomenon that is now observed in reduced levels and intensity of violence in warfare.
If the aim is to objectively test the conceptual framework of warfare then two of your proposed chapter headings should be revised. As synthesized by RADM J. C. Wylie in Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control - Chapters 2 and 3 would be better headed Sequential – Carl von .... , and Cumulative - Mao .... Sun Tzu.Quote:
Originally Posted by Taiko
J. C. Wylie :)
Ha, and here I was thinking I was the only person who had read and still uses Wylie. His work really opened up and leveled the conceptual playing field for me when I was working on the model! In fact, I would probably recommend that anyone interested in this theory read Echevarria II, and Wylie first before opening CvC. I primarily use Wylie's work in the introduction and chapter four when dealing with the specifics of defining strategy and war.
The study is on war (the strategic use of force to gain a political objective), not warfare, the goal being to develop a general explanatory theory of the level and intensity of violence in war. So the theory has to be very broad gauged to not only cover a considerable time period, but plausably explain why the level and intensity within war can be so drastic. From the death of a thousands cuts via insurgencies to total annihilation via nuclear war. CvC provides the best and most broadest/stable base to work from in developing a theoretical model, however, Mao/ST provide a more complex and narrower political framework that fits neatly within CvC. Mao read both works and has some interesting insights into understanding the shift from theory to practice. While I was originally only going to focus on CvC, including Mao/ST adds another explanatory layer that further enables the user of the model to drill down into the various "modes of warfare" for the relevant data.Quote:
conceptual framework of warfare
Thank you for your suggestions on chapter titles, the ones I have are place holders at the moment.
That is one conclusion I am currently investigating. "Intensity in violence" can be a slippery concept to define. For example, in understanding the intensity of violence of a nuclear war, concepts such as space and time shift/change dramatically when compared to the level and intensity of violence in even World War Two. This in itself has an impact on politics/strategy etc. As Echevarria II has correctly stated, when we are looking at this concepts, and the many variables involved, CvC establishes the fact that there is a feedback loop between then all, so it is very important to be careful in how you approach understanding/analyzing/explaining the causal relationships between all of the variables at play. Easy to say, very very hard to do!Quote:
I don't believe that the intensity of violence differs between time periods, but rather due to the objectives of politics. The trend for political systems to emphasise stability and the maintenance of a balance of power may have moved away from absolutes in conquest and destruction towards less costly and less permanent measures, and it is this phenomenon that is now observed in reduced levels and intensity of violence in warfare.
Of note, I bumped into an interesting article in the RUSI journal discussing "intensity" and critiquing its utility.
Christopher Bellamy (1998): If you cant stand the heat ... new concepts of conflict intensity, The RUSI Journal, 143:1, 25-31
You're institution should allow you online access to the RUSI archives through informaworld. If not, PM me an email address and I'll send you a copy if you wish.
That whole idea only works because of the real reason:Quote:
Originally Posted by Infanteer
The culminating point of attack.
This is being driven by superiority of defence over offence AND the overextension of logistics.
Two sides deciding to recover for a while is the requirement for a temporary reduction of intensity (beyond mere movement of forces for a new attack at another location). This wouldn't work if offence was superior to defence.
I'm having trouble trying to find a date as reference for my thesis. When was the exact day and time that the Europeans defeated the 'Native Americans'?
No idea if you are being cheeky with your question, but the event of 29 December 1890 at Wounded Knee is often given as the close of the Indian Wars. But keeping in mind that treaties were negotiated on a nation-to-nation basis, Red Cloud’s War ended at best in a draw for the federal government and the ancestors of the Seminole and Miccosukee nations currently located within the boundaries of Florida never signed any treaty related to cessation of the Seminole Wars.Quote:
Originally Posted by Taiko
I'm not being cheeky (:D), so I'll also go with 1890 Wounded Knee as the conventional event of closure.
Except that, of course, if one wants to be very accurate, the last encounter of the "Indian Wars" was won by the Indians. The Indians in question being a group of "Nobbies" (Anishinabe - Minnesota Ojibwe) under Bugonegijig (aka Bugonaygeshi). The location was Sugar Point (Leech Lake), Minnesota. The date was 5 Oct 1898 (in the afternoon), when a US officer and 5 troopers (3rd Inf. Reg.) were killed, and a number wounded - Indian casualties, none.
A settlement was made and full clemency was granted by Pres. McKinley in Jan 1899.
Some refs: Wiki, from the report to the Secretary of the Interior:
The Battle of Sugar Point : a re-examination; and The last Indian uprising in the United States.Quote:
The Indians were prompted to their outbreak by the wrongs committed against them and chafed under unfair treatment. They now will go back to their homes and live peaceably if the whites will treat them fairly, which is very likely, as the whites were thoroughly impressed with the stand taken by the Indians. In this respect the outbreak has taught them a lesson.
Ironically, the Ojibwe have worn Army Blue since the Civil War (e.g., K Coy, 1st Michigan Sharpshooters, was mostly Ottawa, but included Ojibwe), in living black & white:
http://www.mfhn.com/native/GetFile.a...01551v-web.jpg
Best for your thesis.
Regards
Mike
Back on deck for the 'Asia-Pacific Century', I volunteer to go on point :)
Question: What impact has the compression of time and space had on the level and intensity of violence during and between wars in the past/present/future.
"compression of time and space"?Quote:
Originally Posted by Taiko
Are you talking about space travel or warfare?
Primarily warfare at the operational level, specifically the time/space/assets it takes to break the will of the opposing forces to fight eg: cabinet warfare->napoleonic warfare->nuclear warfare->sub-state warfare etc.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Space is a little more difficult to define, eg: cyberspace, sub-orbital space, all the way down to geographical space (urban/rural) and how our understanding/conceptualization of time/space has changed as a part of the history of war and warfare.
I'm in the process of understanding/explaining how/if this compression of time and space has any impact on the level and intensity of violence during and between wars:
- Warfare defined as the use of violence/force to break the will of an opponent to fight/resist.
- the role of social-media/cyber-space in Syria or Burma for example.
- World War 2 Vs the Cold War in understanding the effects of the compression of time and space on the level and intensity of violence.
- WOT (Iraq/Afghan) sub-state warfare is almost the inverse of the Cold War's compression of time and space.
- Cyber/Sub-orbital space warfare is the most prominent, in so far as it does not require the physical presence of armed forces and the potential effect is instantaneous (based on future projections on the possible lethality of both cyber/sub-orbital warfare in 20-30 years time).
- Cyber/Sub-orbital space warfare almost looks like it has the potential to be a evolution in siege warfare if you take Nth Korea, China or Iran as an example.
I've finished my theoretical model/general theory on explaining why the level and intensity of violence oscillates during and between wars. Now I'm trying to get a better grasp on warfare as it is today and a 20-30 year future projection on how warfare will change. Thus far in my research the compression and utilization of time and space is starting to become the prime candidate for being the most significant dependent variable on warfare for the foreseeable future.
I'm still not sure I know what you mean, and my time is short now.Quote:
Originally Posted by Taiko
I advise you to read
"Blitzkrieg: The Myth of Blitz"
by (then) Captain Thomas T. Smith
Infantry (Journal) July/August 1990
It should be accessible online. In worst case PM me, I obviously have a copy.
In short, World War 2 lasted from September 18 1931 to September 2 1945. At the peak of the Cold War it would have taken less than a day to destroy the entire planet. This is what I mean by the compression of time and space in warfare and its impact on the level and intensity of violence during and between war.
One of the main selling points of network centric warfare was the ability to compress time and space via the use of technology, it was also described as a 'force multiplyer'. The same with over the horizon technology, it provided a means to compress time and space. It gave the user the ability to process threat information at a speed that was not available before the technology was developed.
It is the same with the development of cyberwarfare and drone technology, for example. I'm trying to gauge how this can further compress time and space, the tempo of warfare if you will, and what impact this will have, if any, on the level and intensity of violence in future wars. A cyber attack on a countries main infrastructure is all but instantaneous eg: Russia and Georgia War is a clear example of the use of cyberwarfare to compress time and space.
Thanks for the blitzkrieg article, what I am trying to get my head around is a little different to the decisive battle theory, from what I can work out the concept is closer to deterrence. I'll keep researching. I can understand what it is that I am looking at, it's just a matter of finding the right definition/terminology/conceptual framework to better explain it to others. This is made even more difficult when trying to analyse war/warfare 20-40 years in the future, as there are no readily available conceptual frameworks to explain what is to come eg: singularity.
The future signal to noise ratio: compression of time and space/drones/cyberwarfare/sub-orbital space warfare/human biomechanical evolution/human biological evolution/targeted assassination/deterrence/taking a state whole/singularity/total war/GOES solar x-ray flux weaponisation/spectrum
The frustrating thing is that I can see it and understand it, but not in a way that can be readily or easily translated into current conceptual frameworks. I neither have the time nor finances to try and separate the signal from the noise anymore.
:(
WW3 is theory, not warfare. Even if practice, it would not have been warfare, but top-down suicide.Quote:
Originally Posted by Taiko
alleged ability at most.Quote:
One of the main selling points of network centric warfare was the ability to compress time and space via the use of technology,
Seriously, nobody can compress time or space. What you're talking about is being quicker. The article I supposed and the clumsy Western staffs should make quite clear that quickness is hardly a chief advance.
Yeah, almost everything was already. Even canteen designs.Quote:
it was also described as a 'force multiplyer'.
Nope. There would be lots of physics Nobel prizes awarded for it if that ability was ever available.Quote:
The same with over the horizon technology, it provided a means to compress time and space.
First and foremost, it multiplied the ability of users to drown in data and yawn in meetings. There are some nice cases of theoretical or even practical acceleration of processes, but I doubt the overall effect has been such.Quote:
It gave the user the ability to process threat information at a speed that was not available before the technology was developed.
Radio nets have grown and been digitised and traffic increased. The ability to process data with technical means has increased exponentially, the ability to understand twhat the data means did not evolve a bit.
Humans are psychologically very defective and often outright stupid.
We cannot cope with the growth of technical performance, and as a consequence cannot exploit the technical potential at all.
It's educating about such grandiose effect ideas to look at the history of air warfare in WW2 and the history of the EMP fear since the 70's. The Y2K story should also help.Quote:
It is the same with the development of cyberwarfare and drone technology, for example. I'm trying to gauge how this can further compress time and space, the tempo of warfare if you will, and what impact this will have, if any, on the level and intensity of violence in future wars. A cyber attack on a countries main infrastructure is all but instantaneous eg: Russia and Georgia War is a clear example of the use of cyberwarfare to compress time and space.
Generally I would advice to take it seriously, to expect people/institutions to adapt rather well and to keep friction and generally imperfections in mind. Nobody is going to shut down th electrical grid for more than once for two days with mere software, for example. The sum of undetected, unspectacular efforts are much more likely to be reqally influential (this being essentially an application of Luttwak).
I suppose our take on an interest in military theory is so much different I won't be any more helpful to your effort.Quote:
Thanks for the blitzkrieg article, what I am trying to get my head around is a little different to the decisive battle theory, from what I can work out the concept is closer to deterrence. I'll keep researching. I can understand what it is that I am looking at, it's just a matter of finding the right definition/terminology/conceptual framework to better explain it to others. This is made even more difficult when trying to analyse war/warfare 20-40 years in the future, as there are no readily available conceptual frameworks to explain what is to come eg: singularity.
To me, technological change isn't what determines military performance, but something which provokes adaptations - and I appear to assume a much lesser degree of exploitation of technical potential than you do.
Take the article as an example; compare the cruise speed of a horse with the cruise speed of a WW2 tank (~20-30 kph) and imagine what you would have written about the increase of operational advance speeds thanks to mechanisation. Then compare with what really happened (the article misses Manstein's dash to the Duna river, though).
Also, you should raise your awareness for how easily people stop listening or reading when they encounter a shipload of buzzwords.Quote:
Originally Posted by Taiko
At times, I was considering you're trying to prank us with your buzzword avalanches.
In case you're really into buzzwords; maybe I can help you with an observation about what seems to turn into a buzzword these days: "clandestine".
Clearly the ability to deliver a massive, punishing attack has become faster and easier with nuclear weapons, and now the growth of reliance on vulnerable cyber-based systems.
But how does that change the speed of war?
To attack an opponent is not to defeat an opponent. One must still occupy and hold ground and the skies above that ground. One must secure passage across the seas and skies to reach that ground. And even if one accomplishes all of those things, one must then force the people living on that ground to submit to their newly imposed system of governance.
As the US has demonstrated (too often of late), if one has the relative advantage of resources and technology, yes, the initial aspects of that can be fairly quick and easy. But forcing a people to submit? The only "easy" way is genocide, coupled with the destruction and replacement of the existing culture with that of the invader. Plenty of historic examples of that, some fairly recent. Are nuclear weapons spread across a populace faster than a Sharps rifle directed at the primary source of food and culture? No, not if one takes into account how soon that place is occupiable by the invading element.
But yes, punitive attacks are easier, faster, and now something that individuals and non-state actors can conduct at levels once the sole realm of powerful states (with far less risk of consequence, and thus outside our current concepts of deterrence). But to conduct an act of war is different than waging war, just as throwing a punch is different than a fight.
Countries such as the US will increasingly need to absorb the occasional sucker punch and not be distracted from the business of being a powerful state. Retaliation and prevention cannot be an all-consuming extravaganza such as we have put on for the past decade or so, but rather must be a small, quiet, but deadly certain capability. No massive deployments, no public chest-thumping when enemies fall, just cold hard business of being a state in the modern age.
Reality is the best measuring stick for theory.
In a sense that is partly what I'm talking about. I appreciate that to literally compress time and space is still a concept in words only, however, CERN/Hadron Collider Project is taking humanity closer to the point where compressing time and space could very well become a reality. What implications that has is still an unknown.Quote:
Seriously, nobody can compress time or space. What you're talking about is being quicker.
'Compressing' may be the wrong conceptual framework to use in this instance. I am trying to get a sense of what has changed, if anything, in how strategists view/understand time and space over the history of warfare. From set field battles of the Cabinet warfare era to nuclear warfare to decentralized networks of sub-state actors. Our understanding of the role time and space plays in war has changed.
True, however, in 2011 a group of amateurs shut down a major service carriage provider for seven million users over a three month period without interruption. The political and economic implications alone give pause for thought. Modern siege warfare (cyberwarfare) target sets are as diverse as they are detrimental to a states ability to claim a monopoly on force/security.Quote:
Nobody is going to shut down th electrical grid for more than once for two days with mere software
This is my concern as well, adapt or perish. By 'we' who do you mean? This is my other concern, whoever has the ability to adapt and exploit the technical potential will have a clear advantage over the next 20-40 years. We all saw that happen in 2001.Quote:
We cannot cope with the growth of technical performance, and as a consequence cannot exploit the technical potential at all.
I agree, friction, chance and probability, human fallibility etc will always have to be taken into consideration no matter the technical advances made.Quote:
Take the article as an example; compare the cruise speed of a horse with the cruise speed of a WW2 tank (~20-30 kph) and imagine what you would have written about the increase of operational advance speeds thanks to mechanisation. Then compare with what really happened (the article misses Manstein's dash to the Duna river, though).
Thank you for the advise. I am also very cautious when a strategic theorists puts the word 'new' into a sentence, especially when it is in front of the words idea/warfighting concept/strategy, because more often than not the 'new' they are talking about is either old, or old dressed up as new. I generally agree and loath the use of buzzwords and I am not trying to prank. I've been around this council long enough to know you all have excellent BS detectors :)Quote:
Also, you should raise your awareness for how easily people stop listening or reading when they encounter a shipload of buzzwords.
At times, I was considering you're trying to prank us with your buzzword avalanches.
My problem is if I am to try and at least theory craft what warfare will be in 20-40 years time how would be the best way to go about it? I do not want to sensationalize nor over/underestimate what is to come, but try to present a picture of the various potential realities that could be probable. I am not about selling books nor promoting myself, but I have a genuine interest in future forecasting/foresight and how it can be used to better equip policy makers to head off potential pitfalls/threats.
Agreed, this is an area I need to work on. The principles of war as set out by CvC, ST etc are more or less universal. I am well versed in those principals and confident that my theoretical model on war is rock solid. Warfare, however, is constantly changing. That change can and does influence how policy is made and politics is conducted. It is this subject matter that I am now trying to better understand. Hence the preoccupation with the figurative compression of time and space (I'll have to find a better conceptual framework), as a general principle or basic conceptual framework that can be used to explain the advances in warfare over past history and into the future.Quote:
But yes, punitive attacks are easier, faster, and now something that individuals and non-state actors can conduct at levels once the sole realm of powerful states (with far less risk of consequence, and thus outside our current concepts of deterrence). But to conduct an act of war is different than waging war, just as throwing a punch is different than a fight.
In short, my argument is: to understand the utilization/exploitation of time and space is to understand the general principles of the ephemeral/ever changing nature of warfare from the operational to tactical level of analysis.
That is worth repeating! Speak quietly and carry a big stick.Quote:
Countries such as the US will increasingly need to absorb the occasional sucker punch and not be distracted from the business of being a powerful state. Retaliation and prevention cannot be an all-consuming extravaganza such as we have put on for the past decade or so, but rather must be a small, quiet, but deadly certain capability. No massive deployments, no public chest-thumping when enemies fall, just cold hard business of being a state in the modern age.
As always, great to get a response from you Bob's World, nothing like a reality check to help me keep my head in the game :D
Why bother?Quote:
Originally Posted by Taiko
There have been so few tests for doctrine during the last 60 years there's not even a solid foundation for guessing right how certain conflicts would look if they turned into hot war this or next year.
We're military theory-wise in a similar situation as our forefathers were around 1900-1912. We've seen lots of small wars not telling us much about inter-state warfare, very partial glimpses of modern inter-state warfare and there were huge technological and society changes over the course of the last generations.
Basically 'we' have little clue about modern inter-state warfare; lots of opinions, theories and assertions - but almost no real knowledge.
I for one would not have guessed the Russians would be capable to rush two division equivalents through a tunnel on short notice, overwhelm Georgian forces in a brief hasty attack on terrain which benefited the defence and have a flag rank officer WIA while he lead an advance party. It was totally not Russian in my opinion, but it happened. And this wasn't even about new technologies.
Hard to explain, but I believe if I can develop a comprehensible toolkit/conceptual framework that will allow for a clearer separation of signal to noise and enhance our ability to connect the dots, in terms of future forecasting/foresight, then it will be a net benefit to policy makers.Quote:
Why bother?
I know that the attempt could very well be little more than a Sisyphusian task in redundancy, that still does not mean that there are people out there who are already trying to do something similar. To be honest, I do not want to let over a decade of serious study and thought go to waste.
Plus, for better or worse I have developed a talent in this area of knowledge and need to pay rent/food. If it is deemed a waste of time then I'll just have to walk away and try and work out what it is I can do to make a living. More than anything it's the idea of the potential to improve our ability to future forecast that keeps me going.
The utilisation/exploitation of time and space brought about by the use of new/developing technology in warfare. From my reading the Russians were simply adapting to, and exploiting, new technology. This is part and parcel of why I think what I do is important, not for myself but policy makers.Quote:
I for one would not have guessed the Russians would be capable to rush two division equivalents through a tunnel on short notice, overwhelm Georgian forces in a brief hasty attack on terrain which benefited the defence and have a flag rank officer WIA while he lead an advance party. It was totally not Russian in my opinion, but it happened. And this wasn't even about new technologies.
Education, although sometimes painful, is always worth it. ;)
If we can agree that 'compression of time and space' is an artifact of globalization, could your question be restated as: What impact has globalization had upon warfare?Quote:
Originally Posted by Taiko
Very broadly, and by contrasting the battlefields of Iraq (OIF) with those of WWI Europe, I would say that a focus upon rapid removal of governance (individuals and structures) using an overwhelming force synchronized with realtime ICT (information and communication technology) results in reduced casualty rates for both sides. I also wonder about reduced post war recovery rates for both sides...by contrasting the ongoing recovery versus the interval from 1918 to 1939. A comparison of costs indicates that war is, and will always be, expensive in lives and treasure. :cool:
Perhaps a better contrast would be to examine the Iraq wars with the British (British Mandate 1920 -1932) and with the US (1991 and 2003-2010)?
How does globalization account for these differences in levels and intensity of violence? The IMF defines four aspects of globalization: 'trade and transactions, capital and investment movements, migration and movement of people and the dissemination of knowledge.' Current themes in the media which relate to this topic include trade, energy, 'Chimerica', high finance, growth rates, innovation...
Some references for a later read on this topic might include:
- The Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli
- The Scientific Way of Warfare by Antoine Bousquet
- Globalization, A Short History by Jurgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Pietersson
- The Quest by Daniel Yergin
- The Ascent of Money by Niall Ferguson
- The American Phoenix by Charles Dumas and Diana Choyleva
- How Soccer Explains the World by Franklin Foer
The pain is nothing compared to finding a career/job. 18 months in and still nothing.Quote:
Education, although sometimes painful, is always worth it.
Where do I sign up Bob's World?Quote:
clandestine
Globalization is an artifact of a neo-liberal agenda :cool: In part, I agree that discounting globalization's impact on warfare would be detrimental to any attempt at understanding the changing utilization/exploitation of time/space in warfare. My problem is that globalization, as a conceptual framework, has the potential to over-estimate the role of trade/economics/international institutions etc at the cost of under-estimating the power and positions of states within the 'international system'. Sometimes I get the feeling that the net effect of globalization has been to strengthen the hand of sub-state actors at the cost of both states and international institutions. Hence, the most prominent argument since the mid 1990's has been, where there is globalization there is also fragmentation.Quote:
If we can agree that 'compression of time and space' is an artifact of globalization
Is globalization's price tag the erosion of the sovereignty of a state and its monopoly on force? Is this a price states are willing to pay for the assumed net benefits of globalization?
This is close to what CvC would call the 'ideal war', or a war on paper. In the near term it syncs very closely to my understanding of the exploitation/utilization of time/space to influence the level and intensity of violence via cyberwarfare. Would you say it is an adaptation of the Powell Doctrine to better fit with current technological assets?Quote:
I would say that a focus upon rapid removal of governance (individuals and structures) using an overwhelming force synchronized with realtime ICT (information and communication technology) results in reduced casualty rates for both sides.
I don't think that submission or occupation should be presumed necessary: that would depend on the political objectives being pursued. Entering a conflict with clear objectives and refusing to expand those objectives can often (not always, but often) free us from the assumption that we "must" occupy territory and impose systems of governance.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Well I'll be damned, we agree on something...Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
I suggest you have a look at the new, free e-journal following the model of Wilf Owen's 'Infinity Journal'. Journal of Military Operations (JOMO) is dedicated to military operations as well as tactics. Registration is free: https://www.tjomo.com
Secondly the Editor is Dr. Jim Storr, a.k.a Colonel Storr, author of 'The Human Face of War', now republished in paperback, which might help too.
I bought The Prince and Sun Tzu when I was 15, been reading both once a year ever since, along with CvC and Thucydides. Still have not found many books that are not reiterations of these four classic. With the exception of Mao whose work is more an amalgamation of CvC/Sun Tzu.Quote:
The Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli
Thanks for the link DavidbfpoQuote:
I suggest you have a look at the new, free e-journal following the model of Wilf Owen's 'Infinity Journal'. Journal of Military Operations (JOMO) is dedicated to military operations as well as tactics. Registration is free: https://www.tjomo.com
@Fuchs: see PM
Principles/Laws of warfare: 1. adaptation of defence/offence 2. exploitation/utilization of time and space
Ay, speak quietly, carry a big stick and avoid foreign entanglements :wry:Quote:
Well I'll be damned, we agree on something...