Civilian Casualties, Religion, and COIN Operations
Too Soft, Too Hard, or "Just Right"?
Ralph Peters certainly has a way with words. Many SWJ-ers have probably read his recent indictment of US operations in Afghanistan (and elsewhere). He argues that we are walking on eggshells - tactically and strategically - because we worry too much about offending the adversary's religion and killing civilians and that our moral weakness is causing us to lose the war. Peters says:
As our enemies’ view of what is permissible in war expands apocalyptically, our self-limiting definitions of allowable targets and acceptable casualties—hostile, civilian and our own—continue to narrow fatefully. Our enemies cannot defeat us in direct confrontations, but we appear determined to defeat ourselves.
Peters' analysis - consistent with arguments he has made a number of times before - raises two questions about which I would welcome the thoughtful input and feedback of SWCouncil Members (and other readers).
The first question is to what extent - and why - do civilian casualties matter in COIN/IW operations? (Is this different when the counterinsurgent is a third-party? Different than in conventional wars?)
On one hand we have the view that high-power kinetic activity is necessary to "win" and that winning trumps all other mission objectives. The "butcher's bill" philosophy is that once a nation has decided to go to war, it should "go hard or go home." Peters' observes, for example, that:
The paradox is that our humane approach to warfare results in unnecessary bloodshed. Had we been ruthless in the use of our overwhelming power in the early days of conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the ultimate human toll—on all sides—would have been far lower. In warfare of every kind, there is an immutable law: If you are unwilling to pay the butcher’s bill up front, you will pay it with compound interest in the end. Iraq was not hard; we made it so.
On the other hand, we have the view that civilian casualties actually weaken our strategic objectives and amplify battlespace friction. Some have argued that the rising number of civil causalities in Afghanistan is a major cause of the declining Afghan support for the ISAF. Andrew Exum, a member of GEN McChrystal's advisory team, argues that humanitarian considerations notwithstanding, civilians casualties impede the military mission - at least in Afghanistan:
The reason we do not drop compounds in Afghanistan has more to do with operational considerations than it does with some high-minded moral code or the laws of land warfare. Opponents of COIN doctrine who claim the U.S. Army has gone "soft" would best remember that. If dropping compounds helped us to advance the ball down the field in terms of mission success, we might be more tolerant of civilian casualties and "collateral damage." But the evidence suggests that killing civilians and destroying their property actually harms the mission more than it helps.
The second question is to what extent - and how - our enemy's religion, in this case Islam, is or should be a focus of our war effort (kinetic and nonkinetic)?
One point of view is that Islam itself poses an ideological, existential threat (even if its adherents do not) to democracy and to freedom. The arguments - such as thse made in Robert Spencer's book "stealth Jihad" suggest that core Islamic texts and teachings mandate subjugation of and warfare against non-Muslims (unbelievers), and advocate for Sharia law be globally imposed as the only legitimate source of social and political authority. Accordingly, they argue, there is no such thing as a “moderate Muslim.”
Proponents of this position acknowledge than many Muslims – particularly American Muslims – do not adhere to those tenets in practice, but maintain that these anti-Democratic principles are precisely what the doctrine commands. They see no distinction between the separatist, anti-Democratic, violence-inciting doctrine of those labeled as “violent extremists” or Islamists and the core doctrine of Islam. They believe that their arguments cannot be openly discussed without their being accused of bigotry and labeled as Islamophobes, and that their position is easily dismissed by most of the American public because others are uninformed about Islamic doctrine. Peters, for example, states starkly:
The problem is religion. Our Islamist enemies are inspired by it, while we are terrified even to talk about it. We are in the unique position of denying that our enemies know what they themselves are up to. They insist, publicly, that their goal is our destruction (or, in their mildest moods, our conversion) in their god’s name. We contort ourselves to insist that their religious rhetoric is all a sham, that they are merely cynics exploiting the superstitions of the masses. Setting aside the point that a devout believer can behave cynically in his mundane actions, our phony, one-dimensional analysis of al-Qaeda and its ilk has precious little to do with the nature of our enemies —which we are desperate to deny—and everything to do with us.
A contrasting view - as both Presidents Bush and Obama have asserted - is that the U.S. is not (and presumably should not be) at war with Islam or with Muslims generally. The explanation for this position is that Islam is a religion, but that Islamism (or some other variant on this ideological term), refers not to a religion, but to a radical political ideology driven by a strong anti-Western and anti-democratic sentiment. The argument is that militant leaders – particularly since the late 1980s – have been able to use Islam (the religion) very effectively as a platform or vehicle to transport and deliver this extremist ideology. As evidence of this distinction, they point to the fact that most adherents of the religion do not subscribe to the violent ideology, and that many proponents of the militant ideology are not particularly religious” or pious.
I appreciate you considering these questions and look forward to learning from your insights and responses. This is the first substantive thread I have started here, so please forgive any clumsiness in protocol - and let me know if this question/discussion would be better placed elsewhere.
There have been quite a few
Threads where this type of thing has come up so the search will help.
That said it may be a simple as recognizing the preponderance of evidence that Dead people tend not to fight back thus throughout history that seems to have been a favorite option.
As Intel indicated though things are somewhat more complicated in societies where death of one's family/Tribe/guest requires a blood for blood action against the offender due to not only cultural but generally historic practice. That and the many other factors such as need to be able to focus on finding bad guys vs having to look everywhere since you never know who might have died let alone who might feel they need to make it right.
Thus "eggshells"
Probabilities can outweigh improbabilities. Sometimes.
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Originally Posted by
rborum
My point here was not really to argue that conflicts are different than counterinsurgencies, but to clarify my interest in learning what factors would make the "utility of force" vary in different COIN campaigns (as well as perhaps in different non-COIN conflicts).
Wilf can of course answer for himself but to me, the simplistic answer -- which is not at all simple -- is 'the adversary' and, of course, one's goal. Either of those can be a thread unto themselves. Goes back to Bob's World's analogy; Slugging a stranger; your neighbor; or your son all mean different types of adversaries and probably different goals on your part as well as differing reasons for the provocation on their part. Wars vary as widely as people.
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there is consensus that the political objective in any COIN campaign is to establish the control by the counterinsurgent's government (CG).
That is possibly true, perhaps even probably so but it is not universal. In Afghanistan for example, some of the Talibs want that, others do not, the AQ and foreign fighters there mostly are just desirous of fighting Americans and / or Westerners. Few wars are simple.
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But some think the only/best way to to establish CG control is to overwhelm the resistance with devastating force - and that overdoing is unlikely to significantly interfere with establishing and sustaining the CG control. CG control - in this model - is a function of coercive power, not political legitimacy.
I think very few military people would espouse that view other than in the very rare circumstances where that might be a viable option. Kenya in the mid 50s come close, the Boer Wars are perhaps a better example. Both would be proscribed due to popular opinion today. Thus, there are likely few occasions where anyone could or would seriously consider that approach.
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While other believe that the only/best way to establish CG control is to use force selectively so as not to risk alienating the population. CG control - in this model - is a function of political legitimacy...Does that fairly characterize the positions or am I off base?
That view is correct, I think, I'd only throw in the caveat that CG control may not be an issue.
I do not believe the 'devastating force' option is subscribed to by many. The issue is the degree of force that constitutes 'minimal' or 'selectively' and the determining factor on that for most is own casualties. Some believe those must be accepted for the greater good or 'accomplishing the mission.' Others believe they should be minimized for own good or there will be public clamor leading tor no troops to complete the mission. The issue becomes far more significant when the forces involved are third parties -- e.g. the US and UK as well as other in either Afghanistan or Iraq (or Viet Nam, Malaya, Algeria...). Third party nation citizens can and will strongly question the merit of a 'softly' approach if it increases their casualties. They tend, mostly, to be less concerned with other casualties.
Like that wise old Communist Philosopher said,
"You cannot legislate morality."
I believe that to be true -- and proven. Whether one believes that or not, the simple thought prompts questions.
Should one enforce morality at gunpoint? Should one even try to attempt that? What is the probability of succeeding in doing that? How long should one be prepared to point the weapon?
I'd also suggest that if "any" given political aim has to be sustained for any reasonable period of time (decades/centuries) with attendant social-moral aims by persistent and rather messy enforcement of those social-moral aims, then one is probably attempting to do something one probably shouldn't have contemplated, much less be attempting.
Napoleon is alleged to have said "Old soldiers and old Priests have much in common, they have seen mankind at its worst." Probably an accurate thought regardless of who coined it. That's really about all they'd have in common though. Soldiers break things, that's what they're for. They can do it sensibly and avoid excessive damage, they can and do perform with good judgment and compassion and they can help make room for the spread of sweetness and light, they can clear a path for the social and moral improvement in an area but the actual social / moral effort is not their job. That's the job of the Priest and / or his allies and fellow believers in the goodness of man.
Generally pays to use the right tool for the job. Use the wrong tool for that effort and you'll risk destroying the tool and the population you tried to morally improve. Not a great plan to do more harm than good...
OK, what if COIn was in the USA?
Randy,
Two immediate comments on your questions.
The urban rioting in the USA, for examples Detroit '67 & Watts, LA '65 and much later in LA '92, all had IMHO a significant impact and some even speculated they were signs of an insurgency. How would those local communities reacted if the nation-state's response had been mainly foriegn troops, say the RCMP in Detroit or Mexico in LA? Would people like Ralph Peters be so "hardline" on the supposed 'effete' action taken? I doubt it.
David Kilcullen in his talks (see previous threads) makes this point, cannot immediately find the thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...hlight=chicago
You have a burglary / crime problem in your community, the local (US) police cannot cope and reinforcements are called for - imagine - the Iraqi police arrive. A police that follows different rules, operating styles - maybe less minimum use of force - and cannot speak English. My variation would be to have the Saudi religious police arrive on your campus and impose their rules.
My point is if you'd not do 'X' at home, why do it abroad?
A current, similar thread on these questions is: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7776
Direct response to your first question
Mr. Borum,
As for your first question, about whether we should avoid civilian casualties, in my experience avoiding civilian casualties was always the best option. We would be having great success in our AO as a battalion, and as soon as we had civilian casualties, across the AO intelligence reporting would plummet and our Key Leader Engagements would grind to halts and we would gain nothing. This was Afghanistan and the death of one innocent seemed roughly proportional to the death of several dozen "bad guys."
I don't know enough about Islam to answer my thoughts on your questions about whether Islam is engaged through non-kinetic means. I know it isn't really in Afghanistan, just respected and allowed to be. Whether or not we should address Islam more explicitly I cannot speak to because I do not know enough.
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
The "Nouveau COIN," guys like to call the Neo-Classical and/or "Neo-Orthodox" tendency "threat centric." It's true. We are!
...but as Ken very well explains, you focus on the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of violence against those who deserve it, because doing so has political benefit. Military force must serve the political aim.
As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.
Since I am in complete agreement with your post
It may be worth ensuring the difference between what you said and I said is well delineated. Don't want any major confusion or misconceptions on the part of casual or skim readers.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
"You cannot legislate morality."
I believe that to be true -- and proven. Whether one believes that or not, the simple thought prompts questions.
Should one enforce morality at gunpoint? Should one even try to attempt that? What is the probability of succeeding in doing that? How long should one be prepared to point the weapon?
I'd also suggest that if "any" given political aim has to be sustained for any reasonable period of time (decades/centuries) with attendant social-moral aims by persistent and rather messy enforcement of those social-moral aims, then one is probably attempting to do something one probably shouldn't have contemplated, much less be attempting.
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Originally Posted by
Ron Humphrey
It might be that although they might not be completely right they are probably not much further from the truth then those who feel that "any" given political aim is going to be sustained for any reasonable period of time(decades/centuries) sans some sort of social-moral aims without persistent and rather messy enforcement of those political non-social aims
I was rather clumsily trying to make the point that in any given conflict which seeks as its end state to leave a standing, stable form of political governance upon whom the requirement will be placed to maintain said end state; it seems only wise that we recognize the fact that human beings and thus societies as a whole absolutely do not exist sans some sort of standards (be they Moral/judicious/social-norms, etc). This to me is why trying to approach how to's on any given conflict without taking into account and accepting that whatever those standards are they can and most certainly will affect how things work out would seem to be asking for a major @#$% kicking.
I would probably liken this to when CVC was giving feedback to several officers trying to develop strategy in relation to possible enemy actions.
To para-phrase anyone who seeks to develop strategy without acknowledging that the political aims and or strengths/weaknesses of both parties isn't gonna get it right.
(well aware it ain't perfect but I'll try to look it up to get the wording more accurately, still pretty sure the point remains valid)
Napoleon is alleged to have said "Old soldiers and old Priests have much in common, they have seen mankind at its worst." Probably an accurate thought regardless of who coined it. That's really about all they'd have in common though. Soldiers break things, that's what they're for. They can do it sensibly and avoid excessive damage, they can and do perform with good judgment and compassion and they can help make room for the spread of sweetness and light, they can clear a path for the social and moral improvement in an area but the actual social / moral effort is not their job. That's the job of the Priest and / or his allies and fellow believers in the goodness of man.[/QUOTE]
Absolutely, that statement however does leave out the reality that regardless of the missions non-sociality these are still soldiers who represent a given standard of social (values). (Read Army/Navy/Marines/AF Values).
Can these be left out of planning without effecting the expectations for actions?
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Generally pays to use the right tool for the job. Use the wrong tool for that effort and you'll risk destroying the tool and the population you tried to morally improve. Not a great plan to do more harm than good...
Could not be more in agreement.
I can do most the same things with a sledge hammer, a mallet, or a regular hammer. I guess I just figure I might want to be aware of what I'm building before I decide which one to use
You're kidding, right? Still, perfectly valid question. Really.
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Originally Posted by
Michael C
As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.
My "You're kidding" was because I suspect you know the answer to the question. It is a fair question. What follows is not snark or smart aleck comment but my best if overlong answer to your question:
[1] In my experience, anyone who fired at me is in what we can call Category 1.
[2] Anyone who did not but seemed likely to fire given a chance is in Category 2A. Anyone who did not and might not was suspect until proven not a potential threat (Category 2B). Anyone who offers cooperation is accepted conditionally and cautiously until some proof of their intent is shown (Category 2C). Anyone who does cooperate, seems unlikely to shoot at me is in Category 2D.
[3] Anyone who fights with me is in category 3A. Anyone who has fought with me on multiple occasions and thus has proven some loyalty or appreciation of the benefits of a mutually rewarding relationship is in category 3B.
[4] Fellow members of my own or closely allied units are in category 4.
As I'm sure you already know Category 1 persons are easily identified on the battlefield and should be killed.
Categories 2-4 persons should not be killed if possible. However, they bear considerable watching and due to necessary action ([1] above), Category 2 persons may be accidentally killed on a sliding scale of A to D with A being of small consequence and B being avoided if at all possible, C being avoided in most cases while killing D is to be avoided even at some cost *.
Category 3 persons should not be killed but 3A persons must be closely watched unless and until they move to Category 3B. Those in 3B must still be loosely watched...:(
Category 4 persons should not be killed unless they are engaged in wrongdoing. Unfortunately, even some of them bear watching...
As for TTP, METT-TC applies ( * As it does for the asterisked item above) . For distinguishing between categories of persons on the battle field, my experience was that Cat 1, Cat 3 and Cat 4 were easy while for Cat 2, the majority of people to be seen on any FID battlefield, it was difficult if not impossible to diffrentiate. Thus one had to watch them closely, even suspiciously -- all of them -- but also avoid killing them if possible. That possibility must be weighed in your mind at each encounter and the decision must be made based, again, on METT-TC. I suspect you knew and know that, all I can do is affirm it.
As you also know, that unfortunately allows the Cat 2A person to have a chance at becoming a Cat 1 person. This is a disconcerting, even disheartening to some, aspect. It should not be, it just is part of the job, like rain or snow or heat or an 80 pound Ruck.
IOW who to kill is obvious, who not to kill is far less obvious and avoiding killing them while it increases your risk is necessary -- and please remember this:
That is true not only in an FID or COIN operation but in all combat to include major combat operations against a peer force in a war of movement.
If that equates to a platitude, my regrets -- it's reality. FWIW, I suspect Wilf knows as I do that you have a difficult job and are searching for answers. He's likely to provide you a better answer than I did. If he does, I doubt either answer will make a hard job one bit easier, you have to feel your way through it. You'll make mistakes, you'll do some things very well, some days will just be bad days. We all did or do those things and experienced the bad days. Goes with the job. There is no easy way. That's why it's a tough job and a lot of people don't want to do it.
My comprehension isn't great
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Originally Posted by
Ron Humphrey
It may be worth ensuring the difference between what you said and I said is well delineated. Don't want any major confusion or misconceptions on the part of casual or skim readers.
and I can prove that. I still do not fully understand your point as stated in the paragraph of yours that you and I quoted. Still, leaving that aside and going to this:
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This to me is why trying to approach how to's on any given conflict without taking into account and accepting that whatever those standards are they can and most certainly will affect how things work out would seem to be asking for a major @#$% kicking.
Agreed.
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To para-phrase anyone who seeks to develop strategy without acknowledging that the political aims and or strengths/weaknesses of both parties isn't gonna get it right.
Agreed.
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Absolutely, that statement however does leave out the reality that regardless of the missions non-sociality these are still soldiers who represent a given standard of social (values). (Read Army/Navy/Marines/AF Values).
Can these be left out of planning without effecting the expectations for actions?
They should not be but often are because the egos of the planners cannot visualize that the affected States may not be like nor want to be like said Planners.
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I can do most the same things with a sledge hammer, a mallet, or a regular hammer. I guess I just figure I might want to be aware of what I'm building before I decide which one to use
Agreed -- that was sort my point with the added fillip that anyone who expects Soldiers to do morality or social norms might not like what they get. So by all means, we should decide what we're building before we start pounding nails -- we should also be willing in addition to the hammer(s) to use a drill and some screws to avoid excessive pounding that might weaken parts of the structure... :wry:
Thoughts for your consideration.
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Originally Posted by
Michael C
It seems that there is a huge movement on the SWJ forums (as opposed to the journal and blog) to get rid of yucky "population-centric COIN" that "wants to win hearts and minds." The biggest critique seems to be that population-centric COIN hides behind catch phrases and offers no real solutions to our modern fight.
Very perceptive. Do you think it does offer such solutions?
If so, and not to be snarky in the least, your questions here and your Blog do not indicate that you've found any answers that really help. I say that only to point out that ALL doctrine is murky and must be applied with large doses of common sense and in accordance with an important acronym I will not repeat... :wry: ...In the end, it's down to bunch of men trying to feel their way in a lonely place with limited information and a population that may be hostile. Been done before.
We who urge caution have watched Armies make doctrinal mistakes by tilting too far to one side or the other; we're simply urging balance -- and, with respect to FID, pointing out there is no golden bullet and every war, every affected populace is different. There is no one size fits all doctrinal answer, never has been, never will be. That really is a good thing, it gives you the latitude to do it in a way that works for you.
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What I want to know is, where are the resources to get intelligence from the population without doing population-centric COIN?
There aren't any and I don't think anyone here has suggested not doing "population centric COIN." What many including me have said is do not think that will dispel all your problems and do not lose sight of the fact you are involved in one war at one place in one time -- the Army, as an institution, must work on a far wider scale of possibilities (and if you decide to stay in, so will you...).
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If the British Army has manuals or recommendations on gathering intelligence, finding and identifying the enemy and operations to kill them, what are they? It seems like the whole of the military has disregarded the approach, both the UK and the US.
My understanding is that we have a number and they're available on BCKS and AKO. Both Armies tried to disregard it simply because it is messy and debilitating, it grinds down Armies. Unfortunately, Armies do not get to pick who they fight, the Politicians do that, much as Armies hate that and try (usually unsuccessfully) to divert the Pols...
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Without trying to give support to the population, how do we get intelligence to kill the Taliban, HiG and AQ groups there?
You don't and no one here to my knowledge has suggested otherwise. What has been said is that you will get some but not enough intel, that some will prove invalid due to local jealousies, disinformation and a host of reasons and it is not likely to get any better. It's a tough and dirty job with no pat solutions.
What I and some others have also said is that most such conflicts should be avoided by better diplomacy, aid and low key SF involvement to stop burgeoning problems before they require GPF deployment because those will always be messy and difficult. Your comments prove that that they are that. It will be no consolation but a lot of us discovered that 40 years ago and our forebears in the Army on the Plains in the late 19th Century probably had precisely the same complaints. As did a bunch of Alexanders folks in what is now Afghanistan 2,340 years ago. The tools may change, warfare may change but war does not.
After re-reading through my former post
It seems prudent to add a little bit more
Accepting that the statements made are rather absolutist they still seem fairly correct.
It is probably important however to follow with this-
The reality of human variances in manner/thought/ and deed means just about no society ever exists in complete peace but it does seem at least from my studies that those which experience the least amount of violent conflict are those which focus on ensuring that to the greatest extent possible the majority of groups which make up their populous at least feel as though they can live as they believe without having to fight governmental processes to do so.
Any characterization of the situation in Afghanistan on a discussion board
is going to be inaccurate, out of date and will fail to do justice to the nuances.
Any characterization of people in groupings or categories is going to be inaccurate, able to be taken out of context and will fail to do justice to the nuances.
Combine those two thoughts. then go forth...
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Originally Posted by
Brandon Friedman
Ken, I might be misunderstanding you, because in your later comments, I tend to agree with you. But with all due respect, I think your categorizations above badly underestimate the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan and fail to reflect the reality on the ground.
I don't underestimate the situation in Afghanistan, the categorizations above may state grossly simplified categories to make a point in a semi light hearted vein they are incapable of underestimating or overestimating or even estimating anything. Aside from having a long ago but still educational peacetime tour in the area, recall I even went out of my way earlier to point out my son had two tours there, a Grandson in law also has two and I know folks there now as well as others who've been. I'm not pulling this stuff out of my back pocket. I have more respect for everyone on this board than that.
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Dealing with Afghans (or even Iraqis, for that matter), cannot be broken down into eight simple categories. Relationships in these places are more fluid than you're suggesting. So, assuming I haven’t just misread you (which I might be doing),
You didn't misread but you seemingly took a simplistic set of points for a scholarly dissertation on population centric operations. Aside from people in general being infinitely more complex than that -- you cannot categorize them other than in generalities. With a tour in the ME and pretty broad travel there, I'm aware of the nuances and the fact that nothing in the ME -- or South Asia -- is as it seems. The national sport in that area is haggling, they're masters at it and no westerner will ever match them -- foolish to try.
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I have some questions for you:
Do you kill civilians who actively assist the Taliban by offering shelter to their fighters? How do you know whether or not they were coerced into it? What about those who provide the Taliban with weapons? What about civilians who actively assist one Taliban group, but offer you information about another Taliban group? What about farmers who eagerly sell opium to warlords known for attacking Americans? How do you distinguish between those who support the warlords and those who are coerced into supporting the warlords?
Assuming 'you' is GPF acting on intel provided in all cases, in order: No; That's one reason why you don't; No (willingly provided, sold or were coerced or just taken? No way to ever be sure even with a brilliant 'Terp and half an MI Det along); Take the info with a grain of salt and check it out while compensating them in some way thus keeping a possible information source; No; You can't.
Once more, as I said way above: "IOW who to kill is obvious, who not to kill is far less obvious and avoiding killing them while it increases your risk is necessary."
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What if U.S. forces offend the honor of a local tribe one day, and the next time U.S. forces come around, the locals fire at them? Leaving immediate self-defense aside, are they to be killed?
Did you punish or report the offending US elements and make sure the local tribe knew of the punishment? You must hav known about it if you know that's why they're shooting at you. If not you were wrong and are therefor responsible for your unit being fired upon and you have to make a judgment call. Enjoy.
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Are they considered the "enemy?"
First thing you need to do is purge the word enemy from your COIN lexicon, that's an MCO construct and is woefully un-population centric; in FID, there is no enemy, there are good guys and bad guys, a few of each. There are a great many in between who will go with the flow. The trick is to kill the bad guys, not kill the good guys and kill as few of the floaters as possible. Bad guys shoot at you; good guys and floaters do not, thus they're easy to tell apart.
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What if they start planting land mines on the approaches to their village to keep U.S. forces out?
Do not step on or drive over them. Tell the point Squad to start probing, the second and the guns to overwatch and the third to standby to go anywhere and do anything, if you have a 'Terp, tell him to ask them to come out and guide you in to save work, call it in -- wait a minute,why are you asking me this; you should know all that stuff...
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And what about the ever-present problem of receiving seemingly-good-but consistently-bad information from locals who are motivated by tribal rivalries and/or profit—and not by America’s desire to win the “Global War on Terror?”
Take it with a grain -- no, a truckload -- of salt, write it down, make sure your Company intel guru gets it (you do have one, right?) and logs it, report it, keep it in mind and don't act on it unless you get corroboration unless it poses immediate danger to US troops, then act -- but sensibly and with good judgment.
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There are an infinite number of categories that inhibit the process of knowing who to kill. I’ve never once fired my personal weapon or ordered anyone else to fire theirs without (at least) first being drawn upon by the enemy. That’s because we had no idea who to kill otherwise.
That may be why I said try to kill anyone who shoots at you and try to avoid killing all the others. Are we not saying the same thing in a different way? The 'at least' BTW is a good touch, inaccurate harassing fire need not be answered -- should not be, really (showing disdain is good); probing fire at night must be answered cautiously if at all and absolutely not with an automatic weapon. As an aside on that count, re: the local who fired on you and may not have lacking an insult by us -- shoot back. In that part of the world to not do so is to appear weak and that's more dangerous than being weak. You should also never relax -- most irregular forces will avoid contact with an obviously tough and ready element and wait for easier pickings if they can.
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This is why the U.S. military is moving toward a population-centric approach. Sure, it’s not the way I was brought up in the infantry.
That's because all the things learned the hard way before you were born were purged from the system. Speak to several Chiefs of staff Army about that -- I sure tried to tell a bunch of their senior minions and two of them it was a dumb idea. The US Army was doing population centric operations all over the world for a good many years; some us got to be pretty good at it -- good enough to realize we learned something new every day and that no one had all the answers. :wry:
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But when you don’t have adequate intelligence or language skills within American units--and you haven't grown up in the "neighborhood"--being focused primarily on killing the right people is a recipe for disaster in places like Afghanistan--as Michael C rightly notes. We’re just not equipped. If you want to kill the right people, you must first secure the population, give them confidence, and then let the intelligence come to you. Only then should you start looking for fights.
We can disagree on that. You cannot provide security unless you look for fights in the right places and the intel is good enough to tell you that -- and I'll bet big buck few if any GPF units have set up ambushes on the known infiltration / exfiltration trails due to risk aversion. The population will have no confidence in you as long as they get night visitors and you are not the visitor.
Killing people who are trying to kill you is never wrong; killing anyone not actively trying to do that is almost never right. If you re-read my post, you'll note that's what I said. I also pointed out that was true in ANY war, population centric or not, something you also seem to have missed.
We have tons of intel, perhaps too much, the problem is in the distribution and utility; the bottom line is that at Bn level and below, you'll almost never have what you can consider adequate Intel. Fact of life. Nor will there ever be enough good interpreters -- that also is a fact of life. I hear your complaints, heard others voice them in 1950, 52, 61, 65, 66, 68, 70 in more than five countries all while doing the Grunt population centric shtick. I even picked up a first edition Galula from the SWC Bookstore in '64. not a great book IMO. Truly sorry to hear things haven't gotten better -- but sadly not at all surprised. Goes with the territory, I'm afraid.
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I have no doubt you’ll pick this apart--and maybe I'm misunderstanding you--
Found out the hard way on these boards it's better to read a comment and if it raises red flag, leave it and come back and read it again later. Then go answer it point by point to insure you didn't miss or elide an important item. All of us react to adverse stimuli and then tend to miss the thrust for a tree or two.
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but if there’s one thing on which we could probably agree, it’s the idea that these situations are best dealt with by avoiding them like the plague in the first place. We certainly agree this:
Yes, we can, we can probably agree on a number of other things as well. We're all products of our experiences and we're all better for sharing an learning. Closer to 80 than I'd like and I'm still learning new stuff every day...
Some thoughts about the business of soldiering in FID/SFA/COIN...
Most civilians want nothing to do with war and instead are focused upon raising a family and living life. Effective FID/SFA/COIN recognizes this simplified generalization by sheltering civilians from violence, enabling just governance & associated services, minimizing the generation of additional troublemakers, and hunting down existing troublemakers.
All of us who step onto a battlefield in a professional capacity have forfeited the ‘right’ to reasonably expect to be able to return home. Soldiering is not about trying to avoid spilling your coffee while at a quiet 9 to 5 desk job. For my nickel, Ken has clearly and succinctly shared a way of thinking, with his proposed eight categories, which is worthy of consideration by those who soldier. Much of it jives with my experience that soldiers must accurately anticipate the wide range of behaviors which people exhibit when under stress and have a viable plan of action to capitalize upon those behaviors.
There have been some comments about ‘drawing down’ on our own on other threads. Officers have the additional responsibility of imposing order upon the daily continuum, which ranges from apparently peaceful to very dangerous and during which all participants may be either ready, tired, mad, scared, sick, certain or uncertain or some mix of all of them. We all get paid for our ability to be extremely violent when required however ‘drawing down’ on our own is failure of leadership plain and simple. There are other solutions, you just have to be tough enough to follow through on them.
The question of how to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield is a daily question and it is my observation that effective leadership is central to resolving it. We do what we are trained to do in tough situations. Teaching our troops what we have learned upon the battlefield before we deploy is important because they will try and use what they have been taught (battle tested or not). Part of the answer is clearly articulated ROE that all have been trained upon. Part of it is learning everything that we can about our AO. Part of it is effective unit training and part of it is participating in CTC exercises. Once I am down range part of it may involve putting that wild-eyed kid in my vehicle, and taking him along with me when the situation allows so that I can keep an eye on him while modeling some good behavior. Part of it is asking myself ‘what would my family think of what I am currently doing?’ For me it means recognizing that anything is possible, relying upon my training and experience, recognizing that I don’t have all the answers, and doing what I must do as the situation unfolds.